REPUBLIC v.

COJUANGCO
GR No. 139930 June 26, 2012 Abad, J.
Article XI - Section 15
Petitioners Respondents
Republic of the Philippines Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al.

Recit Ready Summary

 The case at bar is an attempt of the government to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired during
the Marcos era. In March 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint
for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 against herein respondents, the 1979 members of the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Board of Directors, before the Presidential
Commission on Good Governance (PCGG). The OSG alleged that the UCPB’s investment
in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the gov’t. The alleged
anomalous investment was made 10 yrs. prior to the filing of the complaint. In March 1999,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a memorandum stating that although
there is sufficient basis to indict respondents for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, the action
has already prescribed. The issue here then is W/N the alleged violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019 has already prescribed. The Court ruled that, yes, it has. Although Sec. 15, Art. XI
provides that that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel – it should, however,
be noted that this applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal
cases such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Hence, the
prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to ill-gotten wealth contemplated in
Sec. 15, Art. XI may be barred by prescription. The Court also ruled that the last day for
filing the action by the petitioner was, at the latest, Feb. 8, 1990, or ten years after the
UNICOM filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation. However, the filing was done later than
the said date; hence, the action has already prescribed.
Facts of the Case
 April 1977: respondents incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc. (UNICOM) w/ an
authorized capital stock of PHP100 million divided into 1 million shares w/ a par value of
PHP100 per share.
 August 1979: Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), composed of
respondents in this petition, approved the resolution authorizing UCPB, the Administrator of
the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more than PHP500 million
from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut farmers.
 September 1979: a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of respondents in this petition,
approved another amendment to UNICOM’s capitalization by increasing its authorized
capital stock to 1 billion shares divided into 500 million Class “A” voting common shares,
400 million Class “B” voting common shares, and 100 million Class “C” non-voting common
shares.
 10 years later or on March 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a complaint
for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 against respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB
Board of Directors, before the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG). The
OSG alleged that the UCPB’s investment in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the gov’t since the UNICOM had a capitalization of only 5 million and it
had no track record of operation. The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint of the
OSG to the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-90-2810.
 9 years later or on March 1999, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) issued a
memorandum stating that although there is sufficient basis to indict respondents for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, the action has already prescribed.
Issues Ruling
1. W/N the alleged violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 has already prescribed Yes.

Rationale/Analysis/Legal Basis
1. In the case at bar, petitioner maintains that although the charge against respondents was
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to its efforts
to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his cronies. Sec. 15, Art. XI of
the Const. provides that the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel. However, the
Court has ruled in Desierto that Sec. 15, Art. XI applies only to civil actions for recovery of
ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases such as the complaint against respondents in OMB-0-
90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to ill-gotten
wealth contemplated in Sec. 15, Art. XI may be barred by prescription.
2. The prescriptive period for offenses punishable under RA 3019 is only 10 years (prior to the
amendment by BP Blg. 195). Now RA 3019, being a special law, the 10 yr. prescriptive
period should be computed in accordance w/ Sec. 2 of Act 3326 which provides that
prescription shall run from the day of the commission of the violation, but if that is unknown,
from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation &
punishment. The Court ruled that the last day for filing the action by the petitioner was, at
the latest, Feb. 8, 1990, or ten years after the UNICOM filed its Amended Articles of
Incorporation.

Disposition
Court DENIES the petition.

Separate Opinions
Bersamin, concurring.
 Like the ponente, Bersamin agrees and holds that the State already lost the right to
prosecute respondents for violating Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 by Feb. 8, 1990, or 10 years after
UNICOM filed its Amended Articles of Incorporation. The offense charged against
respondents had clearly prescribed upon the lapse of 10 years from the date of its
commission on Feb. 8, 1980, the starting point of the prescriptive period.
 As to whether or not the criminal action prescribed as to respondent Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr. because his supposed absence from the country in the period from 1986 to 1991 had
interrupted the running of the prescription period, Bersamin submits that there was no
interruption. The applicable rule for computing the prescription period for violation of RA
3019 is Sec. 2 of Act 3326, which provides that “the prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.” It’s worth noting that Sec.
2 does not state the effect on the prescriptive period of an accused’s absence from the
country. He construes the silence of Sec. 2 on the effect of the absence of the accused from
the country as a clear and undeniable legislative statement that such does not interrupt the
running of the prescription period for violations of special penal laws such as RA 3019.

Brion, concurring & dissenting.

  The ponencia held that it was Feb. 8, 1980, or the date when the UNICOM filed its
Amended Articles of Incorporation when the 10-year prescriptive period began to run.
However, Brion submits a different opinion regarding this. He does not actually give an
exact date, but he posits that the proper period to reckon the running of the prescriptive
period should be from the filing of UNICOM’s General Information Sheet (GIS) for 1980,
which would definitely be much later than Feb. 8, 1980. This is so because the alleged
“discovery” of the violation/crime would only be upon review of the UNICOM’s GIS for the
year 1980.
 On the question of the interruption of the prescriptive period w/ respect to respondent
Cojuangco, he submits that the silence of Sec. 2 of Act 3326 on the effect of the accused’s
absence from the country on the running of the prescriptive period does not preclude the
suppletory application of Art. 91 of the RPC. Art 91 provides that “the term of prescription
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Phil. Archipelago.” Its suppletory
application is authorized and mandated under Art. 10 of the RPC, and the only instance
when the application of the RPC to special penal laws (like RA 3019) is barred when the
special law itself should specifically provide the contrary. The silence of Sec. 2 of Act 3326
cannot be construed as providing terms contrary to Art. 91 of the RPC. Hence, it can be
concluded that the 10-year prescriptive period to file charges for violations of RA 3019
should not run when the offender was absent from the country. In other words, such
absence of the offender does interrupt the prescriptive period from running.

Perlas-Bernabe, dissenting.
 She submits that the violation of respondents in the case at bar has not prescribed. This is
so because she posits that the date for prescription should be reckoned from the issuance
of then Pres. Aquino of Executive Order No. 1, creating the PCGG, on Feb. 28, 1986, which
admittedly spurred the investigation on the subject UNICOM investment.