Equitable Remedies

Worksheet 7 – Anton Piller Orders & Mareva Injunctions

Topic outline:

A. Anton Piller (search) orders

- Definition
- History
- Rules of Entry
- Basis of order and conditions for grant
- The form, execution and the scope of the order

B. Mareva (freezing) injunctions

- definition
- history
- raison d’être of the remedy
- conditions for the grant of a Mareva injunction
- guidelines for the grant of a Mareva injunction
- circumstances where the jurisdiction of the court is involved
- assets within the jurisdiction and assets outside the jurisdiction
- subject matter of a Mareva injunction : action in personam – operation in rem
- ownership of assets and third party rights
- position of the defendant

Learning Outcomes:

by the end of this topic, students should be able to:

1. illustrate the contribution of the define the Anton Piller order

2. outline the rules, principles and conditions applicable to the grant of an Anton
Piller order

3. discuss the form, execution and the scope of the Anton Piller order

4. delineate the features of a Mareva injunction

5. identify the subject matter of a Mareva injunction

6. recognise the circumstances where the jurisdiction of the court is involved with
respect to the remedy of a Mareva iinjunction – assets within the jurisdiction and
assets outside the jurisdiction!

7. illustrate the fact that the Mareva injunction is an action in personam, but operates
in rem!

DRE pg. 1
8. examine the issue of ownership of assets and third-party rights with respect to the
issuance of Mareva injunction

9. elucidate the position of the defendant pursuant to the institution of a Mareva

injunction against his/her assets;

10. explain and effectively deploy in both problem and essay question – by means of
case law, legislation and secondary sources – the core principles relating to the
remedies of Anton Piller orders and Mareva injunctions.

Required Readings:

- Glister & Lee. Hanbury and Martin on Modern Equity, 20th ed. (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2015), 825 – 856

AND

- Ben McFarlane and Charles Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell on the Law of
Trusts & Equitable Remedies: Text, Cases & Materials 14 ed. (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2015), pp. 820 – 847

Key cases: Anton Piller Orders

 E.M.I. Ltd v Pandit [1975] 1 All E.R. 418

 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55
 Rank Film Distributors v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380
 Colombia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson [1987] Ch 38
 Universal Thermosensors Ltd v Hibben [1992] 1 W.L.R. 840
 Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 1 WLR 1268
 Yousif v Salama [1980] 1 W.L.R 1540
 Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Karageorgis [1975] 1 WLR 1093

Key cases: Mareva Injunctions

 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bank Carriers SA the Mareva

[1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509
 The Siskina[1929]AC210
 Z Ltd v A–Z and AA – LL Ltd [1982] QB 558
 Rasu Maritima SA v Perusahaan etc. [1979] 3 WLR 518 CA
 Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] Ch 13
 American Cynamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396

DRE pg. 2
Recap on the basic features of injunctions:

Type Stage

Perpetual injunction Prohibitory or mandatory order made at the

conclusion of the trials that determine the rights of
the parties
Interlocutory Granted for a specific period of time before or
during the trial to protect asserted rights until the
merits can be determined

Types of injunction by stage awarded in the trial process

Type Purpose

Prohibitory Injunction Restrains the defendant from doing something

Mandatory injunction Enjoins the defendant to take a positive action

Quia Timet Prevents apprehended harm which has not yet

occurred
Injunction without notice An emergency application made in the absence of
the defendant

Types of injunctions by purpose

Type Purpose

Anton Piller (search order) A mandatory quia timet interlocutory injunction

Mareva (freezing) injunction
that allows the search of property to preserve
evidence before the trial
A prohibitory quia timet interlocutory injunction
that restrains a party from removing assets from
the jurisdiction before the judgement

Anton Piller (search) orders

Definition:

 an Anton Piller order is a court order which provides a party to litigation with
the right to enter and search premises and seize evidence without prior notice
to the defendant

 the order operates much like a search warrant and it is an exercise of the
court’s inherent jurisdiction to protect its process from being frustrated

 it is designed to secure that pending trial, the defendant does not dispose of
any articles in his possession which would be prejudicial to the trial

DRE pg. 3
  it is “an illustration of the adaptability of equitable remedies to new situations”

 it is particularly useful to the victims of commercial malpractice, such as

breach of confidence, breach of copyright and passing off
 it has also been used in the family context

 it is essential that such an order be available without notice, so that the

defendant is not forewarned

o if the stable door cannot be bolted, the horse must be secured ... if the
horse is liable to be spirited away, notice of an intention to secure the
horse will defeat the intention

see Rank Film Distributions Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] A.C.
380 at 418

History (Anton Piller search orders)

 the order derives its name from the case of Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing
Processes Ltd although the first reported order was granted in E.M.I. Ltd v
Pandit

o in E.M.I. Ltd v Pandit an order was made without notice in a breach of

copyright action to enable the plaintiff to enter the defendant’s premises to
inspect, photograph and remove infringing articles

o the jurisdiction to make such an order was confirmed in Anton Piller KG

v Manufacturing Processes Ltd

Key case: Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55

 the claimants were foreign manufacturers who owned the copyright in the
design of a high-frequency converter used to supply computers

 they learnt that the defendants – their English agents, were planning to supply
rival manufacturers with information belonging to the claimants which would
enable their rivals to produce a similar product

 the claimants wished to restrain the defendants from infringing the copyright,
using confidential information, or making copies of their machines, but they
were afraid that the defendants – if notified – would take steps to destroy the
documents, or would send them out of the jurisdiction, so that there would be
none in existence by the time the action reached the stage of discovery of
documents

 the claimants accordingly made an ex parte application for an order requiring

the claimants to enter the defendant’s premises in order to inspect, remove or
male copies of documents belonging to the claimants

DRE pg. 4
History of Anton Piller search orders continued:

 today, they are generally referred to as search orders in the UK, since they
were given statutory footing by s. 7 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1997, and are
governed also by the Civil Procedure Rules 1998

o however in the case law preceding these developments in UK they

are referred to as Anton Piller orders or injunctions

 the order has become increasingly important in protecting businesses from

disgruntled or departing employees as the order protects the employer’s
proprietary interest

 however, the Anton Piller order has been variously described as “a draconian
power which should only be used in very exceptional cases” and “ an
innovation which has proved its worth time and time again (Yousif v Salama
[1980] 1 W.L.R 1540 at 1544 per Donaldson LJ.)

o his Lordship, dissenting, regarded the order granted by the majority

as power to “take” disclosure

see
o Yousif v Salama [1980] 1 W.L.R 1540
o Rank Film Distributions Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] A.C. 380
o Columbia Picture Industries Inc. v Robinson [1987] Ch 38
o Universal Thermosensors Ltd v Hibben [1992] 1 W.L.R. 840
o Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 1 WLR 1268
o Tate Access Floors Inc. v Boswell [1991] Ch 512

Read: read
o Martin Dockray and Hugh Laddie, ‘Piller Problems’ (1990) 106 LQR 601

o Anne Staines, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Anton Piller Orders (1983)
46 (3) Modern Law Review, 274

Rules of entry

 unlike a search warrant, the order does not authorize the claimant to enter
against the defendant’s will

 rather it commands the defendant to permit entry to the claimant, so that, if

the defendant does not comply not only is (s)he in contempt of court, but
adverse inferences will be drawn against him/her at trial

 the claimant or claimant’s agents may not use force to effect entry in the face
of the defendant’s denial of permission

 once entry is permitted, it allows the plaintiff to

DRE pg. 5
 1. carry out the search and inspection of anything described in the
Order; and

2. make or obtain a copy, photograph, sample or other record of same. This

includes, where the material is stored on a computer making a printout and
where stored in a locked cabinet, the handing over of the keys

see
o Yousif v Salama [1980] 1 WLR 1540
o CBS UK Ltd v Lambert [1983] Ch 37
o Z Ltd v A–ZAA–LL Ltd [1982] QB 558

Basis for order & condition of the grant

 the premise of the Anton Piller order is that:

o the defendant is likely to frustrate the order if given notice of it in advance;

o there is a strong prima facie case that the defendant has conducted himself/
herself badly

o given the extraordinary and some may argue, its draconian nature, the order
will only be granted in exceptional or emergency cases

 in Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd (1976), Ormrod J laid down

3 conditions to the grant of the order:

o the claimant must have:

1. an extremely strong prima facie case

2. show actual or potential damage of a very serious nature
3. have clear evidence that the defendant has incriminating documents
or things and a real possibility of their application before an application
with notice can be made

 further guidelines were provided in CBS United Kingdom Ltd v Lambert (1983)
and Digital Equipment Corp v Darkcrest Ltd (1984)

 the order should not be sought as a “fishing expedition” – i.e. as a means of

finding out what charges can be made

see
o Emmanuel v Emmanuel [1982] 1 WLR 669
o Colombia Picture Industries Inc v Robinson [1987] Ch 38
o Lock International plc v Beswick [1989] 1 WLR 1268
o Yousif v Salama [1980] 1 WLR 1540

 in the enforcement of the order, the claimant must act with circumspection –
(s)he should be attended by his lawyer, and must undertake in damages

DRE pg. 6
 (giving security in appropriate cases), so as to safeguard the defendant’s
rights
 because of the draconian nature of the order, the applicant is under a strict
duty to make full and frank disclosure of all relevant matters to the court

 strict requirements have been developed to avoid oppression, e.g.

o the order must be executed in office hours so that legal advice is

available

o a female should be present at a search of a private house where a

woman may be alone

o a list of items must be prepared before they are removed, which the
defendant may check

 where the claimant or his/her lawyer have acted improperly, the court may set
aside the order

o even if it is not set aside, the defendant may be entitled to exemplary

damages

 even if it is not set aside, the defendant may be entitled to exemplary

damages

 an example of the abuse of the order is Lock International plc v Beswick

(1989), and commentators said that “an exceptional device intended to avoid
injustice has become almost a routine method of creating it”

The form and execution of the order:

 the application for the order is made in nearly every instance ex parte, usually
after the writ/claim form has been issued, but before it is served on the
defendant

 the application is heard in private or otherwise the purpose of the ex parte

procedure would be frustrated if the defendant were to learn informally of the
hearing

 in making the order, the plaintiff must give an undertaking as to damages and
provide proof of his ability to pay

 an undertaking by the plaintiff’s attorneys as to the safekeeping of the

documents seized must also be given

 the appointment of an attorney-at-law, independent from the firm acting for the
plaintiff and experienced in search orders, must be appointed at the plaintiff’s
expense

DRE pg. 7
  when effecting the order, the attorney must inform the defendant of his right to
seek legal advice and the effect of the order, for failure to do so is a contempt

The scope of the order

 the order should be no wider than is necessary to secure and preserve the
relevant evidence

 it is not to be used as a ‘fishing expedition’ by plaintiff seeking evidence on

which to found a subsequent action

 the order may be effected outside the jurisdiction, though this is rarely the
practice

 the order though originally applicable to intellectual property, now extends to

search and seizure of any evidential material relevant to the action or
proposed action

Mareva (freezing) injunctions:

Definition:

 a Mareva injunction is a quia timet interim order of the court which is

prohibitive in nature and made in personam but operating in rem without
creating rights in rem

 the effect of a Mareva injunction is to temporarily freezes assets which are

required to satisfy a judgment or expected judgment! to prevent their
dissipation within the jurisdiction or removal from the jurisdiction of the court,
but giving the claimant no security over the property frozen

 the Mareva injunction was described by Lord Denning M.R. as “the greatest
piece of judicial reform of my time” and a “rediscovery” of the procedure
known as foreign attachment

 in Bank Mellat v Nikpour (1985), Donaldson L.J described the Mareva

injunction along with the Anton Piller order, as “one of law’s two nuclear
weapons”

 a Mareva injunction is interlocutory, not final! it is ancillary to a substantive

pecuniary claim for debt or damages! it is designed to prevent the
judgement ... for the sum of money being a mere ‘brutum fulmen’, i.e. an
empty threat

History of Mareva Injunctions:

DRE pg. 8
  the increase in international trade, and the use of the flags of convenience in
the shipping world led to the development in equity of the freezing order
injunction

 the injunction was for many years known as a Mareva injunction, taking its
name from Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bank Carriers SA
the Mareva (1975), although the first reported exercise of this novel
jurisdiction occurred in Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Karageorgis (1975)

 it is now widely referred to in the United Kingdom as a freezing injunction

 before the Mareva case was brought, the law prevailing in England with
regard to how a defendant to a suit can deal with his/her money, was stated in
Lister & Co v Stubbs (1890)

o the law was that nothing empowered a person to obtain an injunction

which restrains another from dissipating his money or removing it out of
the jurisdiction of a court hearing a suit against him/her

Key case: Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bank Carriers SA (The

Mareva) [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509

 the claimants brought an action for injunction ex parte i.e. without notice to the
defendant, to prevent the defendants from removing from their banks in
London, moneys which the claimants hoped would satisfy a judgement
against the defendants

 the claim was in respect of unpaid hire and damages for repudiation of a
charter party

Raison d’etre of the remedy:

 the usual purpose of a freezing injunction is to prevent the dissipation or

removal of assets before trial, so that if the claimant succeeds in the action,
there will be property of the defendant available to satisfy the judgement

 it may also be granted after final judgement if the claimant can show grounds
for believing that the defendant will dispose of his assets to avoid execution,
and in such as case, may even be granted against the defendant’s wife

 in view of the advent of electronic banking, the significance of the injunction

will be readily appreciated

 its effectiveness is assisted by ancillary orders to enable the claimant to

obtain disclosure of documents and information as to assets and by the
availability of contempt proceedings against third parties

DRE pg. 9
  it is unlimited as to subject matter, and the nature of the proceedings but with
“great circumspection”

 it may be granted, although rarely in matrimonial cases

Conditions for the grant

 the Mareva is always interlocutory, and usually without notice – speed is of

the essence

see o Third Chandris Shipping Corp v Unimarine SA [1979] Q.B. 645

 as in the case of interlocutory injunctions, the claimant must satisfy the

conditions laid down by the House of Lords in American Cynamid Co v
Ethicon Ltd. (1975)

1. the claimant’s case must be not frivolous or vexatious

2. there must be a balance of convenience

o considerations include:

• the court’s ability to quantify likely damages

• the sufficiency of the claimant’s cross-undertaking in damages (if

the defendant is successful at trial

• the sufficiency of the defendant’s financial resources to compensate

the claimant (if the claimant is successful at trial)

• other special factors may be considered

3. if there is no imbalance, then the status quo is preserved

 the court must have jurisdiction over the underlying dispute

 there must be full and frank disclosure

 the claimant must give an undertaking in damages in case he should be

unsuccessful at the trial, and the defendant may apply within 7 days of service
of the order on him for it to be discharged

 the defendant may rely on the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid

compliance with the injunction or a disclosure order, unless he is adequately
protected by a term of the order preventing the use of it

Guidelines for the grant:

DRE pg. 10
  while the discretion of the court is not fettered by rigid rules, Lord Denning
M.R. suggested the following guidelines in the case Rasu Maritima SA v
Perusahaan etc. (1979)

o the claimant must have a good arguable case

o where the injunction applies to goods, caution is required to avoid
bringing the defendant’s business at a standstill

o the court should favour the grant if it would be likely to compel the
defendant to provide security

 while the discretion of the court is not fettered by rigid rules, Lord Denning
M.R. suggested the following guidelines in the case Rasu Maritima SA v
Perusahaan etc. (1979)

o the claimant must make full and frank disclosure of all material
matters

o (s)he should give particulars of his claim and its amount, and (in an
application without notice) (s)he should fairly state the points made
against the defendant

o (s)he must undertake in damages, giving security in suitable cases,

in case (s)he is unsuccessful in the action

 Lord Denning added that the claimant had to establish that there was the risk
of the removal of assets from the jurisdiction

o in the U.K. this requirement has been removed by means of s. 37(3)

of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 (U.K.) which provides that the
injunction may be granted to prevent the defendant from removing from
the jurisdiction “or otherwise dealing with” the assets

o thus the risk of dissipation within the jurisdiction (or in an extreme

case, damage or destruction) is sufficient

 exceptionally, the injunction may be made against all the defendant’s assets,
but usually a limit will be specified

 in rare cases it may be with respect to a joint account, but not the assets of
the defendant’s wife or another third party save in aid of enforcing a
judgement

 an order made in relation to “his assets” does not include those of which the
defendant is the legal owner, but which he holds on trust for a third party

Circumstances for the grant:

DRE pg. 11
  the House of Lords in The Siskina (1929) emphasised that the injunction has
to be ancilliary to the substantive relief which the High Court had jurisdiction to
grant, and there was no power to grant the injunction save in protection or
assertion of some legal or equitable right which the High Court had jurisdiction
to enforce the final judgement

 the principle in The Siskina has however been eroded by cases within s. 25 of
the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements Act, 1982 (U.K.), which was originally
confined to proceeding in countries which are parties to the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions, but was extended in 1997 to proceedings in countries
which are parties to neither Convention

 however, in cases where the court has no independent jurisdiction as to the

subject matter of the proceedings, it may refuse to grant the injunction on the
basis of inexpedience

 it has been held that a freezing injunction may not be granted unless the
cause of action has accrued, but the current view is that equity will “lend a
hand” in advance of the appropriate time at law to prevent injustice

 however, the claimant must have formulated a case for substantive relief
which (s)he intends to seek

 assets within the jurisdiction and assets outside the jurisdiction

o the Mareva evolved as a remedy against a foreign based defendant

having assets within the jurisdiction

o it is assumed in the earlier decisions that there was no power to grant

a Mareva injunction against an English-based defendant, although in
The Siskina (1929), the merit of such a distinction was questioned

o the difficulty in the way of extending the Mareva to English-based

defendants was the clear line of authority to the effect that there is

[n]o statutory or other power in the Court to restrain person from

dealing with his property at a time when no other order made against
him/her has been made

 the Mareva was originally confined to assets outside the jurisdiction, but is
now established that the injunction (and ancillary disclosure order) may be
granted against a defendant which is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court
in respect of assets outside the jurisdiction, even on a worldwide basis

o the objections to extending the injunction to foreign assets wee that

the order would be oppressive and unenforceable, and that the
territorial limitations were confirmed in s. 37(3) of the Supreme Court
Act 1981

DRE pg. 12
 o but the Court of Appeal held in Babanaft International Co SA v
Bassatne (1990) that s. 37(3) did not restrict the scope, geographical or
otherwise, of s. 37(1)

o the issue also arose in the Court of Appeal in Haiti (Republic of) v
Duvalier (1990) where the court granted a pre-judgement freezing
injunction in respect of worldwide assets, although recognizing that this
was a most unusual measure which should rarely be granted

 the Mareva was originally confined to assets outside the jurisdiction, but is
now established that the injunction (and ancillary disclosure order) may be
granted against a defendant which is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court
in respect of assets outside the jurisdiction, even on a worldwide basis

o while the court would be more willing in a post-judgement case, or

where the claimant has a tracing or other proprietary claim, the
injunction could be granted in respect of pre-judgement money claim,
such as the Duvalier case, where international cooperation was
demanded

o previous limitation arose from practice rather than from any

restrictions on the court’s power

 the Mareva was originally confined to assets outside the jurisdiction, but is
now established that the injunction (and ancillary disclosure order) may be
granted against a defendant which is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court
in respect of assets outside the jurisdiction, even on a worldwide basis

o the injunction was granted subject to the “Babanaft proviso” in

respect to foreign assets, to protect third parties outside the jurisdiction
save to the extent that the order might be enforced by the local court

o even stricter safeguards were required by the Court of Appeal in

Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (1990)

 the Mareva was originally confined to assets outside the jurisdiction, but is
now established that the injunction (and ancillary disclosure order) may be
granted against a defendant which is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court
in respect of assets outside the jurisdiction, even on a worldwide basis

o the court may make or grant a pre-judgment world-wide Mareva

Injunction provided:

- the defendant is amenable to the court’s jurisdiction over assets

located outside the jurisdiction

-the assets within the jurisdiction are insufficient to satisfy the

claimant’s claim

DRE pg. 13
 - there are foreign assets belonging to the defendant which are at risk
of disposal

-the defendant will not be oppressed by exposure to a multiplicity of

proceedings

 subject matter of a Mareva injunction: action in personam – operation in rem

o the usual subject matter in a Mareva injunction is a sum of money,

often in a bank account
o there is however no reason why other assets such as a ship or an
aeroplane should not be “frozen” by this method

o it is important to note however, that such an injunction, even if it is

related to a specified asset, operates only in personam

o it is not a form of pre-trial attachment

o it does not affect seizure of the asset, nor is it analogous to a lien – it

merely prohibits the defendant personally from removing or transferring
the asset

o it gives no proprietary right to the asset, nor priority over creditors

o it does not attach to assets of the defendants in excess of the

claimant’s claim

o the claimant’s right is merely to have the asset preserved so that, if

he succeeds in his/her action, judgement may be executed against it,
but the rights of a third party with an interest n the assets will not be
prejudiced

o the injunction may – initially or by variation – permit the assets to be

used for living expenses, or to make payments in good faith in the
ordinary course of business

o such a term does not protect the recipient of payments in a case

where the claimant establishes proprietary rights over the assets

 ownership of assets and third-party rights

o as far as the liabilities of a third party are concerned, a third party

who aids and abets in the breach of an injunction by the defendant is
guilty of contempt

see • Martin. Hanbury and Martin on Modern Equity, 18 ed., pp. 799–
800: para. 25 – 011

o if it does so, it may commit contempt, but the claimant has no action
against the bank in negligence

DRE pg. 14
 o it is clear that any expenses incurred by a bank or other third party in
complying with the injunction, must be met by the claimant

o furthermore, a bank can exercise any right of set-off it had before

notification of the injunction

o similarly, the injunction must not interfere with the convenience or

freedom of action of a third party
• in Galaxia Maritime SA v Mineral import export (1982) where a
Mareva injunction has been obtained as to a ship’s cargo the
shipowner obtained its discharge, as it would interfere with the crew’s
arrangements for Christmas

o an injunction will be refused if it interferes substantially with the rights

of a third party

o a third party who aids and abets the breach of an injunction is guilty
of contempt

o however, in granting the injunction:

• third party freedom of action must be protected

• expenses incurred by third party in complying with the injunction

must be met by the claimant

• though it creates no rights by way of a lien, a creditor is entitled to a

right of set-off even, if this reduces the defendant’s assets below the
‘maximum sum’

o only assets belonging to the defendant can be included in a

Mareva Injunction

o a third party who is prejudiced by the injunction may apply for its
discharge or variation. Where there is a dispute over ownership – that
the assets belong to a third party, the following are the guidelines
which the court adopts:

- where the assets on the face of it belong to a third party, the courts
should be slow to treat the assets as those of the defendant

- where the defendant asserts the assets belong to a third party, the
court should make its own inquiry, depending on the circumstances

o only assets belonging to the defendant can be included in a Mareva

Injunction. A third party who is prejudiced by the injunction may apply
for its discharge or variation. Where there is a dispute over ownership –
that the assets belong to a third party, the following are the guidelines
which the court adopts:

DRE pg. 15
 • the court will be guided by considerations of justice and convenience
in the above circumstances, in deciding whether to make further inquiry
as to ownership of the assets in question

• where the court decides to make further inquiry, it may order an issue
to be tried between the parties

Tutorial Questions

Bright Inc. produces videos and tapes of lectures and accompanying notes for the
purpose of teaching law to overseas students by distance learning. Ten (10)
members of staff are employed by Bright Inc. on a full-time basis. Nia Nymone, a
senior member of staff, and author of a leading textbook on energy law, is employed
on a five (5) year contract to develop new materials in her field. Nia’s contract
requires her not to work with any other firm of law tutors during the period of her
contract, and for one (1) year after the end of the contract. Nia is a member of the
National Union of Law Teachers (NULT).

Negotiations over conditions of service between Bright Inc. and its staff have broken
down. The following circumstances have occurred:

a) Nia, who has three (3) years left to run on her contract, writes a letter of
resignation to Bright Inc. She accepts an offer of employment with the tutorial
firm Law the Lazy Way – which is based in The Pyjamas but headquartered in
New Fork!

and

Negotiations over conditions of service between Bright Inc. and its staff have broken
down. The following circumstances have occurred:

b) All the materials that Nia had been working disappear from Bright Inc.’s office, and
the company fears that they may now be in the possession of Law the Lazy Way.
Bright Inc. has also discovered that its current students have received advertisement
material from Law the Lazy Way and believes that Nia took a list of clients with her.
Bright Inc. also believes that Law the Lazy Way has bank accounts in The Pyjamas
and New Fork, and that all monies received are transferred on a regular basis to the
New Fork account!

and

Negotiations over conditions of service between Bright Inc. and its staff have broken
down. The following circumstances have occurred:

c) after conducting a ballot in which the majority of staff members voted in support of
industrial action, NULT has called a strike on Bright Inc.’s premises as a result of the
breakdown in negotiations. Picketing is taking place on a regular basis.

DRE pg. 16
Advise Bright Inc. of any equitable remedies it may be able to obtain in the scenarios
outlined in (a), (b) and (c) above.

Taken from the May 2015 examination

Past Examination Questions

Consider the claim for an injunction in EACH of the following circumstances:

(a) by Andrew to prohibit the Mount Meviter Hall Football Club – one of the most
successful football teams in the country of Burbajos, from continuing to play football
on the largest football field in the country. Andrew moved to the area in 2002 and
owns the property adjacent to the field. On that property, her built his home on the
land and erected a 7-foot wall. However, he claims footballs are being kicked over
the wall onto his property with increasing frequency, posing danger to his property
and family. Members of the club maintain that the field has been used for playing
football matches since 1975, and that an injunction restraining its use would impact
negatively not only on the club, but the entire village community;
(12 marks)

Consider the claim for an injunction in EACH of the following circumstances:

(b) by Smart Inc. to search the premises of their rival Stupid Inc. who they suspect
have obtained the proprietary formula for their award-winning line of beauty
products!
(5 marks)

(c) by Candy Copse Development Co. for constructing 42 houses in violation of a

restrictive covenant touching and concerning the layout of the buildings.
(8 marks)

TOTAL: 25 marks
Taken from the May 2017 examination

DRE pg. 17