590 Phil.

634

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 174154, October 17, 2008 ]

JESUS CUENCO, PETITIONER, VS. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS

COMPLEX, INCORPORATED AND MATIAS B. AZNAR III,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Decision dated April 18, 2005 and the Resolution dated
August 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 65773.

The Facts

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On May 25, 1992, petitioner leased from respondents for a period of two (2)
years, from May 8, 1992 to May 8, 1994, the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, to
be operated as a cockpit. The lease was extended for another four (4) years, or
until May 8, 1998.

Under the Contract of Lease,[1] it was stipulated that petitioner shall, like a good
father of the family, maintain in good condition the furniture, chattels and all
other equipment and shall, at all times, keep the leased premises clean and
sanitary. For this purpose, petitioner would allow the respondent's building
supervisor or his authorized representative to make a regular spot inspection of
the leased premises to see to it that these stipulations are strictly implemented.
[2] Any damage caused to the furniture, chattels, equipment and parts of the

leased premises shall be the responsibility of petitioner to repair and

compensate.[3] Furthermore, petitioner would give a deposit equivalent to six
(6) months rental to answer for whatever damages may be caused to the
premises during the period of the lease.[4]
Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding
for the lease of the property. Petitioner participated in the bidding. The lease was
eventually awarded to another bidder, Mr. Rex Cuaqui Salud.[5] Thereafter,
petitioner wrote four (4) demand letters to respondents.

The first letter, dated June 8, 1998, reads:

Dear Mr. Aznar:

I was so disheartened that after going through with the supposed

public bidding, haggling with the terms and conditions of a new lease
agreement and after full compliance of ALL your requirements and the
handshakes signifying the clinching of the deal, the contract was
awarded to another party. Though I believe I deserve a renewal, I had
to accept your decision with a heavy heart.

It is now my desire to be released quickly from whatever liability or

responsibility under our previous contract. Repair works on some
damaged portions were already done. Based on our contract, par.
5 thereof, it is my understanding that I am answerable to all
damages caused to furnitures (sic), chattels and other
equipments and minor parts of the leased premises. Once
cleared, I want the return of my deposit of P500,000.00.

Kindly send your inspector to determine by actual ocular

inspection if the restoration work is to your satisfaction.

Very truly yours,

JESUS C. CUENCO [signed][6]

Obviously, the letter was not answered, because on June 17, 1998 petitioner
found it necessary to write respondents a second letter reiterating his request
for the return of the deposit. The second demand letter reads:

Dear Mr. Aznar:

It has been more than a week since my letter dated 8 June 1998
requesting the return of my deposit of P500,000.00. I would assume
your representative had already conducted an ocular inspection and
you were satisfied on the restoration works made on the premises. As
I've stated in my said letter, I want to be released as soon as possible.
 I need to know immediately if I still have other things to
comply with as pre-condition for the release of the deposit. As
far as I know, I have already done my part.

Very truly yours,

JESUS C. CUENCO [signed][7]

With still no response from respondents, petitioner, on August 14, 1998, sent a
third demand letter which read:

Dear Mr. Aznar:

I am surprised by the unreasonable delay in the release of my deposit

of P500,000.00 in spite of my full compliance as to repair works on
minor damage to the premises during my term as lessee. Twice I
requested in writing for the immediate release of my deposit
but until now it remains unheeded. And the so-called
"inventory" which your lawyer Atty. Algoso[8] promised to give
has not been given. Frankly, I am doubtful of the accuracy of
said inventory, if any, considering the full blast major
renovation now being conducted on the complex by the new
concessionaire. I think it's about time we close the last chapter of
the book, in a manner of speaking, so we can proceed in our separate
distinct ways.

I reiterate my request to please release right now my deposit of

P500,000.00.

Very truly yours,

JESUS C. CUENCO [signed][9]

Finally, on August 18, 1998, petitioner, thru his counsel, wrote respondents a
final demand letter as follows:

Dear Mr. Aznar:

For ignoring the two letters of my client Mr. Jesus C. Cuenco, dated
June 8 and 17, 1998 regarding his request for the return of his
deposit in the sum of P500, 000.00, he has decided to endorse the
 matter to this office for appropriate action.

It appears that when Mr. Cuenco leased the cockpit complex he was
required to put up a deposit to answer for damages that may be
caused to furnitures (sic), chattels and other equipments and minor
repairs on the leased premises. When the lease expired and he
failed to get a renewal, Mr. Cuenco in fulfillment of his
obligation under the contract caused the repair of minor
damage to the premises after which your attention was invited
to get your reaction to the restoration work. And since he did
not receive any objection, it can be safely premised that the
restoration was to the lessor's satisfaction.

Mr. Cuenco informed me that the new concessionaire has undertaken

a full blast major renovation of the complex. Under this condition and
in the absence of an accurate inventory conducted in the presence of
both parties, it would be doubly difficult, if not impossible, to charge
Mr. Cuenco of any violation of his undertaking especially as to
deficiency in the furnitures (sic), chattels and other equipments in the
premises.

In view of all the foregoing, it is consequently demanded that you

return to Mr. Cuenco the aforesaid sum of P500,000.00 within THREE
(3) DAYS from notice hereof; otherwise, he may be constrained to
seek judicial relief for the return of the deposit plus interest, damages
and attorney's fees.

Your compliance is enjoined.

Very truly yours, At my instance:

FEDERICO C. CABILAO (signed) JESUS C. CUENCO (signed)

Counsel for Mr. Jesus C. Cuenco[10]

As all of his demand letters remained unheeded, on October 21, 1998, petitioner
filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money, damages and attorney's fees. He
maintained that respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the amount of the
deposit without any justifiable reason.[12]

In their Answer,[13] respondents countered that petitioner caused physical

damage to some portions of the leased premises and the cost of repair and
replacement of materials amounted to more than P500,000.00.[14] They also
averred that respondent Matias B. Aznar III (Aznar) cannot be sued personally
under the contract of lease since a corporation has a separate and distinct
personality from its officers and stockholders, and there was no allegation that
Aznar, who is the President of the corporation, signed the contract in his
personal capacity.[15]

On March 8, 1999, the RTC issued a Pre-trial Order,[16] the pertinent portions of
which reads:

The following facts were admitted by the [respondents]:

1. There is no inventory of damages up to this time;

2. [Petitioner] deposited the amount of P500,000.00;

3. [Petitioner] sends (sic) several letters of demand to

[respondents] but said letters were not answered.

4. There was a renovation of the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex

with a qualification that the renovation is only 10% of the whole
amount.

The main issues in this case are as follows:

1. Whether or not [petitioner] is entitled to the return of the

deposit of P500,000.00, with interest;

2. Whether or not some portions of the complex sustained physical

damage during the operation of the same by the [petitioner].[17]

On May 24, 1999, the RTC issued an Order[18] admitting the exhibits of
petitioner, consisting of the contract of lease dated May 4, 1994 and the four (4)
demand letters.

On July 29, 1999, an Order[19] was issued by the same court formally admitting
the respondents' following exhibits: the lease contract, inventory of the leased
property as of June 4, 1998, inventory of the sports complex dated June 24,
1995, ocular inspection report dated January 15, 1998 and various receipts
mostly in the name of Southwestern University incurred in different months of
1998.
On August 11, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision[20] in favor of petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioner] and

against the [respondents], directing the latter jointly and severally to
return to [petitioner] the sum of P500,000.00, representing the
deposit mentioned in the Complaint, plus 3% interest per month from
August 18, 1998 until full payment thereof.

The latter are, likewise, directed to pay [petitioner] the sum of

P15,000.00 as and for litigation expenses.

With costs against the [respondents].

SO ORDERED.[21]

The RTC ratiocinated that respondents' failure to reply to the letters of petitioner
raises a presumption that petitioner has complied with his end of the contract.
The lower court gave credence to the testimony of respondents' witness, Ateniso
Coronado (Coronado), the property custodian of the respondents, that the sports
complex was repaired and renovated by the new lessee. The court also
considered the admission of respondents' counsel during the pre-trial that no
inventory of the property was conducted on the leased premises. The RTC
debunked the inventory presented by the respondents during trial as a mere
afterthought to bolster their claim against petitioner.[22]

Respondents appealed. On April 18, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[23]

reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The fallo of the CA decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 13, Cebu City, dated August 11, 1999, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered finding this case in favor of
defendants-appellants Talisay Tourists Sports Complex and Matias
Aznar III. Consequently, Civil Case No. CEB-22847 for sum of money,
damages, and attorney's fees involving herein parties, as well as all
other claims and counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
factual and legal basis.

No pronouncement as to costs.
 SO ORDERED.[24]

The CA ruled in favor of respondents on the basis of: (1) Coronado's testimony
that petitioner continued to hold cockfights two months after the expiration of
the lease contract which was not refuted by petitioner; (2) the summary of
repairs made on the property showing that respondents spent the amount of
P573,710.17 immediately prior to the expiration of the lease contract and shortly
thereafter; and (3) the new lessor incurred expenses amounting to over P3
million when he shouldered the rest of the repair and renovation of the subject
property.[25]

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raised the following issues for resolution of the Court: (1) whether a
judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission;
and (2) whether such judicial admission was properly rejected by the CA.[26]

On the other hand, respondents posed the following: (1) whether the findings of
the CA that the cockpit sustained damage during the period of the lease was
rendered not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Court; (2)
whether the CA committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled
for the return of the deposit.[27]

The ultimate question we must resolve is whether petitioner is entitled to the

return of the amount deposited.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative. Respondents failed to present sufficient proof to

warrant the retention of the full amount of the deposit given by petitioner.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and as a rule, does not weigh anew
the evidence presented by the parties. However, the instant case is one of the
exceptions to the rule because of the conflicting decisions of the RTC and the CA
based on contradictory factual findings. Thus, we have reviewed the records in
order to arrive at a judicious resolution of the case at bench.

Petitioner questions the CA's finding that there was damage caused the premises
while the lease was still in force. Such finding could only have been based on
alleged inventory of the property conducted by the respondents. Petitioner takes
exception to this evidence because of the earlier judicial admission made by
respondents' counsel that no inventory was conducted and, accordingly, any
evidence adduced by the respondents contrary to or inconsistent with the
judicial admission should be rejected.

Indeed, at the pre-trial conference, respondents' counsel made an admission

that no inventory was made on the leased premises, at least up to that time.
This admission was confirmed in the Pre-Trial Order issued by the trial court on
March 8, 1999 after the lease expired on May 8, 1998.

Yet, on July 1, 1999, respondents' witness Coronado testified, as follows:

ATTY. VASQUEZ:

Q Why do you know the defendants?

A Because Talisay Sports Complex is owned by Aznar Brothers

Realty Corporation of which I am employed as (sic) in charge
of the realty department.

Q How about Matias Aznar III, the defendant here?

A He is the Chairman of the Board.

Q Board of what?

A Of the Aznar Brothers Realty Corporation.

Q Is he the Chairman of Talisay Tourist Sports Complex?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that you are in charge of the realty department, what
is your function with respect to the properties of Talisay Tourist
and Sports Complex?

A I am the in-charge of the administration and overseeing of the

complex owned by Talisay Sports Complex.

Q When you said that you are in charge of the administration and
overseeing of the complex, what does it includes (sic)?
A It includes collection of rentals of complex and routine
inspection to determine that there are missing or damage of
(sic) the properties.

Q How long have you been employed with the Aznar Brothers
Realty Company?

A 25 years.

xxxx

Q In your earlier testimony, you said that part of your function is

to conduct routine inspection of the complex. Now, was there a
routine inspection conducted during the period of the lease
contract between plaintiff and the defendant?

A Yes, we conducted inspection sometime in January 1998.

Q For what purpose was that inspection?

A The purpose is to determine if there are damage sustained by

the complex.

Q And what was the result of the inspection.

A There were missing and destroyed fixtures and physical

damage sustained by the complex.

xxxx

COURT

xxxx

Q W[h]y did you not take photographs of the damage sustained

by the complex?

A We did not take pictures, Your Honor, because in fact their

personnel were in our presence (sic) during the inspection,
they were accompanied by us, because we can not conduct
 inspection without the presence of the personnel of Jesus
Cuenco, Your Honor, the lessee.

Q Did the personnel of Jesus Cuenco sign any paper

acknowledging receipt of any report?

A There was no refusal, but we did not initiate to let them sign
and confirm.

COURT

Q So, we have to rely on your testimony?

A Yes, sir.[28]

Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary

evidence[29] of an alleged property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that
the CA based its conclusion that the amount of damage sustained by the leased
premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of
petitioner's deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents'
counsel which should have been binding on the respondents.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made

by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial,
by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the
judicial proceeding.[30] The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case
constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no
further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the
admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were
made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the
pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.

Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they
claim that the same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the
stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. The
pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be
brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of
compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless.[31]
Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or
implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client which renders respondents
in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is
conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.[32]

Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the
pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary
weight to respondents' evidence contradictory to the judicial admission.

The appellate court's findings that the damage in the premises exceeded the
amount of the deposit is further sought to be justified, thus:

Verily, a perusal of the summary of repairs amounting to P573,710.17

claimed to have been made by appellants over the property at about
that time immediately prior to the expiration of the lease contract and
shortly thereafter, would show that the repairs pertained to repairs on
the drainage, sewage, immediate premises and structure of the
complex. We find the same highly credible and meritorious
considering that as earlier admitted by appellee, the repairs he made
were minor and were confined only to certain portions of the complex,
although substantial repairs were done on the cockhouses only, and
that said repairs were done because of a coming big time derby and
not to satisfy the provisions of the lease contract. Also, by implication,
appellee is stating that the new lessor incurred expenses amounting
to over P3 million when he shouldered the rest of the repair and
renovation of the complex after the term of lease of appellee.[33]

Yet, upon perusal of the receipts presented by respondents, we found that

majority of the receipts are under the name of Southwestern University. In their
Memorandum,[34] respondents aver that Southwestern University and
respondent corporation are sister companies.[35] Even if true, this matter is of
no consequence because respondent company and Southwestern University
have distinct and separate legal personalities, and Southwestern University is
not a party to this case. Thus, we cannot just accept respondents' argument that
the receipts paid in the name of Southwestern University should be credited to
respondent company. In any event, they were not able to prove that those
receipts were in fact used for the repair or maintenance of the respondents'
complex.

Furthermore, respondents are not entitled the full amount of the deposit
because the repair and renovation of the sports complex after the expiration of
petitioner's lease were undertaken not by respondents but by the new lessee.
This can be gleaned from Coronado's testimony on cross-examination, viz.:

Q You do not know. Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that the new
lessee was Wacky Salud?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that was sometime of July or August of 1998?

A They were about to conduct three months repair of the

complex?

Q So, Mr. Wacky Salud conducted, did you say repair or

renovation? Is it renovation or repair?

A There was a renovation and repair.

Q Renovation including repair?

A Yes, sir.

COURT

Q In other words, after the expiration of the contract of Mr.

Cuenco, Wacky Salud took over?

A Yes, he took over that repair and renovation were no longer

included in this presentation, that is at his own expense.

Q Precisely. In other words, some repairs were made by Mr.

Salud and not by Aznar Brothers Realty?

A Yes, sir.[36]

Finally, the Court observes that the inventories presented by respondents were
not countersigned by petitioner or were they presented to the latter prior to the
filing of the case in the RTC. Thus, we are more inclined to agree with the trial
court that the "inventory was made as an afterthought,"[37] in a vain attempt of
the respondents to establish their case.

However, Coronado's testimony that petitioner extended the operation of the

sports complex for a period of two months after the expiration of the lease
without the respondents' authority and without the payment of rentals, remains
unrebutted. Enlightening is the following testimony:

Q I observed here in No. 16 of your summary, two months

arrears rentals, June to July, how come? The contract was
supposed to expire May 1998?

A Yes, because it had happened on this extension of the lease

because they are still occupying until July after the
expiration of the contract.

COURT

Q You mean to say that they still use the complex for the
purpose for which it was intended, which is for cockfighting?

WITNESS

A Yes, they are still doing their usual operation.

ATTY. VASQUEZ

Q You mean to say that there were still cockfighting held in the
complex even after May 1998?

A Yes, sir.[38]

This two (2) months over-stay of petitioner in the leased premises should be
charged against the deposit. Because there was no renewal of the lease
contract, it is understood that the continued use of the premises is on a monthly
basis with the rental in the amount previously agreed upon by the parties, in
accordance with Articles 1670[39] and 1687[40] of the Civil Code.

In the Contract of Lease of petitioner and respondent company, it was agreed

that the rental to be paid shall be the following:

WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is the owner of the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex,
Inc. located at Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu;

WHEREAS, the SECOND PARTY has expressed his desire to lease said
complex (cockpit) and the FIRST PARTY have agreed to lease/let the
same to the SECOND PARTY subject to the following term and
condition, to wit:

1. In consideration of this lease, the SECOND PARTY agrees to pay the

FIRST PARTY a lump sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00)
representing advance rental for the first year, the same to be paid on
May 8, 1994. Thereafter, the rental shall be as follows:

Second year - P1,050,000.00 or P87,500.00/month

Third year - 1,100,000.00 or P91,666.67/month
Fourth year - 1,175,000.00 or P97,916.67/month[41]

Thus, by way of rental for the two-month overstay, the amount of P195,833.34
should be deducted from the amount of deposit paid by petitioner to respondent
company.

As to petitioner's claim of interest of three percent (3%) per month on the

amount due him, the same is without legal basis. We note that no amount of
interest was previously agreed upon by the parties in the contract of lease.

Under Article 2213 of the Civil Code, "interest cannot be recovered upon
unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty." In the instant case, the claim of petitioner is
unliquidated or cannot be established with reasonable certainty upon his filing of
the case in the RTC. This is because of the contending claims of the parties,
specifically, the claim of petitioner for the return of the P500,000.00 deposit vis-
a-vis the claim of respondents on the arrears in rentals and on the damage to
the premises. It is only now that the amount that should be returned is
ascertained, i.e., P500,000.00 less the two-months arrears in rentals amounting
to P195,833.34, the sum of which will earn

interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum[42] from the time the
case was filed in the RTC on October 21, 1998.[43] Upon finality of this decision,
the rate of interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum from such finality
until full satisfaction. The foregoing interest rate is based on the guidelines set
by the Court in Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA, viz.:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts,

 quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of

actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well
as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the

payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under
and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance

of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the
court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time
the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only
from the date of the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed
to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on
the amount of finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money

becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest,
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2,
above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its
 satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then
an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[44]

Concerning the solidary liability of respondents, we hold that respondent Matias

Aznar III is not solidarily liable with respondent company. His function as the
President of the company does not make him personally liable for the obligations
of the latter. A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its
directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred by them while acting as
corporate agents, are not their personal liability but the direct accountability of
the corporation they represent.[45]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. CEB-22847 is hereby REINSTATED with the following modifications:

(1) Talisay Sports Complex, Inc. is solely liable to return the amount of the
deposit after deducting the amount of the two-months arrears in rentals; and

(2) The rate of legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) on the amount due
computed from October 21, 1998, and TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest,
thereon upon finality of this decision until full payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Azcuna, and Chico-Nazario,

JJ., concur.

* Additional member replacing Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes per Special

Order No. 521 dated September 29, 2008.

[1] Records, pp. 6-9.

[2] Paragraph 4 of the Contract of Lease, id. at p. 7.

[3] Paragraph 5 of the Contract of Lease, id.

[4] Paragraph 11 of the Contract of Lease, id.

[5]The new lessee's name appears in other parts of the records as
Wakee/Wacky Salud.

[6] Records, p. 10. (Emphasis supplied.)

[7] Id. at 11. (Emphasis supplied.)

[8] Atty. Algoso is the in-house counsel of the respondents.

[9] Records, p. 12. (Emphasis supplied.)

[10] Id. at 13-14.

[11] d. at 1-14.

[12] Id. at 3.

[13] Id. at 17-22.

[14] Id. at 18.

[15] Id. at 19.

[16] ssued by Judge Meinrado P. Paredes; id. at 34.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at 40.

[19] Id. at 58.

[20] Penned by Judge Meinrado P. Paredes; id. at 59-68.

[21] Records, p. 68.

[22] d. at 59-68.
[23] Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas, with Associate Justices

Arsenio J. Magpale and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 36-42.

[24] Id. at 41.

[25] Id. at 39-41.

[26] Id. at 286.

[27] Id. at 264-265.

[28] TSN, July 1, 1999, pp. 4-8. (Emphasis supplied.)

[29] Exhibits "2," "2-B," "2-C" and "2-D."

[30] Binarao v. Plus Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 154430, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA

49.

[31] Ramos v. Dizon, G.R. No. 137247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 17, 34.

[32] Yujuico v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 164282, October 12, 2005, 472 SCRA 463.

[33] Rollo, p. 40.

[34] d. at 258-278.

[35] d. at 272.

[36] TSN, July 1, 1999, pp. 19-30.

[37] Rollo, p. 90.

[38] TSN, July 1, 1999, pp. 17-18.

[39] Art. 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue enjoying

the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a
notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given, it is understood
that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but
for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the
original contract shall be revived.

[40] Art. 1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to
be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if
it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if
the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no
period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease
after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is
weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has
been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may
also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one
month.

[41] Records, p. 6.

[42] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2209.

If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor
incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence
of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.

[43] CIVIL CODE. Art. 2212.

Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded,
although the obligation may be silent upon this point.

[44] G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 79.

[45] Siemens Philippines, Inc. v. Enrico A. Domingo, GR. No. 150488, July 28,
2008.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: April 03, 2014

This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System

Supreme Court E-Library