Saguisag vs Ochoa

FACTS:

EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within
certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. 85 Accordingly, in June
2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the U.S. Embassy exchanged
diplomatic notes confirming the completion of all necessary internal requirements for
the agreement to enter into force in the two countries. 86

According to the Philippine government, the conclusion of EDCA was the result of
intensive and comprehensive negotiations in the course of almost two years. 87 After
eight rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense and the U.S.
Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014. 88 President
Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014. 89 The OSG clarified during the oral
arguments90 that the Philippine and the U.S. governments had yet to agree formally on
the specific sites of the Agreed Locations mentioned in the agreement.

Two petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed assailing the constitutionality of EDCA.

They primarily argue that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred in by the
Senate, not an executive agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in

entering into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement and violates the constitution.

RULING:

The power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international
sphere inheres in the person of the President. This power, however, does not crystallize
into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief Executive so desires. As
previously mentioned, the Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international
agreements the President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members.

In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal

and necessary for Philippine defense interests. It is no coincidence that the
constitutional provision on the faithful execution clause was followed by that on the
President's commander-in-chief powers, 164 which are specifically granted during
extraordinary events of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this duty of
defending the country is unceasing, even in times when there is no state of lawlesss
violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such times, the President has full powers to ensure
the faithful execution of the laws.

It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the faithful-execution
clause of the Constitution to do nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing
the military's defensive capabilities, which could include forging alliances with states that
hold a common interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit against an
offending state.

The context drawn in the analysis above has been termed by Justice Arturo D. Brion's
Dissenting Opinion as the beginning of a "patent misconception." 165 His dissent argues
that this approach taken in analyzing the President's role as executor of the laws is
preceded by the duty to preserve and defend the Constitution, which was allegedly
overlooked.166

In arguing against the approach, however, the dissent grossly failed to appreciate the
nuances of the analysis, if read holistically and in context. The concept that the
President cannot function with crippled hands and therefore can disregard the need for
Senate concurrence in treaties167 was never expressed or implied. Rather, the
appropriate reading of the preceding analysis shows that the point being elucidated is
the reality that the President's duty to execute the laws and protect the Philippines is
inextricably interwoven with his foreign affairs powers, such that he must resolve issues
imbued with both concerns to the full extent of his powers, subject only to the limits
supplied by law. In other words, apart from an expressly mandated limit, or an implied
limit by virtue of incompatibility, the manner of execution by the President must be given
utmost deference. This approach is not different from that taken by the Court in
situations with fairly similar contexts.

Thus, the analysis portrayed by the dissent does not give the President authority to
bypass constitutional safeguards and limits. In fact, it specifies what these limitations
are, how these limitations are triggered, how these limitations function, and what can be
done within the sphere of constitutional duties and limitations of the President.

Justice Brion's dissent likewise misinterprets the analysis proffered when it claims that
the foreign relations power of the President should not be interpreted in isolation. 168 The
analysis itself demonstrates how the foreign affairs function, while mostly the
President's, is shared in several instances, namely in Section 2 of Article II on the
conduct of war; Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and
international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII on the judicial review
of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and international
agreements entered into prior to the Constitution and on the presence of foreign military
troops, bases, or facilities.

In fact, the analysis devotes a whole subheading to the relationship between the two
major presidential functions and the role of the Senate in it.
This approach of giving utmost deference to presidential initiatives in respect of foreign
affairs is not novel to the Court. The President's act of treating EDCA as an executive
agreement is not the principal power being analyzed as the Dissenting Opinion seems
to suggest. Rather, the preliminary analysis is in reference to the expansive power of
foreign affairs. We have long treated this power as something the Courts must not
unduly restrict. As we stated recently in Vinuya v. Romulo: