001 LANARIA v.
PLANTA (Callueng)
November 22, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure
PETITIONER: Spouses Henry Lanaria and The Late Belen Lanaria as Substituted
by Francis John Lanaria
RESPONDENTS: Francisco M. Planta
SUMMARY: Petitioner Francis John Lanaria is the son of decedent Belen M.
Lanaria, while respondent Francisco M. Planta is the nephew and one of the heirs of
the late Rosario Planta. Rosario Planta was the registered owner and possessor of a
parcel of land. Respondent was the plaintiff in a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
filed against the spouses Henry Lanaria and the late Belen M. Lanaria before the
MTC. The Complaint alleged that Planta, through her permission and generosity,
allowed the grandparents and parents of Belen Lanaria to construct their house on a
portion of the parcel of land with an implied promise to vacate the premises and
restore possession thereof to her or her heirs upon demand. A formal demand to
vacate was sent to defendants, but they refused to heed the same. Upon submission
of the position papers of the respective parties, the MTC rendered its Decision,
ruling in favor of respondent Francisco M. Planta. Seeking recourse from the
adverse Decision, petitioners elevated the case to the RTC. The RTC affirmed with
modification the Decision of the MTC, deleting the award of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 12 May 2004
but it was denied by the RTC in an Order issued on 20 July 2004.On 3 August 2004,
petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA. On 27 August 2004, the Court of
Appeals, finding petitioners' Petition for Review deficient in form and substance,
resolved to outrightly dismiss the petition as follows: It appearing that after a careful
reading of the contents of this petition, it shows that it failed to attach plain copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the record such as, Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer, Answer with Counterclaim, Parties' Position Paper,
Memorandum on Appeal and Motion for Reconsideration dated May 12, 2004, as
required under Section 2, Rule 42 and in violation of Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, this petition is DISMISSED outright due to
deficiency in form and substance. Petitioners thereafter filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration and to Allow/Admit the Inclusion of Pleadings and Other Material
Documents." Petitioners explained that the failure to attach copies of documents in
support of their petition was due to oversight and inadvertence, and asked the Court
of Appeals to allow the inclusion of the pleadings attached to the Motion for
Reconsideration, "in the most prevailing interests of substantive justice, equity and
substantive rights."
Issue/s: (1) WoN the CA erred when it dismissed outrightly the Petition for Review
dated August 3, 2004 on the ground of deficiency in form and substance to the
greater sacrifice of substantial justice. YES.
(2) WoN the CA gravely erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration and to
Allow/Admit the Inclusion of Pleadings and Other Material Documents since its
denial would result to denial of right to substantial justice. YES.
Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure embodies the procedure for
appeals from the Decision of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Said section reads: SEC. 2. Form and Contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven
(7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as
such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case,
without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on
time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional
Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the
appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of
the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and
of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition.
Non-compliance with any of the foregoing requisites is a ground for the dismissal of
a petition based on Section 3 of the same Rule, to wit: Sec. 3. Effect of failure to
comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
Petitioners' subsequent submission of the following documents annexed to their
Motion for Reconsideration - viz, Complaint for Ejectment, Transfer Certificate of
Title, Answer to the Complaint, Four Affidavits, Position Paper filed by petitioners,
Memorandum on Appeal, Appellee's Memorandum, and Motion for Reconsideration
- constitutes substantial compliance with Section 2, Rule 42. Jurisprudence
pertaining to the same has established that "submission of a document together with
the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with the

requirement that relevant or pertinent documents be submitted along with the
petition, and calls for the relaxation of procedural rules."
DOCTRINE: Submission of a document together with the motion for
reconsideration constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement that relevant
or pertinent documents be submitted along with the petition, and calls for the
relaxation of procedural rules
002 DONATO v. COURT OF APPEALS (DONES)
December 8, 2003 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Rule 42; Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping; Attachment of Records and Other Supporting Documents
PETITIONER: Antonio T. Donato
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Filomeno Arcepe, Timoteo Barcelona, et al.
SUMMARY: In an ejectment case, petitioner lost in the MeTC. Upon appeal to the
RTC, the RTC sustained the MeTC Decision. The petition for review filed before
the Court of Appeals contains a certification against forum shopping but said
certification was signed by petitioner’s counsel. Also, attached to the petition were
the certified true copies of the MeTC and RTC Decisions, but no other records or
supporting documents were attached. In submitting the certification for non-forum
shopping duly signed by himself in his motion for reconsideration, petitioner
explained the physical impossibility of personally accomplishing the certification
and filing the petition for review within the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
considering that he is a resident of Virginia, U.S.A. Petitioner also attached the
relevant records of the proceedings in the MeTC and RTC in the motion for
reconsideration. The CA denied this Motion for Reconsideration, ruling htat
peitioner’s subsequent compliance did not cure the defect.
The issues are whether or not: (1) relaxation of the rules on certification is justified;
and (2) relaxation of the rules on attachment of supporting documents is justified.
The rules on ccertification were relaxed for petitioner. Petitioner has adequately
explained his failure to personally sign the certification. The subsequent filing of
the certification duly signed by petitioner himself should be deemed substantial
compliance pro hac vice. It was physically impossible for the petition to have been
prepared and sent to petitioner in the U.S., for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A.
To the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to siggn
the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition
to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. The rationale for the rule
on personal execution of the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only
the petitioner who has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar
actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even counsel of record may be
unaware of such fact.
The rules on attachment of supporting documents was also relaxed for petitioner.
The failure of petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph (b), Rule VI of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), that is, to append to his
petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would
suport the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. The
RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit
additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice.
Under Section 3, paragraph (d), Rule III, RIRCA, the CA may require the parties to
complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due
course, the CA may require the levation of a complete record of the case under
Section 3(d)(5), Rule VI, RIRCA. At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the
pleadings and other material portions of the records below with his motion for
reconsideration. As held in previous cases, subsequent submission of missing
documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance
which calls for the relaxation of the rules.
DOCTRINE: The rationale for the rule on personal execution of the certification
by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge
of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or
tribunals; even counsel of record may be unaware of such fact. Also, subsequent
submission of missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to
substantial compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules.

003 ANG v. GRAGEDA (IVY)

June 8, 2006 | Cellejo, Sr., J. | Rule 42

PETITIONER: Elsie Ang

RESPONDENTS: Dr. Erniefel Grageda

SUMMARY: Janet Ang had liposuction surgery on her thighs at the EPG Cosmetic
and Aesthetics Surgery Clinic, attended to and operated on by Dr. Erniefel
Grageda. In the course of the operation, Janet began to have seizure that led to her
death. Ang Ho Chem, Janets father, filed a criminal complaint against respondent
Dr. MeTC rendered judgment acquitting accused Grageda. Private complainant
appealed the civil aspect to the RTC, which directed the private complainant to file
the appeal memorandum within 15 days from notice. Appelant failed to file the
memorandum within the period and filed for motion for extension at least 15 times.
RTC issued an Order dismissing the appeal for failure to file appeal memorandum.

Appellant received a copy of the Order of the RTC dismissing his appeal, and
finally filed his appeal memorandum/brief by registered mail as well as a motion
for reconsideration. RTC again denied. Counsel for appellant filed a
Manifestation informing the RTC of the appellants death and named the latters
daughter, Elsie Ang, as his substitute and representative. Instead of appealing the
Order of the RTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court,
Elsie Ang (petitioner) filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, questioning the
Orders of the RTC. CA dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy to
question the RTC Orders.
Issue: W/N CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Held: NO.
(15) days.
  
Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional; failure to do so renders the questioned
decision/final order final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the judgment or final order, much less to entertain the appeal.
When the RTC issued its Orders, the court was exercising its appellate jurisdiction
over the judgment rendered by the MeTC of Muntinlupa City. To reiterate,
the December 2, 2002 Order of the RTC denying the appeal of petitioner was a
final order, appealable to the CA via petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court within the 15-day reglementary period thereof.

Petitioner received the December 2, 2002 Order of the RTC on December 16, 2002.

The remedy of petitioner from the Orders of the RTC was to appeal by filing a
She then filed a motion for reconsideration on December 23, 2002. She received
petition for review in the CA under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It bears stressing
the January 20, 2003 Order of the RTC denying the motion for reconsideration
that when the RTC issued the aforementioned Order, it did so in the exercise of its
on February 7, 2003. As the 15th day fell on a Saturday, petitioner had up
appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the remedy of petitioner was to appeal the order under
to February 24, 2003 to file a petition for review before the CA. However, she
Rule 42, which reads:
allowed the reglementary period to lapse without filing a petition for review in the
  CA. Thus, the Order of the RTC dismissing petitioners appeal had become final and
executory, beyond the competence of the CA to reverse, much less modify.
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to
appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered  
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
Apparently to resuscitate her lost appeal, petitioner filed a petition
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, alleging that the RTC committed
same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and
a grave abuse of its discretion in issuing its Orders. She likewise insisted that she
other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
filed her Memorandum well within the extension prayed for by her. The CA,
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a
however, saw through her scheme and dismissed her petition, and in so doing acted
copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within
in accord with case law.
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or
Indeed, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy. It is not and should not be a
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper
substitute for lost appeal. It is not a procedural devise to deprive the winning party
motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and
of the fruits of the judgment in his or her favor. Courts should frown upon any
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of
scheme to prolong litigations. A judgment which has acquired finality becomes
the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Once a judgment or order becomes final,
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest.
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen

004 HEIRS OF PLANA vs. CA (LAGUILLES)
October 31, 2008Azcuna, J. | Rule 42
PETITIONER: Heirs of Jose Esplana
RESPONDENTS: CA and Heirs of Pedro De Lima
SUMMARY: Esplana filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession
against Pedro de Lima before the MTC. MTC tried and decided the case as an
action for forcible entry, and later on dismissed the case and ordered Esplana to
pay de Lima attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. On appeal, the RTC held
that the forcible entry aspect was only incidental to the issue of ownership so it
remanded the case to the MTC for the latter to decide the issue on ownership.
Esplana contends that he was the owner of the property by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute sale executed in his favor by his father. De Lima claims he owns the
land by purchasing it from the Esplana sisters, which sale was admitted by the
sisters. MTC rendered a decision in favor of De Lima. Esplana appealed to the
RTC but the latter affirmed in toto the MTC decision.
TIMELINE:
Feb. 21 – Esplana’s counsel received a copy of the RTC decision
March 7 – Counsel filed before the CA a motion for extension of 30 days, within which
to file a petition for review reckoned from March 8
May 16 – CA issued a Resolution granting petitioners only 15 days, to be reckoned on
March 8, or until March 23
May 29 – Petitioners received a copy of the CA resolution on their motion for extension
April 5 – Petitioners filed a petition for review, which was within the 30-day extension
requested.
June 27 – CA dismissed the petition for review for having filed out of time on April 5,
instead of the deadline, March 23.
July 29 – Petitioners received the Resolution dismissing their petition.
Petitioners filed an MR alleging that they filed for a motex for 30 days from
March 8 considering that the original petitioner died. They attached to their MR
a death certificate. However, this was denied. The issue is WoN petitioners’
petition for review was filed within the 15-day extension to file a petition for
review under Rule 42.
The SC held in the negative. Sec. 1, Rule 42 is very clear that petitioners are
allowed an extension of only 15 days to file a petition for review with the CA.
Although a further extension not to exceed 15 days may be granted for the most
compelling reasons, the grounds stated by petitioners do not entitle them to a
further extension. Petitioners’ motex was grounded on the death of their father
and their counsel’s voluminous work. Their motex was granted based on their
grounds but they submit that they are entitled to a further extension of 15 days
under Sec. 1 Rule 42. However, the death certificate shows that their father died
in December, and their counsel received the RTC decision dated Feb 6 on Feb
21, which is more than two months after the death of their father. The Court
here thinks that the petitioners were just undecided about appealing their case to
the CA. Moreover, petitioners also failed to pay the full amount of the docket
and other legal fees within the reglementary period. Motions for extension are
not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court. The
requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period must be
strictly followed as they are considered interdictions against needless delays.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a petition for review must be filed 15 dayas
from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration. However, upon proper motion and
payment of full docket and other legal fees, the CA may grant an additional
period of 15 days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason.

005 MONTAJES v. PEOPLE (PLEYTO)

March 12, 2012 | Peralta, J. | Petition for Review from the RTC to the CA

PETITIONER: Alfredo Jaca Montajes

RESPONDENTS: People of the Philippines

DATES ARE IMPORTANT

SUMMARY: In an information dated June 5, 2003, Montajes was charged with the
crime of Direct Assault (Art. 148 of the RPC) before the MTC of Buenavista,
Agusan del Norte. The information stated that on Dec. 8, 2002, at 1am, he attacked,
assaulted and hacked Jose Rellon, who was the Brgy. Captain at that time, while in
the performance of his duties. He also knows that he was the Brgy. Captain.
Montajes pleaded not guilty.
Defense’ side:
On the said date and time, Rellon was at the benefit dance supported by the Sangguniang Kabataan.
There he met Montajes who uttered to him, “You’re a useless captain” and other similar imports. He
then hacked Rellon with a lagaraw (bolo). He wasn’t hit because he moved backwards. Rellon was then
brought home by his wife and daughter. Many people witnessed the incident. It was also alleged that
during the mediation, Montajes asked for forgiveness but Rellon declined. On cross-examination, Rellon
said that he was there to stop the event because it was supposed to end at 12, as per the permit he gave
them. Then the house of Montajes was stoned and so, Montajes got mad and went out of his house.
However, he did not ask for help from Rellon. A witness corroborated this.
Petitioner’s side:
On that day, he was at his house just listening to the disco coming from the benefit concert when it was
stopped by Rellon. This angered the people because those who have paid weren’t allowed to dance
anymore. The stoning incident followed. This made him wild. While looking for the persons along the
road, he saw Rellon who was two meters away, and he said that he was looking for the people that
stoned his house. Then, Rellon tried to get the lagaraw from him. He admitted that he asked for
forgiveness so that the case would not be elevated anymore. He, however, denied attacking the captain.
Two witnesses corroborated this.
MTC found Montajes guilty. On appeal, the RTC affirmed this. Montajes filed with
the CA a petition (should be motion) for extenstion of time to file the petition for
review under Rule 42, praying for an extended period of 15 adys from May 21,
2007, or until June 5, 2007, within which to file his petition. He then filed his
petition on June 5, 2007. CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time on
Sept. 21, 2007.
CA said that the received the resolution of the MR on May 4. Thus, the 15-day
period to file a petition for review expired on May 21 (Monday), considering that
May 19 was a Saturday. Now, Montajes reckoned the extension from May 21 and
not from May 19. It is well settled that when the day of the period falls on a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, and a party is granted an extension, the
extension should be counted from the last day which is the Saturday, Sunday,
holiday.
The issue is W/N the CA erred in denying due course to his petition for review for
being filed out of time. Montajes argued that his basis was Section 1, Rule 22 of the
ROC.1
SC issued an AM (AM No. 00-2-14-SC) dated Feb. 29, 2000, clarifying the subject
provision. SC said that Sec. 1, Rule 22, speaks only of “the last day of the period.”
Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted
from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Thus, CA was correct in ruling that it was filed
out of time. The petition filed on June 5 was 2 days late. However, this case merits
a liberal application. The petition was filed long before the CA issued its resolution
on Sept. 21, 2007. There was no showing that respondent suffered any material
injury or his cause was prejudiced by reason of the delay. Also, the RTC affirmed
the MTC (don’t know why sinabi to but just in case.) There’s nothing in the record
to show that Montajes deliberately intended to delay the final disposition of the
case. Thus, SC held that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review
does not automatically warrant the dismissal thereof. Where strong consideration of
substantial justice is manifest in the petition, SC may relax the stringent application
of technical rules.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 1, Rule 22, speaks only of “the last day of the period.” Any
extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the
expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday.
1
Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last
day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

006 Plopenio v. Department of Agrarian Reform (EMAR)
March 10, 2006| Garcia, J. | R42 - Appeal from RTC to CA
PETITIONERS: SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO and ROSIELINDA
PLOPENIO represented by GAVINO PLOPENIO
PETITIONERS: EDUARDO LL. PLOPENIO represented by GAVINO
PLOPENIO
RESPONDENTS: DAR and LBP
SUMMARY: Plopenios own a land which DARAP valued at P51k/ha so they offered
their land to DAR for acquisition under CARL. LBP valued their land at P23k/ha so
they rejected LBP’s notive of valuation and referred the matter to PARAD for
summary administrative proceedings. PARAD affirmed the LBP valuation. Plopenios
filed an MR of the PARAD decision but was denied. Plopenios filed separate
Petitions before the Special Agrarian Court-RTC (SAC-RTC); 16d after their receipt
of the PARAD’s Order. They explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15
days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their MR. Since the 15th day fell on a
Sunday, they reasoned that they should be allowed to file their appeal until the 16 th
day. LBP argued that PARAD decision attained finality after the 15d period and that
SAC-RTC should no longer entertain the petitions. SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision
of the PARAD had already attained finality because petitioners failed to file their
Petitions on time. Plopenios filed an MR but were denied. Hence, this petition for
review before the SC.
ISSUE: WON the Plopenio’s mode of appeal (R45 before the SC for being purely
question of law) is correct – NO. 1. Section 60, CARL, “An appeal may be taken
from the decision of the SAC by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
within 15d from receipt of notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall
become final.”
WON Petitions before the SAC-RTC were filed out of time – YES. A party aggrieved
by the PARAD’s decision is given 15d to file the original petition before the SAC-
RTC. The pendency of a MR of the decision suspends the running of the period
within which the petition may be filed before the RTC-SAC. Consequently, upon
receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the reglementary period
for filing the petition before the RTC-SAC again commences to run. In this case,
Plopenios received a copy of the PARAD Decision on 27 September. They filed their
MR on 11 October 2002, or 14d from their receipt of a copy of the Decision.  On 21
December 2002, they received the Order denying their motion. Hence, Plopenios only
had 1 more day within which to file their Petitions with the SAC-RTC for the
determination of just compensation for their respective properties.
DOCTRINE: Although the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of law
from RTC decision are taken to SC via R45 petition, decisions of trial courts
designated as SACs are only appealable to the Court of Appeals. The only mode
of appeal from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review  to the
CA, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact,
questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
007 MAGSINO vs. DE OCAMPO (STA. MARIA)

August 18, 2014| Bersamin, J. | Rule 42

PETITIONER: Juanito Magsino
RESPONDENTS: Elena De Ocampo and Ramon Guico
SUMMARY: Magsino filed against the respondents a complaint for forcible
entry with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order in the MeTC. He alleged that he was the owner in fee simple
of a land and that respondents had unlawfully bulldozed portions of his land.
TIMELINE:
1) Magsino filed a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction but the
MTC issued only a writ of preliminary injunction.
2) MTC dismissed the complaint for failure to substantiate the allegations
made.
3) RTC affirmed the judgment of MTC.
4) Magsino filed a petition for review with the CA.
5) The CA dismissed the petition for review as it was procedurally
flawed:
 The petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings
and other material portions as would support the allegations of
the petition, such as:
1) Copy of the complaint filed withthe Municipal Trial Court
of Taytay, Rizal, Answer, and Motion to Dismiss;
2) Copies of the appeal memoranda filed by the parties.
Magsino moved for reconsideration arguing that the decisions of the MTC and
the RTC submitted with the petition for review were sufficient for the CA to
resolve the issues. That, at any rate, should the CA have really desired to inform
itself more, all that it needed to do was simply to order the elevation of the
records; and that "all rules of procedure should bow to the greater imperative
ofdoing substantial justice." The CA denied the MR. The issue is WON the CA
erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground that Magsino did not
comply with Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the ROC? – No. Failure to comply with such
requirement is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition for review.
Section 2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible
copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by
the petitioner, and shall…xxx (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts,
certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite
number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.
The SC discussed the case of Galvez vs CA which provided for the 3 guideposts
for the CA to consider in determining WON the rules of procedures should be
relax: (guideposts and application to the case at bar)
1. Not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached
to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must
accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in
question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether
said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.
 Magsino entirely bypassed this. He omitted the complaint,
answer of the respondents, the motion to dismiss, and
memoranda on appeal filed in the RTC. All these were
important to properly inform the court of Magsino’s
allegations and if he has anything to support these.
2. A document, although relevant to the petition for review, need not be
appended if it is shown that its contents could be found in or could be
drawn from another document already attached to the petition – refers
to a process whereby the CA derives the contents of the omitted
relevant document from another attached to the petition for review
filed in the CA.
 Magsino contends that the copy of the MTC decision was a
sufficient basis to resolve the issues he was raising in his
petition for review. Even with the copy of the MTC judgment
being actually attached to the petition for review, however,
the second guidepost could not be complied with because the
copy was hopelessly illegible. The MTC judgment did not
 contain the statement of the issues relied upon by the him in
his appeal in the CA, for such statement was made only in his
memorandum on appeal.
3. A petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may
still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon
showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that
it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the
merits.

 Magsino could still have submitted the omitted documents at

the time he filed his motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the
first assailed resolution of the CA. Yet, he did not do so.

It is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what pleadings or material
portions of the record of the case would support the allegations in the petition.
The petitioner's discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the
petition is however not unbridled. The Court has the duty to check the exercise
of this discretion, to see to it that the submission of supporting documents is not
merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty is to enable us to determine
at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit in the petition.
Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 provides that if petitioner fails to comply with
the submission of "documents which should accompany the petition", it "shall
be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."

DOCTRINE: Section 2 (d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires the petition
for review to be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by
the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, and the requisite number of plain
copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with the requirement shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition for review.
 008 KUIZON v. DESIERTO (Callueng)
March 9, 2001 | Puno, J. | Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
PETITIONER: Benedicto E. Kuizon, Joselito Raniero J. Daan And Rosalina T.
Tolibas
RESPONDENTS: Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, In His Capacity As Ombudsman And
The Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)
SUMMARY: The cases subject of this petition emanated from a complaint by one
Melanio Saporas with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas against petitioner
Benedicto Kuizon for Nepotism and Malversation Thru Falsification of Public
Documents in connection with the forging of signatures of some casual laborers of
Bato, Leyte in the payroll slips of the municipality and the drawing of their salaries
on different dates. Petitioners were ordered to file their counter-
affidavits. Petitioners submitted their Answer with Special Affirmative Defenses,
attaching therewith the counter-affidavits of petitioners Daan and Tolibas as well as
the affidavits of several witnessesto rebut the accusations of Saporas and Zacarias
Kuizon. Meanwhile, Saporas filed another complaint against petitioners with the
Office of the Ombudsman, Manila. The complaint was referred to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas in an Indorsement OMB-Visayas thru Graft
Investigation Officer I Samuel Malazarte issued a Resolution recommending the
filing of the Informations for Malversation and Falsification of Public/Official
Document on two (2) counts each against all the petitioners before the
Sandiganbayan. GIO Malazarte recommended however the dismissal of the
complaint for nepotism against petitioner Kuizon. The Resolution was approved by
the respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. Petitioners learned that four (4)
Informations were filed against them on September 16, 1997 with the
Sandiganbayanby the Office of the Ombudsman. Saporas filed with the OMB-
Visayas another Affidavit-Complaint or Malversation of Public Funds Thru
Falsification of Public Documents and violation of R.A. No. 3019, against herein
petitioners and three others.OMB-Visayas thru Graft Investigation Officer I
Venerando Ralph P. Santiago, Jr. issued a Resolution finding sufficient grounds to
hold petitioners for trial for Malversation of Public Funds and Falsification of Public
Documents.  The Resolution was approved by the respondent Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto. Upon verification, the petitioners learned that two (2) Informationswere
filed against them in September, 1997 by the Office of the Ombudsman with the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners filed two (2) separate Motions for Reinvestigation.In an
Order, the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) granted the two (2) Motions for
Reinvestigation filed by the petitioners. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan set the
criminal cases for hearing. Petitioners were arraigned on the same date and they all
pleaded "not guilty" to the crimes charged. The pre-trial and the trial on the merits
were then set upon agreement of the parties. Petitioners filed a petition before the
Court of Appeals assailing the approval by the respondent Aniano A. Desierto of the
Memorandum of his Legal Counsel which recommended the continued prosecution
of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order in a
Resolution dated September 17, 1999. On even date, petitioners filed a Motion for
Suspension of Proceedings and/or Postponement with the Sandiganbayan.The Court
of Appeals promulgated a Resolution which states: "Per the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Teresita G. Fabian vs. Aniano A. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742,
September 16, 1998, the jurisdiction of this Court extends only to decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The cases involved in the instant
petition are criminal cases. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED
DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction."
Issue/s: (1) WoN the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the petition. NO.
In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited
the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate court correctly ruled that its
jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears
stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as
unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only
whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review,
such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present
petition should have been filed with this Court.
It follows that the instant petition was filed late. A petition for certiorari should be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution
sought to be assailed. The present petition was filed with this Court only on
November 24, 1999 which is more than sixty (60) days from the time petitioners
were notified of the adverse resolutions issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman. The erroneous filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals did not
toll the running of the period.
DOCTRINE: Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
009 ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES v. NLRC (DONES)
September 16, 1998 | Regalado, J. | Rule 43 Not Proper Mechanism to Appeal NLRC
Decision
PETITIONER: St. Martin Funeral Homes
RESPONDENTS: National Labor Relations Commission, and Bienvenido
Aricayos
SUMMARY: St. Martin Funeral Homes was owned by Amelita Malabad
(Amelita). Amelita’s mother managed the funeral parlor. Subsequently, Aricayos
was granted financial assistance by Amelita’s mother and, as a sign of appreciation,
Aricayos helped Amelita’s mother in managing the funeral parlor without
compensation and without any written employment contract. When Amelita’s
mother died, Ameita took over, and discovered that St. Martin had arrearages in the
payment of BIR taxes and other fees owing to the government even though the
records of St. Martin reflected that these had been paid. As a result, Amelita
removed Aricayos from the management of St. Martin. Aricayos then accused St.
martin of illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Based on the position papers of
the parties, the Labor Arbiter then decided in favor of Amelita, holding that it did
not have jurisdiction over the case, since the existence of the employer-employee
relationship was disputed. On appeal, the NLRC annulled the LA’s Decision, and
remanded the case to determine the factual issue of the existence of employer-
employe relationship. Amelita then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
The issues is whether or not a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
is the proper appellate remedy for the decisions of the NLRC.
The Court eventually held in the negative. The legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 was and still is the proper vehicle
for judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC.
The Supreme Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto
could have been a lapse because appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The
important distinction between them is that the special civil action of certiorari is
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;
whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congres.
The case was ultimately remanded to the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that
while it did not wish to intrude into the congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, it further observed that there is a growing number of labor cases
being elevated to the Supreme Court which, not being a trier of facts, has at times
been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or
ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for
that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that
there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a
major aspect of the constitutional protection to labor.

All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from
the NLRC to the Supreme Court were thus interpreted to mean and refer to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should then
be initially filed in the Court of Appeals, following the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts.

DOCTRINE: To appeal an NLRC Decision, file a Rule 65 special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. There is no direct recourse to the Supreme
Court from the NLRC. Neither is Rule 43 (review of decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies) the proper appeal mechanism for the decisions of the NLRC.

010 FABIAN v. DESIERTO (IVY)

September 16, 1998 | Regalado, J. | Rule 43

PETITIONER: Teresita G. Fabian

RESPONDENTS: Hon. Aniano A. Desierto

SUMMARY: Fabian was the major stock holder and president of of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) who participated in the
bidding for government construction project including those under the First Metro
Manila Engineering District (FMED). Agustin had an affair with Fabian that
resulted in the former awarding public works contracts to the latter. Due to some
unpleasant incidents between the two, Fabian tried breaking up with Agustin but
the latter refused and even employed acts of harassment, intimidation, and threats.
Thus Fabian filed an administrative case wherein the Ombudsman ruled in favor of
Fabian resulting to the dismissal of Agustin. A motion for reconsideration was
filed; however, Desierto inhibited himself because the new counsel of the former
was his former classmate and close associate. The case was transferred to Deputy
Ombudsman Guerrero who set aside Desierto’s order and exonerated Agustin from
the case.
Fabian, then, appealed with the argument anchored in Sec 27 of RA 6770 which
states that: “In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.”
Issue: W/N Rule 45 petition is proper.
Held: NO
This Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number
of cases and instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be
resolved by the appellate court.  Also, the very provision cited by petitioner
specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be
exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts
composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial
bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature intends that the decisions or
resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in
the law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special
statutory court. No such provision on appellate procedure is required for the
regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they are what are referred to
and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appeal
by Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:
Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A person desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth.
This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made
mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating
and providing for appeals from certain administrative or quasi-judicial agencies,
whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law.
That intended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not
fully subserved by recourse to the former Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was
no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts
enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders
of  quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals
on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43
which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of
appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to
"ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which
is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if
hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact
that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service
Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission,
unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily created body.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43.
011 TIROL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (LAGUILLES)
November 4, 1999 | Pardo, J. | Rule 43
PETITIONER: Heirs of Jose Esplana
RESPONDENTS: CA and Heirs of Pedro De Lima
SUMMARY: Based on a complaint filed by members of two groups, the
Federated PTA Organization and the Teachers and Employees Union, the COA
conducted a general audit of the transactions of the Lalawigan National High
School. COA reported that the acquisition of some equipment was made
through a negotiated contract and not by public bidding in violation of COA
Circular 85-55A, resulting in overpricing. COA recommended to the Deputy
Ombudsman the filing of criminal and administrative charges against the
responsible personnel. After preliminary investigation, they found that there was
probable cause for the indictment of petitioner Tirol, the Regional Director of
DECS. The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an information for
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. Upon Tirol’s motion for permission to
travel abroad on official business, the Sandiganbayan conditionally arraigned
him without prejudice to the filing of an MR with the Ombudsman. Tirol
pleaded not guilty.
TIMELINE:
January 2 – Tirol filed a motion for leave to seek
reconsideration/reinvestigation.
May 22 – Denial of Tirol’s motion
July 17 – Tirol filed with the SC a petition for review for the alleged grave
abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman in concluding that he was liable for
overpricing.
August 24 – Arraignment
September 2 – Tirol filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to reset trial
pending resolution of the petition for review on certiorari filed with the SC.
September 4 – Sandiganbayan denied the motion to reset trial.
September 22 – Reduced the ruling in writing by an order nunc pro tunc;
ordered pretrial as scheduled; ruled that appeal by certiorari to the SC under Sec
27 of the Ombudsman Act refers only to admin cases decided by the
Ombudsman, not judicial cases filed with the court.
September 14 – Tirol moved for MR
October 13 – MR denied.
Issue: WoN the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
his motion to defer/suspend trial pending the disposition of the earlier petition
for review with the SC.
The Court ruled in the negative. Although Sec 27 of RA 6770 provides that
orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in admin cases are
appealable to the SC via Rule 45, in Fabian vs. Desierto, the Court declared that
Section 27 is unconstitutional because it expanded the SC’s jurisdiction, without
its advice and consent, which is contrary to the constitution. Hence, all appeals
from decisions of the Ombudsman in admin disciplinary cases may be taken to
the CA under Rule 43. Although the law is silent on remedy of an aggrieved
party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause for indictment in criminal
or non-admin cases, the Court cannot supply such deficiency if none has been
provided in the law. However, the aggrieved party is not without recourse since
where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the aggrieved may file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

It should also be stressed that there is pending before the SC a petition for
review under Rule 45 questioning the finding of probable cause by the
Ombudsman. What is at issue in this petition for certiorari is the propriety of the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion to suspend trial pending resolution of the
certiorari case. The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to suspend trial in the criminal case. As a rule, criminal
prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.
While there are exceptions to this (case did not mention the exceptions), this
case does not fall within the exceptions to warrant restraining the criminal
prosecution.

DOCTRINE: All appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative

disciplinary cases may be taken to the CA via Rule 43, and not under the
Ombudsman Act.

012 ELMA vs. JACOBI (LAGUILLES)

June 27, 2012 | Brion J.| Rule 43

PETITIONER: PCGG Chairman Magdangal Elma Issue: WoN certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the DOJ’s
determination of probable cause 
RESPONDENTS: Reiner Jacobi, Usec. Gutierrez

The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. Respondents claim that a petition
SUMMARY: This case involves several letters showing that the PCGG and
for review under Rule 43 is the proper remedy to question the assailed DOJ
Jacobi entered into agreements wherein PCGG would give Jacobi incentive for
resolution. This is incorrect. By weighing the evidence submitted by the parties
efforts in recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. A few years later,
in a preliminary investigation and by making an independent assessment
new PCGG Chairman De Guzman sent Jacobi a confirmation letter for the fee
thereof, an investigating prosecutor is, to that extent, performing functions
he is to receive for recovery of the Swiss account. Respondents (Jacobi et al)
of a quasi-judicial nature in the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
filed with the Sandiganbayan a verified Petition for Mandamus, Prohibition, and
However, since he does not make a determination of the rights of any party
Certiorari (with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
in the proceeding, or pronounce the respondent’s guilt or innocence (thus
Injunction).against the PCGG for allegedly hiring Swiss lawyers preventing the
limiting his action to the determination of probable cause to file an
enforcement of claims against the Marcoses. Another case was filed before the
information in court) ,an investigating prosecutors function still lacks the
Ombudsman against PCGG for allegedly violation RA 3019. Attached to the
element of adjudication essential to an appeal under Rule 43.
complaint before the Ombudsman was a letter implicating Jacobi, claiming that
he participated in the making of such letter. Later on, this letter was withdrawn.
PCGG now claims that the letter is falsified because records do not show that
they existed. Chairman Elma filed before the DOJ a criminal complaint against There is also a compelling reason to conclude that the DOJ’s exclusion
respondents. No summons were issued to respondents. Eventually, the DOJ from the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 is deliberate.
found no probable cause on the complaint and the case was dismissed.  This is in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the
President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. Being thus under
the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, is subject to the
review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the DOJ should
Now, petitioners claim that Usec. Gutierrez gravely abused her discretion when
be to the President, instead of the CA. Rule 43 includes the Office of the
she sustained the impropriety of Jacobi’s simultaneous resort to two different
President, thereby accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of
remedies filing a petition for review and a motion for reconsideration through
department heads must first be taken to and resolved by that office before
two different counsels and filing a second MR of an adverse resolution through
any appellate recourse may be resorted to.
another counsel. 
However, Memorandum Circular No. 57 of the Office of the President bars
an appeal from the decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
Respondents, on the other hand, question the propriety of the petitioner’s resolt on preliminary investigations except for those involving offenses punishable
to a certiorari petition instead of a petition for review under Rule 43. They posit by reclusion perpetua to death. Therefore, a party aggrieved by the DOJ’s
that even assuming the remedy of certiorari is proper, the petition is insufficient resolution, cannot appeal to the Office of the President and is left without
in form and substance due to the petitioner’s failure to implead the DOJ in the any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
petition and failure to observe the hierarchy of courts.  Thus, only certiorari petition is left for one’s remedial avenue. However,
petitioner must allege and show that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting or denying the petition for review.

Unlike a Rule 45 petition, one filed under Rule 65 requires the petitioner to
implead as public respondent the official or agency whose exercise of a judicial
or quasi-judicial function is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Contrary to the respondent’s contention, the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioners with the Court impleaded Usec. Gutierrez, who, as then Justice
Undersecretary, issued the assailed resolutions. While the DOJ did not formally
enter its appearance in this case, the records show that the Court issued
resolutions addressed to the DOJ as a party, to submit the appropriate
responsive pleadings. As an extraordinary remedy, Rule 65 does not require that
summons be issued to the respondent; the service upon him of an order to file its
Comment or Memorandum is sufficient.  

Moreover, the ruling on Jacobi’s second MR and on Atty. Reyes’ first MR

cannot be appreciated as grave abuse of discretion. While it seemingly violated
established rules of procedure, it provided ample justification for it – the
avoidance of possibility of two conflicting rulings on two motions treating of
the same inseparable subject matter.

DOCTRINE: The DOJ is excluded in the enumerated list of quasi-judicial

agencies under Rule 43 because such is under the control of the President. Since
Rule 43 is not available, Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the orders of the
DOJ, provided grave abuse of discretion can be proved by the petitioner.
 013 CARPIO v. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (PLEYTO)

August 8, 2002 | Panganiban, J. | Applicability of Rule 43

PETITIONER: Armando C. Carpio

RESPONDENTS: Sulu Resources Development Corporation

SUMMARY: Sulu Resources filed a a petition for a Mines Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Carpio filed an
opposition/adverse claim alleging that his landholdings in Cupang and Antipolo
will be covered by Sulu’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right to explore and
extract the quarry resources on his properties. The Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines
and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a decision upholding the
opposition. This was reversed on appeal. The Mines Adjudiction Board (MAB)
dismissed Carpio’s adverse claim/opposition against Sulu Resources, ruling that
there was no overlap between their claims. Carpio moved for reconsideration but it
was denied. When the matter was elevated to the CA, said court held that it did not
have jurisdiction to review the MAB Decision since the adjudication of conflicting
mining claims is completely administrative in nature based on Section 79 of
Chapter XIII of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Under this law, the findings of
fact by the MAB as well as its decision or order shall be final and executory. Thus,
MAB’s finding was binding and conclusive. Moreover, it claimed that a petition for
review is improper because Carpio’s challenge is purely factual. The issue in this
case is W/N the CA’s refusal to take jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 43
was justified (W/N appeals should go directly to the SC or CA first.)
No. SC found the petition meritorious. Under Rule 43, appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are required to be brough to the CA on a
verified petition for review. The introductory words “among these agencies are” in
Rule 43 indicate that the enumeration therein is not exclusive or conclusive and
acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not
expressly listed, should be deemed included therein. MAB falls under the definition
of a quasi-judicial agency; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial
bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Moreover, the CA has more elbow room to
resolve factual controversies which are usually involved in administrative actions.
This is because unlike the Supreme Court, the CA is mandated to rule on questions
of fact.
This onward: ako na nag-add. Di kasama sa De Leon haha
This case was compared to the case of Pearson:
In Pearson, it was held that the adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely administrative in
nature. SC held that the reliance of Sulu on Person is misplaced. The claimant therein sued in the CFI to
prevent the exewcution of a decision rendered by the panel of investigations of the Bureau of Mines and
the Office of the President. The mining companies then went to the IAC via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. The claimants averred that the appellate court had no jurisdiction. In the case at bar,
Carpio went to the CA through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 43 seeking a reversal of
the MAB Decision. Thus, the reason for and the mode of appeal are different. (sa Pearson, ang
cinocontest yung power ng CFI to take cognizance of the case. It wasn’t the MAB Decision itself).
Also, the case of Fabian v. Desierto struck down Section 27 of the Mining Act, which was similarly
worded to Section 79, for being unconstitutional. It broadened the jurisdiction of the SC without the
SC’s consent.
SUMMARY:
1. Section 79 broadened the SC’s power without its consent. So, unconstitutional.
2. When the SC, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the CA pending cases
involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decision, such only relates to procedure. Hence,
it does not impare the substantive and vested right of the parties to appeal.
3. The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies.
4. Under BP 129, as amended, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-
judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more
elbow room to resolve them.
5. Judicial policy of observing hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administrative
agencies to the SC will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from
the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances call for
such.
DOCTRINE: The introductory words “among these agencies are” in Rule 43
indicate that the enumeration therein is not exclusive or conclusive and
acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not
expressly listed, should be deemed included therein. Decisions and final orders of
the MAB are appealable to the CA under Rule 43. Quasi-judicial agency or body
has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.
 authority, ignorance of the provisions of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools and incompetence before the CHED. CHED found Mercado guilty of
discourtesy in the course of official duties. Mercado filed an MR attaching a
Resolution issued and signed by former CHED Chairman Alcala (falsified) which
was denied. Mercado appealed CHED Resolution to the CSC. CSC denied Mercado’s
appeal but reversed itself after Mercado’s MR. CHED filed a Manifestation with
Motion for Clarification asking, whether the CSC Resolution was final and executory
and whether the CHED could still file a MR in view of the one MR rule in CSC
proceedings. Pending resolution of its Manifestation with Motion for Clarification,
CHED filed with the CA a motion for additional time within which to file a petition
for review of the CSC Resolution and within the time granted, CHED filed a petition
for review, assailing the CSC Resolution which the CA dismissed on the ground of
prematurity. WON the action was premature – NO. A Motion for Clarificatory
Judgment not being in the character of a MR does not toll the reglementary period for
filing a petition for review with the CA. WON filing an MR is a condition precedent
to the filing of a petition for review – NO.

DOCTRINE: R43, Sec. 4, governing appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to CA,

states that, “the appeal shall be taken within 15d from notice of the award, judgment,
final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial
or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or
agency a quo.” The use of the disjunctive preposition “or” in the rule suggests that a
petitioner has the option to file the petition for review after notice of the assailed
judgment or resolution directly, without need of a prior MR, or after the denial of a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, provided such motion is duly filed in
accordance with the rule of procedure of the court or agency below.

014 CHED v. Mercado (EMAR)

March 10, 2006| Garcia, J. | R43 - Appeal from QJA to CA

PETITIONER: CHED

RESPONDENT: Rosa F. Mercado

SUMMARY: Dimayuga accused Mercado of arrogance, abuse of power and


015 SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v. CA (STA. MARIA)
September 27, 2004 | David, JR., C.J. | Rule 43 – doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
PETITIONER: Social Security Commission and Social Security System
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Jose Rago
SUMMARY: Rago worked as an electrician for. While working on the ceiling
of a building, he stepped on a weak ceiling joist so he crashed into the corridor
twelve feet below. The x-rays taken that day revealed there were fractions and
some bone destruction.
Timeline:
1. Rago filed several claims with the SSS first for permanent partial disability,
then Employee’s Compensation (EC) sickness benefit, also for EC disability
and partial disability. These were all approved.
2. Later on, Rago filed several requests for the adjustment of his partial disability
to total disability. This time, his requests were denied. The denial was based on
the medical findings of the Cebu City office that he was not totally prevented
from engaging in any gainful occupation.
3. Rago filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition for total
permanent disability benefits
4. The SSC denied Rago’s petition for lack of merit.
5. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Rago appealed to the CA by filing
a petition for review and reiterating his claim for permanent disability benefits
6. Court of Appeals reversed the SSC’s resolution. Granted permanent total
disability.
7. SSS seasonably filed a MR on the ground that the CA should have considered
an order issued by the SSC which affirmed, but clarified, its Resolution under
appeal.
8. The CA denied the MR.
In this petition, the SSS and the SSC pray to set aside the CA decision. One of
their contentions is that CA erred in disregarding the established jurisprudence
that the filing of a MR is a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for review to
enable the tribunal, board or office concerned to pass upon and correct its
mistakes without the intervention of the higher court. Failure to do so is a fatal
procedural defect.
The issue is WON in this case the filing of the MR is a prerequisite to the filing
of a petition for review? – No. This is because in the case at bar, there exists an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which is
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable.
The SC ruled that under the SSC rules Rago had the option of filing a motion
for reconsideration which he may or may not exercise. The SC additionally
construed this together with the requirements of appeals. While Rago certainly
had the option to file a MR before the SSC, it was nevertheless mandatory that
he do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of judicial remedies. The policy of
judicial bodies to give quasi-judicial agencies, an opportunity to correct its
mistakes by way of motions for reconsideration or other statutory remedies
before accepting appeals therefrom finds extensive doctrinal support in the well-
entrenched principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The reason for
the principle rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given
the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given
matter and decide it properly. The principle insures orderly procedure and
withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been
allowed to duly run its course. This is but practical since availing of
administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies.
HOWEVER, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may be
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is
estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the
latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule
does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no
administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified
political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non- exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot. For Rago, his case falls within
some of these exceptions.
It is true that Rago disregarded procedural and curative rules in taking
immediate recourse to the appellate court. Nevertheless, to require Rago to
comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies at this stage
of the proceedings would be
unreasonable, unjust and inequitable. It would
prolong needlessly and uselessly the resolution of his claim. SSS and SSC have
consistently shown their stand to deny Rago’s request to convert his permanent
partial disability to permanent total disability. To give the SSC another chance
to rectify its error would inevitably result in the same inflexible stance in
defense of its error. We say another chance because we can consider the SSC’s
clarificatory order as in the nature of a judgment on Rago’s MR as if he had
filed one. The SC ruled that Rago is entitled to the conversion of his permanent
partial disability to permanent total disability.
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
ironclad rule. (please see enumeration above)
016 BAGUNU v. AGGABAO (Callueng)
August 15, 2011 | Brion, J. | Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
PETITIONER: Rosita Bagunu
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Francisco Aggabao & Rosenda Acerit
SUMMARY: The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses
Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioner’s free
patent application over a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto.
Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office).
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first
sale) to Felicisimo Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject
land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag. Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over
the subject land with the Bureau of Lands. Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third
sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant.
The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot
subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application. The respondents filed a
protest against the petitioners free patent application. The respondents asserted
ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale
executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The Office of the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and
formal investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner
actually occupies and cultivates the area in dispute including the area purchased by
[the respondents]. The DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully
included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot belongs to the
respondents. The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional
Office denied the motion.  On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the
DENR Regional Office. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a
technical determination by the appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact
of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to
great respect, if not finality. In the meantime, Atty. Binag filed a complaint for
reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against Bautista and
the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the
pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance
its resolution on the motion to dismiss. 'After the CA affirmed the DENR
Secretary’s favorable resolution on the respondent’s protest, the respondents asked
the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys
ruling.
Issue/s: (1) WoN the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretarys jurisdiction to
resolve the parties conflicting claims of ownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding
that the same issue is pending with the RTC. NO.
Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45 
The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are
generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots
258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The determination of the identity of these lots
involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the
parties respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are
instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues
under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within
the recognized exceptions. On top of this legal reality, the findings and decision of
the Director of Lands on questions of fact, when approved by the DENR Secretary,
are generally conclusive on the courts, and even on this Court, when these factual
findings are affirmed by the appellate court. 
 
The determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive
jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and
dispose of public land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory
actions instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions
and occupations), the respondent’s complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise
the issue of possession whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised the issue of
ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for
declaration of ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its
ruling on the respondents reivindicatory action pending final determination by the
DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondent’s entitlement to a
free patent, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 
DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from
determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact

As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by
the respondents against the petitioner’s free patent application. In resolving this
protest, the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue
of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land
requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative
agency with direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the
public domain. The DENR, on the other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise determine the applicant’s
entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional Office
still has to determine the respondent’s entitlement to the issuance of a free patent in
their favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own
application.) Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival
claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts have no jurisdiction to
intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR Secretary and the
Director of Lands, unless grave abuse of discretion exists.

The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public
lands

  
 January 21, 2010 | Brion, J. | Rule 43; Statement of Facts in Petition

PETITIONER: Sps. Heber & Charlita Edillo

RESPONDENTS: Sps. Norberto & Desideria Dulpina

SUMMARY: Spouses Dulpina filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against

Spouses Edillo in the MCTC. The MCTC dismisse this complaint. Dulpinas then
filed an MR, which the MCTC denied. Dulpinas then filed a Notice of Appeal
which the MCTC granted. On appeal to the RTC, the RTC set aside the MCTC
judgmentand ordered Edillos to vacate the property and to restore possession to
Dulpinas. With their MR being denied, Edillos apealed to the CA through a Petition
for Review under Rule 42. The CA then dismissed the Petition on the ground that it
does not contain a statement of the factual background of the case. Edillos then
moved to reconsider the dismissal, to amend the petition, and to admit their
Amended Petition, which the CA denied on the ground that the amended petition
did not correct the infirmity of the original petition.Hence, this Rule 45 petition for
Review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Edillos argue that the CA’s outright dismissal of the petition was unwarranted since
the Ptition for Review and the Amended Petition sufficiently recited the factual
background of the case. Edillos add that the annexes to the original and amended
petitions, consisting of the Complaint, the Answer, the other pleadings, and the
MCTC and RTC Decisions, also contain the factual background.

The issue is whether or not the CA properly dismissed the Ptition for Review on the
ground that it does not containa separate “Statement of Facts” section.

The Court held in the negative. While the general rule is that the party who seeks to
appealmust comply with the requirements of the law and rules and that failure to
comply leads to the dismissal of the petition and the loss oof the right to appeal, the
Court recognizes that the right to appeal is an essential part of the system of judicial
process, and courts should proceedwith caution in order not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal. Courts are granted – in the exercise of their discretion along the
lines laid down in jurisprudence – the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rule. This prerogative to relax, however, is only done after a prima facie
finding of merit, that the appeal is meritorious in its face.
017 SPOUSES EDILLO v. SPOUSES DULPINA (DONES)
Here, there is jurisprudence to support the relaxed application of the rules, that
while the petition does not contain a separation section on statement of facts, if the
facts are integrated in the petition then this is substantial compliance. The Court’s
examination yielded the conclusion that the case is at least prima facie meritorious,
that merit would remain unventiated unless the Court relaxes the application of the
technical requirement. The issue invovlved in the case is whether the RTC has
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a final and executory MCTC decision, with
the Edillos arguing that the filing of the MR of the Dulpinas did not stop the
running of the reglementary period to appeal because MR is a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Summary Procedure which govern MCTC proceedings.

[Not so relevant] the Court held that the filing of the MR did not operate to toll the
reglementary period to appeal the MCTC decision ince such MR is proscribed by
the Rules on Summary rocedure. The MCTC Decision, then, became final,
executory, and immutable.

DOCTRINE: Statement of facts in the petition need not be contained in a specific

section entitled “Statement of Facts” so long as the facts are within the four corners
of the petition. This is substantial compliance and is not reason enough to dismiss
the petition outright.

018 COCA COLA BOTTLERS vs. CABALO (LAGUILLES)
January 30, 2006 | Chico-Nazario, J.| Rule 43
PETITIONER: Coca Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., Natale J. Dicosmo, Steve
Heath, Mary Chua, Alberto Fajardo, Jess Bangsil, Lito Garcia, Noel Roxas,
Chito Enriquez, Frederick Kerulf, Armando Canlas, Danilo Dauz
RESPONDENTS: Rodolfo Cabalo, Juanito Gerona, Luis Gerona, Luis De
Ocampo, Mario Nilo Mecua
SUMMARY:
This is a petition for review on certiotari. The controversy is about an illegal
dismissal case filed by the respondents against the petitioners. Complainants
claim that they have been employed by Coca Cola for 10-13 years as route
helpers, cargadors, pahinantes, driver, etc. Coca Cola maintains that being one
of the largest soft drink manufacturer in the country, it employs a big workforce
all over the country and that due to fluctuating variable conditions in the market
like volume of work and unexpected shortages in manpower, it is at times
constrained to augment its workforce to cope with operational needs. Because
of this, Coca Cola engages the services of workers on a temporary basis (5
months), apart from its regular workers. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of
Coca Cola for lack of evidence as to the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. On appeal to the NLRC, the latter remanded the case back to the
Labor Arbiter. Coca Cola then sought relief to the CA via petition for certiorari,
but the same was dismissed on the ground that Coca Cola failed to comply with
Sec. 11 Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to attach
certified true copy of the assailed NLRC decision, as required under Sec. 1,
Rule 65.
The issue is WoN:
1. The CA erred in dismissing the petition, notwithstanding the fact that
the NLRC only gave them Xerox copies and the CA only gave them
the same.
- The Court held that yes, the CA erred in this regard. A perusal of the
attached NLRC decision easily discloses that it is not a mere
photocopy, but is in fact, a certified photocopy of the decision. The CA
in this matter, however, zeroed in on the copy of the NLRC Resolution
denying Coca Cola’s MR, which is not a certified true copy.
The Court also discussed the fact that the petition filed before the CA did not
contain an explanation as to why service upon the OSG and Atty. Alam
(counsel for the employees) was not made personally, albeit an affidavit of
service by registered mail was attached to it. However, the Court finds that the
CA did not err in dismissing the petition for failure to observe the requirement
of a written explanation why service was not made personally to the OSG and to
Atty. Alam. It cannot be said that serving the petition on the OSG and Atty.
Alam through personal service was not practical under the circumstances. The
office of Coca Cola’s counsel is in Pasig, while the OSG is in Makati, and that
of Atty. Alam is in QC. Coca Cola’s claim of inadvertence as their reason for
their failure to provide a written explanation why service of their petition was
not made personally cannot justify its omission. It does not constitute excusable
negligence especially since said rule had already been in effect for 3 years
before they filed their petition before the CA. Therefore, the petition is
DENIED.
DOCTRINE: Any petition filed under Rule 65 should be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof (But the
case itself did not say whether petitioners in this case appealed via which rule. It
just said that they filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA. No
mention of Rule 43 either).

019 B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. v. ALZUL (IVY)

June 8, 2007 | Velasco, Jr., J. | Rule 43

PETITIONER: B.E. San Diego, Inc.

RESPONDENTS: Rosario T. Alzul

SUMMARY: [Respondent] Alzul purchased through installment from [petitioner]

B.E. San Diego, Inc. four (4) subdivision lots. Alzul took immediate possession of
the subject property, setting up a perimeter fence and constructing a house thereon.
Alzul assigned to a certain Wilson P. Yu her rights under the Contract to Sell. Later
on, the Contract to Sell in Alzul’s name was cancelled, and San Diego issued a new
one in favor of Yu. Alzul informed San Diego about Yu’s failure and refusal to pay
the amounts due under the conditional deed. She also manifested that she would be
the one to pay the installments due to respondent on account of Yu’s default. Alzul
commenced an action for rescission of the conditional deed of assignment against
Yu before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City and caused the annotation of
notices of lis pendens on the titles covering the subject lots. The trial court ruled in
Alzul’s favor in the rescission case. The decision was even affirmed by this
[appellate] Court. Yu brought his cause before the Supreme Court in a Petition for
Review, but this was likewise denied.
San Diego notified Alzul that the Contract to Sell was declared rescinded and
cancelled. Thereafter, the subject lots were sold to spouses Carlos and Sandra
Ventura who were allegedly surprised to find the annotation of lis pendens in their
owner’s duplicate title. The Ventura spouses filed an action for Quieting of Title
with Prayer for Cancellation of Annotation and Damages before the RTC of
Malabon. The trial court ruled in favor of the Ventura spouses. On appeal before
this appellate Court, however, the decision was reversed. An appeal was filed
before the SC which affirmed the decision of the appellate Court. Alzur tried to
serve payment upon San Diego, however, San Diego allegedly refused to accept
payment.
Alzul decided to file an action for consignation and specific performance against
San Diego before the HLURB, which was dismissed. Alzul thereafter filed a
Petition ffor Review before the HLURB’s First Division, which was again
dismissed for lack of merit. MR, denied. Alzul filed an appeal to the Office of the
President, dismissed for having been filed out of time. MR, and was given due
course; it affirmed the denial of the HLURB. Alzul now brought before the CA a
petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the OP in dismissing
her appeal. CA reversed.
On the procedural issue, petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. assails the sufficiency of
respondent Alzul’s CA petition as the latter, in violation of the rules, allegedly
lacked the essential and relevant pleadings filed with the HLURB and the OP.
Issue: W/N the petition is sufficient.
Section 6 of Rule 43, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides:
SEC. 6. Contents of the petition. — The petition for review shall x x x (c) be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; x x x
The above proviso explicitly requires the following to be appended to a petition: 1)
clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment,
final order, or resolution appealed from; 2) certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to in the petition; and 3) other supporting papers.
Obviously, the main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review
and evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the CA all the orders,
resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence
that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying
on the case records of the lower court. The rule is the reviewing court can
determine the merits of the petition solely on the basis of the submissions by the
parties without the use of the records of the court a quo. It is a fact that it takes
several months before the records are elevated to the higher court, thus the resulting
delay in the review of the petition. The attachment of all essential and necessary
papers and documents is mandatory; otherwise, the petition can be rejected outright
under Sec. 7 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Effect of failure to comply with requirements. — The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees,
the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
To prevent premature dismissals, the requirements under Sec. 6 on the contents of
the petition have to be elucidated.
First, there can be no question that only the award, judgment, or final order or
resolution issued by the lower court or agency and appealed from has to be certified
as true.
The second set of attachments refers to the "certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein."
Material is defined as "important; more or less necessary; having influence or
effect; going to the merits; having to do with matter, as distinguished from
form." Thus, material portions of the records are those parts of the records that are
relevant and directly bear on the issues and arguments raised and discussed in the
petition. They may include any of the pleadings that are subject of any issue,
documentary evidence, transcripts of testimonial evidence, and parts of the records
pertinent and relevant to the grounds supporting the petition. The attachment of the
material portions is subject to the qualification that these are referred to or cited in
the petition. Thus, only the material parts specified in the petition have to be
appended and that would be sufficient compliance with the rule as to form.
It would be prudent however for the petitioner to attach all parts of the records
which are relevant, necessary, or important in whatever way to be able to reach the
resolution of the issues of the petition. The availability of such documents to the
ponente and members of a Division can easily provide the substance and support to
the merits of the grounds put forward by the petitioner. Moreover, the processing
time for the review and resolution of the petition is greatly abbreviated, thereby
obviating intolerable delays.
Lastly, it has to be explained whether the material portions of the records have to be
certified as true by the clerk of court or his/her duly authorized representative as
provided in Sec. 6 of Rule 43. If strictly required, the rule to require attachment of
certified true copies of the material portions will surely make the preparation of the
petition more tedious, cumbersome, and expensive. It should therefore be construed
that merely clear and legible copies of the material portions will suffice. The rules
on the different modes of appeal from the lower courts or quasi-judicial agencies to
the CA reveal that it is only Rule 43 that specifically states that the material
portions to be appended to the petition should be certified true copies. Rule 41 of
course does not require attachment of the pertinent records since the entire records
are elevated to the CA. Rule 42 on petition for review from the trial court in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction to the CA speaks of plain copies of the material portions of
the record as would support the allegations of the petition. Even Rule 45 on appeal
by certiorari from the CA to this Court simply speaks of material portions of the
records without indicating that these should be certified true copies. Rule 46 on
original cases to this Court only requires plain copies of the material portions of the
records. Finally, Rule 65 on special civil actions requires only copies of relevant
and pertinent pleadings and documents.
From the foregoing premises, the inescapable conclusion is that only plain and
clear copies of the material portions of the records are required under Sec. 3 of
Rule 43. This finding is buttressed by our ruling in Cadayona v. CA, where it was
held that only judgments or final orders of the lower courts are needed to be
certified true copies or duplicate originals. There is no plausible reason why a
different treatment or stricter requirement should be applied to petitions under Rule
43.
The last requirement is the attachment of "other supporting papers." Again, it is
only in Rule 43 that we encounter the requirement of annexing "supporting papers"
to the petition. This can be interpreted to mean other documents, pictures, and
pieces of evidence not forming parts of the records of the lower court or agency that
can bolster and shore up the petition. While not so specified in Sec. 3 of Rule 43, it
is inarguable that said papers must also be relevant and material to the petition;
otherwise, the attachments would be mere surplusages and devoid of use and value.
Sec. 7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of the petition if it is not
accompanied by the required documents but simply gives the discretion to the
CA to determine whether such breach constitutes a "sufficient ground" for
dismissal.
In addition, it was noted in Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz that the CA Revised Internal
Rules provide certain flexibility in the submission of additional documents:
When a petition does not have the complete annexes or the required number of
copies, the Chief of the Judicial Records Division shall require the petitioner to
complete the annexes or file the necessary number of copies of the petition before
docketing the case. Pleadings improperly filed in court shall be returned to the
sender by the Chief of the Judicial Records Division.
In Rosa Yap Paras, et al. v. Judge Ismael O. Baldado, et al., the Court preferred the
determination of cases on the merits over technicality or procedural imperfections
so that the ends of justice would be served better, thus:
At the same time, the Rules of Court encourage a reading of the procedural
requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice. Thus:
Section 6. Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
As expressed in Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, "(w)hat should guide judicial action
is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor
or property on technicalities. x x x (T)he rules of procedure should be viewed as

mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed."
020 MANIEBO v. CA (PLEYTO)
August 10, 2010 | Bersamin, J. | Appeals from Quasi-judicial agencies to CA
PETITIONER: Justina Maniebo
RESPONDENTS: CA and the CSC
SUMMARY: The Mayor of the Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro
issued a promotional permanent appointment to the petitioner as Cashier III in the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer because she appeared to possess the
qualifications for the position, including the Career Service (Professional)
Eligibility appearing in her Personal Data Sheet shower her to have passed with a
rating of 74.01%. When it was verified against the Masterlist of Eligibles, however,
it was discovered that she actually failed for obtaining only a rating of only 60%.
CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) No. IV found her guilty on Dec. 16, 1999. On Feb.
4, 2000, Maniebo appealed to the CSC, which affirmed the earlier decision. MR
was also denied. She then filed a petition for review before the CA and attached
therewith were: (1) a certified true copy of CSC Resolution dated Aug. 5, 2002
denying the MR, (2) original copy of the notice of appeal dated Aug. 23, 2002
filed in the CSC, (3) Photocopy of the petitioner’s appeal dated Jan. 31, 2000 to
the CSC, and (4) petitioner’s affidavit of merit dated Aug. 2002. CA dismissed
the petition due to the failure to accompany it with the requisite certified true copies
of the material portions of the record. Maniebo filed an MR, in which her counsel
even undertook to submit the required certified copies of the material portions
within ten days from Oct. 23. She explained in her motion that her counsel had
failed to submit the required certified copies, due to her failure to turn over said
copies to her counsel because of the distance between her home in Puerto Galera
and the office of her counsel in Fairview, QC. CA denied the MR. Petitioner filed
another MR signed by another lawyer allegedly collaborating as counsel to her
original lawyer (so second MR, prohibited under Rule 52, Section 2 of the ROC).
The issue in this case is W/N the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the
petition for review for failure to attach certified coy of the annexes when the rules
and jurisprudence do not require that all annexes attached to the petition should be
certified. SC ruled against Maniebo. Maniebo argued that her submission before the
CA constituted substantial compliance. 2 But SC held that CA did not commit any
reversible error. Section 6, Rule 43 of the ROC expressly lists down the pleadings
and other matters that a petition for review should contain.3 The rule clearly requires
2
The petitioner argues that her submission of a certified true copy of CSC Resolution 02-1028 in her
petition before the CA constituted a substantial compliance with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
She averred that rules of procedure should be liberally construed to afford litigants the opportunity to
prove their claims and prevent a denial of justice due to legal technicalities; that she had already lost her
job due to the immediate execution of the decision pending appeal, that to require her to secure certified
true copies of all the annexes to the petition would be too burdensome for her and would contravene the
constitutionally guaranteed free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance; and that it was already settled that under Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, only the
copies of the assailed judgments or final orders of the lower courts needed to be certified.[20] She insisted
that the dismissal of her appeal due to technicalities would constitute a deprivation of property without due
process of law because what was at stake herein was her right to employment.
3
Section 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to
the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a
concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the
record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific
material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. (2a)
the petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a contented herself with just repeating the grounds used in her first MR. Lastly, the
certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, transmittal of the records was not mandatory but only discretionary upon the CA as
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to provided by Sec. 11, Rule 43.5 There are way too many disregarded rules to merit
therein and other supporting papers. The requirement is intended to immediately any tolerance.
enable the CA to determine whether to give due course to the appeal or not by
having all the material necessary to make such determination before it. This is
because an appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA
DOCTRINE: The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied
may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted
by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award,
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to
judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true
require consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent to file a comment
copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other
on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from notice. Her petition
supporting papers. Also, an appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal,
was not entitled to a liberal construction because it was not even substantial
which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit,
compliant. With respect to the other supporting documents of the petition as set
or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too
forth in Section 6, Rule 43, their legible copies should have been attached to the
unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process by requiring the respondent
petition or to the MR filed against the resolution dismissing the petition. However,
to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within 10 days from
she did not even substantially comply with the requirement. Making her non-
notice. And second MR is not allowed.
compliance worse was her reneging on her own express undertaking to the CA to
submit the omitted documents within the 10-day period she had prayed for in her
first MR by not furnishing the required supporting documents, or even the plain
legible copies thereof from the time she filed her MR on October 23, 2002 until its
resolution on January 8, 2003. Neither did she render any explanation for her failure
to honor her undertaking. It was only when she filed the petition in this Court that
she explained her failure to submit the required documents to the CA to be due to
her financial constraints and the distance between her residence and the office of
her counsel. She also did not state when she received the resolution required for the
timeliness of the filing. Moreover, she filed a second MR after the issuance of the
resolution. This is against Section 4, Rule 43 and Section 2, Rule 52.4 And even in
this second MR, she did not tender any explanation for her failure to make good her
undertaking to furnish to the CA the required certified or legible copies. Instead, she
4
Section 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law
for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration
shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
5
Section 11. Transmittal of record.Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given
Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
due course, the Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a
resolution by the same party shall be entertained. legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted
may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or
permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record.
 petitioners are strangers to the lots and they had no legally recognized interest
binding it in rem that the courts could protect and enforce against the world. The
petitioners filed a notice of appeal to question the RTC resolution, to which,
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the petitioners
raised only questions of law in their appeal; thus, they should have filed an appeal
by certiorari with the SC, and not an ordinary appeal with the appellate court.
(Basically, RTC issued a resolution collating from the pleadings the facts that
were undisputed, admitted and stipulated upon by the parties, and thereafter ruled
on the legal issues raised by applying the pertinent laws and jurisprudence on the
021 HEIRS OF CABIGAS V. LIMBACO matter. Petitioners filed an ordinary appeal to the CA, raising the issue of the
propriety of a summary judgment. CA dismissed the appeal, holding that
27 July 2011 | Brion, J. | R45 petitioners raised only question of law, appealable through a petition for certiorari
under R45) The issue in this case is WON the dismissal is proper. – YES. CA was
PETITIONERS: HEIRS OF NICOLAS S. CABIGAS, NAMELY: LOLITA correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. When petitioners assailed
ZABATE CABIGAS, ANECITA C. CANQUE, DIOSCORO CABIGAS, FIDEL the summary judgment, they were in fact questioning the conclusions drawn by
CABIGAS, and RUFINO CABIGAS the RTC from the undisputed facts, and raising a question of law.

RESPONDENTS: MELBA L. LIMBACO, LINDA L. LOGARTA, RAMON C. DOCTRINE: When there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or
LOGARTA (Heirs of Ouano), HENRY D. SEE, FREDDIE S. GO, BENEDICT not the conclusion drawn from these facts is correct is a question of law.
Y. QUE, AWG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETROSA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and UNIVERSITY OF CEBU BANILAD,
INC

SUMMARY: Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of titles of various

parcels of land. Some respondents filed a motion for summary judgment,
admitting as true the facts stated in the petitioner’s complaint, but claiming that
the petitioners had no legal right to the properties in question. RTC granted the
motion for summary judgment, and dismissing the petitioners’ complaint; stating
that while the petitioners alleged BF and malice in the seller of the properties,
they never alleged BF on the part of the buyer. Since good faith is always
presumed, the RTC concluded that the buyer was a buyer in GF and its
registration of the properties in its name effectively transferred ownership over
lots, free from all the unrecorded prior transactions involving these properties,
including the prior sale of the lots to the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. The
unregistered sale of the lots to the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest was merely
an in personam transaction, binding only the parties. On the other hand, the
registered sale to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, a buyer in GF,
was an in rem transaction that bound the whole world. Since Cobardes rights to
the properties had already been cut off with their registration in the name of the
National Airports Corporation, he could not sell any legal interest in these
properties to the Cabigas spouses. Hence, under the Torrens system, the
 022 SESBRENO v. CA (STA. MARIA)

January 26, 2995 | QuiasonJ. | Rule 45

PETITIONER: Raul H. Sesbreno

RESPONDENTS: Honorable Court of Appeals and Hermilo Rodis, Sr.

SUMMARY: Private respondent Rodis together with 2 others were charged

with Estafa before the RTC. He moved to quash the information on the ground
that SEC not the regular courts had jurisdiction over the offense charged and
that the facts stated herein did not constitute an offense. This was denied by the
RTC and later on by the CA and the SC.

So trial ensued. However, after the prosecution had rested its case, private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence based on the
ground that no criminal offense of estafa from the non-payment of a money
market placement. The motion alleged that the Sesbreno had also filed a similar
complaint against Elizabeth de Villa involving the same money market
placement but, upon review of the complaint, then Minister of Justice Estelito
Mendoza directed the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that a money
market placement partook of the nature of a loan and therefore no criminal
liability for estafa could arise from non-payment thereof.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It issued an order stating that Rodis
had waived his right to present evidence by his dilatory motions to postpone the
trial of the case. Rodis then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the CA. The CA upheld Rodis’ contention that a money market placement is in
the nature of a loan which entails the transfer of ownership of the money so
invested and therefore the liability for its return is civil in nature. Consequently,
Sesbreno interposed the instant petition alleging that the CA gravely erred in
taking cognizance over the case even if it has no jurisdiction over the issue
raised by the petition for certiorari filed therein. The issue is WON the CA had
jurisdiction? – Yes because petitioner did not assail the jurisdiction of the CA
during the pendency of his petition. He actively participated in the proceedings
even though the case should have been with the jurisdiction of the SC since it
involved a question of law. (so he was already estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction)
Sesbreno contends that by the filing of a motion to dismiss on demurrer to
evidence, Rodis in effect, admitted the truth of the allegations in the
information, as well as the evidence presented by the prosecution to support said
allegations. Therefore, the only issue raised by private respondent before the
Court of Appeals, i.e., whether or not he can be held liable for estafa under the
facts obtaining in the case, is purely a question of law for which said appellate
court had no jurisdiction.
In Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the distinction between a
question of law and a question of fact in this wise:. . . . As distinguished from a
question of law which exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on certain state of facts" — "there is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when the
"query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities
of the situation."
An examination of the petition filed before the CA disclosed that indeed no
question of fact was raised. What Rodis asserted was that the facts as
alleged and proved by Sesbreno did not constitute a criminal offense.
Clearly then, the only issue to be resolved by the CA, which it did resolve,
was whether private respondent could be held liable for estafa under the
facts obtaining in the criminal case. This certainly is a question of law that
should fall within the jurisdiction of this Court. Sesbreno did not assail the
jurisdiction of the CA during the pendency of his petition. As a matter of fact,
he actively participated in the proceedings before said appellate court. While
it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at
any time of the proceedings, this rule presupposes that laches or estoppel
has not supervened. In this regard, Banaga v. Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems, is most enlightening. The Court therein stated: This Court has
time and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable when
adverse. Here, a party may be estopped or barred from raising the question
of jurisdiction for the first time in a petition before the Supreme Court
when it failed to do so in the early stages of the proceedings. This principle
should deter those who are disposed to tifle with the courts by taking
inconsistent positions contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and
good faith
(Question of law as applied to the facts: The SC held that , the nature of a
money market transaction partakes of the nature of a loan and therefore
“nonpayment thereof would not give rise to criminal liability for estafa through
misappropriation or conversion.” In short, there no criminal liability but
Sesbreno can still hold Rodis civilly liable.)
DOCTRINE: a question of law which exists "when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts" — "there is a question of
fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts;" or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and
to the whole and the probabilities of the situation."
REMEDIOS PASCUAL vs. BENITO BURGOS
(YRREVERRE)
 G.R. No. 171722 | January 11, 2016
Leonen, J. | Rule 45; Questions of Law; Exceptions
PETITIONER: Remedios Pascual
RESPONDENTS: Benito Burgos, et al.,
SUMMARY: Pascual Spouses and Benito Burgos et, al co-owned a fishpond in Bulacan.
Burgos, et al. filed an action for partition of the fishpond and prayed for an "accounting
of the income of the fishpond from 1945 which was apportioned by the trial court into 17%
(Burgos, et al.) and 83% (Pascual Spouses). The Pascual Spouses were also ordered to pay
Burgos, et al. their unpaid shares in the income of the property since 1945. The Pascual
Spouses did not immediately comply with the order leading to opening their share for public
auction and selling their share to Marcial Meneses for P95,000. The Pascual Spouses
appealed to the trial court to allow them to redeem their rights and interests provided that the
price at which the fishpond was sold was unconscionably low. The trial court allowed the
defendants to redeem their rights within a period of 90 days after the courts’ decision.
Burgos, et al. appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the trial court’s
decision, and ordered the trial court to disallow redemption of the property and to
consolidate ownership upon respondents. The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial
court.
The Court of Appeals' appreciation of the weight of the evidence presented by the parties is
opposed to that of the trial court. Unlike the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not give any
weight to Antonio Gonzales' testimony. Instead, it relied on the tax declarations presented by
the parties to find the market value of the fishpond in 1982.
The Petitioner files this Petition for Review on Certiorari bclaiming that this case presents
two exceptions on the SC’s power to review decisions of the Court of Appeals via a petition
for review: (1) The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and (2) the
findings of fact of the CA and of the RTC are contrary to each other.
The Court does not review factual findings unless Petitioner is able to present one of the 10
recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.(see list in red)
The case did not fall into any of the exceptions. Thus, SC do not delve into the factual issues
of the case and affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
DOCTRINE: Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this court. Although jurisprudence has provided
several exceptions to these rules, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by
the parties so this court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. In any event, even in
such cases, this court retains full discretion on whether to review the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals. Grave abuse of discretion, to be an exception to the rule, must have
attended the evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by the parties. The Court of
Appeals’ reversal or modification of the factual findings of the trial court does not
automatically mean that it gravely abused its discretion. Mere disagreement between the
Court of Appeals and the trial court as to the facts of a case does not of itself warrant this
Court's review of the same. The lower courts' disagreement as to their factual findings, at
most, presents only prima facie basis for recourse to this court.
FACTS:
1. Ernesto and Remedios Pascual (Pascual Spouses) and Benito Burgos, et al.
(Burgos, et al.) coown a fishpond situated in Bulacan covered by OCT 21.
2. On September 8, 1965, Burgos, et al. filed an action for partition of the
fishpond and prayed for an "accounting of the income of the fishpond
from 1945.
3. On August 31, 1976, the trial court rendered the Decision apportioning to
Burgos, et al. 17% and to the Pascual Spouses 83% of the fishpond.
a. Pascual Spouses ordered to pay Burgos, et al. their unpaid shares
in the income of the property since 1945, until the actual
partition and delivery of shares.
b. 1983 – This Decision was appealed before the CA  Denied.
c. 1984 – A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed before the
SC  Denied.
i. MR  Denied.
4. However, while the appeal of the Trial Court Decision on the partition
case –
a. 1978 – A Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of the money
 portion of the trial court decision was filed by Respondent which 5.
was granted.
i. A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA by
Pascual Spouses which was dirmissed.
ii. A Petition for Review filed before the SC by Pascual
Spouses was also denied.
b. 1981 – Another order granting execution pending appeal was
granted by the tial court.
i. 1982 – An auction sale was conducted and the Pascual
Spouses’ share of the fishpond was sold for PHP95,000.
6.
ii. A certificate of sale was then issued in favor of Marcial
Meneses.
April 1984 – Without waiting for the resolution of the Urgent Motion to
Quash and/or Recall Writ of Possession, the Pascual Spouses a separate
case for annulment of execution of sale against Burgos, et al.
a. Burgos, et al. then filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of
their defense of lack of jurisdiction  denied.
b. Burgos, et al. to file a Petition for Certiorari before the CA 
granted, dismissed Pascual Spouses' annulment of execution sale
case
c. Pascual Spouses filed a Petition for Review before the SC 
denied.
October 1984 – As to Pascual Spouses' Urgent Motion to Quash and/or
Recall Writ of Possession  denied by the Trial Court; Motion for Partial
Reconsideration also denied.

c. 1983 – a year since the conduct of the auction sale, the Pascual
Spouses filed an Omnibus Motion before the trial court assailing
the 1981 Writ of Execution and the ensuing levy and sale of their
share in the fishpond.  denied, the assailed order become final
and executory.
i. An Urgent MR and/or Extension of Time to Redeem
was filed by the Pascual Spouses arguing that the sale
was void since the trial court decision on the partition
case was still pending appeal.  denied.
ii. A Motion for Confirmation of Sale and a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession was filed by the Burgos,
et. al.  granted.
iii. In turn, Pascual Spouses filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash and/or Recall Writ of Possession arguing for the
first time that irregularities attended the auction sale,
alleging anomalies in the number of times the notice of
sale was published, the unconscionably low price the
fishpond was sold at the auction sale, the lack of authority
of Marcial Meneses to buy the fishpond on behalf of
Burgos, et al., and the insufficiency in the description of
rights and interests to be sold in the notice of sale.
a. The trial court also rejected the Pascual Spouses' argument on the
irregularities of the auction sale and, instead, upheld its validity.
b. May 1994 – A Peition for Review before the CA by Spouses also
denied but considered the Pascual Spouses' allegation that the price
at which the fishpond was sold was unconscionably low.
i. ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of evidence in order to determine the fair market
value of the fishpond at the time of the auction sale and
whether equity demands that the Pascual Spouses still be
allowed to redeem the property.
c. July 1995 – A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed before
the SC by Burgos, et al.  denied.
7. April 1999 – the trial court set the case for hearing pursuant to the May
1994 CA decision.
a. The Pascual Spouses presented three (3) witnesses to prove that the
fair market value of the fishpond sold at public auction in 1982
was P200,000.00 per hectare.
b. Burgos, et al. presented three (3) witnesses to prove that the
fishpond's fair market value was only P10,000.00 to P20,000.00
 per hectare.
8. September 2001 – the trial court gave credence to the evidence presented
by the Pascual Spouses.
a. The trial court considered the testimony of Antonio Gonzales
authoritative, having come from a disinterested witness who was
a fishpond operator himself and who negotiated the sale of a 48-
hectare fishpond also in Bulacan.
b. The trial court did not give any weight to the tax declarations
presented by Burgos, et al.'s witnesses as these did not reflect the
actual fair market value of the properties covered by these tax
declarations.
9. June 2005 – The CA rendered the Decision granting the appeal.
a. Emphasized that the Decision, which remanded the case to the trial
court, still affirmed the validity of the auction sale and the
issuance of a Writ of Possession in favor of Burgos.
b. The case was remanded solely to determine the fair market value
of the property to decide on whether the Pascual Spouses can still
redeem the property as a matter of equity.
c. Found that there was a discrepancy between the testimony of
Antonio Gonzales and the provisions in the Deed of Sale
presented.
i. Antonio Gonzales testified that the purchase price of the
fishpond in the sale between The Fishermen Corporation
and Precillano Gonzales Development Corporation was
P10,000,000.00. However, the Deed of Sale provides that
the purchase price was P4,000,000.00.
ii. The Pascual Spouses offered no proof to clarify this
inconsistency.
iii. The sale testified to by the witnesses of the Pascual
Spouses was an isolated transaction. No evidence was
presented to show that the fishpond subject of the sale
was the same type, quality, and quantity of the disputed
fishpond.
d. The tax declarations presented by Burgos, et al., being public
documents, are prima facie evidence of the statements written
there, including the market value of the property.
10. Present Case – Remedios Pascual filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution, which
reversed and set aside the trial court Decision.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether a petition for review before this court allows a review of the
factual findings of the lower courts – Discretionary. Generally, no but with
exceptions.
2. Whether this case presents an exception to the rule on this court's power to
review decisions of the Court of Appeals via a petition for review. If in the
affirmative, whether the price at which the fishpond was sold is
unconsionably low – No.
RULING: SC finds that the case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Thus, SC
do not delve into the factual issues of the case and affirm the Decision of the Court
of Appeals.
We do not find any compelling reason to review the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. It is time for this long dispute that has vexed both parties to be finally laid
to rest. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
RATIO:
FIRST ISSUE
1. Review of appeals filed before this court is “not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion” This court’s action is discretionary. Petitions filed
“will be granted only when there are special and important reasons” This is
 especially applicable in this case, where the issues have been fully record.
ventilated before the lower courts in a number of related cases.
6. These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this
2. The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in court involving civil, labor, tax, or criminal cases.
petitions filed under Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not
entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are
“final, binding or conclusive on the parties and upon this court” when
SECOND ISSUE
supported by substantial evidence.
7. Petitioner claims that this case presents two (2) exceptions to the rule
3. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be reviewed nor
against a review of factual findings by this court.
disturbed on appeal to this court. However, these rules do admit
exceptions. a. that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
4. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. b. that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and of the
Regional Trial Court are contrary to each other.
5. The Exceptions – Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., (1990):

a. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; ON GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
b. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or 8. The Court of Appeals must have gravely abused its discretion in its
impossible; appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties and in its factual
findings to warrant a review of factual issues by this court.
c. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
9. Grave abuse of discretion is defined, thus:
d. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
a. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
e. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
f. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond jurisdiction.
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
b. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
both appellant and appellee;
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
g. The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount
the trial court; to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. Grave
h. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of
specific evidence on which they are based; jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and
jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for various reasons,
i. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s there has been a gross misapprehension of facts.
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
10. Petitioner fails to convince this court that the Court of Appeals committed
j. The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the sup grave abuse of discretion in reversing the trial court's factual findings and
posed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.
 11. Grave abuse of discretion, to be an exception to the rule, must have
attended the evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by the
parties.
17. The general rule is that the appellate court's findings are conclusive, but
12. The Court of Appeals’ reversal or modification of the factual findings
of the trial court does not automatically mean that it gravely abused its
discretion. The Court of Appeals, acting as an appellate court, is still a trier
of facts. Parties can raise questions of fact before the Court of Appeals and
it will have jurisdiction to rule on these matters. Otherwise, if only
questions of law are raised, the appeal should be filed directly before this
court. This is not to say that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially with
regard to the credibility of witnesses, are of little weight.
13. The doctrine in the cases cited by petitioner, People v. Vitancur, 345 SCRA
414 (2000) and People v. Mendez, 335 SCRA 147 (2000), is a time-honored
rule. The trial court’s findings of fact are given much weight because of
the trial court judges’ firsthand knowledge and familiarity with the
disposition of the witnesses who testified before them, and this is
important in certain cases. However, this doctrine does not diminish the
Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction in reviewing the factual findings of the trial
court. Further, in the cited cases, the Court of Appeals did not even have the
opportunity to review the factual findings of the trial court as the case was
directly elevated to this court on automatic appeal.
ON THE CONTRARY FINDINGS OF THE CA AND RTC
14. While the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court, this alone does not automatically warrant a review of factual
findings by this court.
18. Petitioner failed to show why the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
15. That mere disagreement between the Court of Appeals and the trial
court as to the facts of a case does not of itself warrant this Court's
review of the same. It has been held that the doctrine that the findings of
fact made by the Court of Appeals, being conclusive in nature, are binding
on this Court, applies even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with
the lower court as to the weight of evidence with a consequent reversal of
its findings of fact, so long as the findings of the Court of Appeals are borne
out by the record or based on substantial evidence.
16. The lower courts' disagreement as to their factual findings, at most,
presents only prima facie basis for recourse to this court.
this rule is not without some recognized exceptions, such as:
a. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures;
b. when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
c. when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
d. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
e. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
f. when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee.
g. the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court;
h. said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
i. the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
j. the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record.
are without any basis. Petitioner does not dispute the tax declarations relied
upon by the Court of Appeals. Instead, petitioner insists that the testimony
of Antonio Gonzales should be given weight despite the valid and
substantial basis provided by the Court of Appeals to find otherwise. She
still failed to clarify and explain the anomaly between Antonio Gonzales'
testimony on the purchase price of the fishpond sold to Precillano Gonzales
Development Corporation and the provision on the purchase price in the
Deed of Sale presented.

024 TAGLE v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Callueng)
April 22, 2008 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Appeal By Certiorari To The Supreme Court
PETITIONER: Alfredo Tagle
RESPONDENTS: Equitable PCI Bank (Formerly Philippine Commercial
International Bank) And The HONORABLE HERMINIA V. PASAMBA, Acting
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan
SUMMARY: Petitioner Alfredo urges this Court to set aside, on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the 4 April
2005 Order of the RTC in LRC Case No. P-71-2004, which denied petitioner
Alfredo’s Motion to Stop Writ of Possession. He prays that this Court certify "for
review with prayer for preliminary injunction to stop the writ of possession of the
property located in Bulacan and after due hearing, let judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of the RTC and CA. According to petitioner
Alfredo, the subject property is registered in his name and was constituted as a
Family Home He and his wife Arsenia Bautista Tagle (Arsenia) never mortgaged the
subject property to respondent Equitable PCI Bank (respondent E-PCI) whether
before or after the subject property was constituted as their Family Home. It was
Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who was not the owner of the subject property, who
mortgaged the same with respondent E-PCI. Josefino was religiously paying the
installments on his mortgage obligation and had paid more than half thereof.
Josefino, however, passed away. Petitioner Alfredo was then forced to assume
Josefino’s outstanding mortgage obligation. Even as petitioner Alfredo was already
paying Josefino’s mortgage obligation in installments, respondent E-PCI still
foreclosed the mortgage on the subject property. On the other hand, respondent E-
PCI recounts that the subject property was formerly registered in the name of
petitioner Alfredo. It was mortgaged, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney
executed by petitioner Alfredo, to secure the obligation of the spouses Josefino and
Emma Tagle with respondent E-PCI. Respondent E-PCI foreclosed the mortgage on
the subject property upon default in payment by spouses Josefino and Emma, and
upon the expiration of the period of redemption, caused the consolidation and
transfer of the title to the subject property in its name. Consequently, respondent E-
PCI filed with the RTC a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession of the subject
property. The RTC issued the assailed Order denying petitioner Alfredo’s Motion.
Petitioner Alfredo and his spouse Arsenia filed with the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration of its foregoing order. However, it was likewise denied by the RTC.
Thereafter, petitioner Alfredo elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a Petition
for Certiorari [and Prohibition] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing and seeking the nullification and the setting aside of the denial of
his Motion to Stop Writ of Possession.. The appellate court resolved to dismiss the
petition. In due time, petitioner Alfredo moved for the reconsideration of the afore-
quoted Resolution.The Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution denying
petitioner Alfredo’s motion for reconsideration. Undaunted still, petitioner Alfredo
once more filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s 16 February
2006 Resolution.The Court of Appeals promulgated the last of its Resolutions,
denying, as expected, petitioner Alfredo’s Second Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner Alfredo filed the instant petition designating it in
both the caption and the body as one for "certiorari" under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court. He anchors the present petition on the sole issue of "whether or not
the subject property subject of the mortgage being a family home is exempt from
foreclosure of mortgage." He argues: That from the records of the mortgage, the
same was not constituted before or after the constitution of the family home by the
petitioner and as such the Honorable Court of Appeals has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in the proceedings
complained of.
Issue/s: (1) WoN the present Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy for petitioner Alfredo to avail of in
seeking the reversal of the three Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 6
September 2005, 16 February 2006 and 11 April 2006. NO.
In the present case, there is no question that the 6 September 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredo’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461
is already a disposition on the merits. Therefore, said Resolution, as well as the
Resolutions dated 16 February 2006 and 11 April 2006 denying reconsideration
thereof, issued by the Court of Appeals, are in the nature of a final disposition of
CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 by the appellate court, and which, under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, are appealable to this Court via a Petition for Review
on Certiorari, viz:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals ,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari.The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the words of Rule 45, it is crystal that decisions (judgments), final orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for
review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case.
In the case at bar, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing
petitioner Alfredo’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were final orders. They were
not interlocutory because the proceedings were terminated; and left nothing more to
be done by the appellate court. There were no remaining issues to be resolved in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90461. Consequently, the proper remedy available to petitioner
Alfredo then was to file before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, and not a special civil action for certiorari.
From the foregoing discussion, it is fairly obvious that the third requisite for a
petition for certiorari is wanting, that is, there must be no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The availability to
petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a petition for review on certiorari from the
assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals effectively barred his right to resort to a
petition for certiorari.
Petition for Review on Certiorari (an appeal by certiorari) vs a Petition
for Certiorari (a special civil action/an original action for  Certiorari), under Rules
45 and 65, respectively, of the Revised Rules of Court
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we
explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
‘When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The
administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.’
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ
of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the
facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the
findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such
correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the
remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate
jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original
jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the
proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit,
while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part
of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of.
The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties
to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the
petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing
parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of
Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action
for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior
to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or
adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from
the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review
should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the
decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within
fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the
petitioner’s motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days
from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of
the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is
generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the
tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a
plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not
required before appealing a judgment or final order.
DOCTRINE: Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the
remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved party. A remedy is considered "plain,
speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious
effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency.
025 San Miguel Bukid Homeowners v. City of Mandaluyong (DONES)
October 2, 2009 | Peralta, J. | Rule 45; Availability of appeal under Rule 45 precludes
resort to Rule 65 SCA
PETITIONER: San Miguel Bukid Homeowners Association, Inc., represented
by President Mr. Evelio Barata
RESPONDENTS: The City of Mandaluyong, represented by Mayor Benjamin
Abalos, Jr.; A.F. Calma General Construction, represented by President Mr.
Armengo F. Calma
SUMMARY:
San Miguel Bukid Homeowners Association, Inc. (Homeowners, Inc.), an
association for urban poor dwellers in Mandaluyong, filed a Complaint for
specific performance and damages against City of Mandaluyong with the RTC.
The Complaint is premised on the alleged violation of the City of Mandaluyong
and A.F. Calma Construction of their undertaking to build homes for the
members of Homeowners, Inc. on land purchased by the City government for
such purpose. City of Mandaluyong filed an answer while A.F. Calma
Construction did not. Homeowners, Inc. subsequently filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default, alleging that the lawyer who signed the City’s Answer
was a private counsel (not Office of the City Legal Officer), who was not
authorized to sign as counsel for the LGU under Section 248 of the LGC,
therefore making the Answer a mere scrap of paper and an unsigned pleading.
RTC denied Homeowners, Inc.’s motion, holding that a party should only be
declared in default in cases showing clear obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect
in complying with the Orders of the court. Upon being elevated to the CA via a
petition for certiorari, the CA dismissed the appeal outright because the person
who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping thereof did
not appear to be authorized by the board of Homeowners, Inc. With
Homeowners, Inc.’s motion for reconsideration being denied, they filed this
Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari seeking the nullification of the CA decision and
resolution dismissing the MR.
The issue is WON Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the Decision of the
CA.
The Court held in the negative. The resolutions of the CA which petitioner
seeks to nullify are orders of dismissal. The Court has held that an order or
dismissal is a final order which is a proper subject of an appeal (Rule 45), not
certiorari (Rule 65). If what is being assailed is a decision, final order or
resolution of the CA, then appeal to the Supreme Court is via a verified petition
for certiorari under Rule 45. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. The existence
and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the
SCA for certiorari, although where it is shown that the appeal would be
inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the
injurious effects of the order complained of, or where an appeal is inadequate
and ineffectual, the SCA of certiorari may be granted.
Since the case involves a final order of dismissal issued by the CA<the proper
recourse of action would have been to file a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Although there are exceptions to the general rule, Homeowners,
Inc. utterly failed to allege and prove that the SCA of certiorari should be
granted. There is nothing in the petition to show that this case qualifies as an
exception to the general rule.
[On the merits, irrelevant to Apprac] If the real party-in-interest is a corporate
body, an officer of the corporation can sign the certification against forum
shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of its board of
directors. Evidently, Homeowners, Inc. only authorized its President to initiate,
sign, file and prosecute the Complaint for specific performance. By no stretch of
imagination can certiorari be included n the cause of action of a complaint for
specific performance. The subsequent submission of a Secretary’s Certificate
along with the Motion for Reconsideration to the CA does not cure the defect,
since this will not have retroactive effect to authorize the President to sign
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping already submitted PNB v. RABAT (IVY)
earlier.
November 15, 2000 | Davide, Jr., J. | Rule 51; issue not raised on appeal
DOCTRINE: If what is being assailed is a decision, final order or resolution of
the CA, then appeal to the Supreme Court is via a verified petition for certiorari
under Rule 45.
PETITIONER: Philippine National Bank

RESPONDENTS: Spouses Francisco and Merced Rabat

SUMMARY: Sps. Francisco and Merced Rabat, applied for a loan with PNB,
which was granted and to mature in three years from implementation. Spouses
Rabat signed a Credit Agreement and executed a Real Estate Mortgage over parcels
of land. Spouses Rabat executed another document denominated as "Amendment to
the Credit Agreement" purposely to increase the interest rate. The several
availments of the loan accommodation on various dates by Spouses Rabat reached
the aggregate amount of P3,517,380. Spouses Rabat failed to pay their outstanding
balance on the due date hence for the failure of Spouses Rabat to pay their
obligation, the PNB filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage executed by Spouses Rabat. 

After due notice and publication, the mortgaged parcels of land were sold at a

public auction. As the proceeds of the public auction were not enough to satisfy the
entire obligation of Spouses Rabat, the PNB sent new demand letters. Spouses
Rabat failed to comply with the demand letter to settle their remaining outstanding
obligation.
PNB then filed a complaint for a sum of money before the RTC. Spouses
Rabat filed their answer with counterclaim and subsequently the Spouses Rabat
filed an amended answer. Spouses Rabat admitted their loan availments from PNB
and their default in the payment thereof. However, they assailed the validity of the
auction sales for want of notice to them before and after the foreclosure sales.
They further added that as residents of Mati, Davao Oriental since 1970 up to
the present, they never received any notice nor heard about the foreclosure
proceeding despite the claim of PNB that the foreclosure proceeding had been duly
published in the San Pedro Times, which is not a newspaper of general circulation.
Spouses Rabat likewise averred that the bid price was grossly inadequate and
unconscionable.
Lastly, Spouses Rabat attacked the validity of the accumulated interest and
penalty charges since their properties were sold in 1987, and yet PNB waited until
1992 before filing the case. Consequently, Spouses Rabat contended that they
should not be made to suffer for the interest and penalty charges from May 1987 up
to the present. Otherwise, PNB would be allowed to profit from its questionable
scheme.
RTC dismissed the complaint.
The first issue was resolved against Spouses Rabat who claimed that the
foreclosure was void due to lack of notice to them at their address in Mati, Davao
Oriental, and that there was no publication of the notice in a newspaper of general
circulation. It held that the mortgage contract did not specifically require that
personal service of notice of foreclosure sale be given to them and that the San
Pedro Times which published the notice of foreclosure sale is a newspaper of
general circulation as certified by the Sheriff and as shown in the affidavit of its
publisher.
Nevertheless, the trial court agreed with Spouses Rabat that the two auction
sales were void in view of the gross inadequacy of the price, which is shocking to
the conscience. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Hence the issue is: WoN THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY REVIEW AND PASS
UPON THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING AND CONCLUSION ON AN ISSUE
WHICH WAS NEVER RAISED ON APPEAL, AND, THEREFORE, HAD
ATTAINED FINALITY?
The SC held that: Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or
the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of
errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly
argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical
errors.
Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes
some substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural
rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by
the court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To
this exception has now been added errors affecting the validity of the
judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein.
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his
assignment of errors but the same is closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in his brief, such error may now be
considered by the court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin.
The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court
of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been
held that the latter is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if
they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error
closely related to an error properly assigned or upon which the determination of
the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by
the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is
authorized to consider a plain error, although it was not specifically assigned by the
appellant, otherwise it would be sacrificing substance for technicalities.
DOCTRINE: The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by
a party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over
the subject matter. To this exception has now been added errors affecting the
validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein.
 027 ALTRES v. EMPLEO (ARIELLE)

December 10, 2008 | Carpio Morales, J. | Verification and Certification against non-
forum shopping; Question of law vs. Question of fact

PETITIONER: B.E. San Diego, Inc.

RESPONDENTS: Rosario T. Alzul

SUMMARY: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated
Feb. 2, 2007, which denied the petitioners’ petition for mandamus praying for a writ
commanding the city accountant or his successor in office, to issue a certification of
availability of funds in connection with their appointments, which were pending
approval by the CSC. Back in 2003, the mayor sent notices of numerous vacant
career positions in the city government to the CSC. The city government then
proceeded to announce the existence of such vacant positions. Petitioners submitted
their applications. Towards the end of the term of the mayor, he issued the
appointments to petitioners. However, the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued a
resolution which stated its policy against midnight appointments and ordered the HR
to hold in abeyance the transmission of all appointments signed or to be signed by the
incumbent mayor to ascertain whether these had been hurriedly prepared or
considered. The city accountant did not thus issue a certification as to availability of
funds for the payment of salaries of petitioners. CSC disapproved the appointments
due to lack of certification and availability of funds.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus against the city
accountant or his successor in office for him to issue a certification of availability of
funds for the payment of the salaries. RTC denied the petition because according to
the LGC, the city accountant cannot be compelled to issue a certification as to
availability of funds for the payment of salaries as this ministerial function pertains to
the city treasurer. An MR was filed, but this was denied. Respondents also assail as
defective the verification and certification against non-forum shopping attached to the
petition as it bears the signature of only 11 out of the 59 petitioners, and no
competent evidence of identity was presented by the signing petitioners. Petitioners,
on the other hand, contend that they have a justifiable cause for their inability to
obtain the signatures of the other petitioners as they could no longer be contacted or
are no longer interested in pursuing the case.
Issues:
1) WoN the certification is valid – YES because 11 out of the 59 petitioners signed
the certification against forum shopping, amply showing that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of imagination.
2) WoN the petitioners raised a question of law proper for a petition for review on
certiorari – YES, they raised a question of law because their main contention is the
proper application of the provisions of the LGC.
FIRST ISSUE: Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination
or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. In this case, the
circumstances squarely involve a verification that was not signed by all the
petitioners therein. The well-settled rule is that all the petitioenrs must sign the
certification of non-forum shopping. The reason for this is that the persons who have
signed the certification cannot be presumed to have the personal knowledge of the
other non-signing petitioners with respect to the filing or non-filing of any action or
claim the same as or similar to the current petition. This is not without exception and
that is when the petitioners who reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. In this case, the signing of the verification by only 11 out of the 59
petitioners already sufficiently assure the court that the allegations in the pleading are
true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation; that
the pleading is filed in good faith; and that the signatories are unquestionably real
parties-in-interest who have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the petition.
With respect to petitioners’ certification against forum shopping, the failure of the
other petitioners to sign as they could no longer be contacted or are no longer
interested in pursuing the case need not merit the outright dismissal of the petition
without defeating the administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are,
however, dropped as parties to the case.
Rules on defective verification and certification against forum shopping:
1. A distinction must be made between non-compliance and submission of
defective verification and certification against forum shopping;
2. For verification, non-compliance or a defect does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its correction.
3. Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint signs the
verification.
4. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance or defect is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission, unless there is need to
relax the rules on ground of substantial compliance.
5. Certification against forum shopping must be signed by all petitioners,
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case.
Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense, the signature of only one of them substantially complies
with the rule.
6. Certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. But if party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute an
SPA designating his counsel to sign on his behalf.
SECOND ISSUE: As to the respondents’ contention that petitioners raised questions
of fact which are not proper in a petition for review on certiorari as the same must
only raise questions of law, the Court holds that petitioners are indeed raising a
question of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other. In the case at bar,
the issue posed for resolution does not call for the reevaluation of the probative value
of the evidence presented, but rather the determination of which of the provisions of
the LGC applies to the CSC memorandum requiring a certificate of availability of
funds relative to the approval of petitioners’ appointments.
 028 MAGLANA RICE AND CORN MILL, INC. v. TAN (PLEYTO)

Sept. 21, 2011 | Bersamin, J. | Question of fact

PETITIONER: Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc., and Ramon P. Dao (Petitioners)

RESPONDENTS: Annie L. Tan and her husband, Manuel Tan

SUMMARY: A vehicular accident occurred, which involved the Fuso truck owned by
Maglana by Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc. (Maglana), driven by its employee, Ramon
Dao, and the Honda Accord sedan owned by Spouses Tan, driven by Manuel Tan. The truck
hit the car at its rear. Spouses Tan demanded reim bursement of their expenses amounting to
P83,750. Petitioners denied liability. The issue here is with regard to whose version of the
accident is true.
Spouses Tan: their car was travelling along Davao-Agusan Road, but it had to stop upon
reaching the All Trac Compound, as did other vehicles, due to the traffic slowdown caused
by an earlier collision between a car and a jeep not far ahead. Dao failed to stop so he hit the
car. This was corroborated by the traffic accident report and the court testimony of the traffic
investigator.
Petitioners: Dao was on board the truck at about 6:45pm occupying the innter of the two
northbound lanes on the national highway, observing an approximate distance of three-cars
length from the vehicle ahead at a speed of about 30kph. Upon reaching the All Trac
Compound, he spotted an accident involving a car and a jeep ahead of his truck, and
immediately shifted to second gear to slow down to about 20 kilometers/hour. The driver of
the vehicle ahead of the truck also slowed down. As he decelerated preparatory to coming to
a full stop, the respondents’ car overtook the truck from the right lane and suddenly cut into
his lane at a very unsafe distance. This cutting-in caused the right front portion of the truck
to come into contact with the left rear of the respondents’ car just when the car was in a
diagonal position with about two feet of its rear still on the right lane. MTC ruled in favor of
Spouses Tan. RTC and CA affirmed this.
The issues are:
1. W/N appeal under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law
2. W/N the appeal by the petitioners is frivolous
W/N appeal under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law - YES
The real issue here is w/n the car of spouses Tan suddenly cut into the lane of the petitioners’
truck; and w/n Dao simply failed to stop on time despite Spouses Tan’s car having already
come to a full stop due to traffic congestion. This is a factual issue because it requires the
ascertainment of which driver was negligent. As such, the appeal fails, for a petition for
review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to be one of law, must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. Indeed, there is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts 6. SC is not a trier of facts. But
6
Whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or should be rejected as feeble
or spurious; or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to
establish a proposition in issue; whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in
relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether
or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as
there are exceptions7
W/N the appeal by the petitioners is frivolous – YES
MTCC, RTC and the CA all found and declared that the police report respecting the accident
was unbiased and worthy of belief: sided with Spouses tan. They noted that the pictorial
evidence revealed no scraping marks or even a dent on the left side of the car, but instead
showed a solitary material damage sustained on the left rear portion of car, proof that only
one collision had occurred between the two vehicles. A frivolous appeal is one where no
error can be brought before the appellate court, or whose result is obvious and the arguments
of error are totally bereft of merit, or which is prosecuted in bad faith, or which is contrary to
established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change. It is
frivolous, too, when it does not present any justiciable question, or is one so readily
recognizable as devoid of merit on the face of the record that there is little, if any, prospect
that it can succeed. Thus, the court imposes treble costs of suit on the petitioners based on
to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of
such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of fact. Questions like these are
not reviewable by the Supreme Court whose review of cases decided by the CA is confined only to questions of
law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth
7
(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusio
Rule Section 3, 142 of the Rules of Court.8
DOCTRINE: Whether a driver was negligent in a vehicular accident is a question of fact
based on jurisprudence. Also, the appreciation and resolution of factual issues are the
functions of the lower courts, whose resulting findings are then received with respect and are
binding on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions.
029 LBP v. CA
August 25, 2003 | Callejo, Sr. J | R45; Error of Judgment vs. Error of Jd
PETITIONER: LBP
RESPONDENTS: CA, MAMERTA RODRIGUEZ, SPS. ARMANDO and
8
The imposition of treble costs of suit on the petitioners is meant to remind them and their attorney that the
extent that an attorneys exercise of his professional responsibility for their benefit as his clients submits to
reasonable limits beyond which he ought to go no further, and that his failure to recognize such limits will not be
allowed to go unsanctioned by the Court. Thus, the Court has not hesitated to impose treble costs of suit (a) to
stress its dislike for any scheme to prolong litigation or for an unwarranted effort to avoid the implementation of a
judgment painstakingly arrived at;[18] (b) to sanction an appeal that was obviously interposed for the sole purpose
of delay;[19](c) to disapprove of the partys lack of good and honest intentions, as well as the evasive manner by
which it was able to frustrate (the adverse partys) claim for a decade; [20] (d) to stifle a partys deplorable propensity
to go to extreme lengths to evade complying with their duties under the law and the orders of this Court and
thereby to cause the case to drag for far too long with practically no end in sight; [21] (e) to condemn the counsels
frantic search for any ground to resuscitate his clients lost cause; [22] and (f) to reiterate that a litigant, although his
right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, is not permitted to initiate similar suits once his case has been
adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, in the hope of securing a favorable ruling for this will
result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice
ZENAIDA STA. ANA, EL OBSERVATORIO DE MANILA INCORPORADA,
SPS. WILFREDO and AURORA POSADAS, REGINALD FRANCISCO,
BIENVENIDO MACEDA, SPS. HECTOR and MATILDE MENDOZA and
EUGENIO ROMILLO
SUMMARY: The private respondents filed a petition for the removal of IBAA or
LBP as trustee. The trial court ordered the suspension and archiving of the case
until after the termination of the proceedings before the SEC. The private
respondents appealed to the CA which reversed RTC orders; ruling that RTC had
jurisdiction over petitions for the removal of trustees. LBP’s MR which was
denied. Instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under R45 of the
Revised RoC, LBP filed the instant petition for certiorari under R65; alleging that
CA committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and LBP had no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. ISSUE: WON R65 is the proper remedy
– NO. R45 is. In order to determine WON LBP’s recourse of petitioners is proper
or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error
of jurisdiction.
Error of judgment - one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.
Error of jurisdiction - one where the act complained of was issued by the court,
officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a cert writ cannot be exercised in
order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness,
either upon the law or the facts of the case.
GR: Questions or findings of facts in the lower court, board or tribunal, and the
probative weight and sufficiency of the evidence upon which the said findings
were based are not reviewable by certiorari under R65, RoC. Sufficiency of
evidence may be inquired into in order to determine whether jurisdictional facts
were or were not proved or whether the lower court had exceeded its jurisdiction.
This exception arises out of the most important office and function of the writ –
the keeping of the lower court and tribunal within their jurisdiction. If the lower
court’s decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish jurisdictional
facts were not reviewable, certiorari would be of no avail as a remedy against an
assumption of jurisdiction. For the purpose of enabling the reviewing court to
determine whether jurisdictional facts were established, it may delve into and
review the evidence on which such facts were based.
Errors ascribed to the CA are errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
CA had jurisdiction over the appeals of the private respondents from the order of decision of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under R45; Where the
the trial court. CA decision was rendered by it in the proper exercise of its error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction or the act complained of was
jurisdiction. In its decision, the CA enumerated the following findings of facts: perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion
(a) the RTC erred in ordering the petitions archived and the proceedings in said amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the
petitions suspended simply because of the pendency of SEC Cases Nos. 1826 and aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under R65.
1835 and of the appointment of Management Committee as interim receiver;
(b) based on the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record, the petitioner
and the IBAA were trustees of the investment portfolios; hence, owners and not
mere agents of MSI;
(c) the investment portfolios are not assets of MSI;
(d) the SEC had no jurisdiction over the investment portfolios held in trust by the
petitioner and IBAA;
(e) only those actions for claims against the distressed corporation are suspended,
but the petition for the dissolution of the trusteeship for IBAA and the petitioner
LBP to render an accounting of their stewardship of the investment portfolios, and
to pay damages on account of their mishandling and/or defalcation of the same,
are not suspended but may proceed until the petitions are finally resolved;
(f) the principle of primary administrative jurisdiction does not apply in the instant
case.
These findings are mere errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction,
correctible by a petition for review on certiorari with this Court under R45 of the
Revised RoC. Hence, the petitioner should have filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari under R45 within the period therefor, and not a petition
for certiorariunder R65 of the said Rules.
Appeal under R45 as amended is a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. A petition for review on certiorari under R45 of the Revised RoC
is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. If LBP filed
its petition for review on certiorari under R45 within the period, the assailed
decision would have been stayed. LBP could have raised issues involving
questions of law, such as WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitions of the
private respondents, or whether the petitions are in effect actions for claims (Right
to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, unsecured.
DOCTRINE: (1) The determination as to what exactly constitutes a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy rest on judicial discretion and depends on the particular
circumstances of each case. (2) Proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a