001 LANARIA v.
PLANTA (Callueng)
November 22, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure
PETITIONER: Spouses Henry Lanaria and The Late Belen Lanaria as Substituted
by Francis John Lanaria
RESPONDENTS: Francisco M. Planta
SUMMARY: Petitioner Francis John Lanaria is the son of decedent Belen M.
Lanaria, while respondent Francisco M. Planta is the nephew and one of the heirs of
the late Rosario Planta. Rosario Planta was the registered owner and possessor of a
parcel of land. Respondent was the plaintiff in a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
filed against the spouses Henry Lanaria and the late Belen M. Lanaria before the
MTC. The Complaint alleged that Planta, through her permission and generosity,
allowed the grandparents and parents of Belen Lanaria to construct their house on a
portion of the parcel of land with an implied promise to vacate the premises and
restore possession thereof to her or her heirs upon demand. A formal demand to
vacate was sent to defendants, but they refused to heed the same. Upon submission
of the position papers of the respective parties, the MTC rendered its Decision,
ruling in favor of respondent Francisco M. Planta. Seeking recourse from the
adverse Decision, petitioners elevated the case to the RTC. The RTC affirmed with
modification the Decision of the MTC, deleting the award of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 12 May 2004
but it was denied by the RTC in an Order issued on 20 July 2004.On 3 August 2004,
petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA. On 27 August 2004, the Court of
Appeals, finding petitioners' Petition for Review deficient in form and substance,
resolved to outrightly dismiss the petition as follows: It appearing that after a careful
reading of the contents of this petition, it shows that it failed to attach plain copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the record such as, Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer, Answer with Counterclaim, Parties' Position Paper,
Memorandum on Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration dated May 12, 2004, as
required under Section 2, Rule 42 and in violation of Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, this petition is DISMISSED outright due to
deficiency in form and substance. Petitioners thereafter filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration and to Allow/Admit the Inclusion of Pleadings and Other Material
Documents." Petitioners explained that the failure to attach copies of documents in
support of their petition was due to oversight and inadvertence, and asked the Court
of Appeals to allow the inclusion of the pleadings attached to the Motion for
Reconsideration, "in the most prevailing interests of substantive justice, equity and
substantive rights."
Issue/s: (1) WoN the CA erred when it dismissed outrightly the Petition for Review
dated August 3, 2004 on the ground of deficiency in form and substance to the
greater sacrifice of substantial justice. YES.
(2) WoN the CA gravely erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration and to
Allow/Admit the Inclusion of Pleadings and Other Material Documents since its
denial would result to denial of right to substantial justice. YES.
Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure embodies the procedure for
appeals from the Decision of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Said section reads: SEC. 2. Form and Contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven
(7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as
such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case,
without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on
time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional
Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the
appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of
the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and
of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition.
Non-compliance with any of the foregoing requisites is a ground for the dismissal of
a petition based on Section 3 of the same Rule, to wit: Sec. 3. Effect of failure to
comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
Petitioners' subsequent submission of the following documents annexed to their
Motion for Reconsideration - viz, Complaint for Ejectment, Transfer Certificate of
Title, Answer to the Complaint, Four Affidavits, Position Paper filed by petitioners,
Memorandum on Appeal, Appellee's Memorandum, and Motion for Reconsideration
- constitutes substantial compliance with Section 2, Rule 42. Jurisprudence
pertaining to the same has established that "submission of a document together with
the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with the

requirement that relevant or pertinent documents be submitted along with the
petition, and calls for the relaxation of procedural rules."
DOCTRINE: Submission of a document together with the motion for
reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement that relevant
or pertinent documents be submitted along with the petition, and calls for the
relaxation of procedural rules
002 DONATO v. COURT OF APPEALS (DONES)
December 8, 2003 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Rule 42; Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping; Attachment of Records and Other Supporting Documents
PETITIONER: Antonio T. Donato
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Filomeno Arcepe, Timoteo Barcelona, et al.
SUMMARY: In an ejectment case, petitioner lost in the MeTC. Upon appeal to the
RTC, the RTC sustained the MeTC Decision. The petition for review filed before
the Court of Appeals contains a certification against forum shopping but said
certification was signed by petitioner’s counsel. Also, attached to the petition were
the certified true copies of the MeTC and RTC Decisions, but no other records or
supporting documents were attached. In submitting the certification for non-forum
shopping duly signed by himself in his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
explained the physical impossibility of personally accomplishing the certification
and filing the petition for review within the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
considering that he is a resident of Virginia, U.S.A. Petitioner also attached the
relevant records of the proceedings in the MeTC and RTC in the motion for
reconsideration. The CA denied this Motion for Reconsideration, ruling htat
peitioner’s subsequent compliance did not cure the defect.
The issues are whether or not: (1) relaxation of the rules on certification is justified;
and (2) relaxation of the rules on attachment of supporting documents is justified.
The rules on ccertification were relaxed for petitioner. Petitioner has adequately
explained his failure to personally sign the certification. The subsequent filing of
the certification duly signed by petitioner himself should be deemed substantial
compliance pro hac vice. It was physically impossible for the petition to have been
prepared and sent to petitioner in the U.S., for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A.
To the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to siggn
the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition
to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. The rationale for the rule
on personal execution of the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only
the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar
actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be
unaware of such fact.
The rules on attachment of supporting documents was also relaxed for petitioner.
The failure of petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph (b), Rule VI of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), that is, to append to his
petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would
suport the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. The
RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit
additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice.
Under Section 3, paragraph (d), Rule III, RIRCA, the CA may require the parties to
complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due
course, the CA may require the levation of a complete record of the case under
Section 3(d)(5), Rule VI, RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the
pleadings and other material portions of the records below with his motion for
reconsideration. As held in previous cases, subsequent submission of missing
documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance
which calls for the relaxation of the rules.
DOCTRINE: The rationale for the rule on personal execution of the certification
by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge
of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or
tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact. Also, subsequent
submission of missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules.

003 ANG v. GRAGEDA (IVY)

June 8, 2006 | Cellejo, Sr., J. | Rule 42

PETITIONER: Elsie Ang

RESPONDENTS: Dr. Erniefel Grageda

SUMMARY: Janet Ang had liposuction surgery on her thighs at the EPG Cosmetic
and Aesthetics Surgery Clinic, attended to and operated on by Dr. Erniefel
Grageda. In the course of the operation, Janet began to have seizure that led to her
death. Ang Ho Chem, Janets father, filed a criminal complaint against respondent
Dr. MeTC rendered judgment acquitting accused Grageda. Private complainant
appealed the civil aspect to the RTC, which directed the private complainant to file
the appeal memorandum within 15 days from notice. Appelant failed to file the
memorandum within the period and filed for motion for extension at least 15 times.
RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal for failure to file appeal memorandum.

Appellant received a copy of the Order of the RTC dismissing his appeal, and
finally filed his appeal memorandum/brief by registered mail as well as a motion
for reconsideration. RTC again denied. Counsel for appellant filed a
Manifestation informing the RTC of the appellants death and named the latters
daughter, Elsie Ang, as his substitute and representative. Instead of appealing the
Order of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
Elsie Ang (petitioner) filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, questioning the
Orders of the RTC. CA dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy to
question the RTC Orders.
Issue: W/N CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Held: NO.
(15) days.
  
Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure to do so renders the questioned
decision/final order final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the judgment or final order, much less to entertain the appeal.
When the RTC issued its Orders, the court was exercising its appellate jurisdiction
over the judgment rendered by the MeTC of Muntinlupa City. To reiterate,
the December 2, 2002 Order of the RTC denying the appeal of petitioner was a
final order, appealable to the CA via petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court within the 15-day reglementary period thereof.

Petitioner received the December 2, 2002 Order of the RTC on December 16, 2002.

The remedy of petitioner from the Orders of the RTC was to appeal by filing a
She then filed a motion for reconsideration on December 23, 2002. She received
petition for review in the CA under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It bears stressing
the January 20, 2003 Order of the RTC denying the motion for reconsideration
that when the RTC issued the aforementioned Order, it did so in the exercise of its
on February 7, 2003. As the 15th day fell on a Saturday, petitioner had up
appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the remedy of petitioner was to appeal the order under
to February 24, 2003 to file a petition for review before the CA. However, she
Rule 42, which reads:
allowed the reglementary period to lapse without filing a petition for review in the
  CA. Thus, the Order of the RTC dismissing petitioners appeal had become final and
executory, beyond the competence of the CA to reverse, much less modify.
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to
appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered  
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
Apparently to resuscitate her lost appeal, petitioner filed a petition
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that the RTC committed
same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and
a grave abuse of its discretion in issuing its Orders. She likewise insisted that she
other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
filed her Memorandum well within the extension prayed for by her. The CA,
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a
however, saw through her scheme and dismissed her petition, and in so doing acted
copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within
in accord with case law.
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or
Indeed, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy. It is not and should not be a
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper
substitute for lost appeal. It is not a procedural devise to deprive the winning party
motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and
of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. Courts should frown upon any
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of
scheme to prolong litigations. A judgment which has acquired finality becomes
the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Once a judgment or order becomes final,
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest.
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen

004 HEIRS OF PLANA vs. CA (LAGUILLES)
October 31, 2008Azcuna, J. | Rule 42
PETITIONER: Heirs of Jose Esplana
RESPONDENTS: CA and Heirs of Pedro De Lima
SUMMARY: Esplana filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession
against Pedro de Lima before the MTC. MTC tried and decided the case as an
action for forcible entry, and later on dismissed the case and ordered Esplana to
pay de Lima attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. On appeal, the RTC held
that the forcible entry aspect was only incidental to the issue of ownership so it
remanded the case to the MTC for the latter to decide the issue on ownership.
Esplana contends that he was the owner of the property by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute sale executed in his favor by his father. De Lima claims he owns the
land by purchasing it from the Esplana sisters, which sale was admitted by the
sisters. MTC rendered a decision in favor of De Lima. Esplana appealed to the
RTC but the latter affirmed in toto the MTC decision.
TIMELINE:
Feb. 21 – Esplana’s counsel received a copy of the RTC decision
March 7 – Counsel filed before the CA a motion for extension of 30 days, within which
to file a petition for review reckoned from March 8
May 16 – CA issued a Resolution granting petitioners only 15 days, to be reckoned on
March 8, or until March 23
May 29 – Petitioners received a copy of the CA resolution on their motion for extension
April 5 – Petitioners filed a petition for review, which was within the 30-day extension
requested.
June 27 – CA dismissed the petition for review for having filed out of time on April 5,
instead of the deadline, March 23.
July 29 – Petitioners received the Resolution dismissing their petition.
Petitioners filed an MR alleging that they filed for a motex for 30 days from
March 8 considering that the original petitioner died. They attached to their MR
a death certificate. However, this was denied. The issue is WoN petitioners’
petition for review was filed within the 15-day extension to file a petition for
review under Rule 42.
The SC held in the negative. Sec. 1, Rule 42 is very clear that petitioners are
allowed an extension of only 15 days to file a petition for review with the CA.
Although a further extension not to exceed 15 days may be granted for the most
compelling reasons, the grounds stated by petitioners do not entitle them to a
further extension. Petitioners’ motex was grounded on the death of their father
and their counsel’s voluminous work. Their motex was granted based on their
grounds but they submit that they are entitled to a further extension of 15 days
under Sec. 1 Rule 42. However, the death certificate shows that their father died
in December, and their counsel received the RTC decision dated Feb 6 on Feb
21, which is more than two months after the death of their father. The Court
here thinks that the petitioners were just undecided about appealing their case to
the CA. Moreover, petitioners also failed to pay the full amount of the docket
and other legal fees within the reglementary period. Motions for extension are
not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court. The
requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period must be
strictly followed as they are considered interdictions against needless delays.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a petition for review must be filed 15 dayas
from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration. However, upon proper motion and
payment of full docket and other legal fees, the CA may grant an additional
period of 15 days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason.

005 MONTAJES v. PEOPLE (PLEYTO)

March 12, 2012 | Peralta, J. | Petition for Review from the RTC to the CA

PETITIONER: Alfredo Jaca Montajes

RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines

DATES ARE IMPORTANT

SUMMARY: In an information dated June 5, 2003, Montajes was charged with the
crime of Direct Assault (Art. 148 of the RPC) before the MTC of Buenavista,
Agusan del Norte. The information stated that on Dec. 8, 2002, at 1am, he attacked,
assaulted and hacked Jose Rellon, who was the Brgy. Captain at that time, while in
the performance of his duties. He also knows that he was the Brgy. Captain.
Montajes pleaded not guilty.
Defense’ side:
On the said date and time, Rellon was at the benefit dance supported by the Sangguniang Kabataan.
There he met Montajes who uttered to him, “You’re a useless captain” and other similar imports. He
then hacked Rellon with a lagaraw (bolo). He wasn’t hit because he moved backwards. Rellon was then
brought home by his wife and daughter. Many people witnessed the incident. It was also alleged that
during the mediation, Montajes asked for forgiveness but Rellon declined. On cross-examination, Rellon
said that he was there to stop the event because it was supposed to end at 12, as per the permit he gave
them. Then the house of Montajes was stoned and so, Montajes got mad and went out of his house.
However, he did not ask for help from Rellon. A witness corroborated this.
Petitioner’s side:
On that day, he was at his house just listening to the disco coming from the benefit concert when it was
stopped by Rellon. This angered the people because those who have paid weren’t allowed to dance
anymore. The stoning incident followed. This made him wild. While looking for the persons along the
road, he saw Rellon who was two meters away, and he said that he was looking for the people that
stoned his house. Then, Rellon tried to get the lagaraw from him. He admitted that he asked for
forgiveness so that the case would not be elevated anymore. He, however, denied attacking the captain.
Two witnesses corroborated this.
MTC found Montajes guilty. On appeal, the RTC affirmed this. Montajes filed with
the CA a petition (should be motion) for extenstion of time to file the petition for
review under Rule 42, praying for an extended period of 15 adys from May 21,
2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition. He then filed his
petition on June 5, 2007. CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time on
Sept. 21, 2007.
CA said that the received the resolution of the MR on May 4. Thus, the 15-day
period to file a petition for review expired on May 21 (Monday), considering that
May 19 was a Saturday. Now, Montajes reckoned the extension from May 21 and
not from May 19. It is well settled that when the day of the period falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, and a party is granted an extension, the
extension should be counted from the last day which is the Saturday, Sunday,
holiday.
The issue is W/N the CA erred in denying due course to his petition for review for
being filed out of time. Montajes argued that his basis was Section 1, Rule 22 of the
ROC.1
SC issued an AM (AM No. 00-2-14-SC) dated Feb. 29, 2000, clarifying the subject
provision. SC said that Sec. 1, Rule 22, speaks only of “the last day of the period.”
Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted
from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Thus, CA was correct in ruling that it was filed
out of time. The petition filed on June 5 was 2 days late. However, this case merits
a liberal application. The petition was filed long before the CA issued its resolution
on Sept. 21, 2007. There was no showing that respondent suffered any material
injury or his cause was prejudiced by reason of the delay. Also, the RTC affirmed
the MTC (don’t know why sinabi to but just in case.) There’s nothing in the record
to show that Montajes deliberately intended to delay the final disposition of the
case. Thus, SC held that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review
does not automatically warrant the dismissal thereof. Where strong consideration of
substantial justice is manifest in the petition, SC may relax the stringent application
of technical rules.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 1, Rule 22, speaks only of “the last day of the period.” Any
extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the
expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday.
1
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last
day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

006 Plopenio v. Department of Agrarian Reform (EMAR)
March 10, 2006| Garcia, J. | R42 - Appeal from RTC to CA
PETITIONERS: SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO and ROSIELINDA
PLOPENIO represented by GAVINO PLOPENIO
PETITIONERS: EDUARDO LL. PLOPENIO represented by GAVINO
PLOPENIO
RESPONDENTS: DAR and LBP
SUMMARY: Plopenios own a land which DARAP valued at P51k/ha so they offered
their land to DAR for acquisition under CARL. LBP valued their land at P23k/ha so
they rejected LBP’s notive of valuation and referred the matter to PARAD for
summary administrative proceedings. PARAD affirmed the LBP valuation. Plopenios
filed an MR of the PARAD decision but was denied. Plopenios filed separate
Petitions before the Special Agrarian Court-RTC (SAC-RTC); 16d after their receipt
of the PARAD’s Order. They explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15
days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their MR. Since the 15th day fell on a
Sunday, they reasoned that they should be allowed to file their appeal until the 16 th
day. LBP argued that PARAD decision attained finality after the 15d period and that
SAC-RTC should no longer entertain the petitions. SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision
of the PARAD had already attained finality because petitioners failed to file their
Petitions on time. Plopenios filed an MR but were denied. Hence, this petition for
review before the SC.
ISSUE: WON the Plopenio’s mode of appeal (R45 before the SC for being purely
question of law) is correct – NO. 1. Section 60, CARL, “An appeal may be taken
from the decision of the SAC by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
within 15d from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall
become final.”
WON Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time – YES. A party aggrieved
by the PARAD’s decision is given 15d to file the original petition before the SAC-
RTC. The pendency of a MR of the decision suspends the running of the period
within which the petition may be filed before the RTC-SAC. Consequently, upon
receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the reglementary period
for filing the petition before the RTC-SAC again commences to run. In this case,
Plopenios received a copy of the PARAD Decision on 27 September. They filed their
MR on 11 October 2002, or 14d from their receipt of a copy of the Decision.  On 21
December 2002, they received the Order denying their motion. Hence, Plopenios only
had 1 more day within which to file their Petitions with the SAC-RTC for the
determination of just compensation for their respective properties.
DOCTRINE: Although the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law
from RTC decision are taken to SC via R45 petition, decisions of trial courts
designated as SACs are only appealable to the Court of Appeals. The only mode
of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review  to the
CA, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact,
questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
007 MAGSINO vs. DE OCAMPO (STA. MARIA)

August 18, 2014| Bersamin, J. | Rule 42

PETITIONER: Juanito Magsino
RESPONDENTS: Elena De Ocampo and Ramon Guico
SUMMARY: Magsino filed against the respondents a complaint for forcible
entry with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order in the MeTC. He alleged that he was the owner in fee simple
of a land and that respondents had unlawfully bulldozed portions of his land.
TIMELINE:
1) Magsino filed a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction but the
MTC issued only a writ of preliminary injunction.
2) MTC dismissed the complaint for failure to substantiate the allegations
made.
3) RTC affirmed the judgment of MTC.
4) Magsino filed a petition for review with the CA.
5) The CA dismissed the petition for review as it was procedurally
flawed:
 The petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings
and other material portions as would support the allegations of
the petition, such as:
1) Copy of the complaint filed withthe Municipal Trial Court
of Taytay, Rizal, Answer, and Motion to Dismiss;
2) Copies of the appeal memoranda filed by the parties.
Magsino moved for reconsideration arguing that the decisions of the MTC and
the RTC submitted with the petition for review were sufficient for the CA to
resolve the issues. That, at any rate, should the CA have really desired to inform
itself more, all that it needed to do was simply to order the elevation of the
records; and that "all rules of procedure should bow to the greater imperative
ofdoing substantial justice." The CA denied the MR. The issue is WON the CA
erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground that Magsino did not
comply with Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the ROC? – No. Failure to comply with such
requirement is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition for review.
Section 2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible
copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by
the petitioner, and shall…xxx (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts,
certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite
number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.
The SC discussed the case of Galvez vs CA which provided for the 3 guideposts
for the CA to consider in determining WON the rules of procedures should be
relax: (guideposts and application to the case at bar)
1. Not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached
to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must
accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in
question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether
said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.
 Magsino entirely bypassed this. He omitted the complaint,
answer of the respondents, the motion to dismiss, and
memoranda on appeal filed in the RTC. All these were
important to properly inform the court of Magsino’s
allegations and if he has anything to support these.
2. A document, although relevant to the petition for review, need not be
appended if it is shown that its contents could be found in or could be
drawn from another document already attached to the petition – refers
to a process whereby the CA derives the contents of the omitted
relevant document from another attached to the petition for review
filed in the CA.
 Magsino contends that the copy of the MTC decision was a
sufficient basis to resolve the issues he was raising in his
petition for review. Even with the copy of the MTC judgment
being actually attached to the petition for review, however,
the second guidepost could not be complied with because the
copy was hopelessly illegible. The MTC judgment did not
 contain the statement of the issues relied upon by the him in
his appeal in the CA, for such statement was made only in his
memorandum on appeal.
3. A petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may
still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon
showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that
it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the
merits.

 Magsino could still have submitted the omitted documents at

the time he filed his motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the
first assailed resolution of the CA. Yet, he did not do so.

It is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what pleadings or material
portions of the record of the case would support the allegations in the petition.
The petitioner's discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the
petition is however not unbridled. The Court has the duty to check the exercise
of this discretion, to see to it that the submission of supporting documents is not
merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty is to enable us to determine
at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in the petition.
Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 provides that if petitioner fails to comply with
the submission of "documents which should accompany the petition", it "shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."

DOCTRINE: Section 2 (d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires the petition
for review to be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by
the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, and the requisite number of plain
copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with the requirement shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition for review.
 008 KUIZON v. DESIERTO (Callueng)
March 9, 2001 | Puno, J. | Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
PETITIONER: Benedicto E. Kuizon, Joselito Raniero J. Daan And Rosalina T.
Tolibas
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, In His Capacity As Ombudsman And
The Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
SUMMARY: The cases subject of this petition emanated from a complaint by one
Melanio Saporas with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas against petitioner
Benedicto Kuizon for Nepotism and Malversation Thru Falsification of Public
Documents in connection with the forging of signatures of some casual laborers of
Bato, Leyte in the payroll slips of the municipality and the drawing of their salaries
on different dates. Petitioners were ordered to file their counter-
affidavits. Petitioners submitted their Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses,
attaching therewith the counter-affidavits of petitioners Daan and Tolibas as well as
the affidavits of several witnessesto rebut the accusations of Saporas and Zacarias
Kuizon. Meanwhile, Saporas filed another complaint against petitioners with the
Office of the Ombudsman, Manila. The complaint was referred to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas in an Indorsement OMB-Visayas thru Graft
Investigation Officer I Samuel Malazarte issued a Resolution recommending the
filing of the Informations for Malversation and Falsification of Public/Official
Document on two (2) counts each against all the petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan. GIO Malazarte recommended however the dismissal of the
complaint for nepotism against petitioner Kuizon. The Resolution was approved by
the respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. Petitioners learned that four (4)
Informations were filed against them on September 16, 1997 with the
Sandiganbayanby the Office of the Ombudsman. Saporas filed with the OMB-
Visayas another Affidavit-Complaint or Malversation of Public Funds Thru
Falsification of Public Documents and violation of R.A. No. 3019, against herein
petitioners and three others.OMB-Visayas thru Graft Investigation Officer I
Venerando Ralph P. Santiago, Jr. issued a Resolution finding sufficient grounds to
hold petitioners for trial for Malversation of Public Funds and Falsification of Public
Documents.  The Resolution was approved by the respondent Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto. Upon verification, the petitioners learned that two (2) Informationswere
filed against them in September, 1997 by the Office of the Ombudsman with the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed two (2) separate Motions for Reinvestigation.In an
Order, the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) granted the two (2) Motions for
Reinvestigation filed by the petitioners. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan set the
criminal cases for hearing. Petitioners were arraigned on the same date and they all
pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. The pre-trial and the trial on the merits
were then set upon agreement of the parties. Petitioners filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals assailing the approval by the respondent Aniano A. Desierto of the
Memorandum of his Legal Counsel which recommended the continued prosecution
of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order in a
Resolution dated September 17, 1999. On even date, petitioners filed a Motion for
Suspension of Proceedings and/or Postponement with the Sandiganbayan.The Court
of Appeals promulgated a Resolution which states: "Per the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Teresita G. Fabian vs. Aniano A. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742,
September 16, 1998, the jurisdiction of this Court extends only to decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The cases involved in the instant
petition are criminal cases. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED
DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction."
Issue/s: (1) WoN the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the petition. NO.
In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited
the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate court correctly ruled that its
jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears
stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as
unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review,
such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present
petition should have been filed with this Court.
It follows that the instant petition was filed late. A petition for certiorari should be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed. The present petition was filed with this Court only on
November 24, 1999 which is more than sixty (60) days from the time petitioners
were notified of the adverse resolutions issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman. The erroneous filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals did not
toll the running of the period.
DOCTRINE: Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
009 ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES v. NLRC (DONES)
September 16, 1998 | Regalado, J. | Rule 43 Not Proper Mechanism to Appeal NLRC
Decision
PETITIONER: St. Martin Funeral Homes
RESPONDENTS: National Labor Relations Commission, and Bienvenido
Aricayos
SUMMARY: St. Martin Funeral Homes was owned by Amelita Malabad
(Amelita). Amelita’s mother managed the funeral parlor. Subsequently, Aricayos
was granted financial assistance by Amelita’s mother and, as a sign of appreciation,
Aricayos helped Amelita’s mother in managing the funeral parlor without
compensation and without any written employment contract. When Amelita’s
mother died, Ameita took over, and discovered that St. Martin had arrearages in the
payment of BIR taxes and other fees owing to the government even though the
records of St. Martin reflected that these had been paid. As a result, Amelita
removed Aricayos from the management of St. Martin. Aricayos then accused St.
martin of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Based on the position papers of
the parties, the Labor Arbiter then decided in favor of Amelita, holding that it did
not have jurisdiction over the case, since the existence of the employer-employee
relationship was disputed. On appeal, the NLRC annulled the LA’s Decision, and
remanded the case to determine the factual issue of the existence of employer-
employe relationship. Amelita then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
The issues is whether or not a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
is the proper appellate remedy for the decisions of the NLRC.
The Court eventually held in the negative. The legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 was and still is the proper vehicle
for judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC.
The Supreme Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto
could have been a lapse because appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The
important distinction between them is that the special civil action of certiorari is
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;
whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congres.
The case was ultimately remanded to the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that
while it did not wish to intrude into the congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, it further observed that there is a growing number of labor cases
being elevated to the Supreme Court which, not being a trier of facts, has at times
been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or
ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for
that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that
there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a
major aspect of the constitutional protection to labor.

All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from
the NLRC to the Supreme Court were thus interpreted to mean and refer to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should then
be initially filed in the Court of Appeals, following the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts.

DOCTRINE: To appeal an NLRC Decision, file a Rule 65 special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. There is no direct recourse to the Supreme
Court from the NLRC. Neither is Rule 43 (review of decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies) the proper appeal mechanism for the decisions of the NLRC.

010 FABIAN v. DESIERTO (IVY)

September 16, 1998 | Regalado, J. | Rule 43

PETITIONER: Teresita G. Fabian

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Aniano A. Desierto

SUMMARY: Fabian was the major stock holder and president of of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) who participated in the
bidding for government construction project including those under the First Metro
Manila Engineering District (FMED). Agustin had an affair with Fabian that
resulted in the former awarding public works contracts to the latter. Due to some
unpleasant incidents between the two, Fabian tried breaking up with Agustin but
the latter refused and even employed acts of harassment, intimidation, and threats.
Thus Fabian filed an administrative case wherein the Ombudsman ruled in favor of
Fabian resulting to the dismissal of Agustin. A motion for reconsideration was
filed; however, Desierto inhibited himself because the new counsel of the former
was his former classmate and close associate. The case was transferred to Deputy
Ombudsman Guerrero who set aside Desierto’s order and exonerated Agustin from
the case.
Fabian, then, appealed with the argument anchored in Sec 27 of RA 6770 which
states that: “In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.”
Issue: W/N Rule 45 petition is proper.
Held: NO
This Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number
of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be
resolved by the appellate court.  Also, the very provision cited by petitioner
specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be
exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial
bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or
resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in
the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the
regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to
and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal
by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A person desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth.
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made
mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating
and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies,
whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law.
That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not
fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was
no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts
enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders
of  quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals
on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to
"ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which
is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if
hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact
that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service
Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission,
unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily created body.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43.
011 TIROL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (LAGUILLES)
November 4, 1999 | Pardo, J. | Rule 43
PETITIONER: Heirs of Jose Esplana
RESPONDENTS: CA and Heirs of Pedro De Lima
SUMMARY: Based on a complaint filed by members of two groups, the
Federated PTA Organization and the Teachers and Employees Union, the COA
conducted a general audit of the transactions of the Lalawigan National High
School. COA reported that the acquisition of some equipment was made
through a negotiated contract and not by public bidding in violation of COA
Circular 85-55A, resulting in overpricing. COA recommended to the Deputy
Ombudsman the filing of criminal and administrative charges against the
responsible personnel. After preliminary investigation, they found that there was
probable cause for the indictment of petitioner Tirol, the Regional Director of
DECS. The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an information for
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Upon Tirol’s motion for permission to
travel abroad on official business, the Sandiganbayan conditionally arraigned
him without prejudice to the filing of an MR with the Ombudsman. Tirol
pleaded not guilty.
TIMELINE:
January 2 – Tirol filed a motion for leave to seek
reconsideration/reinvestigation.
May 22 – Denial of Tirol’s motion
July 17 – Tirol filed with the SC a petition for review for the alleged grave
abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman in concluding that he was liable for
overpricing.
August 24 – Arraignment
September 2 – Tirol filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to reset trial
pending resolution of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the SC.
September 4 – Sandiganbayan denied the motion to reset trial.
September 22 – Reduced the ruling in writing by an order nunc pro tunc;
ordered pretrial as scheduled; ruled that appeal by certiorari to the SC under Sec
27 of the Ombudsman Act refers only to admin cases decided by the
Ombudsman, not judicial cases filed with the court.
September 14 – Tirol moved for MR
October 13 – MR denied.
Issue: WoN the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
his motion to defer/suspend trial pending the disposition of the earlier petition
for review with the SC.
The Court ruled in the negative. Although Sec 27 of RA 6770 provides that
orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in admin cases are
appealable to the SC via Rule 45, in Fabian vs. Desierto, the Court declared that
Section 27 is unconstitutional because it expanded the SC’s jurisdiction, without
its advice and consent, which is contrary to the constitution. Hence, all appeals
from decisions of the Ombudsman in admin disciplinary cases may be taken to
the CA under Rule 43. Although the law is silent on remedy of an aggrieved
party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause for indictment in criminal
or non-admin cases, the Court cannot supply such deficiency if none has been
provided in the law. However, the aggrieved party is not without recourse since
where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the aggrieved may file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

It should also be stressed that there is pending before the SC a petition for
review under Rule 45 questioning the finding of probable cause by the
Ombudsman. What is at issue in this petition for certiorari is the propriety of the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion to suspend trial pending resolution of the
certiorari case. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to suspend trial in the criminal case. As a rule, criminal
prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
While there are exceptions to this (case did not mention the exceptions), this
case does not fall within the exceptions to warrant restraining the criminal
prosecution.

DOCTRINE: All appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative

disciplinary cases may be taken to the CA via Rule 43, and not under the
Ombudsman Act.

012 ELMA vs. JACOBI (LAGUILLES)

June 27, 2012 | Brion J.| Rule 43

PETITIONER: PCGG Chairman Magdangal Elma Issue: WoN certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the DOJ’s
determination of probable cause 
RESPONDENTS: Reiner Jacobi, Usec. Gutierrez

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. Respondents claim that a petition
SUMMARY: This case involves several letters showing that the PCGG and
for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy to question the assailed DOJ
Jacobi entered into agreements wherein PCGG would give Jacobi incentive for
resolution. This is incorrect. By weighing the evidence submitted by the parties
efforts in recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. A few years later,
in a preliminary investigation and by making an independent assessment
new PCGG Chairman De Guzman sent Jacobi a confirmation letter for the fee
thereof, an investigating prosecutor is, to that extent, performing functions
he is to receive for recovery of the Swiss account. Respondents (Jacobi et al)
of a quasi-judicial nature in the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
filed with the Sandiganbayan a verified Petition for Mandamus, Prohibition, and
However, since he does not make a determination of the rights of any party
Certiorari (with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
in the proceeding, or pronounce the respondent’s guilt or innocence (thus
Injunction).against the PCGG for allegedly hiring Swiss lawyers preventing the
limiting his action to the determination of probable cause to file an
enforcement of claims against the Marcoses. Another case was filed before the
information in court) ,an investigating prosecutors function still lacks the
Ombudsman against PCGG for allegedly violation RA 3019. Attached to the
element of adjudication essential to an appeal under Rule 43.
complaint before the Ombudsman was a letter implicating Jacobi, claiming that
he participated in the making of such letter. Later on, this letter was withdrawn.
PCGG now claims that the letter is falsified because records do not show that
they existed. Chairman Elma filed before the DOJ a criminal complaint against There is also a compelling reason to conclude that the DOJ’s exclusion
respondents. No summons were issued to respondents. Eventually, the DOJ from the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 is deliberate.
found no probable cause on the complaint and the case was dismissed.  This is in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the
President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. Being thus under
the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, is subject to the
review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the DOJ should
Now, petitioners claim that Usec. Gutierrez gravely abused her discretion when
be to the President, instead of the CA. Rule 43 includes the Office of the
she sustained the impropriety of Jacobi’s simultaneous resort to two different
President, thereby accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of
remedies filing a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration through
department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office before
two different counsels and filing a second MR of an adverse resolution through
any appellate recourse may be resorted to.
another counsel. 
However, Memorandum Circular No. 57 of the Office of the President bars
an appeal from the decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
Respondents, on the other hand, question the propriety of the petitioner’s resolt on preliminary investigations except for those involving offenses punishable
to a certiorari petition instead of a petition for review under Rule 43. They posit by reclusion perpetua to death. Therefore, a party aggrieved by the DOJ’s
that even assuming the remedy of certiorari is proper, the petition is insufficient resolution, cannot appeal to the Office of the President and is left without
in form and substance due to the petitioner’s failure to implead the DOJ in the any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
petition and failure to observe the hierarchy of courts.  Thus, only certiorari petition is left for one’s remedial avenue. However,
petitioner must allege and show that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting or denying the petition for review.

Unlike a Rule 45 petition, one filed under Rule 65 requires the petitioner to
implead as public respondent the official or agency whose exercise of a judicial
or quasi-judicial function is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Contrary to the respondent’s contention, the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioners with the Court impleaded Usec. Gutierrez, who, as then Justice
Undersecretary, issued the assailed resolutions. While the DOJ did not formally
enter its appearance in this case, the records show that the Court issued
resolutions addressed to the DOJ as a party, to submit the appropriate
responsive pleadings. As an extraordinary remedy, Rule 65 does not require that
summons be issued to the respondent; the service upon him of an order to file its
Comment or Memorandum is sufficient.  

Moreover, the ruling on Jacobi’s second MR and on Atty. Reyes’ first MR

cannot be appreciated as grave abuse of discretion. While it seemingly violated
established rules of procedure, it provided ample justification for it – the
avoidance of possibility of two conflicting rulings on two motions treating of
the same inseparable subject matter.

DOCTRINE: The DOJ is excluded in the enumerated list of quasi-judicial

agencies under Rule 43 because such is under the control of the President. Since
Rule 43 is not available, Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the orders of the
DOJ, provided grave abuse of discretion can be proved by the petitioner.
 013 CARPIO v. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (PLEYTO)

August 8, 2002 | Panganiban, J. | Applicability of Rule 43

PETITIONER: Armando C. Carpio

RESPONDENTS: Sulu Resources Development Corporation

SUMMARY: Sulu Resources filed a a petition for a Mines Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Carpio filed an
opposition/adverse claim alleging that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo
will be covered by Sulu’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and
extract the quarry resources on his properties. The Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines
and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a decision upholding the
opposition. This was reversed on appeal. The Mines Adjudiction Board (MAB)
dismissed Carpio’s adverse claim/opposition against Sulu Resources, ruling that
there was no overlap between their claims. Carpio moved for reconsideration but it
was denied. When the matter was elevated to the CA, said court held that it did not
have jurisdiction to review the MAB Decision since the adjudication of conflicting
mining claims is completely administrative in nature based on Section 79 of
Chapter XIII of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Under this law, the findings of
fact by the MAB as well as its decision or order shall be final and executory. Thus,
MAB’s finding was binding and conclusive. Moreover, it claimed that a petition for
review is improper because Carpio’s challenge is purely factual. The issue in this
case is W/N the CA’s refusal to take jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 43
was justified (W/N appeals should go directly to the SC or CA first.)
No. SC found the petition meritorious. Under Rule 43, appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are required to be brough to the CA on a
verified petition for review. The introductory words “among these agencies are” in
Rule 43 indicate that the enumeration therein is not exclusive or conclusive and
acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not
expressly listed, should be deemed included therein. MAB falls under the definition
of a quasi-judicial agency; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial
bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Moreover, the CA has more elbow room to
resolve factual controversies which are usually involved in administrative actions.
This is because unlike the Supreme Court, the CA is mandated to rule on questions
of fact.
This onward: ako na nag-add. Di kasama sa De Leon haha
This case was compared to the case of Pearson:
In Pearson, it was held that the adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely administrative in
nature. SC held that the reliance of Sulu on Person is misplaced. The claimant therein sued in the CFI to
prevent the exewcution of a decision rendered by the panel of investigations of the Bureau of Mines and
the Office of the President. The mining companies then went to the IAC via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. The claimants averred that the appellate court had no jurisdiction. In the case at bar,
Carpio went to the CA through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 seeking a reversal of
the MAB Decision. Thus, the reason for and the mode of appeal are different. (sa Pearson, ang
cinocontest yung power ng CFI to take cognizance of the case. It wasn’t the MAB Decision itself).
Also, the case of Fabian v. Desierto struck down Section 27 of the Mining Act, which was similarly
worded to Section 79, for being unconstitutional. It broadened the jurisdiction of the SC without the
SC’s consent.
SUMMARY:
1. Section 79 broadened the SC’s power without its consent. So, unconstitutional.
2. When the SC, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the CA pending cases
involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decision, such only relates to procedure. Hence,
it does not impare the substantive and vested right of the parties to appeal.
3. The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies.
4. Under BP 129, as amended, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-
judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more
elbow room to resolve them.
5. Judicial policy of observing hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administrative
agencies to the SC will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from
the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances call for
such.
DOCTRINE: The introductory words “among these agencies are” in Rule 43
indicate that the enumeration therein is not exclusive or conclusive and
acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not
expressly listed, should be deemed included therein. Decisions and final orders of
the MAB are appealable to the CA under Rule 43. Quasi-judicial agency or body
has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.
 authority, ignorance of the provisions of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools and incompetence before the CHED. CHED found Mercado guilty of
discourtesy in the course of official duties. Mercado filed an MR attaching a
Resolution issued and signed by former CHED Chairman Alcala (falsified) which
was denied. Mercado appealed CHED Resolution to the CSC. CSC denied Mercado’s
appeal but reversed itself after Mercado’s MR. CHED filed a Manifestation with
Motion for Clarification asking, whether the CSC Resolution was final and executory
and whether the CHED could still file a MR in view of the one MR rule in CSC
proceedings. Pending resolution of its Manifestation with Motion for Clarification,
CHED filed with the CA a motion for additional time within which to file a petition
for review of the CSC Resolution and within the time granted, CHED filed a petition
for review, assailing the CSC Resolution which the CA dismissed on the ground of
prematurity. WON the action was premature – NO. A Motion for Clarificatory
Judgment not being in the character of a MR does not toll the reglementary period for
filing a petition for review with the CA. WON filing an MR is a condition precedent
to the filing of a petition for review – NO.

DOCTRINE: R43, Sec. 4, governing appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to CA,

states that, “the appeal shall be taken within 15d from notice of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial
or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or
agency a quo.” The use of the disjunctive preposition “or” in the rule suggests that a
petitioner has the option to file the petition for review after notice of the assailed
judgment or resolution directly, without need of a prior MR, or after the denial of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, provided such motion is duly filed in
accordance with the rule of procedure of the court or agency below.

014 CHED v. Mercado (EMAR)

March 10, 2006| Garcia, J. | R43 - Appeal from QJA to CA

PETITIONER: CHED

RESPONDENT: Rosa F. Mercado

SUMMARY: Dimayuga accused Mercado of arrogance, abuse of power and


015 SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. CA (STA. MARIA)
September 27, 2004 | David, JR., C.J. | Rule 43 – doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
PETITIONER: Social Security Commission and Social Security System
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Jose Rago
SUMMARY: Rago worked as an electrician for. While working on the ceiling
of a building, he stepped on a weak ceiling joist so he crashed into the corridor
twelve feet below. The x-rays taken that day revealed there were fractions and
some bone destruction.
Timeline:
1. Rago filed several claims with the SSS first for permanent partial disability,
then Employee’s Compensation (EC) sickness benefit, also for EC disability
and partial disability. These were all approved.
2. Later on, Rago filed several requests for the adjustment of his partial disability
to total disability. This time, his requests were denied. The denial was based on
the medical findings of the Cebu City office that he was not totally prevented
from engaging in any gainful occupation.
3. Rago filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition for total
permanent disability benefits
4. The SSC denied Rago’s petition for lack of merit.
5. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Rago appealed to the CA by filing
a petition for review and reiterating his claim for permanent disability benefits
6. Court of Appeals reversed the SSC’s resolution. Granted permanent total
disability.
7. SSS seasonably filed a MR on the ground that the CA should have considered
an order issued by the SSC which affirmed, but clarified, its Resolution under
appeal.
8. The CA denied the MR.
In this petition, the SSS and the SSC pray to set aside the CA decision. One of
their contentions is that CA erred in disregarding the established jurisprudence
that the filing of a MR is a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for review to
enable the tribunal, board or office concerned to pass upon and correct its
mistakes without the intervention of the higher court. Failure to do so is a fatal
procedural defect.
The issue is WON in this case the filing of the MR is a prerequisite to the filing
of a petition for review? – No. This is because in the case at bar, there exists an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which is
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable.
The SC ruled that under the SSC rules Rago had the option of filing a motion
for reconsideration which he may or may not exercise. The SC additionally
construed this together with the requirements of appeals. While Rago certainly
had the option to file a MR before the SSC, it was nevertheless mandatory that
he do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of judicial remedies. The policy of
judicial bodies to give quasi-judicial agencies, an opportunity to correct its
mistakes by way of motions for reconsideration or other statutory remedies
before accepting appeals therefrom finds extensive doctrinal support in the well-
entrenched principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The reason for
the principle rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given
the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given
matter and decide it properly. The principle insures orderly procedure and
withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been
allowed to duly run its course. This is but practical since availing of
administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies.
HOWEVER, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may be
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no
administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified
political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non- exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot. For Rago, his case falls within
some of these exceptions.
It is true that Rago disregarded procedural and curative rules in taking
immediate recourse to the appellate court. Nevertheless, to require Rago to
comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies at this stage
of the proceedings would be
unreasonable, unjust and inequitable. It would
prolong needlessly and uselessly the resolution of his claim. SSS and SSC have
consistently shown their stand to deny Rago’s request to convert his permanent
partial disability to permanent total disability. To give the SSC another chance
to rectify its error would inevitably result in the same inflexible stance in
defense of its error. We say another chance because we can consider the SSC’s
clarificatory order as in the nature of a judgment on Rago’s MR as if he had
filed one. The SC ruled that Rago is entitled to the conversion of his permanent
partial disability to permanent total disability.
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
ironclad rule. (please see enumeration above)
016 BAGUNU v. AGGABAO (Callueng)
August 15, 2011 | Brion, J. | Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
PETITIONER: Rosita Bagunu
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Francisco Aggabao & Rosenda Acerit
SUMMARY: The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses
Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioner’s free
patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto.
Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office).
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first
sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject
land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag. Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over
the subject land with the Bureau of Lands. Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third
sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant.
The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot
subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application. The respondents filed a
protest against the petitioners free patent application. The respondents asserted
ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale
executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The Office of the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and
formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner
actually occupies and cultivates the area in dispute including the area purchased by
[the respondents]. The DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully
included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot belongs to the
respondents. The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional
Office denied the motion.  On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the
DENR Regional Office. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a
technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact
of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to
great respect, if not finality. In the meantime, Atty. Binag filed a complaint for
reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and
the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the
pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance
its resolution on the motion to dismiss. 'After the CA affirmed the DENR
Secretary’s favorable resolution on the respondent’s protest, the respondents asked
the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys
ruling.
Issue/s: (1) WoN the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarys jurisdiction to
resolve the parties conflicting claims of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding
that the same issue is pending with the RTC. NO.
Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45 
The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are
generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots
258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity of these lots
involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the
parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are
instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues
under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within
the recognized exceptions. On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of
the Director of Lands on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR Secretary,
are generally conclusive on the courts, and even on this Court, when these factual
findings are affirmed by the appellate court. 
 
The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive
jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and
dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory
actions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions
and occupations), the respondent’s complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise
the issue of possession whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised the issue of
ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for
declaration of ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its
ruling on the respondents reivindicatory action pending final determination by the
DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondent’s entitlement to a
free patent, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from
determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact

As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by
the respondents against the petitioner’s free patent application. In resolving this
protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue
of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land
requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative
agency with direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the
public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicant’s
entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional Office
still has to determine the respondent’s entitlement to the issuance of a free patent in
their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own
application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival
claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to
intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary and the
Director of Lands, unless grave abuse of discretion exists.

The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public
lands

  
 January 21, 2010 | Brion, J. | Rule 43; Statement of Facts in Petition

PETITIONER: Sps. Heber & Charlita Edillo

RESPONDENTS: Sps. Norberto & Desideria Dulpina

SUMMARY: Spouses Dulpina filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against

Spouses Edillo in the MCTC. The MCTC dismisse this complaint. Dulpinas then
filed an MR, which the MCTC denied. Dulpinas then filed a Notice of Appeal
which the MCTC granted. On appeal to the RTC, the RTC set aside the MCTC
judgmentand ordered Edillos to vacate the property and to restore possession to
Dulpinas. With their MR being denied, Edillos apealed to the CA through a Petition
for Review under Rule 42. The CA then dismissed the Petition on the ground that it
does not contain a statement of the factual background of the case. Edillos then
moved to reconsider the dismissal, to amend the petition, and to admit their
Amended Petition, which the CA denied on the ground that the amended petition
did not correct the infirmity of the original petition.Hence, this Rule 45 petition for
Review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Edillos argue that the CA’s outright dismissal of the petition was unwarranted since
the Ptition for Review and the Amended Petition sufficiently recited the factual
background of the case. Edillos add that the annexes to the original and amended
petitions, consisting of the Complaint, the Answer, the other pleadings, and the
MCTC and RTC Decisions, also contain the factual background.

The issue is whether or not the CA properly dismissed the Ptition for Review on the
ground that it does not containa separate “Statement of Facts” section.

The Court held in the negative. While the general rule is that the party who seeks to
appealmust comply with the requirements of the law and rules and that failure to
comply leads to the dismissal of the petition and the loss oof the right to appeal, the
Court recognizes that the right to appeal is an essential part of the system of judicial
process, and courts should proceedwith caution in order not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal. Courts are granted – in the exercise of their discretion along the
lines laid down in jurisprudence – the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rule. This prerogative to relax, however, is only done after a prima facie
finding of merit, that the appeal is meritorious in its face.
017 SPOUSES EDILLO v. SPOUSES DULPINA (DONES)
Here, there is jurisprudence to support the relaxed application of the rules, that
while the petition does not contain a separation section on statement of facts, if the
facts are integrated in the petition then this is substantial compliance. The Court’s
examination yielded the conclusion that the case is at least prima facie meritorious,
that merit would remain unventiated unless the Court relaxes the application of the
technical requirement. The issue invovlved in the case is whether the RTC has
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a final and executory MCTC decision, with
the Edillos arguing that the filing of the MR of the Dulpinas did not stop the
running of the reglementary period to appeal because MR is a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Summary Procedure which govern MCTC proceedings.

[Not so relevant] the Court held that the filing of the MR did not operate to toll the
reglementary period to appeal the MCTC decision ince such MR is proscribed by
the Rules on Summary rocedure. The MCTC Decision, then, became final,
executory, and immutable.

DOCTRINE: Statement of facts in the petition need not be contained in a specific

section entitled “Statement of Facts” so long as the facts are within the four corners
of the petition. This is substantial compliance and is not reason enough to dismiss
the petition outright.

018 COCA COLA BOTTLERS vs. CABALO (LAGUILLES)
January 30, 2006 | Chico-Nazario, J.| Rule 43
PETITIONER: Coca Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., Natale J. Dicosmo, Steve
Heath, Mary Chua, Alberto Fajardo, Jess Bangsil, Lito Garcia, Noel Roxas,
Chito Enriquez, Frederick Kerulf, Armando Canlas, Danilo Dauz
RESPONDENTS: Rodolfo Cabalo, Juanito Gerona, Luis Gerona, Luis De
Ocampo, Mario Nilo Mecua
SUMMARY:
This is a petition for review on certiotari. The controversy is about an illegal
dismissal case filed by the respondents against the petitioners. Complainants
claim that they have been employed by Coca Cola for 10-13 years as route
helpers, cargadors, pahinantes, driver, etc. Coca Cola maintains that being one
of the largest soft drink manufacturer in the country, it employs a big workforce
all over the country and that due to fluctuating variable conditions in the market
like volume of work and unexpected shortages in manpower, it is at times
constrained to augment its workforce to cope with operational needs. Because
of this, Coca Cola engages the services of workers on a temporary basis (5
months), apart from its regular workers. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of
Coca Cola for lack of evidence as to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. On appeal to the NLRC, the latter remanded the case back to the
Labor Arbiter. Coca Cola then sought relief to the CA via petition for certiorari,
but the same was dismissed on the ground that Coca Cola failed to comply with
Sec. 11 Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to attach
certified true copy of the assailed NLRC decision, as required under Sec. 1,
Rule 65.
The issue is WoN:
1. The CA erred in dismissing the petition, notwithstanding the fact that
the NLRC only gave them Xerox copies and the CA only gave them
the same.
- The Court held that yes, the CA erred in this regard. A perusal of the
attached NLRC decision easily discloses that it is not a mere
photocopy, but is in fact, a certified photocopy of the decision. The CA
in this matter, however, zeroed in on the copy of the NLRC Resolution
denying Coca Cola’s MR, which is not a certified true copy.
The Court also discussed the fact that the petition filed before the CA did not
contain an explanation as to why service upon the OSG and Atty. Alam
(counsel for the employees) was not made personally, albeit an affidavit of
service by registered mail was attached to it. However, the Court finds that the
CA did not err in dismissing the petition for failure to observe the requirement
of a written explanation why service was not made personally to the OSG and to
Atty. Alam. It cannot be said that serving the petition on the OSG and Atty.
Alam through personal service was not practical under the circumstances. The
office of Coca Cola’s counsel is in Pasig, while the OSG is in Makati, and that
of Atty. Alam is in QC. Coca Cola’s claim of inadvertence as their reason for
their failure to provide a written explanation why service of their petition was
not made personally cannot justify its omission. It does not constitute excusable
negligence especially since said rule had already been in effect for 3 years
before they filed their petition before the CA. Therefore, the petition is
DENIED.
DOCTRINE: Any petition filed under Rule 65 should be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof (But the
case itself did not say whether petitioners in this case appealed via which rule. It
just said that they filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA. No
mention of Rule 43 either).

019 B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. v. ALZUL (IVY)

June 8, 2007 | Velasco, Jr., J. | Rule 43

PETITIONER: B.E. San Diego, Inc.

RESPONDENTS: Rosario T. Alzul

SUMMARY: [Respondent] Alzul purchased through installment from [petitioner]

B.E. San Diego, Inc. four (4) subdivision lots. Alzul took immediate possession of
the subject property, setting up a perimeter fence and constructing a house thereon.
Alzul assigned to a certain Wilson P. Yu her rights under the Contract to Sell. Later
on, the Contract to Sell in Alzul’s name was cancelled, and San Diego issued a new
one in favor of Yu. Alzul informed San Diego about Yu’s failure and refusal to pay
the amounts due under the conditional deed. She also manifested that she would be
the one to pay the installments due to respondent on account of Yu’s default. Alzul
commenced an action for rescission of the conditional deed of assignment against
Yu before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City and caused the annotation of
notices of lis pendens on the titles covering the subject lots. The trial court ruled in
Alzul’s favor in the rescission case. The decision was even affirmed by this
[appellate] Court. Yu brought his cause before the Supreme Court in a Petition for
Review, but this was likewise denied.
San Diego notified Alzul that the Contract to Sell was declared rescinded and
cancelled. Thereafter, the subject lots were sold to spouses Carlos and Sandra
Ventura who were allegedly surprised to find the annotation of lis pendens in their
owner’s duplicate title. The Ventura spouses filed an action for Quieting of Title
with Prayer for Cancellation of Annotation and Damages before the RTC of
Malabon. The trial court ruled in favor of the Ventura spouses. On appeal before
this appellate Court, however, the decision was reversed. An appeal was filed
before the SC which affirmed the decision of the appellate Court. Alzur tried to
serve payment upon San Diego, however, San Diego allegedly refused to accept
payment.
Alzul decided to file an action for consignation and specific performance against
San Diego before the HLURB, which was dismissed. Alzul thereafter filed a
Petition ffor Review before the HLURB’s First Division, which was again
dismissed for lack of merit. MR, denied. Alzul filed an appeal to the Office of the
President, dismissed for having been filed out of time. MR, and was given due
course; it affirmed the denial of the HLURB. Alzul now brought before the CA a
petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the OP in dismissing
her appeal. CA reversed.
On the procedural issue, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. assails the sufficiency of
respondent Alzul’s CA petition as the latter, in violation of the rules, allegedly
lacked the essential and relevant pleadings filed with the HLURB and the OP.
Issue: W/N the petition is sufficient.
Section 6 of Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides:
SEC. 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall x x x (c) be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; x x x
The above proviso explicitly requires the following to be appended to a petition: 1)
clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment,
final order, or resolution appealed from; 2) certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to in the petition; and 3) other supporting papers.
Obviously, the main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review
and evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the CA all the orders,
resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence
that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying
on the case records of the lower court. The rule is the reviewing court can
determine the merits of the petition solely on the basis of the submissions by the
parties without the use of the records of the court a quo. It is a fact that it takes
several months before the records are elevated to the higher court, thus the resulting
delay in the review of the petition. The attachment of all essential and necessary
papers and documents is mandatory; otherwise, the petition can be rejected outright
under Sec. 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
To prevent premature dismissals, the requirements under Sec. 6 on the contents of
the petition have to be elucidated.
First, there can be no question that only the award, judgment, or final order or
resolution issued by the lower court or agency and appealed from has to be certified
as true.
The second set of attachments refers to the "certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein."
Material is defined as "important; more or less necessary; having influence or
effect; going to the merits; having to do with matter, as distinguished from
form." Thus, material portions of the records are those parts of the records that are
relevant and directly bear on the issues and arguments raised and discussed in the
petition. They may include any of the pleadings that are subject of any issue,
documentary evidence, transcripts of testimonial evidence, and parts of the records
pertinent and relevant to the grounds supporting the petition. The attachment of the
material portions is subject to the qualification that these are referred to or cited in
the petition. Thus, only the material parts specified in the petition have to be
appended and that would be sufficient compliance with the rule as to form.
It would be prudent however for the petitioner to attach all parts of the records
which are relevant, necessary, or important in whatever way to be able to reach the
resolution of the issues of the petition. The availability of such documents to the
ponente and members of a Division can easily provide the substance and support to
the merits of the grounds put forward by the petitioner. Moreover, the processing
time for the review and resolution of the petition is greatly abbreviated, thereby
obviating intolerable delays.
Lastly, it has to be explained whether the material portions of the records have to be
certified as true by the clerk of court or his/her duly authorized representative as
provided in Sec. 6 of Rule 43. If strictly required, the rule to require attachment of
certified true copies of the material portions will surely make the preparation of the
petition more tedious, cumbersome, and expensive. It should therefore be construed
that merely clear and legible copies of the material portions will suffice. The rules
on the different modes of appeal from the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies to
the CA reveal that it is only Rule 43 that specifically states that the material
portions to be appended to the petition should be certified true copies. Rule 41 of
course does not require attachment of the pertinent records since the entire records
are elevated to the CA. Rule 42 on petition for review from the trial court in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction to the CA speaks of plain copies of the material portions of
the record as would support the allegations of the petition. Even Rule 45 on appeal
by certiorari from the CA to this Court simply speaks of material portions of the
records without indicating that these should be certified true copies. Rule 46 on
original cases to this Court only requires plain copies of the material portions of the
records. Finally, Rule 65 on special civil actions requires only copies of relevant
and pertinent pleadings and documents.
From the foregoing premises, the inescapable conclusion is that only plain and
clear copies of the material portions of the records are required under Sec. 3 of
Rule 43. This finding is buttressed by our ruling in Cadayona v. CA, where it was
held that only judgments or final orders of the lower courts are needed to be
certified true copies or duplicate originals. There is no plausible reason why a
different treatment or stricter requirement should be applied to petitions under Rule
43.
The last requirement is the attachment of "other supporting papers." Again, it is
only in Rule 43 that we encounter the requirement of annexing "supporting papers"
to the petition. This can be interpreted to mean other documents, pictures, and
pieces of evidence not forming parts of the records of the lower court or agency that
can bolster and shore up the petition. While not so specified in Sec. 3 of Rule 43, it
is inarguable that said papers must also be relevant and material to the petition;
otherwise, the attachments would be mere surplusages and devoid of use and value.
Sec. 7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of the petition if it is not
accompanied by the required documents but simply gives the discretion to the
CA to determine whether such breach constitutes a "sufficient ground" for
dismissal.
In addition, it was noted in Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz that the CA Revised Internal
Rules provide certain flexibility in the submission of additional documents:
When a petition does not have the complete annexes or the required number of
copies, the Chief of the Judicial Records Division shall require the petitioner to
complete the annexes or file the necessary number of copies of the petition before
docketing the case. Pleadings improperly filed in court shall be returned to the
sender by the Chief of the Judicial Records Division.
In Rosa Yap Paras, et al. v. Judge Ismael O. Baldado, et al., the Court preferred the
determination of cases on the merits over technicality or procedural imperfections
so that the ends of justice would be served better, thus:
At the same time, the Rules of Court encourage a reading of the procedural
requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice. Thus:
Section 6. Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
As expressed in Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, "(w)hat should guide judicial action
is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor
or property on technicalities. x x x (T)he rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than

promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed."
020 MANIEBO v. CA (PLEYTO)
August 10, 2010 | Bersamin, J. | Appeals from Quasi-judicial agencies to CA
PETITIONER: Justina Maniebo
RESPONDENTS: CA and the CSC
SUMMARY: The Mayor of the Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro
issued a promotional permanent appointment to the petitioner as Cashier III in the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer because she appeared to possess the
qualifications for the position, including the Career Service (Professional)
Eligibility appearing in her Personal Data Sheet shower her to have passed with a
rating of 74.01%. When it was verified against the Masterlist of Eligibles, however,
it was discovered that she actually failed for obtaining only a rating of only 60%.
CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) No. IV found her guilty on Dec. 16, 1999. On Feb.
4, 2000, Maniebo appealed to the CSC, which affirmed the earlier decision. MR
was also denied. She then filed a petition for review before the CA and attached
therewith were: (1) a certified true copy of CSC Resolution dated Aug. 5, 2002
denying the MR, (2) original copy of the notice of appeal dated Aug. 23, 2002
filed in the CSC, (3) Photocopy of the petitioner’s appeal dated Jan. 31, 2000 to
the CSC, and (4) petitioner’s affidavit of merit dated Aug. 2002. CA dismissed
the petition due to the failure to accompany it with the requisite certified true copies
of the material portions of the record. Maniebo filed an MR, in which her counsel
even undertook to submit the required certified copies of the material portions
within ten days from Oct. 23. She explained in her motion that her counsel had
failed to submit the required certified copies, due to her failure to turn over said
copies to her counsel because of the distance between her home in Puerto Galera
and the office of her counsel in Fairview, QC. CA denied the MR. Petitioner filed
another MR signed by another lawyer allegedly collaborating as counsel to her
original lawyer (so second MR, prohibited under Rule 52, Section 2 of the ROC).
The issue in this case is W/N the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the
petition for review for failure to attach certified coy of the annexes when the rules
and jurisprudence do not require that all annexes attached to the petition should be
certified. SC ruled against Maniebo. Maniebo argued that her submission before the
CA constituted substantial compliance. 2 But SC held that CA did not commit any
reversible error. Section 6, Rule 43 of the ROC expressly lists down the pleadings
and other matters that a petition for review should contain.3 The rule clearly requires
the petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
2
The petitioner argues that her submission of a certified true copy of CSC Resolution 02-1028 in her
petition before the CA constituted a substantial compliance with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
She averred that rules of procedure should be liberally construed to afford litigants the opportunity to
prove their claims and prevent a denial of justice due to legal technicalities; that she had already lost her
job due to the immediate execution of the decision pending appeal, that to require her to secure certified
true copies of all the annexes to the petition would be too burdensome for her and would contravene the
constitutionally guaranteed free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance; and that it was already settled that under Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, only the
copies of the assailed judgments or final orders of the lower courts needed to be certified.[20] She insisted
that the dismissal of her appeal due to technicalities would constitute a deprivation of property without due
process of law because what was at stake herein was her right to employment.
3
Section 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to
the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a
concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific
material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (2a)
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to provided by Sec. 11, Rule 43.5 There are way too many disregarded rules to merit
therein and other supporting papers. The requirement is intended to immediately any tolerance.
enable the CA to determine whether to give due course to the appeal or not by
having all the material necessary to make such determination before it. This is
because an appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA
DOCTRINE: The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied
may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted
by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award,
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true
require consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment
copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other
on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from notice. Her petition
supporting papers. Also, an appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal,
was not entitled to a liberal construction because it was not even substantial
which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit,
compliant. With respect to the other supporting documents of the petition as set
or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too
forth in Section 6, Rule 43, their legible copies should have been attached to the
unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent
petition or to the MR filed against the resolution dismissing the petition. However,
to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from
she did not even substantially comply with the requirement. Making her non-
notice. And second MR is not allowed.
compliance worse was her reneging on her own express undertaking to the CA to
submit the omitted documents within the 10-day period she had prayed for in her
first MR by not furnishing the required supporting documents, or even the plain
legible copies thereof from the time she filed her MR on October 23, 2002 until its
resolution on January 8, 2003. Neither did she render any explanation for her failure
to honor her undertaking. It was only when she filed the petition in this Court that
she explained her failure to submit the required documents to the CA to be due to
her financial constraints and the distance between her residence and the office of
her counsel. She also did not state when she received the resolution required for the
timeliness of the filing. Moreover, she filed a second MR after the issuance of the
resolution. This is against Section 4, Rule 43 and Section 2, Rule 52.4 And even in
this second MR, she did not tender any explanation for her failure to make good her
undertaking to furnish to the CA the required certified or legible copies. Instead, she
contented herself with just repeating the grounds used in her first MR. Lastly, the
transmittal of the records was not mandatory but only discretionary upon the CA as
4
Section 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law
for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
5
Section 11. Transmittal of record.Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given
Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
due course, the Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a
resolution by the same party shall be entertained. legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted
may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or
permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record.