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Culture, Ecology, and Embodied Cognition
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CULTURE, ECOLOGY, AND EMBODIED COGNITION 1
Culture, Ecology and Embodied Cognition
Jung Yul Kwon, Arthur M. Glenberg, and Michael E. W. Varnum
Department of Psychology, Arizona State University
This preprint in currently under review and has not been published
Preprint date: 12/16/2020

Abstract
In the present paper, we explore the dynamical relationship between culture, body, and embodied
cognition, from the perspective that mental processes cannot be disentangled from our physical
actions, body morphology, sensorimotor systems, and physiological characteristics. First, we
argue the embodiment framework can be useful for investigating how cultural psychological
variations arise. Culture is a product of the cognitive system that evolved foremost to maneuver
the body through its surroundings and thus should be sensitive to chronic features of the
environment constraining bodily processes. Considering the ecological influence on collective
sensorimotor experiences may provide useful insight into how group-level psychological
variations occur. Moreover, embodied processes play an important role in cultural transmission
through which such variations persist. Second, we argue that considering the influence of culture
on bodily processes could offer novel insight into the embodied mind. Culture situates bodily
activity and modifies the existing assumptions about body-environment interactions by shaping
people’s physical and social realities. Culture also shapes people’s chronic sensorimotor
experiences through norms regulating how we comport our bodies and how we should feel.
Third, we argue that culture-specific embodied processes could ultimately facilitate sharing of
meaning within the group by defining how an action should be understood under different
contexts. Finally, we show that this framework which integrates culture, ecology, and embodied
cognition is capable of generating novel hypotheses, and provide a set of new predictions and
implications stemming from this synthesis.
Keywords: culture, ecology, embodied cognition, situated cognition, cultural change

Culture, Ecology, and Embodied Cognition
Suppose you are soon to relocate to a foreign country. What is going through your mind
as you imagine your new everyday life? Depending on the destination, you may be thinking
about getting on the crowded subway in Tokyo, walking around the filthy streets of New York,
or enduring the summer heat of the Sonoran Desert. You may also be anticipating the difficulties
of adjusting to the local customs, etiquette, or body language. In any case, it is likely that many
of one’s concerns would be about how one would feel in a new environment or how one should
move through the new physical and social terrain. And when we do find ourselves in a new
culture, some of the most readily noticeable differences tend to be about how people carry and
express themselves.
Given such pertinence of bodily processes in thinking about cultural experiences, perhaps
it is no surprise that researchers studying culture have long been interested in variables related to
one’s body and its interaction with the physical and social environment. Examples of such work
include cross-cultural differences in nonverbal communication (Efron, 1941/1972; Ekman &
Friesen, 1969; Kita, 2009; Matsumoto & Hwang, 2016), preferred interpersonal space (Hall,
1966; Hayduk, 1983; Sorokowska et al., 2017; Sundstrom & Altman, 1976), sensory experiences
of emotions (Breugelmans et al., 2005; Hupka et al., 1996; Rimé & Giovannini, 1986),
regulation of emotions (Matsumoto et al., 2008; Mesquita et al., 2014; Miyamoto et al., 2014;
Miyamoto & Ma, 2011), spatial orientation (Levinson, 2003; Majid et al., 2004; Mishra et al.,
2003; Taylor & Tversky, 1996), and physical contact in parenting (Harkness & Super, 2002;
Keller et al., 2009, 2011). These lines of research reflect the notion that culture does not operate
in the abstract. Moreover, we “carry” our culture with us and give concrete forms to it by the
way we feel, act, and express ourselves.

At the heart of this connection between culture and the body is the idea that mental
processes cannot be disentangled from the body, its morphology, sensorimotor systems, and
physiological characteristics (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg, 2010). In
the present paper, we explore the links between the body, neural systems which have evolved to
facilitate the body’s interactions with the environment, and culture as the product of psychology
that is grounded in bodily processes. It should be noted that this emphasis on the concrete and
physical is not to dismiss the more abstract aspects of culture, such as values, beliefs, and
attitudes. Instead, as we will argue, even such abstract cultural concepts may in fact be grounded
in the interaction between the body and its environment. Further, we argue that corporeal
manifestations of abstract cultural concepts can serve as an important context for the way we
experience the world around us.
Overview
In the following sections, we explore the idea that the embodiment framework can be a
useful perspective for investigating cultural psychological variation. We begin with the premise
that the human cognitive system is embodied and argue that such a system must be sensitive to
environmental context. We then explain how the neural and bodily systems interacting with the
physical and social ecology may give rise to certain cultural psychological variations.
We then reverse the arrow and argue that considering the influence of culture on the
body, in interaction with environment, can offer novel insight into the embodied cognitive
processes. First, taking culture as an integral part of the complex set of circumstances situating
bodily action, we explain how culture can modify the existing assumptions regarding how the
body should interact with its physical and social environment, by modifying the physical world
through which it navigates, and by changing the body itself. Second, we explain the ways in
which culture shapes people’s chronic sensorimotor experiences through norms regulating how
we should comport our bodies, as well as how and what we should feel. Third, we explain how
cultural-specific embodiment facilitates sharing of meaning within the group.
Next, we offer novel predictions based on the dynamical interaction between culture,
ecology, and embodied cognition, considering how cultural psychological variation might
emerge from the embodied minds’ response to ecological conditions, as well as how embodied
processes may be influenced by culture. We end by suggesting broader implications of this
approach to culture and the body and by identifying open questions and future directions based
on this line of thinking.
Culture as a Product of the Embodied Mind
What is Embodied Cognition?
To establish that bodily processes can be important for understanding the roots of cultural
psychological phenomena, we must explain how the cognitive system, capable of producing
complex forms of culture, is fundamentally tied to the body and its interaction with the
environment. The embodiment perspective posits that psychological processes are inextricably
tied to body morphology, sensorimotor systems, and physiological states (Barsalou, 2008;
Gallese et al., 2004; Glenberg, 2010; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013).
This view rests on the assumption that the central nervous system first evolved to be in the
service of locomotion and sensory feedback (e.g., detecting and moving away from physical
threats and towards sources of energy), and that the primary function of the cognitive system is
to maneuver the body through its physical and social surroundings (Clark, 1998; Gibson,
1979/2014; Hutchinson & Barrett, 2019; Wilson, 2002). This evolutionary foundation
characterizes human cognition, such that the sensorimotor system is involved in higher cognitive
functions, including language comprehension (Glenberg & Gallese, 2012; Hauk et al., 2004;
Kaschak et al., 2005), memory (Glenberg, 1997), and abstract thinking (Boroditsky & Ramscar,
2002; Saj et al., 2014).
One of the central ideas in embodied cognition is the theory of perceptual symbol
systems (Barsalou, 1999), which claims that representations of concepts are achieved through
sensorimotor simulations. More specifically, it proposes that during the perception of an object
or event, the perceptual state is stored across different modalities (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile
experiences of a hug), and that perceptual symbols are the neural activity corresponding to
selectively attended parts of the perceptual state (e.g., neural activity corresponding to the
physical warmth of the hug). Activating a concept requires simulating the perceptual experience
of it, which involves the activation of necessary perceptual symbols.
Another key idea in embodied cognition is that we represent abstract concepts by
recruiting our capacity for understanding the interaction of concrete entities in the physical
environment. This is evident in the prevalence of metaphorical language (Jackendoff, 2002;
Lakoff & Johnson, 2008; Pinker, 2013). For example, concepts, such as “time” and “progress”,
are discussed as if they are spatially organized (e.g., “looking forward to the future”, “the project
hit a dead end”). That abstract cognition is grounded in the interaction of the body with the
environment is also apparent in the facilitative effects of motor activity on cognitive processes in
various domains, including mathematics (e.g., use of gestures in solving algebraic equations;
Alibali & Nathan, 2012; Cook et al., 2008), physics (e.g., physical experience of angular
momentum; Kontra et al., 2015), and language comprehension (e.g., action congruent with the
meaning of a sentence; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Günther et al., 2020).

A third idea is that the body literally affects how we perceive the environment (Proffitt,
2013; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). Thus, the size of an individual’s hand determines which
rocks are seen as pebbles, stones, rocks, or boulders; the length of the leg determines which stairs
are climbable; and physiological fitness determines the perceived slant of a hill.
These ideas can easily be extended to cultural concepts. The embodiment perspective
suggests that the relevance of the body for thinking about culture goes beyond the observation
that culture is manifested by how we express ourselves and comport our bodies. That culture is
embodied implies it is impossible for culture to exist in the abstract; rather, culture should be
viewed as a phenomenon fundamentally tied to the body in interaction with its environment. In
the following sections, we turn to the role of the environment in embodied cultural cognition.
Cognition Is Situated in The Cultural and Ecological Context.
A key premise in embodiment theories is that cognition is situated (Barsalou, 2003;
Clark, 1998; Gibbs, 2006; Glenberg, 2010; Smith & Semin, 2004; Wilson, 2002; Yeh &
Barsalou, 2006). The concept of situated cognition holds that all mental activity is in the service
of action situated within a complex environment. In other words, cognition is for doing, which
always occurs in the context of threats and opportunities that exist in the real world (S. T. Fiske,
1992; Gibson, 2014; Neuberg & Schaller, 2014). Although work in this tradition has not
necessarily emphasized the role of the body per se, embodiment is consistent with the notion of
situatedness, and one appears to logically imply the other and vice versa. In other words, having
a physical body entails some kind of interaction with the environment, which means that no
cognition by a biological organism is ever not situated; moreover, embodiment itself can be
viewed as a kind of situatedness, meaning that particular characteristics of the body shape the
way that the organism interacts with the environment, in the same way that other constraints in
the environment limit such interactions (Gibbs, 2006; Mataric, 1997; Smith & Semin, 2004).
In terms of perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999), because a perceptual experience of an
object or event, always occurs within some context, representations of concepts involve
simulations of the situations in which perceptual experience occurred. Thus, activating the
concept should also activate the associated contexts, and vice versa (Barsalou, 2003; Yeh &
Barsalou, 2006). As different cultures offer different sets of situations in which a particular
object or event is perceived, the same referent (e.g., a hug) can differ markedly in cultural
meaning, as it is grounded in different contexts (e.g., hugs occurring only in intimate
relationships in some cultures versus the more generous use of hugs in other cultures). The idea
of situatedness could be extended to the particular threats and opportunities an object or event
might afford (Neuberg et al., 2010), which are moderated by the cultural and ecological context.
For example, an acorn is rarely included in the modern Western diet and is instead used mostly
as feed for livestock. Although for most people in the U.S. acorns would not be associated with
the context of a meal or other related concepts, they are perceived as a valuable source of
calories in societies with cultural knowledge of the elaborate process involved in preparing
acorns for consumption, or in ecologies that offer no superior alternatives. Thus, thinking about
an acorn involves the simulation of not only the visual or tactile perception of acorns, but can
also cue the introspective states (e.g., hunger) or the sensory experience of other related concepts
(e.g., condiments) that are specified by the cultural and ecological contexts in which one
perceives the affordances of an acorn.
The situatedness of cognition also suggests that embodied processes should be sensitive
to variations in the ecology in which the organism is acting. Thus, chronic environmental
influence on a group of individuals should lead to observable group-level variations in
embodiment. Evidence of this can be found in cultural variations in metaphorical representations.
Whereas certain kinds of embodied representations seem to be universal, attributable to the
commonalities in the human physiology and habitat across societies, different metaphorical
structures can map onto the same concept, if different situational information is associated with
the concept (D. Cohen & Leung, 2009; Leung et al., 2011).
As an illustration, metaphorical representations of basic emotions (Ekman, 1992; Izard,
1971) are grounded in their corresponding physiological states, suggesting that they should be
similar across cultures to the extent that the physiological profile of each emotion does not vary
significantly. For instance, expressions of anger using the structure of hot liquid inside a
container (e.g., “filled with anger”, “about to explode”) are found in many languages (Kövecses,
1995, 2010), suggesting that this structure maps onto a widely shared introspective state
associated with anger. However, metaphors for emotions can also depart from commonly shared
physiological responses and be extended to incorporate elements of the environment. Maalej
(2004) provides examples of culture-specific metaphors of anger in Tunisian Arabic, which
reflect cultural practices, such as religious sacrifice of sheep (e.g., “He broke my bones into
small bits/joints”, referring to the slaughtering and butchering of a sheep to which one may have
an emotional connection), and cultural or ecological knowledge (e.g., “I found him growling like
a camel”, referring to anger responses of camels, which are known to be spiteful animals).
How Can Embodied Cognition Help Explain Cultural Psychological Variations?
Differences in psychology across human societies have been widely documented,
including self-construal (Cross et al., 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), cognitive styles (Nisbett
et al., 2001), social orientation (Triandis, 1989; Varnum et al., 2010), cooperation (Henrich et al.,
2010), personality (Schmitt et al., 2008), sociosexuality (Schmitt, 2005), tightness-looseness of
norms (Gelfand et al., 2017), and conformity (Murray et al., 2011). A number of compelling
theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain how such differences between human groups
have emerged, including explanations emphasizing behavioral ecological principles (Sng et al.,
2018), consequences of different modes of subsistence (Talhelm et al., 2014; Talhelm & English,
2020; Uskul et al., 2008), adaptive responses to environmental threats (Gelfand et al., 2011;
Thornhill & Fincher, 2014), demands of the climate (Van de Vliert, 2007, 2013; Van Lange et
al., 2017), and psychological effects of residential mobility (Oishi, 2010).
These accounts have in common that they emphasize culture as an adaptation to group
living in a given environment (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). That is, selection pressures act on
behavioral alternatives, such that culturally normative traits and behaviors reflect their benefit to
fitness over time. Key to many of these accounts are cultural transmission processes that allow
such variations to persist over time (Berger & Heath, 2005; Boyd & Richerson, 2005). However,
less well established in the accounts of cultural variation described above are the proximate
mechanisms through which certain behavioral alternatives emerge in the first place. The
literature on how ecological factors lead to cultural variation has remained relatively agnostic
about which mechanisms could be at play. For example, cultural variations could simply be
reflecting an aggregation of individual responses that an ecological factor evokes. Alternatively,
a cultural variant might have been transmitted vertically from previous generations or
horizontally from other individuals, such that it is not necessarily reflective of the present
ecological pressures (e.g., Cohen & Nisbett, 1994). Other perspectives, such as behavioral
ecology, have focused on the functions of a behavioral trait, under the proposition that the
underlying mechanisms are of little use in predicting behavior (e.g., Nettle et al., 2013).
We suggest that the embodied nature of cognition may be key to understanding how
some cultural psychological variations arise in response to features of the environment. If mental
processes are grounded in bodily interactions with the environment, as we have described, then
considering how such interactions are shaped by the ecology should inform us about the mind. In
other words, if certain behavioral patterns are adaptive in a given ecology, or if certain sensory
inputs are consistently available to an individual, corresponding changes in cognition should be
observed. Further, if the ecology constrains sensorimotor experiences consistently over time and
for many individuals in a group, we should expect to see stable group differences in cognitive
tendencies.
One approach to studying these links is to first identify covariations between ecology and
culture, and then try to determine what constraint on body-environment interactions could be
mediating the relationship. For example, previous research has shown that harsher climate is
linked to less endorsement of self-expression, less concern for qualify of life, less trust, less
value in social involvement (Van de Vliert, 2007, 2013). Climatic stress has direct implications
for bodily processes, including increased need for thermoregulation, resource scarcity (less
output, food spoilage), and health problems. It presents an energy allocation problem for the
body—if one expects to expend more energy for homeostatic needs, given that the rate of energy
capture is limited, this leaves less energy for other endeavors (e.g., self-expression, venturing to
trust in strangers). One interesting feature of this work is the fairly consistent lack of climate
effects in wealthy countries, which suggests that wealth can buffer against harsh climate
conditions. Another interpretation, from the embodied perspective, is that wealth may be a proxy
for abundance of disposable energy, such that no tradeoff needs to be made when allocating
energy to different needs. There may be individual differences in the susceptibility to climatic
stress (e.g., body fat, energy throughput) that could weaken the relationship between climate and
expressivity, for example. This account of how climatic and economic factors can give rise to
cultural variations is consistent with the idea of cognition being grounded in bodily states.
Research in embodied cognition suggests that energetic considerations for the body can affect
visual perception of the physical environment, such that perception is biased towards
conservation of energy, as over-expenditure can be very costly for survival (Proffitt, 2006).
Moreover, estimates of geometric features of the environment can shift in response to changes in
perceived current energetic state of the body, as well as the potential energetic cost of acting
upon the environment. Thus, from the embodiment perspective, it seems plausible that chronic
and pervasive energetic constraints posed by climate could shift people’s perceptual tendencies,
resulting in group-level differences in behavioral traits.
Other findings relating climate to psychological variations are also largely consistent with
the embodiment perspective. Climate has been linked to regional differences in personality, such
that those who grew up in milder temperatures tended to be higher on agreeableness,
extraversion, and openness to experience (Wei et al., 2017). The idea here is that temperatures
more favorable for physical activity should lead to a set of cognitive traits consistent with such
behavioral patterns. Work on “latitudinal psychology” (Van de Vliert & Van Lange, 2019)
suggests that a society’s distance from the equator is related to several psychological variables
such as happiness, creativity, and aggression. This variation is attributed to equatorial climates
harboring more threats to the body, including resource scarcity, pathogen prevalence, and natural
disasters.
Further, many cultural psychological variations may be designed (at least in part) to
regulate bodily actions. Considering the functional value of constraints on the body may provide
insight into why such variations emerge. For example, pathogen prevalence has been linked to
conformity (Murray et al., 2011; Murray & Schaller, 2012; Varnum, 2013), authoritarianism
(Murray et al., 2013), less openness to experience (Schaller & Murray, 2008), and tighter social
norms (Gelfand et al., 2011), all of which has implications for restricting certain physical actions.
Given that infectious diseases have historically been a significant threat to survival, it would
have selected for traits that favor enforcement of behaviors (for self and others) that reduce
exposure to pathogens, usually involving physical separation from possible sources of threat
(e.g., outgroup members, disease cues in the environment).
Figure 1
Interaction between culture, ecology, and embodiment
Chronic Cognition Cultural Variation

Social/
Physical Sensorimotor (e.g., decrease in Psychology
Experience in desire to (e.g., decrease in
Ecology
(e.g., harsh (e.g., increase in engage in self-expression,
activity in service nonessential trust, social
climate)
of homeostasis) activities) engagement)
Culture Is Transmitted Through Embodied Processes.
How do cultural psychological variations persist? Successful means of cultural
transmission often take advantage of the grounding of mental processes in bodily action. For
example, ritualized behaviors between the infant and caregiver, such as turn-taking interactions
and imitative behaviors, play a key role in the transmission of social rules (Rossano, 2012).
Ritualized behaviors also serve as costly signaling of upheld values towards members of the
ingroup or the outgroup (Sosis, 2004), as well as self-reminders that internally reinforce the
associated values (D. Cohen & Leung, 2009).
Cohen and Leung (2009) make a distinction between what they refer to as “pre-wired
embodiments” and “totem embodiments.” Pre-wired embodiments are representations that use
innate associations between an action and the corresponding internal state (e.g., touch and release
of oxytocin). They suggest that bodily actions can “pre-dispose” people to certain psychological
states, such that actions can be used to repeatedly evoke cultural concepts, facilitating their
transmission. For example, it has been argued that body contact, especially in the context of
parenting (i.e., proximity to caregiver), fosters an interdependent (versus independent) sense of
self (Keller et al., 2011). Thus, co-sleeping is more common in cultures that emphasize
collectivistic values, and parents tend to explain the sleeping arrangements in terms of values
they want to instill in their children (Caudill & Plath, 1966; Morelli et al., 1992). This is
consistent with the finding that body contact increases feelings of warmth and belongingness
(MacDonald, 1992), and contrary to the idea that these views of the self are somehow learned in
a top-down manner. There are a number of other examples of how psychological connection is
facilitated by physical connection (Lee & Schwarz, 2020), including rituals involving
synchronized song and dance to promote cohesion, as well as greeting norms, such as hugging or
handshaking. Similarly, other bodily actions should induce different kinds of psychology. For
example, lowering the head, as in a bow, could enforce a state of subordinance (Schubert, 2005).
Totem embodiments are links between bodily action and cultural concepts that can be
formed through repetition and learning. For example, for Catholics, the sign of the cross serves
to activate the belief system of the Trinity and communicates to others one’s commitment to
Catholic values. However, this is specific only to Catholics—the sign of the cross likely will fail
to elicit any such response for members of a different religious group. This is broadly consistent
with the idea we will explore next, namely, that embodied processes can be modified via
repeated sensorimotor experiences provided by the cultural context.
Effect of Culture on Embodied Cognition
In the previous section, we explored the idea that we have been endowed through natural
selection with a cognitive system that is fundamentally tied to bodily activities situated in the
ecology, which exerts a persistent force shaping our patterns of behavior. Through the properties
of the embodied mind, this can be translated into lasting shifts in psychological processes. In this
section, we reverse the arrow and focus on how culture, the product of embodied minds, in turn
leads to variation in grounded mental processes by shaping the physical and social world the
body inhabits.
Culture Situates Action, Changing the Assumptions of Body-Environment Interactions.
So far, we have focused on how the physical and social ecology (e.g., density, parasite-
stress, climate, resource availability) constrains our bodily activities in the course of managing
the threats and opportunities of the local environment, which leads to different mental
representations of the world. It should be emphasized, however, that how we experience the
world is not simply determined by the natural environment. We find ourselves surrounded by
cultural products modifying the physical realities we must navigate. In addition, our bodily
actions are constrained by the standards of behavior that we take for granted, as though it were
the case that no other behavioral alternative is possible.

An organism must successfully complete various tasks related to survival in order to
reproduce. These tasks include acquiring basic resources, like food and water, protecting oneself
from the harshness of the environment and various physical threats, and avoiding disease
(Kenrick et al., 2010). How easily these goals are achieved depends firstly on the features of the
natural environment. However, the effect of the natural environment is modified, even reversed
at times, by cultural inventions (e.g., generous use of air conditioning sometimes makes it
difficult to stay warm even during the extreme summer heat in Phoenix), and the particular
strategies employed to overcome challenges depend largely on cultural learning processes (e.g.,
fans vs. air conditioning systems).
Body-environment interactions that were utterly impossible before are now taken for
granted. For example, modern automotive technology has changed our assumptions about the
expected amount of immediate calorie expenditure required for traveling long distances. On the
one hand, the case could be made that, as labor is still needed to acquire the resources to be
exchanged for fuel, airfare, etc., travel still consumes a significant amount of energy, but, on the
other hand, temporal and spatial dissociation between the event and physical exertion supporting
the event makes it difficult for them to be linked. Such a shift in the expected energetic costs of a
goal-oriented action may have implications for how we perceive and process environmental
information to judge the outcome of the action. This reasoning is consistent with the work
suggesting that people tend to overestimate the difficulty of navigating a given terrain, as the
perceptual system is biased towards ensuring that our energy reserve is not completely depleted
(Proffitt, 2006). Although this effect was observed among inhabitants of large, industrialized
societies, we might expect this effect to be enhanced among people in societies where
mechanized transportation is not common (e.g., where people primarily move on foot or under
their own motive power) when compared with those living in industrialized societies.
Returning to the example of climate, access to temperature control technology could also
change the metabolic assumptions of the body, such that more energy can be reserved for other
activities. Thus, the effect of harsh climate on psychology might be attenuated in places where
HVAC technologies are widespread. One prediction then, is that within wealthy, developed
countries, where people are more likely to be protected from the elements, climate should have
relatively little impact on psychological outcomes, compared to less developed countries, where
the body must be prepared for efforts to maintain homeostasis.
Culture Shapes Our Physical and Social Realities.
In addition to providing knowledge, skills, and technology that allow humans to interact
with the environment in different ways, culture situates cognition by shaping the physical world
in which the body operates. Consider cultural variations in visual perception, which demonstrate
the effects of culture shaping the physical world in which perceptual experiences occur. Classic
examples include differences in susceptibility to visual illusions (e.g., Müller–Lyer illusion,
Sander parallelogram, Ponzo illusion) and the ability to use depth perception cues on 2D
surfaces, which have been attributed to systematic differences in the exposure to certain
perceptual cues, such as right angles prevalent in modern carpentered environments (Brislin,
1974; Hudson, 1960; Segall et al., 1966).
Similarly, exposure to complex visual scenes characteristic of urban environments have
been associated with differences in attention to focal versus contextual visual information. For
example, Miyamoto and colleagues (2006) found that Japanese scenery were judged as more
cluttered and ambiguous than American scenery, when cities of similar size were compared.
Moreover, Japanese participants detected more contextual changes than American participants
when shown pairs of images that differed only minor details, and both groups paid more
attention to context when primed with Japanese scenery. This is consistent with other cross-
cultural evidence that East Asians tend to be more holistic and Westerners tend to be more
analytic in their cognitive styles (Nisbett et al., 2001), but provides an alternative account to the
well-established explanation that differences in social orientation (i.e., independent vs.
interdependent) underlie the differences in cognition (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Varnum et al.,
2010).
In support of the idea that exposure to different perceptual environments may drive the
differences in patterns of visual perception are the findings that the Himba of Northern Namibia,
who are considered to have interdependent orientations, were actually less susceptible to the
Ebbinghaus illusion and made more analytic judgments on Navon tasks (Navon, 1977) compared
to Japanese participants, and even Western participants (Davidoff et al., 2008; de Fockert et al.,
2007). Moreover, exposure to urban environments reduced such analytic perceptual tendencies
(Caparos et al., 2012). Although at first glance these findings seem inconsistent with the social
orientation hypothesis, the two accounts are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as particular
features of the perceptual environment may affect social orientation and cognitive styles
differently. For example, population density, taking into account clustering of residences (e.g.,
urban density; Vandello & Cohen, 1999), and residential stability (Oishi et al., 2007), which
characterize places like Japan, has been associated with collectivism. Such socioecological
conditions can lead to cluttered environments that foster attention to context. In contrast, people
living in low density environments can be more evenly distributed and be highly mobile, which
may lead to less cluttered perceptual environments. It is also possible that construction of the
environment is influenced by perceptual preferences in some collectivistic cultures (e.g., Japan)
that may not be possible to express in other collectivistic cultures (e.g., the Himba). For the
Himba, despite an interdependent orientation, the visual environment is less dense due to a
seminomadic lifestyle.
Culturally constructed environments also determine the manner in which we navigate the
physical world. For example, to get from point A to B, urban dwellers tend to move in linear
segments on very hard surfaces, in stark contrast to how the same goal is achieved in nature.
Grid street patterns of urban environments (e.g., Phoenix) affect our navigation strategies, as
well as spatial representations of the city (Montello, 1991; Montello & Sas, 2006). In a similar
vein, schematic representations of the city such as subway maps facilitate underground
navigation but distort perceptions of the actual geography (Vertesi, 2008), which likely lead to
inaccurate spatial representations. Culture also affects spatial distribution of resources, which has
implications for both physiological and cognitive outcomes. For instance, distance to public
service facilities (e.g., hospitals, schools, libraries) is directly related to their accessibility, and
associated with a variety of outcomes including health and educational attainment (affected by
time spent in transit, physical costs of travelling, fatigue, etc.; Fredriksson, 2017).
Cultural adaptations can also help protect against physical threats in several ways. First,
the culture provides the tools for defense, such as warm outerwear to defend against the cold.
Second, cultural adaptations provide a buffer which dampens the sensorimotor responses to a
threat (e.g., activation of the sympathetic nervous system, hypothermia), even when the threat is
nearby (think of strolling through a zoo, or sitting by the fireplace during the winter in
Stockholm). Modern living conditions separate us from outside threats so effectively that much
of the time people in developed countries are oblivious to the elements and other sources of
physical harm. Third, social norms, laws, and institutions protect us against conspecific violence
to some extent, such that vigilance against violence is often unnecessarily, depending on the
neighborhood one is in.
It is also worth noting the extent to which culture molds our socioecological realities. For
example, even though people living in areas high in population density are at any given moment
in close proximity to others (e.g., your upstairs neighbors are just a few feet away), they are
protected from the sensory experience of crowding by culturally constructed features of the
environment (e.g., your upstairs neighbors are two doorways, a flight of stairs, and a doorbell
away). Indeed, many urban dwellers interact face-to-face with their neighbors much less
frequently than what would be predicted based on traditional measures of density alone (Davis &
Parker, 2019). Other cultural factors that minimize the amount of direct physical interaction
include social networking sites, video conferencing, e-commerce, delivery culture, and
canalization of pedestrian traffic, some of which have been credited for allowing effective social
distancing in urban environments during the COVID-19 pandemic (Guo et al., 2020; Romero et
al., 2020). These and other changes in features of the social environment have implications for
cultural change that we turn to in the last section.
Culture Can Modify the Body.
One of the central propositions of embodied cognition is that different bodies produce
different cognitions. Evidence for this proposition comes from experiments manipulating
sensorimotor capacities (e.g., Bidet-Ildei et al., 2017; Havas et al., 2010; Proffitt, 2006; Taylor-
Covill & Eves, 2016; van der Hoort et al., 2011), studies of people with deficits in sensorimotor
functioning (e.g., Arrighi et al., 2011; Bloch et al., 2016; Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016), and
studies of individual differences in body usage (Casasanto, 2011), with outcomes ranging from
differences in visuoperceptual judgments to impairments in language processing.
Can culture change the body? We argue that it has certainly changed what a single body
can do and is perhaps analogous to changing the body itself. Technological advances throughout
history have increasingly augmented the capabilities of the human body. For example,
improvement of farming equipment, domestication of farm animals, irrigation systems, use of
fertilizers, and so on have changed how effectively we can exploit the environment for resources.
These developments let us go beyond the limits of our physiology and achieve the same things as
if we had a different body with a stronger, more efficient motor system. It is not difficult to think
of other similar examples, from seemingly simple inventions, such as a ladder which effectively
extends our lower limbs, to more advanced technologies, such as a self-balancing scooter which
allows us to travel miles without taking a single step. Human inventions have also been able to
offset existing physical deficits or challenges, such as poor eyesight, the effects of which can
mitigated by eyeglasses or contact lenses.
Culture can also change the body in a more literal sense. There are many straightforward
examples, including body modification practices, such as tattooing, piercing, or cosmetic
surgery, grooming practices, such as skin care or growing facial hair, and exercise, which can
build muscle, and increase cardiovascular and respiratory endurance. But culture can bring about
slow, intergenerational changes as well. For example, improvements in living conditions,
including better nutrition and less exposure to pathogens, have been associated with increase in
average height (Perkins et al., 2016; Silventoinen, 2003; Steckel, 2009; Stulp & Barrett, 2016).
Modern Western lifestyle has also been associated with an increase in obesity and other negative
health outcomes (e.g., Ding et al., 2014), which affect how we engage with the environment.
One explanation for gradual changes in body morphology is variations in individual life
history strategies, which concern the timing of developmental events affected by differential
allocation of resources to growth, somatic maintenance, and reproduction (Charnov, 1991, 1993;
Stearns et al., 2008). The key idea in life history theory is that because resources (e.g., time,
energy) are limited, allocation of resources to one domain always involves a tradeoff with
allocation to another domain. This presents a problem of investment, in which the organism must
decide how to optimally invest resources (i.e., amount, domain, timing) in order to maximize the
returns, and these investment decisions must be sensitive to extrinsic factors affecting the
probability that the organism will be able to successfully reproduce (Hill, 2020). For example, a
high level of extrinsic mortality suggests that delayed reproduction is likely to lead to dying
before producing any offspring, so the organism adapts by investing more in earlier
reproduction, at the expense of investment in growth or somatic maintenance.
Culture can affect life history strategies in two ways. First, as mentioned above, culture
as an adaptive response helps us minimize threats and maximize opportunities in the
environment. We are less likely than ever to die from accidents, warfare, predation, or infectious
diseases (Pinker, 2018), which makes investing in embodied capital (Kaplan et al., 1995, 2003) a
strategy that is likely to pay off. It also allows the strategy of putting quality over quantity, rather
than managing mortality risk by distributing it widely (e.g., producing fewer offspring and
investing more in each, rather than producing more at the cost of reduced investment per
offspring). Increase in the absolute amount of energy harvested from the environment implicates
decreased need for tradeoffs, making a strategy that invests heavily in all domains viable (e.g.,
very wealthy individuals able to support many children).
Second, cultural norms can influence decisions about how to optimally invest resources
in order to maximize fitness (e.g., Colleran, 2016, 2020; Newson et al., 2005, 2007). These
decisions are often beyond our conscious control (e.g., adults cannot keep growing taller, no
matter how hard they try). Rather, they can be viewed as a result of phenotypic plasticity
(Pigliucci, 2005; Stearns, 1989; West-Eberhard, 1989), or variation in the expression of traits
contingent upon environmental circumstances. However, some decisions do seem to be
cognitively mediated. In fact, people implicitly and explicitly contemplate the timing of
developmental events (e.g., when one should have children). They also have a degree of control,
owing to cultural products, such as contraceptives. They can also consciously decide how much
energy to invest in which domain of life and are able to consider the tradeoffs involved.
Relatedly, culture can also influence life history strategies by driving changes in the social
ecology. For example, the trend of immigration to urban cities increases population density and
competition in those areas. Population density has been found to lead to slow life history
strategies (e.g., more investment in embodied capital and the future; Sng et al., 2017; decreases
in fertility rates; Rotella et al., 2020)
What are the implications of these cultural changes in body morphology and capabilities
for embodied cognition? Here predictions may be more nuanced than straightforward. Most of
the changes we have discussed in this section are slow, gradual changes at the group level, and
their effects on cognition may be more difficult to predict than the effects of relatively acute
changes. Much of the evidence in embodied cognition comes from research using experimental
manipulations of the body at the individual level, such as temporarily altering the perception of
one’s own body size (e.g., van der Hoort et al., 2011) or inhibiting motor activity during
cognition (e.g., Havas et al., 2010). However, chronic or gradual changes in the body should lead
to eventual re-calibration of the sensorimotor system to allow individuals to take effective action
given the circumstances. This re-calibration is analogous to how bodily changes during
development affect cognition. For example, changes in growth that allow for crawling re-
calibrates perception of fearful situations (Campos et al., 1992), changes in the control of
grasping re-calibrates detection of goals (Sommerville et al., 2005), and changes in modes of
locomotion promoted by physical growth affect ability to predict the outcomes of locomotion-
related actions (Stapel et al., 2016).
One potentially useful approach to investigating these outcomes would be to compare
different cohorts within societies that would have been exposed to very different cultural
influences on the body, due to rapid shifts in living standards, technology, lifestyles, etc. For
example, South Korea has undergone dramatic changes at the societal level since the
impoverished circumstances post-Korean War, such that we might expect differences across
generations in the exposure to technology that augment bodily capabilities, and cultural norms
about energy allocation affecting life history, as well as general body size and strength. We may
speculate that intergenerational differences in body morphology and perceived body
functionality could lead to different embodied processes, which may be a potential source of
intergenerational conflicts worth investigating.
Cultural Norms Shape Our Chronic Sensorimotor Experiences.
Thus far, we have focused mostly on the concrete manifestations of culture and how the
interaction between the body and its environment can be shaped through observable changes
caused by culture on the body itself, its functionality, and features of its environment. Here, we
consider that the abstract aspects of culture—norms, as well as values, attitudes, and beliefs—are
grounded in bodily processes, shaping people’s chronic sensorimotor experiences. From the
embodiment perspective, systematic cultural variations in bodily processes should in turn lead to
observable group-level differences in mental processes.
Culture regulates motor activity through a variety of social norms, or expectations of
behavior shared by a group of individuals (Arrow & Burns, 2004; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005;
Legros & Cislaghi, 2019). Such norms inform the way we comport our bodies, especially in
social contexts, forming collective patterns of bodily action. For example, cultural norms about
interpersonal space define what the appropriate physical distance between people is in different
social settings (Hall, 1966; Hayduk, 1983; Sorokowska et al., 2017; Sundstrom & Altman,
1976). Hall (1966) proposed distinguishing between contact and noncontact cultures based on
the normative interpersonal space and the degree to which physical touch is endorsed during
social interactions. Shared understanding within cultures facilitates the coordination of spatial
arrangement in social settings, such that it quite literally constrains the space of possible
behaviors (e.g., imagine backing up in response to someone being too close, triggering a chain of
behaviors in others also trying to maintain appropriate spacing). However, interactions between
the contact and noncontact realities can lead to misunderstandings and negative reactions.
Norms about motor activity can either be descriptive or injunctive. Descriptive norms
refer to the typical behavior of a group, providing information about what is, whereas injunctive
norms refer to rules or standards of behavior, specifying what ought or ought not to be, and are
often enforced by social sanctions in response to norm violations (Cialdini et al., 1990; Deutsch
& Gerard, 1955). The two types of norms provide different sources of motivation for behavior,
although it is not always clearly distinguishable which type of norm is exerting influence on an
action at a given moment. For example, research on cultural variations in the “pace of life”
shows that people in different societies walk through the city at different speeds (Levine &
Norenzayan, 1999). At the proximate level, when the descriptive norm is salient in the presence
of others, one’s walking speed is likely influenced by the walking speed of surrounding
individuals and adjusted online in the flow of traffic. However, beyond the immediate context,
pace of life in general may be affected by broader socioecological factors, such as economic
circumstances, mode of production, and climate (Levine & Norenzayan, 1999), and associated
injunctive norms (e.g., “one ought to be punctual”, “one ought to be productive”).
What are the implications of chronic regulation of sensorimotor experiences for
embodied cognition? The embodiment perspective posits that meaning is grounded in situated
action, simulations, and bodily states (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg &
Robertson, 1999, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; McNeill, 1992; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001), and
this proposition should extend to cultural concepts as well. That is, representation of cultural
concepts should involve simulations of the perceptual, motor, and affective states of when the
concept was acquired through experience. Consider, for example, the greeting norm of
handshaking, which is more common in Western cultures than East Asian cultures. In Western
cultures, a “good” handshake involves a firm grip and direct eye contact, and is associated with
positive traits, such as agreeableness, extraversion, and trust (Chaplin et al., 2000; Stewart et al.,
2008). During the experience of a handshake, the perceptual state across sensorimotor modalities
(i.e., tactile sensation of the firm grip, degree of muscle activation, frequency of oscillations, eye
contact) is stored in memory. Also encoded are the situation in which the handshaking occurred
(e.g., formality of the meeting, ethnicity of the other person) and the cultural norms and values
that are salient at the time (e.g., being told by one’s caregiver or a cultural informant that the
“dead fish” handshake ought to be avoided). Thus, the situation of greeting should invoke the
simulation of the perceptual experience, including the ideas (e.g., norms, attitudes, values)
associated with the proper form of greeting, and vice versa. Moreover, if different groups
repeatedly associate an idea with distinctive sets of sensorimotor experiences and social contexts,
then we should observe corresponding group differences in how such ideas are processed.
One line of research that well illustrates how the regulatory influence of cultural norms
on bodily activity affects cognition is in emotion perception. Although cross-cultural research on
emotions has provided some evidence for universality in basic emotions, specific aspects of
emotion may vary across cultures (e.g., Ekman, 1992, 2000; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Scherer,
1997; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994). In particular, it has been argued that there are cultural
differences in facial expression and recognition of emotions (Blais et al., 2008; Crivelli et al.,
2016; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Gendron et al., 2014; Jack et al., 2012). Such variations can
in part be accounted for by cultural norms designed to modify motor activity corresponding to
internal states. For example, cultures that differ in emotional expressivity have different display
rules determining the amount and type of motor activity deemed appropriate for a particular
emotional experience under the given social context (Matsumoto et al., 2008; Mesquita & Frijda,
1992). Individuals with systematically different sets of sensorimotor experiences associated with
an emotion, due to the chronic regulatory influence of expressivity norms, should infer from the
same bodily expression different underlying internal states. For example, given a high-intensity
facial display of emotion, Americans tend to judge the actual internal experience to be less
intense than the external expression, whereas Japanese judge the internal experience and external
expression to be similar in intensity (Matsumoto, 1999; Matsumoto et al., 2002). One

explanation for this is that Americans, having internalized cultural norms endorsing expressivity,
understand the high-intensity expression may be an exaggeration, whereas the Japanese infer the
high-intensity expression to be accurately representing the internal state, as it is being displayed
despite the norms that discourage over-expression.
Emotion is communicated not only through facial expressions, but also through body
movement and posture. For example, anger is typically associated with faster movements
(Montepare et al., 1987; Roether et al., 2009), whereas sadness is typically associated with slow
movements (Michalak et al., 2009; Pollick et al., 2001). Consistent with the idea that motor
simulation underlies emotion perception and that one’s own expressivity should influence this
process, one’s own action kinematics, or tendency to move fast or slow, affect the perception of
emotion from velocity of other’s movement (Edey et al., 2017), such that someone who tends to
move faster than average judges slower movements as conveying a more intense emotion, as the
velocity deviates more from one’s own typical movements. This raises the question of whether
cultural influences on movement kinematics might also affect emotion perception. As previously
mentioned, research on cultural differences in the “pace of life” (Levine & Norenzayan, 1999)
found that people tend to walk and work faster in societies with higher income. Thus, we might
expect them to perceive less anger in faster movements, which are more culturally typical, and
more sadness in slower movements, as they are more atypical.
Finally, considering the possible functions of a cultural norm regarding bodily activity
through the lens of embodiment may provide insight into how and why such a norm came to be.
That is, the embodiment perspective allows us to infer from the sensorimotor features of the
norm what its psychological correlates might be and to consider under what circumstances such a
relationship could be adaptive. Returning to the example of cultural differences in interpersonal

space, previous research has proposed several factors that could explain the variations in
preferred distance, including the need to buffer from possible physical threat (Kennedy et al.,
2009; Vagnoni et al., 2018), sensitivity to pathogens (Park, 2015), and metabolic costs associated
with temperature (Sorokowska et al., 2017). It is unlikely that people conform to their culture’s
norms about personal space because they have insight into these relationships—rather, people
tend to adopt such behaviors wholesale from ingroup members, circumventing the need for
individual learning which can be costly (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Heyes, 2020; Mesoudi, 2019).
But whether people are aware of it or not, cultural norms may be taking advantage of the
grounded nature of psychological processes to regulate bodily processes in order to meet
psychological needs. Similarly, in different cultures there are various rituals that involve physical
connection to others (e.g., joining hands in prayer) or physical separation from others (e.g.,
coming-of-age rituals that involve leaving one’s childhood residence). Such ritualized behaviors
may serve to facilitate psychological connection and separation, to the extent that they are
grounded in the corresponding physical acts (Lee & Schwarz, 2020). Then, considering whether
such psychological outcomes can be adaptive in certain ecologies may provide clues about the
origin of social rituals (Kwon et al., 2020).
Culture-Specific Grounding Facilitates Within-Group Communication.
One important implication of the variability in embodiment across cultures is that it can
facilitate sharing of meaning among individuals within the same cultural group, whereas it can
hinder communication between groups. As hitherto laid out, cultural specificity in embodiment
arises because understanding of meaning is based on the interaction between the body and its
environment, which differs systematically across societies due to cultural and ecological
constraints. Culture not only directly shapes the sensorimotor activities underlying one’s
cognitive processes, but also provides systematically different contexts in which perceptual
experiences occur, which leads to fine-tuning of action-based communication. That is,
understanding meaning from action poses a kind of inverse problem, in which an observed
bodily expression may be associated with multiple alternative internal states (e.g., putting one’s
head down may indicate sadness, shame, or deference)—shared cultural experiences solve this
problem by defining the context in which an action carries a particular meaning (e.g., putting
one’s head down indicates deference in the presence of an authority figure, whereas it might
indicate sadness if one is alone) and by culturally specific nuances in bodily expressions, which
serve to reduce ambiguity (e.g., a deferent head-tilt accompanied by body stiffness versus a
slouching, sad head-tilt). As previously described, social norms help create such shared
experiences via chronic regulatory influence on behavior in various social contexts. For example,
in cultures that tend to suppress expressivity, repeated associations between an emotional state
and more subdued or subtle expressive behavior should calibrate the perceptual system to be
more sensitive to finer variations in expressions, allowing accurate emotion recognition despite
the lack of clear, pronounced signals. Consistent with this idea, there is evidence that people
judge emotions more accurately from facial expressions of those from the same culture,
suggesting there are subtle cultural differences in expressive styles that members of the same
cultural group are attuned to (Elfenbein, 2013; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002).
Cultures can also adapt to socioecological conditions, so as to facilitate sharing of
experiences and meaning. For example, in regions characterized by heterogeneity in the origins
of historic migration, there is more diversity in norms, practices, and language, posing a
challenge for communication. Increase in general expressiveness can address such a challenge,
as clear, unambiguous expressions would mitigate the likelihood of misperception among
individuals with different expressive styles (Niedenthal et al., 2019; Rychlowska et al., 2015).
Thus, the shared experiences of associating relatively greater sensorimotor activity with internal
states allow effective communication without having to rely on understanding of culturally
specific expressive norms and access to indirect sources of information, such as reputation.
It should be noted that cultural attunement of nonverbal communication is a dynamical
process in which constraints on the sensorimotor activity of both the target and the perceiver
jointly affect the accuracy of perception. For example, within cultures that endorse expressivity,
the perceiver’s own tendency to up-regulate motor activity may facilitate the embodied
simulation of typically amplified expressive behaviors, whereas a perceiver from a culture that
chronically down-regulates expressive behavior may initially experience difficulties with the
same task. Thus, the embodiment perspective may provide a useful alternative account of why
cultural misunderstandings arise, and why acculturation and second language acquisition can be
a difficult process—namely, that the underlying issue may involve the failure of a meaning to
elicit an adequate sensorimotor simulation response—in addition to the existing explanations
based on factors such as attitude, motivation, coping styles, and self-esteem (e.g., Gardner, 2000;
Kosic, 2006; Masgoret & Gardner, 2003; Ward, 2001).
Predicting Variations in Embodied Cognition Associated with Cultural Regulation of
Bodily Activities
The current framework has the potential to generate novel hypotheses that can be
empirically tested. To illustrate, in the next two sections we offer several new predictions based
on this line of thinking (see Table 1 for a list of all predictions). The current section focuses on
the constraints that culture places on bodily processes and suggests several approaches for
examining how such constraints affect cognition via embodiment.
Table 1
Summary of predictions
Culture → Body ≅ Cognition Ecology → Body ≅ Cognition → Culture

1 Cultural differences in self-construal should 7 Interdependence and collectivism should
moderate the psychological effects of physical increase in response to ecological constraints
actions. on bodily processes.
2 Visual perception of spatial layouts should be 8 The relationship between resource scarcity and
less biased for perceivers in collectivistic collectivism should be weaker in places where
cultures when accompanied by close others. scarcity is not associated with physical
proximity to others.
3 Switching interpretive frames in multicultural 9 The relationship between subsistence style and
individuals should result in divergent embodied collectivism should become weaker over time
processes. as cultural changes lead to more independent
lifestyles.
4 Culturally incongruent gesture usage should 10 Different kinds of mimicry should be more
result in the worse cognitive performance. prevalent depending on what goals are salient
in the socioecological context.
5 Accuracy of cross-cultural emotion recognition
should depend on valence- and context-
dependent expressivity.
6 Cultural tightness-looseness should affect how
violations of display rules are interpreted.
Note. The arrows (→) indicate the postulated direction of influence. The symbol ≅ indicates the
notion of embodiment which rejects any dualistic separation of cognition and bodily activities,
such that persistent influences on the body should entail corresponding psychological variations.
How Might Cultural Variations in Social Orientation Influence Embodied Cognition?
Here we revisit the idea that embodied cognition is situated in social contexts (Smith &
Semin, 2004; Yeh & Barsalou 2006). That is, the interaction between the body and its
environment is influenced by the actions of other bodies; thus, how one perceives oneself in
relation to others, including close others and strangers, should influence body-environment
interactions.
Prediction 1: Cultural differences in self-construal should moderate the psychological effects
of physical actions.
Previous research has examined whether actions intended to change the relationship
between one’s body and some physical entity in the environment (e.g., washing off a
contaminant from one’s hands, moving toward or away from something, pushing something
away or pulling it towards the self) can have parallel psychological consequences (Lee &
Schwarz, 2020; West & Zhong, 2015). Lee and Schwarz (2020) suggest that the physical act of
separating a contaminant from one’s body facilitates psychological separation from a negative
event, as such mental processes are grounded in bodily activities. For example, research shows
that the act of cleansing (e.g., washing one’s hands) can reduce the residual effects of past
behavior, such as guilt from a moral transgression (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) and cognitive
dissonance after a decision (Lee & Schwarz, 2010).
Given that humans are prone to feeling vicarious emotions (Miller, 1987; Niedenthal &
Brauer, 2012) and that vicarious emotions are facilitated by perceived connection to others
(Cialdini & de Nicholas, 1989), it is plausible that people also vicariously experience the effects
of moral transgressions (e.g., collective feelings of guilt or shame). Consistent with this notion, it
has been suggested that watching others’ act of physical cleansing may produce the same effect
as one’s own act of cleansing on reducing guilt and remedial actions in response to moral
transgressions (Xu et al., 2014). Moreover, the degree to which one perceives the self as
connected to close others should increase the likelihood of vicariously experiencing the effects of
moral transgression, such that members of the ingroup share the sense of responsibility for the
transgression, regardless of who the transgressor is. Consistent with this idea, when primed with
interdependent self-construal, Chinese participants’ neural responses to winning a reward for
their friend was similar to when wining a reward for themselves (Varnum et al., 2014). Thus, in
interdependent cultures, the vicarious effect of physical cleansing may be amplified, as the
boundary between the original transgressor and others claiming responsibility is blurred (Kwon
et al., 2020).
Prediction 2: Visual perception of spatial layouts should be less biased for perceivers in
collectivistic cultures when accompanied by close others.
Across the world, there are different rules about how resources should be transferred
(e.g., Aktipis et al., 2016; Gurven, 2004; Kameda et al., 2005; Kaplan & Hill, 1985). We rely on
close others in times of need, but to whom we should turn and whether they will in fact help
depends on cultural dimensions, such as individualism and collectivism (Chen et al., 1998).
Whether we see close others as being a part of ourselves, sharing our fate, and interconnected
(Aktipis et al., 2018; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) likely has implications for how we acquire
resources from others. Moreover, the perception of whether and how easily we can acquire
resources from the physical or social environment should influence how the body interacts with
its environment.
In studies examining perceptions of spatial layout, Proffitt (2006) argues that inclines of
hills are overestimated in explicit verbal or visual judgments because people need to make sure
they are not expending more energy than they are consuming. This affects visual perception such
that action planning ensures conservation of energy. Moreover, this process should be sensitive
to an individual’s current physiological state, such as fatigue, general health, fitness, or body
mass. In other words, if one perceives a hill to be steeper, she will plan to walk slower, and, if
one is carrying a heavy backpack, she should perceive the hill to be even steeper, such that she
will make sure to minimize metabolic costs by walking slower still. As the human mind has
evolved to have psychological mechanisms for resource-sharing (e.g., Delton & Robertson,
2016; A. Fiske, 1992; Gurven, 2004; Kaplan et al., 2000), it stands to reason that such
mechanisms factor into estimating the net expenditure of a physical action. That is, energy is
conserved, if others are willing to expend energy on your behalf or transfer energy to you.
In fact, research suggests that psychosocial factors can moderate the perception or effect
of physical stimuli (Beckes & Coan, 2011; Harber et al., 2008, 2011). For example, when
perceivers are accompanied by a friend, or asked to think of a friend, they judge a hill to be less
steep (Schnall et al., 2008). Moreover, the feeling that one is understood by others affects
judgments of spatial layouts, such that hills are perceived to be less steep and distance to a
location (Oishi et al., 2013). The logic is that close others can alleviate the costs associated with
a physical endeavor by providing direct assistance, providing additional resources, or reducing
the costs of other activities, such as vigilance against threats. Thus, one’s perception of the
degree to which the self is connected to others (i.e., interdependent construal; Markus &
Kitayama, 1991), how intertwined one’s fate is with others’ (Campbell, 1958), and how willing
others are to incur a cost on one’s behalf (e.g., welfare tradeoff; Cosmides & Tooby, 2013;
fitness interdependence; Aktipis et al., 2018), as well as how able, and socially obligated they are
to provide assistance, should factor into the calculations of conserving energy. We could thus
predict lower susceptibility to overestimating the spatial layout by an individual from a
collectivistic culture, with high levels of interdependent self-construal, in the presence of kin or
an ingroup member who is bound by social norms to infer a cost on the individual’s behalf (e.g.,
a squad leader) and is physically capable of doing so.
How Might Cultural Contexts Influence Embodied Simulations During Verbal and
Nonverbal Communication?
Embodied theories suggest that sensorimotor simulation facilitates cognitive processing,
such that inhibition or interference of simulation should incur cognitive costs. There are several
experimental methods for investigating such effects, which can be used in conjunction with
cultural moderators. For example, motor simulation can be inhibited by temporarily paralyzing
the muscles involved, as via administration of botulinum toxin (e.g., Hennenlotter et al., 2009).
In one such study, participants were asked to read sentences conveying emotional content, and
inhibiting the activity of facial muscles involved in emotional simulation (e.g., the zygomaticus)
by injecting botulinum toxin led to slower reading times, suggesting that sentence
comprehension is facilitated by motor simulation (Havas et al., 2010). Processing of emotional
information can also be hindered by asking participants to engage in tasks that interfere with the
motor activation involved in simulation, such as being asked to hold an object between the lips
while reading a sentence conveying positive affect (Havas et al., 2010; Noah et al., 2018;
Oberman et al., 2007) or to produce movements that are in direct conflict with the one described
in the sentence (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Günther et al., 2020). In addition, inducing
emotions in participants that are inconsistent with the presented stimulus can affect perception by
eliciting inconsistent sensorimotor simulation (Niedenthal et al., 2000).
For such methods, we can consider whether the effects would differ for individuals from
cultural backgrounds providing different patterns of sensorimotor grounding. For example, we

could speculate that the cognitive costs of inhibiting simulation might be greater for individuals
whose baseline motor activity is greater when processing information (e.g., individuals from
culturally heterogeneous societies promoting greater expressivity). We can also leverage existing
cultural variations to enhance the differences in cognitive processes, such as by priming specific
cultural mindsets (Oyserman et al., 2009; Oyserman & Yan, 2018) or by manipulating the
salience of norms that promote or inhibit motor activity (e.g., presence of ingroup audience).
Prediction 3: Switching interpretive frames in multicultural individuals should result in
divergent embodied processes.
One fruitful approach for studying the effect of culture on cognitive processes has been to
examine how the interpretive frame switches for bicultural individuals depending on which
cultural concepts are salient at the time (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002; Hong et al., 2000;
LaFromboise et al., 1993; Morris & Mok, 2011). This body of research has provided evidence
that priming bicultural individuals with stimuli laden with cultural meaning from either culture
(e.g., images of cultural icons) activates the associated cultural concepts and value systems,
which in turn can lead to different interpretations of the same information. The same approach
can be used to examine whether a context-dependent switching occurs for understanding
embodied concepts. That is, an embodied concept should be more accessible under the context in
which the concept was acquired, so that activating the context should facilitate the processing of
the concept.
Cultural frame switching can be one way to manipulate the degree to which sensorimotor
simulation can facilitate cognition, where the outcome of which can be measured by the
cognitive costs incurred when the salient cultural context is inconsistent with the task at hand.
For example, consider an individual who grew up in a culture, such as China, in which
expressivity is suppressed, but has since acculturated to an individualistic culture, such as the
U.S., in which expressivity is endorsed. Such an individual should have access to both cultural
meaning systems that shape how internal states are expressed and perceived. One might expect
that given a sentence comprehension task in English, which should elicit greater activation of
sensorimotor systems, priming concepts related to collectivism or interdependence (e.g.,
presenting a yin-yang symbol; Alter & Kwan, 2009; reading a passage about taking a trip to the
city by oneself or with others; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; see Oyserman & Lee, 2008 for a review
of cultural primes) would inhibit the necessary motor activation, resulting in slower reading
times.
Another possibility is to examine whether the same gesture might be interpreted
differently, or whether different gestures are recruited to convey the same meaning, depending
on the cultural context. Cultural norms also determine the appropriate use of gestures, including
gestural rate, space, and conventions (Graham & Argyle, 1975; Kita, 2009, p. 200; Nicoladis et
al., 2007, 2009). For example, Chinese monolinguals gesture less than American English
monolinguals (So, 2010). Similar to the case of cultural differences in display rules of emotions,
people should adapt to the repeated experience of culturally normative gesture rate or size, such
that the facilitative effect of gestures is conserved, provided that they are consistent with the
given context. For bilingual speakers, gesture rate differs depending on which language is used.
For example, those fluent in both French and English gesture more when speaking French,
compared to when speaking English, which is consistent with the culturally stereotypical gesture
usage (Laurent & Nicoladis, 2015). Expanding on this idea, consider a bicultural individual who
has internalized two different gesture norms, including the expansive use of gestures by Italians
(e.g., Efron, 1941/1972) and more reserved use by the British (e.g., Graham & Argyle, 1975).
When judging the level of arousal, for instance, based on the same gesture, the bicultural
individual may reach different conclusions depending on the salient cultural context, which may
be affected by factors such as the language being used and presence of an audience from one of
the cultures.
Prediction 4: Culturally incongruent gesture usage should result in the worse cognitive
performance.
Meaningful gesturing reduces cognitive load while speaking, so that inhibiting such
gestures incur cognitive costs (Hostetter & Alibali, 2019). For example, given both a speech task
(e.g., explaining a solution to a math problem) and a memory task (e.g., remembering a list of
letters) at the same time, participants tend to perform better on the subsequent recall task when
the speech was accompanied by gestures (Cook et al., 2012; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001).
Hostetter and Alibali (2019) suggest that motor activation during speech needs to cross a
threshold in order for it to be manifested as observable movement. Moreover, situational
constraints can temporarily lower or raise the threshold. For example, when trying to
communicate an important point or a difficult idea, the threshold may be lowered, such that even
weak motor activations may elicit visible action. In contrast, if an audience is present that might
negatively evaluate the speaker for excessive use of gestures, then the threshold may be elevated
to inhibit visible action. Taking these factors into account, we could construct a situation that
maximizes gesture rate, which may involve trying to communicate a complex idea in a second
language (high task difficulty) to strangers whose expectations are ambiguous (low social
inhibition), such that suppression of gestures would lead to poor performance on simultaneous
cognitive task.
We can also adopt an experimental paradigm using response times to measure the degree
to which gesturing facilitates or interferes with a following task. In such studies (Ping et al.,
2014; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan et al., 2002, 2004), participants see a video clip of a
person speaking a sentence (e.g., “She hammered the nail into the wall”). In the congruent
condition, the speech is accompanied by an appropriate gesture (e.g., gesture of hammering
something horizontally, as if into a wall), in the incongruent condition, the gesture is inconsistent
with the content (e.g., gesture of hammering something vertically, as if into the ground), and in
the control condition, no gesture is used. The gesture congruent with the meaning of the sentence
leads to faster response times on subsequent judgment tasks (e.g., whether the word “nail” was
used in the sentence). Incorporating cultural context into the design, we can ask whether
culturally congruent gesture usage might reduce response times. For example, it has been
suggested that representations of time differ depending on language (Boroditsky, 2001;
Boroditsky et al., 2011), such that while English speakers tend to think of time as horizontally
organized, Mandarin speakers tend to think of it as vertically organized. As previously described,
for bilingual individuals, the cultural context can be specified simply by language used in the
task. Thus, when individuals fluent in both English and Chinese listen to a sentence in English
about time (e.g., “Christmas is later in the year than Easter”), response times in the subsequent
task will be faster when the speech is accompanied by a congruent gesture (e.g., horizontal hand
movement), compared to an incongruent gesture (e.g., vertical hand movement (which would
otherwise be congruent with Mandarin usage of “up” and “down” to discuss times of the year).
How Might Cultural Norms Regarding Bodily Expressivity Moderate Processing of
Affective Information?
Prediction 5: Accuracy of cross-cultural emotion recognition should depend on valence- and
context-dependent expressivity.
One important moderator of cultural differences in expressivity is valence. A culture that
endorses expressivity of positive emotions may at the same time discourage expression of
negative emotions. Such tendencies may be especially pronounced in public settings, due to the
general desire for positive affect and aversion to negative affect (Tsai, 2007). For example, while
spontaneous bodily expressions of shame (e.g., slumped posture, as observed in athletes in
response to a loss) seem to be a universal phenomenon (Tracy & Robins, 2008), shame displays
in response to public failure tends to be less conspicuous for individuals from individualistic
cultures (Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008).
Such discrepancies may stem from self-enhancement tendencies in individualistic
cultures (Hampton & Varnum, 2017; Kitayama et al., 1997), in which public admittance of
failure would be a threat to self-esteem. Moreover, while shame itself may serve the function of
avoiding negative evaluation from other group members (Sznycer et al., 2016), individuals from
societies high in relational mobility (e.g., the U.S.) may be less prone to feeling shame, as the
cost of being negatively evaluated by the current group members is reduced by the relative ease
with which new relationships can be formed (Sznycer et al., 2012). It is also possible that
expression of shame may actually backfire under certain contexts, such as when no social
judgments on wrongdoing has yet been made. That is, not expressing shame may be an effective
strategy of denying that there is nothing to be ashamed of. Taken together, for perceivers from
collectivistic cultures, recognizing shame in someone from an individualistic culture may present
a particular challenge, especially in public settings, as mimicry would be hindered by the target’s
suppressed display of shame, as well as the social inhibition of the perceiver’s own motor
activity.
Prediction 6: Cultural tightness-looseness should affect how violations of display rules are
interpreted.
If the typical sensorimotor activity corresponding to some internal state is shaped over
time by the repeated regulatory influence of social norms, then it would be informative to
consider the strength and consistency of such an influence. That is, if a sensorimotor state co-
occurs with an affective state in a given setting with much higher probability than the alternative,
then a group of individuals who share this understanding should be able to reliably infer the
meaning of an expression under similar circumstances. Relevant here is idea of cultural
tightness-looseness, which represents how pervasive norms are, how clearly norms are defined
for a given context, and how strongly norm violations are sanctioned (Gelfand et al., 2006, 2017;
Jackson et al., 2020). Whereas the tightness-looseness dimension is used to describe differences
across larger groups (e.g., nations) in broad strokes, it can also be used for multiple levels of
analysis and scaled down for finer-grained analyses, including regions within countries, social
class, religious groups, and organizations (Gelfand et al., 2017). Further, tightness-looseness can
be domain-specific, such that a group can have tight norms under certain contexts and loose
norms under others. For example, although societies with historically heterogeneous migration
patterns generally tend to be looser, reflecting the diversity in cultural norms (Niedenthal et al.,
2019), they may nonetheless have strong norms for some domains, such as for expressivity of
positive emotions during affiliative events (e.g., a meet and greet), in which conspicuous and
unambiguous displays of emotion can be rendered necessary because people share the motivation
to express goodwill but are less attuned to other cues, such as linguistic cues and subtle culturally
specific expressions.
Tight-loose context should have implications for how deviant expressions are perceived.
For example, if an individual expresses an emotion despite norms against it, then a common
assumption would be that the emotion must have been so intense as for its expression to be
uncontrollable. However, for varying degrees of tightness, different inferences could be made
about what induced or motivated the expression. When there are loose norms for suppressing
expressive behavior, even lower intensity emotions are allowed to be displayed to some extent,
so that a deviant expression can be perceived as not necessarily betraying an intense emotion.
From the embodied simulation perspective, looseness allows idiosyncratic sensorimotor
activities for both the target and perceiver, such that perception should rely less on the social
context and more on direct simulation of the expression. In contrast, if there are clear and strong
injunctive norms around expressivity, accompanied by serious sanctions against violations, there
is likely to be some discrepancy between the experience of the emotion and the visible
expression, which should be accounted for in order to accurately infer the internal state
(Matsumoto, 1999; Matsumoto et al., 2002). Consider the case of when there are very strict
norms against expressing a particular emotion in a given setting (e.g., a hearty laughter at a
funeral). In this case, the following holds “if felt, then do not express”, as well as its
contrapositive, “if expressed, then not felt.” Thus, a deviant expression in the context of tight
norms could present a puzzle for the perceiver (e.g., it is inconceivable that the person who
laughed is actually having a good time at the funeral”), especially as the perceiver’s own
sensorimotor activity would be suppressed in such settings, hindering adequate simulation of the
expression. In comparison, if there are strict norms promoting expressivity, such that “if felt,
then express” holds, then “if not expressed, then not felt” should also hold, which poses
challenge for a target from a culture with norms that suppress expression, because the lack of
expression should lead to a strong inference that nothing has been felt.
Predicting Cultural Psychological Variations from Embodiment of the Ecology.
In the present section, we offer several predictions from the perspective that embodiment
of chronic sensorimotor experiences shaped by the ecological constraints and opportunities may
underlie cultural psychological variations. Such ideas can be tested by examining potential
moderators of the relationship between an ecological factor and sensorimotor outcomes (e.g.,
buffers against a threat, susceptibility or heightened sensitivity to the threat) and measuring
relevant psychological outcomes.
Prediction 7: Interdependence and collectivism should increase in response to ecological
constraints on bodily processes.
Resource scarcity, or low socioeconomic status, has been associated with higher levels of
interdependent self-construal and collectivism (Grossmann & Varnum, 2011, 2015; Inglehart &
Baker, 2000; Kraus et al., 2011; Santos et al., 2017). Existing accounts point out that these
psychological variations may be adaptive responses to such environmental constraints. That is,
interdependent self-construal and collectivistic values were selected for because they promote
cooperation and resource sharing among close others. As noted above, the embodiment
perspective may provide a proximate mechanism through which these psychological variations
arise. Resource scarcity often entails sharing one’s space with others and physical proximity to
genetically close individuals, which are sensorimotor experiences likely to promote
psychological connection to close others.
Different modes of subsistence should also lead to different sensorimotor experiences.
For example, previous research has linked farming to individualism and herding to collectivism
(Nisbett et al., 2001). Farming and fishing versus herding has also been linked to differences in
cognitive styles (holistic versus analytic; Uskul et al., 2008). Recent work has found that even in
similar geographical regions, rice farming compared to wheat farming leads to more collectivism
(Talhelm et al., 2014). These findings can be explained by the fact that farming, especially rice
farming, involves longer durations of labor, higher levels of cooperation, more sharing of labor
during peak times (i.e., energetic expenditure loans), and chronic physical proximity to others.
Such physical proximity and dependency should lead to psychological proximity and
dependency. A number of findings on the effects of joint action, coordinated behavior of two or
more individuals cooperating to achieve a joint outcome, support this view (see Pesquita et al.,
2018 for a review). Joint action, such as synchronous mimicry, increases cooperative behavior
(Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009) and social bonding (Tarr et al., 2016). Moreover, those involved in
joint action can form a joint body schema, or overlapping body representations, such that their
actions are attuned with each other’s (Soliman et al., 2015). Notably, stronger joint body
schemas were associated with interdependent self-construal, suggesting that joint action may be
a key part of collectivistic orientations.
Prediction 8: The relationship between resource scarcity and collectivism should be weaker in
places where scarcity is not associated with physical proximity to others.

If the relationship between resource scarcity and collectivism rests on the typical bodily
experience of resource scarcity, then such a relationship should disappear in times and places in
which resource scarcity does not involve chronic physical proximity to others (Kwon et al.,
2020). For example, some parts of the world may be so dense that there may be a limit to how
much space one can afford, unless one is extremely wealthy (e.g., Hong Kong). In colder
climates, people might choose to live in relatively close quarters to facilitate conservation of
body temperature, even when there is plenty of space available. Alternatively, in industrialized
societies, even less-wealthy individuals can spend much time separated from others (e.g.,
prevalence of “micro-apartments” as a solution to affordable housing shortage in high-demand
areas; Gabbe, 2015).
Prediction 9: The relationship between subsistence style and collectivism should become
weaker over time as cultural changes lead to more independent lifestyles.
Similarly, the posited relationship between modes of subsistence and individualism-
collectivism rests on the typical bodily experience of rice farming versus herding or hunting.
With the advancement of agricultural technology, much manual labor in agricultural societies
has been replaced by machinery, such that there is no longer as much need for coordinated labor
with other group members. Although the effects of such changes in subsistence activities may
take a long time to be observed, as values can persist through transmission, we might expect
collectivistic values in traditionally rice-growing communities to eventually wane, partly as a
result of less frequent opportunities for sensorimotor experiences of joint labor. Such a pattern
may also be observed in more historically industrialized, urban regions, as subsistence activities
increasingly involve independent or solitary labor (e.g., working in cubicles).

Prediction 10: Different kinds of mimicry should be more prevalent depending on what goals
are salient in the socioecological context.
People make interpersonal trait inferences from others’ facial expressions (Adams et al.,
2017; Knutson, 1996; Montepare & Dobish, 2003). For example, smiles are often associated
with positive traits, such as agreeableness (Hess et al., 2002; Senft et al., 2016). People also infer
traits from other bodily actions, such as posture (Shariff & Tracy, 2009) and gaze (Mason et al.,
2005). This kind of impression formation process plays an important role in initiating new
relationships and negotiating one’s position in the group by signaling that one’s positive traits,
such as trustworthiness and friendliness, when other sources of information are lacking. In
response to others’ bodily expressions, people also engage in spontaneous mimicry (Dimberg et
al., 2000), which can lead to positive outcomes, such as affiliation (Lakin et al., 2003; Chartrand
& Bargh, 1999). For example, people tend to respond to a smile with a smile (Cappella, 1997;
Heerey & Crossley, 2013; Hess & Bourgeois, 2010), and such mutual signaling of goodwill may
improve coordination and increase trust (Scharlemann et al., 2001).
However, the kind of mimicry, or behavioral matching, that facilitates building of new
relationships may depend on the particular goals that joint action needs to achieve in the given
socioecological context. For instance, mimicry of emotional displays (e.g., facial expressions) or
gestures laden with cultural meaning (e.g., emblems) should differ in function from mimicry of
more incidental types of bodily action (Hess & Fisher, 2013). van Baaren and colleagues (2003)
found that individuals primed with interdependent (vs. independent) self-construal showed more
nonconscious visible mimicry of limb movements, such as rubbing one’s face and shaking one’s
foot. They found similar patterns when comparing individuals from cultures high in
interdependent self-construal (e.g., Japanese) and those from cultures high independent self-
construal (e.g., Americans). Further, mimicry of bodily orientation and posture led those who
had been mimicked to engage more in informal help, such as helping to pick up a dropped
object, and financial help, such as donating to a charity (van Baaren et al., 2004). Although the
behaviors mimicked in these studies are relatively incidental and do not convey particular
intentions, mere synchronization of limb movements may promote social bonding and group
cohesion (Launay et al., 2016), and are an important part of coordinated subsistence activities
(e.g., rice farming) in collectivistic cultures (Talhelm & English, 2020; Talhelm & Oishi, 2018).
In comparison, mimicry of bodily actions used as social signals may lead to a different kind of
relationship formation. For example, smiles can signal intention to affiliate and cooperate
(Martin et al., 2017; Niedenthal et al., 2010; Rychlowska et al., 2015). Visible mimicry of a
smile can be a relatively low-cost way to signal intent to reciprocate, which can be a useful for
initiating new cooperative relationships, especially in the context of cultural heterogeneity
(Niedenthal et al., 2018; Rychlowska et al., 2015). Taken together, we might expect that when
different goals are made salient (e.g., building a long-term vs. short-term partnership,
accomplishing tasks that involve different levels of coordination), people may try to match
different features of others’ bodily action. Thus, different types of behavioral matching which are
calibrated to local ecological conditions may provide an indicator of culturally normative goals
or values.
Implications, Open Questions, Future Directions
Implications of Cultural Change for the Embodiment.

Research on cultural change has documented shifts that have occurred over time in
various psychological tendencies, including individualism/collectivism (Greenfield, 2013;
Grossmann & Varnum, 2015; Hamamura & Xu, 2015; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Santos et al.,
2017; Twenge et al., 2012, 2013; Zeng & Greenfield, 2015), conformity (Bond & Smith, 1996),
self-esteem (Twenge & Campbell, 2001), and narcissism (Twenge et al., 2008; Twenge &
Foster, 2008). Varnum and Grossmann (2017) have suggested that such shifts can be attributed
to changes in the physical and social environment. That is, cultural change can be viewed as a
result of psychological adaptations to new kinds of threats, demands, and opportunities in the
ecology. As we have discussed in previous sections, focusing on the degree to which an
ecological factor directly affects people’s chronic sensorimotor experiences may be useful for
predicting its downstream effects. And the perspective we have hitherto laid out may help further
specify links between particular features of the ecology and ensuing changes in psychology. For
example, previous work has found that periods during which resources are scarce (e.g., as
measured by employment status or income) have led to decreases in individualism (Bianchi,
2016; Grossmann & Varnum, 2015). We speculated above that such a link may be partly
mediated by living conditions with decreased interpersonal space, resource-sharing activities,
and modes of subsistence involving synchronous labor. However, if an economic downturn is
precipitated by an event such as the social distancing measures in response to the COVID-19
pandemic, which reduces the frequency of physical interactions and dependencies, the effect of
the downturn on individualism should be suppressed.
Moreover, considering recent shifts in culture and ecology, and the sort of novel
constraints they place on our everyday physical experiences, may be useful for predicting future
psychological variations. Life today offers sensorimotor experiences that are far different from
that of our ancestors, or even of those who lived just a few decades ago. What implications might
these strange situations have for our psychology? If we accept that representations of abstract
concepts are grounded in the understanding of physical bodies interacting in the environment,
then inadequate understandings may result from a relative lack of direct experience with the
physical world. Consider, for example, the belief that the Earth is flat, which is supported by the
perceptual experience in which the curvature of the Earth’s surface is not immediately apparent
to the naïve perceiver. False beliefs, such as conspiracy theories, can result from the motivation
to maintain an internally consistent understanding of the world, while failing to successfully
integrate contradictory information (Douglas et al., 2017). One reason for such failure may be
that the information has not been adequately grounded in concrete bodily experiences (i.e., aside
from the cases in which evidence is actively discredited). In fact, effective demonstrations that
the Earth is round involve vivid perceptual experiences of information that is incompatible with
the previous view, such as observing a ship disappearing off the horizon or noticing the shape of
the shadow cast on the moon during a lunar eclipse. This perhaps suggests that a biased
understanding of the physical world partly results from a restricted range of bodily experiences
in the natural environment, which is becoming increasingly common due to cultural changes
(e.g., urbanization, modern work settings, sedentary lifestyles).
Further, if concrete metaphors are the basis of abstract thought, then a sufficiently diverse
set of concrete experiences may facilitate processing of complex abstract concepts. For instance,
if the understanding of cause-and-effect is based on the perceptual experience of physical forces
causing a change in some entity (Pinker, 2013), then having not only direct experiences of such
events (e.g., dragging a plow through a field) but also a diverse set of experiences (e.g., plowing
through different kinds of soil) may contribute to a more nuanced causal reasoning (i.e.,
underlying a simple linear movement are a complex interaction of various forces). Unfortunately,
the modern life is increasingly filled with spaces that are relatively homogeneous in their features
(e.g., white stucco walls) and designs that tend to obscure the complex mechanisms underlying a
function in favor of more streamlined user experiences. For example, consider how elevators
have changed in the past hundred years. In most modern elevators, one’s sensory experience is
dulled, such that one is almost oblivious to what is going on behind the scenes. And the
sensorimotor activity corresponding to the superficial causal action (pressing a button) is so far
removed from the actual chain of events that needs to occur for the upward movement that one
might even make erroneous causal attributions to the simple act of pressing (e.g., pressing the
“close” button in rapid succession when one is in a hurry).
Recent cultural shifts may also have implications for sharing of meaning grounded in
bodily actions. On the one hand, it could be argued that people’s sensorimotor experiences are
becoming more homogeneous in general, due to factors like overall elevation in the standard of
living or prevalence of cultural exchanges, which could facilitate horizontal transmission of ideas
between groups. But, on the other hand, factors like growing income inequality are further
polarizing the sets of experiences available to different strata within a society. Moreover,
disintegration of traditional norms and ritual has reduced the opportunities for different
generations to share a common set of sensorimotor experiences. Thus, within groups it may be
more difficult for ideas to be transmitted vertically or across people of different positions. It is
interesting that, while people seemingly have more freedom than ever to shape their own
sensorimotor experiences, such conditions can also lead to increasingly mutually exclusive sets
of experiences (e.g., in theory, one could spend a whole lifetime without ever stepping on dirt, if
one chooses so). It is perhaps of importance to consider how cognition is being influenced by
shifts body-environment interactions, when examining the causes of radically different attitudes
and beliefs that seem to characterize our society today.
Implications for Thinking About Various Other Forms of Culture
Embedded in what we have proposed so far is the idea that cultures can be defined in
terms of what sensorimotor experiences are typical of a particular place and time. This approach
can offer an alternative way to organize cultures, beyond the existing methods based on
geographical location, broad cultural identities (e.g., East vs. West), and various cultural
dimensions, including values (e.g., (Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart & Welzel, 2010). Traditional
cultural variables can also be reconceptualized or deconstructed to capture their relevance for
body-environment interactions.
The current approach can also be extended to studying relatively understudied forms of
culture including social class, religion, and within-country regions (A. B. Cohen, 2009; A. B.
Cohen & Varnum, 2016; Kraus et al., 2012), as they offer systematically different sets of
sensorimotor experiences. For example, different religions endorse different kinds of internal
states (e.g., tranquil Buddhist temple or Quaker meeting versus service at a Pentecostal church or
Sufi mosque). Further, integrating the study of subcultures within cultures (Oyserman, 2017)
with the current framework can be mutually beneficial. On the one hand, as Oyserman points
out, what distinguishes subcultures from cultures is rather ambiguous and depends largely on the
context, including the question being asked. Considering what kinds of sensorimotor experiences
are typical for a group can be one useful way to define subcultures. On the other hand, the
predictions we have made thus far regarding the effect of culture on embodied processes does
not have to be confined to comparison of different countries or broader cultural groups. In fact,
comparing smaller groups that are more homogeneous in culture and ecology can reduce noise
and allow us to make stronger inferences. Indeed, the typical sensorimotor experiences within a
“culture” (e.g., American) can differ dramatically depending on the region. For example, the
relationship between cultural heterogeneity and expressivity hold within the U.S., as well as
across countries (Niedenthal et al., 2018). Thus, future work based on the present approach can
benefit from considering finer-grained definitions of culture. One potential challenge here is the
role of self-selection; however, considering the function of self-organized groups can offer clues
about why certain subcultures may thrive under some ecological circumstances.
Implications for Acculturation
We began this paper by describing a scenario in which the implications of bodily
processes for psychology could have important implications for adjusting to a new culture. If it is
the case that even our higher cognitive processes are attuned to the sensorimotor constraints of
the local physical and social environment, then having to navigate a new set of stimuli that afford
systematically different sets of sensorimotor experiences should require recalibration of the
cognitive system in order to accurately convey and comprehend meaning based on sensorimotor
simulation.
As we noted before, embodiment has implications for interpersonal communication. For
example, the inference of emotional states based on facial expressions may be attuned to the
particular cultural variants of facial expressions (e.g., degree of activation in the muscles
involved in forming a smile), which could lead to bias in interpreting ambiguous stimuli or
misunderstandings between individuals from different cultures. But it may be worth thinking
about the implications of embodiment for understanding the more abstract cultural differences,
such as values and sense of self. As we have noted, rituals, customs, norms, etc. that prescribe
certain bodily actions are instrumental in transmitting and enforcing values because they make
use of the embodied nature of the mind. Thus, culturally prescribed actions may not only
facilitate understanding of values but may also be necessary for acquiring a fundamental
understanding of a new culture. This suggests that overcoming the challenges of acculturation
may depend on the extent to which an individual is immersed in the typical embodied
experiences of a new culture, rather than a top-down learning process that is not grounded in the
physical body.
Embodiment may also offer a new way of thinking about well-known constructs in the
study of acculturation, such as cultural distance (Ward, 2001; Ward & Searle, 1991). Typically,
cultural distance is thought of in terms of language, values, or shared history, but it might be the
case that similarities or differences in sensorimotor experiences and norms for action might be as
important, if not more so, for understanding why some cultures might feel close or familiar and
others less so. Future research might consider the extent to which there are different dimensions
of cultural distance, and the extent to which bodily experiences predict acculturation outcomes.
Conclusion
How do cultural variations in psychology arise in response to features of the ecology? In
the present paper, we proposed that considering the embodied nature of the human mind can be
key to answering this question. That is, if mental processes are fundamentally entwined with
bodily processes, then cultural psychological variation could be viewed as the consequence of
persistent ecological constraints on the body. Further, considering culture as part of a suite of
environmental constraints on bodily activities, we proposed that the interaction between culture
and body can reveal insights about embodied mental processes. In the present review, we have
attempted to integrate theory and findings on cultural variation, ecology, and embodied cognition
in order to provide a novel synthesis and a generative framework for future research in these
areas. Doing so may enrich our understanding of not only how and why human societies vary,
but also how embodiment vary across cultures. This framework may also provide novel insights
into a diverse array of phenomena, ranging from acculturation to belief in conspiracy theories,
suggesting that the interplay of culture, ecology, and the body may have broad implications for
psychology as a whole.
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Culture, Ecology, and Embodied Cognition

Preprint · December 2020

Jung Yul Kwon Michael E W Varnum

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Culture, Ecology and Embodied Cognition

Jung Yul Kwon, Arthur M. Glenberg, and Michael E. W. Varnum

Department of Psychology, Arizona State University

Preprint date: 12/16/2020

actions, body morphology, sensorimotor systems, and physiological characteristics. First, we

environment constraining bodily processes. Considering the ecological influence on collective

implications stemming from this synthesis.

Keywords: culture, ecology, embodied cognition, situated cognition, cultural change

Culture, Ecology, and Embodied Cognition

include cross-cultural differences in nonverbal communication (Efron, 1941/1972; Ekman &

way we feel, act, and express ourselves.

experience the world around us.

cultural-specific embodiment facilitates sharing of meaning within the group.

processes may be influenced by culture. We end by suggesting broader implications of this

on this line of thinking.

Culture as a Product of the Embodied Mind

What is Embodied Cognition?

2002; Saj et al., 2014).

of it, which involves the activation of necessary perceptual symbols.

Another key idea in embodied cognition is that we represent abstract concepts by

environment. This is evident in the prevalence of metaphorical language (Jackendoff, 2002;

meaning of a sentence; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Günther et al., 2020).

Cognition Is Situated in The Cultural and Ecological Context.

A key premise in embodiment theories is that cognition is situated (Barsalou, 2003;

In terms of perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999), because a perceptual experience of an

meaning, as it is grounded in different contexts (e.g., hugs occurring only in intimate

perceives the affordances of an acorn.

influence on a group of individuals should lead to observable group-level variations in

embodiment. Evidence of this can be found in cultural variations in metaphorical representations.

Whereas certain kinds of embodied representations seem to be universal, attributable to the

As an illustration, metaphorical representations of basic emotions (Ekman, 1992; Izard,

physiological responses and be extended to incorporate elements of the environment. Maalej

(2004) provides examples of culture-specific metaphors of anger in Tunisian Arabic, which

How Can Embodied Cognition Help Explain Cultural Psychological Variations?

Differences in psychology across human societies have been widely documented,

2010), personality (Schmitt et al., 2008), sociosexuality (Schmitt, 2005), tightness-looseness of

al., 2017), and psychological effects of residential mobility (Oishi, 2010).

reflecting an aggregation of individual responses that an ecological factor evokes. Alternatively,

inputs are consistently available to an individual, corresponding changes in cognition should be

resulting in group-level differences in behavioral traits.

that those who grew up in milder temperatures tended to be higher on agreeableness,

(e.g., outgroup members, disease cues in the environment).

Interaction between culture, ecology, and embodiment

Chronic Cognition Cultural Variation

Culture Is Transmitted Through Embodied Processes.

How do cultural psychological variations persist? Successful means of cultural

associated values (D. Cohen & Leung, 2009).

parenting (i.e., proximity to caregiver), fosters an interdependent (versus independent) sense of

repeated sensorimotor experiences provided by the cultural context.

Effect of Culture on Embodied Cognition

Culture Situates Action, Changing the Assumptions of Body-Environment Interactions.

the case that no other behavioral alternative is possible.

An organism must successfully complete various tasks related to survival in order to

fans vs. air conditioning systems).

the body must be prepared for efforts to maintain homeostasis.