G.R. No. 183385.

February 13, 2009

EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. MASMUD), Petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division) and ATTY. ROLANDO B.
GO, JR., Respondents.

FACTS: In 2003, Evangelina Masmud’s husband, the late Alexander J. Masmud, filed a
complaint against First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of
permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Go as his counsel.

In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney’s fees on a contingent
basis, as follows: 20% of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional 10% in case of appeal.
The Labor Arbiter granted the monetary claims of Alexander.

Alexander’s employer filed an appeal before the NLRC. During the pendency of the proceedings,
Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyer’s fees to Evangelina, Atty. Go caused her
substitution as complainant. In 2004, the NLRC rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal of Alexander’s
employer. The employer subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the same in
an Order. On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed. Alexander’s employers filed a
petition for certiorari before this Court which was dismissed for lack of merit.

Atty. Go moved for the execution of the NLRC decision. The surety bond of the employer was garnished.
In 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of ₱3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of
the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of ₱680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as
attorney’s fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorney’s fees.
Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney’s lien.

Evangelina filed a comment with motion to release the amount deposited with the NLRC Cashier.
Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go’s claim for attorney’s fees of 40% of the total monetary award was
null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code. LA issued an Order granting Atty. Go’s motion.
NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. CA rendered a Decision partially granting the petition.
Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed serious and reversible error of law insofar as it upholds
respondent lawyer’s claim of forty percent (40%) of the monetary award in a labor case as attorney’s fees.

RULING: NO. There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent
the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On
the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for
damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in any of the cases provided by
law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount
is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the
lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.

Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees, or the compensation that Atty. Go is entitled to
receive. Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should govern Atty. Go’s
compensation as her counsel and assiduously opposes their agreed retainer contract.

Article 111 of the said Code provides: ART. 111. Attorney's fees. — (a) In cases of unlawful withholding
of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the
wages recovered.
Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept
of attorney’s fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages
sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount
payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered.

In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in determining Atty. Go’s
compensation. The said Rule provides:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its
own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina shall control in the determination of the amount to
be paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Attorney's fees are
unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness. The decree of
unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will not
preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer's
services.

The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the said Code
provides:

CANON 20 — A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 20.01. — A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to
which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients
may be protected from unjust charges. The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is
subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation
prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer
may get nothing if the suit fails. The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between
Atty. Go and Evangelina’s husband. The CA committed no error of law.

Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive
adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award of attorney's fees
by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to
secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of
the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of
fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court
is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is
paid his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost
not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial
tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. It would
be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his
due.
A.C. No. 5655. April 22, 2005
VALERIANA U. DALISAY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.

FACTS: In her complaint, Dalisay alleged that she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice
advocacy of respondent, a media personality. So she engaged his services as her counsel in Civil Case
No. 00-44. In turn, respondent demanded P25,000.00 as acceptance fee which she paid. Then respondent
asked her to pay P8,000.00 as filing fee.   She paid the amount although she knew that Civil Case No. 00-
44 was already filed with the court.

After a month, respondent demanded additional acceptance fee, or a total of P90,000.00.   Respondent
also asked her to pay him P3,000.00 as appearance fee. Complainant raised an additional amount and paid
respondent the total sum of P48,000.00. Adding to this amount P8,000.00 filing fee, her total payment
was P56,000.00. Complainant further alleged that notwithstanding her payments, respondent never
rendered any legal service for her in Civil Case No. 00-044.   As a result, she terminated their attorney-
client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents.   However, he refused to do so.

In his comment, respondent denied complainant’s charge.   He claimed that Atty. Oliver Lozano referred
her to him to defend her in Civil Case No. 00-044.  He explained to her that she is not covered by the free
legal services being rendered by his office.   Thus, she would be treated as a regular client.   Accordingly,
his acceptance fee would be Php 1000, 000.00 Pesos.   In addition, she would be charged for any pleading
and paper filed with the court, plus an appearance fee of P3,000.00.    

Respondent denied demanding P8,000.00 as filing fee.   He clarified that such fee was intended for
another case he would file for complainant, aside from Civil Case No. 00-044. Respondent also alleged
that he asked complainant to bring her son-in-law to his office for a conference and to submit to him the
necessary documents to enable him to prepare the filing of the complaints in order to protect her rights
over the subject property. But complainant did not heed his advice. Instead, she returned to his office and
told him that she was no longer interested in retaining his services. She then demanded a refund of the
amounts she paid.

In 2002, we resolved to refer this case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In her
Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that the complaint against Atty. Melanio ‘Batas’ Mauricio, Jr., be dismissed and the
respondent be required to refund the amount of Fifty Six Thousand Pesos (P56,000.00) to the complainant
within two (2) months from receipt hereof.

The IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-121 adopting and approving in toto the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Navarro.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation of Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro to dismissed the case is
correct

RULING: NO. When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he
agreed to take up the latter’s case and that an attorney-client relationship between them was
established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with competence and attend to her
case with fidelity, care and devotion. However, there is nothing in the records to show that respondent
entered his appearance as counsel of record for complainant in Civil Case No. 00-044.  He did not even
follow-up the case which remained pending up to the time she terminated his services.

As to the P8,000.00, allegedly as docket fees for other cases, paid to respondent by complainant, the
Investigating Commissioner found that "there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show
that respondent filed any case considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the
filing of a case."

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the body of rules governing the conduct of
every member of the Bar in this jurisdiction, provides:
"CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
 CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE."

More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:

"A LAWYER SHALL NOT NEGLECT A LEGAL MATTER ENTRUSTED TO HIM, AND
HIS NEGLIGENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH SHALL RENDER HIM LIABLE."

Also, respondent’s Attorney’s Oath declares that respondent shall impose upon himself the sacred duty,
among others, that he will not delay any man for money or malice, and will conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his
clients. A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and
ability to protect his client’s case, for his unwavering loyalty to his client likewise serves the ends of
justice.   Indeed, the entrusted privilege of every lawyer to practice law carries with it his corresponding
duties, not only to his client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

In Santos vs. Lazaro, we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, above-quoted, is
a basic postulate in legal ethics.   Verily, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting his rights.   The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and
attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable
not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.

Respondent insists that he is entitled to attorney’s fees since he gave legal advice and opinions to
complainant on her problems and those of her family.   Just like any other professional, a lawyer is
entitled to collect fees for his services.   However, he should charge only a reasonable amount of fees. 

Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees." There is, however, no hard and fast rule which will serve as guide in determining what
is or what is not a reasonable fee. That must be determined from the facts of each case. The power to
determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of a lawyer’s fee is a matter falling within
the regulatory prerogative of the Court.

It is now clear to us that since respondent did not take any step to assist complainant in her case,
charging P56,000.00 is improper.  While giving legal advice and opinion on complainant’s problems and
those of her family constitutes legal service, however, the attorney’s fee must be reasonable.  
Obviously, P56,000.00 is exorbitant.  

By his inaction in Civil Case No.00-044, respondent violated Canons 17, 18 and 18.03, earlier cited, as
well as his Oath as an attorney.  Likewise, in collecting from complainant exorbitant consulting fee,
respondent violated Canon 20 of the same Code.   For all these violations, respondent should be
penalized.
A.C. No. 4948. February 23, 2000
ANA CECILIA G. CABATI, et al. vs. ATTY. ALFONSO R. REYNO, JR., et al.

FACTS: Complainant Cabati was the bookkeeper of Reyno spouses for their personal and business
accounts. She was also the bookkeeper of the Reyno De Vera Tiu Domingo and Santos Law Offices. The
Reyno spouses filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City a complaint against Cabati and
her common-law husband, complainant Raynon, charging them with qualified theft through falsification
of commercial documents and theft through falsification of commercial documents, respectively. Cabati,
in complicity with Reynon, allegedly forged the signature of Atty. Yolanda G. Reyno in checks which
were in her custody by virtue of her position in order to withdraw large amounts of money from the
personal accounts of the Reyno spouses.

Subsequently, complainants filed countercharges against respondents with the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Pasig City serious illegal detention, light threats, robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons and carnapping. Petitioners claimed that they were subjected by respondent
Reyno, Jr. and a certain Col. Douglas Rosete to separate interrogations regarding alleged unauthorized
disbursements from the accounts of the Reyno spouses. They likewise alleged that respondents acted
collectively and in conspiracy in detaining them against their will at the Reyno De Vera Tiu Domingo and
Santos Law Offices, coercing them into admitting responsibility for the aforementioned unauthorized
disbursements from the Reynos' accounts, and compelling them to execute several documents conveying
their real and personal properties to the Reyno spouses in restitution for the amounts which thy took from
the accounts of the former.

Acting on the complaint, the Court the respondents to file their comment on the complaint. After the
respondents filed their respective comments, the Court in 1999, resolved to refer this case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.

Petitioners, however, filed an Opposition to the referral of the case to the IBP on the ground that the close
association of respondent Atty. Reyno, Jr. with some officials of the IBP, specifically his law firm partner
Atty. Leonard De Vera, IBP spokesperson, and his brother in his fraternity, Atty. Jose A. Grapilon,
National President of the IBP, will influence the investigation of the IBP and deny them justice and fair
play. Complainants apprehension that the IBP may not be fair and just in conducting the investigation is
grounded on pure speculation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the referral to the IBP of the case is valid

RULING: NO. The IBP, through its investigating arm, the Committee on Bar Discipline. The Committee
on Bar Discipline was created in August 1998 by the Board of Governors of the IBP to take the place of
the National Grievance Investigation under Section 2, Rule 139-B, Revised Rules of Court is empowered
under Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court to conduct proceedings for the disbarment of an attorney
upon the verified complaint of any person. Section 1, Rule 139-B, supra. The investigator or investigators
appointed to probe complaints against lawyers are mandated to adhere to the procedure laid down by law
on how to conduct such disbarment proceedings. See Section 2-12, Rule 139-B, supra. They are required
to take their oath of office before discharging their duties. Section 2, Rule 139-B, supra. The grounds for
their disqualification are laid down in the law, which are, in particular, relationships within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity to any of the parties or their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias
or having acted as counsel for other party. Sec. 2, par. 2, Rule 139-B, supra. Just because some of the
respondents belong to the same fraternity as some of the IBP officers is not a sufficient ground to brand
the entire organization as biased. If the investigator shows any manifestation of partiality during the
investigation, complainants can ask for his disqualification.
Considering the foregoing, there is no reason to warrant the transfer of the investigation of the case to the
Court of Appeals absent any showing of actual bias and/or arbitrariness on the part of the investigator or
investigators to be designated by the IBP for the purpose.

The Court now takes occasion to clarify that its referral of the case to the IBP for investigation does not
include the charges against respondent Judge Lantion. Being a member of the Judiciary, it is the Supreme
Court alone which has the power to discipline him. This is clear in Art. VIII. Section 11 of the
Constitution which provides:

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall
hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

The matter was further clarified in Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89 dated February 9, 1999, wherein it
was explained that justices and judges are not among those who may be investigated by the Committee on
Bar Discipline of the IBP. The phrase "attorneys in the government service" in paragraph 2 of Section 1,
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court was interpreted by the Court as excluding members of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals and Judges of the other courts.

A careful examination of the complaint reveals that it failed to allege any specific charge against Judge
Lantion. Complainants did not identify what specific or particular acts were committed by respondent
Judge which would warrant his disbarment. The complaint simply contained a general charge which was
sufficiently refuted by Judge Lantion. Specifically, it states:

24. Thereafter, in the evening of 24 November 1997, after Atty. Reyno, Jr. and Col.
Rosete unlawfully and forcibly took the aforesaid properties and/or documents
relating thereto and while the complainants were still being unlawfully detained in
one of the rooms of the Law Firm of Reyno, De Vera, Tiu, Domingo & Santos,
Respondents Atty. Alfonso R. Reyno, Jr., Atty. Ferdinand Domingo, Atty. Arturo
Tiu, Atty. Lemuel Santos, Judge Ralph C. Lantion, Atty. Ian dela Vega, Atty. Peter
Francis Zagala, Atty. Lenito Serrano. Rodolfo Reyno, Col. Douglas Rosete and his
unidentified armed men acting collectively and conspiring with one another,
pressured, coerced, intimidated and threatened with bodily harm, death and
continued detention Complainant[s] Ana Cecilia Cabati and Fernando Raynon to
sign and execute the following documents which the said respondents prepared x x
x.

In his comment to the complaint, respondent Judge averred that complainants' claim against him relates to
his act of signing as a witness in their Joint Affidavit. Respondent Judge explained that he and his former
law classmate co-respondent Serrano dropped by the Reyno De Vera Tiu Domingo and Santos Law
Offices in the evening of November 24, 1997 to fetch their classmate, respondents Domingo and Santos,
as they were schedule to attend their class reunion that evening. It was only then that he learned that
complainant Cabati who worked as bookkeeper in said law firm was being accused of forging the
signature of respondent Atty. Yolanda G. Reyno and withdrawing large amounts of money from the
accounts of the Reyno spouses without the latter's consent. When respondent Judge was asked if he could
be a witness to the signing by complainants of their Joint Affidavit, he asked if he could read said
document and talk to them before signing as witness. Judge Lantion claimed that he signed as such
witness only after reading the document and after confirming from the complainants themselves that they
executed said document voluntarily and that they understood the consequences o their execution thereof.

Respondent Judge added that he neither witnessed nor participated in any act of intimidation or threat of
bodily harm against complainants while he was inside the Reyno Law Offices on November 24, 1997.

After a careful study of the complainants' allegations against Judge Lantion and the latter's response
thereto, the Court finds no real and sufficient basis for the charges imputed by complainants upon him.
There is nothing unlawful, immoral nor improper in respondent Judge Lantion's act of signing as witness
the Joint Affidavit of petitioners given the circumstances surrounding it.
A.C. No. 8519. February 22, 2010
EFREN G. BATTAD V. SENATOR MIRIAM PALMA DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

FACTS: In 2010, Efren G. Battad filed a Complaint against Senator Miriam P. Defensor-Santiago for
serious misconduct, violation of PD No. 1829, and Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleged that Sen. Santiago committed the following acts:

4.1. Culpable violation of the Constitution. By her deliberate failure to make a full disclosure of her
financial and business interests;
4.2. Obstruction of apprehension and prosecution of a criminal offense. When her son Alexander
Robert violently died in her house in La Vista, Quezon City, on November 20, 2003, respondent
claimed it was "suicide";
4.3. When appointed as Secretary of Agrarian Reform in 1990, her appointment   was   unanimously
rejected by the Commission on Appointments, then presided by Senate President Jovito Salonga.
The charge against her was graft and corruption for having stolen the Toyota Supra sports car of
Margarita Roxas from the custody of the Bureau of Customs;
4.4. As former Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation in 1988 to 1989, respondent embarked
on her corrupt and notorious "Alien Legalization Program". Under this program, thousands of
aliens who opted to legalize their residence in the Philippines were charged with at least P200,000.00
each;
4.5. Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago is of unsound mind. She appeals to be suffering from a severe
mental disorder, characterized by the following symptoms:
  a. Delusion of grandeur. She wanted to be President of the Philippines; Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court; and a Member of the International Court of Justice. In all of these attempts to be such, she
miserably failed;
  b. Flight of ideas;
  c. Mood swings;
  d. Penchant for lying; and
  e. Paranoia;
 
4.6. Using her position and power as Senator, she gave unwarranted benefits to her husband, brother,
sister, son and cousin by having them appointed to the government posts;
4.7. Repeated disrespect to the Supreme Court, and lack of remorse;

Complainant prayed that Sen. Santiago be disbarred and her name be removed from the Roll of
Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sen. Santiago should be disbarred and her name be removed from the Roll of
Attorneys.

RULING: NO. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
provides:

SECTION 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained
of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
We scrutinized the complaint and we find that the allegations contained therein are mere generalizations,
speculations, malicious insinuations, and conclusions without any factual basis. Contrary to said
deposition, the allegations clearly show that the same are not of complainant's personal knowledge.
Stripped of its unnecessary trimmings, the allegations are pure hearsay. There is no showing at all how, or
from whom, or in what capacity, complainant knew of the aforesaid allegations. Also, an examination of
the 15-page complaint reveals that same is not supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein. No document or so-called authentic records were attached to the
complaint to substantiate the allegations stated therein.

In Angeles vs. Figueroa, we held viz:

It is settled that the power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons. The burden of proof
rests on the complainant and the case against respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Thus, the adage that lie who asserts, not he who denies, must prove'.

As explained by this Court in Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr.:

x x x a mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to support the charge. The reason for this rule is that:

The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and laborious study. It is a lifetime profession. By
years of patience, zeal and ability, the attorney may be able to amass considerable means to support
himself and his family, besides the honor and prestige that accompany his office and profession. To
deprive him of such honored station in life which would result in irreparable injury must require proof of
the highest degree. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends almost entirely on his reputation.
Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored. Private persons, and particularly disgruntled
opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their
rancor on members of the Bar.

Indeed, the power to disbar lawyers should be used with utmost caution and only for serious reasons so as
not to unjustly deprive them of their means of livelihood and distinct reputation in the society. It must be
exercised only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of lawyers as
officers of the court and as members of the bar.

Considering the serious consequence of disbarment, we have consistently held that only clear
preponderant evidence would warrant the imposition of such a harsh penalty. It means that the record
must disclose as free from doubt a case that compels the exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers.
The dubious character of the act done as well as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. In
this case, we find no sufficient justification that calls for the exercise of our disciplinary power.