Professional Documents
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PERSONS Digests Atty Legarda
PERSONS Digests Atty Legarda
KATRINA LEGARDA | 1
NCC1-18
Revised Administrative Code (RAC) Secs. 18-24 [1987]
NCC2
Pesigan v. Angeles
129 SCRA 174
Nature: Petition to review the order of the Caloocan public of the contents of the regulations & make the
City RTC said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all
Facts: Presidential EOs having general applicability should
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the EH SXEOLVKHG LQ WKH 2* ,W SURYLGHV WKDW ³HYHU\ RUGHU
evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their deemed to have general applicability and legal effect.
destination. They were provided with three This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because
certificates: 1) a health certificate from the provincial its confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction
veterinarian, 2) permit to transfer/transport from the makes it a penal statute. It results that they have
provincial commander; and 3) three certificates of cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The
inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were VXPPDU\ FRQILVFDWLRQ ZDVQ¶W LQ RUGHU 7KH UHFLSLHQWV
confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans.
WRZQ¶V SROLFH VWDWLRQ FRPPDQGHU ZKLOH SDVVLQJ However, they cannot transport the carabaos to
through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on Batangas because they are now bound by the said
EO No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of executive order. Neither can they recover damages.
carabaos & carabeef from one province to another. Doctor Miranda & Zenerosa acted in good faith in
ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
Issue:
WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation Judgment:
and forfeiture by the government of carabaos Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of
transported from one province to another, dated the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents
October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in to restore carabaos, with the requisite documents, to
the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982 petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot,
Camarines Sur. No costs.
Held:
1R 7KH VDLG RUGHU LVQ¶W HQIRUFHDEOH DJDLQVW WKH Important point:
3HVLJDQV RQ $SULO EHFDXVH LW¶V D SHQDO Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
regulation published more than 2 mos. later in the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties
OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice &
provided in A2 of the CC & §11 of the Revised fairness dictate that the public must be informed of
$GPLQLVWUDWLYH &RGH 7KH ZRUG ³ODZV´ LQ DUWLFOH that provision by means of the publication on the
includes circulars & regulations which prescribe Gazette.
penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the
Tañada v. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no The publication of presidential issuances of public
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
WKHUHVKDOOEHSXEOLVKHGLQWKH2IILFLDO*D]HWWH«7KH may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
ZRUG³VKDOO´WKHUHLQLPSRVHVXSRQUHVSRQGHQWRIILFLDOV specifically informed of its contents. The Court
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the declared that presidential issuances of general
constitutional right of the people to be informed on application which have not been published have no
matter of public concern is to be given substance and force and effect.
validity.
In Fariñas, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It
Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of does not demand absolute equality among residents;
the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed on the it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election which applies only to those persons falling within a
Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
facto resigned from their respective offices upon their such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since a distinction between those who fall within such class
Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on and those who do not.
appointive officials continues to be operative ± they
are deemed resigned when they file their certificates Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
of candidacy. officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
The petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal They are elected to an office for a definite term and
protection challenge against Section 14, with the end may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
³DSSO\ HTXDOO\´ WR ERWK HOHFWHG DQG DSSRLQWLYH hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto
officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials
created by the Legislature is a reasonable hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
classification, as there are material and significant entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
distinctions between the two classes of officials. pleasure of the appointing authority.
Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the
Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of Another substantial distinction between the two sets
the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
protection clause of the Constitution, failed muster. Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of
We ruled: the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in
The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging
67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials election except to vote. Under the same provision,
as against the appointive ones and violates the equal elective officials, or officers or employees holding
protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous. political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to
take part in political and electoral activities.
The equal protection of the law clause in the
Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of
reasonable classification. If the groupings are the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it
characterized by substantial distinctions that make proper to treat these two classes of officials differently
real differences, one class may be treated and with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office
regulated differently from the other. The Court has of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any
explained the nature of the equal protection position other than those occupied by them. Again, it
guarantee in this manner: is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or
look into the wisdom of this classification.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep.
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive
inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation officials, is anchored upon material and significant
which is limited either in the object to which it is distinctions and all the persons belonging under the
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 3
The SC declared invalid for lack of compliance with Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it
the publication requirement the previous Senate may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of
LQTXLU\LQDLGRIOHJLVODWLRQRQWKH³+HOOR*DUFL´WDSHV Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation
³+RZHYHUWKH6HQDWHPD\QRZFDOOIRUDQHZLQTXLU\ conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
on the same following the publication of the Senate procedurally infirm.
Rules of Procedure in two major dailies last October
´ The Court said that the respondents cannot justify
their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
The Court cited sec. 21, Art. VI of the 1987 publication requirement by arguing that the rules have
Constitution which mandates the publication of the never been amended since 1995 and that they are
rules of procedure of either the Senate or the House published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
of Representatives, or any of its respective DQG DFFHVVLEOH WR WKH SXEOLF DW WKH 6HQDWH¶V LQWHUQHW
committees before it may conduct inquiries in aid of ZHE SDJH ³7KH DEVHQFH RI DQ\ DPHQGPHQW WR WKH
legislation. The requisite of publication of the rules is rules cannot justify WKH6HQDWH¶VGHILDQFHRIWKHFOHDU
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI
process. RI WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ«7KH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO PDQGDWH WR
publish the said rules prevails over any custom,
The SC reiterated its ruling in Neri v. Senate SUDFWLFHRUWUDGLWLRQIROORZHGE\WKH6HQDWH´LWVDLG,W
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and added that tKH UHVSRQGHQWV¶ LQYRFDWLRQ RI WKH
InvestLJDWLRQVWKDWWKHSKUDVH³GXO\SXEOLVKHGUXOHVRI provisions of RA 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of
SURFHGXUH´UHTXLUHVWKH6HQDWHRIHYHU\&RQJUHVVWR 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in WKURXJKWKHLQWHUQHW ZDVLQFRUUHFWVWUHVVLQJWKDW³WKH
aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence of
from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial electronic data messages and/or electronic
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of GRFXPHQWV´ EXW VXFK ³GRHV QRW PDNH WKH LQWHUQHW D
WKH 6HQDWH¶V PHPEHUVKLS WKH FRPSRVLWLRQ RI WKH PHGLXPIRUSXEOLVKLQJODZVUXOHVDQGUHJXODWLRQV´
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
NCC3
F: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and on the land and its improvements, during the
heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the
commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner owner of the land; in clause VII, it was covenanted
the possession of the land and its improvements that w/in 30 days from the date of the contract, the
granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio owner of the land would file a motion in the CFI of
(EA). Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the
improvements on the land acquired as homestead to provisions of RA 496; in clause VIII the parties agreed
secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 that should EA fail to redeem the mortgage w/in the
plus interest. In clause V, the parties stipulated that stipulated period of 4 1/2 yrs, she would execute an
EA was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 yrs, the debt w/ interest absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the
thereon, in w/c event the mortgage would not have mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the
any effect; in clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax loan including unpaid interest; and in clause IX it was
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 4
stipulated that in case the motion to be presented unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
under clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI- acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the
Bataan, the contract of sale of sale would flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts as
automatically become void and the mortgage would found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume
subsist in all its force. that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it the manner of its acquisition, aside from the
came to pass that EA was unable to pay the prohibition contained in Sec. 116. This being the
stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon
its improvements. For this reason, she and the ignorance of the laws.
petitioner entered into another verbal contract Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of be the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be
the land on condition that the latter would not collect such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It
the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the
of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, laws bec. he is not a lawyer. In accepting the
and would introduce improvements thereon. mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the
well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In
receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as taking possession thereof and in consenting to
integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
illegal and void agreements, bec. the such contract is does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits
a lien and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that
of Act No. 2874, as amended. The CA held that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus,
petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of
bec. he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF.
absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may
the land bec. it is prohibited by Sec. 116 of Act 2874. elect to have the improvements introduced by the
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in BF when he petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof,
knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have
of its acquisition, by w/c it is invalidated. the land where the improvements or plants are found,
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner by paying them its market value to be fixed by the
should be deemed a possessor in GF bec. he was court of origin, upon hearing the parties.
Foreigners cannot be any less bound by our laws in our own country
Elegado was a Filipino lawyer representing the foreign company ± shows ignorance of the law.
Facts: :213D\DRDQG'DYLG¶VPDUULDJHLVYDOLG
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David
Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. Held/Ratio:
However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted No. Although the couple had lived together for seven
another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before years (as the affidavit shows and which the Judge
Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was relied on in crafting his decision), Article 34 of the FC
also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David, also requires that there must be no legal impediment
had, prior to the solemnization, issued an affidavit to marry each other. Also in their marriage contract, it
stating that they were both married; however due to ZDV LQGLFDWHG WKDW ERWK ZHUH ³VHSDUDWHG´ 7KH MXGJH
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage
they no longer communicated with them. They lived (regardless of the couple being separated) is a
together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed diriment impediment which would make the
to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of subsequent marriage null and void. And besides, free
gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least
five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
Issue: previous marriage.
Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor- candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo
elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January GHVFULEHG KLPVHOI DV D ³QDWXUDO-ERUQ´ FLWL]HQ RI WKH
1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss
1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the 1983 per the certification from the United States
Comelec a petition fRU WKH DQQXOPHQW RI )ULYDOGR¶V District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
election and proclamation on the ground that he was authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco,
United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in
that he was naturalized in the United States as the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and
alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did
defenses that he had sought American citizenship not find it necessary ² nor do they claim to have
only to protect himself against President Marcos. His been coerced ² to abandon their cherished status as
QDWXUDOL]DWLRQ KH VDLG ZDV ³PHUHO\ IRUFHG XSRQ Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his
himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
persecution by the 0DUWLDO /DZ 'LFWDWRU¶V DJHQWV citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in
DEURDG´+HDOVRDUJXHGWKDWWKHFKDOOHQJHWRKLVWLWOH accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA
should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
petition that should have been filed within 10 days Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He
of the Omhibus Election Code. failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a
Issue: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the person sitting as provincial governor in this country
Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January while owing exclusive allegiance to another country
1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by
Held: The Commission on Elections has the primary the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
contests relating to the election, returns and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications of the members of the Congress and will of the people as expressed through the ballot
elective provincial and city officials. However, the cannot cure the vice of ineligibilityQualifications for
GHFLVLRQ RQ )ULYDOGR¶V FLWL]HQVKLS KDV DOUHDG\ EHHQ public office are continuing requirements and must be
made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the possessed not only at the time of appointment or
Solicitor General, who categorically claims that HOHFWLRQRUDVVXPSWLRQRIRIILFHEXWGXULQJWKHRIILFHU¶V
)ULYDOGR LV D IRUHLJQHU 7KH 6ROLFLWRU¶V VWDQFH LV entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications
assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of
represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that Sorsogon.
the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of
Gregorio vs. CA
G.R. No. L-22802 (November 29, 1968)
Aruego vs CA
254 SCRA 711
o Attendance to school problems Issue: WON the FC (where action for compulsory
o Calling and allowing to his office recognition of illegitimate children prescribes upon
o Introducing them as children to death of parent) can be applied in the case
family friends.
x LC held that Antonia is illegitimate daughter Held: NO. The case was filed prior to the effectivity of
while Evelyn is not FC. Its retroactive application will impair vested rights
x Respondent invoked A285 of CC, while of respondent to have case decided under A285 of
petitioners contend that FC is applicable CC. Private respondent was a minor when it was filed,
because the case was decided after its an exception provided in A285.
effectivity
Cang vs CA
296 SCRA 128
A256 of the FC provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or actual rights in
accordance to the CC and other laws.
FC August 3, 1988: A188; consent of adoption: SHUVRQWREHDGRSWHGLIparents by nature
Francisco vs CA
299 SCRA 188
Facts: Held: NO. The party who invokes A160 must prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during
Petitioner Teresita Francisco is the wife of respondent the marriage. Proof of acquisition during overture is a
(XVHELR)UDQFLVR(XVHELR¶VFKLOGUHQE\WKHILUVW condition sine qua non for the operation of the
marriage are also respondents in the case. The presumption in favor of conjugal partnership. This
spouses have acquired a sari-sari store, a residential presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, and
house and lot, an apartment house, and an additional convincing evidence. Petitioner, however, admitted
house and lot, which were all administered by that Eusebio brought the land into their marriage, and
Eusebio until he was invalidated by tuberculosis, evidence showed that he inherited it from his parents.
KHDUWGLVHDVHDQGFDQFHU(XVHELR¶VFKLOGUHQE\WKH The property should be regarded as his own
first marriage succeeded in securing a general power exclusively pursuant to A148 of CC. Essentially,
of attorney from their father which authorized property owned by a spouse prior to the marriage,
Conchita (one of the children) to administer the house and brought to the marriage, is considered as his/her
and lot and the apartment. Petitioner filed a case for separate property. Acquisitions by lucrative title are
the annulment of the general power of attorney and to properties acquired gratuitously by inheritance,
be declared administratix of the properties. Trial court devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it was
rendered judgment in favor of the private DFTXLUHG GXULQJ WKH PDUULDJH LV LW LV (XVHELR¶V
respondents, saying that petitioner failed to prove that exclusive property by virtue of lucrative title. Also, the
the properties were acquired during the marriage. CA fact that the land was registered in the name of
affirmed the decision of the trial court. ³(XVHELR)UDQFLVFRPDUULHGWR7HUHVLWD)UDQFLVFR´LV
no proof that the property was acquired during the
Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that the properties are VSRXVHV¶ FRYHUHG WR ,W LV PHUHO\ GHVFULSWLYH RI WKH
not conjugal but capital civil status of Eusebio. Finally, Eusebio was not
suffering from serious illness to impair his fitness to
administer his property.
NCC6
Quitclaims were prepared and readied by PEFTOK and employees were forced to sign the same for fear that they
would not be given their salary on pay day, and worse, their services would be terminated if they did not sign the said
quitclaims under controversy.
NO VOLUNTARINESS
The contention of the petitioners that the respondents had waived their right of first refusal is not supported by
evidence. (requirements of waiver)
DM Consunji vs. CA
G.R. No. 137873 (April 20, 2001)
The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the
Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at
bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her
claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
NCC7
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3
Rationale of CA: Upon the repeal of the Usury Law by Central Bank Circular No. 905 on 22 December 1982, there is
no more interest ceiling or maximum rate of interest, and the rate will just depend on the mutual agreement of the
parties.
,QWHUHVWDWSHUPRQWKRUSHUDQQXPLVLQLTXLWRXVRUXQFRQVFLRQDEOHDQGKHQFHFRQWUDU\WRPRUDOVµFRQWUD
ERQRVPRUHV¶LIQRWDJDLQVWWKHODZ
It is more consonant with justice that the said interest rate be reduced equitably.
An interest of 12% per annum is deemed fair and reasonable.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the interest rate of
72% per annum is ordered reduced to 12 % per annum
SC holds that the Family Code Act of 1997 did not empower the family courts to exclusively issue writs of habeas
corpus and it did not revoke the capacity of SC and CA to issue writs of habeas corpus. In relation to the word
³H[FOXVLYH´DOWKRXJKLWLVDVVXmed that the language of the laws should follow common understanding, the spirit of
the law and intention of the lawmakers come first than legal technicalities.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
NCC8
De Roy vs. CA
157 SCRA 757
The interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law (legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet)
7KHLQWHQGPHQWRIWKHODZKDVEHHQWRFRQILQHWKHPHDQLQJRIµSV\FKRORJLFDOLQFDSDFLW\¶WRWKHPRVWVHULRXVFDVHVRI
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. ± citing the Canon Law
NCC9
RPC5
NCC 10-12
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XII Sec. 5
Rules of Court Rule 129 (2), (3)
Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in
by society for so long a time has to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and
that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in
unloading his wagon.
Alonzo vs Padua
150 SCRA 379
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the
petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their
co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.
NCC13
cf. Rules of Court (ROC) Rule 22
RAC Sec. 31
Armigos v. CA
179 SCRA 1
Namarco v. Tecson
29 SCRA 70
<HDUVGHILQHGDVGD\VPRQWKVDUHRIGD\VQRWWKH³QDWXUDO´RU³VRODU´PRQWKVXQOHVVWKH\DUHGHVLJQDWHGE\
name. (Spanish Code)
Change in legislation should be done by the congress re: NCC13
Go v. Dizon
214 SCRA 41
[Concurring Opinion, J. Regalado]
RIWKH,QWHULP5XOHVDQG*XLGHOLQHVSURPXOJDWHGE\WKLV&RXUWWRLPSOHPHQW%3FOHDUO\VWDWHV³3HUIHFWLRQRI
Appeal ± in cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to
DSSHDOE\DQ\SDUW\´
Quiqui v. Boncaros
11 SCRA 416
Their Motion for Reconsideration, although dated August 16, 1979, was filed with the trial court on August 17, 1979 or
one day beyond the 30-day reglementary period prescribed by Section 3 of Rule 41.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 9
SEC. 3. How appeal is taken. ² Appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court
within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.
The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37
NCC15
cf. FC26par.2
Barreto v. Gonzales
58 Phil 67
Matrimonial residence of the couple has always been the Philippines (both Filipinos), the residence acquired in the
State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not
confere jurisdiction upon the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
Tenchavez v. Escaño
15 SCRA 355
There being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there rises a presumption that it is the same as that of
Philippine law..Santiago (grandfather) was not pressed by the CID to prove the laws of China relating to marriage,
having been content with his testimony that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese
occupation of China.
NCC17
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 10
x Held that a power of attorney executed in Germany, should be tested as to its formal validity by the laws of that
country and not by the provisions of the CC.
x Government v Frank ± contract was entered into in Illinois by a minor in the Philippines but had the capacity in
Illinois.
NCC19-22
People v. Ritter
194 SCRA 690
Moral and exemplary damages DUH DZDUGHG WR WKH YLFWLP¶V KHLUV GHVSLWH DFTXLWWDO RI DFFXVHG RQ JURXQGV RI
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Doctrin (Urbano v IAC) a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable.
The provisions of the NCC oh Human Relations are merely guides for human conduct in the absence of specific legal
provisions and definite contractual stipulations. The Code of By-laws of the Society contains specific provisions
governing the term of office of petitioner.
To find the existence of a abuse of right, the following elements must be present:
i. There is a legal right or duty;
ii. Which is exercised in bad faith;
iii. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only
LQWKHH[HUFLVHRIRQH¶VULJKWVEXWDOVRLQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIRQH¶VGXWLHV These standards are the following: act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
NCC37-39
NCC4O-41
1987 Constitution, Art II Sec 12
P D 603 [Child and Youth Welfare Code], Art 5
FC 164
RPCArts.256²259
Roe v Wade
41OUS 113, 93SCt 705, 35Led 2d147
Geluz v. CA
2 SCRA 801
Quimiging v. Icao
34 SCRA 134
De Jesus v. Syquia
58 Phil 866
NCC 42
Service of summons on a dead person is void. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.
Eugenio v. Velez
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 12
A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves
to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
PD\EHFRQVLGHUHGOHJDOO\³PDUULHG´LQFRPPRQODZMXULVGLFWLRQVEXWQRWLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV
Right to bury a dead person does not include a common law husband who is still married.
Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 (October 27, 1989)
'HDWKRI0U0DUFRVKDVQRWFKDQJHGWKHIDFWXDOVFHQDULRXQGHUZKLFKWKH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQZDVUHQGHUHG
The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased.
NCC 43
ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 (jj) - (kk)(1989 Rev. Rules on Evidence)
Joaquin v. Navarro
93 Phil 257
NCC 44-47
Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (Corp. Code), Secs. 2, 4, 17
NCC 1767-1768
Barlin v. Ramirez
7 Phil 41
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Issue: WON the Catholic Church is the rightful owner
Camarines. Willard, J.: of the Church?
Facts: Ramirez, having been appointed parish priest Held: Yes.
by the plaintiff Barlin, took possession of the Church Ratio: The Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity
in 1901 until a successor had been appointed in 1902. in the Philippine Islands, and under Article 46 of the
Defendant Ramirez refused to surrender the Church Civil Code, Juridical persons may acquire and
and Barlin filed a suit; the municipality of Lagonoy possess property of all kinds as well as incur
joined Ramirez as defendants, claiming possession obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
DQG RZQHUVKLS RI WKH &KXUFK DQG FRQWHVWLQJ %DUOLQ¶V conformity with the laws and regulations of their
authority and capacity to order that Ramirez be organization.
replaced and surrender the Church to the appointed Disposition: Judgment of the Lower Court affirmed.
successor.
It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has
claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without
interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.
a. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his
property
b. ,QRUGHUIRUGRQDWLRQRISURSHUW\WREHYDOLGZKDWLVFUXFLDOLVWKHGRQRU¶VFDSDFLW\WRJLYHFRQVHQWDWWKHWLPHRI
the donation.
NCC38-39
R.A. 6809
A.M. NO: 03-02-05-SC Rules on Guardianship
Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution {cf. Sangguniang Kabataan]
Marriage, FC 5; cf. R.A. 6809
NCC 1327
NCC 1390 (par. 1)
NCC 1403 (par. 3)
NCC 1397
NCC 1399
NCC 1489
NCC 1426 ² 1427
Mercado v. Espiritu
37 Phil 215
Bambalan v. Maramba
51 Phil 417
Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu, herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of
legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid
consideration.
The circumstance that about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the appeallants of
KLV PLQRULW\ LV RI QR PRPHQW EHFDXVH DSSHOOHH¶V SUHYLRXV PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ KDG DOUHDG\ HVWRSSHG KLP IURP
disavowing the contract.
Braganza v. Villa-Abrille
105 Phil 456
Facts: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision
De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in of the CA which found them similarly liable due to their
consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained
P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the previous sources in Jurisprudence ± ³LQ RUGHU WR KROG
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not
Because they have no paid, Abrille is sued them in constructive. It has been held that his mere silence
March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA when making a contract as to his age does not
held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an
contract they signed.The family petitioned to review DFWLRQRIGHFHLW´
the decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the
solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2% interest, contract, are still liable to pay the actual amount they
praying for consideration of the minority of the have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that
Braganza sons when they signed the contract. even if the written contract is unenforceable because
Issue: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the
respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan extent that they may have profited by the money
they have signed. received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is
Held: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine
pay her share in the contract because they minority of money is equivalent to P1,166.67.
her sons does not release her from liability. She is
ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 15
RPC 12(2)-(3)
Republic Act No. 9344, Juvenile Justiè~ and Welfare Law
RPC13(2)
PD 603 Sees. 189 ² 204
Also see: Rule 3, Section 5 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
FC 45 (2)
NCC 1327 (1), 1328
RPC 12(1)
Rule 101, Rules of Court
US v. Vaquilar
27 Phil 88
Facts: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his Held: The evidence is insufficient to declare him
wife and his daughter, as well as injuring other LQVDQH 7KH DSSHOODQW¶V FRQGXFW ZDV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK
persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses testified that the the acts of an enraged criminal, not of a person with
defendant appeared to be insane prior to the an unsound mind at the time he committed the
commission of the crimes. They also testified that the crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not
appellant was complaining of pains in his head and conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of
VWRPDFK SULRU WR WKH NLOOLQJ 7KH ZLWQHVVHV¶ HYLGHQFH ³FUD]\´ LV QRW V\QRQ\PRXV ZLWK WKH OHJDO WHUPV
for insanity include: ³LQVDQH´ 7KH FRQGXFW RI WKH DSSHOODQW DIWHU KH ZDV
x ³DSSHOOants eyes were very big and red with confined in jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a
his sight penetrating at the time he was sane person (not saying a word in the cell, crying out
NLOOLQJKLVZLIH´ loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after
x ³KHORRNHGDWPHKHZDVFUD]\EHFDXVHLIKH the commission of the crime.
ZDVQRWKHZRXOGQ¶WKDYHNLOOHGKLVIDPLO\´ The court further held that mere mental depravity, or
x DW WKH PRPHQW RI FXWWLQJ WKRVH SHRSOH ³KH moral insanity which results not from any disease of
looked like a madman; crazy because he the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral
ZRXOGFXWDQ\ERG\DWUDQGRP´ system where the person is mentally sane, does not
x VLVWHU VDLG ³«WKHQ KH SXUVXHG PH«KH exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the
PXVWKDYHEHHQFUD]\EHFDXVHKHFXWPH´ absence of proof that the defendant had lost his
Issue: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are reason or became demented after a few moments
sufficient to declare the accused as insane, therefore prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is
exempt from criminal liability. presumed that he was in a normal state of mind.
People v. Rafanan
204 SCRA 65
Facts: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, not the appellant, was incapable of entering into
including the appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted contract at the time the bond was executed on
as surety to the loan. The CFI of Manila ordered the December 15, 1908.
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs Held: The court affirmed the trial court decision that
SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of Villanueva possessed the capacity to act. The SC
execution, Elisa Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared held that there is no evidence to warrant the
and alleged that her husband was declared insane on conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person
July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane
authorized by the court as guardian to institute the and therefore is deranged and incapable of binding
proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several himself in a contract. From the testimony of his wife,
bonds given by her husband while in a state of it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever
insanity. he wished, that he had property of his own and was
Issues: (1)Whether or not suffering from monomania not deprived of its management, as well as the fact
of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the that he had never squandered any large sum of
person does not have capacity to act. (2) Whether or money.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 16
As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that none at the time of the execution of the said bond on
showed that at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife
December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of never before sought to legally deprive her husband
acting because of insanity. The witnesses who as management over his estate knowing full well that he
physicians, testified that they observed insane periods was insane.
in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but
RPC 31,41
FC 150-15; cfFC 87
NCC 1490
NCC 2035
cf. NCC 963-967
cf. Art. IV, Sees. 1-5, 1987 Constitution
NCC381²396
NCC 1381, 1491, 2236
Villanueva vs CA
GR No 114870 (May 26, 1995)
352',*$/ ³JDPEOHU´DZD\IURPKRPHVOLJKWO\LQFRPSHWHQW
Husband and wife cannot sell or donate to each other
Affinity by blood
o Always start from self
o Parents ± 1st degree
o Brothers/Sisters ± 2nd
o Cousins ± 4th
o Grandparents ± 2nd
o Aunts/Uncles ± 3rd
o <RXUEURWKHU¶VZLIHLVQRW\RXUUHODWLYHE\EORRGRUDIILQLW\
NCC5O
cf. FC 55, 101, 149, 152, 101
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 8, 1995 ± Marcos filed her Certificate of April 24, 1995 ± COMELEC Second Division by a
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that found
First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election 0RQWHMR¶V SHWLWLRQ IRU GLVTXDOLILFDWLRQ PHULWRULRXV
Supervisor. 0DUFRV¶ FRUUHFWHG FHUWLILFDWH RI FDQGLGDF\ YRLG DQG
her original certificate cancelled.
March 23, 1995 ± Montejo, incumbent of and
candidate for the same position, filed a petition for May 7, 1995 ± COMEL(& HQ EDQF GHQLHG 0DUFRV¶
cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution drafted
alleging that Marcos did not meet the residency on April 24.
requirement.
March 29, 1995 ± Marcos filed an May 11, 1995 ± COMELEC issued another Resolution
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the DOORZLQJ0DUFRV¶SURFODPDWLRQWRWKHRIILFHVKRXOGWKH
&20(/(&¶V KHDG RIILFH LQ ,QWUDPXURV FODLPLQJ WKDW results of the canvass show that she obtained the
her error in the first certificate was the result of an highest number of votes. However, this was reversed
³KRQHVW PLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ DQG WKDW VKH KDV DOZD\V and instead directed that the proclamation would be
³PDLQWDLQHG 7DFOREDQ &LW\ DV KHU GRPLFLOH RU suspended even if she did win.
UHVLGHQFH´
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 17
May 25, 1995 ± In a supplemental petitition, Marcos and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881,
declared that she was the winner of the said it is evident that the respondent Commission does not
Congressional election. lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even
Issues/ Held/Ratio: after the elections.
(1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency (3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral
required to be a voter, and thus candidate, of the first Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the question of
district of Leyte. WKHSHWLWLRQHU¶VTXDOLILFDWLRns after the elections.
Facts:
Atienza, visiting his house in Makati wherein he has Issue:
two children with De Castro, saw the respondent WON the judge can contract a second marriage
Judge Brillantes sleeping in his bed. The houseboy without a judicial declaration of nullity.
claimed that the judge had been cohabiting with De
Castro. Atienza files charges on the judge on the Held/Ratio:
ground that the respondent is already married and No. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered
has five children. Judge denies the claim of being into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988
PDUULHG VWDWLQJ WKDW WKH DOOHJHG XQLRQ ZDVQ¶W YDOLG regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides,
because it lacked a marriage license. Although upon under Article 256 of the FC, said Article is given
WKHUHTXHVWRIWKHZRPDQ¶VSDUHQWVWKH\KHOGDQRWKHU ³UHWURDFWLYH HIIHFW´ VLQFH LW GRHV QRW SUHMXGLFH RU
PDUULDJH FHUHPRQ\ ODWHU WKDW \HDU WKH\ VWLOO GLGQ¶W impair any vested right. His failure to secure a
apply for a marriage license. The woman abandoned marriage license on two possible occasions betrays
the Judge nineteen years ago leaving their children to his sinister motives and bad faith as a lawyer and
his care. He claims that Article 40 of the Family Code judge.
does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was thus governed Dismissed from service.
by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage on 1991, governed by the Family Code.
The right of children to seek recognition granted by the NCC to illegitimate children who were still minors at the
time the FC took effect cannot be impaired. NCC185 allows an illegitimate child to file for recognition within 4 years
of attaining age of majority, thus gave child a vested right which the FC cannot impair.
FC1
Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
35 Phils 252
Facts: ,668( :21 DUW LV DEVROXWH DQG WKHUHIRUH FDQ¶W
-‐ Jan 7, 1915 ± parties were legally married grant wife any support since she was the one who left
but after a month woman left because of home
gross acts by her husband -‐ Person obliged to give support can either
-‐ Marriage ± a contract in so far as civil effects pay the pension fixed or receive and
are concerned requiring consent of parties maintain in his home the person.
o After marriage ceremony, a HELD: NO
conjugal partnership is formed -‐ Separation is different from support given to
between the 2 wife as agreed upon in the contract they
o Reciprocal rights arise and legal entered into when they got married when
existence becomes one husband promised to support wife.
o Termination of it should result in -‐ Wife is still part of conjugal domicile even if
some relief VKHGRHVQ¶WOLYHLQKRXVHDQ\PRUH
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 20
Sermonia v. CA
233 SCRA 155
Prescription period for the filing of a Bigamy case starts at the discovery of the subsequent marriage.
Constructive notice does not apply to bigamous marriages since the essence of such marriages is to conceal the
first marriage and deceive the first spouse.
Perido v. Perido
63 SCRA 97
A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take place.
In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and
wife are presumed married.
People v. Malabago
G.R. No. 115686 (December 2, 1996)
Parricide case, need to establish marital relationship in order to prosecute the crime of parricide. The best
proof of marriage is a marriage certificate. To prove a marriage in the absence of a marriage certificate, oral
evidence will suffice as long as it is not objected.
A wife is solely liable for the damages caused by a contract she entered individually, since under FC 73 wives can
work without the consent of husband.
Trinidad vs CA
G.R. No. 118904 (April 20, 1998)
The absence of a marriage certificate does not mean that the marriage did not take place.
Evidence of marriage:
1.) marriage certificate
2.) witness to ceremony
3.) public and open cohabitation
baptismal certificates indicating the marital relationship
De Jacob vs CA
312SCRA772
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the
offeror establishes its due execution and subsequent loss. The fact of a marriage may be shown by extrinsic
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Due execution and loss of marriage certificate constitutes a condition
sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents
Silverio vs Republic
(October 22, 2007)
For marriage purposes (and everything else for that matter) a male is defined as the sex that bears spermatozoa,
while the female is the sex that bears ova. A medical sex change does not change the these physical attributes.
Panganiban v. Borromeo
58 Phil 367
A notarized contract that permits concubinage and adultery, barring the opposition of a spouse is not judicially
recognizable. Although the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes, the acts are still
contrary to customs, good morals and against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 21
In re Santiago
70 Phil 66
Facts: Respondent lawyer prepared for a married Issue: Whether Santiago should be disbarred from the
couple (who had bee separated for 9 years) a practice of law
document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia, that Held: The respondent was suspended from practice
they authorize each other to marry again, at the same of law for one year for having been ignorant of the law
time renouncing whatever right of action one might or being careless for giving legal advice by trying to
have against the other. When the husband inquired if beak the marriage through a private contract. The
there could be no trouble, respondent lawyer pointed document is contrary to law, good morals and public
to his diploma which was hanging on the wall and order. Marriage is an inviolable social institution that
VDLG ³, ZRXOG WHDU WKDW RII LI WKLV GRFXPHQW WXUQV RXW cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the
QRWWREHYDOLG´7KHKXVEDQGUHPDUULHG parties.
Selanova v. Mendoza
64 SCRA 69
FACTS: The case stems from a document prepared of conjugal partnership without court approval.
and ratified by Judge Alejandro Mendoza which Mendoza, in his defense, claimed that he ratified the
extrajudicially divided the assets of the Selanova document on the pretext that Saturnino Selanova and
couple, effectively authorized the spouses to commit his wife Avelina Ceniza would later seek the approval
marital infidelity and ratified their personal separation of the courts. The law requires, however, that prior
without the express and prior approval of the court. approval of the court be sought by the parties seeking
the dissolution of conjugal partnership during the
ISSUE: WON the private contract is valid. marriage in order for it to have the effect and force of
law. Clearly, Judge Martinez erred in ratifying this
HELD: No. Even before the enactment of the New arrangement. The contract as it stands is not
Civil Code, the law prohibits extrajudicial dissolution judicially recognizable and is therefore void.
Lichauco-de Leon v. CA
186 SCRA 345
The issue in this case is whether or not a letter pardoning one spouse is valid. In this case it waVQ¶W VLQFH WKH
consent of de Leon was vitiated as the girl threatened to file cases against the guy, scandalizing their entire family.
Domalagan v. Bolifer
33 Phil 471
Facts:
x In November 1909, Jorge Domalagan and Issue:
Carlos Bolifer entered into a conrtract by
virtue of the terms of which Domalagan was WON the verbal contract entered into in regard to the
to pay Bolifer P500 upon the marriage of his delivery of the money by reason of a prospective
VRQ&LSULDQRWR%ROLIHU¶VGDXJKWHU%RQLIDFLD marriage valid and effective?
x In August 1910, Domalagan completed his
obligation by paying Bolifer P500 plus P16 Held:
as token of future marriage. Yes. Par. 3 Sec 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil
x Bonifacia Boliger joined in lawful wedlock to Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A
Laureano Sisi in Agusut 1910 contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of the said
x Upon learning the marriage, Domalagan section, that parties will be unable to prove it. Said
demanded the return of P516 plus interest section simply provides the method by which the
and damages (he was obliged to sell real contracts mentioned therein may be proved. It does
property belonging to him in order to raise not declare that said contracts are invalid. A contract
P500) may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not
x CFI ruled in favor of Domalagan and clothed with the necessary form. If the parties to an
concluded that he delivered to Bolifer the action make no objection to the admissibility of oral
sum of P516 and that Carlos Bolifer evidence to support contracts like the one in question
received and did not return said amount and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
x Bolifer appealed to the SC
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 22
other than in writing, it will just be as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.
Cabague v. Auxilio
92 Phil 294
The verbal agreement to marry must be proven by the proper party: the person involved in the agreement
(one of the people getting married)
Hermosisima v. CA
109 Phil 629
Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing apart from right to recover money or property
advanced upon faith of such promise. Damages can be claim if seduction was involved though, in this case the
dude being 10 years younger than the girl, seduction could not have been present says the SC.
Wassmer v. Velez
12 SCRA 648
Tanjanco v. CA
18 SCRA 994
Baksh v, CA
219 SCRA 115
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 23
promise but because of the intent and deceit employment reiterates his intention to merely
involved, provided that such injury should have fool or deceit Marilou into sexual congress by
been committed in a manner that is contrary to proposing to her.
morals, good customs, and public policy. Blatant disregard to Art. 19 which directs every
*DVKDP¶V FRQGHVFHQGLQJ UHPDUNV UHJDUGLQJ person to act with justice, giver everyone his due and
0DULORX¶V LJQREOH birth, inferior educational observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his
background, poverty, and dishonorable rights and in the performance of his obligations.
De Mijares vs Villaluz
274 SCRA 1
Promise to marry case. Seduction is more than a promise to marry for sex, it involves deceit, enticement, abuse of
confidence in order to get laid. Since the parties have been having sex regularly for 2 years, seduction cannot apply
since the regularity of the act shows voluntariness and mutual passion. Thus girl cannot recover for damages.
Mallion vs Alcantara
506 SCRA 336
Sought annulment on the grounds of psych incapacity, the case was dismissed. Filed again for annulment on the
grounds of lack of marriage license. The court said that since both cases involved the same issue and the same
remedy its Res Judicata. QRWH PD¶DP VD\V WKLV GHFLVLRQ LV ZURQJ 0RULJR LV FRUUHFW ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKLV
issue).
Te vs. Choa
G.R. No. 149530 (October 22, 2001)
2XWFRPH RI DQQXOPHQW FDVH KDG QR EHDULQJ RQ WKH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI $UWKXU¶V LQQRFence or guilt in bigamy case.
Ground for annulment cited by petitioner was for voidable marriage. Therefore, at the time he committed the
crime of bigamy, marriage was still valid and subsisting.
Anaya vs Palaroan
(November 26, 1970)
Villanueva vs CA
505 Scra 564
)RUFHDQGLQWLPLGDWLRQLVQRPRPHQWVLQFHKHZDVDVHFXULW\JXDUG,QWKHOLJKWRIDSSHOODQW¶VDGPLVVLRQWKDWKHKDGD
sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his fDLOXUHWRDWWULEXWHWKHODWWHU¶VSUHJQDQF\WRDQ\RWKHU
man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
FC 35: The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other
FC45(4);NCC1335²1337
FC 45 (5)
FC45(6)
Jimenez v. Cañizares
109 Phil 27
Facts: -‐ 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for
-‐ Aug 3, 1950 ±Joel Jimenez and Remedios reconsideration since impotency was never really
Canizares wed established. Rather than nullifying marriage Court
-‐ 7 June 1955 the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a should have compelled her to undergo and
decree annulling his marriage in the Court of First examination
Instance of Zamboanga. This was because her ISSUE: WON marriage may be annulled on sole
vagina was too small for his member and thus testimony of husband that his wife is impotent
WKH\FRXOGQ¶WFRSXODWHDQGWKXVVKHLVLPSRWHQW HELD: NO
-‐ 14 June 1955 - wife was summoned and served -‐ law specifically enumerates the legal grounds,
a copy of the complaint. She did not file an that must be proved to exist by indubitable
answer evidence, to annul a marriage.
-‐ 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order Not proven in this case since wife has
requiring the defendant to submit to a physical been unresponsive. Court says that it
examination by a competent lady physician to may not so much be indifference as it is
determine her physical capacity for copulation that she is shy and embarrassed about
-‐ 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree the situation
annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and o RESULT: presumption is in favor of potency.
the defendant since plaintiff had no response Case is thus remanded to lower court for further
whatsoever proceedings.
Republic v. CA
236 SCRA 257
The duty of the civil registrar is to keep record of all applications for marriages. Thus, its certification is valuable. Their
PDUULDJHZDV³VHFUHW´, thus there is failure to offer other witnesses to corroborate her testimony. Also, Edwin failed to
answer and was declared in default.
Cosca v. Palaypayan
237 SCRA 249
Illegal Solemnization of marriage: He solemnized marriage without the requisite of marriage license. He did not
sign their marriage contracts.
Sy vs. CA
G.R. No. 127263 (April 12, 2000)
Filipina did not expressly state in her petition the incongruity between the date of issuance of marriage license and
date of marriage ceremony. License was issued a year after marriage ceremony. Thus, marriage was contracted
without marriage license. Thus under Art 80 of NCC, marriage is void.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Art 53 of NCC. Their marriage contract reflects a
marriage license number. A certification was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The
certification is precise since it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued. Issuance of
a marriage license where none of the parties is resident, is just an irregularity.
marriage is still valid even if the marriage license is issued in a place not the domicile of the parties
FC9-10
PC 11
Sevilla vs Cardenas
497 SCRA 429
FC 15- 19
P.D. 965
FC2O
FC 24-25
Leda v. Tabang
206 SCRA 395
stating that they were both married; however due to relied on in crafting his decision), Article 34 of the FC
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and also requires that there must be no legal impediment
they no longer communicated with them. They lived to marry each other. Also in their marriage contract, it
together as husband & wife for 7 years. Judge agreed ZDV LQGLFDWHG WKDW ERWK ZHUH ³VHSDUDWHG´ 7KH MXGJH
to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage
gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. (regardless of the couple being separated) is a
diriment impediment which would make the
Issue: subsequent marriage null and void. And besides, free
:213D\DRDQG'DYLG¶VPDUULDJHLVYDOLG and voluntary cohabitation with another for at least
five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
Held/Ratio: previous marriage.
No. Although the couple had lived together for seven
years (as the affidavit shows and which the Judge
validity of marriage can be collaterally attacked even in an action for support. Such will determine the
legitimacy/illegitimacy of the child
Republic vs Dayot
G.R. No. 175581 (March 28, 2008)
FC7,10,31&32
NCC 56, 74, 76
R.A. 7160 (1991 Local Government Code), Secs. 444(b)(1)(xviii), 445 (b)(1)(xviii)
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-2007
Guidelines On The Solemnization Of Marriage
By The Members Of The Judiciary
Aranes vs Occiano
380 SCRA 402
Facts: and said that she had filed the case in a fit of rage but
Arañes filed charges against Judge Occiano of for Court still decided the case.
GrosV,JQRUDQFHRI/DZ2FFLDQRVROHPQL]HG$UDxHV¶
marriage without the requisite marriage license in Issue:
ODWWHU¶V KRXVH ZKLFK LV RXWVLGH MXGJH¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ WON the marriage was valid with regards to the lack
Arañes was not able to claim her right to inherit his RI D PDUULDJH OLFHQVH DQG WKH ODFN RI WKH MXGJH¶V
GHFHDVHG KXVEDQG¶V SURSHUW\ DQG VKH ZDV GHSULYHG jurisdiction.
oI UHFHLYLQJ KHU KXVEDQG¶V SHQVLRQ 2FFLDQR DYHUV
WKDW WKH FHUHPRQ\ WRRN SODFH LQ $UDxHV¶ KRXVH Held/Ratio:
because the groom had a difficulty walking & he No. Judges can only solemnize marriage within their
FRXOGQ¶W VWDQG WUDYHOLQJ -XGJH ZDV DZDUH WKDW WKHUH territorial jurisdiction. Marriage license is a requisite
was no marriage license but due to the pleas of the for marriage and without it, marriage is void. It is the
couple and everything was prepared already and the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
visitors were there, he agreed to solemnize the authority to solemnize a marriage. And since there
PDUULDJH +H UHPLQGHG WKHP WKDW PDUULDJH ZRQ¶W EH was no license, Occiano GLGQ¶W KDYH WKH DXWKRULW\ WR
valid without the license. They promised to give it officiate the ceremony
within the day but they never did. Arañes desisted
Navarro v. Domagtoy
S.C. A.M. MTJ-96-1088 (July 19, 1996)
Villar v. Paraiso
96 Phil 659
Paraiso was disqualified when he ran for mayor while he was still holding a religious position granting him the
power to solemnize marriages
FC 4; FC 35 (2)
RPC 352
cf.
Tenchavez v. Escaño(supra)
FC23-24
FC4
FC3(3);FC6cf.FC33,FC8
Martinez v. Tan
12 Phil 731
Facts: Issue:
Rosalia Martinez was visiting her brother in WON the marriage is valid.
Palompon, Leyte. She met Angel Tan there and they
were married by a Justice of Peace. Tan and Martinez Held/Ratio:
first submitted a petition requesting the Justice to Yes. They were married since there was an
solemnize their marriage. Upon arriving at the office expression of mutual consent and both of them
of the justice, they signed another document to ratify appeared before the justice of the peace. Court ruled
their petition under oath. Then the marriage was WKDW *HQHUDO 2UGHUV 1R 6HF VWDWHV ³1R
solemnized and a marriage certificate was signed by particular form for the ceremony of marriage is
Tan, Martinez, Ballori and witnesses Esmero and required, but the parties must declare in the presence
Pacita Ballori. The couple did not live together and solemnizing the marriage that they take each other as
when Martinez went home to Ormoc, her relatives KXVEDQG DQG ZLIH´ /HWWHUV RI 0DUWLQH] WR 7DQ
convinced her to file charges claiming that the regarding the marriage and asking for her parents
marriage was not valid since she signed the consent are proof that marriage took place and is
document in her own home thinking that it was a valid. Parties ratified their petition under oath. They
paper authorizing Tan to ask the consent of her both understood Spanish thus they knew the contents
parents to the marriage. of the document they were signing.
FC 8; FC 28-29; FC 32-33
FC6;FC22
Madridejo v. De Leon
55 Phil 1
People v. Borromeo
133 SCRA 106
Facts:
Elias Borromeo was convicted beyond reasonable Held/Ratio:
doubt of the crime of parricide after killing his wife. Yes. Mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in
There were witnesses and police officers who testified the marriage registry does not invalidate the marriage,
against him. He claims that he cannot be charged provided all requisites for its validity are present.
with parricide (and thus, only homicide) since he was People living together in apparent matrimony are
never legally married to the victim because (a) presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption
officiating priest testified against it and (b) no or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
marriage contract was executed. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus
Issue: hold themselves out as being, they would be living in
WON Borromeo can be considered married to the constant violation of decency and law.
victim.
NCC 17
NCC15&17
FC 26; FC 21, FC 10
Aside from failure to show the documents of marriage, Chinese customs on marriage were not proven by Yao
Kee.
Facts:
Orbecido married Villanueva in the Philippines and Held/Ratio:
had two children. Villanueva, wife, left for the US, was Taking into consideration legislative intent and
naturalized and eventually remarried. Orbecido applying the rule of reason, Par. 2 Art 26 should be
petitioned for authority to remarry using Par. 2 of interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at
$UWLFOH )& 1R RSSRVLWLRQ 26*¶V PRWLRQ IRU the time of the celebration of the marriage were
reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
stating: that the questioned provision only applies to naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
valid mixed marriages between Filipinos and aliens; degree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
that the remedy is annulment or legal separation; and allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
WKDW WKHUH LV QR ODZ WKDW JRYHUQV UHVSRQGHQW¶V foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
situation. marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.
Issue:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, The reckoning point in the provision is not the
where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
remarry under Philippine law? capacitating the latter to remarry.
FC26inrelation to:
FC 35(1), 35(4), 35(5), 36, 37 & 38
cf. NCC 71
DOJ Opinion No. 11 S. 1990 (Jan. 17, 1990)
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 31
FC 147,cf.RPC 350
Rule 131 Sec. 3, 1989 Rules on Evidence cf.NCC 220
FC 26 par. I
NCC Book II, Title III (484-50 1)
Lesaca v. Lesaca
91 Phil 135
Baldomero sold properties before the second marriage but bought it again after the said marriage. There was no
proof that the money spent was from the CPG.
Yaptinchay v. Torres
28 SCRA 489
Common-law wife was not able to prove that they jointly bought the property in Forbes Park so it belonged to the
legal marriage.
FC4
cf. VII (D) of Outline
FC35cf. FC234, RA6809
FC 35(4), 39, 40, 41,44
RPC 344, 349
Mercado vs Tan
337 SCRA 122
Ty vs. CA
G.R. No.127406 (November 27, 2000)
Morigo vs Morigo
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 32
422 SCRA
Morigo is not guilty of bigamy even if he did not get a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. First
marriage was void ab initio due to lack of ceremony and solemnizing officer so it does not bear any legal effect.
Tenebro vs. CA
G.R. No. 150758 (February 18, 2004) [concurring opinion, Justice Vitug]
4) On the issue of nullity due to psychological declaration as being void, constitute a valid
incapacity: retroacts?= so since marriage defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
with Ancajas was void ab initio bigamy was x Yes. Except for a void marriage on account
therefore not committed==== aS second or of psychological incapacity²void marriages
subsequent marriage contracted during the are inexistent from the very beginning, and
VXEVLVWHQFH RI ILUVW PDUULDJH SHWLWLRQHU¶V no judicial decree is required to establish
marriage with Ancajas would be null and their nullity
void from the very beginning completely x The complete nullity of a previously
UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH SHWLWLRQHU¶V SV\FKRORJLFDO contracted marriage being void ab initio and
incapacity or capacity²but this does not legally inexistent can outrightly be a defense
however presents an argument for the in an indictment for bigamy
avoidance of criminal liability x Strong reservation on the ruling that bigamy
5) Art 349 of the RPC criminalizes any person is still committed though marriage is ab initio
who shall contract a second or subsequent null and void (if marriage is contracted
marriage before the former marriage has before th judicial declaration of its nullity)
been dissolved legally or before the absent x Canon law-reconcile grounds for nullity of
spouse has been declared presumptively marriage
dead by means of a judgment rendered in x Reasons why except those due to
proper proceedings psychological incapacity:
6) As soon as the 2nd marriage was contracted a) Breaches neither the essential nor the
April 10, 1990²the crime of bigamy had formal requisites of marriage
already been consummated b) Other grounds are capable of relatively
7) The declaration of the nullity of a second easy demonstration, psychological
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity however, being a mental
incapacity is NOT an indicator that state may not be so readily evident
SHWLWLRQHU¶V PDUULDJH WR $QFDMDV ODFNV WKH c) It remains valid and binding until
essential requisites for validity²requisites declared judicially as void
are essential and formal requisites²in this DISSENTING OPINION
case requisites of marriage were satisfied CARPIO, J.
by petitioner and ANcajas
8) Third marriage contracted while two past CALLEJO, Sr. J.
marriages are still subsisting²deliberate x Vote to grant pro hac vice the petition
disregard for sanctity of marriage Since second marriage is null and void ab initio, such
marriage in in contemplation of criminal law never
SEPARATE OPINION existed and for that reason, one of the essential
VITUG, J. elements of bigamy has disappeared
x Would the absolute nullity of either first or
second marriage prior to its judicial
FC 41 in relation to FC 42-44
NCC 390-39 1, PC 55 (9), FC 101
Nolasco cannot declare that his English wife was presumptively dead as he did not diligently look for her in
Liverpool.
Armas vs Calisterio
330 SCRA 201 (April 6, 2000)
Facts:
1) April 24, 1992: Teodorico Calisterio died RTC: issued order appointing Sinfroniano C.
intestate leaving several parcels of land Armas Jr and respondent Marietta
(value: P604,750.00) administrator and administratix of the
2) He was survived by his wife (respondent- intestate estate of teodorico
Marietta Calisterio) 9) Marietta appealed the decision to CA
3) Teodorico was second husband of CA: decision appealed from is REVERSED
Marietta²married previously to James and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
William Bound (jan 13, 1946) a) P$ULHWWD &DOLVWHULR¶V PDUULDJH ZLWK
4) James Bound disappeared w/o trace on teodorico remains valid
February 11, 1947 b) house and lot situated as 32 Batangas
5) 11 years later Marietta and teodorico were St San Francisco del Monte QC belong
married (may 8, 1958) w/o Marietta having to conjugal partnership property
secured a court declaration that James was c) PDUULHWD &DOLVWHULR EHLQJ WHRGRULFR¶V
presumptively dead compulsory heir is entitled to one half of
6) Oct 9, 1992: petitioner, surviving sister of KXVEDQG¶V HVWDWH DQG VLVWHU RI
teodorico filed with RTC of QC a petition Teodorico the other half
HQWLWOHG ³,Q WKH 0DWWHU RI ,QWHVWDWH (VWDWH RI d) ordered TC to determine competence of
the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y MArrieta Calisterio to act as
&DFDEHORV $QWRQLD $UPDV SHWLWLRQHU´ DGPLQLVWUDWRURI7HRGRULFR¶VHVWDWH
claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the -‐ CA denied motion for reconsideration
deceased- marriage between Marietta and
Teodorico as bigamous thereby null and void SC DECISION: Assailed judgment of the CA is
7) Prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas Jr. AFFIRMED except in so far only as it decreed in par
be appointed administrator w/o bond of the © of the dispositive portion thereof that the children of
estate of the deceased and that the petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her to the
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the other half of the inheritance in lieu of which it is
obligations of the estate would have been DECLARED that said one-half share of the
settled GHFHGHQW¶V HVWDWH SHUWDLQV VROHO\ WR WKH SHWLWLRQHU WR
8) mArietta opposed the petition²first marriage the exclusion of her children
w/ Bound had been dissolved due to his
absence, whereabouts being unknown² REASONS:
contends to be the surviving spouse of 1) Marriage happened in 1958²law in force at
teodorico and sought priority in the that time was the Civil Code not the family
administration of the estate of the decedent code
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 35
2) Art 83 of the new Civil Code²retroactive she entered into second marriage²second
only when it would not prejudice ort impair marriage having been contracted during the
vested acquired rights in accordance wit Civil regime of the Civl Code, should thus be
code and other laws deemed valid notwithstanding the absence
3) A judicial declaration of absence of the of judicial declaration of presumptive death
absentee spouse is not necessary as long as of james Bounds
the prescribed period of absence is met. It is 5) Conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta
equally noteworthy that the marriage in these pertains to them in common²upon its
exceptional cases are, by the explicit dissolution, the property should rightly be
PDQGDWH RI $UW WR EH GHHPHG YDOLG ³XQWLO divided in two equal portions²one portion
declared null and void by a competent going to surviving spouse and the other to
FRXUW´²the burden of proof would be, in the estate of the deceased spouse
these cases, on the party assailing the $SSHOODWH FRXUW HUUHG LQ JUDQWLQJ WR SHWLWLRQHU¶V
second marriage children, along with their mother Antonia who herself
4) 0DULHWWD¶V ILUVW KXVEDQG -DPHV :Llliam is invoking successional rights over the estate of
Bounds had been absent or had deceased brother
disappeared for than eleven years before
Gloria abandoned husband who was a violent alcoholic. They were separated for 9 years 7KH WULDO FRXUW¶V UXOLQJ
that the husband was presumptively dead is final.
Apolinaria filed for presumptive death of her husband Clemente Jomoc after being absent for 9 years. Such
declaration is under a summary proceeding.
Manuel was guilty of bigamy since he did not get a declaration of presumptive death of his first wife who BTW
was only in prison.
Alegro did not diligently search for his missing wife. He only reported to the NBI that his wife was missing after
WKH26*¶VDSSHDOWR the declaration.
FC44
FC36
FC 36, 39, 68-73
R.A. 8533
Lim v. CA
214 SCRA 237
DOOHJHG VFKL]RSKUHQLF ZLIH¶V SV\FKLDWULVW¶V WHVWLPRQ\ DGPLVVLEOH LQ FRXUW not a breach in patient-physician
relationship; during trial, use hypothetical questions
Salita v. Magtolis
233 SCRA 100
Krohn v. CA
233 SCRA 146
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 36
Santos V. CA
240 SCRA 20
psychological incapacity must refer to mental (not physical) incapacity to comprehend basic mental covenants
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, incurability, existing at the time of the marriage
7) Court find the gravity of the failed obligations can do no less but sustain the
relationship in which the parties found studied judgment of respondent appellate
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled court
vows and unconsummated marital
and fidelity and rendering mutual help protected by the State) , Section 12, Art II ( The State
and support recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
c) Psychology condition must exist at the and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
time the marriage is contracted although social institution), Section 1, Article XV ( The State
its overt manifestations may occur only recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
thereafter and nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity
d) The mental disorder must be grave or and actively promote its total development) of the
serious and incurable Constitution show how the state regard marriage and
Section 2 Art. XV (marriage as an inviolable social the family
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
Facts: Held/Ratio:
Erlinda Matias (16) married Avelino Dagdag (20), No. Erlinda failed to comply with the evidentiary
Sept. 1, 1975 and had two children. A week after the requirements5: particularly guideline no. 2 which
wedding, husband would oftentimes disappear for requires the root cause of psychological incapacity to
months, indulge in drinking sprees, would return be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
home drunk and force his wife to submit to sexual proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical
intercourse with him. If she did not comply, she was doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
beaten. The last time Erlinda saw him was on Oct. incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation
1993. She later learned that he was imprisoned but that her husband is a fugitive was not sufficiently
escaped from jail and was now a fugitive. A certificate proven.
issued by the Jail Warden on Feb. 14, 1990 declared
that he was still at-large. Petition by OSG is granted. Assailed decision by the
CA is reversed and set aside.
July 3, 1990 ± Erlina filed with the RTC Olangapo City
a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage Notes:
on the ground of psychological incapacity under The guidelines governing the application and
Article 36 of the Family Code. interpretation of psychological incapacity do not
require that a physician examine the person to be
Dec. 17, 1990 ± RTC issued an Order giving the declared psychologically incapacitated ± what is
investigating prosecutor until Jan. 2, 1991 to present important is the presence of evidence that can
controverting evidence. Although he found that there DGHTXDWHO\ HVWDEOLVK WKH SDUW\¶V SV\FKRORJLFDO
was no collusion, he intended to intervene in the case condition.
to avoid fabrication of evidence.
Issues:
identify and prove root cause of alleged x In case at bar, respondent merely shows
incapacity ± no meical or clinical proof of that he and his wife could not get along
incurability if there was true incapacity nor was it with each other²no showing of the
grave enough gravity and juridical antecedent or
- assessment of petitioner by dr. Gauzon was incurability of problems besetting their
based merely on descriptions communicated to marital union
him by respondent²never conducted any x TC should have carefully studied and
p[psychological examinations assessed the evidence presented by
respondent and taken into account the
NOTE; definitions of psychological incapacity² prevailing jurisprudence on the matter²
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly concluded that it was useless to proceed
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that further with the tedious process of
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged hearing contravening proof
by the parties (Art 68 FC) It was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to
- mere neglect, difficulty or refusal in the deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this
performance of marital obligations and mere FRXUW¶V UXOLQJV LQ SRLQW²continuing the process
showing of irreconcilable differences or of litigation would have been a total; waste of time
conflicting personalities in no wise and money for the parties and an unwelcome
constitutes psychological incapacity LPSRVLWLRQRQWULDOFRXUW¶VGRFNHW
RP vs. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498 (May 20, 2004)
Dedel vs.CA
G.R. No. 151867 (January 29, 2004)
ZLIH¶VLQILGHOLW\ZKLFKGLGQ¶WH[LVWSULRUWKHPDUULDJH; her abandonment; that she had sexual affairs with several
men Æ not psychological incapacity
Antonio vs.Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 (March 10,2005)
Yes. Petition granted-marriage null and void experts, and clearly explained in the
WULDOFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ
RATIO: o Psych incapacity existed at the time
It is settled principle of civil procedure that of and even before the celebration
the conclusions of the trial court regarding of marriage
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to o Gravity is sufficient to prove
great respect from the appellate courts GLVDELOLW\ /HRQLOR FRXOGQ¶W WROHUDWH
because the trial court had an opportunity to Marie for a year. Failure of Marie to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while distinguish truth from fiction or at
giving testimony which may indicate their least abide by the truth. A person
candor or lck thereof unable to distinguish between
The Court of Appeals did not dipute the fantasy and reality would similarly
veracity of the evidence presented be unable to comprehend the legal
Intent of the FC: case-to-case basis, guided nature of the marital bond, mush
by experience, in the finding of experts and less its psychic meaning, and the
researchers in psych disciplines, and by the corresponding obligations attached
decisions of church tribunals which, although to marriage, including parenting.
not binding on the civil courts, may be given o Obligations complies with Art 68 to
persuasive effect since the provision was live together observe mutual love,
taken from Canon Law respect and fidelity, and render
Molina guidelines were satisfied mutual help and support
o Sufficiently provided evidence o CA failed to recognize that the
o Root cause has been medically or Catholic Church annulled the
clinically identified, alleged in the marriage
complaint, sufficiently proven by Incurable; psychosis is quite grave and a cure thereof
a remarkable feat
6) Psychological defects spoken here were as married persons, it is essential that they
PRUHRID³GLIILFXOW\´LIQRW³RXWULJKW´UHIXVDO or must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
neglect in the performance of some marital due to some psychological not physical
obligations and that a mere showing of illness
irreconcilable differences and conflicting 8) Sanctity of marriage stated in Constitution²
personalities in no wise constitute protected by the state
psychological incapacity Art 36 should not be confused with divorce law nor
7) It is not enough to prove that the parties equated with legal separation
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) Incapacity should not be a result of mental
clearly explained in the decision. Expert illness. For if it were due to insanity or
evidence may be given by qualified defects of the mental faculties short of
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be consent, thus rendering the marriage
existing at the time of the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to /DFNRIDSSUHFLDWLRQRIRQH¶VPDULWDO
be medically or clinically permanent or obligation; psych incapacity does not refer to
incurable mental faculties and has nothing to do with
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
bring about the disability of the party to marriage.
assume the essential obligations of Bases for determining void marriages: (a)
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological lack of one or more of the essential
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional requisites of marriage as contract, (b)
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted reasons of public policy and (c) special
as root causes. The illness must be cases and special situations
shown as downright incapacity or Lack of due discretion means that the person
inability, not a refusal, neglect or did not have the ability to give valid consent
difficulty, much less ill will. at the time of the wedding and therefore the
(6) The essential marital obligations must union in invalid.
be those embraced by Articles 68-71 of Lack of due competence means that the
the Family Code as regards the person was incapable of carrying out the
husband and wife as well as Articles obligations of the promise he or she made
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in during the marriage ceremony
regard to parents and their children. The professional opinion of a psychological
Such non-complied marital obligation/s expert became increasingly important in
must also be stated in the petition, such cases
proven by evidence and included in the It could no longer be assumed in annulment
text of the decision cases that a person who could intellectually
(7) Interpretations given by the National understand the concept of marriage could
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the necessarily give valid consent to marry. The
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while ability to both grasp and assume the real
not controlling or decisive, should be obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment
given great respect by our courts. What are now considered a necessary prerequisite
is decreed canonically invalid should ti valid matrimonial consent.
also be decreed civilly void
(8) The trial court must order the CONCURRING OPINION (VITUG):
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Tests:
Solicitor General to appear as counsel (1) Incapacity must be psychological or
for the state. mental, not physical
(2) The psych incapacity must relate to the
SEPARATE STATEMENT (PADILLA): inability, not mere refusal, to
As to whether or not psych incapacity exists understand, assume and discharge the
in a given case calling for annulment of basic marital obligations of living
marriage, depends crucially, more than in together, observing love, respect and
any field of law, on the facts of the case fidelity and rendering mutual help and
In the field of psych incapacity as a ground support
for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say (3) The psycholigic condition must exist at
WKDWQRFDVHLVRQ³DOOIRXUV´ZLWKDQRWKHU the time the marriage is contracted
case. although its overt manifestations may
occur only thereafter
SEPARATE OPINION (ROMERO): Mental disorder must be grave or serious and
incurable
3) Three children born: Maie (may 3, 1982); -‐ Once beaten by husband when she
Lyra (May 22, 1985) and Marian (June 15, confronted her about Tess ±confined at
1989) De LA sale University Medical Center
4) July 10, 1992: filed complaint RTC Br 18 (cerebral concussion)
tagaytay City annulment of marriage on the -‐ Oct 1992; petitioner learned that
ground of psychological incapacity respondent left for middle east and
5) ALLEGATIONS since then whereabouts had been
-‐ Private respondent failed to perform his unknown
obligation to support family and
contribute to management of household RTC DECISION: dismissing the petition
-‐ Devoting most of time engaging in for annulment of marriage
drinking sprees w/ friends -‐ What were mentioned were not ground
-‐ Cohabited with other women though for annulment but for legal separation
married with whom he had illegitimate (art 55 of FC)
children
-‐ Because of his promiscuity private CA: affirmed decision of RTC (January
respondent endangered her health by 30, 1996) ± quoted Santos vs CA
infecting her with sexually transmitted -‐ Acts and attitudes complained
disease happened after the marriage and there
-‐ PR irresponsible. Immature and is no proof that the same have already
unprepared for duties of married life existed at the time of the celebration of
-‐ Ordered to give support to their three the marriage to constitute psychological
children P9000 every month; she be incapacity under Art 36 of FC
awarded custody of their children and
she be adjudged sole owner of parcel of DECISION OF SC: Petition is DENIED, decision of
land (Don Gregorio Subd, BUcal CA AFFIRMED.
dasmarinas Cavite) as well as jeep REASONS:
which private respondent took with him 1) Differentiated Voidable (Art 46) , Void
when he left conjugal home on June 12, marriage and legal separation (Art 55)
1992 2) Petitioner failed to establish the fact that at
-‐ Not close to their children the time of the marriage respondent was
6) Met in 1977 at Phil Christian University suffering from a psychological defect which
(petitioner 5 years older than respondent- in fact deprived him of the ability to assume
teacher and student) the essential duties of marriage and its
-‐ Respondent continued studies after concomitant responsibilities
marriage supported by parents and 3) Quoted Republic vs CA: root cause of
petitioner SV\FKRORJLFDOLQFDSDFLW\«
-‐ Aside form her salary augmented their 4) Expert testimony should have been
income by doing sideline businesses presented
-‐ Respondent left but received again by Separate proceeding for other contentions (custody,
the petitioner to save their marriage support etc)
-‐ Smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse
ailure to give support, physical abuse, abandonment Æ not psychological incapacity so need to undergo
psychological exam
Guidelines set in Molina/Santos mandatory; emotional immaturity and irresponsibility Æ not psychological
incapacity
DUH SURRI RI ODWWHU¶V SV\FKRORJLFDO LQFDSDFLW\ NOTE; definitions of psychological incapacity²
to complu with essential obligations of mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
marriage²abnormal for wife who instead of incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
protecting name of husband had acted to concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
contrary by the parties (Art 68 FC)
- documents presented by respondent during - mere neglect, difficulty or refusal in the
trial do not show alleged incapacity of his performance of marital obligations and mere
wife showing of irreconcilable differences or
- to rule that filings are sufficient to establish conflicting personalities in no wise
her psychological incapacity is not only constitutes psychological incapacity
erroneous but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity x In case at bar, respondent merely shows
x Second: neither is the testimony of that he and his wife could not get along
respondent taken by itself or in conjunction with each other²no showing of the
w/ his documentary offerings sufficient to gravity and juridical antecedent or
SURYHSHWLWLRQHU¶VDOOHJHGLQFDSDFLW\ incurability of problems besetting their
-testimony of respondent: 1) lack of attention to marital union
children; 2) immaturity; 3) lack of intention of x TC should have carefully studied and
procreative sexuality²none of these constituent assessed the evidence presented by
psychological incapacity respondent and taken into account the
* Third: insufficiency, if not incompetency of the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter²
supposed expert testimony presented by concluded that it was useless to proceed
respondent (Dr. Antonio M./ Gauzon), failed to further with the tedious process of
identify and prove root cause of alleged hearing contravening proof
incapacity ± no meical or clinical proof of It was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to
incurability if there was true incapacity nor was it deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this
grave enough FRXUW¶V UXOLQJV LQ SRLQW²continuing the process
- assessment of petitioner by dr. Gauzon was of litigation would have been a total; waste of time
based merely on descriptions communicated to and money for the parties and an unwelcome
him by respondent²never conducted any LPSRVLWLRQRQWULDOFRXUW¶VGRFNHW
p[psychological examinations
between the petitioner and the - FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND
respondent GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS
-‐ Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the - Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of
guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no void marriage ± petition does not need to show
cause for action (NOT) root cause since only experts can
-‐ determine it b the physical manifestations of
-‐ ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action physical incapacity
against Diana RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE
-‐ HELD: YES , since petition stated legal right of OF ACTION
Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
act or omission as seen in facts (cause of action
± 46)
Hot-tempered and extravagant wife left husband then married an American Æ not psychological incapacity
Yu vs. Yu
484 SCRA 485 (March 10, 2006)
Facts:
1) CA reversed decision of RTC of dagupan CA: GRANT the appeal and REVERSE and SET
City declaring the marriage between ASIDE the appealed decision, civil case DISMISSED;
respondents Orlando B. catalan and Merope motion for reconsideration denied
Braganza void on the ground of bigamy and ISSUES:
the denied motion for reconsideration 1) Whether petitioner has the required standing
2) June 4, 1950: mabini, Pangasinan; married in court to question the nullity of the marriage
3) Migrated to the US and allegedly became between respondents
naturalized citizens of US 2) Whether the failure of the court of appeals to
4) After 38 years of marriage, divorced in Aril declare the questioned marriage void
1988 constitutes reversible error
5) June 16, 1988: Orlando married Merope in
calasiao, pangasinan DECISION OF SC: Case is REMANDED to the trial
6) Contending that said marriage was court for its proper disposition
bigamous; Merope has subsisting marriage a) If it is proven that a valid divorce decree was
with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed petition obtained and the same did not allow
for declaration of nullity of marriage with UHVSRQGHQW¶Vremarriage, then the TC should
damages in the RTC of Dagupan GHFODUH UHVSRQGHQW¶V PDUULDJH DV ELJDPRXV
7) Respondents filed motion to dismiss but and void ab initio but reduce the amount of
denied moral damages from P300,000 to P50,000
RTC: judgment in favor or petitioner; subsequent and exemplary damages from P200,000 to
marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando catalan is P25,000
declared null and void b) If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
Defendants jointly pay moral damages (P300,000) obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry,
DQG H[HPSODU\ GDPDJHV 3 DQG DWWRUQH\¶ V then the trial court must dismiss the instant
fees (P50,000) including cost of suit; donation in petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the ground that petitioner Amor-Catalan lacks
property donated is ordered awarded to the heirs of legal personality to file the same
Juliana Branganza
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 49
Being jobless, a drug-user, and having anti-social personality Æ not psychological incapacity.
Person who had depression/escapism; Person who is always jealous Æ not psychologically incapacitated
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 50
Homosexuality (which was not proven that it was concealed before the marriage Æ not psychological incapacity.
Laurena vs CA
GR No. 159220 (September 22, 2008)
Te vs Te
GR No. 161793 (February 13, 2009)
Dispute over land causing heirs/children go to court claiming that the marriage was null and void for lack of
marriage license, SC applies the current rule of AM 02-11-10-SC (2003) - which says that petition for nullity may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, and that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and solely belongs to
them
What the heirs should've done is file for a declaration of nullity VIA a "proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse"
Ancheta vs Ancheta
424 SCRA 725
Petitioner files for dissolution of conjugal partnership, and then respondent files for nullity on grounds of psych
incapacity. TC grants nullity coz of PI. Later on respondent marries again, petitioner files for against the decision on
grounds of PI but is denied. SC: Grants the petition stating the declaration of nullity was w/o a state appointed
attorney to prevent collusion hence, the case is remanded.
Jocson v Robles
22 SCRA 521
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 51
Petitioner files for annulment of marriage, and respondent supports the claim that he was only forced into the
marriage through a joint affidavit executed by him, his father and brother. SC: annulment denied on grounds that
judgment rendering a marriage annulled cannot be made upon stipulation of facts or confession of judgment
(confession here being that the respondent himself admitted to being forced into the marriage) - NCC - 88 and 101
prohibit this.
Tolentino v Villanueva
56 SCRA 1
Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be allowed even if the sermons were not served to the respondent.
SC: denied because in accordance with NCC - 88, 101, in case of non-appearance of defendant, court shall order a
prosecuting attorney to inquire w/n collusion exists, and if not, the attorney shall intervene to make sure that
evidence is not fabricated and no collusion is in place.
Salcedo-Ortanez v CA
235 SCRA 111
Respondent files for annulment for lack of marriage license and/or psych incapacity and provides 3 taped telephone
conversations of the petitioner as evidence. Petitioner challenges the use of tapes as evidence but is dismissed by
the CA. SC: the tapes are obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping law, CA decision is set aside.
Petitioner files for declaration of nullity due to psych incapacity, and is dismissed. SC: even if the petition is
dismissed, process should be correct - the state did not participate through an appointed fiscal to prevent
collusion hence the case is remanded to the lower court for proper trial.
Pesca vs Pesca
356 SCRA 588
Petitioner files for nullity through psych incapacity. Denied. SC: Petitioner, based on the standards set in Santos and
Molina, has failed to make a case out of psych incapacity. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be
equated to psych incapacity.
Marcos vs Marcos
343 SCRA 755
Petitioner files for psych incapacity which is given by the RTC, but CA reverses on grounds that a psychological
evaluation is needed. SC: Psych evaluations are not needed to settle psych incapacity but regardless there is no
showing that the respondent's defects were present at the inception of the marriage no is it incurable. The illness can
only be traced for a certain period and not during the celebration of marriage. Petition denied.
FC5O-54
But seeFCl47-148
FC4O
(Legarda: wrong case ± rushed to the supreme court before lower court decides on the nullity)
Respondent contracts a second marriage w/o declaration of void of the first case. Respondent files for declaration of
nullity of second marriage and while ongoing information for bigamy was filed against him. Respondent then files a
motion to suspend the proceedings of bigamy because of the pending nullity case makes it a prejudicial question. TC
Grants. SC: FC - 40 - effective during the 2nd marriage requires a judicial declaration before a party can
remarry, it doesn't erase the fact that he did marry for a second time. Declaration of nullity won't affect the bigamy
case.
Mercado vs.Tan
G.R. No 137110 (August 1, 2000)
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 52
Mercado marries Tan, declaring that he is single even if he was still married. Tan files for bigamy. Petitioner files for
declaration of nullity for his first marriage. CA says he is guilty of bigamy. SC: Petitioner contracts 2nd marriage w/o
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. Given that bigamy is already consummated, its immaterial that he is now
filing for a declaration of nullity. FC 36 is not a defense to bigamy. VITUG: FC40 applies to VOIDABLE marriages
and FC36 and 53.
Ty vs CA
346 SCRA 327
Carino vs Carino
351 SCRA 127
nd
SC: absent a judicial decree declaring the 1st marriage void, it remains valid (pursuant to Art. 140 of the FC) and 2
marriage is bigamous. Resp. gets nothing except what she can prove as her property via individual income by
Art.148 of FC.
Morigo vs Morigo
422 SCRA 376
He was acquitted via the retroactive application of his declaration of nullity w/c rendered his first marriage void
ab initio. Lacking one element of the crime of bigamy (the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead) he was rightfully
acquitted. DGGW¶OSULQFLSOHYRLGDEOHPDUULDJHVQRWGHIHQVHIRUELJDP\
Valdes v. QC-RTC
G.R. No. 122749 (July 31, 1996)
failed to apply correct law that should govern 1) in void marriages, regardless of the cause
the disposition of family dwelling in a thereof, the property relations of the parties
situation where a marriage is declared ab during the period of cohabitation is governed
initio because of psychological incapacity on by the provisions of art 147 or 148 such as
the part of either or both of the parties of the the case may be, of the Family Code Art 147
contract is the remake of Art 144 of the CC
2) January 5, 1971: Antonio Valdes and 2) this peculiar kind of co-ownership applies
Consuelo Gomez married when a man and a woman suffering no legal
3) 5 children impediment to marry each other, so
4) June 22, 1992: valdez sought the declaration exclusively lives together as husband and
of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Art 36 wife under a void marriage or without the
of the FC benefit of marriage
5) RTC declared marriage null and void 3) under this property regime, property
6) Consuelo Gomez sought for a clarification of acquired by both spouses through their work
that portion of the decision directing and industry shall be governed by the rules
compliance with Arts 50, 51 and 52 of the on equal co-ownership.Any property
FC; she asserted that the FC contained no acquired during the union is prima facie
provisions on the procedure for liquidation of presumed to have been obtained through
common property in unions without marriage their joint efforts A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property
RTC: clarification: considering that Art 147 of shall still be considered as having
the FC explicitly provides that property FRQWULEXWHG WKHUHWR MRLQWO\ RI VDLG SDUW\¶V
acquired by both parties during their union, efforts consisted in the care and
in the absence of proof to the contrary, are maintenance of the family housedhold.
presumed to have been obtained through the Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
joint efforts of the parties and will be owned IUXLWV RI WKH FRXSOHV¶ VHSDUDWH SURSHUW\ DUH
by them in equal shares, plaintiff and not included in the co-ownership
GHIHQGDQW ZLOO RZQ WKHLU ³IDPLO\ KRPH´ DQG 4) the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
all their other properties for that matter in precipitately ± a court which had jurisdiction
HTXDO VKDUHV´²provisions on co-ownership to declare the marriage a nullity must be
will apply deemed likewise clothed with authority to
7) Petitioner moved fore reconsideration of the resolve the incidental and consequential
order (issue regarding family dwelling)² matters
petition denied it did not commit error in ruling that petitioner and
8) Appealed SULYDWHUHVSRQGHQWRZQWKH³IDPLO\KRPH´DQGDOOWKHLU
common property in equal shares as in concluding
DECISION OF SC: Trial court correctly applied the that in the liquidation and partition of the property
law; Questioned orders, dated May 5, 1995 and owned in common by them the provisions on co-
October 30, 1995 of the trial court are AFFIRMED. ownership under the CC not Arts 50, 51 and 52 in
relation to arts 102 and 129 of the FC should aptly
REASONS: prevail--- these are only for valid and voidable
marriages (community and conjugal partnerships)
FC 4 cf. 45
Held/Ratio: LUUHOHYDQWVLQFHWKHSUHYLRXVPDUULDJHZDVQ¶WYRLGEXW
The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since
prove that her marriage was vitiated by force. no annulment was made, her current marriage is
Assuming, however that this is so, it would still be therefore void.
Facts: Issue:
The man, a lawyer, pursued a woman despite WON an action for judicial declaration of nullity of the
knowing that she was already married. He convinced prior marriage is necessary before entering a
her to marry him and that the first marriage was void subsequent marriage.
because the woman married her first cousin, and was
thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the Held/Ratio:
lawyer, it was no longer necessary to go to court to Yes. Even if the first mistake was contracted in good
declare it as such. She agreed to marry him. After the faith, the lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after
birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and he contracted his second one. It was deemed that the
contracted a second marriage while claiming that his moral character of the respondent was deeply flawed
marriage to the woman was void from the beginning and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the
since she had already married her first cousin. Roll of Attorneys.
Lim vs. CA
214 SCRA 237
Not a breach of confidentiality. In the case at bar, the doctor was brought in as a medical expert, and not as
the attending physician RI WKH SHWLWLRQHU %DVHG RQ WKH SOHDGLQJV IURP WKH ORZHU FRXUWV DQG SHWLWLRQHU¶V IDLOXUH WR
prove otherwise (that the physician blackened the reputation of the petitioner), it shows that Dr. Acampado was there
simply as an expert of psychiatry.
Buccat v Buccat
72 Phil 49
Facts:
Couple got married, stayed together for 89 days, but
suddenly, respondent gave birth to a baby boy after 9 Held/Ratio:
months of being pregnant. As a result of this, plaintiff The Court upheld the decision of the CFI Baguio in
abandoned respondent and sued her on the basis of favor of the respondent because they saw no reason
her not being a virgin when they were married and to reverse it. They got married when the woman was
thus the marriage was obtained by fraud. CFI Baguio, seven months pregnant. It is an incredible allegation
however, ruled in favor of the respondent. that the wife's advanced pre-natal state was not
suspected by the husband. There was no fraud
Issue: involved.
WON the marriage was valid.
Aquino v Delizo
108 Phil 21
WON the concealment of pregnancy by another man Yes. Under Article 85, par. 4, it is explicitly declared
prior to marriage can be considered fraud and as as fraud. Using Buccat v. Buccat as a defense in this
such, can it be a ground for annulment. case is untenable since in the present case, she was
only four months pregnant during the marriage and at
Held/Ratio: that stage the court is not prepared to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent.
Anaya v. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
Macarrubo vs Macarrubo
424 SCRA 42
Facts: Atty. Macarrubo married thrice and thrice had reasons for a void marriage: 1st marriage: psychological
incapacity, 2nd marriage: consent by fraud, 3rd marriage: for lack of a marriage license (pending)
Held: Disbarred for lack of good moral character.
Homosexuality in itself is not grounds for annulment, but consent vitiated by fraud as manifested in a
concealment of homosexuality is sufficient grounds. However in this case homosexuality before and at the time
of the celebration of the marriage was not proven and thus the petition for annulment is denied.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 56
FC 45(4), 47(4)
NCC 1335-1337
RPC 344, last paragraph
FC 45(5), 47(5)
Jimenez v. Cañizares
109 Phil 273
Facts: -‐ 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for
-‐ Aug 3, 1950 ±Joel Jimenez and Remedios reconsideration since impotency was never really
Canizares wed established. Rather than nullifying marriage Court
-‐ 7 June 1955 the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a should have compelled her to undergo and
decree annulling his marriage in the Court of First examination
Instance of Zamboanga. This was because her ISSUE: WON marriage may be annulled on sole
vagina was too small for his member and thus testimony of husband that his wife is impotent
WKH\FRXOGQ¶WFRSXODWHDQGWKXVVKHLVimpotent HELD: NO
-‐ 14 June 1955 - wife was summoned and served -‐ law specifically enumerates the legal grounds,
a copy of the complaint. She did not file an that must be proved to exist by indubitable
answer evidence, to annul a marriage.
-‐ 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order Not proven in this case since wife has
requiring the defendant to submit to a physical been unresponsive. Court says that it
examination by a competent lady physician to may not so much be indifference as it is
determine her physical capacity for copulation that she is shy and embarrassed about
-‐ 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree the situation
annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and RESULT: presumption is in favor of potency. Case is
the defendant since plaintiff had no response thus remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
whatsoever
Barcelona vs. CA
G.R. 130087 (September 24, 2003)
present time. Such incapacity was act or omission as seen in facts (cause of action
conclusively found in the ± 46)
psychological examination - FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND
conducted on the relationship GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS
between the petitioner and the - Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of
respondent void marriage ± petition does not need to show
-‐ Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the (NOT) root cause since only experts can
guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no determine it b the physical manifestations of
cause for action physical incapacity
-‐ RESULT: PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE
-‐ ISSUE: WON petitioner stated a cause of action OF ACTION
against Diana Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
-‐ HELD: YES , since petition stated legal right of
Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her
Tuason vs. CA
256 SCRA 158
FC 4 1-44, compare with NCC 83, 85(2) and 87(2) cf. RPC 349
Jones v. Hortiguela
Lukban v. Republic
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 58
98 Phil 574
Gue v. Republic
107 Phil 381
Facts: dead.
-‐ Bailon contracted 3 marriages in his lifetime -‐ HELD: NO
Alice Diaz -1st wife was presumed dead -‐ 2nd marriage is valid more than 1st marriage and
Elisa Jayona ± 2nd wife SS had no jurisdiction to say that 1st marriage
Teresita Jarque ± respondent. was the valid marriage
-‐ ISSUE: WON 2nd marriage is made void by 1st wife is deemed absent until action for annulment is
appearance of first wife who was presumed filed.
NCC 15, 17
FC26
Facts:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 59
1) This is an action for divorce on the ground of however, any part of the canon law
abandonment and adultery which by proper action of the civil
2) The answer charged the plaintiff with authorities had become a civil law stood
adultery, denied the adultery imputed to upon same footing as any other law in
defendant, and asked for divorce spain
CFI: granted the divorce to plaintiff and 81, 042. 76 7) COUNCIL OF TRENT²these decrees
pesos as her share of the conjugal property- court have in spain the force of a civil law
assumed that the provisions of the civil code relating 8) It may be doubted if these decrees,
to divorce contained in title 4 of book1 are still in force even if considered as extended to the
3) Married in July 1891 to august 1892² phils and in force here, furnish any aid in
happily together the solution of the question
4) The defendant suddenly without any 9) CANONISTS: declare adultery to be a
previous warning took his wife to the house ground for divorce²however, the
of her parents, left her there and never lived causes for divorce are nowhere
with her afterwards distinctly stated therein
5) The plaintiff: complains that husband 10) The laws of the church which do state
committed adultery with one GREGORIA what these causes are have not the
BERMEJO in 1892 force of civil laws
6) Other two charges relate to 1899 and 1901 ± 11) The DECRETAL LAW ±abolishing in the
insufficient evidence peninsula the special jurisdictions was
ARGUMENTS; extended to the phils
a) The power of the gov gen, without such 12) DECRETAL LAW STATES:
order to suspend the operation of the code ecclesiastical courts shall continue to
b) The order of suspension is inoperative ±did take cognizance of matrimonial and
not mention the book of this code in which ellemosynary causes and of
the suspended titles 4 and 1q2 were to be ecclesiastical offenses in accordance
found with provisions of canon law and have
c) Title 4: relates to marriage and divorce , title jurisdiction over causes of divorce and
12: to civil registry (book 1) annulment of marriage as provided by
the Council of Trent²but incidents with
SC: this is an error respect to the deposit of a married
Ratio: woman, alimony, suit money and other
1) July 31, 1889, the Civil Code as it existed temporal affairs shall pertain to ordinary
in the peninsula was extended to the phils courts
and took effect on dec 8, 1889 13) PARTIDAS: contain provisions relating
2) On dec 31, an order was published to the subject of divorce²states that
which states that titles 4 and 12 of the when spouses are separated by law, it
CC are suspended in the archipelago- is not then considered that man
no decree can be found published in the separates them, but the written law and
Gaceta the impediment existing between them
3) The history of Law of Civil Marriage of 14) Two forms of separation with two
1870 is well known. As a consequence reasons: one is religion and the other
of the religious liberty proclaimed in the the sin of fornication
consti of 1869, the whole of the law was 15) Religion ±if on desires to take holy
in force in the peninsula. But that basis orders and the other should grant
was wanting in these islands, and prior permission²with authority of the church
to the promulgation of the CC in 1889, 16) Divorce due to adultery or fornication²
no part of the law was in force here, brought before the judge of the holy
except arts 44 to 78 which were church, includes spiritual fornication
promulgated in 1883 17) In here the spouses are separated but
4) It is claimed that if these are suspended, the marriage still subsists, neither one of
the only marriages in the islands would them can contract second marriage at
be canonical and the only courts any time excepting in the case of
competent to declare a divorce would be separation granted by reason of adultery
ecclesiastical in which case the surviving spouse may
5) There can be no doubt that the order of remarry after the death of the other
suspension refers to titles 4 and 12 f 18) No other person but the spouses
book 1 and it has always been themselves can make an accusation for
understood²follows that arts 42-107 of such a cause and it ought be made
the CC were not in force here before the bishop or the ecclesiastical
6) The canon law had not as such any judge either by the parties themselves of
binding force outside the church- their attorneys
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 60
19) This divorce did not annul the marriage -‐ C) that the action on that ground can be
20) That either spouse has been guilty of maintained by husband and
adultery is a defense to his or her suit so -‐ D) that the decree does not dissolve the
is the fact that she has pardoned her²if marriage bond
after a divorce has been granted to the
husband, he commits adultery, there is DECISION: the CFI of Iloilo therefore,
a waiver of the judgment committed no error in assuming the
jurisdiction of this case
ISSUE: Were these provisions of the -‐ The adultery of the defendant was fully
partidas in force in the island prior to 1889? proved
-‐ The general rule was that laws of the -‐ Adultery of the plaintiff is however,
Peninsula did not rule in the colonies plainly and manifestly against the weight
unless they were expressly extended to of the evidence (PROOF²letter)
them, as to certain laws, this result was, -‐ Letter: confession of guilt?
however, accomplished in another way MAIN ISSUE: adultery
-‐ RECOPILACION de lasLEYES de 1) The lack of evidence destroys the theory
INDIAS²provision that²and as to all of the court below and of the appellee
matters not provided for by the laws of that the defendant expelled the plaintiff
this compilations, the laws of the from his house because he was tired of
compilations and the PARTIDAS of tese her and desired the company of other
kingdoms of the Castile shall be women
followed in the decisions of causes in 2) Not adequate to explain the sudden
accordance with the following law termination of their marital relations
-‐ By the operation of this law (TORO), 3) Testimony of the defendant correctly
first enacted in 1530, those laws of the explained the theory²he stated that on
PARTIDAS herein before referred to his return from an inspection of one his
relating to divorce, upon the discovery eVWDWHVKLVZLIH¶VPDLGJDYHKLPDOHWWHU
and settlement of the Phils became at in the handwriting of his wife and
once effective therein²they have directed to her lover, a Spanish corporal
remained in force since all civil laws of of the civil guard, named ZABAL
the state as distinguished from laws of 4) She admitted the genuineness of the
the church letter, fell upon her knees and implored
-‐ Being in force on august 13, 1898²they him to pardon her²that same day he
continued to be in force with other laws took her to the home of her parents, told
of a similar nature what had occurred and left her there
-‐ The PARTIDAS recognized adultery as 5) If The plaintiff is guilty the defendant
a ground for divorce²therefore has condoned the offense²no factual
according to the civil as well as evidence on this claim
canonical law in force in august 13,
1898²the commission of the offense PRINCIPLE:
gave the injured party the right to a a) Law 6 , title 9 partida 4, the wife can
divorce defeat the husband¶V VXLW IRU
-‐ That provision of the substantive civil divorce by proving that he has
law was not repealed by the change of pardoned her but no laws in the
sovereignty partidas which say that the effect of
-‐ The complete separation of the church the pardon would be so far-
and the state under the American govt reaching as to entitle her to a
while it changed the tribunal in which divorce against him in a case like
this right should be enforced, could not this present one
affect the right itself CONCLUSION:
-‐ The fact that ecclesiastical courts no -‐ Neither of the party is entitled to a
longer exercise such power is not divorce²both committed adultery
important -‐ JUDGMENT REVERSED
-‐ The jurisdiction formerly possessed by
them is now vested in CFI by virtue of
ACT no. 136 COOPER, J. DISSENTING
-‐ The RESULT: -‐ Immaterial which law governs , since
-‐ A) the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to under each causes for divorce are
entertain suit for divorce substantially the same, one of which is
-‐ B) that the only ground therefore is adultery
adultery
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 61
-‐ Higher court not to review the findings of -‐ Condoned offence not being sufficient
the lower courts²more competent since as a cause for divorce, is not a bar to
they have the witnesses divorce in favor of the plaintiff
-‐ Condonation: offending party is restored condonation restores equality before the
to the same position he or she occupied law
before the offense was committed the -‐ The court has not only reversed the
only condition being that the offense judgment of the trial court but has
must not be repeated entered a judgment against the plaintiff
-‐ Not proper to say that just because -‐ To deprive the plaintiff of the judgment
plaintiff has once been guilty she would which she has obtained and make a
forever lose her right to a divorce² final determination of the case here
makes condonation conditioned²party without giving her an opportunity of
granting it shall forever have the right to correcting this error, if such exists, is
commit the same offense himself with inequitable and unjust
impunity
Arca vs Javier
(July 31, 1954)
Facts: -‐
June 11, 1982 ± already acknowledged in
-‐ 1972 ± Van Dorn a Filipino and Romillo a US divorce proceedings in Nevada Court that
citizen married in Hongkong the and petitioner had no community
o established residence in Phil property as of said date.
-‐ 1982 ± obtained divorce in Nevada, US -‐ US divorce releases Romillo from marriage
o petitioner remarried in Nevada to under American law where divorce dissolves
Theodore Van Dorn marriage thus also relinquished any rights he
-‐ June 8, 1983 ± Romillo is contesting for his may have obtained through marriage
share in Galleon Shop which he contends is including property
conjugal property Cannot hold Fil law against petitioner is not valid
ISSUE: WON Romillo still has rights on conjugal since own law would discriminate her.
property
HELD: NO
Somera v. Pilapil
174 SCRA 663
FACTS -‐
344 of RPC ± only offended spouse may
-‐ Sept 7, 1979 ± Imelda Pilapil a Filipino bring case of adultery to court and should
married Erich Geiling German in Federal still be spouse when complaint was filed.
Republic Germany. They later resided in Since he filed it after he divorce was decree
Malate, Manila he is now not considered a spouse
-‐ Jan 1983 ± asked for divorce which was o absurd to bring action determined
obtained on Jan 15 1986 by his status before or subsequent
-‐ June 27, 1986 ± Geiling filed two complaints to commencement of adultery.
of adultery with William Chia and Jesus Marriage in his part was already extinguished thus he
Chua cannot sue as spouse anymore
ISSUE: WON he can still file for adultery after
German divorce
HELD: NO
Quita vs CA
300 SCRA 406
in the US and subsequently remarried. On April 1972, decedent considering their divorce, Fe replied that
Arturo died without a will. Blandina Dandan, who was Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to Arturo on April 1947 and had five legitimate married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.
children with the deceased, claimed to be the
surviving spouse. The trial court invoked the ruling in Issue:
Tenchavez v. Escano, which held that a foreign WON Fe is entitled to inherit in spite of the divorce
divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed secured in the United States.
after the effectivity of the Civil Code was not entitled
to recognition was valid in this jurisdiction, and Held/Ratio:
discarded the divorce between Fe and Arturo. It No. Her statement in the facts implied that she was no
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
WKHGHDWKRI$UWXUR%ODQGLGD¶VPDUULDJHWR$UWXURZDV Arturo. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino
bigamous since it was contracted on April 1947. citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
During the proceedings, when asked by Blandida become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
whether or not Fe was entitled to inherit from her right to inherit from Arturo.
Llorente vs CA
345 SCRA 592
Garcia vs Recio
366 SCRA 437
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of
Australia. RTC declared the marriage dissolved their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
because the Australian divorce had ended the countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC. severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
Issues/ Held/Ratio: laws.
(1) WON the divorce between Recio and Samson was
proven (2) WON Recio was legally capacitated to marry
Garcia
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an No. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
on evidence must be demonstrated. separation from bed and board, although an absolute
divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
)RUWXQDWHO\IRUUHVSRQGHQW¶VFDXVHZKHQWKHGLYRUFH period during which no reconciliation is effected. The
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, the national law of the party concerned. Since he is
but only to the fact that it had not been registered in an Australian, none of the records he produced do not
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial absolutely prove that he has legal capacity to marry
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to on January 12, 1994.
SHWLWLRQHU¶VTXDOLILFDWLRQ+HQFHLWZDVDGPLWWHGLQ
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, +RZHYHU*DUFLD¶VSUD\HUWRGHFODUHWKHPDUULDJHQXOO
SHWLWLRQHU¶VIDLOXUHWRREMHFWSURSHUO\UHQGHUHGWKH and void based on bigamy cannot be granted
divorce decree admissible as a written act of the because it may turn out that Recio did, in fact, have
Family Court of Sydney, Australia. capacity to marry. Hence, the SC believes that the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no SHWLWLRQHU¶V OHJDO FDSDFLW\ WR PDUU\ SHWLWLRQHU )DLOLQJ
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization the parties¶ PDUULDJH RQ WKH JURXQG RI ELJDP\ WKHUH
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him being already in evidence two existing marriage
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. certificates.
Diego vs Castillo
436 SCRA 67
RP vs. Orbecido
G.R.No. 154380 (October 5,2005)
Facts:
Orbecido married Villanueva in the Philippines and Held/Ratio:
had two children. Villanueva, wife, left for the US, was Taking into consideration legislative intent and
naturalized and eventually remarried. Orbecido applying the rule of reason, Par. 2 Art 26 should be
petitioned for authority to remarry using Par. 2 of interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at
$UWLFOH)&1RRSSRVLWLRQ26*¶VPRWLRQIRU the time of the celebration of the marriage were
reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
stating: that the questioned provision only applies to naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
valid mixed marriages between Filipinos and aliens; degree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
that the remedy is annulment or legal separation; and allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
WKDWWKHUHLVQRODZWKDWJRYHUQVUHVSRQGHQW¶V foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
situation. marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice.
Issue:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, The reckoning point in the provision is not the
where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
remarry under Philippine law? capacitating the latter to remarry.
AMOR-CATALAN vs. CA
G.R. No. 167109 (February 6,2007)
Bayot vs CA
G.R. No. 155635 (Nov. 27, 2008)
FC4,FC16,
NCC84,
RPC351-352
R.A. 6955, ³$Q $FW WR 'HFODUH 8QODZIXO WKH 3UDFWLFH RI 0DWFKLQJ )LOLSLQR :RPHQ IRU 0DUULDJH WR )RUHLJQ
1DWLRQDOV´
R.A. 9208, Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 66
FC 23 8-248
NCC 221 (1)
Albano v. Gapusan
71 SCRA 26.
FC 26 paragraph 2
NCC97
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC. March 4, 2003
FC 55(8)
RPC 333 & 334
RPC 247
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 67
Goitia v. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
Facts: ,668( :21 DUW LV DEVROXWH DQG WKHUHIRUH FDQ¶W
-‐ Jan 7, 1915 ± parties were legally married grant wife any support since she was the one who left
but after a month woman left because of home
gross acts by her husband -‐ Person obliged to give support can either
-‐ Marriage ± a contract in so far as civil effects pay the pension fixed or receive and
are concerned requiring consent of parties maintain in his home the person.
o After marriage ceremony, a HELD: NO
conjugal partnership is formed -‐ Separation is different from support given to
between the 2 wife as agreed upon in the contract they
o Reciprocal rights arise and legal entered into when they got married when
existence becomes one husband promised to support wife.
o Termination of it should result in -‐ Wife is still part of conjugal domicile even if
some relief VKHGRHVQ¶WOLYHLQKRXVHDQ\PRUH
RESULT: should pay support
Gandionco v. Peflaranda
155 SCRA 725
Facts: -‐
On Separation: civil action for legal
-‐ 29 May 1986 - respondent, the legal wife of separation, based on concubinage, may
the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
Court of Misamis Oriental complaint against criminal action for concubinage, because
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground said civil action is not one "to enforce the
of concubinage, with a petition for support civil liability arising from the offense
and payment of damages o governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule
-‐ 13 October 1986 ± respondent also filed in 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City a Procedure
complaint against petitioner for concubinage, o refers to civil action for the recovery
-‐ 14 November 1986 ± respondent filed for of civil liability arising from the
support of pendent lite which was granted on offense charged. Whereas, the old
10 December 1986 Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred
-‐ Petitioner contends that civil action for legal to "Civil action arising from the
separation and its consequences should be offense."
suspended in light of criminal charge of o action for legal separation is not to
concubinage under Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules recover civil liability, but is aimed at
on Criminal Procedure the conjugal rights of the spouses
o After a criminal action has been and their relations to each other
commenced the pending civil action o decree of legal separation on
arising from the same offense shall ground of concubinage may be
be suspended, in whatever stage it issued without criminal conviction of
may be found, until final judgment concubinage thus no need to wait
in the criminal proceeding has been -‐ On support
rendered o can be availed of in an action for
ISSUE: WON other actions should be suspended due legal separation, and granted at the
to criminal action of concubinage discretion of the judge
HELD: NO RESULT: petition is dismissed
Ong vs Ong
505 SCRA 76
-‐ RTC/ CA - held that the Quitclaim Deed is donation in favor of minor by parents of legal
equivalent to a Deed of Sale and thus representatives applies only to onerous and
Sandra had a right to it conditional donations where the donation
-‐ March 15, 1985 ± reached age of majority may have to assume certain charges or
and replaced guardian as respondent burdens
ISSUE: WON Sandra has a right to the land through o In this case no such burden was
quitclaim assumed by then minor thus
HELD: YES quitclaim is recognized even
-‐ presumption is that there is a sufficient without a guardian
cause of the contract thus need to prove RESULT: CA ruling is affirmed
otherwise
-‐ Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that
the requirement of the acceptance of the
Lapuz v. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
Matubis v. Praxedes
109 Phil 789
Facts: Socorro Matubis²Zoilo Praxedes (1/10/43). 4/24/56 which was outside reglementary
But from 5/30/44 they lived separately from each period
other. They had an agreement on4/3/48 where: x CC 100 legsep can be invoked by innocent
x They relinquish their rights over each other spouse, i.e. that there was no condonation.
as h & w But agreement b/w Zoilo and Socorro
x That they cannot prosecute each other for showed that there was condonation (Exhibit
concubinage or adultery (condonation) B of their agreement)
x That each is no longer entitled to support Therefore this petition.
from the other spouse ISSUE: WON TC erred in saying that petitioner filed
x Neither can claim anything from each other her case for legal separation out of time and cannot
On Jan 1955, Zoilo cohabited with Asuncion claim it since she is not an innocent spouse
Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and recorded HELD: YES
DV=RLOR¶VWKH\DOVRSXEOLFO\DSSHDUHGDVK Z -‐ knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but
Socorro then filed on 4/24/56 @CFI CamSur for only made the complaint on April 24, 1956
legsep and change of surname against husband due o Art 102 of NCC provides for time
to abandonment and concubinage. one can file for legal separation
7& GHFODUHG WKDW =RLOR¶V DFWV FRQVWLWXWHV -‐ As shown in the agreement she condoned
concubinage but dismissed complaint due to: and consented to (1) living separately (2)
x CC 102 said action for legsep can only be can commit grounds for legal separation ie
filed a year after such grounds have arisen. concubinage
Socorro said to have known cohab of Zoilo Condonation and consent are expressed thus cannot
since Jan 1955 but action was filed on claim to be innocent spouse which law provides for
(NCC 100)
FC 58-60;
Araneta vs Concepcion
99 Phil 709
Ocampo v Florenciano
107 Phil 35
46 SCRA 110
on 6/18/71 petitioner Lucy Samosa filed for legsep for -‐ Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute
concubinage and attempt against her life. She also bar to the hearing motion for preliminary
sought for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for injunction prior to the expiration of the six-
the return to her of what she claimed to be her month period.
paraphernal and exclusive property (under admin and -‐ Art 103 provides that in cases where court
management of priv resp). Clemente Ramos (priv deems proper, it can appoint another to
resp) opposed such saying that hearing the pet for manage property between husband and
injunction would only make the prospect of wife.
reconciliation dim. o In this case her paraphernal
CFI Judge Vamenta Jr granted such motion to property
suspend hearing on the injunction. And thus this o Would show that it is not an
certiorari aggravating circumstacnce to the
ISSUE: WON preliminary mandatory injunction prescribed 6-month period deemed
applied for as an ancillary remedy on exclusive as the cooling off period
property of wife that is currently being administered by In any case, more than 6 months have already
her husband can be tried in court even before the 6- passed thus court can hear both legal separtion and
month period allotted in cases of legal separation mandatory injunction.
HELD: YES
Pacete v. Cariaga
231 SCRA 321
FC58
FC 61 par. 1
FC 61 par. 2
De Ia Viña v. Villareal
41 Phil 13
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of 1) adultery; husband ejected her from
First Instance: divorce; partition of the conjugal conjugal home and thus she established her
property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of residence in Iloilo, that she had no means of support
P400/month and was only living at the expense of one of her
daughters
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 72
2) preliminary injunction restraining her and and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in
prohibiting her husband from conjugal property since restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
defendant was trying to alienate or encumber said complained of either for a limited period or
property perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act
CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent complained of during the litigation would probably
appealed claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction work injustice to the plaintiff;
since wife should follow his domicile and that the 3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is
judge has exceeded his power in granting the about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
preliminary injunction. some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights,
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
ISSUE: render the judgment ineffectual.
1. WON a married woman ever acquire a - is a logical and necessary incident
residence or domicile separate from that of of the general powers conferred
her husband during the existence of the upon Courts of First Instance
marriage -‐ law making the husband the sole
2. WON the wife may obtain a preliminary administrator of the property of the conjugal
injunction against the husband restraining partnership is founded upon necessity and
and prohibiting him from alienating or convenience as well as upon the
encumbering any part of the conjugal presumption that, from the very nature of the
property during the pendency of the action relating between husband and wife, the
HELD: former will promote and not injure the
-‐ 1. YES, when the husband has given interests of the latter. when that relation
enough reason for her to do so as example, ceases and, in a proper action, the wife
cause of divorce. seeks to dissolve the marriage and to
-‐ The law will recognize a wife as having a partition the conjugal property, it is just and
separate existence, and separate interests, proper, in order to protect the interests of the
and separate rights, in those cases where wife, that the husband's power of
the express object of all proceedings is to administration be curtailed, during the
show that the relation itself ought to be pendency of the action, insofar as alienating
dissolved or encumbering the conjugal property is
-‐ The law making the domicile of the husband concerned.
that of the wife is applicable only to their -‐ , if the defendant should dispose of all or any
relations with third parties, and has no part of the conjugal property during the
application in cases of actual separation and pendency of the action for divorce, and
controversy between themselves as to the squander or fraudulently conceal the
temporary or permanent severance of the proceeds, that act "would probably work
marriage ties by judicial proceedings injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would
2. YES, in protection of her share in the property probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's
-‐ Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides: rights, respecting the subject of the action,
-‐ A preliminary injunction may be granted and tending to render the judgment
when it is established, in the manner ineffectual
hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of RESULT: judge acted within his jurisdiction
the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded
Sabalones v. CA
230 SCRA 79
-‐ Samson- Remedios married -‐ Appealed in Ca, she prayed for preliminary
-‐ Samson Sabalones- member of diplomatic injunction which was granted
service left to his wife remedios Sabalones
the administration of some of their conjugal WON CA can issue a writ of preliminary injunction
properties for 15 years against husband on part of his conjugal property
-‐ Oct 5, 1981 ± Samson-Thelma HELD: YES
-‐ !985 ± UHWLUHG DV DPEDVVDGRU EXW GLGQ¶W JR -‐ Purpose of prelim injunction: preserve the
back to wife and kids status quo of the things subject of the action
-‐ 1989 ± filed action for judicial authorization or the relations between the parties and thus
to sell conjugal property claiming that he is protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting
very sick and living alone without income these matters during the pendency of the
-‐ Prayer of Remedios ±asked to grant legal suit.
separation and liquidation of property
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 73
-‐ Requirements: (1) existence of a right (2) contested by petitioner thus just gives more
actual or threatened violation. reason to grant preliminary injunction
-‐ Art 61 of FC which provides for an RESULT: prelim injunction is granted however this
administrator of conjugal assets was already does not permanently make the respondent the
made when TC denied petitioner any share administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.
on conjugal relations and CA gave
respondent the preliminary injunction
-‐ Allegations: harassing tenant of Forbes park,
having other properties, issuing quit claim on
US conjugal party and all of which was not
Yangco v. Rhode
1 Phil 404
Lerma v. CA
61 SCRA 440
- May 1951 ± Lerma (P) and Diaz (R )get married respondent the opportunity to present evidence to the
- Aug 1969 ± P files a complaint for adultery vs. R lower court, the CA dismissed the petition after the
and her lover Teodoro Ramirez respondent asked for a reconsideration saying that he
- Nov 1969 ± R files for legal separation and / or were not asking for a chance to present evidence to
separation of properties, custody of children and the lower court
support pendente lite (during pendency of action) for ➢ CFI (1972) ± R and Ramirez are convicted of
youngest son, Gregory on the grounds of adultery, this decision was appealed to the CA
concubinage and attempt against her life - P files a new case of adultery against R and new
➢ CFI ± (1970) R is entitled to support pendente lite lover, Manila policeman Jose Gochangco
IURP WKH GDWH RI 5¶V ILOLQJ WKH FRPSODLQW WKH DPRXQW - P raises the petition against the giving support
would be a monthly support of Php 1, 820 pendent elite to the SC, claiming, among others, that
- P raised the petition to the CA R did not ask for the enforcement of the CFI orders
➢ CA (1971) - initially issuing a preliminary injunction until he filed a second adultery charge against R
on the decision of the lower court to give the
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 74
ISSUE: WON respondent can still claim for support o CC 921 - one of the causes for
even though she has already been convicted of disinheriting a spouse is "when the
adultery spouse has given cause for legal
HELD: NO separation
-‐ Adultery is recognized as a defense for -‐ If allowed one would only need to file a case
support of legal separation no matter how groundless
o CC Article 303 - obligation to give in order to get support
support shall cease "when the Mere filing would not set Art 292 of FC to action. Still
recipient, be he a forced heir or not, preclude loss of such right in certain cases.
has committed some act which
gives rise to disinheritance
People v. Sansano
50 Phil 73
People v. Schneckenberger
73 Phil 413
expressly or impliedly after the crime has 12) Prior consent is as effective as subsequent
been committed consent to bar the offended aprty from
9) PARDON: refers to the offense after its prosecuting the offense
commission If these is morally condemnatory in a situation of this
10) CONSENT: refer to offense prior to its character, the remedy lies not with the court but with
commission the legislative dept of the govt²what the law is, not
11) Both means that offended party has chosen ZKDW LW VKRXOG EH GHILQHV WKH OLPLWV RI WKH FRXUW¶V
to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she authority
becomes unworthy to come to court and
invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong
FC 56(1)
Ginez v. Bugayong
100 Phil 616
FACTS:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 76
Arroyo v. CA
203 SCRA 753
3. Whether or not Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair -‐ Not all recantations are given new trials
precludes him from filing the criminal complaint on the o question whether a new trial shall
ground of pari delicto; and be granted on this ground depends
4. Whether or not Dr. Neri's manifestation is sufficient on all the circumstances of the
basis for the granting of a new trial. case, including the testimony of the
witnesses submitted on the motion
HELD: NO for the new trial. Moreover,
-‐ On self-incrimination recanting testimony is exceedingly
o disregarded when her admission to unreliable, and it is the duty of the
her husband in the privacy of their court to deny a new trial where it is
conjugal home that she had indeed not satisfied that such testimony is
lain with petitioner Arroyo true.
o constitutionality of admitting it as o Already had other opportunities to
evidence recant evidence (1) compromise
The right to counsel agreement (2) affidavit
attaches upon the start of documents merely stated
an investigation, i.e., when that Dr. Neri had pardoned
the investigating officer petitioners 18 and the
starts to ask questions to complaint was filed out of
elicit information and/or "pure misunderstanding"
confession or admissions 19 without hinting that Dr.
from respondent-accused. Neri knew of the
x Does not attach adulterous relations
(1) when not an x attempt to cure
investigating deficiency of two
officer as Dr. Neri previous
is not (2) when it documents
was spontaneous -‐ PARDON HAS TO BE GIVEN BEFORE
confession (3) CRIMINAL COMPLAINT HAS BEEN FILED.
x Also, husband is once the complaint has been filed, the
not precluded control of the case passes to the public
under the Rules prosecutor.
of Court from o In this case given after the trial
testifying against court had already rendered its
his wife in decision dated 17 December 1987
criminal cases for finding petitioners guilty beyond
a crime reasonable doubt.
committed by one In protection of family and marriage as inviolable
against the other institution.
-‐ no evidence that they entered into
agreement allowing adultery
FC56(4)
FC6O
FC 5 6(3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 221(3)
Brown v. Yambao
102 Phil 168
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 78
FC63
fC 63(3); FC 213
NCC 106(3)
P.D. 603 (CYWC) Art. 17 par. 3
Matute v. Macadaeg
99 Phil 340
o Court of First Instance denied her -‐ Custody of children she has now was only
request and ordered her to give given by Armado thus he is free to ask for
back children them back. The abuse of discretion given is
o Asked for certiorari and prohibition not a very grave one and she is poor and as
with preliminary injunction to to said living under the charity of her brothers.
cease and desist from enforcing in -‐ sections 1 and 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
any way the order of the Court, reading:
respondent Court dated June 19, -‐ "SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When
1965, and after hearing, to annul any tribunal, board, or officer exercising
the said Order and to award the judicial functions, has acted without or in
custody of the children to your excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
petitioner. abuse of discretion and there is no appeal,
ISSUE: WON she can be granted custody of children nor any plain, speedy, end adequate remedy
HELD: NO in the ordinary course of law, a person
-‐ Reasons given: 1) she is their legitimate aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
mother and they wish to stay with her, not in the proper court alleging the facts with
their father Armando Medel; (2) three (3) of certainty and praying that judgment be
the children are over ten (10) years of age, rendered annulling or modifying the
and, hence, their aforementioned wish must, proceedings of such tribunal, board, or
pursuant to Rule 100, section 6, of the Rules officer as the law requires, with costs.
of Court, be heeded, unless "the parent so -‐ "SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the
chosen be unfit to take charge" of them "by proceedings of any tribunal corporation
reason of moral depravity, habitual board, or person, whether exercising
drunkenness, incapacity or poverty"; (3) the functions judicial or ministerial, are without or
act of infidelity of which she had been found in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
guilty in the decision of November 6, 1952, grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
does not involve "moral depravity"; (4) in any appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
event, it is a thing of the past, not a present adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
reality; (5) respondent Armando Medel is law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
now unfit to have the children under his care, verified petition in the proper court alleging
for he is living maritally with a woman by the the facts with certainty and praying that
name of Paz Jesusa Concepcion; and (6) judgment be rendered commanding the
although he had married the latter, after defendant to desist from further proceedings
securing in the United States a decree of in the action or matter specified therein, with
divorce dissolving his marriage with costs."
petitioner herein, said decree is null and void Petition is denied.
and, accordingly, he is guilty of bigamy.
Macadangdang vs. CA
108 SCRA 314
ISSUES:
Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses Elizabeth
Mejias and Crispin Anahaw; and
Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her husband,
the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
HELD:
YES
The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the
said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 80
spouses. Æ Art. 255: Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of Mejias and
Anahaw
Rolando was born on October 30, 1967. Between March, 1967 and October 30, 1967, the time
difference is clearly 7 months. The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such
is not the case. Respondent underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy.
Presumption of legitimacy becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical
impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child
the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other Æ same
province
Physical impossibility:
(1) impotence of husband;
inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function
(2) living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and
(3) serious illness of the husband.
NO.
Art. 256 provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy
Art. 257: adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the presumption of legitimacy of
her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife
Art. 220
FC 63(2), FC 64
FC 198
NCC 370-372
Laperal v. Republic
116 Phil 672
Facts: Issue:
Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are WON a wife can use her maiden name after a decree
now legally separated. Elisea wants to resume the of legal separation has been granted.
use of her maiden name. Petition was opposed by the
City Attorney on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of Held/Ratio:
the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of No. LHJDO6HSDUDWLRQDORQHLVQRWDJURXQGIRUZLIH¶V
Court. The lower court originally dismissed the change of name. Art 372 specifically mandates the
petition but changed its mind and granted it on the wife to continue using name and surname employed
ground that it was merely for a change of name. It before the legal separation. Her marriage status is
also reasoned that the use of the married name would unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for
JLYHULVHWRFRQIXVLRQLQWKHZRPDQ¶VILQDQFHVDQGWKH a change of name in general) does not prevail over
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
FC 63(4)
Solo Parents Act
FC 65-67
cf.NCC 113-114
FC68
FC 68; FC 72
NCC 92 1(4)
RPC 11(2)
RPC 247
Arroyo v. Vasques-Arroyo
42 Phil 54
Cuaderno v. Cuaderno
12 SCRA 505
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 82
-‐ Nov 17, 1956 ± began living separately ISSUE: WON CA can order them to live together as
o Due to husband inflicting bodily their duty
injuries / HELD: NO
o 7RRNKHUWRKHUPRWKHU¶VKRXVH -‐ Cohabitation between them must be due to
-‐ Aug 14, 1957 ± Juvenile and Domestic spontaneous mutual affection and not a legal
Relations Court ordered husband Angel order
Cuaderno to support his wife Lourdes -‐ PRQWK LV UHDVRQDEOH VLQFH ZLIH GRHVQ¶W
Cuaderno with 150/month. have a job and husband is still continuing to
-‐ CA: reversed their decision since they may support her
resume cohabitation which is their duty as as the separation has been brought about by the
husband and wife husband and under the circumstances established
o Acknowledgement of de facto during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different
separation situation between the parties shall take place.
Lacson v. Lacson
24 SCRA 837
-‐Sept 20, 2000 ± set the case in S to -‐ Question of mental capacity has already
determine physical and medical condition of been decided by CA who declared that there
Potenciano and if it an issue. ZDVQ¶W DQ\ PDQLIHVWDWLRQ IRU WKLV WR EH DQ
-‐ Jan 31, 2001 ± FRXUWGHQLHG(UOLQGD¶VPRWLRQ issue.
that Potenciano be produced before court -‐ Quoting Art 12 of 1987 COnsti and Art 68
and be medically examined and 69 of FC which said that spouses are
-‐ March 27, 2001 ± court denied motion of duty bound to live together and take care of
reconsideration for physical/mental each other
examination to be conducted. o &DQ¶W DSSO\ VLQFH WKH\¶YH EHHQ
ISSUE: WON Erlinda can be granted custody of her living separately since 1972 which
husband through consortium is evidence of absence of empathy
Held: NO between
-‐ Illegal restraint had not been proven in CA ± empathy - shared feeling
Potenciano declared that his children were between husband and wife
not preventing him from seeing anybody, experienced not only by
including his wife. having spontaneous
o Court was also wrong in deciding sexual intimacy but a deep
to grant wife with visitation rights sense of spiritual
since this impugns on the right to communion. Marital union
privacy of the husband which is a is a two-way process.
constitutional right esp since he is RESULT: became moot and academic since husband
deemed to be with his full mental had passed on June 28, 2001. Motion for
capacity coupled with the right of reconsideration is denied.
choice
Abella v. COMELEC
201 SCRA 335
FC 70-71
FC 73, compare with NCC 117
Art. II Sec. 14 and Art. XIII Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution
cf. NCC 113 compare with ROC Rule 3 Sec. 4
FI5$³$Q$FW3URPRWLQJthe Integration of Women as Full & Equal Partners of Men in Development
DQG1DWLRQ%XLOGLQJ´
FI5$³$Q$FW*UDQWLQJ3DWHUQLW\/HDYH´
VWLOO XVH KXVEDQG¶V VXUQDPH :KHQ JXLOW\ -‐ Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of
one SHOULD use her maiden name. women in nation-building, and shall ensure
-‐ Thus the use of maiden name is more of an the fundamental equality before the law of
OPTION than a DUTY. women and men.
-‐ Also, no judicial authority to have her name -‐ Republic Act No. 7192 "promoting the
changed to her husband when she marries integration of women as full and equal
thus no judicial confirmation should be partners of men in development and nation
needed when she changes it back. Only building. . . ."
necessary for civil status. -‐ the dissolution of the matrimonial bonds
o 7KXVUXOHVKRXOGQ¶WEHDSSOLHG consequent upon the granting of absolute
o Changed through: prefixing the divorce or the declaration of nullity of
word "Mrs." before her husband's marriage or its annulment, provides legal
full name or by adding her ground for the automatic dropping of said
husband's surname to her maiden family name and the resumption of the use
first name of her maiden name
RESULT: . Petitioner is authorized to resume her Vitug: showed that before a law allow a married
maiden name and surname. woman to use her maiden name and surname was
Romero: women should be given equal rights as men proposed but turned down
to resume use of their names
FC1;FC76
FC 66, 67, 128, 135, 136
FC77
FC81
FC78
FC 79, in rel. to NCC 3 8-39
FC81
FC 80 (2) and (3) in rel. To NCC 16
FC (3) in rel. To NCC 17
FC82
Solis vs Solis
53 Phil 912 [1928]
o In case of death of donees, 1/2 of o does not revoke the donation with
land donated would revert to donors presence or without
while the surviving donee would o marriage in a donation propter
retain the other half nuptias is rather a resolutory
o Alejo died followed by Juan, after condition which, as such,
death wife got lands again presupposes the existence of the
-‐ Fortunata wants part of her land obligation which may be resolved or
ISSUE: WON marriage makes the donation valid revoked, and it is not a condition
HELD: NO necessary for the birth of the
-‐ The donation propter nuptias is not valid obligation.
and did not create any right, since it was not Result; no need to give land
made in a public instrument Dissent by Street: believes marriage makes it an
-‐ marriage is a consideration, but not in the obligation.
sense of being necessary to give birth to the
obligation
FC84
FC 84; NCC 761
FC85
FC8T
FC87
Matabuena v. Cervantes
38 SCRA 284
Sumbad vs CA
308 CRA 575
-‐ 1982-1983 ± Maria Tait sold lots, some of Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous
-‐
which to the private respondents advantage, direct or indirect between the
-‐ July 24, 1989 ± petitioners Emilie Sumbad spouses during the marriage shall be void,
and Beatrice Tait field action to nullify deeds except moderate gifts which the spouses
of sale and to recover the lands in their may give each other on the occasion of any
name family rejoicing. The prohibition shall apply to
o Alleged they are children and persons living together as husband and wife
compulsory heirs of George and without a valid marriage.
Agata and that Maria sold lands -‐ 5HFRUG GRHVQ¶W¶ VKRZ WKDW *HRUJH PDUULHG
without their consent. Maria and if marriage took place. If they
-‐ TC and CA both ruled that petition was ZHUHQ¶W PDUULHG SHWLWLRQHUV VKRXOV VKRZ
without merit evidence that at time the time the deed of
-‐ ISSUE: WON donation was made in violation donation was executed, their father and
of Art. 133 of the Civil Code, now Art. 87 of Maria F. Tait were still maintaining
the Family Code common-law relations
HELD: NO %HDWULFH 7DLW¶V WHVWLPRQ\ LV RQO\ WR WKH HIIHFW WKDW in
-‐ Art. 133. Every donation between the 1941 Maria F. Tait became their stepmother. There is
spouses during the marriage shall be void. no evidence on record that George K. Tait, Sr. and
This prohibition does not apply when the Maria F. Tait continuously maintained common-law
donation takes effect after the death of the relations until April 2, 1974 when the donation was
donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to made.
moderate gifts which the spouses may give
each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing.
Mateo vs Lagua
29 SCRA 864
support and for his forced heir Gervasio -‐Disposable portion is to computed as such
Lagua (Art 908 of NCC): net estate of the decedent
-‐ Nov 1958 ± Cipriano died must be ascertained, by deducting payable
-‐ 1960 ± court said Gervasio and Sotera were obligations and charges from the value of the
possessors in bad fatih and not entitled to property owned by the deceased at the time
reimbursement. Also, action to anul donation of his death; then, all donations subject to
KDVSUHVFULEHGVLQFHLW¶VEHHQRYHU\HDUV collation would be added to it. With the
-‐ Appeal to CA which affirmed the court partible estate thus determined, the legitimes
decision but with the change that Gervasio is of the compulsory heir or heirs can be
entitled to part of the land since it exceeded established; and only thereafter can it be
what should be given which should be part of ascertained whether or not a donation had
&LSULDQR¶V GLVSRVDEOH SRUWLRQ LQ KLV ZLOO DQG prejudiced the legitimes.
should thus be given to Gervasio since it o CA just based it on the area and not
would be prejudicial to him as the heir. the value of the properties.
ISSUE: WON Court of Appeals acted correctly in -‐ in order that a donation may be reduced for
ordering the reduction of the donation for being being inofficious, there must be proof that
inofficious and in ordering herein petitioners to the value of the donated property exceeds
reconvey to respondent Gervasio Lagua an that of the disposable free portion plus the
unidentified 494.75 square-meter portion of the donee's share as legitime in the properties of
donated lots. the donor.
HELD: NO o CA had no evidence to declare lot
- proper nuptias has marriage as the motive of the as inofficious
donation alone and are without onerous (heavy RESULT: CA decision is set aside.
obligations) consideration , they remain subject to
reduction for inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if
they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.2
FC 48; 44; 61
FC75
FC88
FC89
FC 89 par. 2
FC 90; of NCC 484-501
FC91
FC as of NCC 164
FC 93 of NCC 160
FC92;FC95
FC94
conjugal property are those incurred in the defeat and frustrate the avowed
legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or objective of the new Civil Code
business with the honest belief that he is -‐ In this case, this is not benefiting his family in
doing right for the benefit of the family anyway and even if Art 163 says that the
o liable only for such "debts and husband is the administrator of the conjugal
obligations contracted by the property, this is limited to what benefits his
husband for the benefit of the family
conjugal partnership o benefit was clearly intended for
o to make a conjugal partnership third party, Ladislao Chavez
respond for a liability that should 5(68/7FRQMXJDOSURSHUW\FDQ¶WEHXVHG
appertain to the husband alone is to
Gelano vs CA
103 SCRA 90
G-Tractors, Inc., vs CA
135 SCRA 192
-Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He owns partnership from the husband's transaction",
a logginc company but it suffices that the transaction should be
- Feb 1973 ± Luis Narciso entered into Contract o one that normally would produce such
Hire of heavey Equipment with petitioner G-Tractors benefit for the partnership.
where G-tractors leased former tractors. Co tract o Debts he accumulated were for the
VWLSXODWHG SD\PHQW IRU UHQWDO +RZHYHU /XLV ZDVQ¶W VXSSRUW RIKLV IDPLO\ DQGWKXV FDQ¶W
able to pay be deemed his exclusive and
-Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt, one of private debts.
which was conjugal property of land. -‐ :LIH¶V QDPH GRHV QRW QHHG WR EH LQ WKH
ISSUE: WON land that is owned by both spouses can information when the conjugal property is the
EHVROGWRSD\IRU/XLV¶GHEW one being contested in trial since she is not
HELD: YES the recognized administrator. Only
-‐ all debts and obligations contracted by the necessary the other way around.
husband for the benefit of the conjugal Sec. 4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article 113
partnership "do not require that actual profit of the Civil Code
or benefit must accrue to the conjugal
SHUVRQDO IXQGV VR WKDW VKH ZRXOGQ¶W EH o Evidence: (1) the title had been
involved in the obligation. Promised it would issued in her name; (2) petitioner
be named to their children after. Never had categorically admitted that the
happened property was in her name; (3)
-‐ 1992 ± separated and Elvira filed an Affidavit petitioner was estopped from
of Adverse Claim of the land claiming otherwise, since he had
o Yu Bun Guan contends however signed the Deed of Absolute Sale
that he just used Elvira as a dummy that stated that she was the
to buy property since he was still a "absolute and registered owner"; (4)
Chinese National that time she had paid the real property taxes
(declared false by TC and CA) -‐ %X<XQ*XDQ¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWVKHXVHGKHU
ISSUE: WON Elvira Ong can regain her property income, salaries and savings, which are
HELD: YES conjugal in nature to buy the land made it co-
-‐ Provided enough evidence to show it was owned by them was disregarded through the
SDUDSKHUQDOSURSHUW\ZRPDQ¶VSURSHUW\WKDW evidence.
she owned prior to the marriage) RESULT: land is with Elvira esp since it was void
since it was a simulated sale.
FC96
FC 100(3)
FC 101
FC61
FC 96-98
FC 100; cf. FC 239
FC 104
Delizo v. Delizo
69 SCRA 216
Thus held that land properties should be divided heirs from the first marriage out would only enhance
between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion discord and not promote family solidarity.
to the duration of each partnership since to leave the
Belcodero v. CA
227 SCRA 303
Jocson v. CA
170 SCRA 333
Ansaldo v. Sheriff
64 Phil 115
Sps. Estonina v. CA
G.R. No. 111547, Jan. 27, 1997
FC 105(2) of FC 256
FC 105 of FC 74-74
Malang vs Moson
338 SCRA 393
PNB v. Quintos
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 92
46 Phil 370
FC 109
Laperal v. Katigbak
10 SCRA 493
-‐ Dec 27, 1958: SC rendered judgment that o Shown through: (1) title is in name
while the conjugal property should be used of wife alone (2) husband gave his
to pay the debt of Katigbak, the paraphernal marital consent to their being
SURSHUW\RI.DODZVKRXOGQ¶W mortgaged by his wife (3) wife is
-‐ 7&UHQGHUHGMXGJPHQWWKDW.DODZ¶VSURSHUW\ financially able to buy proeprty
was indeed paraphenral. -‐ In this case, proved that mother of Evelina
ISSUE: WON property being contested is part of bought the contested property for her, it was
conjugal property XQGHU (YHOLQD¶V QDPH 5DPRQ .DWLJEDN
HELD: NO issued a manifestation where he stated he
-‐ Art 160 of CC- properties acquired during had no interest in the property, husband
marriage are deemed conjugal property could not have afforded to buy it.
unless it is proven that it belongs exclusively 5(68/7 ODQG LV SDUDSKHUQDO DQG WKXV FDQ¶W EH
to husband and wife subject to the debts of Katigbak.
Berciles v. GSIS
128 SCRA 53
Veloso v. Martinez
28 Phil 255
Plata v. Yatco
12 SCRA 718
Lim v. Garcia
7 Phil 320
FC 109(4);ofFC 118-119
FC 110
FC 110 2nd par.;
FC 142, FC 75
Manotok Realty v. CA
149 SCRA 372
contract in order for him to make further -‐ Issue: WON sale between Legarda and
payments. Lucero was valid
-‐ In 1957-1958, PTC refused to entertain -‐ Held: NO, the Court directed Legarda to sell
Lucero when he finally went to them for the subdivision by executing the necessary
payment of the property because the estate document/s and submitting it to the Court for
was then involved in litigation. Consequent approval which Legarda failed to do
to the litigation, a deed of sale was then especially where the sale was on instalment
issued to Manotok Realty, Inc. on March 13, basis.
1959; the same was approved by the Court. Moreover, the receipt does not conform to the legal
On Jan. 1966, Manotok Realty, Inc. requirements of contracts of sale since it was neither
demanded the surrender of the actual and executed in a public instrument nor registered with the
material possession of the property and on Registry of Deeds. By virtue of Sec. 1, Rule 73
March 4, 1966, it filed a complaint for (Estate of Olave v. Reyes) and Sec. 4, Rule 89 (Vda.
ejectment. Although summonses were de Gil v. Cancio) of the Rules of Court, the Court as a
served to Lucero and tenant Sojio, Lucero probate court is authorized to approve sales of
instead executed a deed of assignment of immovable properties belonging to an estate of a
the lot in favour of his lessees. decedent. Hence, the sale was invalid and
-‐ When RTC favoured Manotok Realty, Inc., unenforceable (against third parties). Lucero and
Lucero alleged on appeal to CA that the sale Sojio were also found to have acted in bad faith since
made by Legarda was valid because the latter waited a long time before going to PTC,
Legarda was authorized to do so and hence, ignored the Court summons, and instead executed a
there was no need for the approval of the deed of assignment, while the latter constructed a
probate court. house when he was a mere lessee.
-‐
Ong vs CA
204 SCRA 297
Palanca v. Smith-Bell
9 Phil 131
declaration that the property was her Held: NO, because the borrowed P14k of Emiliano
exclusive property and demanded its was made upon credit of the property of his wife, the
possession and the dissolution of the levy. money became conjugal property by virtue of Civil
-‐ Code 1401 (3). The subsequent use of the money to
-‐ Issue: :21 SURSHUW\ LV $OHMDQGUD¶V the construction of the house also made the house
exclusively conjugal property and liable to the payment of his
debts by virtue of Civil Code 1408.
FC 106
FC 116
Torela v. Torela
3 SCRA 391
x there is nothing in the record to be taken as proof that the land was acquired during
show that the lot in question was their coverture. The further circumstance that the land
acquired during the marriage of was registered during their marriage cannot in itself
Felimon Torela and Graciana constitute proof that it was acquired during their
Gallego marriage for land registration under Act No. 496, as
Decree No. 440157 which confirmed the ownership of amended, does not confer title; it merely confirms a
Felimon Torela over the land in question described title already existing and which is registerable
him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely
descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot
Magallon v. Montejo
146 SCRA 282
Cuenca v. Cuenca
168 SCRA 335
Petitioners
- Denied legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino HELD:
and Maria as well as the legitimacy of the <HV
respondents Engracia was entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca
- Claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia together with the respondents (legit children by Maria)
Basadre were legally married and that they are the in accordance with Art. 892 of the NCC
legitimate children thereof Appellate Court declared Engracia as surviving
- Contend that subject parcels of land are conjugal spouse ĺQRQHHGWRSURYHOHJDOLW\RIPDUULDJHPXFK
properties of Agripino and Engracia less to prove the legitimacy of the other petitioners
Appellate Court 12
- Agripino, in his lifetime, expressed in the oArt. 160 of NCC: all property of the marriage is
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
%DQJDKRQĺSURRIVWKDWSURSHUWLHVLQTXHVWLRQEHORQJ unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property husband or the wife
-Tax declarations presented by petitioners are not real oPresumption refers only to the property acquired
evidence to prove ownership or possession GXULQJPDUULDJHDQGGRHVQ¶WRSHUDWHZKHQWKHUHLVQR
- Petitioners wanted to present new evidence to showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal
prove: was acquired
o That Engraciaand Agripino were legally oDocuments sought to be presented do not show that
married the claims to the subject parcles consisting of
o That other petitioners were the legitimate homestead lands were perfected during the marriage
children of Agripino and Engracia
o That subject parcels of land were conjugal oPresumption cannot prevail when the title is in the
properties of Agripino and Engracia name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved
ISSUES: 'RFXPHQWVVKRZWhat 5 out of 8 parcels covered are
:21(QJUDFLDLVHQWLWLOHGWRLQKHULWIURP$JULSLQR titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or
:21 WKH VXEMHFW SDUFHOV RI ODQG ZHUH FRQMXJDO Retituto
properties of Agripino and Engracia (WON oPresumption cannot prevail
presumption should hold) Petition Dismissed
FC117
Cheesman vs IAC
193 SCRA 93
Criselda assumed exclusive management
FACTS: and administration of property, leasing it
to tenants
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were July 1, 1981: Criselda sold the property to
married (1970) but separated (1981) Estelita without the knowledge or
June 4, 1947: Deed of Sale and Transfer of consent of Thomas
Possessory rights executed by Armande Alteras in July 31, 1981: Thomas brought suit against
favor of Criselda Cheesman Criselda and Estelita, praying for the
annulment of the sale on the ground that
Thomas Cheesman was aware of the deed and did the transaction had been executed
not object to the transfer being made only to his wife without his knowledge and consent
Answer: property was paraphernal,
SXUFKDVHGE\&ULVHOGD¶VH[FOXVLYHIXQGV
Tax declarations for the property purchased were RTC: sale was void ab initio
issued in the name of Criselda with knowledge of Summary judgment: sale was valid
Thomas and without his objection) Evidence on record satisfactorily
overcame the disputable
presumption in Art. 160 of NCC
3URSHUW\ ZDV &ULVHOGD¶V
paraphernal property
Legal presumption could not apply
inasmuch as the husband-
plaintiff is an American citizen
and therefore disqualified
under the consti to acquire and
own real properties
ISSUES:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 100
WON Thomas has rights over the property subsequent sale of the same
WON the residential land is conjugal property by his wife on the
property theory that in so doing he is
WON the property would be conjugal merely exercising the
property if Criselda used conjugal funds prerogative of a husband in
respect of conjugal property
HELD: If the property were to be declared
NO conjugal, this would accord the
Constitutional provision (Sec. 14, alien husband a not
Art. XIV of 1973 Consti) insubstantial interest and right
prohibits sale to aliens of over land Æ against
residential land constitution
Thomas acquired no right over the NO
property by virtue of the land Against constitution
NO
Thomas had, and has no capacity Petition Denied
or personality to question the
Villanueva vs CA
427 SCRA 439
FACTS:
Oct 7, 1926 - Plaintiff Eusebia is the legal wife of
defendant Nicolas 5 children
During their marriage, they acquired real properties
and all improvements situated in Mandue City and
Consolacion (22 properties)
Zulueta v. Pan-Am
49 SCRA 1
FACTS:
Altercation between Zulueta and Capt. Zentner of
Pan-Am led to the off-loading of Mr. Zulueta, Mrs.
Zulueta, and Miss Zulueta
Plane trip from Wake Islands to Philippines
Mr. Zulueta was 20 to 30 minutes late in boarding
because he had to relieve himself at the beach
(HAHAHA)
Previous decision:
5HO\LQJXSRQ$UWRI&&ZKLFKSURYLGHVWKDW³WKH
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
KXVEDQG¶VFRQVHQWH[FHSWLQFDVHVSURYLGHGE\ ODZ´
and it is not claimed that this is one of such cases
Mendoza v. Reyes
124 SCRA 154
Under NCC:
Castillo v. Pasco
11 SCRA 102
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 103
FC 119
FC 120
Padilla vs Padilla
74 Phil 377
Narciso and Concepcion were married in 1912 of either, regardless of the true
ownership of the property and
Husband (med student then) brought little into the regardless of the source of
partnership, while wife contributed a considerable money
amount Upon liquidation, trust should be
recognized and enforced so
Practically all the conjugal partnership property came that the real ownership of the
from fruits of the paraphernal property property may be established
Torrens title should not be turned
Husband left no children and gave whole estate to into an instrument for
mother deprivation of ownership
That prevailing from the time of the
Property included in the inventory is appraised at liquidation of the conjugal partnership
261,000 Art. 1404 of CC.
Mere construction of a building from
ISSUE: common fund does not
WON the Torrens titles are final and incontrovertible automatically convey the
RZQHUVKLS RI WKH ZLIH¶V ODQG WR
WON the value of the paraphernal land to be the conjugal partnership
reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of Erecting a building is merely a
the construction of the building or the value at the exercise of the right of usufruct
time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership pertaining to the conjugal
SDUWQHUVKLSRYHUWKHZLIH¶VODQG
WON the value of the paraphernal buildings which In consequence of this usufructuary
were demolished to make possible the construction of right, the conjugal partnership
new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent
should be reimbursed to the wife during the occupation of the
ZLIH¶V ODQG EHFDXVH LI WKH ORt
HELD: were leased to a 3rd person,
NO instead of being occupied by
There is nothing sacrosanct the new construction from
(inviolable) and definitive in the partnership funds, the rent from
certificate of title when the the third person would belong
conjugal partnership is to the conjugal partnership
liquidated. YES
The true and real owner may be The value of the old building at the
shown time they were torn down
Because of feelings of trust existing should be paid to the wife
between the spouses,
certificates of title are often Judgment affirmed
secured in the name of both, or
Caltex vs Felias
108 Phil 873
Spouses Juliano and Eulalia Felias donated Lot No. Texas Company now Caltex
107 to their daughter, Felisa Felias (Private (Phil.) Inc.
Respondent) on March 31, 1928. Provincial Sherrif executed a final
March 26, 1941: Trial court held that in a deed of sale which was duly
case against respRQGHQW¶V KXVEDQG recorded on a TCT.
(Simeon Sawamoto), he had to pay Felisa filed an action, declaring herself the
Texas Company (Phil.) Inc. a sum of owner of the 2 parcels of land.
P661.94 plus legal interest and 7ULDOFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ
DWWRUQH\¶VIHHV Sale of Lot. No. 107 is null and void
A writ of execution was issued to Sale of coconut land is NOT. It
the provincial sheriff who levied rightfully belongs to Caltex.
upon Lot No. 107 together with Both parties appealed and CA declared that:
the improvements and a small Lot. No. 107 belongs to Felisa and
parcel of coconut land and sold ordered the Register of Deeds
these at a public auction to to Cancel the entry of the levy,
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 105
Calimlim v. Fortun
129 SCRA 675
Maramba v. Lozano
20 SCRA 474
Embrado v. CA
233 SCRA 335
Facts:
Lucia was misled into signing the deed of sale. She
Lot 564 was sold to Lucia Embrado, as can be proven thought that the lot was only intended as a security for
LQ D 9HQWD 'HILQLWLYD´ E\ VSRXVHV &DUSLWDQRV 7KH a loan of the Jimenez spouses.
deed was prepared and signed on July 2, 1946,
although it was effective since 1941. They also believe that Cimafranca and Salimbagat
are buyers in bad faith.
1943: Petitioners got married to each other.
CA ruled for the respondents, saying that Lucia does
Feb 13, 1948: The sale was registered and Transfer not need the consent of Oreste because the lot is her
Certificate No. T-99 was issued in her name alone. paraphernal property. CA also believes that
Originally, her status on the Title was single, but it Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good faith.
ZDVFKDQJHGWR³PDUULHGWR2UHVWH7RUUHJLDQL´E\WKH
CFI of Zamboanga del Norte.
Issues/Held/Ratio: Eda never proved also how she obtained the money
W/N Lot 564 was paraphernal property of Lucia or to pay.
conjugal property.
Conjugal. Also, based on the decision in the first issue, the land
beng conjugal needed the consent of Oreste as well.
First of all, the sale was not completed until the The sale is void ab initio being contrary to law. Thus
DELIVERY of the object to the creditor. (Art 1496 of this also applies to Cimafranc and Salimbagat ± quod
the Civil Code) nullum est, nullum producit effectum
The construction of the building on the lot was done
during the marriage already and according to Art. 158, W/N Cimafranca and Salimbagat are buyers in good
the land becomes conjugal upon 2 conditions: faith. If this is so, the sale to them is valid.
NO. The relationship of Cimafranca and Salimbagat
Construction of building was at the expense of the to the Jimenez spouses show that it would be
partnership impossible that they did not know of their financial
Land is owned by one of the spouses. situation. It is a general rule that a buyer of real
property must be wary before buying property and
W/N sale to Jimenez was valid. invstigate the rights of those in possession of a
Not valid. certain property. The fact that they looked in the
Register of Deeds to see the title is not an excuse,
Evidence shows that the Jimenez spouses had no especially if they know about the bad financial status
sufficient means of livelihood so it is questionable how of the Jimenezes.
they were able to obtain the money for the property.
FC 121
Mariano vs CA
174 SCRA 59
Ayala vs CA
286 SCRA 272
Ching vs CA
423 SCRA 356
1) Same Chings in Ayala vs. CA properties 4) PBMCI fails to pay. ABC files the complaint
wrongfully levied. Same deal another loan to recover the unpaid loans with a
not paid and conjugal partnership not held preliminary attachment against PBMCI
liable. and sureties Ching, Tanedo and Kiat Hua.
2) PBMCI (Philippine Blooming Mills Company, 5) RTC initially denies preliminary attachment
inc.) takes a P9m loan from Allied Banking later agreeing after a bond was posted on
Corporation (ABC) Ching signs a WKH DUJXPHQW E\ SULYDWH ɹ WKDW WKH
promissory note. defendants were disposing of their
3) As added security Ching w/ Tanedo and Kiat properties w/ intent to defraud their
Hua executed a continuing guarantee w/ creditors.
ABC binding them to guarantee the 6) On July 26, 1983 the deputy sheriff of the
payment of all PBMCI obligations trial court seizes 100,000 common shares
amounting to P38m (w/ subsequent loans RI &LW\FRUS VWRFNV EHORQJLQJ WR $OIUHGR
of 12m and 13m). Ching.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 110
8) SUD\HG WR GLVPLVV FLWLQJ WKH IDFW WKDW the debtor alleging such a benefit. In the
Marcelino was the exclusive owner. instant case this fact was not sufficiently
9) 7& VLGHV Z ɹ DQG JUDQWV DOO SUD\HUV Z proven. The sweeping conclusion furnished by
WKH WKDW WKH ORDQ 0DUFHOLQR DFTXLUHG ZDV
damages.
utilized to construct housing units to the benefit
10) CA affirms TC of his family, is unfounded in the absence of
Issues: proof of the matter. Moreover the matter of
WON the conjugal Partnership is liable for benefit to the family was only raised on appeal
the payment of the loan obtained by the late and is thus not well founded and even less
Marcelino Dailo the same having redounded proven.
to the benefit of the family. Also discussed here is the lack of consent where
Held: Not Necessarily, the adherence to Art. consent of both parties is necessary when one is
SDUZKLFKWKHXVHWRLQFXUOLDELOLW\RQ selling land (art 124 of FC)
WKHɹSURSHUW\SODFHVWKHEXUGHQRISURYLQJWKH
benefit given to the family of the debtee on the
Javier v. Osmeña
34 Phil 336
G-Tractors v. CA (supra)
DBP v. Adil
161 SCRA 307
FACTS:
x Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Issue: WON conjugal partnership may be used to pay
Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from debt in promissory note when husband was the only
the DBP in the sum of P2,000.00 in a one who signed it
promissory note whereby they bound HELD: YES
themselves jointly and severally to pay the -‐ Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is
account in ten (10) equal yearly the administrator of the conjugal partnership.
amortizations All debts and obligations contracted by the
x Obligation remained outstanding and unpaid husband for the benefit of the conjugal
x Confesor, who was by then a member of the partnership, are chargeable to the conjugal
Congress of the Philippines, executed a partnership.
second promissory note on April 11, 1961 in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second
expressly acknowledging said loan and promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal
promising to pay the same on or before June partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable
15, 1961 for this obligation.
x Defaulted in payment Æ DBP filed complaint
x Inferior court ordered payment
x CFI of Iloilo reversed order
Mariano v. CA (supra)
Only when one contracts it as the principal obligor in and services can Art 161 apply
the contract and is the direct recipient of the money
Ramones vs Agbayani
137808, Sept 30, 2005
BA Finance v CA
161 SCRA 608
Sps. Amadeo and Estela Costuna bought 3 parcels of Amadeo in Samar for the purpose of financing his
land during their marriage and registered the same in medical needs. Hence, Amadeo executed the
the name of Amadeo. Amadeo was later hospitalized mentioned deed of sale, which sold his ½
(on different dates) for 3rd degree burns on his legs. indeterminate share on the 3-parcel property, in
While already ill due to old age, he went to his favour of Laureana Domondon. When Amadeo died,
relatives in Samar to settle his property documents. (VWHOD VRXJKW WKH H[HFXWLRQ RI $PDGHR¶V ZLOO
Because of his failure to return, Estela refused to give executed prior to his trip to Samar, which named her
her consent to the action of partition of their conjugal as sole. Laureana opposed the motion, claimed her ½
partnership and the deed of sale allegedly filed by
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 115
share in the property and sought to have Estela give medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly
consent to the deed of sale. abandoned conjugal home and wife
HELD:
CA: (1) NO
-‐ husband may not sell real estate without -‐ $PDGHR VRXJKW WKH SHWLWRQHU¶V FRQVHQW EXW
consent unless (1) sale of personal petitioner withheld it. However when deed of
properties (2) real properties acquired before sale was made, she did nothing to impugn it
NCC (3) real properties acquired after NCC and assailed it for the first time when
but wife is in a leprosarium, declared Respondent filed a case in RTC-QC.
spendthrift or under civil interdiction, (4) -‐ Amadeo only sold his ½ share of community
purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (5) property. Her share in the property is intact.
purpose is to secure future of children or -‐ When consent is unreasonably withheld, one
finishing a career. should consider law as falling within the
-‐ Support of spouse by conjugal property is recognized exceptions
not relieved when they do not live on the -‐ (2) YES
same roof. it falls under the obligations protected by Art 161 of
ISSUE: CC since it gives a discernible advantage or good to
-‐ (1) WON deed of sale should be nullified the conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. Health
since it waas without the consent of the wife would obviously benefit their conjugal partnership
-‐ (2) WON conjugal partnership should be
made liable for payment of hospital and
On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio Carlos issued a check the personal account of Honorio and that the same
worth $25k, in the name of Pura Vallejo, against his was received by the spouses and given to Vallejo for
SHUVRQDODFFRXQWLQ%DQNHU¶V7UXVW,WZDVDOOHJHGO\D payment of a house and lot that became their
loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband conjugal dwelling.
Manuel Abelardo for the purchadse of a house and lot
from Vallejo in order to help them in their married life. -‐ ISSUE: WON conjugal property should pay
Vallejo issued an acknowledgement receipt. The for the loan of 25, 000 even when
failure of the spouses to pay led Honorio to formally acknowledgement was not signed by
demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged husband
their debt to her father but claimed that it was payable -‐ HELD: YES
on a staggered basis. Despite this acknowledgement -‐ Art 121 of FCC ± conjugal partnership is
DQG WKH HYLGHQFH RI +RQRULR¶V %DQN¶V 7UXVW &KHFN liable for (1) debts and obligations that
(the one paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand, benefit the conjugal partnership of gains
Manuel denied the nature of the money as a loan. He made by both the spouses or one of them
claimed, instead, that the amount given was his share but with the consent of the other (2) debts
LQ LQFRPH IURP +RQRULR¶V EXVLQHVV + / &DUORV and obligations that are without consent f
Construction. He even presented 10 BPI checks one of the spouse but their family has
against the account of HLCC to prove that he had benefited
been receiving profit from HLCC. However, he is not Evidence here shows that family did benefit since
LQFOXGHG LQ +/&&¶V $UWLFOHV RI ,QFRUSRUDWion or they used the loan to buy the house which became
Organizational Profile as stockholder, officer, their conjugal home.
employee, or agent. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that
a check of $25k had been issued to Vallejo against
FC122
People v. Lagrimas
29 SCRA 153
4) LC grants the petition which is later reversed Held: YES, the Civil Code provides that indemnities
by a second judge of the same court only to may be imposed on the conjugal property of an
be reaffirmed by a third judge ruling for the RIIHQGHUZKHQWKHRIIHQGHU¶VH[FOXVLYHSURSHUWLHVDUH
insufficient to cover the cost his indemnity. In this the
wife of the accused on March 5, 1960.
law does not contemplate that the conjugal
5) LC rules that indemnities may be imposed partnership must be dissolved and its assets
on the conjugal properties of the accused liquidated before the indemnity is to be drawn. It
only after the dissolution of the conjugal merely requires that the offending spouse repay the
partnership and the liquidation of the assets liabilities taken from the conjugal partnership when
thereof pursuant to ART 161 of the NCC. such partnership is to be dissolved. However it is a
Issues: WON civil indemnities may be taken condition in the article that the indemnities collectible
IURP WKH RIIHQGHU¶V FRQMXJDO SURSHUWLHV HYHQ from the CPG must not eat in to the funds for the
before the dissolution of the conjugal maintenance of the family and the education of the
partnership and the liquidation of its assets. children as it would lead to injustice.
Go vs Yamane
489 SCRA 107
FC 123
FC 124
Guiang vs CA
291 SCRA 372
Heirs vs Mijares
410 SCRA 97
Lot 4349-B-2 is a 396 m2 covered by TCT 205445 in Vicente was appointed guardian on 9/29/83
Balintawak QC registered under Spouses Vicente and + authorized on 10/14/83 to sell estate of Ignacia. On
Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, purchased using conjugal 8/9/84 she wrote Mijares spouses to return ½ shares
funds during converture (inc. apartments in the CPG). in lot. Thereafter she filed for annulment of sale.
Vicente married Ignacia in 1960 but were de Mijares spouses claimed to be good faith buyers and
facto separated since 1974. In 1984, Ignacia learned WKDW WKH VDOH ZDV YDOLG GXH WR WKH FRXUW¶V DSSURYDO
that on 3/1/83 Vicente sold 4349-B-2 to Mijares Vicente also contended that what he sold was only ½
spouses (resps) for 40k and therefore new TCT (his share) and left intact her share, that he never
306087 was issued. She also found out that Vicente misrep her.
filed for admin and appointment as guardian of their 5 On 2/15/90 TC declared sale as null and
minor children @MTC QC XXI where he misrep that void wrt share of Ignacia. That purchase price was
Ignacia died on 3/22/82 and that he and the 5 kids are 110k and ordered Vicente to return 55k to Mijares
the sole heirs. couple.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 118
Ignacia filed for Motion for modification that unless wife has been declared a
sale be declared viod in its entirety and that Mijares spendthrift, or under civil
reimburse to her the rentals from 3/1/83. TC granted interdiction or in a leprosarium
on 5/31/90 and said that the sale was void in entirety, o 167 ± wife may annul said contract
ordered Vicente to reimburse the full 110k. TC on within ten years from transaction
6/29/90 amended the previous order and directed the questioned
Register of Deeds to issue new TCT in the name of -‐ both laws were complied with
Ignacia and Vicente+Vicente paying 50k to Ignacia for o Nov 25, 1978 ± entered into
damages. Pending appeal, Ignacia died thus was contract
substituted by compulsory heirs, they were o June 4, 1986 ± sale was filed
contending that rentals should be reimbursed. o March 1, 1983 ± action to annul
On 1/26/2000 CA reversed TC, upholding -‐ Alienation must be annulled in its entirety
that the Mijares were in good faith thus the sale was and not only in so far as the sahre of wife in
valid. the conjugal property is concerned
o /LPLWDWLRQ RI ³FRQWUDFW VKDOO
SUHMXGLFH ZLIH´ ZDV QRW VSHOOHG RXW
ISSUE: WON voidable deed of sale of property due to in statute
ODFNRIFRQVHQWSHUWDLQVWRRQO\ZLIH¶VVKDUH Conjugal partnership is liable for many things when it
HELD: NO, whole property is existing thus husband has to be stopped from
-‐ Governing rules Art 166 and 173 of CC disposing it without consent of wife.
o 166 ± KXVEDQG FDQ¶W DOLHQDWH UHDO
property of conjugal partnership
Roxas v. CA
198 SCRA 541
Melania (pet) is married to Antonio Roxas but is now indefinite. However no lease for
living separately . Melania then found out that more than 99 years shall be valid.
estranged husband Antonio Roxas entered into a Grant of use and
contract of lease w/ Cayetano on 3/30/87 involving possession.
CPG in Nova QC TCT 378197. o Encumberance ± includes not only
Melania planned to a flea market w/ 20 stalls liens but also attachment, LEASES,
for grocery and dry goods in said area and invested and other restrictions
N IRU WKH SUHS DQG FRQVWUXFWLRQ 0D\RU¶V SHUPLW Lessor transfers right of
and Municipal license was already issued for 1986 but use in favor of lessee.
when she attempted to renew for said year, it was Thus his right is impaired
blocked by Antonio Cayetano. She therefore seek and may even be ejected
redress saying that there was unlawful deprivation by lessee if lessor uses
from her operating her business as conjugal owner. the leased realty. Thus it is
On 7/31/89 Cayetano moved to dismiss a burden and
saying that there was no cause of action. TC encumberance on the land
dismissed said complaint and CA affirmed TC. o Alienation ± when lessee becomes
the owner of the thing affected by
ISSUE: WON a lease is an encumberance and/or the lease
alienation within scope of Art 166 of NCC -‐ Thus consent of wife is necessary if lease is
HELD: YES for more than one year since it is now
-‐ Defintions: considered as a conveyance and
o Lease ± Art 1643 of NCC ± one of encumberance within the provisions of the
the parties binds himself to give to CC by which real property is conveyed or
another the enjoyment or use of a encumbered.
thing for a price certain, and for a Art 173 of CC ± remedy of wife to annul the contract.
period which may be definite or
Ysasi v. Fernandez
23 SCRA 1079
Facts: Juan Ysasi (pet) married Maria Aldecoa de Hacienda Manucao-A is managed by
Ysasi (resp). Juan conceded that Hacienda Manucao- Valentin Bilbao (1952-1965) but Juan is overall
A is CPG. Since 1948 spouse have been shuttling admin. In 1965 Jon (son) took over as manager.
back and forth from PI to Spain (where they also own 1966, Juan told younger son Jose Mari to assist Jon
real estate) but Juan travels more frequently. but Jon refused to let Jose Mari act as cashier,
dissension thus developed.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 119
Such prompted wife to leave Spain (May Juan moved for a writ of prelim mandatory
1967) to fix problem. She brought letter from Juan to and preventive injunction to compel wife and son to
sons and a list of matter that she was to ascertain and turn over hacienda to Valentin, but wife and son
report to husband. Husband then contends that she opposed.
never made any report. Repsondent Judge denied petition for
June 1967, jon resigned which was accepted mandatory injunction on 12/22/67. Thus petition
by Juan who designated Valentin to take over. But where husband prays for prelim mandatory injunction
XSRQ9DOHQWLQ¶VDUULDOLQ3,RQ-RQUHIXVHGWR to compel wife and son to hand over hacienda.
hand over hacienda saying that his mother took
possession as admin.
Wife filed pet on 9/5/67 @CFI Negros ISSUE: WON husband may be deprived of conjugal
Occidental where she sought admin of CPG or partnership of properties upon allegations of fraud
separation of property, praying that she be appointed and abuse of such powers
receiver litis pendentia on the grounds that HELD: NO
x Juan is not in the position to manage since -‐ Code recognizes authority of husband to be
he is already of old age (77 yrs old) and has administrator of conjugal property and mere
a blind left eye allegations of fraud may not take this right
x Abandonment without just cause away from him.
Husband moved to set aside order -‐ 7KH &$¶V UHVROXWLRQ RI SXWWLQJ KDFLHQGD LQWR
appointing wife as receiver but she opposed. On receivership of BPI would destroy the
9/22/67 she further prayed that a disinterested person KXVEDQG¶V ULJKWV ZKHQ LW VKRXOG EH XVHG to
(BPI) be assigned as receiver if dispute continues. preserve and secure them.
Resp judge on 10/7/67 turned aside 9/5 RESULT: respondents are directed to turn over
orders appointing her as admin. authority to petitioner
Alinas vs Alinas
GR No 158040, April 14, 2008
FC 124
Uy vs. CA
346 SCRA 246
FC 100(3)
FC1O1
FC61
Sabalones v. CA (supra)
FC 124-125
Ayuste vs.CA
GR no. 118784, Sept. 2, 1999
deed of sale was signed by Rafael courts for the annulment of any
and Christina. In 1990 Christina filed a contract of the husband entered into
complaint for the annulment of the without her consent, when such
sale. She claims that her signature consent is required, or any act or
was forged and the sale was without contract of the husband which tends
her knowledge of consent. to defraud her or impair her interest in
- RTC: sale is null and void the conjugal partnership property.
- CA: sale is valid, the annulment was instituted Should the wife fail to exercise this
after Rafael died (the deed is voidable but right, she or her heirs, after the
complaint should be raised during the marriage dissolution of the marriage, may
as required by Art. 173.) demand the value of property
-‐ fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Pertinent Issues: whether or not the Registration of the sale with the Register of
sale is valid Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole
-‐ world. Since the deed of sale was registered on
-Held/Ratio- Yes. The sale is valid. March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed
-‐ Art. 173 The wife may, during the to have constructive notice of the sale from
marriage, and within ten years from such date.
the transaction questioned, ask the
-‐ Facts: -‐ The CA further found that Ana was aware
-‐ Land was left to Vicente Villaranda and of the execution of the Deed, and yet she
Honorio Villaranda and their siblings by brought no action for its annulment within
their parents. In 1976 Honorio and Vicente ten (10) years from its execution.
executed the deed of exchange where -‐
Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22- Pertinent Issues: Whether there was a
square-meter portion to Honorio, in perfected and consummated deed of
exchange for a property in Macasandig, exchange
Cagayan de Oro City. After the execution -‐ Whether the Deed of Exchange which was
of the Deed, Honorio took possession of not signed by the wife of Respondent
the 64.22-square-meter lot and Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and
constructed a building thereon. enforceable.
-‐ On April 6, 1992, a subdivision plan was -‐ Held/Ratio- Yes. The deed is valid.
completed, in pursuit of which TCT No. T- -‐ The absence of the signature of Ana on
65893 for the 64.22 square-meter share of the Deed does not prove lack of her
Vicente was issued in his name. consent thereto, because a contract may
-‐ Honorio and Ana brought an action before validly exist even if the parties have not
the RTC to compel Vicente to comply with reduced their stipulations to writing. Too,
his obligations under the Deed of assuming that her consent to the Deed is
Exchange. They want Vicente to identify lacking, such fact would not render the
and delineate his undivided portion of the agreement void, but merely voidable.
property and convey to them the 64.22- -‐ There is no evidence that any action to
square-meter Divisoria lot, in compliance annul the transfer made by Honorio was
with his obligations under the Deed. ever brought by Ana within ten years from
-‐ During the pendency of the case, Honorio "the transaction questioned." Her right to
conditionally sold the Divisoria lot to bring an action to invalidate the contract
Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc. has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed
-‐ Vicente contends that because the Deed is still valid and enforceable.
property had not been delivered, the Deed The legal prohibition against the
had not been consummated. Moreover, he disposition of conjugal property by one
claimed that the Deed had already been spouse without consent of the other has
revoked by both parties. been established for the benefit, not of
-‐ RTC: in favor of Honorio, contract valid third persons, but only of the other spouse
-‐ CA: upheld RTC for whom the law desires to save the
-‐ The provisions of the Civil Code were conjugal partnership from damages that
applicable to the case at bar, since the might be caused. Not being the proper
Deed of Exchange had been entered into party, Vicente cannot avail himself of the
prior to the enactment of the Family remedy prescribed by Article 173.
Code. 7KXV WKH DEVHQFH RI WKH ZLIH¶V
signature on the Deed made it only
voidable, not void.
Ainza vs.CA
G.R. No. 165420. June 30, 2005
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 123
FC128
Partosa-Jo v. CA
216 SCRA 693
property for lack merit saying that it pregnancy and that he would visit and
was not allowed as their separation support her. But when she returned to
was due to their agreement rather their house in Dumaguete in 1942, he
and not because of abandonment refused to accept her.
- She is entitled to separation of
ISSUES: property on ground of abandonment.
- Abandonment implies departure of
- W/N the decision of RTC can be one spouse with intent never to return,
questioned given that it is final and followed by prolonged absence
executory without just cause and without
- W/N she is entitled to judicial providing for means although able to
separation of conjugal property on the do so. There must be absolute
ground of abandonment cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention
HELD/RATIO: of perpetual separation. The
physical separation of the parties,
- The RTC failed put judgment on coupled by the refusalm by Jose Jo
separation of property in the to give support to Prima, sufficed
dispositive portion, BUT it was made to constitute abandonment as a
in the penultimate paragraph reading ground for legal separation of their
as follows: conjugal property. Aside from this,
o ³«DOO WKe properties in he admittedly cohabitated with other
question are considered women and have not established just
properties of Jose Jo, the cause for his refusal to comply with
defendant is subject to his duties as husband.
VHSDUDWLRQRISURSHUW\«´ - Court ordered for division between the
- The RTC held that they were legally two hal/half. It should include
married and that the properties were properties such as those which were
acquired during coverture although registered in the name of other
they were in the name of a dummy persons in violation of the anti-dummy
(Chinese national kasi) law.
³7KH SDVW KDV FDXJKW XS ZLWK WKH SULYDWH
respondent. After his extramarital flings and a
- Prima submits that their agreement succession of illegitimate children, he must
was not to be separated but for her to now make an accounting to his lawful wife of
temporarily live with her parents the properties he denied her despite his
during the initial period of her promise to her of his eternal love and care.´
FC 126 (10
FC 63 (2), FC 66
FC 50 in rd. To FC 43 (2)
FC 134-138
FC129
FC 129
FC 129; FC 43(2)
FC 63(2)
FC 130 (cf. FC 104)
FC131
FC132
Santero v. CFI
153 SCRA 728
FC 143-146
FC 103 &FC 130
FC 66(2)
FC144
FC145
FC 142
FC 146
FC 87, NCC 1490
FC 134
Maquilan vs Maquilan
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 126
June 8, 2007
FC 137 par. 1
FC l37par.2
FC 138 ofFC 66 (2)
FC 139-140; of FC 66(2)
FC 141 cf.FC67
FC 142
FC 147
Maxey v. CA
129 SCRA 187 cf. NCC 144
1911-1912 ± when Melbourne bought the lands CA: Ruled otherwise, they believed that the
1919 ± when they married in church and when land was exclusive property of Melbourne
1st wife died. Maxey. Art. 144 should not have applied
1953- husband remarried, when 2nd wife sold because the Regina did not contribute to the
the land. acquisition of the profit. She had no income of
1961 ± when children discovered sale KHURZQ&DQQRWFRQVLGHUWKLVD³MRLQW´HIIRUW
Plaintiffs are currently praying for the
annulment of the documents of sale over SC: YES. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should
particular lands that were sold to private apply there being no showing that vested rights
UHVSRQGHQWFRXSOHE\WKHLUIDWKHU¶Vnd wife. would be impaired or prejudiced through its
They allege that common properties belonged application.
to their parents who acquired the lands during
their lifetime and through their joint effort and Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they
capital. Sales of land by their father were done do not prejudice or impair any vested or
without their knowledge and consent and only acquired right.
after their mother, Regina had died in 1953.
Children discovered sale in 1961. Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code
Respondent spouses insist that they are on August 30, 1950, the formation of an
buyers in good faith and they believed that the informal civil partnership between a man and
Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of wife not legally married and their corresponding
land. right to an equal share in properties acquired
Melbourne and maxey started living together in through their joint efforts and industry during
1903. That same year, the children allege that cohabitation was recognized through
WKH\ JRW PDUULHG ³LQWKH PLOLWDU\ IDVKLRQ´ 7KH\ decisions of this Court. (Aznar et al. vs.
acquired properties in 1911 and 1912. They got Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs.
married in 1919. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil.
Regina died sometime in 1919, soon after the 451; Marata vs. Dionio, L-24449, December
church marriage. 31, 1925; Lesaca v. Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.)
1953: husband remarried.
Under this new code, it is believed that even if
Issue: it is only the man who works, there is still a
W/N spouses Maxey were married as early 50-50 sharing of property acquired during
DV³LQDPLOLWDU\IDVKLRQ´DVDOOHJHGE\ their cohabitation together.
the children
NO. The CFI and the CA were correct in The woman runs the household:
rejecting this since the Act No. 3613 a.k.a. the "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse,
Revised Marriage Law was approved much husbands hand over their pay checks and get
later (Dec. 4, 1929). It could not apply to a an allowance in return and the wife manages
1903 marriage. WKHDIIDLUVRIWKHKRXVHKROG´ (Dean Cortes)
W/N common law spouses, prior to ³,Q WKH 3KLOLSSLQHV WKH EHVW PDQ LV WKH
marriage, share conjugal property over woman." (Gov-Gen Leonard Wood)
lands acquired in 1912.
Ruling:
RTC: applied Art. 144 that states that in ³WKH SHWLWLRQHUV VKRXOG UHWXUQ RQH-half of the
common law marriages, the property P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the
acquired by both through work, industry, private respondents should pay some form of
wages, salaries are governed by the rules of rentals for their use of one-half of the
co-ownership. properties. Equitable considerations, however,
lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and
UHWXUQRI3RQWKHRWKHU´
Domingo v. CA
226 SCRA 572 (All Opinions)
Belcodero v. CA (supra)
Joaquino vs Reyes
434 SCRA 260
Rodolfo had been living with his paramour, THEY CLEARLY ARE THUS
Milagros B. Joaquino. &$1¶7$33/<
- As Vice President and Comptroller of Warner (X) applied to
Barnes & Company, - Rodolfo obtained a loan adultery/concubinag
of P140k from Commonwealth Insurance e
Corporation in order to purchase a house and o ART 148 does ± when
lot in BF Homes, Parañaque. He also common-law couple have a
mortgaged the same (through a Special Power legal impediment, only
of Attorney) to pay the balance of the purchase property acquired by them ±
price and secured a life insurance policy from through ACTUAL, JOINT
Philam Life Insurance Corporation to guaranty CONTRIBUTION OF
the payment where he paid monthly MONEY, PROEPRTY OR
amortizations. The property was registered INDUSTRY, shall be owned
under the name of Milagros Joaquino only by them in common and in
even though it was purchased with the proportion to their respective
earnings, and hence conjugal funds, of properties
Rodolfo. This also waVQ¶W
- When Rodolfo died on September 12, 1981, proven by petitioner
Milagros and their natural children claimed that since she had no
0LODJURV ZDV XQDZDUH RI 5RGROIR¶V PDUULDJH job or money to
WKDW WKH KRXVH DQG ORW DV 0LODJURV¶ H[FOXVLYH gain the properties
which she allegedly obtained with her own in question. Thus
funds, that she only authorized Rodolfo to they are conjugal.
mortgage the house and lot as a matter of
convenience but she personally provided funds -‐ The financial capacity of Rodolfo as
for the amortization, and that she did not VP and Comptroller of WBC, his
EHQHILW IURP 5RGROIR¶V HPROXPHQWV DQG RWKHU retirement package, his application for
pecuniary benefits. On the other hand, Lourdes the mortgage loan intended of
and their children claimed that the properties µKRXVLQJ¶ DQG KLV PRQWKO\
were conjugal properties because they were amortizations and semi-annual
paid for by the earnings of Rodolfo during the premiums payable to Commonwealth
marriage. by Philam sufficiently prove that
Rodolfo purchased the property by his
Issue: WON house and lot are conjugal own funds. And where his salaries are
properties considered cp, the loan and the
Held: YES purchased properties were also cp.
The presumption in favour of the conjugal -‐ On the other hand, Milagros only
partnership operates in the case at bar showed Affidavits and undated
because the properties were acquired during Certifications to prove that she
coverture (NCC 160). purchased the properties by her own
-‐ Even though Rodolfo was already money, borrowing from her siblings,
living with Milagros when the selling jewellery and selling a
properties were bought, the rules of drugstore four years prior. The
co-ownership between persons registration of the properties under
cohabiting as husband and wife 0LODJURV¶ QDPH FDQ WKXV EH
(under NCC 148) only applies to considered only as a donation that is
properties acquired by both through void under NCC 739 (1) especially
their actual joint contribution of where Rodolfo intended to deprive
money, property or industry. Lourdes of ownership over the
Ownership then is proportional to their properties.
respective contributions, which are -‐
considered equal absent proof to the ,Q WHUPV RI WKH LOOHJLWLPDWH FKLOGUHQ¶V ULJKW WR
contrary. Rodolfo¶V HVWDWH WKHLU ULJKWV PXVW EH
o Art 153 ± what are conjugal determined in a special proceeding instituted
properties for that purpose. The issue was not raised or
o $UW '2(61¶7 $33/< ± presented in the original and supplemental
common law marriages are complaints for reconveyance of property and
entitled to co-ownership damages, in the answers of Milagros and her
(50/50) laws IF COUPLES memorandum. Hence, the illegitimate filiation
ARE NOT INCAPACITATED of her children could not have been duly
TO MARRY EACH OTHER established in the case at bar.
WHICH IN THIS CASE
Gonzales vs Gonzales
478 SCRA 327
Facts:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 130
Before they started living together on March efforts and will be owned by them in equal
1977, Francisco Gonzales offered Erminda shares absent proof of the contrary. Francisco
Gonzales to be his partner in Fiesta Pizza, his admitted in a handwritten letter dated Sept. 6,
pizza business, and to take over its operations. 1989 that Erminda had helped in the
She accepted the offer and took care of the management of the business and was not a
EXVLQHVV¶ GDLO\ RSHUDWLRQV SHUVRQQHO mere housewife. Hence, the business is co-
management, outlets supervision, and met owned and both Francisco and Erminda are
people during inspections. presumed to have contributed jointly.
- Despite their marriage on Feb. 4, 1979, the -‐ Art 147 applies when )1) when man
same was declared void under FC 36 on Feb. and woman capacitated to marry each
12, 1997. Erminda then sought the dissolution other live exclusively with each other
of the conjugal partnership and claimed the without benefit of marriage (2) when
pizza business to be conjugal property where man and woman live together under
she contributed to 80% of the total void marriage
management. Francisco, however, claimed that o Presumption is anything
it was exclusive. acquired during both
instances are obtained
Issue: WON properties should be divided through joint efforts and shall
equally between husband and wife be divided equally.
Held: YES 3DUW\ ZKR GLGQ¶W SDUWLFLSDWH LQ DFTXLVLWLRQ E\
because the marriage was declared void, the other party of any property shall be deemed to
property regime that applies is co-ownership KDYHFRQWULEXWHGMRLQWO\LQDFTXLVLWLRQLIIRUPHU¶V
under FC 147. Under the rules of co- efforts consisted of care and maintenance of
ownership, properties acquired by both parties family and household.
during their union (under a void marriage) are
presumed to have been obtained through joint
Juaniza v. Jose
89 SCRA 306
Gomez v. Lipana
33 SCRA 615
Yap v. CA
145 SCRA 229
x Facts: Maning Yap married Talina Bianong into two equal part: ½ to Talina and her
in 1939 and they had 4 children. 2 of which children and ½ to Nancy Yap and her kids
died in infancy. Herein petitioners are the by virtue of the Leyes de Partidas.
two surviving children, Shirley and Jaime. x
While the first marriage was still x Petitioners contend that since Maning died
subsisting, Maning married Nancy on in 1964 when the NCC was already
December 11, 1948. They had four effective, the Spanish Civil Code should be
children. On February 21, 1964, Maning followed.
died because of a plane crash. On March x
3, 1964, Talina sought the issuance of x Issue: WON the second wife is entitled to
letters of administration for the estate of inherit
Maning. It was opposed by Nancy and her x
minor children. Talina was initially x Held. No
appointed special administratix and then x
later Shirley Yap was appointed regular x Ratio: The records show that the
administratix. properties in question were acquired by
x Talina and Maning during their marriage.
x Since there was a residue of properties Hence, these properties in the absence of
and collectible debts after payments to any evidence to the contrary are
creditors, the court set the case for hearing considered conjugal properties of Talina
to arriave at a declaration of heirship for and Maning (Art. 142, NCC)
the purpose of liquidating the conjugal x
partnership of Maning and his surviving x Pursuant to Art. 142 and Art. 185 of the
spouse and to determine the heirs entitled NCC, the net remainder of the conjugal
to inherit his intestate estate. Lower court partnership of gains after money claims
declared Talina and her children as the filed by creditors against the intestate
legal heirs of Maning . estate of Maning approved by the lower
x court have been paid by the administratix
x The CA reversed this decision and ruled should be equally divided between Maning
that the estate should be equally divided and Talina as their shares. The ½ share of
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 132
Maning would then comprise his intestate x Nancy Yap, the second wife cannot inherit
estate to be distributed to his heirs. from Maning Yap because their marriage
x was void ab initio (Art. 83, NCC)
x
Ruling: Petition is granted.
Agapay vs Agapay
276 SCRA 340
building and that they had allowed the to one in which the marriage of the
defendants-private respondents to parties is void from the beginning. It
occupy the apartment building for the does not apply to a cohabitation that
last seven (7) years, since 1989 amounts to adultery or concubinage,
without the payment of any rent. They for it would be absurd to create a co-
agreed that after a few months ownership where there exists a prior
guillerma tumlos would start paying conjugal partnership or absolute
rent but she failed to pay after community between the man and his
repeated demands. They prayed that lawful wife
defendants be ejected x Based on evidence presented by
x Guillerma Tumlos averred therein respondents, as well as those
that the Fernandez spouses had no submitted by petitioner herself before
cause of action against her, since she the RTC, it is clear that Mario
is a co-owner of the subject premises Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
as evidenced by a Contract to Sell petitioner because he was legally
wherein it was stated that she is a co- married to Lourdes Fernandez. It is
vendee of the property in question also clear that, as readily admitted by
together with [Respondent] Mario petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in
Fernandez a state of concubinage. Therefore,
x Defendants alleged Mario Fernandez Article 144 of the Civil Code is
and Guillerma had an amorous inapplicable
relationship, and that they acquired x Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not
WKH SURSHUW\ LQ TXHVWLRQ DV WKHLU µORYH falling under the preceding
QHVW¶ Article,[21] only the properties
acquired by both of the parties
x Guillerma administered the property,
through their actual joint contribution
until she discovered that Mario of money, property, or industry shall
deceived her as to the annulment of be owned by them in common in
his marriage. It was also during the proportion to their respective
early part of 1996 when Mario contributions. In the absence of proof
accused her of being unfaithful and to the contrary, their contributions and
demonstrated his baseless jealousy corresponding shares are presumed
to be equal. The same rule and
x 3HWLWLRQHU¶V FHQWUDO WKHRU\ DQG PDLQ presumption shall apply to joint
GHIHQVH DJDLQVW UHVSRQGHQWV¶ DFWLRQ deposits of money and evidences of
for ejectment is her claim of co- credit.
ownership over the property with "If one of the parties is validly married
Respondent Mario Fernandez. At the to another, his or her share in the co-
first instance before the MTC, she ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership
presented a Contract to Sell indicating
existing in such valid marriage. If the
that she was his spouse party who acted in bad faith is not
x &$UHMHFWHGSHWLWLRQHU¶VFODLPWKDWVKH validly married to another, his or her
and Respondent Mario Fernandez share shall be forfeited in the manner
were co-owners of the disputed provided in the last paragraph of the
property preceding Article.
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall
likewise apply even if both parties are
in bad faith
Issue:
A. Is the petitioner a co-owner of the x 3HWLWLRQHU¶V DUJXPHQW -- that the
property? Family Code is inapplicable because
B. Can the claim for support bar this the cohabitation and the acquisition of
ejectment suit? the property occurred before its
Held: effectivity -- deserves scant
x the applicable law is not Article 144 of consideration. Suffice it to say that the
the Civil Code, but Article 148 of the law itself states that it can be applied
Family Code which provides retroactively if it does not prejudice
x Article 144 of the Civil Code applies vested or acquired rights. In this case,
only to a relationship between a man petitioner failed to show any vested
and a woman who are not right over the property in question.
incapacitated to marry each other, or Moreover, to resolve similar issues,
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 134
we have applied Article 148 of the purchase the subject property. She anchors
Family Code retroactively her claim of co-ownership merely on her
Petitioner failed to present any evidence that cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez
she had made an actual contribution to
Malilin vs Castillo
333 SCRA 628
Saguid vs. CA
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 135
Joaquino vs Reyes
434 SCRA 260
-‐ 1990 Eduardo bought 7500 bags of Ratio: They are not paraphernal since she
cement from Master Iron Works but ZDVQ¶W DEOH WR SURYH WKDW VKH ERXJKW the said
failed tp pay. land with her funds before the marriage. There
is no proof that she contributed money on the
-‐ MIW filed a complaint against him,
acquisition of the said property. The
and the trial court sided with MIW on presumption of conjugality was not overcome.
1992. -‐ evidence lacking: no proof to show
-‐ Sheriff Alejo levied on the property of that she borrowed money to buy land
Josefina which made her execute an from mother and sister and also failed
affidavit of third party claim saying that to divulge their names.
the two parcels of land were o 3rd claim party affidavit
claiming that properties are
paraphernal.
exclusively from the fruits of
-‐ The property was sold in an auction own labor negates what she
for 1,350,000 said that she borrowed the
-‐ Josefina amended her complaint, to money
reconvey the property with moral o failed to testify against
damages. whose account the check
was drawn and issued and
-‐ Josefina then filed a petition to annul
whose account it was
her marriage with Eduardo on the o was 23 when she married so
grounds of bigamy. GRXEWIXO WKDW VKH¶G KDYH
-‐ RTC of Paranaque granted her plea. money before to buy such
-‐ RTC 1997 found also the sale of the property
two parcels of land were null and void o bought the property 1 year
-‐ %87 WKH &$ UHYHUVHG WKH 57&¶V and 7 months after marriage
AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER ± executed by
decision! Saying that the property was
Eduardo to protect property against third party
conjugal in nature. claims against him. Also significant is he still
Issues: WON the said property is the DWWDFKHG KLV PDULWDO FRQIRUPLW\ WR WKH ODQG¶V
paraphernal property of Josefina mortgage.
Held: No
Acre vs Yutikki
2007
Signey v SSS
GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008
2. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits -‐ Says also that the marriage between
against the illegitimate children? Yolanda and Rodolfo is null and void
because Rodolfo was still married with
Held: No. There is no merit to the petition Editha
1. The existence of a prior marriage between -‐ Yolanda files with SSC
Editha and Rodolfa is supported by -‐ SSC affirms the SSS Decision
evidence o Sayin
2. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very
clear (court applies statcon) (found in the Issue:
case pg. 638): 3. :Q SHWLWLRQHU¶V PDUULDJH ZLWK WKH
o It defines who are dependents: deceased is valid?
Legal Spouse 4. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits
Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate against the illegitimate children?
child who is unmarried, not employed
and is under 21 years old Held: No. There is no merit to the petition
o Whoever claims entitlement benefits 3. The existence of a prior marriage between
should establish his/her right by Editha and Rodolfa is supported by
substantial evidence evidence
o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a 4. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very
beneficiary and bec the deceased has no clear (found in the case pg. 638):
legitimate child, it follows that the o It defines who are dependents:
dependent illegitimate minor children of Legal Spouse
the deceased shall be entitled to the death Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate
benefits as primary beneficiaries. child who is unmarried, not employed
o *LQD¶V PLQRU FKLOGUHQ DUH HQWLWOHG WR and is under 21 years old
100% of the benefits o Whoever claims entitlement benefits
o Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo should establish his/her right by
o Claims that she and Yolanda were substantial evidence
common law-wives, while Editha is the o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a
legal wife. beneficiary and bec the deceased has no
4. Editha Espinosa (respondent) legitimate child, it follows that the
o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001) dependent illegitimate minor children of
o Claims that she is the legal wife the deceased shall be entitled to the death
-‐ 666 GHQLHV <RODQGD VD\LQJ *LQD¶V benefits as primary beneficiaries.
children are the primary beneficiaries *LQD¶V PLQRU FKLOGUHQ are entitled to
under the SSS Law 100% of the benefits
Borromeo vs Descallar
GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009
in the name of respondent, and that month at the time of the purchase of
the subject property has already been the properties.
mortgaged. 11) April 10, 2002 Respondent appealed
8) On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a to the Court of Appeals. CA sides w/
complaint against respondent for
respondent citing: In the case at bar,
recovery of real property before the
the title of the subject property is not
Regional Trial Court, alleging that the
in the name of Jambrich but in the
deed of sale issued for the property in
name of defendant-appellant. Thus,
favor of the respondent do not reflect
Jambrich could not have transferred a
the true agreement of the parties, the
property he has no title thereto.
latter having paid nothing for the said
Issues: WON Respondent has a right over
properties. the said property.
9) Respondent denies the allegation Held: NO, it was proven in the RTC trial that
citing that she had paid for the the properties in question were in fact
property solely and exclusively using purchased from the exclusive funds of Wilhelm
the money from her copra business. Jambrich who at the time of acquisition had
VXIILFLHQW LQFRPH FRPSDUHG WR WKH ZDLWUHVV¶
10) RTC rules for the petitioner wages of the respondent. As such the
(Borromeo) citing the proofs purchase of the property could clearly be
presented on the earning capacity of attributed Janbrich and subsequently to the
Jambrich at the time the property was petitioner. Furthermore the vice of alienage
purchased over the supposed plaguing the sale of the property to Jambrich
earnings of the respondent from her was in fact cured by the transfer of the property
to the petitioner who is a Filipino citizen citing
Copra business (which were markedly
the case United Church Board for World
fictional since the respondent was still Ministries v. Sebastian.
working as a waitress for P1000 a
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 140
FAMILY RELATIONS
FC 149
Arroyo v. CA
FC 150- 151
NCC 2035
ROC Rules 6 Sec. 1(j)
RPC 20, 247 and 332
Gayon v. Gayon
36 SCRA 104
Wainwright v. Versoza
26 SCRA 78
Magbaleta vs Gonong
76 SCRA 511
De Guzman vs genato
89 SCRA 674
Tribiana vs.Tribiana
G.R. No. 137359, Sept. 13, 2004
FC 152,FC 161
Taneo vs CA
304 SCRA 308
FC 155, FC 160
Modequillo v. Breva
185 SCRA 766
Honrado vs.CA
G.R. No. 166333, Nov. 25, 2005
Cabang vs Basay
GR No. 180587, March 20, 2009
Ching vs CA (supra)
Modequillo vs Breva
185 SCRA 756
FC163
FC 164 cf. FC 166 in reT to NCC 256-257
Tan v. Trocio
191 SCRA 764
Angeles vs Maglaya
469 SCRA 363
FRQVLGHUHGGHSHQGHQWFKLOGUHQ7KXVVKHFDQ¶W be a beneficiary.
Moore v. Republic
8 SCRA 282
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 144
Facts: Petitioner Elaine Moore (American reason exists to allow change of name c) WON
citizen) is married with Joseph Velarde (also mother has the authority to ask such
American) had a son out of wedlock William
Michael Velarde (now 14 yrs old) born also at Held: Regarding the 1st issue, RP said that
US. through NCC 364 legitimate child should use
Said marriage however was dissolved the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover
through a decree of divorce from SC of cites that in case of annulment, child conceived
California on 5/31/49. Elaine had 2nd marriage before such decree shall use the surname of
with Don Moore on 9/29/56 at LA, CA. William his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules
(minor) lived with them. over decree of divorce; therefore law does
Elaine filed @ CFI Rizal a motion to NOT sanction such change of name. SC
KDYH KHU FKLOG¶V VXUQDPH EH FKDQJHG LQWR upheld such position, saying that confusion
Moore instead of Velarde. TC denied such may arise wrt (with respect to) paternity and
petition therefore this appeal. that said change may even redound to the
Issue: Government of the Phil. Opposed prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still
such petition with the following issues a) WON a minor and therefore aforesaid action is
law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd premature. Said child may in his mature age
husband of his mother b) WON justifiable decide for himself to instigate such change of
name.
Naldoza v. Republic
112 SCRA 658
Marquino vs IAC
233 SCRA 348
Ong vs CA
272 SCRA 725
family pictures of Dolores Dy and Manuel Ong constituted cohabitation under par. 3 is proof
and by visiting them in their house on A. Lopez that private respondents were conceived and
Street in 1980. born during such relationship and constitutes
-Manuel Ong also gave money to Alfredo, first, HYLGHQFH RI 2QJ¶V SDWHUQLW\ This relationship
DV WKH ODWWHU¶V KLJK VFKRRO JUDGXDWLRQ JLIW DQG was further established through the testimony
VHFRQG IRU WKH ODWWHU¶V educational support. of Constancia Lim. The evidence for private
Manuel Ong even told Alfredo to comeback respondents is not negated by the admission of
with a list of what he needs for school but when Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with
he came back with some friends in September another man before, because the relationship
1982, Manuel turned down his request and terminated at least a year before the birth of
ordered him to leave and threatened to call the Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before the birth
police if he did not leave. of the second child Robert Caballes.
-September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint SC agree that this DOES NOT fall in Art 283
for recognition and support against Manuel (2) When the child is in continuous possession
Ong. The complaint was amended on of status of a child of the alleged father by the
November 25, 1982 to include Robert as co- direct acts of the latter or his family--- the times
plaintiff. Manuel died in May 1990 while the during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo and
case is pending. gave the latter money cannot be considered
TC-declared Alfredo and Robert illegitimate proof of continuous possession of the status of
children of Manuel in accordance with Art. 283, a child. 7KH IDWKHU¶V FRQGXFW WRZDUG KLV VRQ
pars. 2 and 4 of the Civil Code. must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this
CA-affirm TC, cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an ground to exist.
additional ground for ordering the recognition of Does NOT fall in Art 283 (3) When the child
private respondents as illegitimate children. was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father------
Issue: WON Alfredo and Roberto are ----While Saturnina Caballes testified that she
illegitimate children of Manuel and Manuel Ong lived together for four months
as husband and wife in order to justify a finding
Held/Ratio: of cohabitation, the relationship was not open
Yes. Alfredo and Roberto are sons of Manuel. and public so as to constitute cohabitation.
Using Article 283 Paragraph. 4 (The father is Petitioner claims that Manuel is sterile (due to
obliged to recognize) When the child has in his illness during World War). For despite living
favor any evidence or proof that the defendant with 2 other women, Dolores and Victoria
is his father . Veloria (later established as Victoria Balili) but
Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision WKH\ GLGQ¶W KDYH D FKLOG &$ GLVPLVVHG WKLV IRU
covering all cases in the preceding ones, so there is no medical proof and Manuel
that evidence, even though insufficient to acknowledged a Lourdes Balili (born 1939) as
constitute proof under the other paragraphs, his natural child with a Victoria Balili.
may nonetheless be enough to qualify the case An adult male is presumed to have normal
under par. 4. powers of virility and the burden of evidence to
In this case, the testimony of Saturnina prove the contrary rests upon him who claims
Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with otherwise. Petitioner has not overcome this
Manuel Ong over a long period (1954-1957) presumption
which, had it been openly done, would have
FC 165, 175476
Jao vs CA
152 SCRA 359
Facts:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 146
-‐ In 1968, Janice Jao, a minor represented by Issues: WON Perico Jao is the parent of
her mother Arlene filed a case for support Janice
against Perico Jao.
-‐ It seems from evidence that Perico Jao was Held: No
introduced to Arlene in a club. Then they had Ratio: There could only be compulsory
sex. recognition when the child was conceived
-‐ 1968, Jao accompanied Arlene to a hospital for during the time when the mother cohabited with
a check-up, Jao paid the rentals in the hospital WKH VXSSRVHG IDWKHU -DQLFH VKRXOG¶YH EHHQ
-‐ Arlene gave birth to Janice on August 16, conceived between Nov 20, 1967 to December
1968. 4, 1967 according to the court. However,
-‐ Arlene said that they had sex on November 30 Arlene herself said that they only started to
1967. cohabit on December 16, 1967. Hence, Janice
-‐ Jao said that they had sex on January 18 1968. was NOT conceived during cohabitation.
-‐ The NBI, upon order by the court, conducted a Moreover, Arlene cohabited with 2 other men!
blood grouping test which results say that Lastly, the blood grouping test (which showed
Janice could not have been the offspring of that Janice could not have been a child of
Perico Jao and Arlene Salgado. Perico and Arlene) is conclusive on non-
-‐ RTC sided with Janice, CA reversed. paternity. Hence, it cannot be said with
certainty that Perico Jao is indeed the father.
Uyguangco vs CA
178 SCRA 684
Issue: WON Graciano may adequately prove However, since his father has already died, his
filiation. action is now barred as Art. 172 specifically
requires that when the action is based on other
Held: NO proofs of filiation such as open and continuous
possession, the action must be brought during
Ratio: the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The Civil Code provisions they invoke have Ruling: Petition Granted.
been superseded or at least modified by the
corresponding articles n the FC.
Mangulabnan v. IAC
185 SCRA 760
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 147
Issue: WON recognition of an illegitimate However, under Article 887 of the NCC, in all
child like the minor Alfie whose father is cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must
married and had no legal capacity to be proved. The status of the minor child had
contract marriage at the time of his been provisionally established as affidavits of
conception is required before support may petitioner and 2 witnesses, and the birth
be granted. certificate were presented to prove the
paternity of the child.
1.The declarant is dead or unable to testify 4.The relationship between the declarant
Brigida and Hipolito Mendoza passed away at (Brigida/Hipolito) and person whose pedigree is
the time Isaac testified in court. in question
2.The pedigree must be in issue Casimiro) must be shown in evidence other
than declaration.
Main issue of case! Presentation of extrajudicial partition of the
estate of Florencio Mendoza where Casimiro is
3.The declaration must be made before the an heir.
controversy arose This, including the other evidence presented by
Isaac knew about this before PR filed in court PR and witnesses shows that she is the
illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Tijing vs CA
2001
as neglect or abandonment, unemployment, custody shall remain w/ the mother, with the
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug father granted visitation rights.
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, (action moot since child off to Japan during
and affliction w/ a communicable disease) the pendency of the action)
Both the dad and son are named camelo, so vehemently denied having sex with her on
\RXGRQ¶WJHWFRQIXVHG January 2, 1982 and renting a house for her in
Facts: Version of Florencia Regodos Singcang, Bacolod City
x Controversy stems from a petition for Issue
recognition and support filed by Florencia THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE
respondent Camelo Regodos CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY
x Camelo Regodos was born on September 9, RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT
1982. Florencia testified that she was the one IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
supporting her child CAMELO REGODOS ± that the evidence was
x Florencia recounted that after her husband left insuffucient
in 1981, he went to Escalante, Negros It was further established by the CA that
Occidental to look for work and was eventually Florencia was posing as a widow but in reality
KLUHGDV&DPHOR¶VKRXVHKROGKHOS was living with her husband
x On January 2, 1982, Camelo brought her to Aside from self serving testimony, respondents
Bacolod City where they checked in at the only presented certificates of live birth and
Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. baptismal certificates
Camelo promised to support her if she got Held
pregnant x Trial court and CA decided that the child was
x Florencia claimed that she discovered she was &DPHOR¶V 7KH WULDO FRXUWV ILQGLQJ RI D SDWHUQDO
FDUU\LQJ &DPHOR¶V FKLOG GD\V DIWHU WKHLU relationship between petitioner and private
sexual encounter respondent was based on the testimony of the
x On suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, childs mother and the personal appearance of
&DPHOR¶V ZLIH VHQW KHU KRPH %XW &DPHOR the child
instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City x The fact that Florencias husband is living and
where he rented a house for her. On there is a valid subsisting marriage between
September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her them gives rise to the presumption that a child
aunts house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she born within that marriage is legitimate even
gave birth to her child, private respondent though the mother may have declared against
Camelo Regodos its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
Version of Camelo Cabatania an adulteress
x Basically he says that the father of the child is The trial court and CA should not have
)ORUHQFLD¶V KXVEDQG DQG when they had sex, overlooked this fact (though really stupid to
she was already pregnant presume that the kid is the son of her husband
x Petitioner refused support, denying the alleged when he looks very much like the other guy)
paternity
x He denied going to Bacolod City with her and
checking in at the Visayan Motel. He
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) bloodstained clothes of the accused were
whether a complaint for support can be DGPLWWHGLQHYLGHQFH:HUHDVRQHGWKDW³WKH
converted to a petition for recognition and (2) purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered whether an association exist(ed) between the
in a proceeding for support without violating evidence sample and the reference sample.
SHWLWLRQHU¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWWRSULYDF\DQG The samples collected (were) subjected to
right against self-incrimination various chemical processes to establish their
Held: profile
x The petition is without merit. x The SC upheld the constitutionality of
x It is undisputed and even admitted by the compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility
parties that there existed a sexual relationship of the results thereof as evidence since both
between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the
question is whether such sexual relationship Constitution is simply against the legal process
produced the child, Martin. of extracting from the lips of the accused an
x Being the first case where DNA testing was the admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
focal issue the court examines the history of evidence sought to be excluded is not an
DNA testing incrimination but as part of object evidence
o The court opened the possibility of admitting There is no violation of the right of self
DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated incrimination in DNA testing
in Tijing v. Court of Appeals
o In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and
PXUGHUYLFWLP¶V'1$VDPSOHVIURPWKH
evidence. The Court moved from the issue of o This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to
DFFRUGLQJ³RIILFLDOUHFRJQLWLRQ´WR'1$DQDO\VLV the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence.
as evidence to the issue of observance of Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is
procedures in conducting DNA analysis - DOORZHG ³ZKHQ LW WHQGV LQ DQ\ UHDVRQDEOH
People v. Vallejo degree to establish the probability or
x ,W DOO ERLOV GRZQ WR HYLGHQFH DQG LW¶V improbability of the fact in issue
admissibility x The court goes on to discuss the Vallejo case
x Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to on the caution with the method employed in the
the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded actual testing DNA.
by statute or the Rules of Court.[48] Evidence o In assessing the probative value of DNA
is relevant when it has such a relation to the evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence among other things, the following data: how
or non-existence.[49] Section 49 of Rule 130, the samples were collected, how they were
which governs the admissibility of expert handled, the possibility of contamination of the
testimony, provides as follows samples, the procedure followed in analyzing
o The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring the samples, whether the proper standards and
special knowledge, skill, experience or training procedures were followed in conducting the
which he is shown to possess may be received tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
in evidence conducted the tests
Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed
Guy vs CA
GR No. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006
Facts Held
x June 13, 1997: Karen Oanes Wei and 1. NO
Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their 2. No decision on this issue
mother Remedio Oanes, filed petition for Ratio
letters of administration before the Makati 1. As we already know now, the law prohibits
RTC. implicit waivers of rights. Although the
x Karen and Kamille allege that they are the document is titled Release and Waiver of
duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Claim, there is nothing in the document
Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim). that states unequivocally a waiver of
x October 29, 2009: Sima Wei died hereditary rights. It merely states that
intestate, leaving behind an estate valued Remedios received PhP300,000.00 for the
at PhP10M in real and personal properties. education of Karen and Kamille. Also,
His known heirs include his surviving under NCC1044, parents or guardians
spouse Shirley Guy and children Emy, may repudiate the inheritance left to their
Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all wards only by judicial authorization. In the
surnamed Guy. (Michael is herein case at bar, such an authorization is not
petitioner). present. The Release and Waiver of Claim
x Karen and Kamille prayed for the is therefore null and void.
appointment of a regular administrator for 2. The court did not decide on this issue
WKH RUGHUO\ VHWWOHPHQW RI 6LPD :HL¶V yet and decided to remand the case to
estate, but for the meantime, prayed for the trial court for reception of evidence.
the appointment of petitioner Michael as A ruling on this issue would be
Special Administrator of the estate. premature considering the respondents
x Michael prayed for the dismissal of the have yet to present evidence, not
petition. He contends there is no need for before the SC, but before the trial court.
letters of administration being prayed for Under the Family Code, when filiation of
by Karen and Kamille because Sima Wei an illegitimate child is established by a
left no debts. Also, Karen and Kamille record of birth appearing in the civil
should have established their status as register or a final judgment, or an
illegitimate children during the lifetime of admission of filiation in a public document
Sima Wei according to FC175. or a private handwritten instrument signed
x Before Sima Wei died, Remedios received by the parent concerned, the action for
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for recognition may be brought by the child
KHU PLQRU GDXJKWHUV ³E\ ZD\ RI ILQDQFLDO during his or her lifetime. However, if the
assistance and in full settlement of any action is based upon open and
and all claims of whatsoever nature and continuous possession of the status of
kind x x x against the estate of the late an illegitimate child, or any other
6LPD :HL´ 0LFKDHO QRZ FRQWHQGV WKDW means allowed by the rules or special
because of this Release and Waiver of laws, it may only be brought during the
Claim, respondents are now estopped lifetime of the alleged parent (FC175). It
from making claims from the estate of the is clear therefore that the resolution of the
decedent. issue of prescription depends on the type
of evidence to be adduced by private
Pertinent Issues respondents in proving their filiation.
1. W/N Remedios is deemed to have waived However, it would be impossible to
KHU GDXJKWHUV¶ OHJLWLPH E\ YLUWXH RI WKH determine the same in this case as there
Release and Waiver of Claim between her has been no reception of evidence yet.
and the decedent
2. W/N Karen and Kamille are barred by Petition denied; remanded as to the third issue.
prescription from proving their filiation
in view of FC175
People vs Umanito
GR No. 172607, Oct. 26, 2007
Facts: Held:
On July 15, 1989, Rufino Umanito allegedly 5HOHYDQW WR WKH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI 5XILQR¶V JXLOW
raped AAA (name withheld), for which he was LVWKHILOLDWLRQRI$$$¶VFKLOGZKRZDVERUQRXW
on October 15, 1997. Although AAA was an RI WKH DOOHJHG UDSH +HQFH 5XILQR¶V SDWHUQLW\
unmarried woman, 12-18 years of age and of over the child is key to his acquittal. SC thus
good reputation, Rufino contended that she ordered Rufino, AAA and child to subject
was actually impregnated by her married lover; themselves to DNA testing and remanded the
that her mother only prodded her to accuse case to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence
him; that he was at home the whole day of July under the New Rule on DNA Evidence,
15, 1989, working in their picture frame family Sections 4, 5, 7, and 8. (The New Rule on DNA
business; that he courted AAA but they were Evidence took effect on October 15, 2007.)
not sweethearts. On the other hand, AAA By doing so, SC acknowledges the strong
claimed that she met Rufino only on the day of weight of DNA testing as exculpatory evidence
the rape but later claimed that they were in determining filiation, reiterating its rulings in
actually friends, and later, that they were People v. Yalar, Tijing v. CA, Herrera v. Alba,
actually close friends. and Tecson v. COMELEC. This is because
DNA is composed of two copies: one copy from
Issue: WON Rufino is guilty of rape each parent, and each DNA configuration is
unique to a person.
marriage was void, deciding without knowing and it also resulted from the subsequent
about the earlier judgment on the nullity of their declaration of nullity of their marriage.
marriage.
CA erred in adding the decision that their
Issue as stated in the case: marriage is void because such nullity had
WON CA did not err in affirming RTC ruling already been decided in a separate case.
that there is conjugal partnership and that the
Amicable Settlement is valid and in adding that Issue concerning illegitimacy but not
their marriage is void explicit in the case:
WON their child is legitimate
Held:
CA and RTC did not err in ruling the non- Presumptive Held:
existence of a conjugal partnership because it No. As a consequence of the declaration of
has already been dissolved by the Amicable nullity of their marriage, their child is illegitimate
Settlement which had been judicially approved, because the child was born outside of a valid
marriage
Montefalcon v Vasquez
GR No. 165016, June 17, 2008
FC 166
Andal v. Macaraig
89 Phil 165
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 157
Macadangdang v. CA
100 SCRA 73
Concepcion vs. CA
G.R. No. 123450, Aug. 31, 2005
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (RULE ON DNA Evidence) effective October 15, 2007
Jao v. CA
152 SCRA 359
People v. Tumimpad
235 SCRA 483
TIJING (supra)
AGUSTIN (supra)
People v. Quitoriano
G.R. No. 118852, Jan. 20, 1997
FC 166(3)
FC167
FACTS:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 160
1. Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a b. 0RWKHU¶V WHVWLPRQLDOV 6< .XD KHUVHOI WHVWLILHG
petition for the settlement of the estate of the that she is not her son.
late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Quezon
City. He claims that he is the son of Chua Bing Petitioner:
Guan and Sy Kao. a. paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner
2. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for is to be decided. Therefore, the testimony of
lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's the mother should not be credited.
capacity to file the petition. No cause of action
because he is not the son of the ISSUE:
abovementioned couple as testified by the W/N Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing
mother herself. and Sy Kua.
CONTENTIONS: HELD:
Yes.
Respondent: Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of
a. Res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More
been declared as not the son of the spouses than any one else, it was Sy Kao who could
Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in S.P. No. Q- say ---- as indeed she has said these many
12592, for the settlement of the estate of the years ---- that Chua Keng Giap was not
late Chua Bing Guan. begotten of her womb.
Petition Denied.
Rodriguez v CA
245 SCRA 150
FACTS: HELD:
1. On October 15, 1986, an action for Yes.
compulsory recognition and support was REASON 1:
brought before court, by respondent Alarito Private respondent cannot invoke our decision
(Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15 SCRA 114 (1965).
Rodriguez, petitioner herein While we ruled in Navarro that the testimony of
2. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, the mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be
Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. used to established his paternity, such
3. In the course of her direct examination, she testimony was admitted during the trial without
was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of objection and the defendant accepted the
the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel finding of the trial court that he was the
raised a timely objection which the court father of the plaintiff.
sustained.
4. The petitioner now comes to this court Rule: the testimony of the mother may be used
questioning the act of the lower court in to prove paternity IF the father does not
sustaining the objection object.
Respondent: Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil
Navarro v. Bacalla: the testimony of the mother Code of the Philippines were repealed by the
of the plaintiff in said case, could be used to Family Code, which now allows the
established his paternity establishment of illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as
ISSUE: legitimate children (Art. 175).
Was the Lower Court correct in sustaining the
objection? Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation
of legitimate children is by any of the following:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 161
FC 168, 169
FC 170, 171
Cobatbat-Lim vs IAC
166 SCRA 451
Facts: Case at hand is a squabble over the x 3URFHVR¶V WHVWLPRQ\ WKDW VKH¶V KLV FKLOG Z
estate of late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat. Esperanza
Petitioner is Violeta Cabatbat-Lim who claims x %HQLWD/DVWLPRVD¶VGHQLDOWKDWVKHGHOLYHUHGDW
to be the only child of Esperanza while the Provincial Hospital
resps are the sisters and children of a x MC of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao showed that
deceased brother. Esperanza is the mother of the bride
Priv resps (sisters of Esperanza) filed x Deed of Sale 5/14/60 where minor Violeta is
@ CFI Pangasinan for partitioning of DVVLVWHGE\µPRWKHU¶(VSHUDQ]D
(VSHUDQ]D¶VHVWDWHGLHGLQWHVWDWHRQ x Deed pf Absolute Sale 4/21/61 assisted by
Part of her estate is the Calasiao Bijon Factory µIDWKHU¶3URFHVR
which is in possession of Violeta (alleged child TC held that Violeta is NOT natural child of E
of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat). They and P therefore NOT a legal heir.
were saying that Violeta is only a ward (ampon)
through the ff evidences: Issue: WON Violeta is a natural child of
x Absence of any records that Esperanza was Esperanza and Proceso
admitted to hospital where Esperanza was Held: NO. TC and CA findings on filiation is
supposedly born given great accord, conclusive upon the SC.
x Absence of birth certificate in the live birth TC then said that the Registry Book of hospital
section of the Provincial Hospital (1947-1948) DGPLVVLRQ GRHVQ¶W HYHQ (VSHUDQ]D ZDV D
x Civil registry certification of 3/9/77 that there is SDWLHQW RQ DQG LW GRHVQ¶W HYHQ VKRZ
no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat from that Esperanza was ever admitted from 12/1/47
5/26/48 or 49 ± 6/15/48. On 5/26/48, Records only show that
x Certification that Esperanza and Proceso were there was one birth at that day and that was
only guardians (from Principal II of the Pilot Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC baby
School) girl Lastimosa.
x $PSDUR5HVLGH¶VWHVWLPRQ\RQWKDWVKH Absence of birth record in
was in the Provincial Hospital to watch a cousin the Civil Regitry makes her exhibit doubtable.
give birth and there she met Benita Lastimosa Moreover, her reliance on NCC 263 is
who gave birth to an IC Baby Girl Lastimosa on misplaced as such action is not to impugn
5/26/48 (now known as Violeta Cabatbat) legitimacy but to claim inheritance as legal
Violeta on the other hand tried to adduce heirs from a childless aunt. They do not claim
evidence that will support her claim. Among WKDW VKH¶V DQ ,& EXW WKDW VKH¶V QRW D FKLOG RI
which he showed are the following: their aunt at all.
x Her birth record filed 6/15/48 showing her birth
RI DQG WKDW VKH¶V DQ /& RI (VSHUDQ]D
and Prospero
Gaspay v. CA
238 SCRA 163
Facts: Flaviano Gaspay died intestate on (motion to dismiss) saying that Guadalupe is a
10/14/83, then married to Agueda Denoso stranger.
(childless). On 7/6/88 priv resp Guadalupe TC denied the MTD saying that such
*DVSD\ $OIDUR DOOHJHG # 7& WKDW VKH¶V was based on indubitable grounds but TC
acknowledged IC of Flaviano with Claudia nonetheless dismissed petition saying that
Pason, prayed for issuance of letters of admin testimonial and documentary evidence failed to
RI)ODYLDQR¶VHVWDWH prove status of Guadalupe, failed to show
Petitioners are Jr. (adopted son) and Guad consenting to the acknowledgement as
Eriberta (next of kin) who filed for an MTD
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 162
IC and that such action should have been filed regarding the hospitalization expenses of
in the lifetime of Flaviano. *XDG¶V GDXJKWHU &$ VDLG WKDW 7& PXVW KDYH
CA reversed TC on 9/30/91 saying DVVXPHG WKDW )ODYLDQR¶V KDQGZULWLQJ PXVW
that: have metamorphosed during the years but it
x Evid is ample to prove filiation as IC could be possible that handwriting of Flaviano
x Evid is sufficient to show that Guad consented never changed at all. Also when Guadalupe
to the acknowledgement as IC filed said action, she still used Gaspay affixed
x Action can be instituted after death of putative to her legal surname as married to Alfaro,
father thereby shouting to the world her consent to
the acknowledgment of an IC. As to the action
Issue: WON Guadalupe is an IC being instituted after death of putative father,
&$ VDLG ³DFWLRQ EDVHG RQ DFNQRZHOGJHPHQW
Held: YES. TC did not discount the testimony may be brought even after death of putative
of Martin Garin (agent to logging IDWKHU´ 6KH WKHUHE\ SURYHG HQWLWOHPHQW WR WKH
concessionaire of Flaviano for 18 years) who admin of estate. Moreover, the petitioners
verified handwriting and signature of Flaviano neglected to apply for a letter admin 30 days
in a letter addressed to Lupe and Toming after the death of Flaviano Gaspay.
(Guad and his husband Bartolome Alfaro)
Benitez-Badua v. CA
229 SCRA 468
Facts: Vicente Benitez married Isabel Issue: WON Marissa is a biological child of
Chipongian, acquired many props in Laguna. Vicente and Isabel and WON TC misapplied
Isabel predeceased Vicente, former died on FC 166 and 170
4/25/82 while latter died intestate on 11/13/89.
2Q 9LFHQWH¶V VLV DQG QHSKHZ Held: NO. Marissa is not a biological child and
Victoria (priv resps) Benitez Lirio and Feodor yes, TC misapplied said FC provisions. SC
Benitez Aguilar filed @ RTC for issuance of said that reliance on FC 164, 166, 170 and 171
letter of admin for Aguilar, saying that Vicente are misplaced since said provisions show
had no legal heirs since Marissa Benitez situation where husband denies own child with
Badua was never a related by blood and not wife and not a situation where a child is alleged
legally adopted therefore not a legal heir. not to be a natural child of a couple.
On 11/2/90 Marissa opposed saying SC only sustained CA findings on
WKDW VKH¶V VROH KHLU DQG VKH¶V FDSDEOH RI ruling that Marissa is not a biological child
managing estate. She presented the ff evids: Vicente and Isabel based on the ff:
x Cert of live brith x Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant, as
x Baptismal cert substatntiated by his brother Dr. Nilo
x ITR and Info Sheet for Members of Gsis of late &KLSRQJLDQ VD\LQJ WKDW VKH¶V EHHQ PDUULHG
Vicente naming her as daughter already for 10 years but at age 36 was not yet
x School records pregnant and so she was even brought to the
Private resps (Victoria) presented testimonial attention of Dr. Manahan who was a well
evids: known ob-gyne. Many other people (neighbors)
x That spouse failed to beget a child corroborated this point that Iabel never became
x Isabel (then 36) was even referred to an ob- pregnant. Had she been, it would have been
gyne for treatment noticed by people around her.
x Victoria Benitez Lirio (then 77 years old and x 0DULVVD¶V ELUWK FHUWLILFDWH LV KLJKO\ GXELRXV
about to die) elder sis of Vicente categorically because it showed that she was born in the
declared that Marissa is not a biological child Benitez household in Nagcarlan when she
TC on 12/17/90 dismissed petition of would have been born in the hospital and in the
Victoria. Ruled that Marissa is legitimate skillful hands of Dr. Manahan who was the ob-
daughter and sole heir (relying on FC 166 and gyne of her putative mother.
170) x Extrajudicial settlement of Nilo and Vicente
CA reversed on 5/29/92 saying that DIWHU ,VDEHO¶V GHDWK VD\LQJ WKDW WKH\ DUH WKH
Marissa is NOT biological child and therefore sole heirs of the deceased Isabel for she has
not legal heir. CA said that TC failed to apply no other ascending or descending heirs
FC 166 and 170. Letter of Isabel to Vicente pleading him to give
Marissa her share ± which she would not have
need to do had Marissa been their legal heir
Facts: CA reversed RTC w/c declared William x Providing sustenance and introducing him even
Liyao Jr as IC of William Liyao and ordered to his LCs
Juanita et al to recognize jr as compulsory heir CA reversed saying that:
of the deceased William (successional rights to x Law favors legitimacy
be granted thereof). x Gave credence to marriage of Corazon with
On 11/29/76 Jr (represented by Ramon Yulo (legally married with no legal
mother Corazon Garcia) filed for said action for separation)
compulsory recognition as IC of William Liyao, x That Corazon and Ramon were seen in each
being in continuous possession of status as RWKHU¶V DUPVGXULQJWKH WLPH WKDW &RUD]RQ DQG
child and recognized as such child by William were supposed to be cohabiting
decedent. x Birth cert and baptismal cert not enough proof
Corazon had been legally married but of paternity in the case where William had a
was de facto separated with husband Ramon hand in preparing such docs
Yulo for 10 years and was said to have x Neither family pix would prove filiation
cohabited with William from 1965 up to his x Passbook presented did not show that William
death in 1975. She has 2 other daughters by opened such for Billy and Corazon because it
1st marriage and it was claimed that Jr (Billy) GRHVQRWEHDU:LOOLDP¶VVLJQDWXUHDQGQDPH
was born during said cohabitation. This was
VXSSRVHGO\ZLWKWKHNQRZOHGJHRI:LOOLDP¶V/& Issue: WON Jr (billy) is an IC and WON he can
by wife Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Tita Rose and impugn his own legitimacy to claim from estate
Chritina who were both employed in Far East of his supposed father
Realty Investment where William and Corazon
are Pres and VP respectively. Both sides have Held: NO. presumption of legitimacy is strong.
virtually different stories. Even if Jr. insists that Ramon and Corazon
TC was convinced of the have been separated already for 10 years such
preponderance of evidence that William sired that there is physical impossibility for sexual
Jr (billy) because he was conceived during said union, de facto separation is of no bearing.
cohab of William and Corazon and he has Impugning legitimacy under NCC 255 can only
been in continuous possession and enjoyment be invoked by husband and only in qualified
of status of a child of William through his overt situations, his heirs. Petition cannot prosper
acts of: because child born within valid marriage is
x Securing birth certificate through confidential deemed LC even though mother may have
secretary Mrs. Rodriguez declared against said legitimacy or has been
x Openly and publicly acknowledging billy as son sentenced as an adulteress.
FC 172-173
Facts: 7) $XJ¶\HDUVDIWHUJUDQWHGDGPLQɹ
1) In 1911 Isidro Azarraga dies leaving 10 Eduardo Azarraga (heir of Amador) files for the
children the first 7 of who are illegitimate born UHPRYDORIDGPLQIURPFLWLQJIDLOXUHWRUHQGHU
to his mistress Valentina Abarracoso. a final accounting of the estate and a project of
2) The legitimacy of the 8th child is in question in partition. He also requests to be granted
this suit namely Leodegario, (the 9th Filomena admin.
was the only one established as legitimate 8) ə V FLWH WKDW WKH GHFHGHQW LV QRW D OHJLWLPDWH
being born to the valid marriage of Isidro and child of Isidro and thus is not the full blooded
his lawful wife Calixta Lozada) VLEOLQJ RI WKH PRWKHU ZKR ZDV D OHJLWLPDWH
3) 6HSW ¶ /HRGHJDULR GLHV LQWHVWDWHQR ZLOO child.
in an accident in Manila he leaves behind no 9) asserts the opposite, that decedent
spouse and no children to inherit his property Leodegario is legitimate
amounting to P28,000 worth of real estate in 10) &),DJDLQUXOHVIRU
Capiz. 11) ə ILOHV ZLWK &$ DQG LV XSKHOG DQG LV JUDQWHG
4) 2FW ¶ RULJLQDO 0DULD 'LD] GDXJKWHU RI DGPLQWRWKHSUHMXGLFHRI
WKH GHFHGHQW¶V VLVWHU )LORPHQD VKH GLHG Issues:
during the pendency of the case and was WON Leodegario is a legitimate child of
replaced by her heirs) files for letters of Isidro and his legal wife Calixta Lozada
Administration w/ the CFI. Held:
5) 2FW ¶ $PDGRU $]DUUDJD th illegitimate YES, WKH SURYed the legitimacy of
child of Isidro, half brother of decedent) files an Leodegario through his school records (UST
opposition to the petition citing that the /DZ ZKLFK FLWHG WKH GHFHGHQW¶V QDPH DV
deceased is an illegitimate son of Isidro via Leodegario Azarraga y Lozada. It was further
Valentina Abarracoso and thus is his brother strengthened by the preponderance of the will
UDWKHUWKDQWKHPRWKHU¶V of Pastora Azarraga which stated that the
6) 0DU¶&),UXOHVLQIDYRURI GHFHGHQW DQG WKH mother Filiomena are full
blooded siblings. Moreover the court order of
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 164
0DU ¶ JUDQWLQJ DGPLQ WR WKH DOVR CA set aside CFI affirmed.
acknowledges this fact of legitimacy.
Reyes v. CA
135 SCRA 439
the rule on hearsay based on the following Moreover the declaration may stand only if it
conditions: 1) that the declarant is either dead SHUWDLQV WR WKH FODLPDQW¶V ULJKW RYHU WKH
or unable to testify; 2) that the declarant be GHFODUDQW¶V RZQ HVWDWH DV LQ WKLV FDVH ,I
related to the person whose pedigree is subject however the declaration is to claim a right from
of inquiry, 3) that such relationship be shown another family member other than the
by evidence other than the declaration 4) that GHFODUDQW¶V HVWDWH WKH GHFODUDWLRQ PD\ QRW EH
the declaration was made ante litem motum deemed credible.
(before the commencement of the suit). Judgment reversed and set aside.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Being the first case where DNA testing was the
3UROODPDQWH VXHG 0DUWLQ¶V DOOHJHG ELRORJLFDO focal issue the court examines the history of
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support DNA testing
and support pendente lite The court opened the possibility of admitting
Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated
birthday on November 10, 1999 in Tijing v. Court of Appeals
7KH EDE\¶V ELUWK FHUWLILFDWH ZDV SXUSRUWHGO\ In People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and
signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered PXUGHU YLFWLP¶V '1$ VDPSOHV IURP WKH
the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later bloodstained clothes of the accused were
UHIXVHG )H¶V UHSHDWHG UHTXHVWV IRU 0DUWLQ¶V DGPLWWHG LQ HYLGHQFH :H UHDVRQHG WKDW ³WKH
support despite his adequate financial capacity purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain
and even suggested to have the child whether an association exist(ed) between the
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied evidence sample and the reference sample.
having fathered the child The samples collected (were) subjected to
Arnel is actually married and has a family of his various chemical processes to establish their
own at the time he impregnated Fe profile
Arnel claimed that the signature and the
community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to The right against self-incrimination is simply
KLP LQ WKH DFNQRZOHGJPHQW RI 0DUWLQ¶V ELUWK against the legal process of extracting from the
certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It
reflected his marital status as single when he does not apply where the evidence sought to
was actually married and that his birth year be excluded is not an incrimination but as part
was 1965 when it should have been 1964 of object evidence.
July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing individual privacy. The right is not intended to
pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court stifle scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common
ISSUE: WON DNA testing is self-incriminatory good... Intrusions into the right must be
and violates privacy of person accompanied by proper safeguards that
enhance public service and the common
HELD: NO good.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 168
FC175
Castro v. CA
173 SCRA 656
Facts:
-‐ Background love story: Pricola Maregmen HELD: YES
after marrying one Felix de Maya on May 23, -‐ Since FC is now the law being used and no
1913 realized the mistake she made and went vested rights will be prejudiced, FC 172 can be
back to her real love, Eustaquio Castro whom used to prove that Benita possessed an open
she lived with until her death on Sept 11, 1924. and continuous possession of the status of an
Their illicit affair bore them a daughter , Benita legitimate child which action can be brought in
Castro on May 27, 1919. her lifetime
-‐ Two earlier civil cases were filed against Benita o Evidence:
Castro. The first by her uncle and aunt Juan lived with Eustaquio for 42 years, even when
and Feliciano Castro that they and not Benita she was already married
should be the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who Aunt and Uncle Juan Castro and Feliciana
died on May 27, 1923 and the second by Castro admitted that she was the daughter in
Marcelina Bautista, the wife of her alleged Civil Case no 3762.
father Eustaquio Castro who died on August Eustaquio himself reported and registered
24, 1961. Marcelina also alleges that she and %HQLWD¶VELUWK3OXVWKHUHZDVQRLQGLFDWLRQWKDW
not Benita should be the compulsory heir of the he should have signed certificate or taken
property of Euestaquio. judicial action in order for her to be recognized
-‐ TC: consolidated the cases and ruled Benita is as his illegitimate child
indeed the acknowledged and recognized child Eustaquio gave away Benita during her
of Eustaquio Castro and is entitled to wedding to Cipriano Naval
participate in the partition of the properties left certificate of baptism and the picture of the
by him. Castro family during the wake for Eustaqui
-‐ CA: affirmed the decision of TC and held that o rule on separating the legitimate from the
Eustaquio Castro voluntarily recognized Benita LOOHJLWLPDWH IDPLO\ LVQ¶W QHFHVVDU\ EHFDXVH
through the records of birth he registered Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were
himself. the only immediate family of Eustaquio.
OBITER: Unless she asks about NCC
ISSUE: WON Benita Castro Naval is the -‐ diff between voluntary and compulsory
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child recognition ± IN THIS CASE, Eustaquio
of Eustaquio Castro voluntarily recognized her since he himself took
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 169
care of and registered her record of birth in the recognition is yet to be ordered by the courts
municipality. Thus even if his signature was because a private writing, lacking the stronger
missing, his actions clearly show his voluntary guaranty and higher authenticity of a public
recognition of her. document is not self- executory. based on an
o voluntary recognition: natural child merely asks express recognition so found and declared by
for a share in the inheritance in virtue of his the court after hearing
having been acknowledged as such, and is not -‐ diff between natural and spurious ± IN this
trying to compel the father or his heirs to make case, she was a natural child of Eustaquio but
the acknowledgment a spurious child of Pricola
NCC 131 ± law thspat applies for voluntary o natural - those born outside of lawful wedlock
UHFRJQLWLRQ³7KHDFNQRZOHGJPHQWRI DQDWXUDO of parents who, at the time of conception of the
child must be made in the record of birth, in a child, were not disqualified by any impediment
ZLOORULQVRPHRWKHUSXEOLFGRFXPHQW´ to marry each other
acknowledgment has been formally and legally o spurious ± had legal impediment to marry when
accomplished because the public character of child was conceived and born.
the document makes judicial pronouncement in case the recognition is made by only one of
unnecessary the parents, it will be presumed that the child is
o compulsory recognition - requires judicial natural if the parents recognizing it had the
pronouncement of illegitimacy since recognition legal capacity to contract marriage at the time
was made in a private document. of the conception
NCC 135-136 apply.
Lim v. CA
65 SCRA 160
Facts: -‐ CA: ruled that neither one of them showed that
-‐ Francisco Uy executed an affidavit that said he they were voluntarily or compulsory recognized
was the son and sole heir of deceased Susana by Susana
Lim and her property now belongs to him
-‐ Felisa Lim, the alleged natural daughter of ISSUE: WON Felisa is the natural daughter of
Susana Lim, filed a suit in CFI against Susana
Francisco to nullify the said affidavit. She
presented the ff. evidence to show that she is HELD: NO. Francisco is not a pertinent issue
the acknowledged natural daughter of Susana: anymore since he decided to argue that he
o Certificate of baptism which states that Felisa bought the property with his own money thus it
LV6XVDQD¶VGDXJKWHU should be declared as his through implied trust
o Marriage contract which shows consent of )HOLVD¶V HYLGHQFH KLQJHV RQ KHU PDUULDJH
Susana to the marriage of her daughter. certificate where Susana gave her consent.
-‐ On the other hand, Francisco provided the ff. She declares that this is a public instrument,
evidence ZKLFKVKRZV6XVDQD¶VUHFRJQLWLRQ$UWRI
o Application for alien registration which lists Civil Code of 1889). However, public
Susana as his mother instruments are defined as public documents
o Order of Bureau of Immigration cancelling authenticated by a notary or a competent
application stating that Susana is his mother public official. A marriage certificate is not a
o Identification certificate issued by Bureau of notarized public document but a mere
Immigration describing his Filipino citizenship declaration by the contracting parties of their
taken from his mother Susana Lim marriage.
-‐ TC: recognized Susana as the natural child
Bañas v. Bañas
134 SCRA 260
had been an error in his marriage cert; Pedro ISSUE: WON RAYMUNDO WAS AN
declared that he has a natural son named ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL SON OF
Raymundo whom he recognized, and he asked BIBIANO
for the correction of the said cert
June 30, 1930, Pedro Bañas wrote to HELD: NO
"M.R.P. Juez del Arzobispado de Manila" 7KH QRWH Z ³VX SDGUH´ Xnreliable,
wherein he reiterated that he had recognized DVVXPLQJ LW¶V DXWKHQWLF WKH VDPH GRHVQ¶W
his natural son born of Dolores (who is insane), constitute a sufficient proof of a valid
Raymundo; he requested for the correction of recognition
KLVVRQ¶VDQGJUDQGVRQV¶EDSWLVPDOFHUW Formalities of voluntary recognition
July, 1930 Bibiano executed sworn under Article 278 of the New Civil Code is that
VWDWHPHQW VWDWLQJ WKDW 5D\PXQGR LV 3HGUR¶V recognition shall be express and made either in
son the record of birth, in a will, in a statement in a
1954, Bibiano died; 1955, Raymundo court of record, or in any authentic writing
wrote to Atty. Faustino in which he complained 1RWH Z ³VX SDGUH´ LV D PHUH
about the alleged in justice done to him by indication of paternal solicitude.The Filipinos
%LELDQR¶VZLIH are known for having very close family ties.
-XQH %LELDQR¶V KHLUV WKH Extended families are a common set-up among
defendants, extra-judicially settled his estate by them, sometimes to the extent that strangers
means of a deed of extra judicial settlement are also considered as part of the family.
among themselves which was notarized by Tthe rule of incidental
Atty. Angel Vecino, brother of Trinidad acknowledgment does not apply to plaintiffs-
November 7, 1955, the spouses DSSHOODQWV
QRWHZ³VXSDGUH´VLQFHLWLVQRWD
Raymundo Bañas and Trinidad executed a public document where a father would
mortgage over their house and lot in 1444 ordinarily be more careful about what he says
Kalimbas St., in favor of herein defendant Even if the evidence presented by the
Angel V. Bañas plaintiffs-appellants constitute a sufficient proof
1962 Raymundo died; 1965, his heirs of a voluntary recognition, still their complaint
filed complaint for partition and recovery of will not prosper since it is evident that if there
hereditary share was acknowledgment on the part of Bibiano, he
Trinidad said she discovered certain had rectified or repudiated the same by his
GRFXPHQWV ZF HVWDEOLVKHG 5D\PXQGR¶V sworn statement
filiation to Bibiano 1. handwritten note Considering that Raymundo was born
DGGUHVVHG WR 5D\PXQGR Z VDOXWDWLRQ ³6X in 1894, and was already of majority age in
SDGUH´ IURm B. Banas 2) matriculation certs of 1915, long before Bibiano's death in 1954, he
Raymundo w/ Bibiano as father should and could have filed such action either
3) report card w/ Bibiano as under Article 135 of the Old Civil Code, or
parent/guardian 4) autobiographies of Article 283 of the New Civil Code
raymundo w/ alterations Such action for the acknowledgment of a
natural child is not transmissible to the natural
child's heirs; the right is purely a personal one
to the natural child
In re Christensen
102 Phil 1055
into the picture, Helen's mother and the andgot married to a man for Christensen held
deceased were publicly known to be living no high esteem.
together as husband and wife. Testator' last acts cannot be
In fact, Christensen from Helen's made the criterion in determining whether
birth in 1934 providedfor her maintenance; oppositor was his child or not, for human
shouldered the expenses for her education; frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a
tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname person to adopt unnatural or harsh
"Christensen" measures against an erring child
Hisrepudations of her relationship The LC directing Lucy to acknowledge Helen is
with him came about only after he andBernarda absurd , for the heirs would be compelled to
parted ways in March, 1950, and after Helen recognize such child as a natural child of the
took sides with her mother. Furthermore, deceased without a properprovision of the law.
despite that decedent's desire that she The Civil Code only requires a declaration by
continue her studies, Helen ignored the same the court of the child's status as a natural child
of the parent
Ilano v. CA
231 SCRA 242
Baluyut v. Baluyut
186 SCRA 506
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 172
Facts: 3DUHQW¶VZLOO
Statement before a court of record
Victoria, Ma. Theresa and Ma. Flordeliza were Any authentic writing (NCC 278)
minors when they filed this petition. They were
represented by their mother and guardian ad In the case at bar, there was no evidence to
litem, Norma Urbano. show voluntary recognition.
The petition is filed against Felicidad Baluyut The records of birth were not signed by the
and the CA. Felicidad is the wife of the father even if it was in the name of Enrique
deceased, who had an illegal relationship with Baluyut
Norma Urbano because he was already There is no evidence of authentic writing or
married at the time. The petition states that the statement before a court
minors are his illegitimate children and
therefore have a legal interest on the estate of With regard to compulsory recognition, the
the deceased Enrique Baluyut. petitioners relied on testimonies by the mother
They further allege that they were in and another witness:
continuous possession and enjoyment of the ³7KH FRPELQHG WHVWLPRQ\ RI 1RUPD 8UEDQR
status of children of the decease during his and her witness Liberata Vasquez insofar as
lifetime b direct overt acts. (he supported them the issue of recognition is concerned tends to
and maintained them. show that Norma was kept by the late Enrique
They added to having been deliberately M. Baluyut as his mistress first in the house of
excluded from the estate of Enrique Baluyut. Liberata and then in a house supposedly
Felicidad, who is the widow and appointed rented from one Lacuna. But this Lacuna was
administratrix of the estate, opposed the not even presented to testify in support of the
petition. claim of Norma and Liberate that Baluyut
Trial Court: declared that the minors were the rented his house for Norma. And, according to
forced heirs of the deceased (under NCC Norma and Liberata, Baluyut visited Norma
887(5)) and ordered Felicidad to provide some twice a week in the house where she
monthly support for the minors. kept her as his mistress; that Baluyut paid the
hospital bills for the delivery of the two younger
CA: reversed the decision; the petition was children of Norma. But, according to Liberata
dismissed (although the CA did recognize them herself, it was not Baluyut who personally paid
DV(QULTXH¶VLOOHJLWLPDWHFKLOGUHQ the hospital bills but he gave the money for the
payment of the hospital bills to Liberato and he
Issue: requested her to pay the money to the hospital.
W/N the petitioners are the illegitimate children This only shows that Baluyut was hiding his
of the deceased and are therefore entitiled to Identity as the father of the children of
monthly support. Norma, an act which is inconsistent with
recognizing such children as his own.´
Held: Proof of filiation is not sufficient to confer
upon them any hereditary rights in the estate of The SC is very strict in applying the law for
the deceased. The decision appealed from is compulsory recognition, much more than with
affirmed. voluntary recognition.
NCC 283 enumerates the cases where the
Ratio father is obliged to recognize the child:
The illegitimate child must be acknowledged
by the putative parent. (as was decided by SC b.) when the child is in continuous possession
in a previous case: Reyes, et al. v. of the status of a child of the alleged father by
Zuzuarregul, et al.) the direct acts of the latter or his family.
The illegitimate child, to be entitled to support c.) when the child was conceived during the
and successional rights from his parents, must time when the mother cohabited with the
prove his filiation through this means - supposed father
Voluntary or compulsory (NCC 283) recognition « WKHVH HQXPHUDWLRQV DUH LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK
through: the testimonies of the witnesses. Baluyut
appeared to be hiding the fact that he was the
Record of birth father of the minors.
Mendoza v. CA
201 SCRA 675
Marquino v. IAC
233 SCRA 348 (1994)
Fernandez v. CA
230 SCRA 130
Facts:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 173
Petitioners are filing for recognition and support claim to being just a sponsor at the baptism
against the private respondent claiming to be and another as a waiter of a restaurant who
35¶VLllegitimate children said he never saw them together at the
Violeta P. Esguerra is single and the mother of restaurant where Violeta said the frequented
the two petitioners, Claro Antonio and John together.
Paul. RTC: ordered PR to recognize the two as his
Violeta and Carlito met sometime in 1983 at sons and to provide P2000 as support each per
the Meralco Compound tennis courts. month
They started their illicit sexual relationship 6
months after meeting. CA: reversed the decision. CA says that proof
She did not know that Carlito was already is inadequate.
married until the birth of her two children.
She said that they were married in civil rites in Issue:
October, 1983 but in March, 1985 she W/N the minors are the children of Carlito
discovered that the marriage license was Fernandez.
spurious.
Held: NO. SC finds no merit in petition.
Petitioners provided evidence in the form of:
Birth certificates Ratio:
Baptismal certificate Documentary evidence provided for by the
Photographs of Carlito during the baptism and petitioners are insufficient.
RIKLPDQG&ODURZKLOHLQ9LROHWD¶VKRPH
4 witnesses: 3 are friends of Violeta who Photos are unreliable
introduced Carlito to them as her husband and Baptismal certificates cannot be held as a
1 priest who testified that Carlito presented voluntary recognition of parentage
himself as the father of petitioner at the %LUWKFHUWLILFDWHVZHUHQ¶WSUHSDUHG6,*1('E\
baptism Carlito himself and cannot be used as
evidence.
PR Carlito denied the allegations and said he The testimony by the priest was misleading. He
was only a sponsor at the baptism of Claro. He GLGQ¶W UHDOO\ UHPHPEHU WKH IDce of Carlito and
had 2 witnesses: one who affirmed his initial had to be shown a picture by Violeta first.
Jison vs. CA
286 SCRA 495
FACTS: 10. but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
1. Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary child.
of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a rich 11. Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus.
businessman.
2. Private respondent is a married man and a Respondents:
father. a. Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of
3. However, despite this, Daisie and Ramon custody of a minor child may be decided in a
cohabited habeas corpus case contemplate a situation
4. Out of this union, Christopher J., was born (on where the parents are married to each other
March 9, 1985). but are separated
5. Christopher J. was followed by two more b. respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he
children, both girls, namely Christine, born on being a very rich businessman; whereas,
June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters
1988. and parents for support. In fact, he financially
6. The relationship became known to private supported petitioner-appellee and her three
respondent's wife when Daisie took minor children. It is, therefore, for the best
Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa interest of Christopher J that he should
in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and temporarily remain under the custody of
introduced him to Villar's legal wife. respondent-appellant
7. the children of Daisie were freely brought by
Villar to his house as they were eventually ISSUE:
accepted by his legal family. Whether or not the child should be given back
8. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to to Daisie.
allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay. HELD:
9. Daisie agreed. Yes.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 174
The exception allowed by the rule has to be Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is
IRU³FRPSHOOLQJUHDVRQV´IRUWKHJRRGRIWKH a question of fact to be properly entertained in
child. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the special proceedings before the trial court. It
the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce should be recalled that in a petition for review
decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law.
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral We are not in the best position to assess the
dereliction will not have any effect upon the SDUWLHV¶UHVSHFWLYHPHULWVvis-à-vis their
baby who is as yet unable to understand her opposing claims for custody. Yet another
situation. sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of
the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
important role fathers play in the upbringing of preference and opinion must first be sought in
their children. While the bonds between a the choice of which parent should have the
mother and her small child are special in custody over her person.
nature, either parent, whether father or mother,
is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of A word of caution: our pronouncement here
custody. One cannot say that his or her should not be interpreted to imply a preference
suffering is greater than that of the other toward the father (herein private respondent)
parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin
and other feelings of either parent but the Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a
welfare of the child which is the paramount statement against SHWLWLRQHU¶VILWQHVVWRKDYH
consideration. final custody of her said minor daughter. It
shall be only understood that, for the present
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of
on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin the subject minor should remain with her father
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for
guardianship before the trial court have not WHEREFORE, The trial court is directed to
been terminated, and no pronouncement has immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc.
been made as to who should have final No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision
custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the
welfare of the said minor as the controlling OBITER: Parental Authority and its
factor, we find that the appellate court did not Renunciation
err in allowing her father (private respondent
herein) to retain in the meantime parental Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman
custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
not be wrenched from her familiar rightfully assume control and protection of their
surroundings, and thrust into a strange unemancipated children to the extent required
environment away from the people and places E\WKHODWWHU¶VQHHGV It is a mass of rights and
to which she had apparently formed an obligations which the law grants to parents for
attachment. WKHSXUSRVHRIWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VSK\VLFDO
preservation and development, as well as the
COMMENT: The court never expounded on cultivation of their intellect and the education of
what these compelling reasons are. The best their heart and senses. As regards parental
answer I could find is stated in the next DXWKRULW\³WKHUHLVQRSRZHUEXWDWDVNQR
paragraph saying that the SC cannot decide on complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
questions of fact. And the determination of w/n sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the mother is a good mother is indeed a WKHPLQRU´
question of fact. But it still does not answer why
custody was granted to the father. GR: Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or
Is the compelling reason the fact that her renounced except in cases authorized by law.
mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the The right attached to parental authority, being
FKLOGLVDOUHDG\VWD\LQJDWWKHIDWKHU¶VKRXVH purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
and moving the child to and fro would cause parental authority only in cases of EXC:
the child distress? Are these reasons adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
compelling enough for the court to award FKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHRUDQRUSKDQLQVWLWXWLRQ
WHPSRUDU\FXVWRG\WRWKHIDWKHU",GRQ¶WNQRZ
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor
Are cases regarding temporary custody to another, such as a friend or godfather, even
H[FHSWLRQVWR$UWLFOHVDQG",GRQ¶W in a document, what is given is merely
know. temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a
For reference, I also posted the full text of the definite renunciation is manifest, the law
case. still disallows the same.
Pp vs. Delantar
G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
violation of RA 7610. indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
-‐ The testimony of AAA tells us that she was first conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
brought to the first client (an Arab National SURVWLWXWLRQDQGRWKHUVH[XDODEXVH´,WLVFOHDU
named Mr. Hammond) at least 11 times. She that accused-appelant coerced and influenced
told the court that the accused told her that she AAA into having sex with the Arab guy and
needed to do it because they had to pay some Jalosjos for 2 reasons. FIRST, Delantar
obligations and debts. instilled helplessness into her by saying that
-‐ Afterwards, AAA no longer wanted to have sex she had to do it because they had debts and
with the Arab National, but then the accused electric bills to pay (so wala nang choice yung
told her that there is nothing wrong with it as bata diba?). SECOND, Delantar had MORAL
long as the penis does not penetrate her ASCENDANCY over AAA because he was her
vagina (The Arab client never inserted her father figure. All of these point to Delantar
penis into her, binabastos lang siya nito.) coercing and influencing AAA.
-‐ The second client is Romeo Jalosjos, and MORE IMPORTANT ISSUE: WON Delantar is
-DORVMRVFDOOHGWKHDFFXVHGDV³VXNLQJEXJDZ´ D³*XDUGLDQ´RI$$$%HFDXVHLIKHLVD
Jalosjos often paid 5-10K pesos for the guardian then he will be sentenced to reclusion
services of AAA. temporal.
-‐ The accused brought the case to SC for HELD: NO
petition Ratio: The birth certificate of AAA saying that
Issues: WON Delantar is guilty beyond Delantar was her father was NOT signed by
reasonable doubt of violating RA 7610 Delantar. Hence it is not clear if Delantar is
Held: Yes indeed a father. Was he a guardian? NO. A
Ratio: In Section 5 of the RA 7610 it states that guardian envisioned by law is a person who is
³6(&&KLOG3URVWLWXWLRQDQG2WKHU6H[XDO the biological father or adopted parent of the
Abuse.²Children, whether male or female, child.
who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or
Gapusan v. CA
183 SCRA 160
and her application for insurance are x The evidences of Felisa are all considered
"authentic writings under article 278 of the authentic documents: they are the genuine or
civil code" which effectively operated as a indubitable writings of Felisa Gapusan Parcon
recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as her x Felisa's application for membership in the
natural child, even if no action was brought by Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation,
the latter to compel the former, during her where Felisa describes Ligaya as her
lifetime, to recognize her as such "adopted" daughter is also inconsequential
VLQFH LW ZDV RQO\ PHQWLRQHG DV ³DGRSWHG´ WR
Held: KLGH)HOLVD¶VVKDPHDQGUHOXFWDQFHWRFRQIHVV
x Recognition of natural children may be publicly to her colleagues in the teaching
voluntary or compulsory profession that she had borne a child out of
x Compulsory recognition is sometimes also wedlock. Furthermore it only proves that
called judicial recognition. It is recognition /LJD\DLV)HOLVD¶VGDXJKWHU
decreed by final judgment of a competent Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a
court. voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Felisa
x Art 281 (NCC) provides that judicial approval Gapusan Parcon. She is therefore entitled, in
is needful if the recognition of the minor is accordance with Article 282 of the Civil Code,
effected, not through a record of birth or in to bear her mother's surname, and to receive
a will but through a statement in a court of the hereditary portion accorded to her by the
record or an authentic document Code
People v. Barranco
177 SCRA 103
People v. Rizo
189 SCRA 265
Facts: Concepcion Dimen noticed that the his legitimate son despite the fact that Rizo is a
stomach of her 22-year old mongoloid sister married man.
was bigger than usual. She discovered that she
was pregnant. Felicidad revealed that Rizo, the Relevant issue:
husband of her yaya had intercourse with her WON Rizo can be compelled to recognize
in the bodega. Rizo admitted that he had the offspring of the crime.
sexual intercourse with Felicidad. On October Held: No
22, 1986, Felicidad delivered a baby. Rizo did Ratio: The rule is that if the rapist is a married
not confirm nor deny that he had sexual man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the
intercourse with her but filed a motion to offspring of the crime, should there be any, as
dismiss claiming insufficiency of evidence. RTC his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That
found Felicidad to be a competent witness and portion of the judgment ordering him to
rendered judgment against the accused. RTC recognize the child as his legitimate son should
also ordered Rizo to recognize the offspring as therefore be eliminated.
Facts: Rachel Recto went to the store to buy Ratio: Concerning the acknowledgment and
cigarette and ice when Magtibay pulled her support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of
hand and succeeded in having carnal the Revised Penal Code provides for three
knowledge with her in a grassy place. She kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy. the offender: a) indemnification, b)
Magtibay claimed he was bedridden due to acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the
influenza but the RTC found him guilty beyond law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. He was every case to support the offspring.
penalized with RECLUSION PERPETUA and
to indemnify the victim Rachelle Recto of Under the FC, the kid is considered an
50,000 without subsidiary imprisonment. illegitimate child. Art. 176 of the FC vests
parental authority upon the mother and
Relevant Issue: considering that an offender sentenced to
WON the accused is ordered to provide reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental
support to the victim's child born out of the authority over his children, no further positive
rape. act is required of the parent as the law itself
provides for the child's status.
Held: Yes
Hence, accused should be ordered to
indemnify and support the victim's child.
Dempsey v. RTC
164 SCRA 384
Facts: Janalita Rapada cohabited with Joel Held: Yes. Illegitimate children have rights of
Dempsey without the benefit of marriage and the same nature as legitimate and adopted
Christine Marie was born. The child receives children. This is enunciated in Art. 3 of PD 603
monthly support from him in the sum of $150. which provides that all children shall be entitled
Janalita seeks for the accused to declare to the rights herein set forth without distinction
Christina Marie as his dependent and after his as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social
American citizenship. Dempsey freely and status, religion, political antecedents, and other
voluntarily and spontaneously entered a plea of factors.
guilty to the offenses charged against him
which was abandonment and failure to provide Relevant issue#2:
adequate support for the child though he had WON as part of the civil liability, the
the means to do so. Municipal Trial Court found accused is required to recognize Christina
him to be guilty. He appealed for the penalty of as his natural.
imprisonment be changed into a fine and not to Held: No. The recognition of a child by her
be acquitted. RTC reversed the earlier father is provided for in the NCC and now in
decision. the FC. In this criminal prosecution, where the
accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and
Relevant issue #1: the issue of recognition was not specifically
WON Christina is entitled to the rights and fully heard and tried, the trial court
arising from the parental responsibility of committed error when it ordered recognition of
her father, she being an illegitimate child. a natural child as part of the civil liability in the
criminal case.
People v. Bayani
G.R. No. 120894 Oct. 3, 1996
FC 177
Abadilla vs Tabiliran
249 SCRA 447
FACTS:
x Complaint filed by Ma Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk ISSUES:
of Court assigned at the sala of respondent x WON Tabilaran is guilty of deceitful conduct
Judge Jose Tabiliran HELD:
x Respondent charged with gross immorality, x YES
deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of o Children were born in 1970, 1971 and 1975
a judge and prior to the marriage of respondent to
x &RPSODLQDQW¶VDllegations: Priscilla, which was in 1986
o respondent had scandalously and publicly o As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to
cohabited with a certain Priscilla Baybayan know that, despite his subsequent marriage to
during the existence of his legitimate marriage Priscilla, these 3 children cannot be legitimated
with Teresita Banzuela nor in any way be considered legitimate since
o that respondent shamefacedly contracted at the time they were born, there was an
marriage with said Priscilla existing valid marriage between respondent
o that respondent falsely represented himself as and his first wife, Teresita
³VLQJOH´ LQ WKH PDUULDJH FRQWUDFW DQG GLVSHQVH o Applicable Provision Æ Art. 269 of NCC: Only
with the requirements of a marriage contract by natural children can be legitimated. Children
invoking cohabitation for 5 years born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
x Earlier: wife filed a complaint for abandonment time of the conception of the former, were not
of family home and living with a certain disqualified by any impediment o marry each
Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son other, are natural.
x Charge of Deceitful Conduct: o Legitimation is limited to natural children and
o Complainant claims that respondent caused to cannot include those born of adulterous
be registered as legitimate his three illegitimate relations
children with Priscilla by falsely executing o Reasons:
separate affidavits 1. The rationale of legitimation would be
x Other charge: Corruption destroyed
x Respondent: 2. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in
o Declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla is terms of successional rights;
not and was neither bigamous nor immoral 3. There will be the problem of public scandal,
because he started living with her only after his unless social mores change;
1st wife had already left and abandoned the 4. It is too violent to grant the privilege of
family home in 1966 legitimation to adulterous children as it will
o Since then, 1st ZLIH¶VZKHUHDERXWVLVQRWNQRZQ destroy the sanctity of marriage
and respondent has had no news of her being 5. It will be very scandalous, especially if the
alive parents marry many years after the birth of the
o Further avers that 25 years had already child.
elapsed since the disappearance of his 1st wife It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision,
when he married Priscilla in 1986 whether old or new, can give refuge to the
x Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on deceitful actuations of the respondent.
2 counts of corruption
FC 178,FC 180
FC 180-181
DOJ Opinion No. 106 Series of 1991
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 182
FC 182
FC179
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 183
ADOPTION
Lazatin v. Campos
92 SCRA 250
Cervantes v. Fajardo
169 SCRA 575
Republic v. CA
205 SCRA 356
Santos v. Aransanzo
16 SCRA 344
-‐ Respondents cannot intervene in the As the adoption is held valid, and in intestate
settlement proceedings and attack the adoption succession, adopted children exclude first
cousins, the CA decision is reversed
Held / Ratio: No
-‐ Art 335 ± those w/ legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or children by
legal fiction cannot adopt
Duncan v. CFI
69 SCRA 298
Landingin vs. RP
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) requires 2) NO. Section 2 of Act No. 2103 (pardon me if
the consent from biological parents. The I would no longer expound on this point, this
general requirement of consent and notice to part deals more with technicalities of
the natural parents is intended to protect the instruments I think e.g. including the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted intrinsic/extrinsic validity of such instruments
interference by interlopers, and to insure the /) What is important here is that no further
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of proof was introduced by petitioner to
the child in the manner of the proposed authenticate the written consent of her
adoption. Written consent of the biological legitimate children therefore said evidence is
parents is indispensable for the validity of a inadmissible
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of
a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and 3) Primary consideration in adoption is the best
duties may be terminated and re-established in interest of the child, it follows that the financial
adoptive parents. Amelia (mother) was said to capacity of prospective parents should also be
be in PI, therefore it would not have been carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly,
impossible to solicit Written Consent from her. the adopter should be in a position to support
x That consent is no longer needed because of the would-be adopted child or children, in
PRWKHU¶V DEDQGRQPHQW LV XQWHQDEOH ,I PRWKHU keeping with the means of the family. She only
had really abandoned, she should, thus have has a part-time job, and she is rather of age
adduced the written consent of their legal therefore financial stability is questionable.
guardian. Merely permitting the child to remain Even if she says that she has children to rely
for a time undisturbed in the care of others is on, adopter must be the main breadwinner.
not such an abandonment
x More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that Minor children not permitted to be adopted
the latter will not miss her guidance and due to legal infirmities (but Court said that
counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. Diwata is not prevented from filing new
Again, it is the best interest of the child that petition for adoption of herein minors Æ
takes precedence in adoption paasa haay)
o Court Social Worker Report could take the discounts and negates the effects of a valid
place of a report from a duly licensed and final judgment of the Court regarding which
placement agency or of the MSSD no appeal had even been taken from
o Court had impliedly dispensed with the six- (Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes G.R. L-71370,
month trial custody considering that the July 7, 1986)."
Gordons were foreigners whose livelihood was ¾ 10K given by Gordon spouses was only a
earned abroad financial assistance to the natural mother of the
o Decision had become final and executor child
x TC relied on 1) the Resolution of this Court in ¾ Spouses also would want to adopt a baby girl
Administrative Matter No. 85-2-7136-RTC EXW XSRQ OHDUQLQJ WKDW VKH¶V PRQJRORLG WKH\
denying the request of the MSSD for a turned her over to International Alliance for
Supreme Court Circular to all Regional Trial Children, where she unfortunately died.
Court and 2) ruling in Bobanovic vs. Hon. ¾ Muslim laws shall not apply to them, they being
0RQWHV ³,Q UHIXVLQJ WR JUDQW WKH WUDYHO Britons.
clearance certificate, respondent MSSD TC order already final and executory!!!
Republic v. Toledano
233 SCRA 9
R.A. 8043³7KH/DZRQ,QWHU-&RXQWU\$GRSWLRQ´
A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. (Aug. 22, 2002)
6RPHLPSRUWDQWQRWHVRQ5$³7KH/DZRQ,QWHU-&RXQWU\$GRSWLRQ´
x Inter-country adoption refers to the socio-legal process of adopting a Filipino child, i.e. 15 years old and
below by a foreigner or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad where the petition is field, the
supervised trial custody is undertaken, and the decree of adoption is issued outside the Philippines.
x Mandates the creation of The Inter-Country Adoption Board that acts as the policy-making body for
purposes of carrying out the provisions of this Act, in consultation and coordination with the Department,
the different child-care and placement agencies, adoptive agencies, as well as non-governmental
organizations engaged in child-care and placement activities
x Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been
exhausted before resorting to Inter-Country Adoption and ensure as well that such is for the best
interest of the child
x Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted.- Only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption.
x SEC. 9. Who May Adopt.- Any alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an
application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she;
o is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be
adopted, at the time of application unless the adaptor is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted
or the spouse of such parent
o if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption;
o has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national
laws, and has undergone the appropriate counselling from an accredited counsellor in his/her country
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 189
FC 189
FC 186
Tamrago v. CA
209 SCRA 518
Cervantes v. Fajardo
169 SCRA 575
x Respondents offered the child for adoption to the pretext that she was instructed to do so by
*LQD&DUUHRQ¶VVLVWHUDQGEURWKHULQODZWKH her mother. Gino brought the child to her house
petitioners. x Petitioners demanded the return of the child
x Petitioner spouses took care and custody of but Gina refused
the child when she was barely 2 weeks old. x
x An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the ISSUES:
child by herein petitioners was also executed x WON the writ should be granted.
by respondent Gina HELD:
x The appropriate petition for adoption was filed x YES
by petitioenrs over the child o Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married
x RTC rendered a decision granting the petition to a woman other than respondent Gina Æ his
x Angelie Anne Fajardo Æ Cervantes open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the
x Sometime in March or April 1987, petitioners minor that desireable atmosphere
received a letter from respondents demanding o Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners
to be paid P150,000, otherwise, they would get with full knowledge and consent of respondents
back their child. A decree of adoption has the effect, among
x Petitioners refused to accede to the demand others, of dissolving the authority vested in
x Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the child natural parents over the adopted child, except
IURPKHU³\D\D´DWWKHSHWLWLRQHU¶VUHVLGHQFHRQ where the adopting parent is the spouse of the
natural parent of the adopted
FC 191
FC 192
SUPPORT
FC 194
Pelayo v. Lauron
12 Phil 453
Facts:
1. October 13, 1906, evening: Dr. Arturo Pelayo Issue/s: WON husband is bound to
was called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and pay the bill
Juana Abella Held: Yes
a. He was asked to give birth to their daughter-in- 1. Article 142 and 143, Civil Code: Mutual
law obligations to which the spouses are bound by
b. He assisted in the delivery of the child way of mutual support
c. He was kept occupied until the next day a. Includes medical services in case of illness
d. He valued his fee at P500 BUT Marcelo and b. That when either of them by reason of illness
Juana refused to pay without reason should be in need of medical assistance, the
2. November 23, 1906: Complaint by Pelayo other is under the unavoidable obligation to
against Lauron and Abella for collection furnish the necessary services of a physician in
3. Contentions of Lauron and Abella: order that health may be restored
a. that their son and his wife lived independently c. That the father and mother-in-law are strangers
from them and in a separate house with respect to the obligation that devolves
b. that if she did stay in their house that night, it upon the husband to provide support
was due to fortuitous circumstances d. Hence, her husband, and not her father and
c. that their daughter-in-law had died due to the mother- in-law, is liable
childbirth i. That it is of no matter who called the doctor
4. April 5, 1907: RTC Held and requested his services
a. Lauron and Abella absolved from the complaint That there was imminent danger to her life and
due to lack of sufficient evidence to establish a medical assistance was urgently needed
right of action against them
Sanchez v. Zulueta
68 Phil 110
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
88 SCRA 803
De Asis vs, CA
G.R. No. 127578, Feb. 15, 1999
Facts:
1. October 14, 1988: Vircel D. Andres, mother Issue/s: WON action for support is barred by
and legal guardian of minor Glen Camil Andres Manifestation
de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and Held: NO
support of Glen against Manuel de Asis 1. Manifestation of Vircel is void because the
a. that Manuel is the father of Glen Right to support cannot be renounced or
b. that Manuel refused/failed to provide for the compromised
maintenance of Glen despite repeated a. NCC 301: The right to receive support cannot
demands be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a
c. Contentions of Manuel: third person. Neither can it be compensated
i. that Glen is not his child with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .
ii. that he cannot be forced to support him then b. NCC 2035: Future support cannot be the
2. July 4, 1989: Manifestation of Vircel subject of a compromise.
a. that Manuel had made a judicial i. No compromise upon the following questions
admission/declaration of his denial of paternity shall be valid:
b. that it seemed futile to continue the claim of (1) The civil status of persons;
support (2) The validity of a marriage or legal
3. dismisses August 8, 1989: Action was separation;
dismissed (3) Any ground for legal separation
a. Both parties agreed to move for the dismissal (4) Future support;
of the case (5) The jurisdiction of courts;
b. Provided that Manuel will withdraw his (6) Future legitime.
counterclaim c. WHY: Because of the need of the recipient to
4. September 7, 1995: Complaint for maintenance maintain his existence
and support against Manuel by Glen, i. He is not entitled to renounce or transfer the
represented by Vircel right for this would mean sanctioning the
a. 0DQXHO¶VPRWLRQWRGLVPLVVGXHWRres judicata voluntary giving up of life itself.
where the Manifestation of Vircel was, in effect, ii. It is to virtually allow either suicide or the
an admission of lack of filiation, which conversion of the recipient to a public burden
admission binds both parties which is contrary to public policy
b. 0DQXHO¶V PRWLRQ ZDV GHQLHG EHFDXVH iii. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence,
renunciation or waiver of future support is support which is the means to attain the
prohibited by law former, cannot be renounced.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 195
De Guzman vs Perez
496 SCRA 474
Lerma v. CA
61 SCRA 440
Mangonon vs. CA
G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
FC 200-204
Canonizado v. Benitez
127 SCRA 610
support was formally terminated only in April year period because a judgment for support
1969 GRHVQ¶WEHFRPHGRUPDQW
o Total amount due her as of this latter date was o Since the obligation is a continuing one, the
determined at P16,150 for the period from Oct. court never loses jurisdiction to enforce the
1964 to April 1969 same
x Writs of execution were again issued on Feb. o Agreements entered into were only for
10 and March 30, 1970 Æ both were returned deferment but never for a waiver or giving up of
and unsatisfied WKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VREOLJDWLRQV
x July 11, 1973: Petitioner and Respondent x 2. No
entered into an Agreement o NCC 303: The obligation to give support shall
x Petitioner filed a motion for execution and also cease: (3) when the recipient may engage
contempt of court in a trade, profession, or industry, or has
x Aug. 3, 1976, petitioner and respondent obtained work, or has improved his fortune in
entered into an agreement such a way that he no longer needs the
x Jan. 12, 1982: petitioner filed a motion to allowance from his subsistence.
require the respondent to pay current support 7KLVGRHVQ¶WDIIHFWWKHULJKWWRVXSSRUWEHWZHHQ
beginning Feb 1978 based on the decisions of spouses but only the action to make it
Sept. 27, 1968 and Jan. 21, 1969 demandable
x Respondent filed an opposition on the ground Subsists throughout the period that the
that his obligation to support has terminated marriage subsists
ISSUES: o Respondent can rightfully file motion to oppose
x WON Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court the payment of current support to terminate the
can be compelled by mandamus to demandability of the same for the time being
o 1. Issue an alias writ of execution for the o Respondent judge cannot be compelled by
payment of arrearages in support mandamus to order respondent to pay current
o $FWRQWKHSHWLWLRQHU¶VPRWLRQIRUSD\PHQWRI support when the latter alleges that a ground
current support exists for the suspension of such obligation
HELD: A judgment for support is never final in the
x 1. Yes sense that not only can its amount be subject
o Although petitioner obtained the favorable to increase or decrease but its demandability
judgment on Jan. 21, 1969, she can still may also be suspended or re-enforced when
enforce the same by a motion for a writ of appropriate circumstances exists
execution, notwithstanding the lapse of the 5-
FC 200-208
Sy vs CA
Dec. 27, 2009
from the date of judicial or extrajudicial Applying Section 5,[32] Rule 10 of the 1997
demand. Rules of Civil Procedure, since the issue of
o Rules of Court permits the ventilation of the support was tried with the implied consent of
question regarding the care and custody of the the parties, it should be treated in all respects
children as an incident to any proceeding, even as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And
a habeas corpus proceeding. since there was implied consent, even if no
o Respondent testified during trial, without any motion had been filed and no amendment had
REMHFWLRQRQSHWLWLRQHU¶VSDUWUHJDUGLQJWKH been ordered, the Court holds that the trial
QHHGIRUVXSSRUWIRUWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VHGXFDWLRQ court validly rendered a judgment on the issue
and other necessities
FC 198;
Rules of Court, Rule 61
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 199
FC 209
FACTS: x NO
x Feb. 4, 1961: Petitioner Zenaida Medina gave o When our law recognizes the right of parent to
birth to Jospeh Casero in the Makabali Clinic, the custody of her child, Courts must not lose
owned and operated by respondent Dra. VLJKWRIWKHEDVLFSULQFLSOHWKDW³LQDOOTXHVWLRQ
Venancia Makabali on the care, custody, education and property of
x Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabli from FKLOGUHQWKHODWWHU¶VZHOIDUHVKDOOEH
birth, who took care and reared Jospeh as her SDUDPRXQW´1&&
own son o For compelling reasons, even a child under 7
x Court extracted a promise from Dra. Makabali may be ordered separated from the mother.
to allow the mino a free choice with whom to o The right of parents to the company and
live with when he reaches 14yo Æ Court held custody of the children is but ancillary to the
WKDWLWZDVIRUWKHFKLOG¶VEHVWLQWHUHVWWREHOHIW proper discharge of parental duties to provide
with his foster mother the children with adequate support, education,
x Zenaida appealed moral, intellectual and civic training and
ISSUES: development (NCC 356)
x WON the writ be given Zenaida proved remiss in these sacred duties
HELD:
Facts: Unson and Araneta were married on reared and brought up in an atmosphere of
April 19, 1971. Maria Teresa, their child would Christian love, affection and honesty.
stay with petitioner during school days and
spend weekends with her mother but her Issue: WON custody of the child should be
mother wouldn't even bother to pick her up given to the mother.
during non-school days. During early part of
1978, Unson found out that Araneta has been Held. No.
living with her brother in law Reyes. Reyes and
Araneta later beget two kids and later Ratio: It is in the best interest of the child to be
embraced a protestant sect. Petitioner freed from the obviously unwholesome, not say
contends that Maria Teresa was born and immoral influence, that the situation in which
reared under the Roman Catholic faith and Araneta has placed herself might create in the
should not be exposed to an environment alien moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now
to the Catholic way of life which is the in her formative and most impressionable stage
upbringing and training her father is committed in her life. She might start getting ideas about
to. Araneta claims that they had an amicable the peculiar relationship of her mother with her
arrangement and no specific terms were own uncle-in-law.
agreed and stipulated upon by her and Unson
regarding custody of the child and that Maria The Court has no alternative than to grant
Teresa was always allowed to visit and to be Araneta no more than visitorial rights over the
picked up at any time by petitioner's parents. child. Anyway, decisions even of the SC on the
She admits her present circumstances at first custody of minor children are open to
impression might seem socially if not morally adjustment as the circumstances relevant to
unacceptable but Maria Teresa has been the matter may demand in the light of the
inflexible criterion.
Eslao vs CA
266 SCRA 317
Facts: Maria Paz and Reynaldo Eslao were wanted to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga
married on June 22, 1984 and after the but Teresita insisted on keeping the child with
marriage, they stayed with petitioner Teresita, her in the meantime to assuage her grief due to
the mother of the husband. Two children were her son's death.
born. Leslie was entrusted to the care and
custody of Maria's mom while Angelica stayed Maria later met James Manabu-Ouye, a
with her parents at Teresita's house. On Japanese American who is an orthodontist and
August 6, 1990, Reynaldo died. Petitioner they decided to get married. She joined her
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 200
new husband in SFO, USA and then later married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative
returned to the Philippines to be reunited with practice of his profession in SFO. In her
her kids and then bring them with her as her grandmother's house, the rooms are rented to
new husband is willing to adopt her kids. other persons. The foremost criterion is the
Teresita, however, refused to give her Angelica physical and moral well being of the child
because she claims that Maria has already taking into account the respective resources
abandoned her. and social and moral situations of the
contending parties.
The lower court granted the custody of the
minor Angelica to the mother, Maria Paz. CA When the mom entrusted the custody of her
affirmed this decision. minor child to the grandmother, what she gave
to the latter was merely temporary custody and
Issue: WON custody of Angelica should be it did not constitute abandonment or
granted to Maria Paz renunciation of parental authority. For the right
attached to parental authority, being purely
Held: Yes personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption,
Ratio: The child's welfare is always the guardianship and surrender to a children's
paramount consideration in all questions home or an orphan institution which do not
concerning his care and custody. The mom is appear here
Hontiveros v. IAC
132 SCRA 745
Facts: Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros and mom from bringing the kid to the USA where
private respondent Brenda Hernando are the she is bound for.
father and mother of an acknowledged natural
child born on November 27, 1981 named Relevant Issue: WON petitioner is entitled
Margaux Hontiveros. From November 1981 to to custody of his minor child Margaux.
June 1982, the child had been under the care
and custody of Brenda and Alejandro used to Held: No.
take the child out during Saturdays and return
her Saturday night. On June 21, 1982, Ratio: Article 363 of the NCC provides that No
Alejandro picked the kid up and never returned mother shall be separated from her child under
her to the mother. Mom then filed a petition for seven years of age, unless the court finds
habeas corpus to recover custody of Margaux compelling reasons for such measure. Clearly,
without depriving the father of his visitorial Brenda has a clear legal right under Art. 17 of
rights. At the hearing conducted on September PD 603 to the custody of her minor child, there
WKH PLQRUFKLOG ZDV ³SURGXFHG EHIRUH being no compelling reasons to the contrary.
the Court and a settlement was reached upon
agreement of the parties that Margaux shall be While the petitioner would have the court
under the custody of the petitioner for 7 days believe that private respondent is unfit to take
every other week. On May 24, 1983, the care of his child, it is too late in the day to do so
petitioner filed an urgent petition for issuance of because under the Rules of Court, only
a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the questions of law may be raised in the SC.
Facts: Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita to leave his kids with his sister because his
Masauding met in 1976 in Iligan City where assignment in the US was not yet completed.
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel
Corporation and Teresita was a nurse. In 1977, Teresita returned to the Philippines and on
Teresita left for LA, CA, USA to work as a Dec. 8, 1992 filed a petition for a writ of habeas
nurse and in 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his corpus against the petitioners to gain custody
employed to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer. over the children. The TC dismissed the
They maintained a common law relationship petition and suspended Teresita's parental
and they begot two kids, Rosalind (1986)and authority over the kids and declared Reynaldo
Reginald (1988). Reynaldo and Teresita got to have sole parental authority over them but
married in 1987. They decided to separate in with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by
1990. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children the parties and to be approved by the Court.
and went back to CA. Reynaldo brought the The CA reversed this decision and gave
kids back in to the Philippines but then he had
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 201
custody to Teresita and visitation rights on PRWKHU KXJJLQJ DQG NLVVLQJ D ³EDG´ PDQ ZKR
weekends to Reynaldo. lived in their house and worked for her father.
All of the 8 recommendations of the child
WON Teresita is more suitable and better psychologist show that Rosalind chooses
qualified in helping the children to grow into petitioners over the private respondent and that
responsible, well-adjusted and happy her welfare will be best served by staying with
young adults. them . The mom's conduct and demeanor in
the courtroom or elsewhere demonstrated her
Held: No. temper. She was also legally married already
when she married Reynaldo and she entered
Ratio: If a child is under seven years of age, into an illicit relationship with another man in
the law presumes that the mother is the best the house of the petitioner.
custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive: It can be overcome by Not only are the children over seven years old
"compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit
his choice is paramount but, again, the court is or immoral activities of the mother had already
not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the caused emotional disturbances, personality
court may find the chosen parent unfit and conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
award custody to the other parent, or even to a values, at least in Rosalind. The assignment of
third party as it deems fit under the Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary
circumstances. one. He was sent there to oversee the
purchase of a steel mill component and various
In the present case, both Rosalind and equipment needed by the National Steel
Reginald are now over seven years of age. Corporation in the Philippines. Once the
Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on purchases are completed, there is nothing to
August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the keep him there anymore.
same age on January 12, 1985. In a
psychological test, the responses of Rosalind The children are now both over seven years
about her mother were very negative, causing old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's prefer to stay is clear front the record. From all
anxiety. Among the things revealed by indications, Reynaldo is a fit person.
Rosalind was an incident where she saw her
Santos Sr. v. CA
G.R. No. 113054(1995)
Sagala-Eslao v. Cordero-Ouye
G.R. 116773, Jan. 16, 1997
FACTS:
1. On October 21, 1987, or four (4) months before Petitioner: P.D. No. 1083 is applicable only to
her marriage, Sabrina became a Muslim by Muslims.
conversion.
2. Respondent Fouzi and Sabrina were married ISSUE1:
on February 3,1988 under Islamic rites. What law governs?
3. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children,
namely, Abdulaziz and Amouaje, HELD1:
4. At the time of their marriage, unknown to Family Code.
petitioner, respondent was still married to a The standard in the determination of sufficiency
Saudi Arabian woman whom he later divorced. of proof, however, is not restricted to Muslim
5. This was the cause of their de facto separation. laws. The Family Code shall be taken into
6. Sometime in December 1995, the children lived consideration in deciding whether a non-
in the house of Sabrina's mother. Muslim woman is incompetent. What
7. On December 15, 1996, Sabrina had the determines her capacity is the standard laid
children baptized as Christians. She was also down by the Family Code now that she is not a
reconverted as a Christian. Muslim.
8. On March 11, 1996, respondent Fouzy Ali
Bondagjy filed an action to obtain custody of ISSUE2:
his two minor children, Abdulaziz, 10 and Under the Family Code, is she unfit to not be
Amouaje, 9. granted custody of the children?
Contentions: HELD2:
Respondent: No. She is able to provide for the needs of their
1. on various occasions Sabrina was seen with children sufficiently. And the husband is always
different men at odd hours in Manila busy.
2. she engages in 'zina' (illicit sexual relation)
3. she would wear short skirts, sleeveless what determines the fitness of any parent is
blouses, and bathing suits.6 Such clothing are the ability to see to the physical,
detestable under Islamic law on customs. educational, social and moral welfare of the
4. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children children,
sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of The record shows that petitioner is equally
P40.00 after the children come home from financially capable of providing for all the needs
school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school,7 of her children. The children went to school at
the children would be happy to see him but De La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with
they were afraid to ride in his car.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 204
their tuition paid by petitioner according to the absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is
school's certification.32 given to the mother.39
However, the award of custody to the wife does
Either parent may lose parental authority over not deprive the husband of parental authority.
the child only for a valid reason. In cases "Even when the parents are estranged and
where both parties cannot have custody their affection for each other is lost, the
because of their voluntary separation, we take attachment and feeling for their offsprings
into consideration the circumstances that would invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law
lead us to believe which parent can better take nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer
care of the children. Although we see the need absent, of course, any real, grave and
for the children to have both a mother and a imminent threat to the well-being of the child."
father, we believe that petitioner has more
capacity and time to see to the children's Thus, we grant visitorial rights to respondent as
needs. Respondent is a businessman whose his Constitutionally protected natural and
work requires that he go abroad or be in primary right.41 He may visit at least once a
different places most of the time. Under P.D. week and may take the children out only with
No. 603, the custody of the minor children, the written consent of the mother.
Pp vs. Glabo
371 SCRA 567
FACTS: a) indemnification,
1. Mila Lobrico, a 21 year old mental retard, was b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the
raped by his uncle. law should prevent him from so doing, and
2. She got pregnant and gave birth while the case c) in every case to support the offspring.
was pending.
3. He is found by guilty beyond reasonable doubt With the passage of the Family Code, the
by the Supreme Court. classification of acknowledged natural children
and natural children by legal fiction was
ISSUE: eliminated and they now fall under the specie
What is his role in the rearing of the child? Can of illegitimate children. Since parental authority
he exercise parental authority? is vested by Article 176 (illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of the
mother) of the Family Code upon the mother
HELD: and considering that an offender sentenced to
reclusion perpetua automatically loses the
He is mandated to support the child. No other power to exercise parental authority over his
allowable form of exercise of parental authority children, no "further positive act is required of
is allowed. the parent as the law itself provides for the
child's status." Hence, accused-appellant
Concerning the acknowledgment and support should only be ordered to indemnify and
of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the support the victim's child. However, the amount
Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of and terms of support shall be determined by
civil liability that may be imposed on the the trial court after due notice and hearing in
offender: accordance with Article 201 of the Family
Code.
o Grandparents may only be appointed when -‐ Bonifacia is not qualified to be a guardian
there is need for a substitute parental authority. o Too old
Mother is clearly not dead and Bonifacia did o Lives in US and she herself admitted that she
not give any evidence that she was morally was not sure whether or not she would actually
unfit to be the guardian of Vincent. Her move back to the Phil for two years in order to
DOOHJDWLRQ WKDW +HOHQ¶V OLYH-in-partner raped take care of 16 year old Vincent. Most likely,
Valerie several times does not mean anything VKH ZLOO DOVR MXVW OHDYH KLP LQ VRPHRQH HOVH¶V
VLQFH 9DOHULH¶V JXDUGLDQVKLS LV QR ORQJHU LQ care
question. Convicted of libel in Cebu.
Sombong vs. CA
G.R. No. 111876, Jan. 31, 1996
Tonog vs. CA
376 SCRA 642
illegitimate children shall be under the parental HQWLWOHG DPRQJ RWKHU ULJKWV ³WR NHHS WKHP LQ
authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 thHLUFRPSDQ\´
RI WKH )DPLO\ &RGH SURYLGHV WKDW ³>Q@R FKLOG
under seven years of age shall be separated COMMENT: The court never expounded on
from the mother, unless the court finds what these compelling reasons are. The
compelling reasons to order otherwise. best answer I could find is stated in the next
paragraph saying that the SC cannot decide
The exception allowed by the rule has to be on questions of fact. And the determination
IRU ³FRPSHOOLQJ UHDVRQV´ IRU WKH JRRG RI WKH of w/n the mother is a good mother is
child. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, indeed a question of fact. But it still does
the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce not answer why custody was granted to the
decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be father.
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the Is the compelling reason the fact that her
baby who is as yet unable to understand her mother is in the states? Is it the fact that the
situation. FKLOG LV DOUHDG\ VWD\LQJ DW WKH IDWKHU¶V
house and moving the child to and fro
This is not intended, however, to denigrate the would cause the child distress? Are these
important role fathers play in the upbringing of reasons compelling enough for the court to
their children. While the bonds between a award temporary custody to the father? I
mother and her small child are special in GRQ¶WNQRZ
nature, either parent, whether father or mother,
is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of Are cases regarding temporary custody
custody. One cannot say that his or her H[FHSWLRQV WR $UWLFOHV DQG " , GRQ¶W
suffering is greater than that of the other know.
parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride,
and other feelings of either parent but the For reference, I also posted the full text of
welfare of the child which is the paramount the case.
consideration.
Whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule a question of fact to be properly entertained in
on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin the special proceedings before the trial court. It
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for should be recalled that in a petition for review
guardianship before the trial court have not on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law.
been terminated, and no pronouncement has We are not in the best position to assess the
been made as to who should have final SDUWLHV¶ UHVSHFWLYH PHULWV vis-à-vis their
custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the opposing claims for custody. Yet another
welfare of the said minor as the controlling sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of
factor, we find that the appellate court did not the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
err in allowing her father (private respondent statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
herein) to retain in the meantime parental preference and opinion must first be sought in
custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should the choice of which parent should have the
not be wrenched from her familiar custody over her person.
surroundings, and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places A word of caution: our pronouncement here
to which she had apparently formed an should not be interpreted to imply a preference
attachment. toward the father (herein private respondent)
relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin
-‐ Parental authority and responsibility are Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a
inalienable and may not be transferred or statement against SHWLWLRQHU¶V ILWQHVV WR KDYH
renounced except in cases authorized by final custody of her said minor daughter. It
law. The right attached to parental authority, shall be only understood that, for the present
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of
of parental authority only in cases of the subject minor should remain with her father
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
FKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHRr an orphan institution. WHEREFORE, The trial court is directed to
-‐ When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc.
to another, such as a friend or godfather, even No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision
in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not OBITER: Parental Authority and its
constitute a renunciation of parental Renunciation
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman
-‐ Article 220 of the Family Code thus provides Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
that parents and individuals exercising parental rightfully assume control and protection of their
authority over their unemancipated children are unemancipated children to the extent required
E\WKHODWWHU¶V needs. It is a mass of rights and
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 207
obligations which the law grants to parents for The right attached to parental authority, being
WKH SXUSRVH RI WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V SK\VLFDO purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
preservation and development, as well as the parental authority only in cases of EXC:
cultivation of their intellect and the education of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
their heart and senses. As regards parental FKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHRUDQRUSKDQLQVWLWXWLRQ
DXWKRULW\ ³WKHUH LV QR SRZHU EXW D WDVN QR
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of to another, such as a friend or godfather, even
WKHPLQRU´ in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a
GR: Parental authority and responsibility are renunciation of parental authority. Even if a
inalienable and may not be transferred or definite renunciation is manifest, the law
renounced except in cases authorized by law. still disallows the same.
Roehr vs Rodriguez
404 SCRA 495
Facts: Joey Briones and Loreta Miguel were 2001, Maricel and Francisco Miguel came to
not married but they begot a son, Michael the house of Joey to visit Michael and asked if
Kevin Pineda while they were still in Japan. In they can bring him to SM. Joey agreed.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 208
Facts: Jocelyn Gualberto brought her 4 year the child because of her immoral act of living
old child with her as she abandoned her with another woman.
husband Crisanto in 2002. Crisanto claims that
she abandoned him because she was having WON Jocelyn deserves the have the custody
lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay. of the child
Nevertheless, the trial court granted Jocelyn
with the custody of the child since the child is Held: Yes. The Court held that it is not enough
below seven years old. She also stated that for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was
she has no objection to the father visiting the a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she
child even everyday provided that they live in carried on her purported relationship with a
Mindoro. The CA reversed the ruling and person of the same sex in the presence of their
granted Crisanto the custody of the child on the son or under circumstances not conducive to
ground that Jocelyn is unfit for the custody of WKHFKLOG¶VSURSHUPRUDOGHYHORSPHQW This was
not shown by Crisanto.
Silva vs. CA
275 SCRA 604
Facts: Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales a Dutch national and immigrated to Holland
cohabited without the benefit of marriage since with the two kids.
Carlitos was a married man. The union saw the
birth of two children, Ramon and Rica. Later WON the father can visit his children
on, a rift in their relationship surfaced allegedly
GXH WR 6X]DQQH¶V UHVXPSWLRQ RI KHU DFWLQJ Held: Yes. The Court appreciated the
career. Suzanne refuted the claim saying that apprehensions of Suzanne that it is not good
she never actually stopped working. Instead, for the children to see that their father is living
she claimed that it was Carlitos who started the with another woman. Nevertheless, it seemed
rift of their relationship since he was often unlikely that Carlitos would have ulterior
engaged in gambling and womanizing. She PRWLYHVPRUHVWKDQDSDUHQW¶VGHVLUHWREHZLWK
wanted custody of their children without his children even only on weekends. The Court
visitoriaO ULJKWV RI WKHLU IDWKHU DV &DUOLWRV¶ also gave a precautionary measure that in no
activities will affect the moral and social valued case can Carlitos take the children out without
of the children. Meanwhile, she got married to the written consent of Suzanne.
Salientes vs Salientes
500 SCRA 128
custody and parental authority over their Antonette have joint parental authority over
son (Art. 211). their son and consequently joint custody.
Issues: Further, although the couple is separated de
WON the Court of Appeals erred when it facto, the issue of custody has yet to be
dismissed the petition for certiorari. adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a
Held: judicial grant of custody to one parent, both
NO, the CA did not err in dismissing the parents are still entitled to the custody of their
petition for certiorari because clearly the RTC FKLOG,QWKHSUHVHQWFDVHSULYDWHUHVSRQGHQW¶V
was correct in issuing the Writ of Habeas cause of action is the deprivation of his right to
&RUSXVLQWKHLQVWDQWFDVHZKHUHWKHɹDODZIXO see his child as alleged in his petition.[11]
parent of the child had been denied the Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
capacity to visit his child. In accordance w/ the available to him.
ɹDUJXPHQWVGZHOOLQJRQ$UWRIWKH)&WKH $V VXFK WKH ɹ ZDV FRUUHFW LQ DWWHVWLQJ WR KLV
SC ruled: joint custody and right to visitation of the child
Under Article 211[10] of the Family Code, and filing the proper action to assert that right.
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
Sy vs CA
GR No. 162938, Dec. 27,2007
FC 214-216. FC 233
Vancil vs Belmes
358 SCRA 707
9) September 15, 1998- ɹPDQLIHVWV WKDW FXVWRG\ substitute parental authority pursuant to
of Valerie has become moot and academic w/ Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
the latter reaching the age of maturity on ³$UW ,Q FDVH RI GHDWK DEVHQFH RU
September 2, 1998. Thus case only for the son unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
Vincent. authority shall be exercised by the surviving
Issue: JUDQGSDUHQW´
WON the mother of the minor Vincent Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can
should be his guardian (WON grandmother exercise substitute parental authority only
has right to guardianship over the mother). in case of death, absence or unsuitability of
Held: respondent. Considering that respondent is
YES, the natural mother of the minor, has the very much alive and has exercised
preferential right over that of petitioner to be his continuously parental authority over Vincent,
guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to
provides: EH WKH PLQRU¶V JXDUGLDQ UHVSRQGHQW¶V
³$UW 7KH IDWKHU DQG WKH PRWKHU VKDOO unsuitability. Petitioner asserts this based on
jointly exercise parental authority over the the allegation that Valerie was raped several
persons of their common children. In case of WLPHV E\ WKH ɹ OLYH LQ SDUWQHU +RZHYHU WKLV
GLVDJUHHPHQW WKH IDWKHU¶V GHFLVLRQ VKDOO case pertains to Vincent and is thus not directly
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the DWWHVWDEOHWRWKDWIDFW0RUHRYHUWKHVWDWXVDV
contrary. a U.S. resident, her old age and her conviction
Being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, of libel in the country deem her unlikely to be
ɹKDVWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJQDWXUDODQGOHJDOULJKW able to execute the duties of a guardian (has
to his custody.Petitioner contends that she is QRW EHHQ LQ 53 VLQFH ¶ 0RUHRYHU courts
more qualified as guardian of Vincent. should not appoint persons as guardians
3HWLWLRQHU¶V FODLP WR EH WKH JXDUGLDQ RI VDLG who are not within the jurisdiction of our
minor can only be realized by way of courts for they will find it difficult to protect
the wards.
FC218-219,FC233
cf.FC 221 inrel. toNCC 2180
Palisoc v. Brilliantes
41 SCRA 548
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent under the custodial supervision and disciplinary
damage." w/c they did not do. authority of the school authorities, which is the
Additional Held: basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for
-'DIIRQ¶V SDUHQW¶V QRW DFFRXQWDEOe since he his torts, committed while under such authority.
was no longer a minor. Makalintal dissents:
-Brillantes was not held liable since he was -It (ruling that custody in 2180 means mere
only a member of the board and not the owner, custody in school rather than board) would
since the school was incorporated on August 2, demand responsibility without commensurate
1962. authority, rendering teachers and school heads
-the school was not held liable since it was not open to damage suits for causes beyond their
impleaded. power to control.
-the damages were was raised to 12000 to -Article 2180, says that "the father and, in case
keep up w/ devaluation. of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
J.B.L. Reyes concurs: responsible for the damages caused by the
-while in the case of parents and guardians, minor children who live in their company." Note
their authority and supervision over the children that for parental responsibility to arise the
and wards end by law upon the latter reaching children must be minors who live in their
majority age, the authority and custodial company this implies that a similar sense of
supervision over pupils exist regardless of the FXVWRG\ µOLYLQJ LQ WKHLU FRPSDQ\¶ LV LPSOLHG LQ
age of the latter A student over twenty-one, by the case of schools.
enrolling and attending a school, places himself
Amadora v. CA
160 SCRA 315
Salvosa v. IAC
166 SCRA 274
receives his orders from the AFP. He is also a The IAC affirmed with modifications the
commerce student of the BCF. decision of the RTC.
Mar. 3, 1977: Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a Issue: W/N the petitioner can be held solidarily
student of the University of Baguio in the liable with Jimmy Abon for damages under Art.
parking lot of BCF with an unlicensed firearm 2180 of the Civil Code.
which he took from the armory of the ROTC
Unit. Held: NO.
PSBA vs. CA
February 4, 1992
St. 0DU\¶V$FDGHP\YV&DUSLWDQRV
G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
FC215
ROC Rule 130 Sec. 25 cf. Secs. 22 & 23
FC 220-222, FC 223-224
Medina v. Makabali
27 SCRA 502
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 215
Luna v. IAC
137 SCRA 7
Cuadra v. Monfort
35 SCRA 160
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 216
FC 225-227
Pineda vs CA
226 SCRA 754
Lindain v. CA
212 SCRA 725
FC228cf.RA6809
FC229cf.FC 193
FC 23 1-232
Chua v. Cabangbang
27 SCRA 791
x pacita chua worked as a hostess, lived w/chua x petitioner did not at all - not ever - report to the
ben in 1950 (had a child who died in authorities the alleged disappearance of her
infancy).cohab then with sy sia lay (Robert and daughter, and had not been taken any step to
EHWW\FKXDV\DVIUXLWV$IWHUEHWW\¶VELUWKWKH\ see the child when she allegedly discovered
separated. She then became victo ran that she was in the custody of the
YLOODUHDO¶VPLVWUHVVDJLUOZDVERUQWRKHU Cabangbangs.
but then they separated and she gave the child x Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:
away to a comadre in cebu
x may1958 bartolome cabnagbang and "The courts may deprive the parents of their
wife(childless)acquired custody of betty(4 authority or suspend the exercise of the same if
months old) and had her baptized as grace they should treat their children with excessive
cabangbang harshness or should give them corrupting
x on how cabangbangs acquired betty: accdg to orders, counsels, or examples, or should make
pacita, it was villareal during their cohab who them beg or abandon them."
gave betty to cabangbangs (for favors villareal
received)she only knew of such when betty x record yields a host of circumstances which, in
was 3 yrs old and was brought to her by their totality, unmistakably betray the
villareal who then returned betty to the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to
cabangbangs due to threat,etc. cabangbangs completely forego all parental responsibilities
say they found her wrapped in bundles @ their and forever relinquish all parental claim in
gates and then treated her as their own,that respect to the child
only when betty/grace was 5 ½ that x She surrendered the custody of her child to the
controversy arose Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963,
x TC said that betty was given to cabangbangs or after the lapse of a period of five long years,
by villareal but with k and consent from pacita before she brought action to recover custody
x Pacita demanded the custody of the child, filed x her own unadulterated testimony under oath -
for HC. Resps were the cabangbangs and that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia
villareal Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing
x writ issued by court but body of child was not the petitioner the support which he
produced peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when
x TC eventually ruled that for the welfare of the she gave the child away. she expressed her
child, she should remain in the custody of the willingness that the child remain with the
cabangbangs Cabangbangs provided the latter would in
x WON child should be with pacita exchange give her a jeep and some money
x HELD: NO. NCC 363 says that minor under 7 x She needs the child as a leverage to obtain
shall not be separated from mother, but issue concessions - financial and otherwise - either
is now moot as grace is already 11 from the alleged father or the Cabangbangs. If
x The courts may, in cases specified by law, she gets the child back, support for her would
deprive parents of their [parental] authority." be forthcoming - or so she thinks - from the
And there are indeed valid reasons, as will alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand,
presently be expounded, for depriving the if the Cabangbangs would keep the child, she
petitioner of parental authority over the minor would agree provided they gave her a jeep and
Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang some money.
x Note that this was not the only instance when
she gave away a child of her own flesh and
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 217
blood. She gave up her youngest child, named every reason to hope she will have a fair
Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu chance of normal growth and development into
because she could not support it. respectable womanhood.
x petitioner has no regular source of income. x WON custody of betty/grace is without basis
There is no assurance at all that the alleged as the couples are not related by blood or
father, Sy Sia Lay - an unknown quantity, as far affinity
as the record goes - would resume giving the x HELD: NO. law provides that custody can even
petitioner support once she and the child are be given to a third person when it appears that
reunited. both parents (either legally or de facto sep) are
x But the record indubitably pictures the improper persons to entrust the care of the
Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of child
consequence in the community, who have The petitioner has not proven that she is
given her their name and are rearing her as entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy
their very own child, and with whom there is or Grace Cabangbang.
De Guzman vs Perez
496 SCRA 474
See: 5$ ³$Q $FW (VWDblishing Family Courts, Granting Them Exclusive Original
-XULVGLFWLRQ2YHU&KLOGDQG)DPLO\&DVHV´
See: R$³&KLOG$EXVH$FW´
RA 6809
FC 234 as amended
FC 236 as amended cf. FC 15, NCC 2180
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 218
SURNAMES
NCC 364-380
RA9255
Johnston v. Republic
7 SCRA 1040
Facts: Petition for change of name to Keng 1. Jurisdictional Requirements for the Petition of
Lee Uy Change of Name
1. A Chinese resident of Dumaguete has a How the court acquires jurisidiction
number of names in various records: a. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition is
a. Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate acquired after publication of the:
of residence i. "order reciting the purpose of the petition"
b. Jesus Uy Keng Lee, in his school records ii. "date and place for the hearing thereof"
c. Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records iii. for three successive weeks in a newspaper of
d. Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general general circulation
public b. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
e. Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns proceeding has for its object "to bar
f. Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of indifferently all who might be minded to make
registration an objection of any sort against the right sought
2. Having various names had caused much to be established."
confusion in his school records and c. Publication must contain the following
unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him information
in his dealings with the public i. the name or names of the applicant
3. City attorney opposed ii. the cause for which the change of name is
a. that there is no necessity for the change of sought
name iii. the new name asked for
b. that he is guilty of a violation of the laws
regarding the use of names and surnames 2. NCC 408: A person's real name is that which is
4. CFI ruled in favour of Keng Lee Uy entered in the civil register
a. Civil register is an official record of the civil
Issue/s: WON Keng Lee Uy can have status of persons
his name changed b. The only name that may be changed is the true
or official name recorded in the civil register
Guidelines for Petitions for Change of Name
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 219
Held: NO! Jesus Ng did not as Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Uy Keng Lee,
properly follow the requirements. Uy Keng Lee Jesus, Keng Lee Uy and Uy
Keng Lee"
Re: Publication of the Petition 5. Hence, the requirement of publication was not
3. Although the Petition was published in "The met and the court did not acquire jurisdiction
Negros Times," a weekly newspaper in over the case
Dumaguete City,
4. The title of the case was there printed as: "In Re: Absence of Proper and Reasonable Cause
the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng for Change of Name
Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner." 6. 7KH DOOHJHG ³FRQIXVLRQ LQ WKH VFKRRO UHFRUGV
a. µ-HVXV1J<DR6LRQJ¶ZDVXVHGLQWKHSHWLWLRQ and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to
the order of publication, and the publication KLP LQ KLV GHDOLQJV ZLWK WKH SXEOLF´ GR QRW
itself constitute proper and reasonable
b. µ-HVXV1J<DR6LRQJ¶ZDVQRWWKHUHDOQDPHRI 7. Such problems arise from his own use of
Jesus Ng different names which would naturally lead to
His name in the civil register is merely "Jesus different people transacting with him by one
Ng" name or the other
c. µ-HVXV 1J <DR 6LRQJ¶ ZDV QRW WKH RQO\ QDPH
he was known for Re: Violation of the Law
i. The title of the publication should have 8. Jesus Ng violated:
included his aliases a. Commonwealth Act 142, entitled "An act to
1. Because: Readers of newspapers merely regulate the use of aliases"
glances at the title of the petition. It is only after He was not "authorized by a competent court"
he has satisfied himself that the title interests to use an alias nor were his aliases
him, that he proceeds to read down further pseudonyms for literary purposes" (as
2. Hence, the names should not just appear in the stage/pen names) or names by which he had
body been known since his childhood"
ii. It should have read: "In the matter of the
change of name of Jesus Ng, otherwise known
Llaneta v. Agrava
57 SCRA 29
Facts: Petition for change of name to Keng ii. "date and place for the hearing thereof"
Lee Uy iii. for three successive weeks in a newspaper of
5. A Chinese resident of Dumaguete has a general circulation
number of names in various records: b. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
a. Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate proceeding has for its object "to bar
of residence indifferently all who might be minded to make
b. Jesus Uy Keng Lee, in his school records an objection of any sort against the right sought
c. Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records to be established."
d. Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general c. Publication must contain the following
public information
e. Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns i. the name or names of the applicant
f. Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of ii. the cause for which the change of name is
registration sought
6. Having various names had caused much iii. the new name asked for
confusion in his school records and
unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him 10. NCC 408: A person's real name is that which is
in his dealings with the public entered in the civil register
7. City attorney opposed a. Civil register is an official record of the civil
a. that there is no necessity for the change of status of persons
name b. The only name that may be changed is the true
b. that he is guilty of a violation of the laws or official name recorded in the civil register
regarding the use of names and surnames
8. CFI ruled in favour of Keng Lee Uy Held: NO! Jesus Ng did not
properly follow the requirements.
Issue/s: WON Keng Lee Uy can have
his name changed Re: Publication of the Petition
11. Although the Petition was published in "The
Guidelines for Petitions for Change of Name Negros Times," a weekly newspaper in
9. Jurisdictional Requirements for the Petition of Dumaguete City,
Change of Name 12. The title of the case was there printed as: "In
How the court acquires jurisidiction the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng
a. Jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition is Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner."
acquired after publication of the:
i. "order reciting the purpose of the petition"
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 220
Telmo v. Republic
73 SCRA 29
Tolentino v CA
162 SCRA 66
Facts:
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 221
Legamia v. IAC
131 SCRA 479
- In this case, rejected because continued use of his middle name would cause
o Still a minor confusion and difficulty does not constitute
o Reason was only for convenience. Did not proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
really say how dropping his middle name could registered complete name
help him integrate better. .
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 223
ABSENT
NCC 38 1-396, FC 41
Reyes v. Alejandro
141 SCRA 65
Facts: In October 1969, Erlinda Reynoso 3. The general interest of society which
Reyes prayed for the declaration of absence of may require that property does not remain
her husband Roberto L. Reyes who have been abandoned without someone representing it
absent in their house since April 1962 due to a and without an owner (Civil Code by Francisco,
misunderstanding over personal matters. Since Vol. 2, pp. 930-931, 1953 Ed.).
WKHQVKHGRHVQ¶WNQRZKLVZKHUHDERXWV+HOHIW
no will or debts. When to declare for absence:
1. when he has properties which have to
She said they acquired no properties or debts be taken cared of or administered by a
during marriage. She said her only purpose in representative appointed by the Court (Article
filing the petition is to establish the 384, Civil Code);
absence of her husband, invoking the 2. the spouse of the absentee is asking
provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of for separation of property (Article 191, Civil
Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. Code) or
3. his wife is asking the Court that the
CFI dismissed the case administration of all classes of property in the
marriage be transferred to her (Article. 196,
Issue: WON Roberto must be judicially Civil Code).
declared absent.
For civil marriage law
Held: No. The purpose of the declaration is to - Necessary to judicially declare spouse an
provide an administrator of the property. absentee only when (1) there are properties
which have to be taken cared of or
Ratio: administered by a representative appointed by
Rule 107 of the Rules of Court is based on the the Court (2) the spouse of the absentee is
provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on asking for separation of property (3) wife is
absence. The provision is concerned with the asking the Court that the administration of
interest or property of the absentee. The property in the marriage be transferred to her
purpose of the declaration is to provide an - Otherwise law only requires that the former
administrator of the property. spouse has been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage, that
The reason and purpose of the provisions of the spouse present does not know his or her
the New Civil Code on absence (Arts. 381 to former spouse to he living, that such former
396) are: spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
1. The interest of the person himself who spouse present so believes at the time of the
has disappeared; celebration of the marriage
2. The rights of third parties against the RESULT: in this case, since there were no
absentee, especially those who have rights properties to speak of, it was right for the TC to
which would depend upon the death of the dismiss the case.
absentee; and
x On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. o On the third message he stated that seawater
was appointed as captain of the ship was entering the vessel and they were
EASTERN MINICON of eastern shipping lines preparing to abandon ship
x Under the contract, his employment was good x The company notified the coast guard. Search
for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract results were negative
would automatically terminate upon arrival of x The insurers of the company confirmed the
the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company
renewed. It was further agreed that part of the paid the corresponding death benefits to the
captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid heirs of the crew members, except respondent
to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept
x Captain Lucero sent three distress messages x July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for
to the company on the following dates for payment of the accrued salary allotment of
o February l6,1980 7am; February l6/80 her husband which the Company had stopped
3:30pm; FEBRUARY 16/80 9:50pm since March 1980 and for continued payment
of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall
have returned to the port of Manila. She
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 224
contended that the contract of employment a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
entered into by her husband with the Company aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the heard of for four years since the loss of the
same was to terminate only upon the vessel's vessel or aeroplane;...
arrival in Manila The Supreme Court ruled however that a
x The company refused to pay. The National preponderance of evidence from the telegraph
seamen board upheld the complaint and the messages and the fact that the vessel was not
decision was affirmed by the NLRC heard of again show that it can be logically
Issue: WON Mrs Lucero was entitled to the inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew
accrued salary perished. As the Court said in Joaquin vs.
Held: Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or
The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391 knowable, from which a rational conclusion can
regarding the presumption of death at sea. be made, the presumption does not step in,
They argue that it was too early to presume and the rule of preponderance of evidence
that Mr. Lucero has died because under the controls."
law, four (4) years have not yet passed. Hence the decision of the NLRC is reversed;
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead however, death benefits should be paid.
for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board
Tol-Noquera v. Villamor
211 SCRA 616
eventually on January 2001, packed his clothes the benefit of the spouse present, as protection
and left without giving financial support from the pains and the consequences of a
x Tina became curious and went to the NSO and second marriage, precisely because he/she
to her amazement learned that her marriage could be charged and convicted of bigamy if
was bigamous the defense of good faith based on mere
x Manuel testified that Tina had been informed of testimony is found incredible.
his prevous marriage but nevertheless agreed Moreover;
to marry him Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
x He further claimed that he was only forced to person during the subsistence of a
marry her because she threatened that she previous marriage shall be null and
would commit suicide void, unless before the celebration of
x July 2, 2002, Eduardo Manuel was convicted of the subsequent marriage, the prior
Bigamy spouse had been absent for four
x Basically Manuel says that his marriage was in consecutive years and the spouse
good faith because his previous wife was present had a well-founded belief that
absent for 20 years hence his first marriage the absent spouse was already dead.
was dissolved In case of disappearance where there
x He appealed to the CA, CA affirmed the is danger of death under the
decision of trial court circumstances set forth in the
x He points out that, under the first paragraph of provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has Code, an absence of only two years
been absent for seven years, whether or not shall be sufficient.
he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for
all purposes except for succession, while the For the purpose of
second paragraph refers to the rule on legal contracting the subsequent
presumption of death with respect to marriage under the preceding
succession. paragraph, the spouse present
Issue: duh, must institute a summary
WON second marriage is void for being proceeding as provided in this
bigamous Court for the declaration of
Held: presumptive death of the absentee,
7KH SKUDVH ³RU EHIRUH WKH DEVHQW VSRXVH KDV without prejudice to the effect of
been declared presumptively dead by means of reappearance of the absent
D MXGJPHQW UHQGHUHG RQ WKH SURFHHGLQJV´ LQ spouse.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not
an aggroupment of empty or useless words. Hence the petition is denied
The requirement for a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse is for
appoint a person to represent him in all that has to be a minor or insane for that SPA to
may be necessary. have function. An SPA has to be construed
This same rule shall be observed when strictly but its provision has to be construed as
under similar circumstances the power to its existence, i.e. understood in a way that
conferred by the absentee has expired. will give more power/ function to that SPA.
Or incapacity as per NCC 38 Since the said SPA executed by Olaguer gave
Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of powers to the respondents to actually dispose
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil of his share, he cannot therefore assail such
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to now. And even if the said contract is assailable,
act it was already ratified by the reception of the
DPRXQWE\2ODJXHU¶V ZLIHDQGLQ-laws
HELD: NO. If it were, then the very existence of from 1980-1982
that SPA would be rendered nugatory. Olaguer
FUNERALS
NCC 305-3 10
Eugenio v. Velez
185 SCRA 425
NCC 407-413
ROC, Rule 108
RA 9048
In this case, there is a need to ascertain as to same person. TC decision is therefore set
WON Rosario and Domingo are one and the aside
Repubic vs Flojo
152 SCRA 550
Republic v. Sayo
188 SCRA 634
Facts: Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was born on Issue: WON the procedure followed
January 9, 1952 in Nueva Vizacaya as the fifth VDWLVILHG WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV RI ³DSSURSULDWH
legitimate child of his parents. The nurse adversary pro-SURFHHGLQJV´
erroneously reported to the Local Civil
Registrar that his and his parents' citizenship Held: Yes
as Chinese instead of Filipino. He now claims
that he and his parents are Filipino citizens. Ratio: It is true that if the subject matter of a
Copies were furnished to the Office of the petition is not for the correction of clerical
Provincial Fiscal, the Office of the SolGen, and errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
the Local Civil Registrar. Copy of the notice of one involving nationality of citizenship, which is
hearing was posted and it was also published indisputably substantial as well as
in a newspaper of general circulation published controverted, affirmative relief cannot be
once a week for three consecutive weeks. The granted in a summary proceedings. However it
TC then proceeded to receive evidence for the is also true that a right in law may be enforced
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
representing the Government. proper remedy is used.
Immigration showing that his father is a natural Immigration stating that the father is a Filipino
son of a Filipino citizen and that his mother, citizen, the birth certificate of his brother stating
being a legal wife was also a Philippine citizen, that he is the son of Philippine citizens and his
a certification issued by a the Bureau of Voter's ID.
Republic v Valencia
141 SCRA 462
Facts: Leonor Valencia in behalf of her minor correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1)
children Bernardo and Jessica Go filed a the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have
petition for the cancellation and/or correction of or claim any interest which would be affected
entries of their birth in the Civil Registry in the thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
City of Cebu. The TC issued an order directing becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an
the publication of the petition and the date of order fixing the time and place for the hearing
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in of the petition, and (2) cause the order for
the city and province of Cebu once a week for hearing to be published once a week for three
three consecutive weeks and notice was duly (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
served on the SolGen, the Local Civil Registrar general circulation in the province. The
and Go Eng. The petition seeks to change the following are likewise entitled to oppose the
nationality or citizenship of Bernardo and petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any
Jessica from Chinese to Filipino and their person having or claiming any interest under
status from Legitimate to Illegitimate and the entry whose cancellation or correction is
changing also the status of the mother from sought.
married to single. The Local Civil Registrar
avers that the corrections sought are not If all these procedural requirements have been
merely clerical but substantial, involving as followed, a petition for correction and/or
they do the citizenship and status of the minors cancellation of entries in the record of birth
and the status of the mother. even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
The TC granted the petition. described as "summary". There can be no
doubt that when an opposition to the petition is
Issue: WON the proceedings that took place filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person
could be regarded as proper suit or having or claiming any interest in the entries
appropriate action for cancellation and/or sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and
correction of entries in the civil register. the opposition is actively prosecuted, the
proceedings thereon become adversary
Held: Yes. proceedings.
Ratio: The persons who must be made parties The decision of the TC was affirmed by the SC.
to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
Republic v Marcos
182 SCRA 223
Labayo-Rowe v Republic
168 SCRA 294
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 229
Facts: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition WON Emperatriz can change her civil status
for the correction of entries in the civil registry IURP PDUULHG WR VLQJOH LQ 9LFWRULD¶V ELUWK
with the then Court of First Instance of certificate
Pampanga. She asked the court to order the
Local Civil Registrar of San Fernando, Held: No. The petition for correction of entries
Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth in the civil registry does not only involve the
certificates of her children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. correction of petitioner Labayo's name and
and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
petitioner's name which appears in both Labayo in the birth certificates of her children.
certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-Labayu and as The petition also seeks the change of her
regards her civil status and date of marriage status from "married" to "not married" at the
which appears in the birth certificate of Victoria time of her daughter's birth, thereby changing
Miclat as "married" with the year appearing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from
"1953 Bulan." She claimed that she was never "legitimate" to "illegitimate." The right of the
married to Vicente Miclat and that she was now child Victoria to inherit from her parents would
married to an American citizen, William Rowe. be substantially impaired if her status would be
Her petition was granted changing her civil changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate."
status from married to single in the birth Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation
certificate of Victoria. and embarrassment resulting from the stigma
of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear
thereafter.
Sermonia vs CA
233 SCRA 155
Facts: Jose Sermonia was charged with discovered the second marriage in 1991, shall
bigamy in 1992 after his first wife Virginia be dismissed.
Nievera discovered that he was married to
another woman, Ma. Lourdes Unson in 1975. WON the 15-year prescriptive period started
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by when Sermonia filed his second marriage
contracting a second or subsequent marriage contract in the Office of Civil Registrar
before the fist marriage has been legally
dissolved. It is punishable by prision mayor. Held: No. Sermonia intended to keep his
The penalty prescribes a 15 year period which second marriage upon claiming that he was
runs from the day the crime is discovered. single prior to it. He also did not tell his first
Sermonia alleges that he cannot be convicted wife about it. Furthermore, Sermonia cannot
since his second marriage, which is registered argue that the file of his marriage can be found
in the Office of the Civil Registrar, which is in the official records of the state but the
open to the public, has it prescriptive period SUREOHP LV \RX FDQQRW FKHFN DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V
expiring on 1990. Thus, the case, which was file. Therefore, he knew that he was committing
filed on 1992 since his first wife only bigamy. The Court affirmed the decision of the
CA.
Zapanta v Registrar
237 SCRA 25
Lee et al vs CA
367 SCRA 110
Facts: x 7KHVKHDQGWKHFKLOG¶VIDWKHU&DUORV%RUERQ
-‐ Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition to correct the were never married
ff entries in the Birth cert of her son Charles x Therefore child is illegitimate and should have
Christian: PRWKHU¶VVXUQDPH
x Surname from Borbon to Eleosida -‐ TC then issued a notice of hearing, furnishing
x 3DUHQWV¶ZHGGLQJGDWHVKRXOGEHEODQN copies for the petitioner, respondent Carlos
x ,QIRUPDQW¶VQDPHshould be Lourdes Eleosida Borbon, the office of the Local Civil Registrar
-‐ In support she contended that: (LCR) and the Solgen
x Son was born out of wedlock -‐ TC dismissed the petition for lack of merit
stating only clerical errors of harmless nature
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 230
may be corrected ± but this petition changes are allowed under Rule 108 provided that the
the status of the child. Hence this petition appropriate procedural requirements are
complied with.
Issue: W/n corrections of entries in Birth -‐ Records show that: (1) the trial court ordered
Certificates may be allowed even if the errors issued a notice of hearing, (2) ordered the
to be corrected are substantial and not merely publication of said notice, (3) the notice stated
clerical errors? that the petitioner shall prove her petition
during hearing and (4) other persons with any
Held / Ratio: Yes, case remanded to lower court to interest thereon shall also appear and show
proceed any reason why WKHSHWLWLRQVKRXOGQ¶WEH
-‐ Apply the ruling in Republic vs Valencia ± granted, (5) Respondent, LRC, and Solgen
substantial errors in a civil registry may be were all furnished a copy of the notice
corrected and the true facts established under -‐ The foregoing satisfy all the procedural
Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the requirements to make it an adversary
error avail themselves of the proceeding, therefore TC erred in dismissing
appropriate adversary proceeding. (See ROC, the case
Rule 108 ± Sec 3-5)
-‐ Substantial changes that affect the marriage
between a couple and the legitimacy of a child
Barco vs CA
GR No 120587,Jan 20,2004
Facts: (Medyo complicated case sorry :p) Issue: W/n the RTC Order had the jurisdiction
-‐ 12/24/70 ± Respondent Nadina Maravilla to pass judgment on the original petition of
marries Francisco Maravilla Nadina
-‐ Feb 1977 ± Spouses opt to live separately, the
next year they obtain an ecclesiastical Held / Ratio: Yes, petition dismissed.
annulment of the marriage
-‐ 6/9/78 ± Birth of June Salvacion, Birth Cert lists -‐ 2 aspects of jurisdiction w/c are vital for the
)UDQFLVFRDVIDWKHU0DUDYLOODDVWKHFKLOG¶V disposition of cases, both of which Barco
surname, Nadina signs the Birth Cert claims the RTC did not have
-‐ Nadina later on claims that the real father is x Jurisdiction over the parties
Armando Gustilo x Jurisdiction over the nature of the
-‐ $WWKHWLPHRI-XQH¶VELUWK$UPDQGRZDV action/subject of the petition
married, after his wife dies, he marries Nadina
on 8/21/82 a. Jurisdiction over the parties
-‐ 3/12/85 ± Nadina obtained judicial declaration -‐ Before substantial corrections to the civil
annulling her marriage to Francisco registry is allowed, facts must be established in
-‐ 3/17/82 ± Nadina files petition to correct the a proceeding
Birth Cert of June. -‐ Barco points out that she was not impleaded as
x Name should be June Gustilo and Armando is a party in the original petition of Nadina ± Yes,
the real father Barco is indeed a party in the petition,
-‐ Francisco confirms to the petition by signing it, however, we cannot expect Nadina or any
Armando acknowledges June as his daughter other petitioner invoking Rule 108 to know all of
-‐ 1/7/85 ± RTC Order ± grants petition and DIDWKHU¶VOHJLWPDWHLOOHJLWLPDWHFKLOGUHQ
orders corrections to be made -‐ CA correctly pointed out that through
-‐ 12/19/86 ± Armando dies, estate proceedings publication (in accordance with Sec 4 of Rule
arise from his death. WKH\³ELQGHG WKHZKROHZRUOG´WRWKH
-‐ Enter Jose Vicente, an alleged biological child subsequent judgment in the petition, including
of Armando ± he files an annulment of the RTC Barco
Order
-‐ Enter Milagros Barco, files as the guardian of b. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action /
Mary Joy Ann Gustillo ± alleging that Mary Joy subject of the petition
also has a legal interest in the annulment of the -‐ Barco asserts that the general rule is that the
RTC Order as the child was likewise fathered jurisdiction of the court in the correction of
by Gustillo. entries in the civil register is limited to clerical
-‐ CA dismisses the petitions both Jose Vicente mistakes
and Barco, hence this petition by Milagros -‐ This argument has already been debunked in
Barco claiming that the RTC Order of 1/7/85 many cases ± most notably in Lee vs CA :
lacks jurisdiction x It was declared that the provision (Art 412) did
not qualify what kind of entry could be changed
or corrected, and therefore the statute should
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 231
Republic vs Benemerito
GR NO 146963, March 14, 2004
Ceruila vs Delantar
477 SCRA 134
Republic vs KHO
GR No. No. 170340. June 29, 2007
-‐ He additionally prayed to the court that the date Issues: Was the failure to implead Marivel and
of marriage of himself and his wife be changed &DUOLWR¶V SDUHQWV UHQGHUHG WKH WULDl short of
form 1989 to 2000. adversarial proceedings?
-‐ In 2002, the TRIAL COURT ordered the Civil Held: No
Registrar to effect all the changes Carlito Ratio: An in rem proceeding is validated
pleaded for. through publication. Not only was the notices
-‐ The Republic however, APPEALED. Saying published in newspapers of general circulation,
that MARIVEL was never impleaded as an but also the notices of the trial were even sent
indispensable party to the case. to their residences. So this is enough to make
-‐ CA however, AFFIRMED the trial courts the parties aware of the proceedings in court.
decision. Hence the case. On other issues, the deletion of the married
status is also valid since Eugene and Juan
were really not married.
Facts:
-‐ Jennifer Cagandahan was born on Januay 13,
1981, and was registered as a female in her
birth certificate.
-‐ But while growing up she developed secondary
male characteristics. She was diagnosed to
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia ( I
searched this and this actually causes
³$0%,*8286´JHQLWDOLD
-‐ Upon reaching 13 years of age, her ovaries
stopped growing, she had no breasts, and she
had no menstruation. She said that in mind and
in emotion she was a MAN.
-‐ So she prayed that her name be changed from
Jennifer to JEFF and female to MALE.
-‐ Dr. Michael Sionson recommended also that
the court render the gender change since it
would be advantageous to her.
-‐ OSG however says that petition is fatally
defective because the respondent did not
implead the CIVIL Registrar as a party in the
petition.
Issues: WON the petition should fail because
the respondent did not implead the Civil
Registrar as a party in the petition
Held: NO
Ratio: The Supreme Court says that there was
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when
respondent furnished a copy of the petition to
the local registrar. The court says that since he
produces male hormones and that he
considers himself a man, and that no one
showed that they will be prejudiced by the
change of name and gender, then it is just
proper that the court grants the petition. HE IS
NOW A MAN.
C2013 | PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | PROF. KATRINA LEGARDA | 233