GOD HIS EXISTENCE and HIS NATURE A Thomistic Solution of Certain Agnostic Antinomies By Tur Rey. R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, OP. MASTER IN THEOLOGY, PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE COLEGIO ANGELICO, ROME; MUD(GER OF THE ROMAN ACADEMY OF ST, THOMAS AQUINAS ‘Translated from the Fifth Freach Edition By DOM BEDE ROSE, O.S.B,, D.D. sr. amcroicr’s snare we MOUNT ANGH, OnE, & Volume I y “The first indemonsteable principle is thatthe stme thing cannot be at the sume time affirmed and denied: this is based on the notion of being and non-being, and on this principle all others are based, as is sated by the Philosopher in the Fourth Book of his Meraphysicn ch, 3,” (St. Thomas, Suma Thal, 1a 24, 94, 42) B. HERDER BOOK CO, 15 & 17 SOUTH BROADWAY, ST LOUIS, MO., AND 33 QUEEN SQUARE, LONDON, W.C. i. 1949“ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Printed in U. S. 4. NIEML OBSTAT ruprivt POTEST NIHIL OBSTAT ‘sit Ludowici, die 13- Det, 1935» ES B. Hieronymus Weape, OSB Censor depuiatis Thomas Meier, 05.8.» Abbas FJ. Holweck, Censor Libnorum si, Ludovic, die 14. Det 1935 Asoannes J. Glennon, Copyright 1938 1B, HERDER BOOK CO- Tai-Bellou Press, Fifth Printing Ines Binghamton Archiepiscopus ‘ond New York TABLE OF CONTENTS PART II THE NATURE OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTES I What Formally Constitutes the Divine Nature Ir According to Our Imperfect Mode of Know- ing It aD 42. The problem. The Deity, as it is in itself, cannot be known by our natural powers, But among the divine perfections which are contained formally and emi- nently in it, and of which we have a natural knowl- edge, is there not one which claims priority over the others? Various solutions i 43. Neither free will nor the good is what formally con- stitutes the divine nature 44. Does being itself or subsistent thought formally con- stitute the divine nature? . ey ‘The Derivation of the Attributes from Self- subsisting Being A f 45. Notion, division and derivation in general of the at- tributes 2. aa ARTICLE I ATTRIBUTES RELATIVE TO THE BEING OF GoD 46 Unity and simply eruh, perfection and goodness; infinity pene acest eternity 48. Invisibility, incomprehensibility, knowableness 3 16 33 33 43 50 54TABLE OF CONTENTS v iv cuarren IV The Special Antinomies Relating to Freedom . 268 ARTICLE I be 59. Statement of the problem; absolute Intellecrualism and pxrayauTes RELATIVE TO THE DIVINE OPEEAT af Libertism, the third antinomy of Kant. . . , 269 cHNFTE sadam, foreknowledge, providence 59 60. Freedom results from intelligence . . . . . . 284 49 hie rou % 61, Liberty and the principle of sufficient reason... 306 0. The free will and love o | i i 50. al ale . 10 62. The divine attributes of liberty and wisdom... 338 s an Si COu # URIS PAVED 333 63. The divine attributes of liberty and immutability. . 351 tence SRD a are life of God: mystery of the Holy Trinity 170 64. Human liberty and the divine universal causality. 354 53. The 65. ee evil and the eee causality: Orcs a) sufficient grace; (b) sin Scie Seca HN ivine Attributes: Their ut Reconciliation of, the Ri tneir Identification in i ih Formal Existome che Deity. - - 7 V_ God's Ineffability and the Absurdity of the Un- the Eminence ol knowable. Conclusion and Confirmation . . 397 ral antinomy « eee ie BS ee solution of the antinomies and the af- ve 6. Gods ete otiticy (idea eS Pou ves Bi. a0 55. The indi Se ON ae oes 67. Progressive harmony of the apparently conflicting per- firmed cause of the mystery fections in the life of grace, which is sanctity 405, 68. The false harmony. The Unknowableabsurd, the con- dence is fusion between being and nothingness au joaL MYSTERY IN THE 69, The way which generally leads one to the absurdity of EXPLANATION SAN i FERTECTIONS oF cop the unknowable: the confusion between good and - Q Ms sppsrtreavio Fe at ope psd evil in moral mediocrity Aven 44 56. There is Pad formally in the two ser zo. How Agnosticism leads to Atheistic Evolutionism: i af ic identificatio: i i i tio f° die infinitely from each otber by Ser identification of being and nothingness in becoming 424 Mode or manner of being . 71. Conclusion: the true God or radical absurdity... 436 Ik is no contradiction for the absolute perfection: tobe 37 eome really identical in the Diy and ee peat re ee ‘Gurified from all imperfec: ees : s 3 at ees cach according to its proper exigen- I Nore ow Tae Vauiorry oF rue Princes oF INERTIA AND ion, they tend, e wee in some way to become identi te Vaan s 2 i qi I Nore on Tae Simpuicrry or tHe ANatoctcat Norton oF lif it ent in the Scotist and Suarezian ee ae ane gasses Eien it 24 oo em covi TABLE OF CONTENTS TIL ‘Tem Vasious Fons of Pavranine Rururap py St. Troms 456 IV. Sr. Tuomas AND Neomouinism: A SynTHusis OF THE Doc- crainz oF St. THOMAS ON ‘Tuuse Quastions Aproros Ta vray PRBSENTATION OF TH ScumNTIA Mupta 465 EPILOGUE Gov Derianansino on Davenscina; No Orman Aurmauarivs 529 ‘A Qunsrion or Wows tt Wher 889 Ae toersone on BND |! salen See een ole Fouwpanox ror nz Distivorion serwitw Porawor snp ACT ‘Accorpinc To St. THOMAS pi 548 Dennrniow or Poravor anp Tan Nacassrry ov & Raat, Dustin” ‘ion setweeN I AND Act Li 548 ‘Tae Last Answan ro Time Ditexsnsa: “Gop Devemanone On Ds- NEWER Noy Tina Is No Oreten Avrexnative” 558 ie 2) it Wo SUT HS Se a PART II ‘THE NATURE OF GOD AND HIS ATTRIBUTESCHAPTER I Wuar Formauty Consrrrrures te Divine Nature Accorpine ro Our Imrerrect Mopz or Knowre Ir 42) The problem. The Deity, as it is in itself, cannot be known by our natural powers. But among the divine perfections which are contained formally and eminently in it, and of which we have a natural knowledge, is there not one which claims priority over the others? Various solutions. Having proved that God is, we must proceed to the considera- tion of what He is, We have already (n. 32) proved that reason can acquire some knowledge of the divine essence, but that it is incapable of knowing positively what properly constitutes the Deity or of knowing it guidditative, “God can be known indeed,” says St. Thomas! ina natural way “through the images of His effects,” in that these effects are a reflection of Him. Now there cannot be equality between the divine effects and the infinite virtue or power which produced them, and they can be only im- perfect and very faint images of this power, so that they present as multiplied and divided the attributes which are present in the first cause in an absolutely simple unity. Thus, in a way, the sun contains eminently the various forms of energy which we un- doubtedly find on the earth. Thus colors are contained in light, and in a higher order the unity of the human soul includes the 2 Summa theo Tay. 13) 8.554. 12, 8.12. 2 The proper or proportionate object of a created intelligence ix created beings and the proper object of a created intelligence united to a body is the essence of sensible things or what there is of the ineligible in the tenable, Cf. Ta, q 12, 4, See also injra (a, 47), on the“invisiblity of God. 34 GOD: HIS EXISTENCE AND HIS NATURE perfection of the sensitive and vegetative souls, such as we find these in animals and plants Therefore all the perfections which are many and separate in creatures are found unitedly in the eminent simplicity of the Deity. We see this to be particularly so from the proof based on the various degrees in being (fourth proof), arguing as it does from the multiple to the one, from the composite to the simple, from the imperfect to the perfect (a. 39). St. Thomas discusses this question at length in connection with the names given to God. “When any term expressing perfection,” he says, “is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection dis- tinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term ‘wise’ applied to a man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man’s essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas, when we apply it to God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence or power or existence, Thus also this term ‘wise’ (or the term ‘being’), ap- plied to man, in some degree citcumscribes, envelops, and com- prchends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incompre- hended, and as a perfection which infinitely surpasses all the meanings of which it is susceptible, Hence it is evident that this term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God and to man. ‘The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures . . . but in an analogous sense. “However, we cannot say, as some have said, that the names predicated of God and of creatures are purely and simply equivo- cal in such a way that there is no similarity between the uncreated ‘and the created being. If such were the case, nothing could be known or demonstrated of God through creatures; for the rea- . 1 very faint analogies, Solar energy is not, in fact of a higher ee ee titre nee Finally the arse veal which contains eminently and formally senive life and vegetative life is still very defective, for sensitive life applies univocally to man and beast, whereas nothing ean be predicated univocally of God and creatures. WHAT FORMALLY CONSTITUTES THE DIVINE NATURE 5 soning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation; the same term would be employed in totally different senses, a verbal similarity being the only thing in their favor. How could the Philosopher have demonstrated so many important truths concerning the Author of all things? How could the Apostle St. Paul have said in Rom, 1:20: ‘The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made’? “[f the names of the absolute perfections predicated of God and of creatures are neither univocal nor equivocal, what are they? They are analogous. This means that they denote things essentially different between which there is a certain propor- tion.” + We have already (n. 29) proved the transcendent or analogical validity of the primary ideas which denote absolute perfections. ‘These perfections, as we said, may be predicated of God not merely by way of metaphor, as when we say of God that He is angry; but they may be said of Him literally. As a matter of fact, they imply no imperfection and therefore are in no way opposed to the supremely perfect Being® Although they may be predicated of God according to their proper meaning, or formally, these notions denote, nevertheless, things essentially different when applied to God and to creatures. ‘Thnus, even in the created order, the notion of knowledge which is applied, according to its proper meaning, both to sensation and to intellection, denotes in both cases essentially different things, there being a resemblance only of analogy or proportion between them. Sensation is to the sensible as intellection is to the intelligible. For this reason we can truly say of each that it is knowledge. In like manner we say that the first cause is to its existence, as the creature is to its existence: the fir6t cause is to its goodness, as the creature is to its goodness. This permits us to say of God that 4st. Thomas, Ia, q. 13, a. 5. Ibid, a. 2, 3, 6.6 GOD: HIS EXISTENCE AND HIS NATURE He is good, and to call Him “being,” using these terms in an analogous sense. Teis only in a negative and relative way that we can acquire by our natural powers a knowledge of the divine mode of these per- fections, Thus we say that God is an infinite being, meaning by this that He is not finite, not limited. Or again, by comparison with the goodness of created beings, we say of God that He is the sovereign Good. The argument from causality enables us to affirm the existence of God and of His perfections. The mode of the presence of these attributes in God is but very imperfectly determined by way of negation and of eminence® Tn chapter three we will explain how these absolute perfections can all be found formally identified in the eminence of the Deity without being destructive of one another, and without ceasing to be formally in the Deity.* It is of importance to point out here that the formal principle of the Deity as to what properly constitutes it as such, cannot be known by our natural powers, This proves that in God there are truths of a supernatural order.® Cajetan, merely repeating the doc- trine of St. Thomas and recalling the terms used by Dionysius, says that the formal concept of the Deity is superior to the con- cepts of being, of unity, and of goodness. “The divine reality is «1d, a. 3. 4 "The classical text of St. Thomas on this point is that taken from the first book of his Sensennss, ds 3, eX, 3.3, OF “That God exceeds the power of our inelecs Shine dees on the pans of God Hiraslf, 10 the plenitude of His perfection, and aoe ey part 10 the fecblenes of the intellect whick fils 0 comprehend thie Fee ti Monee ti evident that a pucality of these notions is not only de to the nature of our intellect but also because of God ‘Himself, in that His perfection ABs Jans cach eoncept of our intellect. Thetefore, there is something in the object Rear cae ads tthe plurality of tote notions, as to what God is, not indeed Teeslurlig of the object but a fulness of perfection, and henee it comes about Boer cepts are applied to it" See alo the explanation of this text given i ae thomas atthe bainsng of thes eases on God, eg, Billuart, De Deo, dh. 2,2 3 also Joha of St. Thomas, Gonet. * Summa, Ta, Q- 1, % 4. WHAT FORMALLY CONSTITUTES THE DIVINE NATURE 7 prior to being and to all its differences: it is above being and above the one.” ® ‘The Deity contains formally the notes of being, unity, and good- ness, but it is above these. That is why they can be identified in the eminence of the Deity without being eradicated. All Thomists agree in saying that there is no real or formal dis- tinction between the divine attributes previous to that made by the mind. Likewise in created things, between the genus and spe- cific difference (animality and rationality, for instance, as found in man), there is no distinction previous to that made by the mind. ® Cajetan, in his commentary on the Summa (Ia, q. 39, a 1, 0. 7), speaking the Holy Trinity, says: “In the order of valites (ella wre ing Gn Ook 4 thing is one, notin a purely absolute sense nor in a pusely relative sense nor is it mnized or composite or a result of both these, but it is one in a mom eminent and Jorma! way, containing in itself something relative (infact, many things relative) fand also something absolute. In the formal order (shat of formal concepts), in fsa soc eee eae pata Seog a Col ue ae oe al concept, which is not purely absolute nor purely relative nor purely communicable, Be tiny Sameera a eee a en eames Jorma! way contains whatever there is of absolute perfection, and whatever is Mlemanded by the Trinity in a relative seas. Tt must be 20, because to anything absolutely simple in itself and absolutely one, there must correspond a formal and adequate concept: otherwise the thing would not be intrinsically and immediately the one intligible of whatocve intellect. We have a confirmation ofthis inthe Verbum Dey, because it ie the only one of its kind. Evidently if the word it vet soul eget repent ht of whe ti the wor fe make a mistake, however, in arguing from absolute and relative things Pe ae z it one Prior to the divine reality. Yet quite the Roa RpeRaeA TT Ten err, ee en, In like manner Cajetan (op. cit., Ta, q. 13, a. 5, 0. 7) remarks: “Thus constitute one formal concept of a higher order, the proper concept, namely, of Re re eee lg epee LS ee Re in oe ueneare ee however, as the concept of light ines he cme ofc, bt fry teeta of Tht nes te St. Thomas had said about the same: “God, however, as considered in Himsel Sicha Sissel gape sete salen Ea sw aeceg eae because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself” (Ia, q. 13, a. 12). a8 GOD: HIS EXISTENCE AND His NATURE We also say that they are only virtually distinct, or that their reality isthe foundation for making this distinction which actually cxists as such only in the mind. Even less than this is the virtual distinction between the divine attributes. We are right in conceiv- ing the genus as potential and imperfect, and the specific difference ns its extrinsic perfection, which is superadded to it and which is sts determining clement, But in God there is no foundation for such a distinction. We have no grounds for conceiving « divine perfection as potential, imperfect, and determined by another divine perfection extrinsic to it. Hence, even according to our very imperfect mode of knowing, the divine perfections must be con- ceived not as extrinsic to one another, but as actually included in one another in an implicit way, though each is not explicitly in- cluded in the others; otherwise we would have to admit a purcly verbal distinction between them. Among the virtual distinctions, this one between the attributes is therefore the least that can be conceived.'? Hence we sce that itis impossible for us to know, by the natural power of reason, what formally constitutes the divine nature as itis in itself, To arrive at a knowledge of God, according to what mcm es eid oe and Billuart, at the beginning of their treatises on God. Billuast, Se ee Sheer! kaa ies strains Set eden ape soon Mae When ‘the Thomists say that the divine essence actwally and implicitly oe WHAT FORMALLY CONSTITUTES THE DIVINE NATURE 9 properly and intrinsically constitutes the Deity, there must be a supernatural revelation, It is only by divine faith that we are able in this life to know in an obscure manner the mystery of the in- timate life of God. But to have evident knowledge of what con- stitutes the Deity, we should have to see it directly, as the blessed do in heaven. Only then could we see the intimate manner in which the divine perfections, which can be known in a natural way, are indentified in the eminence’ of the Deity without being destructive of one another. ‘Although it is not possible to know in a natural way what con- stitutes the Deity as it is in itself, among the absolute perfections which can be known in a natural way, is there not one, according to our imperfect mode of knowing them, which is the fundamen- tal principle of the distinction between God and the world and which is the source of all the divine attributes? If such be the case, we should be right from the logical point of view of our imperfect knowledge in saying that this perfection is what formally con- ‘tutes the divine essence. It would be in God what rationality is in man: the specifying principle which distinguishes Him from other beings, and from which His properties are derived. ‘The divine perfections, as they are in themselves, though not distinct from one another, are all equal, in the sense that no one of them is more perfect than the others, each of them implying the others. But, inasmuch as they are distinct from one another according to our mode of knowing them, and are analogically like created perfections, it is possible to find a certain order among them, in that there is a first among them. ‘The problem thus stated has been solved in various ways by the Scholastics. We must give a brief account of these solutions. 1) Ockham and the Nominatists do not admit that any one of the perfections explains all the others. This is perfectly in agree- ment with their theory about universals. They maintain that an 1 See Billuar, De Deo, dss. 2 a. 3 appendix.10 GOD: HIS EXISTENCE AND HIS NATURE essence is merely a collection of individuals; a substance, the ag- gregation of its different characteristics, Likewise, according to them, the divine essence is nothing more than the grouping of all the perfeetions, and there is no need to seek for a logical priority of one of them over the others, Moreover, the Nominalists ad- mitted merely verbal distinction between the divine attributes, a purely mental one (rationis ratiocinantis), such as we have be- tween Tullius and Cicero. "This opinion of the Nominalists leads to Agnosticism. In fact, it would no longer be possible to deduce the other divine attributes from one divine and fundamental perfection. Absolute immu- tability, for instance, would not have logical priority over eternity. ‘Theology as a science would no longer be possible. 2) According to Scotus, the divine essence is formally con- stituted by radical infinity, and he considers that this means the exigency of all possible perfections. Also, according to this view, these perfections would be formally distinct from one another in God, before any consideration on the part of our mind. "The ‘Thomists reject this opinion, because radical infinity or the exigency of all perfections cannot be thought of, so they say, except in a subject whose essence includes precisely this idea of exigency. This latter does not constitute the divine essence, but presupposes it and is founded upon it. In fact, we shall see that in- finity is deduced from the fact that God is the selé-subsisting Being (la, q. 7, a 1). Besides, infinity is a mode of each of the divine attributes and not the principle from which they are de- rived. Finally, the simplicity of God does not admit of a formal distinction between the divine perfections previous to any con- sideration of them on our part. God would thus be an acetmula- tion of perfections and not Perfection itself. 3) Several theologians—among whom are the ‘Thomists John of St. Thomas, Gonet, and Billuart—are of the opinion that what WHAT FORMALLY CONSTITUTES THE DIVINE NATURE 1 formally constitutes the divine essence is subsistent #7 ic which is always in actu. This reminds us of aeheneeied refer you: thinking isa thinking on thinking, ‘Their principal argument is as follows: The most perfect of the metaphysical degrees is intellection, according to the gradation which we find among beings. Lifeless creatures have only being; aliaves heen aye ve beiaus cade wed siatidlichand weet belongs the higher orm of if. : Ci \is opinion differs totally from absolute i i Siena er eeu an atte view, being resolves itself into thought, an opinion which leads to panlogism and to the negation of freedom. 4) Most theologians consider self-subsisting Being (ase trie oh Geico Caicedo i ae mately distinguishing it from everything created, and as the prin- ciple from which are deduced all the divine perfections, intellee tion included. First of all, according to this view, God is “He who is,” as revealed to Moses (Exod, ch. iii), This is what Aris- torle means when he says that God is Actus purus. Among the Thomists holding this opinion, we have Capreolus, Bannez, Gotti Contenson, Ledesma, Del Prado, and others. Molina, ees ‘Torres, and others not of the school of St. Thomas side with th ‘Thomists. i Before examining the soundness of these two last named opin- ions, let us point out the principal solutions given by those out- side the Catholic schools of theology. 5) Certain ones are inclined to hold the priori over al ie ener a tbaes ie et ely oie mous passage of Plato: “In the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last ofall, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author ofall things beat- tiful and right, and the immediate source of reason and truth inn GOD: HIs EXISTENCE AND HIS NATURE the intellectual world, However beautiful science and truth may be, you ean feel sure, without fear of being deceived, that the good exceeds them in dignity.” Republic, Bk. VIL, 517, D. 6) Modern Voluntarists, such as Secrétan, maintain that liberty is what formally constitutes the divine nature. For absolute being to be its own reason jor what ie is (ratio sui), according to Seeré- tan, it must be absolute liberty, liberty of second potency, free to be free. “As substance, it gives itself existences as living, it gives itself substance; as spirit, it gives itself life; as absolute, it gives itself berty. . . . The finite spirit is both spirit and nature, and not merely spirit. It would be the perfection of the spirit to be a pure spirit, having nothing material. The pure spirit consists only in what it does, which means that it is absolute liberty. . . . I'ar what I wish, This formula is therefore the factotum.” * Lequier, too, had to admit that the fundamental truth in the deductive order, the truth which is the principle upon which all others are based, is the fact of divine liberty, since for him the fundamental truth in the order of invention is not the principle of identity, but the fact of human liberty. He also maintains with Seerétan that God willed to restrict His foreknowledge with regard to our acts so as to leave us free.!* Boutroux held and taught a similar ‘view. “In God, power or liberty is infinite; itis the source of Fis existence and what comes from it is not subject to the constraint of fatality. The divine essence co-cternal with its power is actual perfection. Tts necessity is that of the practical order, that is it ought to be realized, and cannot be itself, unless it freely becomes a reality.” # Not long ago in Germany, Dr. Hermann Schell held that God is not only ratio sai, but causa sui. Teis difficult to conceive of other ways of solving the problem as to what formally constitutes the divine essence. Priority is given 32 La Philosophie de la liberté, ad ed., Vol. 1, Bk. XV, pp. 361-370 38 gee Lequiee, La Recherche dune véri premizre (fragments posthurces), pp. 82-85. ‘A Contingence det lois de ta nature, 34 ed p 155- WHAT FORMALLY CONSTITUTES THE DIVINE NATURE 13 cither to Being or to the Good or to the Infinite or to intellection or to liberty. Whether we consider in God what is subjective or what is objective, no other answers than these can be found. 43) Neither free will nor the good is what formally constitutes the divine nature. It is easy to explain why Scholastic philosophy never thought of saying that liberty is what formally constitutes the divine essence. In fact, it is difficult to conceive liberty as being prior to intelli- gence, Even Secrétan admits this without seeming to suspect that this acknowledgment means the very ruin of his libertarian sys tem. “Liberty without intelligence is impossible,” he says, “it would be mistaken for chance, which latter is not a species of causality but its negation... . It would be a potency which of itself would unconsciously determine the law according to which it becomes a reality. That is a contradiction in terms. No, the free being is intelligent. It is useless to dwell on this point.” 5 “Bur, on the contrary,” remarks Pillon on this subject, in his cx sm of this philosophy, “it is of great importance to dwell on this point,” for we must say whether, in the Absolute, liberty is dependent upon intelligence as it is with us—and this would be the ruination of Secrétan’s system—or, if the reverse is true, “whether absolute freedom cannot be distinguished from this radical contingenc which they tell us is the negation of causality. That is the lee which must be faced and which really deserves some notice Secrétan passes over it without making the least effort to esca 4 from it” #8 Whereas we cannot think of liberty without delibers tion of the intellect, we can conceive of intellect apart from libert First comes the intellect; and liberty, as we shall see, is dived from it. Besides, the Libertarian thesis leads one to hold with Ockham and Descartes, that by a purely arbitrary decree God has 3® La Philosophie de la liberté, 24 ed., Vol. I, lessc Piao of eeleme oe lessee Gat ee