Shahin Damoui, AZ Bar #000000

241 WASHINGTON AVE., SUITE 1200

TEMPE, AZ 85283
TELEPHONE (714) 338-9476
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MAHINDAR SINGH, NO. CV17-2378

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT’S MOTION
vs.
FOR SUMMARY
STATE OF ARIZONA and ARIZONA JUDGEMENT
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendants.

The Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADC”), and through it the State,

requests summary judgement against plaintiff Mahindar Singh pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Specifically, the ADC moves for summary
judgement on Mr. Singh’s claim that the ADC (and through it the State) violated
42 U.S.C. § 200cc-1 by refusing to grant his requests to wear a turban and keep
three turbans in his cell.
All material facts- including the additional man-hours and cost and of the
accommodation- are undisputed and show the ADC is entitled to judgement
against Mr. Singh as a matter of law. In support of this Motion, the ADC
respectfully refers the Court to the attached memorandum of points and authorities.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

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 Defendants Arizona Department of Corrections (and through it the State)

seek motion for summary judgement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56. Fed. R. Civ. PP. 56(a). Summary judgement is appropriate so long as there are

no reasonably disputed issues of material fact. It is not enough for Mr. Singh to

show slight doubt; summary judgement is appropriate so long as reasonable people

could not dispute that the ADC’s policy against turbans does not violate the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). Even viewing

the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Singh, he cannot carry his burden to show

that the ADC’s denial of allowing him to wear a 10-yard turban and keep three in

his cell substantially burdens his religious beliefs. Furthermore, the ADC can carry

its burden to prove that its policies are in furtherance of their compelling interest to

maintain safety and order for all prisoners. The ADC can also establish that

denying Mr. Singh’s demand was the least restrictive means of furthering this

compelling interest.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. Singh was born to a family who practiced Sikhism. However, in his

early adulthood, Mr. Singh stopped following Sikh religious practices. He cut his

hair, shaved his beard, and stopped wearing clothing identifying him as Sikh. After

he was arrested and sentenced to prison, he serendipitously reverted to being a

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devote Sikh. Accordingly, Mr. Singh demands to wear a turban that is 10 or more

yards in length and also demands three extra 10-yard turbans to keep in his cell.

The ADC justifiably assert that the permitting the accommodation poses

significant safety threats. Mr. Singh can use the large turbans to hurt himself or

other inmates. The turbans allow contraband to effortlessly be hidden. The turban

can also significantly hinder the Prison’s identification especially if another inmate

were to steal it. The turbans are 10 yards in length each and take 10-15 minutes

daily to wrap.

The ADC has even made accommodations to alleviate some burdens on their

prisoners with religious practices. The ADC has expanded its budget for kosher

and vegetarian meals, changed its grooming policies to allow any hair-length, and

allowed for short beards. These compromises have lifted barriers for religious

practices.

Notwithstanding safety concerns, the ADC has determined it would take an

extra 244 man-hours, or $6500, a year just to search Mr. Singh’s turban. Currently,

there are twelve Sikhs in Arizona’s prison system and ever since the ADC banned

turbans, there have been no incidents from these inmates.

II. ARGUMENT

Summary judgement is appropriate so long as there are no reasonably

disputed issues of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). It is not enough for Mr.

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Singh to show slight doubt; summary judgement is appropriate so long as

reasonable people could not dispute that the ADC’s policy against turbans does not

violate RLUIPA.

The undisputed material facts are insufficient to prove that the ADC violated

RLUIPA by refusing to allow Mr. Singh to wear a 10-yard turban and keep three

other 10-yard turbans in his cell. To prevail on a RLUIPA claim, a four-prong test

must be satisfied. For this memorandum it is given Mr. Singh’s religious beliefs

are sincere but he still has to establish the following: (1) the ADC’s ban on turbans

posed a substantial burden for Mr. Singh to practice his religion; (2) the ADC’s

policy against turbans is not in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

and (3) the ADC’s policy against turbans is the least restrictive means of furthering

the compelling interest. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a) (2017).

Under the RLUIPA, plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving his religious

beliefs are sincere and that the policy substantially burdens him from exercising his

religion. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 856 (2015). Once plaintiff meets these

burdens, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the policy was in

furtherance of a compelling interest; and that the policy was the least restrictive

means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Id. at 862. For this

memorandum, the constitutionality of the RLUIPA will not be considered and it is

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presumed Mr. Singh’s religious beliefs are sincere and his desire to wear a turban

are grounded in those beliefs.

Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Mr. Singh, he cannot

carry his burden to show that the ADC’s policy substantially burdens his religious

beliefs. However, the ADC can carry its burden to prove that the policy was in

furtherance of their compelling interest to maintain safety and order for all

prisoners. Further, the ADC can establish that denying Mr. Singh’s demand was

the least restrictive means of furthering this compelling interest. For these reasons,

the Court should grant the ADC’s request for summary judgement as a matter of

law.

A. The ADC’s Policy Does Not Substantially Burden Mr. Singh’s

Religious Beliefs Because Mr. Singh Was Not Under Any Pressure
To Conform.

In applying RLUIPA’s statutory standard for protecting inmates from

substantial burdens on exercises of religion, court should not blind themselves to

the fact that the analysis is conducting in the prison setting. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.

Ct. 853, 856 (2015). RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include any exercise

of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2017). The term “institution” means any facility

which is owned, operated, or managed by the State and which is a jail, prison, or

correctional facility. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(1)(A) (2017).

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 While RLUIPA does not define “substantial burden,” the Ninth Circuit has

held that, “The meaning of a statute must be sought in the language in which the

act is framed and if that is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it

according to terms.” San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d

1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). To determine the plain meaning of term undefined by a

statute, using the dictionary definition is permissible. Id. A “burden” is defined as

“something that is oppressive.” Id. A “substantial burden” is defined as

“considerable in quantity” or “significantly great.” Id. Therefore, for a policy or

regulation to impose a “substantial burden,” it must impose a significantly great

restriction or onus upon the religious exercise.

In Holt v. Hobbs, a Muslim prisoner brought action against prison officials

for violation of RLUIPA in denying him a religious accommodation to allow him

to grow a half-inch beard. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 856. While the court held the prisoner

was substantially burdened by the grooming policy, the court stated the key inquiry

is whether the policy puts significant pressure on the inmate to conform. Id. at 857.

Thus the court held that the threat of “serious disciplinary action” constituted

pressure to conform. Id. at 864.

In Walker v. Beard, plaintiff inmate brought action under RLUIPA against

prison officials challenging their classification of him as eligible to occupy a prison

cell with an individual of a different race. Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1131

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(9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff alleged such a placement would interfere with his

religious practice as an Aryan Christian Odinist. Id. The Housing Policy classified

inmates into one of five categories, including racially eligible and “restricted to

own,” meaning ineligible to be placed in a multi-race cell. Id. at 1130. The plaintiff

received punishments for not conforming including: (1) being confined in his cell,

(2) had additional duty hours imposed on him, (3) reclassified into a workgroup

where inmates do not receive time credits or as many privileges as others working,

(4) lost his phone call privileges, and (5) was expelled from print shop and

landscaping classes, among other punishments. Id. at 1131. The court determined

the punishments the plaintiff received placed him under pressure to conform. Id. at

1135. Therefore, the court held the inmate has “shown that his classification as

racially eligible substantially burdens his religious exercise.” Id.

The ADC did not place any pressure on Mr. Singh to conform or face

serious disciplinary action. Thus, Mr. Singh does not satisfy the substantial burden

inquiry under the RLUIPA. Unlike the plaintiff in Holt v. Hobbs, Mr. Singh has

not faced any pressure to conform or face serious disciplinary action. Mr. Singh

has not had a turban in his possession yet but he has still been able to freely

exercise his Sikh beliefs. The ADC has not imposed any extra duties on Mr. Singh.

The ADC has not confined Mr. Singh to his cell. Furthermore, while the court in

Walker v. Beard held the plaintiff’s classification as racially eligible imposed a

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“significantly great” burden his religious practices, the ADC’s policy against

turbans does not place such an onus upon Mr. Singh’s religious practices. Unlike

the policy in Walker v. Beard, the ADC’s policy applies to all prisoners throughout

Arizona’s prison system.

While the opposition may argue the policy against turbans presents a

substantial burden for Sikhs, the ADC has made accommodations for prisoners

with religious practices. The ADC has expanded its budget for kosher and

vegetarian meals, changed its grooming policies to allow any hair-length, and

allowed for short beards. These compromises have lifted barriers for religious

practices. Therefore, the ADC’s policy against turbans does not present a

“significantly great” burden on his religious practices.

B. The ADC’s Policy Was in Furtherance of Their Compelling

Interest to Maintain Safety and Order for All Prisoners.

The Supreme Court has stated, “Central to all other corrections compelling

interests is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections

facilities themselves.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 563 (9th Cir. 1997); See

Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1555 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that it is

compelling for a prison to prohibit inmates from having long hair in which they

could conceal contraband and weapons); Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir.

1997) (upholding a prison grooming policy requiring male inmates maintain short

hair as furthering the prison’s compelling security interests).

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 Each turban Mr. Singh requests is 10 yards and Mr. Singh asserts he wants

three addition 10-yard turbans in his cell. There are overwhelming security

concerns with allowing an inmate to have over 40 yards of fabric easily at their

disposal. Similar to the defendant prison in May v. Baldwin, the ADC’s policy

against turbans is pivotal in furthering its security interests. With over 40 yards of

fabric, Mr. Singh can easily hurt himself or other inmates.

While in Holt v. Hobbs the court held the defendant prison’s policy against

facial hair did not further its security interest in preventing inmates from

concealing contraband, the ADC’s policy against turbans does further its

compelling interest in preventing contraband. With over 40 yards of fabric, Mr.

Singh can easily conceal his identity. Additionally, if an inmate steals one of Mr.

Singh’s turbans, the prison faces more identification and safety concerns.

In analyzing the impact of Mr. Singh’s accommodation, the ADC has

determined it would take an extra 244 man-hours, or $6500, a year just to search

Mr. Singh’s turban. Also since there are currently twelve Sikhs in the Arizona

prison system, the costs and man-hours are compounded.

The opposition may argue the ADC’s turban ban does not further order and

safety because Mr. Singh is the only inmate requesting the accommodation.

However, if the accommodation is granted, prison officials would be flooded with

claims from other inmates. Also, Mr. Singh is not deprived of “all means of

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expression” because the ADC allows him to maintain a beard. Therefore, the

ADC’s policy against turbans furthers their compelling interest of maintaining

order and safety for all prisoners.

C. The ADC’s Policy Against Turbans Is the Least Restrictive

Means of Maintaining the Safety and Order of All Prisoners.

“Although the government bears the burden of proof to show its practice is

the least restrictive means under the RLUIPA, it is under no obligation to dream up

alternatives that the plaintiff himself has not proposed.” Walker, 789 F.3d at 1137.

In Walker v. Beard, plaintiff inmate consistently demanded only one form of

relief, an exemption from the defendant prison’s celling policy. Id. at 1136. While

the court considered less restrictive alternatives prison could have adopted, the

court adamantly stated, “The State has no additional obligation under RLUIPA

independently to research and propose every possible way of mitigating that

practice’s negative effects.” Id. The court held the defendant’s actions were the

least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest because the plaintiff had

not proposed any less restrictive alternatives. Id. According to the court, “If Walker

wants time outside his cell to perform the ritual, he needs to ask for it.” Id.

In Warsoldier v. Woodford, a Native American prisoner sued officials

of California Department of Corrections (CDC) alleging CDC’s grooming policy

violates RLUIPA. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 990 (9th Cir. 2005).

The prisoner’s faith taught that hair symbolizes knowledge and cutting it would

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cost him his wisdom and strength. Id. at 991. However, the CDC required all male

inmates maintain their hair no longer than three inches. Id. The CDC failed to

explain why other state and federal prisons with identical compelling interests are

able to further their interests while accommodating to their inmates’ religious

practices. Id. at 998. Also, the CDC could not establish the grooming policy

increased security because they failed to explained why its women’s prisons do not

adhere to an equally strict grooming policy. Id. at 999. Therefore, the Court “That

CDC’s compelling interests apply equally to male and female inmates suggests

there is no particular health or security concern justifying the policy, and more

importantly, that the hair length restriction is not the least restrictive means to

achieve the same compelling interests.” Id. at 1000.

Mr. Singh has not proposed any less restrictive alternatives to the ADC’s

policy against turbans. Similar to the defendant in Walker v. Beard, the ADC has

“No additional obligation under RLUIPA independently to research and propose

every possible way of mitigating that practice’s negative effects.” While the

defendant in Warsolider v. Woodford could not establish the grooming policy was

the least restrictive means, the ADC will meet this burden because Mr. Singh has

not proposed any alternative accommodations. In contrast to Warsoldier v.

Woodford, across Arizona’s prison system there is a uniform policy prohibiting

inmates from wearing turbans. The ADC’s policy applies equally to all inmates

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and has been adopted by all of Arizona’s prisons systems. This uniform policy

reinforces a heightened urgency for discipline, order, safety, and security in penal

institutions.

While the opposition may argue that there are less restrictive alternatives,

anything less than a ban would not further the ADC’s compelling interests. The

accommodation for turbans poses much greater risks than an accommodation

allowing facial hair. Turbans can be used to conceal contraband, commit suicide,

and disrupt the Prison’s identification process. Thus, the ADC’s policy against

turbans is the least restrictive means of furthering safety and order because Mr.

Singh has not proposed any less restrictive alternatives; even if he had, they would

not further the ADC’s compelling security interests.

III. CONCLUSION

The undisputed material facts are insufficient to prove that the ADC violated

RLUIPA by refusing to allow Mr. Singh to wear a 10-yard turban and keep three

other 10-yard turbans in his cell. The ADC’s policy does not substantially burden

Mr. Singh’s religious beliefs because he is not under any pressure to conform.

Further, the ADC’s policy against turbans is in furtherance of its compelling

security interests and the policy is the least restrictive means for the ADC to

maintain security and order for all inmates. The ADC is, therefore, entitled to

summary judgement.

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 DATED this 20th day of June, 2017.

ABC, P.L.C.

By /s/ Shahin Damoui

241 WASHINGTON AVE., SUITE
120
TEMPE, AZ 85283

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