G.R. No.
163551 July 18, 2011 On the other hand, the trial court stated that petitioner offered documentary evidence, consisting of a contract of
DATU KIRAM SAMPACO, substituted by HADJI SORAYA S. MACABANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
HADJI SERAD MINGCA LANTUD, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated August 15, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
63801 and its Resolution dated May 13, 2004, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as stated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On September 14, 1984, respondent Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud, the plaintiff in the lower court, filed an action to
quiet title with damages1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 8, Marawi City (trial court),
against petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco (deceased), the defendant in the lower court, who has been substituted by
his heirs, represented by Hadji Soraya Sampaco-Macabando.2
Respondent alleged in his Complaint3 that he is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential lot located at
Marinaut, Marawi City, with an area of 897 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-658.
On August 25, 1984, petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco, through his daughter Soraya Sampaco-Macabando with
several armed men, forcibly and unlawfully entered his property and destroyed the nursery buildings, cabbage
seedlings and other improvements therein worth ₱10,000.00. On August 30, 1984, Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan
Abato and his councilmen prepared and issued a decision4 in writing stating that petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco is
the owner of the subject parcel of land. Respondent stated that the acts of petitioner and the said decision of the
Barangay Captain may cast a cloud over or otherwise prejudice his title. Respondent stated that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public and exclusive possession of the subject property. He prayed
that the acts of petitioner and the decision of Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato and his councilmen be declared
invalid, and that petitioner be ordered to pay respondent damages in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and attorney’s fees.
In his Answer,5 defendant Datu Kiram Sampaco, petitioner herein, denied the material allegations of the Complaint.
Petitioner asserted that he and his predecessors-in-interest are the ones who had been in open, public, continuous,
and exclusive possession of the property in dispute. Petitioner alleged that OCT No. P-658 was secured in violation
of laws and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation, considering that the subject parcel of land is a
residential lot and the title issued is a free patent. Moreover, respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had never
taken actual possession or occupied the land under litigation. On the contrary, petitioner has all the evidence of
actual possession and ownership of permanent improvements and other plants on the land in dispute.
Petitioner filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees for the unfounded complaint and
prayed for its dismissal. He also sought the cancellation of respondent’s OCT No. P-658 and the reconveyance of
the subject parcel of land.
During the trial, respondent Hadji Lantud testified that he acquired the subject lot from his grandmother, Intumo
Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his grandmother’s helper, Totop Malacop, pursuant to a court decision after
litigating with him.6 Respondent had been residing on the lot for more than 30 years, applied for a title thereto and
was issued OCT No. P-658.7 He paid the corresponding real estate taxes for the land.8 He planted assorted trees
and plants on the lot like bananas, jackfruits, coconuts and others.9 He testified that he was not aware of the alleged
litigation over the lot before Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan Abato, although he was furnished a copy of the
decision.10
On the other hand, petitioner Datu Kiram Sampaco testified that the land under litigation is only a portion of the
1,800 square meters of land that he inherited in 1952 from his father, Datu Sampaco Gubat. 11 Since then, he had
been in adverse possession and ownership of the subject lot, cultivating and planting trees and plants through his
caretaker Hadji Mustapha Macawadib.12 In 1962, he mortgaged the land (1,800 square meters) with the
Development Bank of the Philippines, Ozamis branch.13 He declared the land (1,800 square meters) for taxation
purposes14 and paid real estate taxes, and adduced in evidence the latest Tax Receipt No. 1756386 dated
September 15, 19[9]3.15 Petitioner presented four corroborating witnesses as regards his possession of the subject
property.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on March 31, 1999 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the court is of the opinion and so holds that the preponderance of evidence is
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of merit;
2. Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. P-658 (Exh. A) null and void and of no legal effect;
3. Declaring the defendant the absolute or true owner and possessor of the land in dispute; and
4. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant the sum of ₱10,000.00 for attorney’s fees plus ₱500.00 per
appearance.16
The trial court held that the issuance of respondent’s title, OCT No. P-658, was tainted with fraud and irregularities
and the title is, therefore, spurious; hence, it is null and void, and without any probative value. The finding of fraud
was based on: (1) the Certification issued by Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District
No. XII-3, Marawi City, stating that the data contained in respondent’s title were verified and had no record in the
said office; (2) the said Certification was not refuted or rebutted by respondent; (3) while free patents are normally
issued for agricultural lands, respondent’s title is a free patent title issued over a residential land as the lot is
described in the Complaint as a residential lot; and (4) Yusoph Lumampa, an employee of the local Bureau of Lands,
to whom respondent allegedly entrusted the paperwork of the land titling, was not presented as a witness.
Moreover, the trial court stated that respondent failed to establish with competent and credible evidence that he was
in prior possession of the subject property. No corroborative witness was presented to further prove his prior
possession.
real estate mortgage of the subject property, tax declarations, an official tax receipt, and testimonial evidence to
prove that he had been in open, public, continuous, and lawful possession of the subject property in the concept of
owner.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
On August 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the trial court, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE:
1. The appeal is granted and the appealed judgment is hereby totally REVERSED.
2. To quiet his title, plaintiff-appelant Hadji Serad Mingca Lantud is confirmed the owner of the parcel of land covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. P-658;
3. The defendant-appellee is ordered to pay ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees to the plaintiff-appellant; and
4. Costs against the defendant-appellee.17
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution18 dated May 13, 2004.
The Court of Appeals held that there is no controversy that respondent is a holder of a Torrens title; hence, he is
the owner of the subject property. The appellate court stressed that Section 4719 of the Land Registration Act (Act
No. 496) provides that the certificate of title covering registered land shall be received as evidence in all courts of
the Philippines and shall be conclusive as to all matters stated therein.
The Court of Appeals stated that the Torrens title has three attributes: (1) a Torrens title is the best evidence of
ownership over registered land and, unless annulled in an appropriate proceeding, the title is conclusive on the
issue of ownership; (2) a Torrens title is incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the
date of the entry of the decree of registration;20 and (3) a Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack.21
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s counterclaim filed on October 15, 1984 for cancellation of respondent’s
original certificate of title issued on May 22, 1981 was filed beyond the statutory one-year period; hence, petitioner’s
title had become indefeasible, and cannot be affected by the decision made by Barangay Captain Hadji Hassan
Abato and his councilmen. Moreover, the appellate court held that petitioner’s prayer for the cancellation of
respondent’s title, OCT No. P-658, through a counterclaim included in his Answer is a collateral attack, which the
law does not allow, citing Cimafranca v. Court of Appeals22 and Natalia Realty Corporation v. Valdez.23
The allegation of fraud in securing OCT No. P-658 on the ground that the property in dispute is a residential lot and
not subject of a free patent was not given weight by the appellate court as it was supported only by testimonial
evidence that did not show how (by metes and bounds) and why the property in dispute could not have been the
subject of a free patent. The appellate court stated that a mere preponderance of evidence is not adequate to prove
fraud;24 it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
The Court of Appeals also noted that petitioner claimed that the subject property is only part of his larger property.
Although petitioner introduced proof of payment of the real estate taxes of the said property, as well as a previous
mortgage of the property, petitioner did not show that the disputed property is part of his larger property. Hence, the
appellate court stated that under such circumstances, it cannot rule that petitioner owned the land under litigation,
since petitioner failed to show that it is part of his larger property.
The Court of Appeals did not award actual and moral damages, because respondent failed to prove the amount of
any actual damages sustained, and the instances enumerated under Article 2219 of the Civil Code warranting the
award of moral damages were not present.
However, the Court of Appeals awarded attorney's fees in the amount of ₱50,000.00, considering that respondent
was forced to incur expenses to protect his right through the action to quiet title.
Petitioner filed this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISERABLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE TORRENS TITLE
INVOLVED HEREIN WAS ISSUED PURSUANT TO A FREE PATENT WHICH COULD NOT BE VALIDLY ISSUED
OVER A PRIVATE LAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT AS CERTIFIED TO BY THE BUREAU
OF LANDS ITSELF NO SUCH FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT LAND WAS ISSUED BY IT; HENCE, SAID
FREE PATENT IS SPURIOUS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
SUBJECT LOT HAD LONG BEEN OWNED, POSSESSED AND CULTIVATED BY THE DEFENDANT
(PETITIONER HEREIN) OR HIS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL IN THE CONCEPT
OF AN OWNER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER’S COUNTERCLAIM FOR
CANCELLATION OF RESPONDENT’S TITLE IS BARRED.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM IN THE INSTANT CASE IS A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF’S TITLE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.25
The main issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the validity of OCT No. P-658 and
confirming respondent as owner of the property in dispute.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the fact that the Torrens title was issued to
respondent by virtue of a free patent covering a residential lot that is private land as it has been acquired by petitioner
through open, public, continuous and lawful possession of the land in the concept of owner. Petitioner thus prayed
for the cancellation of respondent’s title and the reconveyance of the subject property. Hence, the Court of Appeals
erred in declaring that the subject lot belongs to respondent.
The contention is without merit.
The Torrens title is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein, and other
matters which can be litigated and decided in land registration proceedings. 26 Tax declarations and tax receipts
cannot prevail over a certificate of title which is an incontrovertible proof of ownership.27 An original certificate of title
issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued
under judicial proceedings.28 However, the Court has ruled that indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured
by fraud and misrepresentation.29
In this case, petitioner alleged in his Answer to respondent’s Complaint in the trial court that respondent’s title, OCT
No. P-658, was secured in violation of the law and through fraud, deception and misrepresentation, because the
subject parcel of land is a residential lot, which cannot be subject of a free patent, since only agricultural lands are
subject of a free patent.
The trial court found that "[t]he lot under litigation as clearly described in the complaint is a residential lot and a free
patent title thereto cannot validly be issued." This finding was one of the bases for the trial court’s declaration that
the issuance of OCT was tainted with fraud and irregularities and is, therefore, spurious; thus, OCT No. P-658 is
null and void.
It should be pointed out that the allegation in the Complaint that the land is residential was made only by respondent,
but the true classification of the disputed land as residential was not shown to have been made by the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, pursuant to Section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act. 30 Hence, the trial court erred in concluding
that there was fraud in the issuance of respondent’s free patent title on the ground that it covered residential land
based only on the Complaint which stated that the property was residential land when it was not shown that it was
the President who classified the disputed property as residential, and OCT No. P-658 itself stated that the free patent
title covered agricultural land. It has been stated that at present, not only agricultural lands, but also residential lands,
have been made available by recent legislation for acquisition by free patent by any natural born Filipino
citizen.31 Nevertheless, the fact is that in this case, the free patent title was granted over agricultural land as stated
in OCT No. P-658.
Moreover, petitioner contends in his petition that the Certification32 dated July 24, 1987 issued by Datu Samra I.
Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources District No. XII-3, Bureau of Lands, Marawi City, certifying that the
data contained in OCT No. P-658 in respondent’s name had no records in the said office, showed that respondent’s
Torrens title was spurious.
The Court holds that the certification, by itself, is insufficient to prove the alleged fraud. Fraud and misrepresentation,
as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate.33 Fraud is a question of fact which
must be proved.34 The signatory of the certification, Datu Samra Andam, A/Adm. Assistant II, Natural Resources
District No. XII-3, Marawi City, was not presented in court to testify on the due issuance of the certification, and to
testify on the details of his certification, particularly the reason why the said office had no records of the data
contained in OCT No. P-658 or to testify on the fact of fraud, if any.
Thus, the Court holds that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove that fraud was committed in the issuance
of respondent’s Torrens title. Hence, respondent’s Torrens title is a valid evidence of his ownership of the land in
dispute.
On the other hand, petitioner claims ownership of the subject lot, which is merely a portion of a larger property (1,800
square meters) that he allegedly inherited from his father in 1952, by virtue of open, public and continuous
possession of the land in the concept of owner making it petitioner’s private property. Hence, petitioner prays for
reconveyance of the said property.
Article 434 of the Civil Code governs an action for reconveyance, thus:
Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title
and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property,
the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second,
his title thereto.35
In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.36
In this case, petitioner claims that the property in dispute is part of his larger property. However, petitioner failed to
identify his larger property by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that the same may be
compared with the technical description contained in the title of respondent, which would have shown whether the
disputed property really formed part of petitioner’s larger property. The appellate court correctly held in its Resolution
dated May 13, 2004 that petitioner’s claim is solely supported by testimonial evidence, which did not conclusively
show the metes and bounds of petitioner’s larger property in relation to the metes and bounds of the disputed
property; thus, there is no sufficient evidence on record to support petitioner’s claim that the disputed property is
part of his larger property.
In regard to the second requisite of title to property, both petitioner and respondent separately claim that they are
entitled to ownership of the property by virtue of open, public, continuous and exclusive possession of the same in
the concept of owner. Petitioner claims that he inherited the subject property from his father in 1952, while
respondent claims that he acquired the property from his grandmother Intumo Pagsidan, a portion thereof from his
grandmother’s helper Totop Malacop pursuant to a court decision after litigating with him.37 Respondent has OCT
No. P-658 to prove his title to the subject property, while petitioner merely claims that the property is already his
private land by virtue of his open, public, continuous possession of the same in the concept of owner.
The Court holds that petitioner failed to prove the requisites of reconveyance as he failed to prove the identity of his
larger property in relation to the disputed property, and his claim of title by virtue of open, public and continuous
possession of the disputed property in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent
who holds a free patent title over the subject property. As stated in Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,38 it is
relatively easy to declare and claim that one owns and possesses public agricultural land, but it is entirely a different
matter to affirmatively declare and to prove before a court of law that one actually possessed and cultivated the
entire area to the exclusion of other claimants who stand on equal footing under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended) as any other pioneering claimants.
Further, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner’s counterclaim is time-barred,
since the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance
is in possession of the lot, citing Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago.39 Petitioner also
contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the counterclaim in this case is a collateral attack on
respondent’s title, citing Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court.40 Petitioner cites the case of Heirs of Simplicio
Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago,41 which held that a counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the
title.
The Court notes that the case of Cimafranca v. Intermediate Appellate Court,42 cited by the Court of Appeals to
support its ruling that the prayer for the cancellation of respondent’s title through a counterclaim included in
petitioner’s Answer is a collateral attack on the said title, is inapplicable to this case. In Cimafranca, petitioners
therein filed a complaint for Partition and Damages, and respondents therein indirectly attacked the validity of the
title involved in their counterclaim. Hence, the Court ruled that a Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally, and
the issue on its validity can be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
Here, the case cited by petitioner, Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, declared that the
one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the party seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in
possession of the lot, as well as distinguished a collateral attack under Section 48 of PD No. 1529 from a direct
attack, and held that a counterclaim may be considered as a complaint or an independent action and can be
considered a direct attack on the title, thus:
The one-year prescriptive period, however, does not apply when the person seeking annulment of title or
reconveyance is in possession of the lot. This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title which is
imprescriptible. In David v. Malay, we held that a person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of
ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right,
and his undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title.
xxxx
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack
on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant
to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment,
or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different
relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
x x x A counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the title. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court
Appeals, we ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the fact that the nullity thereof was raised only as a
counterclaim. It was held that a counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time, it is the original defendant
who becomes the plaintiff.1avvphi1 It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were
an independent action. x x x43
The above ruling of the court on the definition of collateral attack under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 was reiterated
in Leyson v. Bontuyan,44 Heirs of Enrique Diaz v. Virata,45 Arangote v. Maglunob,46 and Catores v. Afidchao.47
Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that petitioner’s counterclaim for cancellation of respondent’s title is not a
collateral attack, but a direct attack on the Torrens title of petitioner. However, the counterclaim seeking for the
cancellation of title and reconveyance of the subject property has prescribed as petitioner has not proven actual
possession and ownership of the property due to his failure to prove the identity of his larger property that would
show that the disputed property is a part thereof, and his claim of title to the subject property by virtue of open, public
and continuous possession in the concept of owner is nebulous in the light of a similar claim by respondent who
holds a Torrens title to the subject property.
Respondent’s original certificate of title was issued on May 22, 1981, while the counterclaim was filed by petitioner
on October 15, 1984, which is clearly beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in confirming that respondent is the owner of the parcel of land covered by
OCT No. P-658.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ decision dated August 15, 2003, and its Resolution
dated May 13, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 63801, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204626 June 9, 2014
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, and the Heirs of JULIET B.
PULKERA, Petitioners,
vs.
CARMELING CRISOLOGO, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the June 14, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) and its November 14, 2012 Resolution2 which reversed the April 18, 201 1 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Baguio City (RTC), and reinstated the September 15, 2009 Decision4 of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 1, Baguio City (MTCC). in Civil Case No. 13209, a complaint for recovery of possession.
The Facts
Records show that Carmeling Crisologo (Crisologo), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Pedro Isican (Isican), filed
her complaint5 for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership with Damages against Juliet B. Pulkera, Paul P.
Gabriel, Ireneo C. Calwag, and Thomas L. Tingga-an (petitioners) before the MTCC.
Crisologo alleged, among others, that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land with a total area of
approximately 2,000 square meters, described in, and covered by, two (2) certificates of title – Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT)Nos. T-13935 and T-13936;that the properties were covered by an Assessment of Real Property; that
the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that
petitioners unlawfully entered, occupied her properties by stealth, by force and without her prior consent and
knowledge, and constructed their houses thereon; that upon discovery of their illegal occupation, her daughter, Atty.
Carmelita Crisologo, and Isican personally went to the properties and verbally demanded that petitioners vacate the
premises and remove their structures thereon; that the petitioners begged and promised to buy the said properties
for 3,500.00 per square meter; that she gave petitioners time to produce the said amount, but they reneged on their
promise to buy them; that petitioners refused to vacate the subject properties despite several demands; that the
petitioners knew full well that the subject premises they were occupying were titled properties but they insisted on
unlawfully holding the same; and that she was unlawfully dispossessed and displaced from the subject properties
due to petitioners’ illegal occupation.
On the other hand, petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were products of Civil Registration Case No. 1,
Record 211, which were declared void by the Supreme Court in Republic v. Marcos, 6 and reiterated in Republic v.
Marcos;7 that the said case was later enacted into law, Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1271, entitled "An Act
Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title within the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No.1,
GLRO Record No. 211, pursuant to Act No. 931, as amended, but Considering as Valid Certain Titles of Lands that
are Alienable and Disposable Under Certain Conditions and For Other Purposes" which took effect on December
22, 1977; that Crisologo failed to comply with the conditions provided in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 for the validation
of said titles, hence, the titles were void; that petitioners had been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious,
uninterrupted, and continuous possession of the subject land, in good faith; and that Crisologo was never in prior
possession and had no valid title over the subject land.8
MTCC Ruling
On September 15, 2009, the MTCC rendered a decision in favor of Crisologo, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff directing the defendants, their heirs, assigns,
representatives and/or any person acting for and in their behalves to:
a) Immediately vacate the subject properties, and to demolish/dismantle all their houses and other structures on the
properties; should defendants refuse to comply, the plaintiff may demolish/dismantle them at the expense of the
defendants;
b) Pay reasonable rentals of the use and occupation of the subject properties at Php4,000.00 per month from
January 2006 for each of the defendants;
c) Pay Php20, 000.00 as attorney’s fees, and
d) Costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.
The MTCC ruled that Crisologo was the registered owner of the subject parcels of land, who, as such, had declared
these properties for taxation purposes since 1969 and regularly paid the realty taxes thereon. It stated that with
Crisologo being the owner, petitioners were illegally occupying the land.
The MTCC added that petitioners could not question Crisologo’s titles over the subject parcels of land in an ordinary
civil action for recovery of possession because such defense was a collateral attack which was prohibited under
P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Thus, it could not inquire into the intrinsic
validity of Crisologo’s titles.
Ruling of the RTC
On April 18, 2011, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It was of the view that petitioners’
assertion of the TCTs’ invalidity was not a collateral attack. It cited the rulings in Republic v. Marcos,9 and Republic
v. Marcos,10 which perpetually prohibited the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Rec. No. 211, and,
therefore, the registration of parcels of lands. For said reason, the titles of Crisologo were products of illegal
proceedings nullified by this Court. She also failed to comply with the conditions set forth in P.D. No. 1271.
Accordingly, the titles were void and the same could not be a legal basis for Crisologo to justify the eviction of
petitioners from the subject premises. Having been nullified, these certificates of title ceased to be the best proof of
ownership.
Ruling of the CA
On June 14, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed decision, setting aside the RTC decision and reinstating that of the
MTCC.
The CA held that Crisologo was entitled to the possession of the subject parcels of land. It explained that her
possession was established when she acquired the same by sale sometime in 1967 and when the certificates of
title covering the properties were subsequently issued. It added that her payment of realty taxes due on the said
properties since 1969 further strengthened her claim of possession. Moreover, her appointment of Isican as
administrator of the subject properties and her offer to sell the lots to the petitioners showed that she had control
over the same. Accordingly, the CA concluded that Crisologo’s right to remain in possession of the subject lots
should be preferred over the petitioners’ possession regardless of the actual condition of her titles. Hence, the
petitioners, who used force in occupying her properties, should respect, restore and not disturb her lawful possession
of the subject parcels of land.
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the petitioners instituted this petition anchored on the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
(1)
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
RESPONDENT HAS ACTUAL OR WAS IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE LANDS INVOLVED CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE, THE FACTS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
(2)
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE
PURPORTED EXECUTION AND REGISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC INSTRUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE SALE IN
1967 OF THE SUBJECT LANDS AND THE SUBSEQUENT ISSUANCE OF THE TITLES IN HER NAME
ESTABLISH POSSESSION.
(3)
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE TAX
DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS IN THE NAME OF THE RESPONDENT ESTABLISH HER POSSESSION OVER
THE SUBJECT LOTS.
(4)
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE SUPPOSED
APPOINTMENT OF PEDRO ISICAN AS ADMINISTRATOR ESTABLISHES HER POSSESSION OVER THE
LANDS IN DISPUTE.
(5)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS THE
PRESENT POSSESSOR OF THE SUBJECT LANDS REGARDLESS OF THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF HER
TITLES, IGNORING THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS AND ADHERENCE TO LAW.
(6)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS DISTURBED
THE POSSESSION OF HEREIN RESPONDENT BY FORCE.
(7)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT’SSUPPOSED
POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS SHOULD BE PREFERRED DESPITE THE NATURE OR CONDITION
OF THE PROPERTY AS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.11
Petitioners’ position
Petitioners aver that Crisologo failed to show documentary or testimonial evidence that she acquired the subject
properties by sale or by any other mode of acquisition from its previous owner. Her only bases in claiming them
were the titles issued in her name, without a deed of sale.
Petitioners further argue that assuming that there was really a sale that took place, its execution and registration
cannot establish her right of possession, whether actual or constructive. First, the validity of the subject titles was
stricken down by Republic vs. Marcos cases and P.D. No. 1271.
Hence, the TCTs could not be sources of legal rights. Second, Crisologo never took actual possession of the subject
properties after the alleged sale in 1967. She appointed an administrator over the said property only in 2006.
Moreover, petitioners claim that her tax declarations and receipts evidencing payment of taxes cannot prove her
possession or ownership over the subject properties without proof of actual possession.
Finally, petitioners submit that there are facts and circumstances that militate against her claim of possession. They
point out that the titles over the subject properties have no encumbrances or annotations whatsoever; that for more
than forty (40) years, the subject lots have not been subjected to any deed, agreement, contract, mortgage or any
other property dealings; that the said titles are not validated up to the present as certified by the Register of Deeds
of Baguio City; that she presented no witnesses to prove her intention to possess the subject lots; that the documents
she presented are not reliable because they were issued only in 2008; that no improvements were introduced by
her; and that she is guilty of laches due to her inaction to validate her titles.
Respondent’s position
Crisologo opposes the petition mainly on technical grounds. First, she argues that the supposed representatives of
the petitioners who filed this petition and signed the certification on non-forum shopping have no authority to do so.
Hence, they have no standing to prosecute because they are not the real parties in interest. Second, she claims
that the petitioners failed to furnish the CA a copy of their motion for extension of time to file this petition for review.
The Court’s Ruling
The only question that needs to be resolved in this petition is – who between petitioners and respondent Crisologo
have a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land. Both contending parties claim that they have a
superior possessory right over the disputed lands.
After a careful review of the records, the Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject As the lawful possessor. the respondent has the right to eject the petitioners
parcels of land. The Court agrees with the CA that the only question that needs to be resolved in this suit to recover possession is
Accion Publiciana: its nature and purpose who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the subject parcels of land. Therefore,
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better the foremost relevant issue that needs to be determined here is simply possession, not ownership.
right of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year The testimonial and documentary evidence on record prove that Crisologo has a preferred claim of possession over
from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. that of petitioners. It cannot be denied that she bought the subject properties from the previous owner in 1967, which
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. When parties, was why the transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued in her name. Records further show that she has
however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties been paying the realty taxes on the said properties since 1969. She likewise appointed Isican as administrator of
has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the the disputed lands. More importantly, there is no question that she offered to sell to petitioners the portions of the
issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is subject properties occupied by them. Hence, she deserves to be respected and restored to her lawful possession
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a as provided in Article 539 of the New Civil Code.20
bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
on the issue of ownership.12 SO ORDERED.
In her complaint, Crisologo prayed that she be declared in prior actual possession of the properties in dispute and
that petitioners vacate the same and demolish their houses therein. She alleged, among others, that she was the
registered owner of the subject parcels of land and that petitioners unlawfully entered her properties by stealth, force
and without her prior consent and knowledge. Clearly, she primarily wanted to recover possession of the subject
parcels of land from petitioners. Hence, the case is an accion publiciana.
Nonetheless, the petitioners have raised the issue of ownership in their pleadings. They mainly argue that
Crisologo’s titles on the subject properties are void and that they have been in open, actual, exclusive, notorious,
uninterrupted and continuous possession over the subject properties in good faith.
The nullity of the decrees of registration and certificates of titles in Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 is not absolute
Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 127113 invalidated decrees of registration and certificates of title within the Baguio
Town site Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity, however, is not that sweeping. The said
provision expressly states that "all certificates of titles issued on or before July 31, 1973shall be considered valid
and the lands covered by them shall be deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners"
upon 1) showing proof that the land covered by the subject title is not within any government, public or quasi-public
reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as certified by appropriating government agencies; and 2) compliance by
the titleholder with the payment to the Republic of the Philippines of the correct assessed value of the land within
the required period.
In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were registered on August 24, 1967. The
titles are, thus, considered valid although subject to the conditions set. But whether or not Crisologo complied with
the said conditions would not matter because, this would be a collateral attack on her registered titles, as would be
discussed later.
At any rate, petitioners, as private individuals, are not the proper parties to question the status of the respondent’s
registered titles. Section 6 of P.D. No. 127114 expressly states that the "Solicitor General shall institute such actions
or suits as may be necessary to recover possession of lands covered by all void titles not validated under this
Decree."
The respondent’s certificates of title give her the better right to possess the subject parcels of land
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the
title appears.1âwphi1 It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. It is also
settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession. Thus, in
Arambulo v. Gungab,15 this Court declared that the "age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over a
land is entitled to possession thereof."16
The records show that TCT No. T-1393517 and TCT No. T-1393618 bear the name of Carmeling P. Crisologo, as the
registered owner. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that she has a Torrens title over the subject parcels of land.
The respondent’s Torrens certificates of title are immune from a collateral attack.
As a holder of a Torrens certificate of title, the law protects Crisologo from a collateral attack on the same. Section
48 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title cannot
be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus:
SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. – A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
This rule has been applied in innumerable cases, one of which was Francisco Madrid v. Spouses Mapoy, 19 where
it was written:
Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the
lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack. A collateral attack transpires
when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against
the judgment granting the title.
This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an
action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet
implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. To permit a
collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs' title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of
a Torrens title.
The petitioners-defendants' attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs' title, by claiming that fraud attended its
acquisition, is a collateral attack on the title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the
properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the
judgment granting the title. This is the attack that possession of a Torrens Title specifically guards against; hence,
we cannot entertain, much less accord credit to, the petitioners-defendants' claim of fraud to impugn the validity of
the respondents-plaintiffs' title to their property.
G.R. No. 164787 January 31, 2006
MARLENE CRISOSTOMO & JOSE G. CRISOSTOMO, Petitioners,
vs.
FLORITO M. GARCIA, JR., Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
On 20 June 2002, respondent Florito M. Garcia, Jr. filed Civil Case No. C-20128 for cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 273165 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City against petitioners-spouses Marlene
and Jose Crisostomo raffled to Branch 121 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.1
In his Complaint,2 dated 16 June 2002, respondent alleged that on 24 September 1986, Victoria Garcia Vda. de
Crisostomo, mother of petitioner Jose G. Crisostomo, sold to him, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale,3 the property,
described in the aforesaid TCT including the improvements and rights thereon, particularly described as TAG No.
84-205-1097 (Urban Bliss Level I [ZIP] located at 163 Libis Talisay, Caloocan City). In the Deed of Sale, petitioner
Jose Crisostomo and his sister Cristina Crisostomo signed as witnesses in the execution of the instrument. Since
they were distant relatives, respondent allowed Victoria and her children, petitioner Jose and Cristina, to stay in the
subject property as lessees under a Contract of Lease.4 By virtue of the said deed of sale, respondent effected the
transfer of the tax declaration covering the property, under his name from the City Assessor’s Office of Caloocan
City.
However, before the transfer of title to respondent could be completed, petitioners-spouses Jose and Marlene
Crisostomo were able to secure a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation using the subject
property as security through bad faith and machinations. Worse, petitioners were able to transfer the subject property
under their names, obtaining TCT No. 273165, from the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City, without the knowledge
and consent of the respondent.
Instead of an Answer, petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Dismiss Action,"5 alleging that since respondent’s cause
of action is based on an alleged deed of sale executed on 24 September 1986, the cause of action of the respondent
to enforce and to implement the instrument arose on 24 September 1986 and pursuant to Article 1144 6 of the Civil
Code, the action must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, from 24 September
1986, respondent had only up to 24 September 1996 within which to file the action. Since the complaint was filed
only on 20 June 2002, or after the lapse of more than 16 years, the cause of action is clearly barred by prescription.
Respondent, in his Comment7 to the Motion to Dismiss, countered that the cause of action has not yet prescribed.
He contends that Article 1144 of the Civil Code does not apply to the case because the complaint is for cancellation
of title registered in the names of the petitioners and for reconveyance. Respondent further points out that he did
not file an action for specific performance based on the deed of sale. The complaint, he said, is for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust which expires in 10 years counted from the date the adverse title to the
property is asserted by the possessor.
After the parties filed their respective reply8 and rejoinder,9 the motion was deemed submitted for resolution.
Resolving the motion,10 the trial court issued an Order dated 12 August 2003, dismissing the same for lack of merit,
in this wise:
It appears from the pleadings submitted by the parties that the mother of defendant Jose Crisostomo had sold the
property subject matter of this case to the plaintiff as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, before the
property could have been registered with the Register of Deeds and a transfer certificate of title could have been
issued, the defendants had obtained a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation using the subject
property as collateral. The defendants were able to transfer the subject property in their names now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 273165 before the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.
By way of an opposition, the plaintiff alleged that the action is for the cancellation of title based on fraud which was
discovered upon the registration of the property in 1993. The case was filed on June 20, 2003,(sic) hence, the action
has not yet prescribed.
While it is true that in action based on a written contract prescribes in 10 years, the same however does not find
application in the case at bar. The plaintiff is trying to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of the
private defendants based on the alleged fraud which was discovered in 1993.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant motion is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit.
The defendants are directed to file their Answer within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this order.11
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 dated 11 September 200313 which the respondent opposed.14 The
trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated 21 October 2003.15 Undaunted, petitioners filed
a Petition for Certiorari16 before the Court of Appeals.17
In a resolution18 dated 20 February 2004, the Court of Appeals resolved to dismiss the petition outright stating that
the defense of prescription being a question of fact, the same is not proper in a petition for certiorari.19
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 dated 22 March 2004 which was denied in a resolution dated 06
August 2004.21
Hence, this petition grounded on the following:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION
INVOLVES A QUESTION OF FACT.
II.
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT SAID ISSUE OF PRESCRIPTION INVOLVES A QUESTION OF FACT,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY REFUSING TO RESOLVE THE MERITS OF THE
SAID PETITION BELOW.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION FILED BY THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.22
On the issue of whether the defense of prescription is a question of fact or law, the distinction is settled that there is
a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. On the other
hand, a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts.23 For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.24 The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact.25
The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. 26
In the case of Santos, et al. v. Aranzanso,27 this Court has held that the question of prescription of the action involves
the ascertainment of factual matters such as the date when the period to bring the action commenced to run. In Lim
v. Chan,28 this Court has again decreed that prescription is a factual matter when it held that without conducting trial
on the merits, the trial court cannot peremptorily find the existence of estoppel, laches, fraud or prescription of
actions as these matters require presentation of evidence and determination of facts.
At first glance, applying these jurisprudence as bases, it may seem that the Court of Appeals acted correctly in
denying the petition. However, while we agree with the Court of Appeals that the issue of prescription is a factual
matter, we deem it erroneous on its part to have dismissed the petition on this ground. The Court of Appeals could
have squarely ruled if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the
Complaint filed by the petitioners considering that the facts from which the issue of prescription can be adduced are
available to the appellate court, they being extant from the records.
The records disclose that the date of registration of the subject property in the name of the petitioners was 16
November 1993 while the Deed of Sale executed in favor of the respondent was dated 24 September 1986. The
complaint for the reconveyance and cancellation of TCT was filed by the respondent on 20 June 2002.
Moreover, a motion to dismiss based on prescription hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint.29 Such hypothetical admission is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint which relate to, and are
necessary for, the resolution of the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss as preliminary matters involving
substantive or procedural laws, but not to the other facts of the case. As applied herein, the hypothetical admission
extends to the date of execution of the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondent and to the date of registration of title
in favor of the petitioners.
The foregoing considered, the Court of Appeals was properly equipped with the tools to determine if the trial court
abused its discretion in ruling that respondent’s cause of action had not prescribed. Nevertheless, instead of
remanding this case to the Court of Appeals which is concededly a costly endeavor in terms of the parties’ resources
and time, we shall rule on the issue of prescription.30
Petitioners’ allegation that an action for the reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within
four years from the discovery of the fraud31 is without basis.
The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the petitioners apply only if the complaint seeks to annul a voidable
contract under Article 139032 of the Civil Code. In such case, the four-year prescriptive period under Article
139133 begins to run from the time of discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.34
Generally, an action for reconveyance of real property based on fraud prescribes in four years from the discovery
of fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
Registration of real property is a constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the four-year period shall be counted
therefrom.35
In the case at bar, respondent’s action which is for Reconveyance and Cancellation of Title is based on an implied
trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code since he averred in his complaint that through fraud petitioners were able to
obtain a Certificate of Title over the property. He does not seek the annulment of a voidable contract whereby Articles
1390 and 1391 of the Civil Code would find application such that the cause of action would prescribe in four years.
Art. 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
Thus, it was held that when a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title of property, a constructive
trust is created in favor of the defrauded party.36
Constructive trusts are "created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent
unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains
or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold."37
When property is registered in another’s name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true
owner.38 The action for reconveyance of the title to the rightful owner prescribes in 10 years from the issuance of
the title.39
An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged fraudulent
registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.40
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving rise to an
implied trust under Art. 1456 of the Civil Code, is 10 years pursuant to Art. 1144. This ten-year prescriptive period
begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which repudiation takes place when the
adverse party registers the land.41
Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten years under Art. 1144 and not four years under Arts. 1389 and
1391.42
Applying the law and jurisprudential declaration above-cited to the allegations of fact in the complaint, it can clearly
be seen that respondent has a period of 10 years from the registration of the title within which to file the action.
Since the title was registered in the name of the petitioners on 16 November 1993, respondent had a period of 10
years from the time of the registration within which to file the complaint. Since the complaint was filed on 20 June
2002, the action clearly has not prescribed and was timely-filed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is:
(1) GRANTED, with respect to the petitioners’ prayer that the Court of Appeals should have resolved the petition on
the merits.
(2) DENIED, with respect to the prayer for the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-20128 before the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 121.
The case is ordered remanded to the trial court which is directed to continue with the hearing and proceed with Civil
Case No. C-20128 with deliberate dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155830 August 15, 2012
NUMERIANO P. ABOBON, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICITAS ABATA ABOBON and GELIMA ABATA ABOBON, Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The controversy involves the rightful possession of a parcel of registered land. The respondents, who were the
registered owners, sued the petitioner, their first cousin, to recover 1the possession of the land in question, stating
that they had only allowed the petitioner to use the land out of pure benevolence, but the petitioner asserted that
the land belonged to him as owner by right of succession from his parents.
Antecedents
Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon were the plaintiffs in this action fer recovery of possession and damages
brought against petitioner Numeriano Abobon (Numeriano) in the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Labrador-Sual
in Pangasinan (MCTC). They averred that they were the registered owners of that parcel of unirrigated riceland with
an area of 4,668 square meters, more or less, and situated in Poblacion, Labrador, Pangasinan, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 201367 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan (Exhibit A); that they had
allowed Numeriano, their first cousin, the free use of the land out of benevolence; and that they now immediately
needed the parcel of land for their own use and had accordingly demanded that Numeriano should vacate and return
it to them but he had refused.
In his answer, Numeriano admitted being the first cousin of the respondents and the existence of TCT No. 201367
covering the land in question, and having received the demand for him to vacate. He alleged, however, that he did
not vacate because he was the owner of the land in question. He asserted that if the land in question related to the
unirrigated riceland with an area of 3,000 square meters that he was presently tilling and covered by tax declaration
no. 2 in the name of his father, Rafael Abobon (Rafael), then the respondents did not have a valid cause of action
against him because he had inherited that portion from his parents; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
also continuously, publicly and adversely and in the concept of owner possessed the parcel of land for more than
59 years; that in 1937, his grandfather Emilio Abobon (Emilio), the original owner, had granted that portion of 3,000
square meters to Rafael when he got married to his mother, Apolonia Pascua, by means of a donation propter
nuptias; that since then his parents had possessed and tilled the land; that he himself had exclusively inherited the
land from his parents in 1969 because his brother Jose had received his own inheritance from their parents; that the
possession of his parents and his own had continued until the present; that assuming that the respondents were the
true owners of the land, they were already estopped by laches from recovering the portion of 3,000 square meters
from him.
On August 23, 2000, after due proceedings, the MCTC ruled in favor of the respondents,1 finding that the
respondents’ parents Leodegario Abobon (Leodegario) and Macaria Abata (Macaria) had purchased the property
on February 27, 1941 from Emilio with the conformity of Emilio’s other children, including Rafael; that on February
4, 1954, Leodegario and Macaria had registered their title and ownership under TCT No. 15524; that on February
16, 1954, Leodegario and Macaria had sold the land to Juan Mamaril; that on February 25, 1954, Juan Mamaril had
registered the land in his name under TCT No. 15678; that on November 13, 1970, Juan Mamaril had sold the land
back to Leodegario, and TCT No. 87308 had been issued under the name of Leodegario; that on January 16, 1979,
Leodegario had submitted a sworn statement as required by Presidential Decree No. 27 to the effect that his tenant
on the land had been one Cornelio Magno; that on April 15, 1993, the respondents had inherited the land upon the
death of Leodegario; that on October 22, 1994, the respondents had adjudicated the land unto themselves through
a deed of extrajudicial settlement; that after due publication of the deed of extrajudicial settlement, the respondents
had registered the land in their own names on December 20, 1994, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 201367 to
them; that after the 1989 palay harvest, the respondents had allowed the petitioner the free use of the land out of
benevolence; that the respondents had started to verbally demand that the petitioner vacate the land on May 25,
1993; and that because the petitioner had refused to vacate, the respondents had then brought a complaint in
the barangay on May 31, 1996, where mediation had failed to settle the dispute.
The MCTC further found that the 3,000 square-meter land Numeriano referred to as donated to his parents was not
the same as the land in question due to their boundaries being entirely different; that in the donation propter
nuptias (Exhibit 11), Emilio had stated that the parcels of land thereby covered had not been registered under Act
No. 496 or under the provisions of the Spanish Mortgage Law, whereas the land in question had already been
registered; that even assuming that the 3,000 square-meter land was inside the land in question, his claim would
still not prosper because the donation propter nuptias in his parents’ favor had been invalid for not having been
signed and accepted in writing by Rafael, his father; that the donation propter nuptias had also been cancelled or
dissolved when his mother had signed as an instrumental witness and his father had given his consent to the sale
of the land in question then covered by Original Certificate No. 28727 by Emilio to Leodegario; and that his parents’
assent to the sale signified either that his parents had conformed to the dissolution of the donation propter nuptias in
their favor, or that the land sold to Leodegario had been different from the land donated to them.
The MCTC held that the respondents were not guilty of laches because of their numerous acts and transactions
from 1941 until 1996 involving the land in question, specifically: (a) the sale of the land to Juan Mamaril and its
repurchase by Leodogario; (b) the registration of title and ownership; (c) the extrajudicial partition of the property by
the heirs of Leodegario; (d) Numeriano’s free use of the land from 1989 onwards upon being allowed to do so by
the respondents; (e) the verbal demands from the respondents since 1993 for Numeriano to vacate the land; and
(f) the commencement of the action to recover possession against Numeriano. It considered such acts and
transactions as negating any notion of the respondents’ abandonment of their right to assert ownership.2
The MCTC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant as follows:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the true and lawful owner and possessor of the land in question;
2. Ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to surrender its possession to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of ₱ 20,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of ₱
5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of ₱ 10,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
5. Dismissing the counterclaim;
6. Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Numeriano appealed to the Regional Trial Court in Lingayen City, Pangasinan (RTC), which, on April 16, 2001,
upheld the MCTC,4 viz:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES well-considered, the appeal taken by defendant/appellant is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Citing the variance between the description of the land in question and the description of the land covered by the
donation propter nuptias, as well as the failure of Numeriano to explain his parents’ participation in the sale of the
land in question in 1941 to Leodegario and Macaria, the RTC concluded that the land in question was really separate
and distinct from the property donated to his parents in 1937;5 and lent credence to the respondents’ claim that they
had allowed him to use the land only out of their benevolence.6
Still dissatisfied, Numeriano appealed via petition for review to the Court of Appeals (CA), submitting that he was
the lawful owner and possessor of the 3,000 square meter parcel of land that he occupied and cultivated; and that
the respondents’ TCT was invalid.7
On May 16, 2002, however, the CA rejected Numeriano’s submissions and affirmed the RTC, 8 holding that the
respondents were in possession of a certificate of title that enjoyed the conclusive presumption of validity, by virtue
of which they were entitled to possess the land in question; that the parcel of land that he owned was different from
the land in question; and that his impugning the validity of the respondents’ TCT partook of the nature of an
impermissible collateral attack against the TCT, considering that the validity of a Torrens title could be challenged
only directly through an action instituted for that purpose.9
The CA, pointing out that the MCTC’s declaration that the respondents were the true owners of the land in question
went beyond the ambit of a possessory action that was limited to determining only the issue of physical
possession,10 deleted the declaration, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered. The Decision under appeal is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the declaration by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of respondents as to the owners of the subject
parcel of land is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal, with Numeriano positing as follows:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING POSSESSION OF SUBJECT
PREMISES TO RESPONDENTS WITHOUT CITING ANY REASONS THEREFOR AND DESPITE THE FACT
THAT EVIDENCE ON HAND SHOWS PETITIONER BECAME THE LAWFUL OWNER THEREOF PRIOR TO TIME
RESPONDENTS ACQUIRED THE SAME.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LOT BEING
CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT BEING CLAIMED BY PETITIONER.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER SHOULD
FILE A SEPARATE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AS THERE IS NO NEED THEREFOR.
IV.
ASSUMING SANS ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT THE LAWFUL OWNER OF SUBJECT PREMISES,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S AND MCTC’S
DECISIONS ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT AND
DISMISSING HIS COUNTERCLAIM.11
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, a fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves
as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.12 The certificate of title thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land;13 hence, anyone who
deals with property registered under the Torrens system may rely on the title and need not go beyond the title.14 This
reliance on the certificate of title rests on the doctrine of indefeasibility of the land title, which has long been well-
settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine
of indefeasibility finds no application.15
Accordingly, we rule for the respondents on the issue of the preferential right to the possession of the land in
question. Their having preferential right conformed to the age-old rule that whoever held a Torrens title in his name
is entitled to the possession of the land covered by the title.16 Indeed, possession, which is the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right,17 was but an attribute of their registered ownership.
It is beyond question under the law that the owner has not only the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law, but also the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing
in order to recover it.18 He may exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal of the thing, and, for this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.19
Secondly, Numeriano denies to the respondents the right to rely on their TCT, insisting that he had become the legal
owner of the land in question even before the respondents had acquired it by succession from their parents, and
that he had acted in good faith in possessing the land in question since then. He argues that he did not need to file
a separate direct action to annul the respondents’ title because "by proving that they are owners thereof, said title
may be annulled as an incidental result."20
Numeriano’s argument lacks legal basis. In order for him to properly assail the validity of the respondents’ TCT, he
must himself bring an action for that purpose. Instead of bringing that direct action, he mounted his attack as a
merely defensive allegation herein. Such manner of attack against the TCT was a collateral one, which was
disallowed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), viz:
Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Thirdly, the core issue in an action for the recovery of possession of realty like this one concerned only the priority
right to the possession of the realty.21 As such, Numeriano’s assertion of ownership in his own right could not be
finally and substantively determined herein, for it was axiomatic that the adjudication of the question of ownership
in an action for the recovery of possession of realty would only be provisional and would not even be a bar to an
action between the same parties involving the ownership of the same property. 22
Fourthly, Numeriano insists that the land he occupied had been donated to his parents and was different from the
land in question.
His insistence was bereft of factual support. All the lower courts uniformly found that his evidence related to a parcel
of land entirely different from the land in question. According to the MCTC, "the land for which he has presented
evidence to support his claim of ownership is entirely different from the land the plaintiffs are claiming."23 On its part,
the RTC held that "the land, subject matter of this controversy is all of 4668 sq. meters and bearing different
boundaries from that of the donated property and was already registered under OCT No. 28727 as early as 1926,"
such that "the subject property is separate and distinct from that property donated to the defendant’s parents in
1937."24 Agreeing with both lower courts, the CA declared: "(i)n fine, what these decisions are saying is that petitioner
may have evidence that he owns a parcel of land but, based on the evidence he had presented, the said parcel of
land is different from the one he is presently occupying."25
We sustain the lower courts. The findings of fact of lower courts, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive upon the Court. In this as well as in other appeals, the Court, not being a trier of facts, does not review
their findings, especially when they are supported by the records or based on substantial evidence. 26 It is not the
function of the Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the
lower courts are absolutely devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave
abuse of discretion.27 There has been no such showing made by Numeriano herein.
Lastly, the Court must undo the awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
To be recoverable, moral damages must be capable of proof and must be actually proved with a reasonable degree
of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount
of damages.28 Yet, nothing was adduced here to justify the grant of moral damages. What we have was only the
allegation on moral damages, with the complaint stating that the respondents had been forced to litigate, and that
they had suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings from the petitioner’s refusal to restore the
possession of the land in question to them.29 The allegation did not suffice, for allegation was not proof of the facts
alleged.
The Court cannot also affirm the exemplary damages granted in favor of the respondents. Exemplary damages were
proper only if the respondents, as the plaintiffs, showed their entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages.30 Yet, they did not establish their entitlement to such other damages.
As to attorney’s fees, the general rule is that such fees cannot be recovered by a successful litigant as part of the
damages to be assessed against the losing party because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate.31 Indeed, prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code, such fees could be recovered only when
there was a stipulation to that effect. It was only under the present Civil Code that the right to collect attorney’s fees
in the cases mentioned in Article 220832 of the Civil Code came to be recognized.33 Such fees are now included in
the concept of actual damages.34
Even so, whenever attorney’s fees are proper in a case, the decision rendered therein should still expressly state
the factual basis and legal justification for granting them.35 Granting them in the dispositive portion of the judgment
is not enough;36 a discussion of the .factual basis and legal justification for them must be laid out in the body of the
decision.37 Considering that the award of attorney's fees in favor of the respondents fell short of this requirement,
the Court disallows the award for want of the factual and legal premises in the body of the decision. 38 The
requirement for express findings of fact and law has been set in order to bring the case within the exception and
justify the award of the attorney's fees. Otherwise, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture.39
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 16, 2002 by the Court of Appeals, with
the MODIFICATION that the awards of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees are DELETED.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172316 December 8, 2010
SPOUSES JOSE CHUA and MARGARITA CHUA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PEDRO GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 119, Regional Trial
Court, Pasay City, PEDRO A. ABADILLA, in his capacity as Sheriff IV of Branch 119, Regional Trial Court,
Pasay City, and TAN TEK SING, a.k.a. PETER TAN, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
February 7, 2006 Decision2 and April 17, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 81382.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The dispute involves Townhouse Unit 320, located at Roxas Sea Front Garden, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, which
was previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 127330 in the name of Benito Chua (Benito).
Petitioners, spouses Jose and Margarita Chua, claim that Benito sold the property to them on July 20, 1994 for
₱2,800,000.00. Said sale, however, was only registered on January 5, 1995.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 1994, respondent Tan Tek Sing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City, a suit for collection, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1160, against Benito, among others, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of attachment. On November 15, 1994, a writ of preliminary attachment was issued by the trial
court prompting the Sheriff to levy on Townhouse Unit 320. On November 18, 1994, entry number 94-3278/T-
127330, a notice of levy on attachment, was inscribed in TCT No. 127330 by the Register of Deeds of Pasay City.
At the time of said inscription, TCT No. 127330 was still in the name of Benito.
On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed with the RTC of Pasay City a Motion to Exclude and Remove Writ of
Attachment from Townhouse Unit 320 on the ground that the subject property was already owned by them by virtue
of an unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale4 executed in their favor by Benito on July 20, 1994.
On January 5, 1995, petitioners registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. As
a result, TCT No. 127330 was cancelled and TCT No. 134590 was issued in petitioners’ name. The notice of levy
on attachment, however, was carried over in the new title.
On April 26, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision5 finding Benito liable to respondent. It, however, excluded
Townhouse Unit 320 from attachment. The pertinent portions of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants BENITO NG CHUA,
HENRY A. CHENG and MASTER FOOTWEAR SALES, INC., ordering the said defendants to pay the plaintiff the
sum of ₱2.6 million, with legal interest thereon from September 3, 1994 until the amount shall have been fully paid;
x x x.
xxxx
As prayed for by movants PHILAM, Jose Chua and Chua Tiu Ning Ning, the Unit 320 of the Townhouse within
Roxas Seaport Garden Compound, Aurora III Road, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, is hereby excluded from the
attachment enforced by the Sheriff of this Court on November 18, 1994.
SO ORDERED.6
Respondent partially appealed the RTC Decision to the CA in so far as it excluded Townhouse Unit 320 from
attachment. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 49959. On February 18, 1999, the CA rendered a
Decision,7 granting respondent's appeal, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the herein assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, but MODIFIED in that:
1. The subject Townhouse Unit 320 covered by TCT No. 134590, which is located within the Roxas Seafront Garden
Compound, Aurora III Road, Roxas Boulevard corner Russel Avenue, Pasay City, is hereby made subject to the
writ of attachment enforced by the Sheriff of the court a quo on November 18, 1994; x x x.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution9 dated
March 1, 2001.
Petitioners then appealed the CA Decision to this Court, where it was docketed as G.R. No. 147339. On June 20,
2001, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing the same for failure to (a) submit a certification against forum
shopping duly executed by petitioners themselves, and (2) properly verify the petition.
After the denial of petitioners’ appeal by this Court, respondent then moved for execution against Townhouse Unit
320. The RTC granted respondent's motion. Notwithstanding, the finality of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
49959, petitioners, however, moved to quash the writ of execution and notice of levy on the grounds that they are
not the judgment debtors and the property levied upon was already sold to them prior to the institution of the suit.
On August 5, 2003, the RTC issued an Order10 denying petitioners’ motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the movant's motion to quash writ of execution and notice of levy and motion to issue temporary
restraining order and/or injunction is hereby denied for lack of merit.11
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 which was, however, denied by the RTC in its
Order13 dated December 3, 2003.
Adamant in excluding Townhouse Unit 320 from execution, petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari 14 with the
CA assailing the August 5, 2003 and December 3, 2003 Orders of the RTC. On February 7,
2006, the CA issued a Decision denying petitioners’ petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA ruled that a prior registration of a lien creates a preference and that whatever right over the property
petitioners acquired became subordinate and subject to the duly recorded and annotated attachment and levy.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 17,
2006.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioners raising a lone issue for this Court's resolution, to wit:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE POWER OF
THE COURT IN [THE] EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT EXTENDS ONLY TO PROPERTIES UNQUESTIONABLY
BELONGING TO THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR.16
The petition is not meritorious.
The main issue in this case is whether or not a registered writ of attachment is a superior lien over that of an
unregistered deed of sale. The same is not novel.
Petitioners argue that at the time the property was levied, the same was already in their names. Petitioners thus
posit that, since they are not the judgment debtors, their property should not be the subject of execution.
Petitioners’ arguments deserve scant consideration.
Since the subject property is covered by a Torrens Title, the law applicable is Section 51 17 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529. Said provision provides:
SEC. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage,
lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds,
mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Registry
of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds
for the province or the city where the land lies.18
The preference given to a duly registered levy on attachment or execution over a prior unregistered sale is well
settled in our jurisdiction. This is because registration is the operative act that binds or affects the land insofar as
third persons are concerned.19 It is upon registration that there is notice to the whole world.20
Petitioners cannot escape the fact that when they registered the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 5, 1995, a writ
of attachment was already inscribed on TCT No. 127330 as early as November 18, 1994. Accordingly, when TCT
No. 127330 was cancelled and TCT No. 134590 was issued in petitioners’ name, the notice of levy on attachment
was carried over in the new title. It bears stressing that at the time of the inscription of the writ of attachment,
Townhouse Unit 320 was still in the name of Benito.
In Valdevieso v. Damalerio,21 this Court explained that an attachment is a proceeding in rem and that the right of
ownership of an individual over a sale registered after such attachment is limited and subject to the prior registered
lien, to wit:
The preference created by the levy on attachment is not diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior
sale. This is so because an attachment is a proceeding in rem. It is against the particular property, enforceable
against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can
subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means
that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt. The lien
continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is
satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law.
Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of respondents appeared in the nature of a real lien when petitioner
had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and subordinate the right of
petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien. Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording of
his title in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was not absolute but a limited right, subject to
a prior registered lien of respondents, a right which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.22
It is doctrinal that a levy on attachment, duly registered, has preference over a prior unregistered sale and, even if
the prior unregistered sale is subsequently registered before the sale on execution but after the levy is made, the
validity of the execution sale should be upheld because it retroacts to the date of levy. The priority enjoyed by the
levy on attachment extends, with full force and effect, to the buyer at the auction sale conducted by virtue of such
levy.23
The sale between petitioners and Benito was undoubtedly a valid transaction between them. However, in view of
the prior levy on attachment on the same property, petitioners took the property subject to the attachment.
Petitioners, in buying registered land, stood exactly in the shoes of their vendor, Benito, and their title ipso facto
became subject to the incidents or results of the pending litigation24 between Benito and respondent.
Petitioners may have been in good faith when they bought the property from Benito. So also, petitioners may not
have known about the case filed by respondent against Benito and the resulting grant of a writ of attachment over
Townhouse Unit 320. Be that as it may, this Court is concerned not with actual or personal knowledge, but
constructive notice through registration in the Register of Deeds. Otherwise stated, what this Court should follow is
the annotation (or lack thereof) on the original title on file with the Register of Deeds, not on the duplicate title in the
hands of private parties.25 Furthermore, when a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is constructive
notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. Under the rule on notice, it is presumed
that the purchaser has examined every instrument on record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrefutable and
cannot be overcome by any claim of innocence or good faith.26
There is, however, a known exception to the above-mentioned rules, that is, when a party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him.27 Knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to
registration.28 Thus, if it can be proven that respondent, at the time of the institution of the proceedings before the
RTC, had knowledge of the sale between petitioners and Benito, the same would be considered equivalent to
registration as to him. As far as petitioners are concerned, however, other than their bare allegation that respondent
was aware of the sale of the subject property to them by Benito, the records of the case show no evidentiary proof
that respondent had knowledge of such transaction prior to the institution of the proceedings before the RTC.
This Court is mindful of one of the arguments raised by petitioners in the proceedings below which was that they
derived their right over the property from Philippine American Life Insurance (PHILAM). Petitioners argue that prior
to the annotation of the attachment lien in favor of respondent, the subject property was already mortgaged to
PHILAM. Thus, petitioners theorize that the mortgage lien in favor of PHILAM is superior to the attachment lien in
favor of respondent.29
The same is without merit.
Petitioners claim in their narration of facts that after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 27, 1994,
they notified PHILAM and coordinated with it for the release of the mortgage upon the full payment of Benito’s debt.
PHILAM allegedly required petitioners to first secure a mortgage, but because of the tedious process, PHILAM finally
decided to forego the said plan. Instead, PHILAM allowed petitioners to pay of the mortgage debt of Benito. It was
only on January 3, 1995 when petitioners finally settled Benito’s obligation. Two days after, a Release of Real Estate
Mortgage30 was executed by PHILAM.31
In Biñan Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,32 this Court ruled that the approval of the mortgagee is essential for
the perfection of a sale with assumption of mortgage, to wit:
The Garcias claim they acquired the subject property by means of a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage dated
June 29, 1998, meaning they purchased the property ahead of the inscription of the levy on attachment thereon on
July 27, 1994. But, even if consensual, not all contracts of sale become automatically and immediately effective.
In Ramos vs. Court of Appeals we held:
In sales with assumption of mortgage, the assumption of mortgage is a condition precedent to the seller’s consent
and, therefore, without approval of the mortgagee, the sale is not perfected.331avvphi1
Applied to the case at bar, it is undisputed that the release of the mortgage only occurred on January 5, 1995, when
a Release of Real Estate Mortgage was issued by PHILAM. In addition, notwithstanding PHILAM's approval of the
sale and the assumption of mortgage entered into by petitioners and Benito, there was still another step petitioners
had to take and it was the registration of the sale from Benito to them. To stress, as provided for in Section 51 of PD
No. 1529, the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned. Thus, as far as respondent is concerned, his attachment lien, inscribed on November 18, 1994, is
superior to whatever right petitioners had by virtue of the Deed of Sale which was only duly registered on January
5, 1995.
Lastly, this Court notes of the finality of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 49959, granting respondent's partial
appeal to have Townhouse Unit 320 subject to attachment. The finality of said decision is a necessary consequence
of this Court's denial of petitioners' appeal in G.R. No. 147339. This Court may have disposed of petitioners' appeal
via a minute resolution, but it is settled that when a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to
comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal
conclusions, are deemed sustained.34 Petitioners once came to this Court asking for the
exclusion of the subject property from attachment, it would certainly be iniquitous to allow them to raise the same
issue all over again a second time.
Withal, while this Court sympathizes with petitioners’ plight, law and jurisprudence support respondent's case. It
bears to stress that a levy on attachment, duly registered, has preference over a prior unregistered sale and, even
if the prior unregistered sale is subsequently registered before the sale on execution but after the levy is made, the
validity of the execution sale should be upheld because it retroacts to the date of levy. At any rate, petitioners,
however, are not without recourse, as they may seek reimbursement from Benito.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The February 7, 2006 Decision and April 17, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81382, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150654 December 13, 2007
HEIRS OF ANACLETO B. NIETO, namely, SIXTA P. NIETO, EULALIO P. NIETO, GAUDENCIO P. NIETO, and
CORAZON P. NIETO-IGNACIO, represented by EULALIO P. NIETO, Petitioners,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, represented by MAYOR EDUARDO ALARILLA, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated October 30, 2001, which
dismissed the petition for review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The latter
dismissed a complaint to recover possession of a registered land on the ground of prescription and laches.
The antecedents are as follows:
Anacleto Nieto was the registered owner of a parcel of land, consisting of 3,882 square meters, situated at Poblacion,
Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-24.055 (M). The property is being used by respondent,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which constructed an extension of the public market therein.
Upon Anacleto’s death on July 26, 1993, his wife, Sixta P. Nieto, and their three children, namely, Eulalio P. Nieto,
Gaudencio Nieto and Corazon Nieto-Ignacio, herein petitioners, collated all the documents pertaining to his estate.
When petitioners failed to locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24.055 (M), they filed a petition for the
issuance of a second owner’s copy with the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan. In that case, petitioners discovered that the
missing copy of the title was in the possession of the respondent. Consequently, petitioners withdrew the petition
and demanded from respondent the return of property and the certificate of title.
On February 23, 1994, petitioners formally demanded from respondent the return of the possession and full control
of the property, and payment of a monthly rent with interest from January 1964. Respondent did not comply with
petitioners’ demand.2
On December 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint3 for recovery of possession and damages against respondent
alleging that the latter was in possession of the owner’s copy of TCT No. T-24.055 (M). They averred that, in 1966,
respondent occupied the subject property by making it appear that it would expropriate the same. Respondent then
used the land as a public market site and leased the stalls therein to several persons without paying Anacleto Nieto
the value of the land or rent therefor. Petitioners prayed that respondent be ordered to surrender to them the owner’s
copy of TCT No. T-24.055 (M), vacate the property, and pay them the rents thereon from 1966 until the date of the
filing of the complaint for the total of ₱1,716,000.00, and ₱10,000.00 a month thereafter, as well as ₱300,000.00 as
moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
In its Answer,4 respondent alleged that the property was donated to it and that the action was already time-barred
because 32 years had elapsed since it possessed the property.
Respondent and counsel failed to appear during the scheduled pre-trial conference.5 Upon petitioners’ motion,
respondent was declared as in default and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte. Respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration which the RTC granted. Respondent was then allowed to cross-examine petitioners’
lone witness and present its own evidence. However, despite notice, respondent failed again to appear during the
scheduled hearing. Hence, the RTC considered respondent to have waived its right to cross-examine petitioners’
witness and present its own evidence. The case was then submitted for decision.
On August 1, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint as well as respondent’s counterclaims
for damages. For lack of proof, the RTC disregarded respondent’s claim that Anacleto Nieto donated the property
to it in light of the fact that the title remained in the name of Anacleto. Nonetheless, the RTC did not rule in favor of
petitioners because of its finding that the case was already barred by prescription. It held that the imprescriptibility
of actions to recover land covered by the Torrens System could only be invoked by the registered owner, Anacleto
Nieto, and that the action was also barred by laches.
Petitioners appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). On October 30, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. According to the CA, the petition involved a pure question of law; hence,
petitioners should have filed a petition directly with this Court.6
Accordingly, petitioners elevated the case to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:
A. Are lands covered by the Torrens System subject to prescription?
B. May the defense of [l]aches be invoked in this specific case?
C. May the defense of imprescriptibility only be invoked by the registered owner to the exclusion of his legitimate
heirs?7
The petition is meritorious.
Respondent argues that the action of petitioner to recover possession of the property is already barred by
prescription.
We do not agree.
An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes in view of the provision of Section 44 of Act
No. 496 to the effect that no title to registered land in derogation of that of a registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.8 It follows that an action by the registered owner to recover a real property
registered under the Torrens System does not prescribe.
Despite knowledge of this avowed doctrine, the trial court ruled that petitioners’ cause of action had already
prescribed on the ground that the imprescriptibility to recover lands registered under the Torrens System can only
be invoked by the person under whose name the land is registered.
Again, we do not agree. It is well settled that the rule on imprescriptibility of registered lands not only applies to the
registered owner but extends to the heirs of the registered owner as well.9 Recently in Mateo v. Diaz,10 the Court
held that prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner, but also against his hereditary successors
because the latter step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are the continuation of the personality
of their predecessor-in-interest. Hence, petitioners, as heirs of Anacleto Nieto, the registered owner, cannot be
barred by prescription from claiming the property.
Aside from finding that petitioners’ cause of action was barred by prescription, the trial court reinforced its dismissal
of the case by holding that the action was likewise barred by laches.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert his right has either
abandoned or declined to assert it.11
In a number of cases, the Court has held that an action to recover registered land covered by the Torrens System
may not be barred by laches.12 Laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal
right.13 Laches, which is a principle based on equity, may not prevail against a specific provision of law, because
equity, which has been defined as "justice outside legality," is applied in the absence of and not against statutory
law or rules of procedure.14
In recent cases, 15 however, the Court held that while it is true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible,
the registered landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.
Yet, even if we apply the doctrine of laches to registered lands, it would still not bar petitioners’ claim. It should be
stressed that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time.16 The following elements must be present in
order to constitute laches:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant’s
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.17
We note that the certificate of title in the name of Anacleto Nieto was found in respondent’s possession but there
was no evidence that ownership of the property was transferred to the municipality either through a donation or by
expropriation, or that any compensation was paid by respondent for the use of the property. Anacleto allegedly
surrendered the certificate of title to respondent upon the belief that the property would be expropriated. Absent any
showing that this certificate of title was fraudulently obtained by respondent, it can be presumed that Anacleto
voluntarily delivered the same to respondent. Anacleto’s delivery of the certificate of title to respondent could,
therefore, be taken to mean acquiescence to respondent’s plan to expropriate the property, or a tacit consent to the
use of the property pending its expropriation.
This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the
property upon demand.18 The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease
has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.19 Upon the refusal to vacate the
property, the owner’s cause of action accrues.
In this case, the first element of laches occurred the moment respondent refused to vacate the property, upon
petitioners demand, on February 23, 1994. The filing of the complaint on December 28, 1994, after the lapse of a
period of only ten months, cannot be considered as unreasonable delay amounting to laches.
Moreover, case law teaches that if the claimant’s possession of the land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the
latter’s right to recover possession is never barred by laches. Even if it be supposed that petitioners were aware of
respondent’s occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all.20
Furthermore, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the
better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of laches when by doing so, manifest wrong or injustice would result.21
Finally, we find that the rentals being prayed for by petitioners are reasonable considering the size and location of
the subject property. Accordingly, the award of rentals is warranted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, dated August 1, 1995, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent is ORDERED (a) to vacate and
surrender peaceful possession of the property to petitioners, or pay the reasonable value of the property; (b) to pay
₱1,716,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use of the property from 1966 until the filing of the complaint
and ₱10,000.00 monthly rental thereafter until it vacates the property, with 12% interest from the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; and (c) to return to petitioners the duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24.055 (M).
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205867 February 23, 2015
MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA, represented by JOVIER TAGUFA, Petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIA TAGUFA, ROBERTO TAGUFA and ROGELIO LUMABAN, Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 13, 2012
Decision1 and the January 25, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122648 which
reversed and set aside the July 1, 2011 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela (RTC),
in an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession.
The Facts:
The undisputed facts were succinctly summarized in the August 31, 2010 Decision4 of the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Tumauini-Delfin Albano, Tumauini, Isabela (MCTC) before which a complaint5 for Reconveyance and
Recovery of Possession with Damages was filed by petitioner Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela (Hortizuela)represented
by Jovier Tagufa against respondents Gregoria Tagufa, Roberto Tagufa and Rogelio Lumaban (respondents). As
quoted by the CA, said undisputed facts are:
Gleaned from the joint testimonies of R[u]nsted Tagufa xxx and Jovier Tagufa xxx are the following facts:
The property involved in this case is a parcel of land located at District IV, Tumauini, Isabela containing an area of
539 square meters, more or less, and covered by OCT No. P-84609 of the Registry of Deeds of Isabela. By virtue
of the special power of attorney xxx executed by Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela, Jovier Tagufa instituted this case against
herein defendants praying for the peaceful surrender of the above-described property unto them and further ordering
defendant Gregoria Tagufa to reconvey in plaintiff’s favor the same property which was titled under her name via
fraud.
Before it was titled in the name of Defendant Tagufa, said property was originally owned by plaintiff’s parents,
Spouses Epifanio Tagufa and Godofreda Jimenez. Although untitled, the spouses mortgaged the property with the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for brevity). For failure to redeem the property, DBP foreclosed the
same and sold it to Atty. Romulo Marquez xxx who, in turn, sold it back to Runsted Tagufa, husband of defendant
Gregoria Tagufa, on April 4, 2002 xxx using the fund sent by plaintiff Hortizuela who was in America and with the
agreement that Runsted will reconvey the said property to her sister when demanded. However, plaintiff discovered
that the same unregistered property was titled in the name of Gregoria Tagufa under OCT No. P-84609 of the
Registry of Deeds of Isabela xxx. Investigating further, plaintiff discovered that Gregoria Tagufa was able to title the
said property by virtue of a free patent application before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and the execution of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Spouses Leandro Tagufa
and Remedios Talosig dated May 9,2003 xxx. Plaintiff now seeks to recover possession of the said property which
is presently occupied by Gregoria Tagufa and her co-defendants and have the same be reconveyed unto them.6
In its Order, dated May 5, 2010,the MCTC granted the motion to declare defendants in default and allowed Hortizuela
to present her evidence ex parte. Thereafter, on August 31, 2010, the MCTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit ruling that "in the judicious analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of action."7
Not in conformity, Hortizuela appealed to the RTC. In its July 1, 2011 Decision, the RTC reversed the MCTC ruling.
The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby granted and the Decision dated August 31, 2010, is hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Gregorio Tagufa to reconvey to the plaintiff Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela the land described
in paragraph 4 of the complaint;
2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the same land and to surrender the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the following amounts, jointly and severally:
a) Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as Moral Damages;
b) Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) Pesos as Attorney’s Fees.
SO DECIDED.8
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC.
The reversal being unacceptable to them, respondents filed a petition for review before the CA questioning the RTC
decision. This time, the case was disposed in their favor. According to the CA, although Hortizuela filed with the
MCTC a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession of the subject lot, she was also questioning the
validity of the Torrens title, Original Certificate of Title (OCT)No. P-846609.9 The CA pointed out that this was in
contravention of Section 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1529 which provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law
It cited the well-settled rule that a Torrens title could not be collaterally attacked; that the issue of whether or not the
title was fraudulently issued, could only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose; and that an
action for reconveyance and recovery of possession was not the direct action contemplated by law. 10 Hence, the
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 1, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The present Complaint for reconveyance and recovery
of possession with damages is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
Hortizuela filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution,12 dated January 25, 2013.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTIONFOR RECONVEYANCE AND RECOVERY OF POSSESSION CONSTITUTES
AN INDIRECT OR COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE SUBJECT CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
WHICH IS PROSCRIBED BY LAW.
Hortizuela claims that respondent Gregoria Tagufa (Gregoria),being the wife of Runsted, was certainly aware that
the subject land was actually sold by Atty. Romulo Marquez (Atty. Marquez) to her (Hortizuela). Runsted, only acted
as attorney-in-fact in the sale transaction. Thus, the action for reconveyance was not a collateral attack on the said
title because Hortizuela was not seeking the nullification of the title, but rather the reconveyance of the property,
covered by the said title, which Gregoria was holding in trust for her benefit as the real owner. Gregoria should,
therefore, reconvey the property and its title to her, being the rightful owner.
Position of Respondents
Respondents counter that although Hortizuela’s complaint was denominated as one for reconveyance and recovery
of possession, its main objective was to nullify the title held by Gregoria over the subject property. For said reason,
the complaint would amount to a collateral attack on the title which was proscribed under the principle of
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. To rule that the action for reconveyance was not a collateral one would result in the
nullity of the decree of registration.
Another argument that respondents want this Court to consider in resolving the subject petition is the fact that the
overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession was that
she failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 3813 of Act 496 within the prescribed period of one (1) year,
counted from the issuance of the free patent by the government.
Finally, granting that the title over the property would be nullified and the property be reconveyed to Hortizuela, still
the latter would be ineligible to own the same pursuant to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 223 which requires, among
others, that an applicant for a free patent must be a Filipino citizen. Hortizuela, by her own admission, is an American
citizen who has been residing in Las Vegas, Nevada.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The Court is not unmindful of the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title and Section 48 of P.D. No. 1528 where
it is provided that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. 14 A Torrens title cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. When the Court says direct attack, it
means that the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other
hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or
proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.15 In its decision, the MCTC wrote:
Obviously, the bone of contention in this case are the deed of sale by and between Romulo Marquez and Runsted
Tagufa, the estranged husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, and OCT No. P-84609 registered in the name of
Gregoria Tagufa who, according to the plaintiff, fraudulently caused the titling of the same.
In their lamentations, plaintiff pointed out the following indicia of fraud committed by GregoriaTagufa that would
allegedly justify reconveyance:
First, Gregoria Tagufa made it appear in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of spouses Leandro Tagufa and
Remedios Talosig that she is an heir when, in truth, she is only a grand daughter-in-law,
Second, she already knew when she applied for free patent that plaintiff was already the owner of the land she was
applying for;
Third, she already knew that when she applied for free patent that plaintiff’s parents were not anymore the owners
of the land as the same was mortgaged with the DBP; and
Fourth, defendant has never been in actual possession of the property when she applied for it.
All in all, plaintiff argued, Gregoria Tagufa never acquired any valid right or legal title over the property.
Studying the merits of this case and removing all its superfluities, plaintiffs plainly question the title generated in the
name of defendant Gregoria Tagufa having been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. However, in the judicious
analysis by this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of action.16
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the MCTC was convinced that fraud was attendant in the registration of
the land but was not convinced that reconveyance was an accepted remedy. Contrary to the pronouncements of
the MCTC and the CA, however, the complaint of Hortizuela was not a collateral attack on the title warranting
dismissal. As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available
to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name. In an action
for reconveyance, the decree is not sought to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree but, respecting
it as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner
to the rightful owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third
person for value.17 There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the case at bench, can only be questioned
through a direct proceeding. The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to take into account that in a complaint for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What is being
sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name to its rightful owner or
to the one with a better right. If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.18
The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest ownership upon her of the
subject land. "Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular
property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in
favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons
not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner." 19
Furthermore, respondents’ argument that the overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her name did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the
reconveyance and recovery of possession was that she failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 38 of subject land.1âwphi1 Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because
Act 496 within the prescribed period of one (1) year, counted from the issuance of the patent by the government, is it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
weak. As was similarly held in Cervantes v. CA,20 with the land obtained by respondent Gregoria through fraudulent particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be used
machinations by means of which a free patent and a title were issued in her name, she was deemed to have held it as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its
in trust for the benefit of Hortizuela who was prejudiced by her actions. Article 1456 provides: ARTICLE 1456. If issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner. 26
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Finally, respondents' supposition that Hortizuela was ineligible to own the subject property pursuant to B.P. Blg. 223
The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529 and Article 1456, prescribes in ten (10) years because she was no longer a Filipino citizen cannot be considered for having been raised only for the first time on
from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. appeal. It must be noted that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
The Court is not unaware of the rule that a fraudulently acquired free patent may only be assailed by the government court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.27 The
in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.21 In Sherwill Development Corporation v. reason therefor is due process.
Sitio Sto. Niño Residents Association, Inc.,22 this Court pointed out that: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 13, 2012 Decision and the January 25, 2013 Resolution
x x x It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122648 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 1, 2011
allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly-authorized Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby RE INST A TED.
officers, to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, SO ORDERED.
thru the Solicitor General or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for
the reversion of the land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in
accordance with law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an
investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is
to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for
reversion may be filed by the Government.23
An action for reconveyance is proper
The foregoing rule is, however, not without exception. A recognized exception is that situation where plaintiff-
claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant of publicland unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by him, on
the principle of enforcement of a constructive trust. This was the ruling in Larzano v. Tabayag, Jr.,24 where it was
written:
A private individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title thereof was issued
through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside
the decree of registration, but only to show that the person who secured the registration of the questioned property
is not the real owner thereof.
In Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, we stated that if a patent had already been issued through fraud or mistake and has been
registered, the remedy of a party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance,
thus:
It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the decree
issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is not to annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs.
Fraudulent statements were made in the application for the patent and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor
knowledge of the petition known to the actual possessors and occupants of the property. The action is one based
on fraud and under the law, it can be instituted within four years from the discovery of the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil
Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as the patent here has already
been issued, the land has the character of registered property in accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of
Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party who has been injured by the fraudulent
registration is an action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Registered of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz.
[3] 935; Section 55 of Act No. 496.)
In the same vein, in Quiñiano, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., we stressed that:
The controlling legal norm was set forth in succinct language by Justice Tuason in a 1953 decision, Director of Lands
v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: "The sole remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree,
as was done in the instant case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages." Such a doctrine goes back to the 1919 landmark decision of
Cabanos v. Register of Deeds of Laguna. If it were otherwise the institution of registration would, to quote from
Justice Torres, serve "as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith ...." In the language of the then Justice,
later Chief Justice, Bengzon: "A different view would encourage fraud and permit one person unjustly to enrich
himself at the expense of another." It would indeed be a signal failing of any legal system if under the circumstances
disclosed, the aggrieved party is considered as having lost his right to a property to which he is entitled. It is one
thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter, and one devoid of justification, if [deceit] would
be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the
undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be
guarded against. So it has been before; so it should continue to be. (Citations omitted)
In this case, in filing the complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession, Hortizuela was not seeking a
reconsideration of the granting of the patent or the decree issued in the registration proceedings. What she was
seeking was the reconveyance of the subject property on account of the fraud committed by respondent Gregoria.
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful landowner, whose land was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey
the land to him.25 Thus, the RTC did not err in upholding the right of Hortizuela to ask for the reconveyance of the
subject property. To hold otherwise would be to make the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud. To
reiterate,
G.R. No. 133168 March 28, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,1
vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO, Respondent.
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision2 dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50298 affirming an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-3899, entitled "Petition for
Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin
Guerrero, Registry of Deeds of Quezon City."
The assailed decision of the CA recites the facts as follows:
Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands
Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-83191 covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad
Lawin, Quezon City, consisting of 256 square meters. Upon favorable report and recommendation of the District
Land Officer, Guerrero’s application was approved per Order of Award (Exhibit "B"), with the boundaries of the land
awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-Culiat Creek; E-Road; and W-Public Land. A sketch of
the land awarded is contained at the back of the Order of Award.
Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982 was issued in favor of respondent.
Pursuant thereto the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982.
On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that respondent
obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering that
174 square meters awarded to respondent covered the land where her house is situated and where she has been
residing since 1961.
A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the Director of Lands issued an order
dismissing the protest of Angelina Z. Bustamante. The dismissal of the protest was affirmed by the then Minister of
Natural Resources and by the Office of the President in a Decision dated July 22, 1985.
Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated July 22, 1985. Acting on the motion for
reconsideration, the President, …, ordered that the case be remanded to the DENR [Department of Environment
and Natural Resources] for the latter’s office to conduct an ocular investigation and resurvey of the disputed area.
The said directive is contained in the Order dated October 30, 1987(Exhibit "J").
Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation and relocation survey was conducted by
the DENR. A report (Exhibit "K") was thereafter submitted with a finding that 83 square meters of the titled property
of Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION of Marcelo Bustamante
(husband of Angelina Bustamante) with only 91 square meters under the physical possession of Guerrero. It was
also found out that OCT No. 0-28 is supposed to be traversed by a road 3 meters wide, as even the Order of Award
in favor of Guerrero, shows by the boundaries of the land indicated therein, viz: bounded on the N-Lot No. 10-C,
Psd-37801, S-Culiat Creek, E-Road and W-Public Land.
On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the [DENR] Ocular Investigation and Relocation
Survey Report (Exhibit "K") …, issued an order directing the DENR to implement the … Report for the ‘proper
correction’ of the technical description of the land covered by OCT No. 0-28 issued to respondent.
Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands [on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines] instituted the instant action [Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT No. 0-
28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero] on November 7, 1989.
On April 6, 1990, the [respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss the petition …, alleging among other
things, that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the Director of Lands’ petition and that the said
petition was defective in form and substance, inasmuch as it failed to name [Guerrero] who holds a certificate of title
(OCT No. 0-28) over the properties subject of the petition, as respondent in the action, and that the title sought to
be amended was irrevocable and can no longer be questioned.
In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Trial of the petition
followed with the Director of Lands, on one hand, and [Guerrero], on the other, presenting their respective evidence
and witnesses.3 [Words in bracket added.]
On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to prove its allegation that respondent
obtained the sales patent and the certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation, rendered judgment finding
for the latter. The trial court likewise ruled that the original certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) in the name of respondent
acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of the decree of
registration.
Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a decision dated February 12, 1998, affirmed
that of the trial court, rationalizing as follows:
It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is as conclusive
and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued upon private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration
proceedings. The effect of registration of a homestead or any other similar patent and the issuance of a certificate
of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had
been determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable.
In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be reviewed or reopened within one year after the
entry thereof, upon a charge of actual fraud, a patent awarded in accordance with the Public Land Law may be
reviewed within one year from the date of the order for the issuance of the patent also on the ground of actual fraud.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx there is no showing … that at the time the [respondent] applied for his miscellaneous sales patent, there were
third persons who had been in occupation of the land applied for. While subsequent survey documents, prepared
as a consequence of the protest filed by the Bustamentes, report the possession of the Bustamantes of a portion of
the land, and the erection of their house thereon, these reports do not indicate if such structures were existing at
the time the application of the [respondent] was filed in 1964.
There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent] was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition
of his miscellaneous sales patent, and subsequently, OCT No. 0-28.4 (Words in bracket added)
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied by the appellate court
in its resolution of March 23, 1998.5
Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the appellate court erred in holding -
I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is conclusive and indefeasible
despite the fact that respondent’s title was procured through fraud and misrepresentation.
II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his
miscellaneous sales patent despite the final ruling of the Office of the President from which ruling respondent did
not appeal.
III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of possession of a third person of the land, or a portion thereof,
after the award and issuance of the patent to the applicant despite the obvious fact that the protest was filed within
one year from the issuance of patent.6
Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and certificate of title through fraud and
misrepresentation. To support its basic posture, petitioner points to the verification survey conducted by Engr.
Ernesto Erive of the DENR, which, to petitioner, argues for the proposition that respondent’s entitlement to a public
land award should have been limited to a 91-square meter area instead of the 174 square meters eventually granted.
On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he secured pursuant to a sales patent is
conclusive and indefeasible under the Torrens system of registration. As such, his title can no longer be altered,
impugned or cancelled.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this Petition ― the presence of fraud ― is
factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters, as only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. And as the Court has consistently held, factual findings of trial
courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this Court,7 save when the judgment of
the appellate court is based on a misapprehension of facts or factual inferences manifestly incorrect or when that
court overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.8 Obviously,
petitioner is invoking these exceptions toward having the Court review the factual determinations of the CA.
The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent procured Miscellaneous Sales Patent (MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 through fraud and
misrepresentation.
It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and disposed of via
a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought
under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens
system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the
person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon
noted or what the law warrants or reserves.9 As it were, the Torrens system aims to obviate possible conflicts of title
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the
necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that
he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land. 10
Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands … belonging to the Government of the [Republic of the Philippines] are alienated,
granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of
alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument before its delivery to the
grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to be there registered like
other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an
owner’s duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the
Government shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the
Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The
act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act registration
shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. xxx. (Words in bracket added)
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and again,
we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose
name appears thereon.11
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to reopen
or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. Section 38 of Act No. 496 says so:
SEC. 38. ― xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions
stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the [Republic of the
Philippines] and all the branches thereof, …. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, minority,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or
decrees, subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court]
a petition for review of the decree of registration within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate
of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx. (Emphasis and words in bracket supplied)
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced
by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud
because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though the act is not
done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.12
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an
issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein.
The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting
their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.13
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is
contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party
deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not
contested when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in deliberately failing
to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in misrepresenting about the
identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw his application. In all these
examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the
jurisdiction of the court.14
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud goes into the
merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided. Thus, we have underscored
the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed forged
document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent compromise agreement, or
in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting
the case.15
Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of the decree constitute actual
and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that respondent employed actual and
extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove
that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason
of such fraud. In fact, other than its peremptory statement in its petition filed before the trial court that "the patentee,
Benjamin Guerrero, obtained the above indicated sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or
omission of material facts,"16 petitioner did not specifically allege how fraud was perpetrated by respondent in
procuring the sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor was any evidence proffered to substantiate the allegation.
Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof. 17 The
circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different
shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways.18 Thus, the law requires that fraud be established,
not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.19
Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report20 which stated that respondent Guerrero was entitled to only
91 square meters of the subject lot instead of 174 square meters which was awarded to him. There is, however, no
proof that the area eventually awarded to respondent was intentionally and fraudulently increased. It was never
proven that respondent was a party to any fraud that led to the award of a bigger area of 174 square meters instead
of 91 square meters. Petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error which may have been committed by
its agents who had surveyed the subject property nor had petitioner offered a sensible explanation as to the reason
for such discrepancy. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions must be respected.
This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the subject lot was made in accordance
with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act.21 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the veracity
of the material facts set out in the application.22 The law also requires sufficient notice to the municipality and barrio
where the land is located in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims.23
In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day after respondent filed his miscellaneous sales
application, an actual investigation and site verification of the parcel of land was conducted by Land Investigator
Alfonso Tumbocon who reported that the land was free from claims and conflicts.24 Likewise, the notice of sale of
the lot in question was posted at the District Land Office in San Miguel, Manila, at the Quezon City Hall, and at
Pugad Lawin, Quezon City for 30 consecutive days from February 17, 1965 to March 17, 1965 which was the date
scheduled for the sale of the lot. The said notice was worded as follows:
If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at the Bureau of Lands, Manila on or before the
date of the sale; otherwise such claim shall forever be barred.25
Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the "Issuance of Patent" 27 dated June 28, 1982
were both duly signed by the Director of Lands. The "Order of Award" even declared that Guerrero has in good faith
established his residence on the land in question. On the other hand, the "Issuance of Patent" stated that the land
consisting of 174 square meters is free from any adverse claim and that Guerrero has fully paid the purchase price
of the lot. Having complied with all the requirements of the law preliminary to the issuance of the patent, respondent
was thus issued MSP No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding OCT No. 0-28 was issued on
August 27, 1982 in the name of respondent Guerrero.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have regularly performed their official duties. Thus,
the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of MSP No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 in respondent’s
name are presumptively regular and proper. To overturn this legal presumption will not only endanger judicial
stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted
legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage.28 Besides, this presumption of regularity has not been
overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner. We, therefore, cannot sustain petitioner’s contention that fraud
tainted the sales patent granted to respondent Guerrero, as well as the certificate of title issued in consequence
thereof.
Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to avail itself of the remedy within the
prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration
must be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree.
In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the issuance of the patent by the
government.29
In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16, 1982, while petitioner instituted an
action to amend respondent’s certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years
from the issuance of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to timely avail of the remedy to contest Guerrero’s title.
Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully acquired property is not barred by
prescription. Thus, it can still recover the land granted to respondent.
True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter may still bring an action, even after the
lapse of one year, for the reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to private
individuals.30 However, this remedy of reversion can only be availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion
of the land in patents or certificates of title. In the present case, petitioner cannot successfully invoke this defense
for, as discussed earlier, it was never proven that respondent’s patent and title were obtained through actual fraud
or other illegal means.
Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent and the corresponding certificate of title ceases
to be part of the public domain. As such, it is considered a private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction.31
Petitioner likewise insists that respondent’s title had yet to attain the status of indefeasibility. As argued, Angelina
Bustamante was able to timely file a protest on July 29, 1983, which was well within the one-year prescriptive period.
We do not agree.
While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in favor of respondent, the protest was,
however, filed with the Bureau of Lands instead of with the regional trial court as mandated by the aforequoted
provision of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said provision expressly states that a petition for review of a decree of
registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance" (now Regional Trial Court). The law did not say that
such petition may be filed with an administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what the law
contemplates in allowing a review of the decree of registration is a full-blown trial before a regular court where each
party could be afforded full opportunity to present his/its case and where each of them must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence and not by mere substantial evidence, the usual quantum of proof required in
administrative proceedings. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. 32 On
the other hand, substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.33
As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of land titles and the Torrens
system, a full-blown trial on the merits before a regular court is necessary for the purpose of achieving a more in-
depth and thorough determination of all issues involved.
Hence, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante with the Bureau of Lands cannot be
considered in the context of a petition to review the decree of registration issued to respondent. It was only on
November 7, 1989 that such petition was filed by the Director of Lands with the RTC and obviously, it was way
beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.
It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller’s
title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This
would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would
be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive
investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more
abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be
the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.34
Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the amendment of OCT No. 0-28, derogates
the very integrity of the system as it gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like herein respondent, that their
titles can be questioned by the same authority who had approved their titles. In that case, no Torrens title holder
shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land, for land registration officers can question his title
any time they make a finding unfavorable to said title holder. This is all the more frustrating for respondent Guerrero
considering that he had bought the subject lot from the government itself, the very same party who is now impugning
his title.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to
lands,35 justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage
to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question
as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may
arise subsequent thereto.36 Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude
and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 37
Respondent’s certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was thus vested with the garment
of indefeasibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17956 September 30, 1963
ELISA D. GABRIEL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, respondent,
JUANITA R. DOMINGO, oppositor-appellant.
Romualdo D. Celestra for petitioner-appellee.
Balcos, Salazar & Associates for oppositor-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On January 4, 1960, petitioner herein Elisa D. Gabriel, filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila, an Adverse claim,
against the properties registered in the name of oppositor-appellant, Juanita R. Domingo, her sister. As grounds for
the adverse claim, petitioner allege —
Notwithstanding the registration of the foregoing properties in the name of Juanita R. Domingo, the same properties
have been included in the amended inventory of the estate of the late Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo, filed by
Elisa Domingo de Gabriel1 as they are in fact properties acquired by the deceased during her lifetime. The
registration of the titles of these properties,; should have been made in the name of said Antonia Reyes Vda. de
Dominga, but due to commission of fraud and deceit, by said Juanita R. Domingo, who was then living in the same
house with the deceased, all the titles of the above stated properties were registered instead in her name, thus
depriving herein adverse claimant who is likewise an heir of Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo of her lawful rights,
interests and participations over said properties.
On the same date, a similar notice of adverse claim was presented by petitioner with the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
on the properties registered in the name of Juanita R. Domingo, located in Rizal Province, the ground for which was
stated as follows —
The foregoing properties an included in the amended inventory of the estate of their late mother Antonia Reyes Vda,
de Domingo, who is the true owner of said properties, and considering that the registrations in the name of Juanita
R. Domingo were only made fraudulently, thus depriving herein adverse claimant of her lawful rights, interest and
participations over said properties.
For the adverse claim on the Manila properties, Domingo presented an opposition, claiming that the Adverse claim
was instituted for (1) Harassment;(2) Had no legal basis; and (3) Had done and will do irreparable loss her.
The Register of Deeds of Manila, elevated the matter to the Land Registration Commission en Consulta, where in
he stated —
Because the undersigned is in doubt as to whether the registration of the claim is proper determination by this
Commission.
Oppositor Domingo also asked that the adverse claim of Gabriel on her Rizal properties be denied, contending that
same was presented only to embarrass her that said properties were acquired by her pursuant to an extrajudicial
partition in which the petitioner Gabriel and their mother (Antonia), were signatories.
On January 13, 1960, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied registration of the Notice of Adverse Claim, stating —
P.E. No. 90080 — NOTICE OF ADVERSE CLAIM has have been found to be legally defective or otherwise not
sufficient in law and is/are therefore, hereby denied on the following ground:
Where there are other provisions of remedies under this Act, the affidavit of adverse claim is not applicable.
Under date of January 21, 1960, Elisa D. Gabriel appealed the above denial to the Land Registration
Commission.1awphîl.nèt
On February 17, 1960, the Register of Deeds of Rizal in his letter transmitting the case to the LRC, tried justify his
denial to annotate the affidavit of Adverse claim, by pointing out that such procedure was not proper contending that
petitioner's case does not come under the provisions of Section 110 of Act 496. if at all, he claims petitioner should
have availed Section 98 thereof.
On March 7, 1960, the LRC heard the two cases, and before any of the parties could file his memorandum, the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, presented a Supplemental Memorandum, reiterating his stand. In his reply, Gabriel
clarified the issue, stating that the question at bar concerns the fraudulent registration by oppositor, of the properties
subject of the Adverse claims, and not their fraudulent acquisition.
The Land Registration Commission, on April 29, 1960, issued a resolution, the pertinent portions of which are
reproduced hereinbelow —
The only question to be resolved by this Commission in these related consultas the registration of the two notices
of adverse claim filed with the Registries of Manila and Rizal. Whether or not these adverse claims are valid, whether
or not they are frivolous and merely intended to harass, and such other litigious matters raised by the protagonists,
are for a Court of competent jurisdiction, and not for this Commission to decide.
Sec. 110 of Act No. 496 provides that —
Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the
date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the same, make
statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, and a reference
to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the
right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a place
at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim
and the court, upon petition of any party in interest, shall grant a specific hearing upon the question of the validity of
such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is adjudged
to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the court after notice and hearing shall find that a
claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant. double or treble the costs in its
discretion.
It is believed that the two notices of adverse claim filed both registries substantially comply with the above legal
requirements. And under paragraph 5 of the LRC Circular No. 2, dated July 10. 1954, where the document sought
to be registered is sufficient in law and drawn up in accordance with existing requirements, it, becomes incumbent
upon the Register of Deeds to perform his ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
The registration of an invalid adverse claim will not do as much harm as the non-registration of a valid one. The
notation of an adverse claim, like that of lis pendens, does not create non-existent right or lien and only means that
a person who chases or contracts on the property in dispute does so subject to the result or outcome of the dispute....
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing facts and considerations, this Commission is of the opinion, and so holds, that the notices
of verse claim filed by Elisa D. Gabriel with the Registries of Manila and Rizal are registrable. Registration should
not however be confused with validity. The registration of the adverse claim will not by itself alone make them valid.
Their validity will ultimately decided in Special Proceeding No. 2658 or, in alternative, in the more expeditious remedy
provided for in 110 of Act No. 496, i.e., a speedy hearing upon the question the validity of the adverse claim.
Oppositor Domingo moved for a reconsideration of above order, contending, in the main, that a Register Deeds
exercises some degree of judicial power to determine upon his own responsibility, the legality of instruments brought
before him for registration. In other words, oppositor submits that the duties of the Register of Deeds are not wholly
ministerial, for they can refuse, and/or suspend the registration of documents when they think they are not valid or
not registrable. In denying the motion for reconsideration, the Land Registration Commissioner said, in part —
The only question resolved by this Commission was the registrability of the two notices of adverse claims. The
allegations and counter-allegations of the contending parties on the validity or invalidity of the adverse claims were
not considered. They should be addressed to and decided by a competent court.
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration, oppositor brought the matter to this Court on appeal, claiming that
the Land Registration Commissionerred (1) holding the adverse claims registrable; and (2) in holding that it is the
mandatory duty of the Register of Deeds register the instant notices of adverse claims "whether not they are valid,
"whether or not they are frivolous merely intended to harass."
In addition to the well-taken disquisitions of the L.R.C., it should be observed that section 110 of Act No. 496, which
is the legal provision applicable to the case, is divided into two parts: the first refers to the duty of the party who
claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner, subsequent to the date of the original
registration; and the requirements to be complied with in order that such statement shall been titled to registration
as an adverse claim, thus showing the ministerial function of the Register of Deeds, when no defect is found on the
face of such instrument; and the second applies only when, after registration of the adverse claim, a party files an
appropriate petition with a competent court which shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of
such adverse claim, and to enter a decree, as justice and equity require; and in this hearing, the competent court
shall resolve whether the adverse claim is frivolous or vexatious, which shall serve as the basis in taxing the costs.
In the instant case, the first part was already acted upon by the L.P.C. which resolved in favor of the registrability of
the two adverse claims and this part should have been considered as closed. What is left, is the determination of
the validity of the adverse claims by competent court, after the filing of the corresponding petition for hearing, which
the appellant had not done.
Anent the second assignment of error, the Land Registration Commission did not state that it was mandatory for a
Register of Deeds to register invalid or frivolous documents, or those intended to harass; it merely said that whether
the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court
of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered conform
with the formal and legal requirements for such documents.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Land Registration Commission, holding the registrability of the Adverse Claims
under consideration, should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositor-appellant Juanita R. Domingo.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.
Footnotes
1
Special Proceeding No. 2658, CFI of Rizal, still pending.
G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the
informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it
has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted
to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in
Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have
their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly
stated in the maps which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a
different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who does not
know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin
American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other than the
Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order
to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1)
and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant provisions of
the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled
lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign
neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the
duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that
have developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the
endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified
as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,3 and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land
for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear
on behalf of the State.4 Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes
Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and
Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their
son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his
uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested
that he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-
DENR), which stated that the subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15, 1982."7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of
Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-
04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence
at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the application
of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-
DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos’ possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Court’s
ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was his heirs who appealed the
decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,11 which was
handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the
Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the
registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published
only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when
the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,12 and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments.
The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to
the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable
and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with
the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree or both?13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation
of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered
obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated in June of 2007, the
Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section
14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the
subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and Republic v.
Imperial Credit Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the application,
the property had already been "converted" into private property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under
Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial property,"
while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented
Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the period
of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code.
The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances surrounding the
subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the provision,
reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.20 Alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or
(d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may
be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization." 22 Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that right, subject
to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No.
1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was
changed to "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The OSG submits that this amendment restricted
the scope of the lands that may be registered.23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land
Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition." Evidently,
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12, 1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the
right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this
period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at
least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No.
1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of property, including
lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.
The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the
Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
"have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier." That circumstance
may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant
comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor
than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather
than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been
"in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his
title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes
the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn,
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation
of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the
period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has been
amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only
where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting
under this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of
only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property
Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-
interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSG’s approach, all
lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an
implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already
been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since
June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership."
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.25 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length
of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering
that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered
as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time
the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary
pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of
virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even
if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide
claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the
land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the
notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court’s
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,26 the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny
period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession…" That statement, in the
context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again
be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted
by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to
Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved
situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12
June 1945. The Court’s interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt
as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor
of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27 since in the latter, the
application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of possession
that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980.
Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting,
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable
(sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents’ application. Further, the certification
enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting
also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the ground
that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period required by law
would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as
far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them.29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration
under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after
12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years
after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years
before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to
contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize,
and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application
for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945?
It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential
rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[31 ] With such conversion, such property may now
fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who
have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on
a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based their
registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession
only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application for original
registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It
reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property
of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible
to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership
of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property through prescription.
Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,32 or through extraordinary
prescription of thirty (30) years.33 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith,34 as well as
just title.35
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil
Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the
acquisition by prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical
question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least thirty (30) years.36 Yet if we ascertain the source of the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to
Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-
year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by
granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the concept of an owner
for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the
reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the
30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription
under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription
under the Civil Code–ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article
1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession… for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At
present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as
mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule
operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the
Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither
statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,38 similar to our
earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original registration became
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year
period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time,
Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold
true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly,
we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of
Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial
property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the
object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the public domain, whether declared
alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly authorized
government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial
property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of
man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is
only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope
and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment
of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the
Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although declared alienable or
disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws
in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the legislative
branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled
"An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is more commonly
known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions of
military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of
the military camps, the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA)40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41 The President
is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares
that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government properties."43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and disposable.
However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and
Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article
420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding
their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person
or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly
promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned
in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the public
domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession
of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under
the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion
property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency.
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree
and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year
period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription.
Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years
of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1).
Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior
nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere
to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear
intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with
respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land registration procedures
correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over
property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons through
prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is
ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title; and,
under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars
a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any
apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisites–good faith and just
title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127
of the Civil Code,45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the
purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right." Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have actually transferred
ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale
with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive
prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the required period of possession." 47 It is
evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is
the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange,
donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of
possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose
of computing prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to
run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the
patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods
prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the
ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration
of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is
apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial
property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about
by the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act
No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired through
ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration.50 Still, the gap was
lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons
who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor
of persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws,
that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also
be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription,
a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the
Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this decision.
Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of today’s ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property
that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and
the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without
comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing
habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm
powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands, such as through homestead
or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties.52 Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means
to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as
revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential lands on which they
have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their
hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners.
There is much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court
to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only
be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of
such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could
be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
One’s sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but also
to the person’s family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the
political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and
Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.