Digest - LEGMED

LEGAL MEDICINE Case Digests
Outline by Dr. Joel Macalino
LEGAL MEDICINE SYLLABUS

First Semester 2017-2018
Atty. Joel U. Macalino, MD, FPCS, FACS
I. Introduction to Legal Medicine (General Considerations)

II. Deception and Detection/ Paternity and Filiation
A. Auxillo Jr. vs. NLRC, Baguio Country Club, GR 82189, August 2, 1990
B. People vs. Intino, GR L-69934, September 26, 1988
C. People vs. Adoviso, GR 116196, June 23, 1999
D. De Jesus et al. vs. Syquia, GR 39110, November 28, 1933
E. Agustin vs. CA, Prollamante, GR 162571, June 15, 2005
F. Herrera vs Alba, GR 48220, June 15, 2006
G. Jenie San Juan-dela Cruz vs. Registrar of Antipolo, GR 177728, July 31, 2009
H. Co Tao vs. CA
I. Jao vs. CA
III. Wounds and Physical Injuries
A. Medico-legal aspects of Physical Injuries
B. GSW and Wound Ballistics
C. Knife Wounds
D. Vehicular Crash (RA 4136, The Land Transportation and Traffic Code and Driving Under the Influence
Law RA 10658)
IV. Death and (Birth)
A. Medico-legal Aspects
B. Identification of the Dead
C. Birth, Abortion and Infanticide
1. Roe vs. Wade
2. Grisworld vs. Connecticut
D. Special Deaths/Asphyxia/Disposal of the Dead
E. Death By Hazing
1. RA 8049, Anti-Hazing Law
2. Villareal vs. People, ―The Lenny Villa Case‖ GR 151258, February 2012
V. Rape and Crimes against Chastity
A. People vs. Conde, January 31, 1996
B. People vs. Esteban, Victor, July 9, 1998
C. People vs. Jalosjos, GR 132875, November 16, 2001
D. People vs. Campuhan, March 30, 2000
E. People vs. Orita, GR 88724, April 3, 1990
VI. The Practice of Medicine in the Philippines; For Lawyers
A. Medical Act of 1959 and The PMA Code of Ethics
B. Physician -Patient Relationship
C. Rights and Obligations of Patients and Doctors
VII. Medical Malpractice Doctrines, Jurisprudence and Statutes
A. Ramos vs. CA, GR 124354, April 2002
B. PSI vs. Agana, GR 126277, January 21, 2007
C. Nogales vs. Capitol Medical Center, GR 142625, December, 2006
D. Ninivetch Cruz vs. CA, GR 122445, November 1997
E. Rubi Li vs. Soliman, GR 165278, June 2011
F. RA 9262 Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children
G. RA 7610, Special Protection of Children
H. EO 212, July 10, 1987
VIII. Special Topics in Legal Medicine
A. DNA
1. AM # 06-11-5 SC
2. People vs. Yatar, GR 150224, May 19, 2004
3. People vs. Vallejo, GR 144656, May 9, 2002
B. Informed Consent, DNR (Do not resuscitate), End of Life Issues, etc
IX. Follow-up Lectures/Review of the Whole Course
4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.
Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay,
San Beda College of Law Manila Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren, Frando, Intal, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday, Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro,
Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Peñaflor, Roque, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
PORFIRIO AUXILIO, JR. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BAGUIO COUNTRY
CLUB CORPORATION and LOLITA GENOVE
G.R. No. 82189 | August 2, 1990
DOCTRINE:
The following circumstances showed indications of deception in this case: (1) the results of the
Polygraph examination revealed that petitioner could not fully explain his answers to vital questions
relative to the missing money; (2) when he was again invited for further investigation, he refused to attend
and said that he was not feeling well when he was under the polygraph examination; (3) petitioner offered
no satisfactory explanation for the adverse result of the polygraph test conducted on him; and (4) all the
other employees subjected to the same examination satisfactory explained that they did not steal the
money.
FACTS:
On January 17, 1982, the amount of ₱15,000.00, which had been placed in the cashier's office of the
Baguio Country Club, was found to be missing. The Baguio City Police Department (INP) forthwith
conducted a spot investigation. All employees of the Country Club who had access to the cashier's office,
including the petitioner Porfirio Auxilio, Jr, were invited for questioning. All of them denied having stolen
the money. They were then subjected to a Polygraph examination conducted by the NBI.
The petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for the usual 30-day period due to his possible
involvement in the theft, pending final result of the investigation. The results of the Polygraph Examination
revealed that petitioner could not fully explain his answers to vital questions relative to the missing
money. He was again invited to the Police Headquarters for further investigation but he refused to attend
and said that he was not feeling well when he was under the polygraph examination. In the polygraph
report on the petitioner, it was declared that petitioner offered no satisfactory explanation for the adverse
result of the polygraph test conducted on him. All the other employees subjected to the same examination
showed no indications of deception as they explained their side satisfactorily that they did not steal the
money.
Thus, in a Memorandum issued by the Baguio Country Club Corporation, petitioner was terminated for
"loss of trust and confidence" and for "giving false statement during official investigation."
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter alleging that he was
dismissed on mere suspicion that he stole the money. The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of
petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC, set aside the Labor Arbiters decision and entered another dismissing
petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s dismissal from employment was legal.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal was without basis as his complicity in the theft of the P15,000
was solely based on suspicions and on the polygraph test conducted on his person.
The job of petitioner is of such nature as to require a substantial amount of trust and confidence on the
part of the employer. He may thus be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. It was
established that petitioner had ready access to the cashier's office. The investigations and inquiries
conducted were made on all the employees who had access to the cashier's drawer and not on the
petitioner alone. However, his erratic reaction to the investigator's questioning narrowed down the list of
suspects to him alone. We agree with the public respondent that petitioner's continued absence from his
residence and unexplained disappearance despite several notices for further police investigation implied
flight associated with guilt. The requirement that there be some basis or reasonable ground to believe that
the employee is responsible for the misconduct is sufficiently met in the case at bar.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIANITO INTINO
G.R. No. L-69934 | September 26, 1988
DOCTRINE:
The testimony of Norma Calipayan that the assailant approached the victim from behind is
strengthened by the victim’s medical certificate which was never disputed by the parties and Exh. E-3
which is a sketch demonstrating the seating arrangement or the positions of those persons present in the
house of the Calipayans that fateful night.
FACTS:
Appellant Marianito Intino alias "Marian" was charged before the lower court with the crime of Murder of
one Bienvenido Caluser. The appellant Marianito Intino is a farmer who had been hired as a coconut
picker by the victim Bienvinido Caluser. One day, appellant and the victim went to the house of the latter's
girlfriend, Norma Calipayan. Marianito Intino seated himself at the porch approximately four meters away
from the dining table. After eating, Norma was left with Bienvenido at the dining table. While they were
conversing, Norma saw Marianito suddenly rise from his seat, then approach Bienvenido from behind him
since Bienvenido was seated with his back facing the door leading to the porch. Norma was seated on
another bench at the right side of Bienvenido, sideways to the door leading to the porch so that she was
able to see the action of Marianito. After hearing Bienvenido say "I am wounded" in the vernacular,
Norma stood up as Bienvenido held on to her. As Bienvenido tried to glance at his assailant, appellant
again stabbed him with his bolo which prompted witness Norma to utter "Marian husto na." They placed
Bienvenido Caluser on a hammock and boarded him on a baby bus enroute to the Daniel Z. Romualdez
Memorial Hospital in Tacloban City, where he died about midnight of that same day.
Appellant denied that he stabbed and killed the victim. He identified the assailant as Benedicto Relente or
"Pare Benny" (of the victim). According to the testimonies of Segundina C. Delda, sister of the victim, and
Alejo D. Ripalda, the victim made a dying declaration to Segundina while inside the baby bus, that his
attacker was "Pare Benny" referring to Benedicto Relente of Villa Magsaysay.
The trial court found appellant guilty. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the accused is credible.
RULING:
No. There is no witness aside from the appellant who can testify that "Pare Benny" or Benedicto Relente
mentioned in the dying statement of the victim, actually stabbed the victim. But as against appellant
Marianito Intino both Norma Calipayan and her mother Rosario positively saw appellant stab the victim
after the first blow and all the attending circumstances point to him as the one who killed the deceased. It
is true that appellant pointed to Benny Relente as the one who allegedly stabbed the victim, as shown in
his testimony in court.
However, from the testimony of the accused, the logical conclusion is that the assailant Benny was facing
the victim as he delivered the stabbing blow in the abdomen of the victim, as the witness would want the
court to believe. However, this is belied by the medical certificate issued by the attending physician, Dr.
Sherlito T. Siao and confirmed by Dr. Alden Tabao who testified on this in court that the fatal wound (that
is, the one inflicted in the abdomen) was described as:
Operative Findings: Wound stab, thru and this wouid of entrance right posterior lumbar, wound of
exit epigastric, penetrating perforating Kidney Right #1, Liver #1, Transverse Colon #2, Misocolon,
Severe hemorrhage. (see also Exh. "B." A sketch of a human body showing the entrance and exist
of the fatal wounds of tile victim, p. 142, Records)
The testimony of Norma Calipayan that the assailant approached the victim from behind is strengthened
by the victim's medical certificate which was never disputed by the parties and which is a sketch
demonstrating the seating arrangement or the positions of those persons present in the house of the
Calipayans that fateful night.
As already shown earlier, Bienvenido Caluser was not in a position to identify his assailant as he was
stabbed from behind and when he, already wounded, bloodied and weak from his wounds, took a look at
his assailant, Bienvenido Caluser was again stabbed several times by the appellant giving him no
opportunity to fully identify his attacker. Maybe because of the fact that Bienvenido Caluser and Marianito
Intino had no quarrel or misunderstanding in the past the former never thought of the latter as his
attacker, thus he uttered someone else's name who was their drinking guest earlier as his attacker.
The appeal is meritless. Intino is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO ADOVISO
G.R. No. 116196-97 | June 23, 1999
DOCTRINE:
American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the
purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the
prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific
acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in
this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, stating that much faith and credit should not be vested upon a
lie detector test as it is not conclusive.
FACTS:
At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as his
wife was about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in
the papag. Anastacia had just finished spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four
gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that he had been shot. Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed, Why
should you not be hit when in fact there are guns in front of you. Anastacia saw the protruding edge of the
gun on the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank
coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed to recognize the persons who fired their guns at her
husband.
The Vasquez son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the gunshots. Earlier that
evening, Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still
talking when he noticed that Rufino had fallen asleep, the latters back against the bamboo wall. Bonifacio
left Rufino snoring in the papag and went to the other house. Only a minute had passed after he had
gone up when Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He and his 16-year-old son Elmer immediately went down
the front yard to investigate.
Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut tree. From a distance of eight
(8) meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig, being shot by several persons from the
outside. Looking through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall, Bonifacio recognized one of the
assailants, with a large built and long hair, as appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was
lighted inside the camalig. Of Rufinos assailants, only appellant was not wearing a mask. Appellant was
holding a long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed where Rufino was
sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard his father Emeterio shout
Pino, (referring to his grandson Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs carrying a gas
lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach.
For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father Bonifacio, saw five (5) persons
aiming their firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant, each of these persons had a cover over their
faces. Three (3) of them were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while two (2) others were near its
door. Elmer saw these five (5) persons shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down on
the papag. Although his back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the papag. Elmers grandfather was
also hit on the stomach but he managed to go up the camalig. When appellant and his companion by
the camalig door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three others at the ditch, escaped to the
banana plantation. Elmer, on the other hand, fled towards the coconut plantation.
Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He also found
Rufino at the foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on his side with his body curled. Rufino told Elmer
that he had been hit and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took Elmers hand and put it on
his back.Elmer then moved Rufino sidewise. Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer carried his grandfather
and bandaged his stomach with diapers.
In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the police. Inspector
Antonio Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned to the scene of the crime with him. The
police brought Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol Regional
Hospital. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning.
Defense: On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis of mere
conjectures and speculations, appellant argues that the negative result of the polygraph test should be
given weight to tilt the scales of justice in his favor.
ISSUE: WON the results of the polygraph test are credible and should be used in favor of the accused?
RULING:
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records

certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an
examinees conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector
test is that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in
breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the
results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence
of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason
that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v.
Daniel, stating that much faith and credit should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not
conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to him.
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, et. al. vs. CESAR SYQUIA
G.R. No. 39110 | November 28, 1933
FACTS:
This is a case filed by Antonia Loanco De Jesus against Cesar Syquia to compel him to recognize Ismael
and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia and pay for the maintenance of the three.
Antonia, a likely unmarried girl 20 year of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s
brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a
prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop where he got
acquainted with Antonia and had an amorous relationship with her. As a consequence, Antonia got
pregnant and a baby boy was born.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. He even wrote a letter to a
padre stating that ―The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.‖ Though
he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letter to Antonia reminding her to eat on time. The
defendant even asked his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and made hospital arrangements.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a house in Camarines Street, Manila
where they live together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant
suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at that time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr.
that was first planned.
ISSUE: WON the note to the padre, in connection with the letters written by defendant to the mother
during pregnancy, proves acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of Article 135
of the Civil Code.
RULING:
Yes. Recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one document,
supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the
case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the padre and the other letters suffice
to connect that admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no
requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely
required that the writing shall be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the
continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough (1
year before abandonment) to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that
he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is unimportant. The word
"continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean that the concession of status
shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
ARNEL AGUSTIN v COURT OF APPEALS and MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE
G.R. No. 162571 | June 15, 2005
DOCTRINE:
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA Test for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has 2 copies, one copy from the mother and
the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father for
support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court. In their complaint, respondents alleged
that the baby’s birth certificate was purpotedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-
natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his
adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also
denied having fathered the child.
Respondents, then, moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking
his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He also moved for a dismissal for lack of cause of action,
considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate
child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of
the results thereof as evidence. The kernel of the right against self-incrimination is not against all
compulsion. It does not apply whee the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part
of object evidence. Nor does it violate petitioner’s right to privacy. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose
very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case,
petitioner herein does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider inter alia, the following factors:
1. how the samples were collected;
2. how they were handled;
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
5. whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test.
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who chose to deny their existence.
The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such
ostracized and abandoned progeny. It held that the Court has long believed in the merits of DNA testing
and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. The Court took this opportunity to forcefully reiterate
its stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
ROSENDO HERRERA vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and
HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila
G.R. No. 148220 | June 15, 2005
DOCTRINES:
1. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is a refutable presumption of paternity. This
refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
2. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence
taken from his body when it may be material (i.e. DNA testing).
FACTS:
In 1998, then 13y/o respondent Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner Rosendo Herrera. Petitioner Herrera in
his answer denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Alba filed a motion to direct the taking of
DNA paternity testing. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. who asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Herrera opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability; he further
argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination. RTC ordered parties to
undergo DNA testing. CA affirmed the ruling of RTC. Hence present petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation;
2. Whether it violates Herrera’s right against self-incrimination.
RULING:
1. Yes. Although in 1997, the SC has held in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA being a new science has not yet
been accorded official recognition by our courts, the Court in the 2002 case of People vs. Vallejo
accepted the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence (read Vallejo for guidelines in assessing
probative value of DNA).
Further, in DNA analysis, it is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the
putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the
putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. For this reason, following the highest
standard adopted in an American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a minimum
value of the Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity inclusion. DNA analysis that excludes the exclusive
putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less
than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the inconclusive
value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable
presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards. inclusive
2. No, It will not violate Herrera’s right against self-incrimination because there is no testimonial
compulsion involve in getting DNA sample. As has been held by the Court in People vs. Olvis: The
right against self-incrimination…applies only to evidence that is communicative in essence taken
under duress. It is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his
body when it may be material.
JEANIE SAN JUAN-DELA CRUZ vs. REGISTRAR OF ANTIPOLO
GR No. 177728 | July 31, 2009
DOCTRINES:
1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
FACTS:
Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominiques
parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, Jenie, who continued to live with
Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the
Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the
City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth
Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter
alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and
that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting claiming that his
wife Jeanie, is pregnant.
The Registrar of Antipolo however denied the application to register the child’s surname as that of the
father arguing that the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was born out of wedlock
and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity
to the child.
Jenie and the child filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City arguing that the denial of registration of the child’s name is a
violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code.
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an admission of paternity in
a private handwritten instrument within the contemplation of the provision of law.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action as the Autobiography was unsigned,
citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines private handwritten
document through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child.
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same
does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned statement of Dominique can be considered as a recognition of paternity
within the contemplation of Art. 176 of the Family Code
RULING:
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child’s paternity.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must,
however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition
by the father must bear his signature.
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly expand the import of Article 176 as claimed
by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography,
though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth.
Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique,

correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered
Third, Jennie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father

Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be
affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating
Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ
is MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT
WE LIVE TOGETHER.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography
have been made and written by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that
Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several months
in 2005 at his parents house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when
Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the
child they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting
the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as thesurname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his
Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births.
CO TAO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and LUCITA VALLEJO, for herself and as a mother and
natural guardian of MANUEL CO
G.R. No. L-9194 April 25, 1957
DOCTRINE:
La conclusion, por tanto, del Juzgados es que cuando el demandado Co Tao se unio
maritalmente con Lucita Vallejo, esta era una joven soltera y doncella, y, como fruto de aquellas
relaciones, nacio un niño que fue bautizado con el nombre de Manuel Co, que es hijo ilegitimo
de Co Tao, por estar este casado con otra mujer, cuando aquel fue concebido por su madre.
(NB: GOOGLE TRANSLATE: The conclusion, therefore, of the Courts is that when the defendant Co Tao
married martially with Lucita Vallejo, this was a young maiden and maiden, and, as a result of those
relations, a boy was born who was baptized with the name of Manuel Co , Who is illegitimate son of Co
Tao, to be married to another woman, when he was conceived by his mother.)
FACTS:
It appears that plaintiff Lucita Vallejo, a young girl of 18, entered the services, as maid and laundress of
one Co Bun Kim. There lived also defendant Co Tao alias Jose Co, a cousin and trusted employee of Co
Bun Kim in a store and Chinese pharmacy under the same house. Defendant Co Tao courted Lucita
Vallejo and promised to marry her. And believing that he was single, Lucita accepted him and in no time
they were having carnal relations in the said house almost every day, as must be expected, she became
pregnant and bore a child name Manuel Co.
BLOOD/DNA TEST
Upon the petition of the defendant, the trial court ordered NBI to test the blood of the defendant Co Tao
and the child Manuel Co, in order to determine whether the former could be the father of the latter. The
NBI expert rendered a report of the analysis made, with the following findings: "From their blood groups
and types, the defendant, Co Tao, is a possible father of the child"
In upholding the cause for the plaintiff-appellee, the trial court declared that the minor Manuel Co is the
illegitimate child of the defendant Co Tao, and gave much weight to the testimony of Jose K. Obando
Chemist of the NBI and awarded the damages and attorney's fees mentioned heretofore.
ISSUE: WON the findings of the NBI that "From their blood groups and types, the defendant, Co Tao, is a
possible father of the child" is sufficient to prove paternity
RULING:
Yes. In upholding the cause for the plaintiff-appellee, the trial court declared that the minor Manuel Co is
the illegitimate child of the defendant Co Tao, and gave much weight to the testimony of Jose K. Obando
Chemist of the NBI and awarded the damages and attorney's fees mentioned heretofore. After a careful
survey of the evidence of record, we hold that the judgment appealed from should be sustained. As far as
credibility of the witnesses is concerned, we find no reason at all for disturbing the findings of the trial
court to the effect that the testimony of the plaintiff-appellee and her witnesses deserves more credence
than that of the defendant-appellant.
JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE S. SALGADO,
petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO
No. L-49162 | July 28, 1987
DOCTRINE:
The analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, can establish conclusively
that the man is not the father of the child. But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the father of
a particular child, but at least can show only a possibility that he is.
FACTS:
On October 28, 1968, Janice filed a case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court against Perico Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping
test which was in due course conducted by the NBI upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood
grouping test indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico and Arlene. The
trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon Janice’s second MR, it ordered
the trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly
support. The CA, upon appeal, reversed the trial court’s decision and held that although the findings of
such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the
alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child,
the Uniform Act recognizes that the tests may have some probative value to establish paternity where the
blood type and the combination in the child is shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given
discretion to let it in.
ISSUE: WON the result of the blood grouping tests are admissible and conclusive to prove non-paternity
RULING:
Yes. SC affirmed the CA decision. Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping
tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their conclusions. For the past three
decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal
procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as
to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is
a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by
such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the
mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the
alleged father.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man which can be transmitted
through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not
indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will
indicate the impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the
alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be father and child by consanguinity.
JANE ROE vs. WADE
410 U.S. 113 | January 22, 1973
FACTS:
A pregnant single woman, Jane Roe, brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas
criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for
the purpose of saving the mother's life. A licensed physician (Hallford), who had two state abortion
prosecutions pending against him, was permitted to intervene. A childless married couple (the Does), the
wife not being pregnant, separately attacked the laws, basing alleged injury on the future possibilities of
contraceptive failure, pregnancy, unpreparedness for parenthood, and impairment of the wife's health. A
three-judge District Court, which consolidated the actions, held that Roe and Hallford, and members of
their classes, had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies. Ruling that declaratory, though
not injunctive, relief was warranted, the court declared the abortion statutes void as vague and
overbroadly infringing those plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled the Does'
complaint not justiciable. Appellants directly appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and appellee
cross-appealed from the District Court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford.
ISSUE: WON the Texas criminal abortion laws which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion
except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life are unconstitutional.
RULING:
Yes. State criminal abortion laws, like those involved here, that except from criminality only a life-saving
procedure on the mother's behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests
involved violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state
action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Though the
State cannot override that right, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman's health
and the potentiality of human life, each of which interests grows and reaches a "compelling" point at
various stages of the woman's approach to term.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its
effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its
interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that
are reasonably related to maternal health.
GRISWOLD vs. CONNECTICUT
381 U.S. 479 (1965)
DOCTRINE:
The Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy which is
within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
FACTS:
Appellant Griswold is Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut. Appellant
Buxton is a licensed physician and a professor at the Yale Medical School who served as Medical
Director for the League at its Center in New Haven. They gave information, instruction, and medical
advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception. They examined the wife and
prescribed the best contraceptive device or material for her use.
A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent
conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute, as applied, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.
ISSUE: WON the Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right of marital
privacy.
RULING: Yes. The Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right of marital
privacy which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of
contraceptives, rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means
having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the
familiar principle, so often applied by this Court, that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion, which
although not expressly included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees
meaningful.. Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship.
The association of marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the State’s effort to
control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected
Constitutional freedoms.
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 151258 | December 1, 2014
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner.
Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on
what to expect during the initiation rites. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the
Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with
their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter
were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the
Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the
neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present comic plays
and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and
psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the
first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain
and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He
had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and
the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started
helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellants should be liable under the Anti-Hazing Law
RULING:
No, The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the exception of
Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or
intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two
accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on
him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by
ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space had been stolen by the
victims father. As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido
Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareals brother
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were
baseless, since the statements of the accused were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to
instill fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and
accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites.
We agree with the Solicitor General.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu and
contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez.
At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order
to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity
members shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo,
Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that effect. While beating the
neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed
Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General,
these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation
employed by the Aquila Fraternity.
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was through hurling
make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving
the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the
neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up
Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of
the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
PEOPLE vs. RIZALDY CONDE Y CORTEZ
G.R. No. 112034 | January 31, 1996
FACTS:
PROSECUTION:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 31, 1990, Patricia Jaramillo, a 38 year old housewife
was sleeping on a bed at the ground floor of her house located at 129 San Diego St., 11th Avenue,
Caloocan City. As she was sleeping, Patricia Jaramillo felt something hard penetrating her private organ.
She suddenly woke up and found a man on top of her. She shouted at the man, "Sino ka?" The man
whom she recognized but never saw before this incident, stood up and hurriedly put on his shorts and
tried to flee from the house. Patricia then put on her panty, which she wore when she slept the night
before and which panty she found beside her on the bed, in order to run after the man. Just as the man
was leaving the house by the front door, he was met by Marilyn Opeña, the sister of Patricia, the two
daughters of Patricia named Shirley and Eufemia Jaramillo and Sherwin Baje, a male friend of Shirley
and Eufemia. The accused, in going out of the door managed to touch the thigh of Shirley. At this point,
Sherwin Baje confronted the man and the two fought each other. Shirley, Eufemia and Marilyn shouted
for help. Several neighbors responded and assisted in apprehending the man who identified himself as
Rizaldy Conde. The neighbors as well as her two daughters and Sherwin Baje brought the accused to the
house of Barangay Councilman Ben Silverio who was living nearby. Later on, Councilman Silverio
brought the accused to the Police Station accompanied by Patricia and her two daughters as well as
Sherwin Baje. On their way to the Police Station, the accused threatened to rape Patricia again and the
latter's two daughter; once he was released.
The testimony of the private complainant was corroborated by her daughter, Shirley Jaramillo.
Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) who
physically examined the private complainant, made the following findings and conclusions:
GENITAL EXAMINATION: Pubic hair, fully grown, abundant. Labia majora and labia minora, both gaping.
Fourchette, lax. Vestibule, pinkish. Hymen, reduced to carunculae myrtiformis. Vaginal orifice, admits a
tube, 3.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls, lax. Rugosities, obliterated.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination.
2. Vaginal orifice wide (3.5 cm. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized, adult
male organ in full erection without producing new hymenal injury.
He further testified that it is possible for a woman to be raped while asleep and that if she has
experienced childbirth several times, she may be raped even without being awakened.
DEFENSE:
Defendant, lone witness, denied the charge of rape. He claimed that the night before the incident in
question he had a drinking session with his brother and cousin at his home at Fourth Avenue, Kalookan
City. He became too drunk that his brother had to hail a passenger jeepney for him to report to his
employer, Major Edilberto Santos, Chief of the Kalookan City Police Station. During the ride, he lost
consciousness and could no longer recall what transpired thereafter. He only regained consciousness
when he was being mauled by several persons in front of the house of the private complainant. The latter
accosted and asked him what he was doing in front of her house. He apologized, but instead the private
complainant struck a lighted cigarette on his face. He was eventually brought to the police station. There,
he learned that he was being accused of raping the private complainant. He then requested that he be
allowed to seek the help of his employer but to no avail. The appellant admitted that he had no idea why
the private complainant whom he never met before would contrive the charge of rape. He surmised that
his close association with his employer could be the source of envy of the investigating officer, P/Cpl.
Alberto David, who happened to be a neighbor of the private complainant.
Trial on the merits ensued after the appellant entered a plea of innocence upon his arraignment.
The RTC rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and
sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment penalty of reclusion perpetua, with costs.
On appeal, appellant argues:

1. The Medico-legal findings negate rape in that nothing therein shows that there were manifestations of
recent sexual intercourse or any indication that the private complainant suffered extragenital physical
injuries
2. Considering that she has been separated from her husband since 1985 and, according to her, she
never had any sexual intercourse with any man thereafter, it was improbable for her not to have been
awakened when the appellant was on top of her or not to have sustained any injury after having
fought and pushed the appellant while the latter's organ was in her private organ.
3. If indeed she was waiting for the arrival of her children, then she could not have been in deep sleep
as she so alleged.
4. The testimonies in court and the sworn statements of the private complainant and her daughter
Shirley were inconsistent; and
5. The testimony of the Jaramillos that while they were on their way to the police station he threatened
to kill and rape the private complainant and her daughter is incredible because after he was mauled, it
would be "preposterous and highly contrary to human behavior and experience" that he "would still
have the guts to threaten private complainant and her family."
ISSUE: WON medico-legal findings negate the alleged rape
RULING:
NO. The rape was consummated even before the private complainant was awakened. According to her,
she was awakened at the time when something hard - the appellant's penis - had penetrated her private
organ. The entry or penetration was thus accomplished while she was still asleep. She may be
considered to be unconscious then, for sleep is the "natural usu. regular suspension of consciousness
during which the powers of the body are restored," or "a natural or artificially induced state of suspension
of sensory and motor activity." Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman who is, inter alia, unconscious.
This Court has held that carnal knowledge with a woman who is asleep constitutes rape.
Neither is there any merit in his view that since the private complainant has had no sexual contact since
1985 it was unlikely that she would not suffer any injury in her private parts or any other part of her body.
The absence of genital injury was satisfactorily explained by the medico-legal officer.
The private complainant had already given birth to three children, and her hymenal opening is quite wide;
thus, no new injury on her hymen could be caused by rape. The absence of any injury can also be
explained by the fact that he did not retaliate when the private complainant pushed him upon waking up.
The evidence disclose that when he was pushed by her he just stood up, hurriedly put on his shorts, and
tried to flee. He did not put up a fight.
Nor are we persuaded by the appellant's claim of inconsistencies between the testimonies and the sworn
statements or affidavits of the private complainant and her daughter Shirley. The claim is based on the
erroneous theory that whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court facts which he failed to state
in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists between the testimony and the
affidavit. There can be an inconsistency if what the witness has disclosed in his affidavit is contrary to that
he disclosed in his testimony in court, but not when what he has stated in open court are but details or
additional facts not mentioned in the affidavit. Being taken ex-parte, affidavits are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of suggestions and
inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral
circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate
recollection of all that belongs to the subject. Their infirmity as a species of evidence is a matter of judicial
experience. They are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.
Besides, the witnesses were never confronted by the defense counsel on the alleged inconsistencies.
Finally, even assuming that what the appellant had pointed out are indeed inconsistencies, they are on
trivial or minor matters. It is settled that such inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the
prosecution's evidence as a whole or detract from the witnesses' testimony; on the contrary, they even
tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase the
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
The appellant's attack on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses regarding the threat he made while
on their way to the police station is entirely irrelevant. In any event, his justification why he could not have
made such threat fails to persuade.
The absence of any improper motive on the part of the private complainant is further shown by other
circumstances in this case. She did not know the appellant before the incident. After she woke up and
came to know of the sexual assault, she immediately pushed the appellant and tried to run after him. She
then reported the incident to the police authorities; executed a sworn statement; submitted herself to
physical examination by a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI; and subscribed and swore to a complaint for
rape, which would necessarily result in her exposure to the ordeal of a public trial. The spontaneity of
these acts clearly demonstrate her sincere desire to bring the appellant to justice.
The appellant's defense of denial, which is inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive
testimony of the private complainant. RTC judgment is thus affirmed.
PEOPLE vs. ESTEBAN VICTOR Y PENIS
G.R. No. 127903 | July 9, 1998
DOCTRINES:
(1) Inconsistency between the victim’s testimony at the trial and her declaration before the DSWD did not
destroy her credibility.
(2) Strictly speaking, appellant was not the victim's stepfather. However, this did not, in principle,
completely divest him of some degree of moral ascendancy over her. The trial court had justified the
death sentence pursuant to the amendment introduced by RA No. 7659 to Article 335 of the RPC, which
provided: the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances, inter alia:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
FACTS: Complainant Raquel Villanueva was the daughter of the common-law wife of the appellant.
Sometime in June 1996, when Raquel was 15yo, appellant entered her room, poked a "balisong" at her,
and ordered her to take off her clothes and lie on the floor. Thereafter, appellant took off his clothes,
placed himself on top of complainant, inserted his penis into her genitalia, and proceeded to make the
pumping motions of the sexual act. After that, appellant continued to take indecent liberties, sometimes
by touching her. She later told her employer about it and reported the same to the police.
She was referred to PNP Crime Laboratory Services in QC. Dr. Rosalyn O. Cosidon, medicolegal
officer, later testified and told the trial court that the victim was no longer a virgin. Dr. Cosidon
attested that in her examination, she found a shallow, healed hymenal laceration at 2 o'clock and
two deep, heated lacerations at 5 and 9 o'clock in the victim's genitalia.
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the accusations made against him and claimed that he treated he as
his stepdaughter and that, possibly, the case was filed against him as a sort of reprisal for scolding her.
RTC: Rape.
Appellant then argued that there was an inconsistency between her testimony at the trial and her
declaration before the DSWD. He asserted that, in open court, the victim testified that she was raped only
once but in her previous statement in the DSWD, she declared that she was repeatedly raped by him
since she was 12yo.
ISSUE: WON there was a material inconsistency between her testimony at the trial and her declaration
before the DSWD
RULING: No irreconcilable inconsistency. Dr. Cosidon declared that in the interview in the DSWD, there
were intimations to this effect, but neither the prosecution nor the defense subsequently followed up this
aspect, apparently because it arose from an informal interview of a young victim still erratic from the
trauma of her experience.
The records, however, showed that the victim made no such declaration in the DSWD and that the
appellant's argument was premised solely upon a draft of a mimeographed form appended to a request
for laboratory/medical examination of the victim which stated that Raquel was raped since she was 12yo.
Such draft was neither made nor signed by Raquel.
Further, even if those words be considered as a statement of the victim relayed to the writer, it would be
hearsay and could not discredit her testimony. When Raquel said that she was raped once in June 1996,
it meant that rape happened once on that date.
Furthermore, appellant's posture was contradicted by the joint affidavit of two social workers of the
DSWD, Remedios Jazmin and Hope Bernardes, who narrated that Raquel and Marilyn, her sister, were
repeatedly raped and touched in their private parts by the appellant everytime their mother was not at
home.
WON Raquel was being coached
No, the argument was based on the fact that the defense counsel made a manifestation that the
witness was talking with somebody at the Courtroom who turned out to be the appellant himself.
WON appellant should be considered as a stepfather for the imposition death penalty
Although appellant was only a common-law husband of Raquel’s mother, it did not completely
divest him of some degree of moral ascendancy over her. The fact remained that the element of
force or intimidation was nonetheless duly established and supplied by appellant's use of a
deadly bladed weapon to threaten, coerce and compel submission to his satyric desires by the
hapless complainant.
The death sentence was also pursuant to RA 7659 which provided that death penalty would be imposed
if the crime of rape was committed to a victim under 18yo by the common-law spouse of her parent,
among others.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
G.R. Nos. 132875-76 | November 16, 2001
DOCTRINE:
The mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge, means that the act of touching should be understood here as
inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of
the mons pubis or the pudendum. We further elucidated that:
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice,
etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly
visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ
composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is
covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have
any hairs but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not
merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the
female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it
can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1985 and
96-1986, convicting accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos of two (2) counts of statutory rape, and in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, for six (6) counts of
acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the Child Abuse Law.
There were six (6) other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and
96-1998, where the accused-appellant was acquitted of the charges of acts of lasciviousness for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime of statutory rape; and twelve (12) for acts of
lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, were filed against accused-appellant.
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long, straight black hair and almond-shaped
black eyes. She grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care of Simplicio Delantar,
who was engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
First incident:
On June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned to accused-appellants
condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-appellant came out of his bedroom, Simplicio told
Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while he and accused-appellant stayed outside. After a while, accused-
appellant entered the bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television. He walked towards Rosilyn and
kissed her on the lips, then left the room again. Simplicio came in and bid her goodbye. Rosilyn told
Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which Simplicio replied, Halik lang naman.
Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some time, accused-appellant came in
and entered the bathroom. He came out clad in a long white T-shirt on which was printed the word,
Dakak. In his hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant told Rosilyn that he wanted to change her
clothes. Rosilyn protested and told accused-appellant that she can do it herself, but accused-appellant
answered, Daddy mo naman ako.Accused-appellant then took off Rosilyns blouse and skirt. When he
was about to take off her panties, Rosilyn said, Huwag po. Again, accused-appellant told her, After all, I
am your Daddy. Accused-appellant then removed her panties and dressed her with the long white T-shirt.
The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accused-appellant turned off the lamp and
the television. He turned to Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then raised her shirt, touched her breasts and
inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out, Tama na po. Accused-appellant
stopped. He continued to kiss her lips and fondle her breasts. Later, accused-appellant told Rosilyn to
sleep.
The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom she found bent over and
kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand and led her to the bathroom.He removed Rosilyns shirt
and gave her a bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyns body, he caressed her
breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her body, dried her with a towel and
applied lotion on her arms and legs.Then, he dried her hair and told her to dress up. Rosilyn put on her
clothes and went out of the bathroom, while accused-appellant took a shower.
Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom watching television. When accused-
appellant entered the room, he knelt in front of her, removed her panties and placed her legs on his
shoulders. Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina.Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn P10,000.00 and told his
housemaid to take her shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the Ritz Towers, Simplicio was
waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn narrated to Simplicio what accused-appellant did to
her, and pleaded for him not to bring her back to the Ritz Towers. Simplicio told her that everything was
alright as long as accused-appellant does not have sexual intercourse with her.
That same evening, at around 9:00 to 9:30 in the evening, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz
Towers. After Simplicio left, accused-appellant removed Rosilyns clothes and dressed her with the same
long T-shirt. They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant sat beside Rosilyn and kissed
her on the lips. He made Rosilyn lie down, lifted her shirt above her breasts, and inserted his finger into
her vagina. Then, accused-appellant removed his own clothes, placed his penis between Rosilyns thighs
and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated on her thighs. Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed her
and told her to sleep.
The next day, June 16, 1996, accused-appellant roused her from sleep and bathed her.Again, he rubbed
soap all over her body, washed her hair, and thereafter rinsed her body and dried her hair. While
accused-appellant was bathing Rosilyn, he asked her to fondle his penis while he caressed her breasts
and inserted his finger into her vagina. After their shower, accused-appellant ate breakfast. He gave
Rosilyn P5,000.00 and told her to just wait for Simplicio in the condominium unit. On their way home,
Simplicio told Rosilyn that if accused-appellant tries to insert his penis into her vagina, she should refuse.
At around 8:00 p.m. of June 18, 1996, Simplicio brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers.They found accused-
appellant sitting on the bed in his bedroom. Simplicio told Rosilyn to approach accused-appellant, then he
left. Accused-appellant took off Rosilyns clothes and dressed her with a long T-shirt on which was printed
a picture of accused-appellant and a woman, with the caption, Cong. Jalosjos with his Toy. They watched
television for a while, then accused-appellant lay beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He raised her
shirt and parted her legs. He positioned himself between the spread legs of Rosilyn, took off his own shirt,
held his penis, and poked and pressed the same against Rosilyns vagina. This caused Rosilyn pain
inside her sex organ. Thereafter, accused-appellant fondled her breasts and told her to sleep.
When Rosilyn woke up the following morning, June 19, 1996, accused-appellant was no longer around
but she found P5,000.00 on the table. Earlier that morning, she had felt somebody touching her private
parts but she was still too sleepy to find out who it was.Rosilyn took a bath, then went off to school with
Simplicio, who arrived to fetch her.
The next encounter of Rosilyn with accused-appellant was on June 21, 1996, at about 9:00 oclock in the
evening in his bedroom at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant stripped her naked and again put on her
the long shirt he wanted her to wear. After watching television for a while, accused-appellant knelt beside
Rosilyn, raised her shirt, caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Then, he clipped
his penis between Rosilyns thighs, and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated. Thereafter, Rosilyn
went to sleep.
The next day, June 22, 1996, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant who was kissing her and
fondling her sex organ. She, however, ignored him and went back to sleep.When she woke up, she found
the P5,000.00 which accused-appellant left and gave the same to Simplicio Delantar, when the latter
came to pick her up.
Before Rosilyn went to sleep, accused-appellant kissed her lips, fondled her breasts and inserted his
finger into her vagina. The following morning, she woke up and found the P5,000.00 left by accused-
appellant on the table. She recalled that earlier that morning, she felt somebody caressing her breasts
and sex organ.
On July 2, 1996 at 7:00 p.m., Rosilyn and Simplicio returned to the Ritz Towers. Rosilyn had to wait for
accused-appellant, who arrived between 12:00 to 1:00 a.m. He again dressed her with the long white shirt
similar to what he was wearing. While sitting on the bed, accused-appellant kissed her lips and inserted
his tongue into her mouth. He then fondled her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina, causing
her to cry in pain. Accused-appellant stopped and told her to sleep
The next morning, accused-appellant bathed her again. While he soaped her body, he fondled her
breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and shoved his hand away. After bathing
her, accused-appellant had breakfast. Before he left, he gave Rosilyn P5,000.00. As soon as Simplicio
arrived, Rosilyn gave her the money and then they left for school.
On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant was waiting in
his bedroom. He took off Rosilyns clothes, including her panties, and dressed her with a long T-shirt
similar to what he was wearing. After watching television, accused-appellant kissed Rosilyn on the lips,
inserted his tongue in her mouth and fondled her breasts. Then, he made Rosilyn lie on the bed, spread
her legs apart and placed a pillow under her back. He inserted his finger in her vagina and mounted
himself between her legs with his hands rested on her sides. After that, he lifted his shirt, then pointed
and pressed his penis against her vagina. Accused-appellant made thrusting motions, which caused
Rosilyn pain. Thereafter, accused-appellant told her to sleep.
In the early morning of July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she did not wake
up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on the table, and she gave this to Simplicio when he
came to fetch her.
On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around 7:00 p.m.Accused-
appellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back later that evening. The two did not return.
The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie Estreta, one of their boarders.
Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, where she executed a sworn statement against
Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which
eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against accused-appellant.
On August 23, 1996, Rosilyn was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas at Camp Crame.The
examination yielded the following results:
EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with pinkish brown
areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft
GENITAL
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the pinkish
brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy type
hymen, with shallow healed laceration at 3 o'clock position and deep healed laceration at 8 o'clock
position. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the examining index
finger and the virgin sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is
firm and closed.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.
RTC: After trial, the court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in the two (2) counts of statutory
rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby declared
CONVICTED in each of these cases.
2. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
2a. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of these cases.
2b. indemnify the victim, MA. ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases.
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992 and 96-1993, the prosecution
has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as
principal in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
and penalized under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Child Abuse Law. He is hereby
declared CONVICTED in each of these cases;
5. In Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997 and 96-1998, the prosecution
has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, in
six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Therefore, on the ground of reasonable doubt, the accused in
these cases is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE: WON Jalosjos is guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.
RULING: Yes.
As to the rape: In the present case, there is sufficient proof to establish that the acts of accused-
appellant went beyond strafing of the citadel of passion or shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency, as
depicted in the Campuhan case, and progressed into bombardment of the drawbridge [which] is invasion
enough,[28] there being, in a manner of speaking, a conquest of the fortress of ignition. When the
accused-appellant brutely mounted between Rosilyns wide-spread legs, unfetteredly touching, poking
and pressing his penis against her vagina, which in her position would then be naturally wide open and
ready for copulation, it would require no fertile imagination to belie the hypocrisy claimed by accused-
appellant that his penis or that of someone who looked like him, would under the circumstances merely
touch or brush the external genital of Rosilyn. The inevitable contact between accused-appellants penis,
and at the very least, the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her
vagina when the idiniin part of accused appellants sex ritual was performed.
Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and accused-appellant would not tax the sketchy
visualization of the nave and uninitiated to conclude that there was indeed penile invasion by accused-
appellant of Rosilyns labia. On that occasion, accused-appellant was similarly ensconced between the
parted legs of Rosilyn, except that, this time, Rosilyn was conveniently rested on, and elevated with a
pillow on her back while accused-appellant was touching, poking and pressing his penis against her
vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions employed by accused-appellant, the resulting pain felt by
Rosilyn in her sex organ was no doubt a consequence of consummated rape.
The childs narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The act of idinikit-dikit niya was followed by
itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya. The idiniin-diin niya was succeeded by Masakit po. Pain inside her ari
is indicative of consummated penetration.
The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic narration of what took place at the appellants
room from June 14 to June 16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996 are consistent with the complainants
testimony which shows that rape was legally consummated.
As to acts of lasciviousness: In the case at bar, accused-appellants acts of kissing Rosilyn on the lips,
fondling her breast, inserting his finger into her vagina and placing his penis between her thighs, all
constitute lascivious conduct intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Hence, the trial court
correctly convicted accused-appellant of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, charging him with
the above-described lascivious acts.
The penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, where the victim is below
12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The records show that on at least nine (9) separate occasions, the accused-appellant inserted his finger
into the complainants vagina. These insertions took place in 1996. A year later, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape law of 1997. It does not apply to this case but it indicates state
policy on rape. The Revised Penal Code is now amended to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indicative of the continuing state policy towards rape, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 now classifies the crime
as an offense against persons. Any public prosecutor, not necessarily the victim or her parents, can
prosecute the case.
The penalties for the crime of rape in the light of various circumstances, which are now set forth and
contained in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, have also been increased.
In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates the crime
of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it.The law presumes that a woman of
tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.
Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years old even if she is engaged in
prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force and intimidation or the deprivation of
reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of struggle or outcry of the victim or even her
passive submission to the sexual act will not mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.[49]
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn was only eleven
years of age at the time she was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for
that matter of consent or passive submission to the sexual advances of accused-appellant, was of no
moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with eleven year-old Rosilyn is sufficient to
hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
1985 and 96-1986 finding accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of statutory rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, is
AFFIRMED. Likewise, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 in Criminal
Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in six counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As
modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the
indeterminate penalty of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Ma. Rosilyn Delantar, the additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. Finally, the award of moral
damages for each count of acts of lasciviousness is increased to P50,000.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PRIMO CAMPUHAN y BELLO
G.R. No. 129433 | March 30, 2000
DOCTRINE:
1. In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that
rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-
legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping
with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.
2. In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all
respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter
disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted
or even mischievous results.
FACTS:
Primo was found guilty of statutory rape. It was established that Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of
four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo
chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground floor she met Primo who was then busy filling
small plastic bags. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. She heard one of her
daughters cry, prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo inside her children's room
kneeling before Crysthel whose jogging pants and panty were already removed, while his short pants
were down to his knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. He
evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. Corazon shouted for help, her cousin and an uncle who were
living within their compound, chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who
answered Corazon's call for help. They called the barangay officials instead of detaining him. Physical
examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was
noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5
cm. in diameter. Primo had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and
assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for
his refusal to run an errand for her. Vicente, Corazon's brother, who timely responded to her call for help,
punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the
house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to explain as he
reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente
holding a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this
moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall
instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him. The trial court found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced
him to the extreme penalty of death.
DEFENSE: Primo argued that the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what could be
taking place inside. He insists that it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid
description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen
the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence of
any external signs of physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters his
innocence.
ISSUE: WON Primo Campuhan is guilty of statutory rape.
RULING:
NO. Primo's guilt was not established. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a
grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ A
review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving
that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that
Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of
her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she saw
upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on
the vagina of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and
sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration
that Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a vantage point
from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of
Primo's penis supposedly reaching Crysthel's external genitalia, since the legs and arms of Primo would
have hidden his movements from Corazon's sight, not to discount the fact that Primo's right hand was
allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from Corazon's view. In cases where penetration was not
fully established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the
victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the
vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible.
It is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external signs of
physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that penetration
had taken place. As Dr. Villena explained, although the absence of complete penetration of the hymen
does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical basis to hold that there
was sexual contact between the accused and the victim. In cases of rape where there is a positive
testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely
on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate,
would be productive of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain
whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately
conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from
consummated rape will significantly disappear. Hence, Primo is found guilty of attempted rape only.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CEILITO ORITA
G.R. No. 88724 | April 30, 1990
DOCTRINE: In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the
victim's testimony if credible. The doctor's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable
element in the prosecution of this case.
FACTS:
Complainant Christina Abayan was a 19 year-old freshman at St. Joseph's College. She had just got back
from a party in the early hours of the morning and knocked at the door of her boarding house. All of a
sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized accused who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder. With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a
"balisong" to her neck, accused dragged complainant up the stairs. When they reached the second floor,
they entered complainant's room. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed himself and ordered
complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and
panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina. At said position, however, accused could not fully penetrate her. Accused then lay
down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part again of his penis
was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, accused had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant
immediately dashed out to the next room and jumped out through a window. Still naked, she darted to the
municipal building and knocked on the door. When the policemen who were inside the building opened
the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. They brought complainant to the
hospital where she was physically examined. Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined
complainant, issued a Medical Certificate which states:
Physical Examination — Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing with no under-clothes; appears
in state of shock, per unambulatory.
PE Findings — Pertinent Findings only.
Neck- — Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.
Breast — Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast.
Back — Multiple pinpoint marks.
Extremities — Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.
Vulva — No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous areas noted
surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can
barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.
The accused was charged with rape. The Trial Court convicted him as charged.
ISSUE: WON the medical report sufficiently proved the commission of rape?
RULING:
YES. Interpreting the findings as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was
presented in view of the unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right
knees, linear abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed hematoma at the
anterior neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are conclusive proof of
struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist. On
the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means marked
by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and tender. It bears
emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. He merely
testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there was penetration. Anent this testimony, the victim
positively testified that there was penetration, even if only partially. The fact is that in a prosecution for
rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Moreover,
Dr. Zamora's testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of
this case.
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the
minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON RAYMOND RAMOS vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA
GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 124354 | December 29, 1999
DOCTRINE:
Generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done
a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because
the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos (47years old) was a robust woman, except on occasional complaints of discomfort due to
pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. Because the discomforts she
sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her
gall bladder. She underwent a series of examinations which indicated she was fit for surgery. Erlinda and
her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hosaka. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a
"cholecystectomy" operation. They agreed that their date at the operating table at the DLSMC, would be
on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M. Rogelio asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka,
in turn, assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist.
At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her room, she was prepared for the operation by
the hospital staff. At around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Gutierrez reached a nearby phone to look for Dr. Hosaka who
was not yet in. Dr. Gutierrez thereafter informed Herminda Cruz (sister-in-law, Dean of the College of
Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center) about the prospect of a delay in the arrival of Dr. Hosaka. At
around 10:00 A.M., Rogelio E. Ramos was "already dying [and] waiting for the arrival of the doctor" even
as he did his best to find somebody who will allow him to pull out his wife from the operating room. He
also thought of the feeling of his wife, who was inside the operating room waiting for the doctor to arrive.
At around 12:10 P.M., he came to know that Dr. Hosaka arrived as a nurse remarked, "Nandiyan na si Dr.
Hosaka, dumating na raw." At about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who was inside the operating room with
the patient, heard somebody say that "Dr. Hosaka is already here." She then saw people inside the
operating room "moving, doing this and that, [and] preparing the patient for the operation". As she held
the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter
heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan"
Because of the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr. Gutierrez was doing.
She thereafter noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as
Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon,
another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist
trying to intubate the patient. The patient's nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a
trendelenburg position — a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her
feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain. Immediately
thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos "that something wrong
was . . . happening". Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful
day, she saw the patient taken to the ICU.
Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month. About four months thereafter the patient was released from
the hospital. During the whole period of her confinement, she incurred hospital bills amounting to
P93,542.25. Since that fateful afternoon of June 17, 1985, she has been in a comatose condition. She
cannot do anything. She cannot move any part of her body. She cannot see or hear. She is living on
mechanical means. She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four
to five minutes. After being discharged from the hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still
needing constant medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from
P8-10K. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage"
Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the RTC which ruled in their favor. On appeal, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in finding that the respondents did not cause the unfortunate comatose
condition of Erlinda Ramos
RULING:
The injury suffered by Erlinda was caused by the private respondents’ negligence. Generally, expert
medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or
that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony
applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the
facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to
whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care.
However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances,
and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence,
in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon
proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of
common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and
experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but
how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody
and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and
ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the
patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a
practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and under
these circumstances the Court would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation,
if negligence attended the management and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the physicians
and the hospital in this case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the desired results of an
operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment
was ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is made out for the
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In sustaining the position of private respondents, the Court of Appeals relied on the testimonies of Dra.
Gutierrez, Dra. Calderon and Dr. Jamora. In giving weight to the testimony of Dra. Gutierrez, the Court of
Appeals rationalized that she was candid enough to admit that she experienced some difficulty in the
endotracheal intubation of the patient and thus, cannot be said to be covering her negligence with
falsehood. The appellate court likewise opined that private respondents were able to show that the brain
damage sustained by Erlinda was not caused by the alleged faulty intubation but was due to the allergic
reaction of the patient to the drug Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal), a short-acting barbiturate, as testified
on by their expert witness, Dr. Jamora
We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals. We hold that private respondents were unable to
disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her piteous condition.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. v NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA
G.R. No. 126297 | January 31, 2007
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
DOCTRINE:
1. To successfully pursue a case of medical malpractice or medical negligence, a patient must only
prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider
would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
2. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
3.
FACTS: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital due to difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. She was later diagnosed by Dr. Miguel Ampil (petitioner) to be
suffering from ―cancer of the sigmoid.‖ An anterior resection surgery was then performed on Natividad.
As the malignancy had already spread on her left ovary, a hysterectomy was sought to be performed on
Natividad. With the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique, Dr. Juan Fuentes (respondent) performed
and completed the hysterectomy. Dr. Ampil completed the operation by closing the incision.
The operation, however, became flawed as two sponges used in the operation were missing, as stated in
the Record of Operation. A couple of days after her discharge, Natividad complained of excruciating pain
in her anal region. After consultation, Drs. Ampil and Fuentes both told her that it was only a natural
consequence of the surgery. Natividad, together with husband Enrique, went to US to seek further
treatment.
After four months, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks after, her
daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from Natividad’s vagina. Dr. Ampil was then called to extract
the piece of gauze from the vagina, which he did. The pains still intensified, the cause of which was
detected by another doctor (Dr. Ramon Gutierrez) to be the presence of another foreign object in her
vagina – a foul-smelling gauze which badly infected her vaginal vault, and formed a recto-vaginal fistula
which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. As a result, Natividad Agana underwent another
surgery.
A complaint for damages against Professional Services, Inc., owner of the Medical City, Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes, was filed with the RTC, alleging their liability for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze
inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed
with the PRC an administrative complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes.
RTC: The RTC decided in favor of the Aganas (Natividad died during the pendency of the RTC case),
finding PSI, Drs. Ampil and Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice.
PSI, Drs. Ampil and Fuentes interposed an appeal to the CA.
PRC: Dismissed the administrative case against Dr. Fuentes (they did not acquire jurisdiction over Dr.
Ampil, as he was in the US). Prosecution failed to show that Dr. Fuentes left the two pieces of gauze
inside Natividad’s body, and that he concealed such fact from Natividad.
CA: Appeal DISMISSED. Case against Dr. Fuentes DISMISSED. Dr. Ampil liable to reimburse PSI. Dr.
Ampil’s MR was denied.
ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice?
2. Did the CA err in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability?
3. Is PSI solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil’s negligence?
RULING:
1. NO, the CA did not err in so doing.
Despite the arguments of Dr. Ampil to the contrary, the glaring truth is that all the major
circumstances, taken together, as specified by the Court of Appeals, directly point to Dr. Ampil as
the negligent party.
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To

successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or
that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that
failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
a. Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes,
from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty
to inform Natividad about it.
b. Dr. Ampil breached both duties.
c. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American
doctors and another surgery.
d. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from
his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two
pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina
established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further
aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the
knowledge of Natividad and her family.
2. NO, the CA did not err in so doing.
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." It is the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or
raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
(1) the occurrence of an injury;
(2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant;
(3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if
those who had control or management used proper care; and
(4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most
instrumental is the "control and management of the thing which caused the injury."
In this case, the SC found the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the
injury" to be wanting. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the
operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy
when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary.
Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil.
The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the
operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the
procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A
"diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then
directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the
operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital.
Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of
the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his
orders. As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of
the Ship." The SC ruled that it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding
that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividad’s body.
Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr.
Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
Mere invocation and application of the doctrine, however, does not dispense with the requirement
of proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil
and not by Dr. Fuentes.
3. YES, PSI is liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.
In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the physicians is rendered
inconsequential in view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals that for
purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its liability is also
anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the
doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained acceptance in the determination of a
hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health professionals. The present case serves as a perfect
platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our jurisprudence.
a. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of
ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes
liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the
actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the
relationship or the authority exists. Thus, in cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by
its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient
has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered
in behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s negligence.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and
specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it "is now estopped
from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public
directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence."
Corporate entities, like PSI, are capable of acting only through other individuals, such as
physicians. If these accredited physicians do their job well, the hospital succeeds in its
mission of offering quality medical services and thus profits financially. Logically, where
negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape
liability for the acts of its ostensible agents.
b. As regards the doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility, the trial
court held that PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty. In agreement with the trial
court, the SC ruled that it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital
for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the
public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all
patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to
perform such duty.
Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical
City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is
reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or
constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the
attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing.
This means that the knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes
knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses’ report, to
investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous
negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in fixing the
negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence
of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own
negligence under Article 2176.
One final word. Once a physician undertakes the treatment and care of a patient, the law imposes on
him certain obligations. In order to escape liability, he must possess that reasonable degree of learning,
skill and experience required by his profession. At the same time, he must apply reasonable care and
diligence in the exercise of his skill and the application of his knowledge, and exert his best judgment.
DECISION: Petitions DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.
ROGELIO P. NOGALES, for himself and on behalf of the minors, ROGER ANTHONY, ANGELICA,
NANCY, and MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER, all surnamed NOGALES vs. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
(CMC), DR. OSCAR ESTRADA, DR. ELY VILLAFLOR, DR. ROSA UY, DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ, DR.
PERPETUA LACSON, DR. NOE ESPINOLA, and NURSE J. DUMLAO
G.R. No. 142625; December 19, 2006
DOCTRINE:
CMC may still be liable over visiting a physician as independent contractors, despite not being its
employee, by virtue of the doctrine of apparent authority; In determining whether an employer-employee
relationship exists between doctors and the hospital, the control test should be applied.
FACTS:
Corazon Nogales (Corazon) died after giving birth due to Dr. Oscar Estrada’s (Dr. Estrada) negligence.
Hence, Capitol Medical Center was sued for its responsibility over Dr. Estrada.
th
Corazon, pregnant with her 4 child, 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada.
On her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and development
6
of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous complication of pregnancy. After
experiencing mild labor pains, Corazon and Rogelio Nogales went to see Dr. Estrada at his home, and
was subsequently admitted to Capital Medical Center (CMC), after signing a ―Consent on Admisssion and
Agreement‖ and ―Admission Agreement‖, upon written request of Dr. Estrada. Corazon was transferred to
the Delivery Room where Corazon’s bag of water ruptured spontaneously, her cervix fully dilated, and
she started to experience convulsions. Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of ten grams of magnesium
sulfate, however, Dr. Villaflor administered only 2.5 grams of magnesium sulfate. Dr. Estrada, assisted
by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece
of cervical tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apnic, cyanotic, weak and injured
condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated and resuscitated by Dr. Enriquez and Dr.
Payumo. Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse.
Corazon's blood pressure dropped from 130/80 to 60/40 within five minutes. There was
continuous profuse vaginal bleeding. The assisting nurse administered hemacel through a gauge 19
needle as a side drip to the ongoing intravenous injection of dextrose. Dr. Espinola, head of the
Obstetrics-Gynecology Department, was apprised of Corazon’s condition and this ordered immediate
hysterectomy. Rogelio signed a ―consent to Operation.’ Dr. Espinola arrived an hour later after being
informed, however, despite his efforts, Corazon died 9:15am due to ―hemorrhage post partum.‖
Petitioner Rogelio filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against CMC, Dr. Estrada, and all the other
doctors and nurse who intervened for the death of Corazon. Petitioners assert that the defendant
physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon's condition.
Petitioners charged CMC with negligence in the selection and supervision of defendant physicians and
hospital staff. In allowing Dr. Estrada to practice and admit patients at CMC, it should be liable for Dr.
Estrada’s malpractice.
The trial court ruled that, out of all the doctors, Dr. Estrada is solely liable for damages for leading the
team of doctors. It also agreed with respondent CMC in that CMC is not liable under Art. 2176 and 2180
of the NCC on vicarious liability or respondeat superior, since as agreed between the plaintiff and CMC
during the pre-trial order, CMC did not have any participation in the selection or hiring of Dr. Estrada as
attending physicians. The CA upheld the ruling, asserting that there was no proof that defendant
physician was an employee and was merely an independent contractor exercising hospital privileges.
ISSUES:
1. Is Dr. Estrada an employee of CMC?
2. Assuming Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC, may CMC be vicariously liable for his
negligence?
RULING:
1. No. The Court ruled that the control test essentially determines whether an employment relationship
exists between a physician and a hospital based on the exercise of control over the physician as to
details. Specifically, the employer (or the hospital) must have the right to control both the means and
the details of the process by which the employee (or the physician) is to accomplish his task. Citing
Ramos v. CA, the Court made note, ―While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point
which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the
control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.‖
In this case, the Court finds no single evidence to CMC’s exercise of control over Dr. Estrada's
treatment and management of Corazon's condition. It is undisputed that throughout Corazon's
pregnancy, she was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. There was no showing that
CMC had a part in diagnosing Corazon's condition. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges at
42
CMC, such fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC. CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to
use its facilities, when Corazon was about to give birth, which CMC considered an emergency.
Considering these circumstances, Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC, but an independent
contractor.
2. Yes. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician.
There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the
"ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority.
In Gilbert v. Sycamore,
―Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent
acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an
independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an
independent contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as follows:
"For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the
acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence."
The element of "holding out" on the part of the hospital does not require an express representation by
the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied if
the hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care without informing the patient that
the care is provided by independent contractors.
The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is satisfied if the plaintiff relies upon the
hospital to provide complete emergency room care, rather than upon a specific physician.‖
It involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician.
The first factor focuses on the hospital's manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry
whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
47
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this
regard, the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating
physician is an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied.
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil
Code provides that "[t]hrough estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
In this case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff, clothing Dr. Estrada
with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an
employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority: 1) CMC granted staff
privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its medical staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada. Upon Dr.
Estrada's request for Corazon's admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily accommodated
Corazon and updated Dr. Estrada of her condition; 2) Second, CMC made Rogelio sign consent
forms printed on CMC letterhead. Prior to Corazon's admission and supposed hysterectomy, CMC
asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of which reinforced Rogelio's belief that Dr. Estrada
was a member of CMC's medical staff, ―that the Physician, personally or by and through the
Capitol Medical Center and/or its staff, may use, adapt, or employ such means, forms or
methods of cure, treatment, retreatment, or emergency measures as he may see best and
most expedient; that Ma. Corazon and I will comply with any and all rules, regulations,
directions, and instructions of the Physician, the Capitol Medical Center and/or its staff” With
the Consent to to operation, including the “Surgical Staff and Anesthesiologists of Capitol
Medical Center‖; and 3) Dr. Estrada's referral of Corazon's profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr. Espinola,
who was then the Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of CMC, gave the impression
that Dr. Estrada as a member of CMC's medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed
specialists in treating Corazon.
The second factor focuses on the patient's reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on
whether the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with
ordinary care and prudence
In this case, the records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived employment
relationship with CMC in accepting Dr. Estrada's services. Rogelio testified that he and his wife
specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon's delivery not only because of their friend's
recommendation, but more importantly because of Dr. Estrada's "connection with a reputable
hospital, the CMC. In other words, Dr. Estrada's relationship with CMC played a significant role in the
Spouses Nogales' decision in accepting Dr. Estrada's services as the obstetrician-gynecologist for
Corazon's delivery. Further, the Spouses Nogales looked to CMC to provide the best medical care
and support services for Corazon's delivery. The Court notes that prior to Corazon's fourth
pregnancy, she used to give birth inside a clinic. Considering Corazon's age then, the Spouses
Nogales decided to have their fourth child delivered at CMC, which Rogelio regarded one of the best
hospitals at the time.
CMC’s defense that all it did was to extend facilities is untenable. Court cannot close its eyes to the
reality that hospitals, such as CMC, are in the business of treatment. . Present day hospitals, as
their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for
treatment.
Lastly, petitioners cannot be estopped from claiming damages due to the Consent on
Admission and Consent to Operation providing CMC’s and its employees release “from any
and all claims” arising from treatment. Such release forms, being in the nature of contracts of
adhesion, are construed strictly against hospitals. Besides, a blanket release in favor of hospitals
"from any and all claims," which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would be
contrary to public policy and thus void.
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI
G.R. No. 122445 | November 18, 1997
DOCTRINE:
In order to fully prosecute a crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide committed by doctors,
expert testimonies of doctors are necessary to establish the standard of care observed by other members
of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.
FACTS:
Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother Lydia to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General
Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. Lydia was examined by the petitioner who
found a "myoma‖ in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.
Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be
operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic
was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to
wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade
her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the
operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called
Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told
her that she must be operated on as scheduled.
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside the
operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the
operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought.
About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia.
They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant
into the operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation
was finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty
minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked
Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to
comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank.
Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed
her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had
run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District
Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived. But at around
10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable
condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a
respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior
consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended transfer only
when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other
relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo
District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated
on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending physicians summoned
Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District
Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood
pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there was nothing he
could do to help save the patient. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Thus,
on March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death
certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation
(DIC)" as the antecedent cause.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
RULING:
No, Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila
Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect
represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in
the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore
has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to
treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert
testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes
of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it
has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on
the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar
operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto
Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death
but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have
exercised.
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of
provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia
to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even
without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a
surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the
absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a
consequence of the reckless imprudence.
DR. RUBI LI vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA SOLIMAN, as parents/heirs of deceased Angelica
Soliman
GR No. 165279 | June 7, 2011
DOCTRINE:
“While the theoretical side effects of chemotherapy were explained by her to the respondents, as these
should be known to a competent doctor, petitioner cannot possibly predict how a particular patients
genetic make-up, state of mind, general health and body constitution would respond to the
treatment. These are obviously dependent on too many known, unknown and immeasurable variables.”
FACTS:
On July 7, 1993, respondents 11 year old daughter, Angelica Soliman underwent a biopsy of the mass
located in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was
suffering from osteosaucoma, ostiobiostic type, a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone which
usually affects teenage children. Following this diagnosis, Angelica’s right leg was amputated by Dr.
Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As a adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells,
and hence minimizing the chances of recurrence and prevent the decease from spreading to other parts
of the patient’s body, chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo and referred Angelica to another
doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
On July 23, 1993, petitioner saw the respondents at the hospital after Angelica’s surgery and discussed
with them Angelica’s condition. Petitioner told respondents that Angelica should be given 2-3 weeks to
recover from the operation before starting the chemotherapy. Respondents were apprehensive due to
financial constraints as Reynaldo earns only from P70,000-150,000 a year from his jewelry and watching
repair business. Petitioner, however, assured them not to worry about her professional fee and told them
to just save up for medicines to be used.
As the chemotherapy session started, day by day, Angelica experience worsening condition and other
physical effect on the body such as discoloration, nausea, and vomiting.
Petitioner claimed, that she explained to respondents that even when a tumor is removed, there are still
small lesions undetectable to the naked eye and that adjuvant chemotherapy is needed to clean out the
small lesions in order to lessen the chance of cancer to recur. She did not give the respondents any
assurance that chemotherapy will cure Angelica’s cancer. During these consultations with respondents,
she explained the following side effects of chemotherapy treatment to respondents: 1.) Falling hair; 2.)
nausea and vomiting; 3.) loss of appetite; 4.) low count of WBC, RBC, and platelets; 5.) possible sterility
due to the effects on Angelica’s ovary; 6.) Damage to kidney and heart; 7.) darkening of the skin
especially when exposed to sunlight. She actually talked to the respondents four times, once at the
hospital after the surgery, twice at her clinic and fourth when Angelica’s mother called her through long
distance. This was disputed by respondents who countered that petitioner gave them assurance that
there is 95% chance of healing for Angelica if she undergoes chemotherapy and that the only side effects
were nausea, vomiting and hair loss. Those were the only side effects of chemotherapy mentioned by
petitioner.
ISSUE: WON petitioner committed medical malpractice.
RULING: No. The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or more appropriately,
medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such
claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider in most cases a physician, either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done or that he or she did
something that a reasonably health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused
injury to the patient.
Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference
of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from the former’s realization that the latter
possess unusual technical skills which layman in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating,
hence the indispensability of expert testimonies.
The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes as far back
into english common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of battery if they have not
gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or procedure. In the United States, the
seminal case was Schoendorff vs Society of New York Hospital which involved unwanted treatment
performed by a doctor. Justice Bejamin Cardozo oft-quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to
give consent to any medical procedure or treatment; every human being of adult year and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. From a purely ethical
norm, informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose
what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would
disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risk of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of
treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for her own welfare and faced with a choice of
undergoing the proposed treatment, as alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his
judgement by reasonably balancing the probable risk against the probable benefits.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must proved in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine
of informed consent: 1.) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; 2.) he failed to disclose or
inadequately disclosed those risks; 3.) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and 4.) plaintiff was injured by
the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent requires the plaintiff to point to significant
undisclosed information relating to the treatment which could have altered her decision to undergo it.
Examining the evidence, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s parents. Respondents could not have
been unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower extremity that her
immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When petitioner
informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts
of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin
darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very
well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure.
In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patients reaction to the chemical agents even with
pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician. That death can possibly
result from complications of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after
the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major
medical procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias “KAWIT”
G.R. No. 150224 | May 19, 2004
DOCTRINE:
Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and
reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at
trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure. Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the
court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.
FACTS:
On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother’s (Isabel Dawang’s) house, despite her
intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-relatives left in the morning. At
10:00 am, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn stayed
during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyn’s first cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white
shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at the
back of Isabel Dawang’s house, Judilyn didn’t find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live
therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he
had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and
blue pants; and noticed that the latter’s eyes were ―reddish and sharp‖. Accused-appellant asked about
the whereabouts of Judilyn’s husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar
immediately left when Judilyn’s husband arrived. In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived home, she
found the lights of her house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the containers, which
she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second floor to check whether the
teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein was tied with rope. When Isabel succeeded
opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the second level of her house,
she felt Kathylyn’s lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it. Soon after, police
came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyn’s clothes and
undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also
found 50-meters away from Isabel’s house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of
Kathylyn’s cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the
sperm specimen is identical to Yatar’s genotype.
Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the same
by the RTC of Tabuk, Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the SC in order to assail the court a
quo’s decision.
On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or
analysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victim’s (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the
blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct
of the DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.
ISSUE: WON the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence for
Yatar’s conviction
RULING:
Yes. DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual assault would leave
biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s
body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be
transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there
was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene
or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used
the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With
PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus,
getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify
small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types:
vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the
victim’s vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood
sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in
its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant
and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular
biology.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRICO VALLEJO y SAMARTINO @ PUKE
G.R. No. 144656 | May 9, 2002
DOCTRINE:
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample
and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:
1. The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion).
This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2. It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar
DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then
be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3. The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a
case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical
significance of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
FACTS:
On July 10, 1999, Ma. Nida Diolola sent her 9-year-old daughter, Daisy Diolola, to their neighbor’s house
so that Aimee Vallejo, sister of appellant Gerrico Vallejo, could help Daisy with her lessons. Aimee’s
house, where Gerrico was also staying, was about 4-5 meters away from Daisy’s house. At about 5:30 in
the afternoon, Ma. Nida noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She went to Vallejo’s house and was told
that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had
her menstrual period. Ma. Nida searched the whole evening until the following day but her search proved
fruitless. On June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the
root of an aroma tree by the river. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied
around her neck.
The policemen went to the house of Gerrico and recovered the white basketball shirt, with the name
Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back, and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on
it, worn by accused-appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned
over to the NBI for laboratory examination.
The NBI Medico-Legal officer conducted a physical examination of Gerrico. His findings showed the
following:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
"Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1 cm., knee, left, 7.0 x 6.0
cm. legs, right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0 cms., left anterior aspect, 24.0 x 10.0 cms.,
feet, plantar aspects; right, 9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0 cms.
"Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm.
"Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3 cm.‖
The Doctor also conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Daisy. The postmortem findings are as follows:
"Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition characterized by foul odor, eyes and
tongue protruding, bloating of the face and blister formation.
"Washerwoman's hands and feet.
"Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 6.0 cms. Contused
abrasions, forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip, 5.0 x 22.0 cms., lower lip, 3.0 x 2.0 cms.,
neck (nailmarks) anterior aspect, 8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right antero-medial aspect, middle
3rd 3.0 x 15.0 cms. posterior aspect, upper 3rd, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left posterior aspect, 20.0
x 9.0 cms., forearm, left, posterior aspect, 21.0 x 8.0 cms. left thumb, anterior aspect, 1.5
x 1.0 cms., left middle, ring and little fingers, dorsal aspect, .50 x 4.0 cms. knees, right,
3.0 x 2.0 cms. and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms., legs, right anterior aspect, upper and middle 3rd
3.0 x 2.5 cms. foot right, dorsal aspect.
"Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x 3.0 cms.
"Fracture, tracheal rings.
"Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck, underneath, nailmarks. "Petechial hemorrhages,
subendocardial, subpleural.
"Brain and other visceral organs are congested.
"Stomach, contains ½ rice and other food particles.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation.
"GENITAL EXAMINATION: - Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, gaping and
congested. Hymen, moderately tall, thick with fresh lacerations, complete at 3:00, 6:00
and 9:00 o'clock positions, edges with blood clots."
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan, NBI Forensic Biologist, showed
Gerrico’s blood sample belongs to Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic
basketball shirt, with patches "Grizzlies" in front and "SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9
athletic basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4)
one (1) "cut" pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut" dirty white small panty with
reddish brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group
"A", similar to that of the victim. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Gerrico’s
DNA Profile.
Gerrico insisted that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy
were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence, contaminated.
The trial court convicted Gerrico of the crime of rape with homicide. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the DNA samples obtained from Gerrico’s clothes and those of Daisy’s are admissible in
evidence
RULING:
Yes. DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic code.
Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed,
material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is
the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the
suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample
and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This
conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA
types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or
failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same
or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case,
the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the
Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
It is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the samples
had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal
swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis of the
experts, the DNA profile of Gerrico was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the victim.
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accused-
appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances
which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his
innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect
upon the court.

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LEGAL MEDICINE Case Digests

Outline by Dr. Joel Macalino

LEGAL MEDICINE SYLLABUS

I. Introduction to Legal Medicine (General Considerations)

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s dismissal from employment was legal.

The trial court found appellant guilty. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the testimony of the accused is credible.

The appeal is meritless. Intino is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records

Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique,

Third, Jennie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father

ISSUE: WON accused-appellants should be liable under the Anti-Hazing Law

We agree with the Solicitor General.

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

On appeal, appellant argues:

ISSUE: WON medico-legal findings negate the alleged rape

WON Raquel was being coached

EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL

ISSUE: WON Jalosjos is guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

ISSUE: WON Primo Campuhan is guilty of statutory rape.

PSI, Drs. Ampil and Fuentes interposed an appeal to the CA.

1. NO, the CA did not err in so doing.

This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To

b. Dr. Ampil breached both duties.

2. NO, the CA did not err in so doing.

(1) the occurrence of an injury;

3. YES, PSI is liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.

DECISION: Petitions DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED.

It involves two factors to determine the liability of an independent-contractor physician.

ISSUE: WON petitioner committed medical malpractice.

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