Deriving the Trinity from Conscious Realism

By Johanan Raatz

Summary: The Trinity is a theological doctrine that has traditionally been considered to be well-
defined yet logically incomprehensible. This assumption will be shown to be false with a direct
derivation of the Trinity from a notion of a semantic trinity and Hoffman’s Conscious Realism.
Firstly, the concept of a semantic trinity will be introduced. Specifically, the three-in-one
structure will be derived on grounds of propositional calculus from the internal semantics of any
logical system when reduced to a maximally simple yet non-tautologous form.
Once this has been established, Hoffman’s Conscious Realism, a theory deriving physics from
the dynamics of conscious agents, will be incorporated to account for a naturalized theism.
Within this context, it will be shown that personal identity can be expressed in terms of semantic
content, and thus that the semantic trinity can apply to personal identity. Finally, the
Combination Theorem will be used to derive the existence of such a three-in-one semantic
structure that contains all other conscious agents and comprises three personal identities that
share a single center of consciousness within this naturalized theism.

1.) A Semantic Trinity: Within any self-contained logical system the semantic content of the
elements in that system is necessarily self-reflexive. To illustrate, the semantic meanings of the
words in a dictionary are expressed in definitions. These definitions contain more words still
whose definitions in turn contain their semantic meanings and so on. However in a perfectly
unabridged dictionary, the set of words are complete and their meanings are expressed solely in
terms of other words within the dictionary. Thus at some point, the complete set of definitions in
such a system must reflex back on itself in a self-contained semantic web.
1.1) Deriving the Semantic Trinity: Propositional calculus, which studies the structure of a
logical system regardless of its semantic content, can be used to determine the underlying logical
structure of such a self-contained semantic web. Firstly, it should be understood that any
semantic relation can be converted into symbolic logic. In turn, in symbolic logic any term can
be related to any other term in one of six possible ways, specifically before or after a then, and,
or or operator.
The goal here is to reduce any logical system of arbitrary complexity to its minimum size. This
can be done through a series of logical operations. For example, whenever statements of the form
“A and B” or “A v B” appear, another term C can be used to represent and replace them. To do
this, it is important to first note that in any logical system elements can be linked to other
elements in one of six possible ways, either before or after a then, “and” or “or” operator.
The linking of terms by “and” and “or” operators only signify their inclusion in the same set
and do not otherwise contribute to the semantic content of the linked terms. For instance the
statement “red and yellow” in the “set of colors” does not tell us anything about the relationship
between the two or between these elements and other elements other than their inclusion in the
set of colors.
This leaves us with the then operator. Any time a statement of the form (1.1) appears containing
some element, B, which is linked to some other element A after a then operator, it can be
converted via conditional exchange and then double negation into a statement of the form (1.2)
as follows:

A -> B (1.1)
~A v B (by conditional exchange)
~~A v ~B
A v ~B (by double negation) (1.2)

In turn any time A v ~B appears, it can be replaced with another element C used to represent it
as described earlier. Using this result, we can then condense any logical system with an arbitrary
number of elements down to a minimum size.
As explained before, anytime statements of the form “A and B” and “A or B” appear, they can
be represented and replaced by another element C. In turn whenever the term in question is
linked to another term after a “then” operator, it can be converted into the form “A v ~B” which
can again be condensed into some replacement term C. In turn, this set of operations can be
repeated indefinitely until there is only one “then” operator before the term in question, reducing
the entire system to a maximally simplified statement of the form:

A -> B v ~C (1.3)

Given that the laws of logic are universal to all logical systems, any logical system can be
reduced to a statement of the form in (1.3). The semantic content of the entire system would then
be contained in this single statement. However, before we explore the properties of this
maximally reduced system we should look at systems of two elements and systems of four or
more elements.
1.2) A system of two elements: A system of only two elements where the semantic content of
the system is closed can be represented in terms of a language which uses only two words, Word
1 and Word 2, to describe all of reality. Since nothing exists outside of such a system neither of
the two words receives any additional semantic meaning from anything but the other word.
However this gives us a situation where such a system collapses into tautology, as the semantic
content of Word 1 is wholly expressed by the semantic content of Word 2 and vice-versa. Given
that tautologies do not contain semantic content however, if a system with closed semantic
content were reduced to a statement more simple than a statement of the form in (1.3) it would
lose all semantic content and become meaningless.
1.3) A system of four or more elements: In a system with four or more elements, not all of the
elements in the system will necessarily contain the semantic content of the other elements in the
system. For instance in a system with the four elements, black, white, horse and zebra, zebra
would need to be defined in terms of the other three elements as a black and white horse, but the
element black could be understood without reference to zebras.
1.4) A system of three elements: By contrast, a system of closed semantic content with three
elements has properties dissimilar from similarly closed systems with two elements and four or
more elements. Unlike a system of two elements, it would be non-tautologous and thus contain
semantic content. Here it should be briefly mentioned that a system of only one element would
also be tautologous, as it would have nothing to define its own semantic content other than itself.

When it is compared to systems of four or more elements though, a curious result surfaces. In a
system of four or more elements, it is possible in principle for one of the elements to be missing
from the semantic meaning of another element without the semantic meaning of that element
disappearing. In previous examples, the element “black” would still retain its meaning if the
element “zebra” were removed from the set.
However, this is not so with a closed set of exactly three elements. If any one element, E1, were
removed from the definition of any other element, E2, then E2 could only be defined in terms of
the third element, E3. In turn, that part of E3 which defines E2 could only be defined in terms of
E2, as the definition of E2 could not make reference to E1. Though then E2 would only become
tautologous to that part of E3 which defines E2, and the semantic content of E2 would be
absorbed into E3. This would leave us with only two elements in the system, E1 and E3, which
would in turn collapse into tautology, as any set with only two elements must.
Thus in a semantically self-contained system of exactly three elements, expressed in the form
(1.3) earlier, the semantic content of any one element A, must contain the semantic content of
both other elements B and C. Moreover since apart from A, B and C have only each other to
define their semantic meanings, the semantic meaning contained within the relations between B
and C must be contained in the semantic content of A as well, through A’s containing of the
semantic content of both B and C.
However the semantic content of A, B, and C and their interrelations exhausts the semantic
content of the entire system. As such, any one element in the three element set defined by (1.3)
must contain not only the semantic content of the other two elements, but the entire semantic
meaning of the whole system. For future reference, such a semantically self-contained system of
three elements with these properties will be referred to as a semantic trinity.
1.5) Parallels with the Theological Trinity: The semantic structure of the three element system
exactly parallels the structure of the Trinity in theology. In the Trinity each Divine Person is
defined as the same singular God and thereby contains the other two. Despite this they are
nevertheless distinct Persons.
In parallel, the three semantic elements of a semantic trinity are distinct from one another just
as the Persons of the Trinity are distinct. However each element contains the semantic content of
the entire system, just as each Person of the Trinity contains the other two Persons. Likewise,
each element of the semantic trinity is isomorphic to the semantic content of the semantic trinity
on the whole. This is directly analogous to each member of the theological Trinity being
isomorphic to the same God.
The only differences between the semantic trinity and the theological Trinity are as follows.
Firstly, the semantic trinity is a trinity of semantic elements, whereas the theological Trinity is a
Trinity of Divine Persons. Secondly, each element of the semantic trinity is isomorphic to a self-
contained set of semantic elements, whereas each member of the theological Trinity is
isomorphic to the same God.

2.) Conscious Realism and its Rationale: To further examine the parallels between the
semantic and theological trinitys it may be helpful to look at the theory of conscious realism
proposed by Donald Hoffman. Conscious realism can be seen as treating conscious agents as
elements of a set. As such, it opens up the possibility of exploring the theological Trinity as a
possible example of the semantic trinity. Though first a description of conscious realism and the
reasons for it are necessary.
2.1) Conscious Realism Described: Conscious realism states that the world consists of
conscious agents and their experiences1 rather than physical entities such as space, time, energy
or matter. Here the physical world is seen as an illusion being generated by external conscious
agents and perceived by our minds. It then recovers modern physics through a precise
mathematical description of conscious agents and their dynamics. In particular conscious realism
recovers the Minkowski space of relativity2 and the free-particle wavefunction of quantum
mechanics from the dynamics of conscious agents3.
2.2) Reasons for Conscious Realism: On face value such a theory may seem bizarre or
counterintuitive. As such, it may be important to examine the reasons that motivate and
necessitate it.
A.) Quantum-Non-Realism and Emergent Spacetime: Firstly, developments in modern physics
have demonstrated that reality is in fact not comprised of physical elements such as spacetime
and matter and energy. The falsification of realism by the experimental violation of the Leggett
inequalities by Zeilinger et al in 2007 establish that material particles do not exist prior to
measurement4. Furthermore, quantum mechanics and quantum gravity suggest that space is not
fundamental5, but emerges from underlying quantum information6.
Given that physical reality is defined in terms of spacetime and the matter and energy contained
in it, and these things are either illusory or emergent, it follows that physicality itself is emergent.
However if physicality is emergent then by definition whatever it emerges from must be non-
physical. Given that the only other thing we know to exist are non-physical conscious agents, it
would make sense that physical reality emerges from conscious agents.
B.) The Hard Problem of Consciousness: Secondly, the nature of the mind/body problem
suggests a non-physical solution. The Hard Problem of Consciousness described by Chalmers in
1995 is the problem of why physical objects such as brains should produce consciousness at all
rather than not7. Given that the answer to the Easy Problem, namely a complete physical
understanding of how the brain correlates to the mind, does not answer the Hard Problem it
follows that the solution to the Hard Problem is not exhausted by the physical facts and thus
requires a non-physical solution.
Physicalist accounts of consciousness have proven inadequate for addressing this problem.
Emergentism for instance is the view that consciousness emerges from a physical substrate, but
that no account can be given for how it emerges. As it admits no such account is possible it can
not be treated as an answer to the hard problem, but rather a bare assertion.
Likewise, substance dualism admits no possible account for the interaction between material
and mental substances, but simply asserts that it exists without explanation. Furthermore, it
leaves the mind/body problem permanently unanswered as mind and matter are seen as two
fundamental substances and thus not reducible to each other.
Given that physicalism fails to account for the Hard Problem, and dualism fails to solve the
mind/body problem, it follows logically that some sort of non-physical monism is true. Without
adding any additional unnecessary metaphysical assumptions about either the external world or
the nature of the mind, the most obvious solution is a mental monism such as proposed by
conscious realism.
C.) Epistemic Necessity: Lastly there is an epistemic issue arising from the Kantian distinction
between sense perception and the outside world. Kant noted that we do not perceive the world
directly but rather perceive what he called the phenomenon, which is comprised of perceptions
which are mental in nature8. In turn our perceptions were to somehow connect to the outside
world beyond our perceptions, which he dubbed the noumenon9.
Though Kant left the problem of bridging the phenomenon and the noumenon unsolved, it is
possible to determine what any potential solution to the problem must look like on grounds of
logical necessity. In any logical explanation linking phenomenon with noumenon, we must start
with statements with terms referring to sense percepts as premises and somehow derive
statements about the contents of the noumenon as conclusions.
However this is only possible if the terms in the conclusion also show up in the premises.
Otherwise a leap of logic would need to be made. However since the terms in the premises refer
exclusively to mental terms in the phenomenon, the noumenon must necessarily also be mental.
If it is not, the gap could never be bridged, and we would be cut off from being able to perceive
the outside world. Thus the outside world must necessarily have a mental ontology if we are to
treat empirical methods as valid for acquiring knowledge. Curiously, this would eliminate all
other interpretations of the wavefunction other than the derivation from conscious agent
dynamics in conscious realism as a precondition for science.
There is a possible objection from direct realism which states that we do not observe
perceptions but objects. However a simple exercise in Cartesian skepticism eliminates this. The
world of objects could be doubted in principle even though our perceptions can not be. Thus
since our perceptions are the same whether or not there are objects behind them, it is clear that
we observe perceptions rather than objects in themselves.

3.) Naturalized Theism: Given the reasons just stated, conscious realism is on a very sound
epistemic, metaphysical and scientific footing. However it also opens the door for a naturalized
form of theism. Belief in a deity is traditionally associated with ontological dualism wherein God
is an immaterial mind and beyond the material realm that can be studied by science. However,
replacing dualism with a scientifically rigorous model of mental monism opens the door to
modelling immaterial conscious agents, and by extension in theory a deity, within a scientific
framework. To explore this however we must first examine the Combination Theorem.
3.1) The Combination Theorem: Conscious realism describes conscious agents in terms of
Markovian kernels10. In turn these Markovian kernels model the interactions between conscious
agents in terms of probabilities. A curious consequence of this formalism however is that two or
more interacting conscious agents fit the same mathematical description of a new conscious
agent. In principle this can be scaled up indefinitely with any arbitrary number of conscious
agents comprising a new conscious agent11. This is referred to as the combination theorem.
An equivalent understanding of the combination theorem can be deduced from the derivation of
the free-particle wavefunction from interacting conscious agents and relational quantum
mechanics. Given that systems of interacting conscious agents are themselves new conscious
agents according to the combination theorem, it follows that any wavefunction can be treated as
conscious agent in its own right.
However, a relational understanding of quantum mechanics demonstrates that superposition is
relative to reference frame12. For instance in the Wigner’s Friend thought experiment
Schrodinger’s cat is not in superposition with respect to its own frame. However with respect to
Wigner’s friend, the cat and the rest of the contents of the box in which it has been placed are in
superposition together and share the same wavefunction.
The same result can be achieved through a quantum version of integrated information theory, or
IIT, as entangled information in the wavefunction is defined as integrated and would thus
constitute a conscious state or phi state under IIT’s formalism13. However it is uncertain as to
whether IIT can be extended into the quantum realm. Tegmark for instance argued that quantum
phi is limited to values of about 0.2514. Though Kremnizer and Ranchin calculated a quantum phi
value of 1.1715.
3.2) A Universal Conscious Agent: Given that any wavefunction can be treated as a conscious
agent in its own right on conscious realism, it follows that this can in principle be extended to the
wavefunction of the universe. In turn, such a universal wavefunction would also represent a
universal conscious agent.
The wavefunction of the universe is given as the solution to the Wheeler-DeWitt equation.
Given that the Wheeler-DeWitt equation is time independent it follows that the wavefunction of
the universe has the unique property of being timeless. This property of timelessness was used to
provide experimental confirmation of the wavefunction of the universe by Moreva et al in
201316. Given this result, conscious realism would entail the existence of a universal conscious
agent.
3.3) Universal Conscious Agent as Naturalized Deity: Given the existence of a universal
conscious agent, or UCA, the natural question to ask is to whether such an agent would fit the
criterion traditionally associated with God. Traditionally four defining properties are ascribed to
God; omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and eternality. Given the properties of conscious
agents in conscious realism, the emergence of spacetime from underlying quantum states, and
the properties implicit in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation, all four of these properties can be
ascribed to the UCA.
A.) Omniscience: Omniscience is implicit within the definition of conscious agents when
applied to the UCA. Conscious realism defines conscious agents as17:

C = (X, G, P, D, A, N) (3.1)

X and G are experiences and actions respectively. P, D, and A, are perceptions, decisions, and
acts respectively. These operate as information channels between experiences, actions and the
outside world, which is comprised of more conscious agents. N is an integer. Here we wish to
examine the terms X and G.
 X refers to experiences that are received from the outside world as Figure 1 notes. Of course on
conscious realism, the external world is comprised of conscious agents as well. The combination
theorem tells us that two interacting conscious agents, C1 and C2, comprises a new conscious
agent C3 as seen in Figure 2. Thus C1’s perceptions of C2 and C2‘s perceptions of C1 are internal
to C3. Thus curiously what is seen as extrospection to C1 and C2 is in fact introspection to C3. The
external world of C1 and C2 would be internal to C3.
 If this result were to be scaled up to the UCA, it would follow that all experiences of everything
in existence, including all introspective states of all other conscious agents, would constitute
introspective knowledge to the UCA. However this would fit the definition of being all-knowing,
and the UCA would have the property of omniscience.
B.) Omnipotence: In turn just as the X term in the definition of the UCA accounts for
omniscience, the G term in 3.1, which refers to the actions of conscious agents, accounts for
omnipotence. On conscious realism the wavefunction is derived from the interactions of
conscious agents. In turn, the wavefunction determines the behavior matter and spacetime.
In the case of the UCA however this wavefunction would be the wavefunction of the universe.
In turn the wavefunction of the universe would control the behavior of all spacetime, matter and
energy in the universe. However given that the UCA’s actions would determine the behavior of
the wavefunction of the universe, it would follow that the UCA would control everything in the
universe. As this would fit the definition of omnipotence, the UCA would be omnipotent as well.

C.) Omnipresence: Much research of late has led to the conclusion that spacetime emerges
from entangled information. Cao, Carroll, and Michalakis have recently argued that the geometry
of spacetime arises from quantum states in Hilbert space18. Whitworth has pointed out that
physical spacetime behaves as a sort of virtual construct being generated from an underlying
quantum reality19.
However these quantum states are describable in terms of the same wavefunctions that arise
from the dynamics of conscious agents on conscious realism. Thus if we extrapolate this result to
the UCA, physical spacetime would be an emergent construction or illusion being generated or
perhaps “simulated” as an introspective state of the UCA. As all of spacetime would lie within
the UCA, the UCA would definitely be located at every point in spacetime and would thus be
omnipresent.
D.) Eternality: Eternality would be trivially derivable from the Wheeler-DeWitt equation
itself. As mentioned before the time variable drops out of the Wheeler-DeWitt equation. Thus the
UCA described by the wavefunction of the universe would be timeless or eternal.
Given that the UCA fits the four properties associated with God, the UCA could be conceived
of as God in a literal sense. However it is important to note that the UCA also follows from a
naturalistic yet immaterialist theory of the world and is not beyond rational comprehension as is
sometimes asserted in regards to God.

4.) The Trinity from Agent Dynamics: Having derived a naturalized form of theism, we are
now ready to examine the theological Trinity in terms of the semantic trinity. If the conscious
agents in Hoffman’s agent dynamics can be treated as semantic elements, then in principle the
theological Trinity could be shown to be the natural structure of the UCA.
4.1) Semantic Content and Personal Identity: In Section 1.5 it was explained that there were
two differences between the semantic trinity and the theological Trinity. Firstly, each element of
the semantic trinity is a semantic element which contains the semantic content of the other two
elements. By contrast the theological Trinity is defined in terms of each of three divine persons
containing the other two. Secondly, the semantic trinity involves a set of semantic elements,
whereas the theological Trinity involves a Divine Conscious Agent.
The first step in determining the relationship between the theological Trinity and the semantic
trinity is to determine the relationship between semantic elements and persons or personal
identities. If personal identity can be expressed in terms of semantic content, then it should be
possible to derive the theological Trinity from the semantic trinity.
Firstly, when we speak of personhood or personal identity we should point out that we are not
talking about the “I” or sense of self. The “I” is irreducibly simple and thus the sense of self is
the same from person to person. Rather what we are looking for is what remains apart from the
“I,” namely an individual’s memories, perceptions, intentionalities and so forth.
If somehow someone’s memories, proclivities and so forth were switched with another’s, that
person would be unable to distinguish himself from the other person even from the first-person
perspective. From his perspective he would literally take on the other person’s personal identity.
However if we look at all of the things that constitute this personal identity, memories,
perceptions, intentionalities in decision making and so on, we find that they are all comprised of
semantic elements. It should also be noted that the terms in (3.1) describing a conscious agent
can be described as semantic elements.
However as pointed out in Section 1.1 semantic elements can be grouped together to form new
semantic elements through propositional calculus. Thus a discrete personal identity could in
principle be equated with a larger composite semantic element.
4.2.) Deriving the Trinity: Given that we can now equate personal identities with semantic
elements, we should be able to directly derive the theological Trinity from the semantic trinity.
To do this, the combination theorem discussed in 3.1 will be necessary.
If interacting personal identities, which would of course be conscious agents, are identified with
semantic elements, then a set of these semantic elements can in turn be identified with a distinct
conscious agent according to the combination theorem. This conscious agent would of course
have its own singular center of consciousness. If these results are applied to the UCA it becomes
possible to apply the semantic trinity to the interacting conscious agents comprising the UCA.
Of course with four or more conscious agents no one agent would encompass the entire
semantic content of the UCA at large. Thus none of the subsidiary conscious agents in a system
of four or more agents could be identified with the whole UCA itself.
 Likewise in a closed universal system of only two agents, if each agent is treated as a semantic
element, then the two agents would define each other exclusively and be tautologically
equivalent to each other. As such, any meaningful semantic content would disappear from such a
system. However as conscious agents are defined in terms of their semantic content, such a
system could no longer be described as being truly comprised of conscious agents.
This would not be the case in any other system of two elements though. In cases other than the
universal system the system would not be truly closed, and other conscious agents would exist as
semantic elements that would contribute to the semantic content of the two interacting agents.
However in a system where only two conscious agents comprise the UCA, no other such agents
would exist.
This leaves us with the system with three agents comprising the UCA. In this case the semantic
trinity would also happen to apply. Each of the three agents would encompass the semantic
content of the whole system as per the derivation of the semantic trinity in Section 1.1, and each
could be thought of as a distinct personal identity.
However as per the combination theorem the system of these three interacting agents would
constitute the UCA, which would in turn have a distinct singular center of consciousness. Unlike
in a scenario where four or more agents combine to form the UCA however, each of these three
agents would also share the same center of consciousness, as each would individually encompass
the semantic content of the system on the whole.
If we identify the UCA as a naturalized conception of God then, the theological Trinity would
be replicated as an example of the semantic trinity applied to the combination theorem in
conscious realism. Each of the three agents, possessing their own distinct personal identities
would in turn be identical with the UCA at large.

Conclusion: Rather than being an impenetrable mystery, the theological Trinity turns out to be
directly derivable from the semantic trinity and the combination theorem, just as a naturalized
theism is directly derivable from the combination theorem on its own. Given that the result
maintains the traditional distinctions regarding the Trinity, namely that they are three distinct
Persons each identical with the same Divine Mind, the model of the Trinity from conscious
realism should be compatible with the orthodox understanding of the Trinity. The naturalization
of theism implicit in the model is however admittedly highly unconventional. However, it does
offer a new approach to further study of the concept of the Trinity and opens the door to the
possibility of studying other theological topics within a naturalized framework.

Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Donald Hoffman for answering questions on conscious

realism and for allowing me to use his diagrams.

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Vol 6(1) pp. 87-121
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