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Cambridge University Press The Americas: This Content Downloaded From 34.192.2.131 On Wed, 01 May 2019 14:58:54 UTC
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The Americas
BLACK REBELS:
THE CIMARRONS OF
SIXTEENTH-CENTURY PANAMA
T cial network of the Spanish Empire and the need to defend it has
he strategic location of the Isthmus of Panama within the commer-
greatly influenced historical writing on sixteenth-and seventeenth-
century Panama. Most studies have emphasized military and economic his-
tory and with few exceptions, have shown little interest in other aspects of
Panamanian life. An excellent review of the historical literature on colonial
Panama can be found in Christopher Ward, Imperial Panama: Commerce
and Conflict in Isthmian America, 1550-1800 (Albuquerque, 1993). Despite
a continuing emphasis on the usual themes of trade and defense, there is a
growing trend to focus on other topics such as population movements and
social classes. One of the areas still awaiting further investigation and study
is the history of the cimarrons of Panama. The two principal primary sources
for the role of the cimarrons are the collections of documents from the
Archivo General de Indias in Seville published by Irene Wright and Carol F.
Jopling, respectively. Wright's Documents Concerning the English Voyages
to the Spanish Main, 1569-1580 (London, 1932) contains the correspon-
dence of Spanish officials on the Isthmus to the king relating to the activi-
ties of the English pirates and their alliance with the cimarrons. Jopling's
Indios y negros en Panama en los siglos XVI y XVII (South Woodstock, Ver-
mont, 1994) is a selection of documents dealing specifically with the history
of the blacks and Indians and contains a wealth of information about the
cimarrons. Among the early writers, the chronicle of Pedro de Aguado is of
particular value for its rich account of the cimarron king Bayano. The writ-
ings of Maria del Carmen Mena Garcia, especially her volume on La
sociedad de Panama en el siglo XVI (Seville, 1984) presents a thorough
overview of Isthmian society with several chapters devoted to the black pop-
ulation and the cimarrons. Two other earlier informative studies are Federico
Guillot, Negros rebeldes y negros cimarrones (Buenos Aires, 1961), and
Armando Fortune, "Los negros cimarrones en Tierra Firme y su lucha por la
libertad," Revista Loteria (1970). Another valuable contribution is an article
243
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244 BLACK REBELS
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RUTH PIKE 245
In that year Governor Pedrarias informed the king that some black slaves had
risen up in the city of Panama and fled into the countryside where they had
begun to attack the farms and cattle ranches in its vicinity. Since the munici-
pal government lacked the funds to pay for an armed force to defeat and cap-
ture them, all the owners of slaves in the city decided to voluntarily cover the
cost. Pedrarias was a principal contributor with 20 pesos.3
Although the revolt was put down and the participants executed, the
danger remained. It grew in proportion to the increase in the African slave
trade that resulted in the creation of a growing black slave population on the
Isthmus. One of the places where there were large numbers of black slaves
and only a few Spanish settlers was the town of Acla, on the Atlantic coast,
where the exploitation of the gold mines made a large black labor force nec-
essary. It was the site of another uprising in 1530. Aided by the element of
surprise and their numerical supremacy, the slaves who worked in the mines
killed their owners and fled into the wilderness. They took refuge in the
ruins of the abandoned settlement of Santa Maria la Antigua on the western
side of the Gulf of Ural* where they established the first palenque on the
Isthmus of Panama. In 1532 they were attacked by a Spanish force under the
command of Julian Gutierrez who killed the majority of the inhabitants and
seized a few others who were later punished. Some survivors fled into the
jungle where they continued their free existence.4
One year after the destruction of the palenque at Acla there was an
abortive black slave uprising in the city of Panama. Influenced by the events
at Acla, a group of black slaves, including those of the governor Francisco
de Barrionuevo and other officials conspired together to flee to Acla and
with the help of the remaining cimarrons of the region to establish another
palenque. Under their leader, a slave named Damian, they planned to set fire
to the city and neighboring cattle ranches. The plot was denounced and the
participants severely punished.5
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246 BLACK REBELS
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RUTH PIKE 247
The Governor of Panama Alvaro de Sosa (1553-1556) sent out three mili-
tary expeditions beginning in 1553 against Bayano and all failed. One of them
commanded by Gil Sanchez actually arrived in the area dominated by the
cimarrons where they encountered Bayano who defeated them and killed their
commander. Only four soldiers escaped alive. Another expedition led by that
same Captain Francisco Carrefio who had destroyed the palenque of Felipillo
succeeded in capturing Bayano and bringing him to Nombre de Dios."
The royal authorities on the Isthmus did not have the men or resources to
effectively combat the problem of the cimarrons. Almost all the inhabitants
of Nombre de Dios and Panama were merchants, and the majority, natives
of Seville. Many were agents for the commercial firms of that city and only
temporary residents of the Isthmus. None were able or willing to fight or pay
for any large-scale campaign against the cimarrons. Given the circumstances
the Governor Alvaro de Sosa decided upon conciliation. He freed and par-
doned Bayano, but this policy failed as well. The cimarrons continued their
raids and they became more arrogant and daring.12
The struggle against the cimarrons could only be successful when fought
by an armed force of experienced soldiers financed with funds from the
royal treasury that were designated for that purpose. In 1556 the Marquis de
9 Aguado, Historia, III, lib. 9, cap. 11, p. 170; Mena Garcia, La sociedad, p. 415.
Io Aguado, Historia, III, lib. 9, cap. 12, pp. 180-181.
11 Aguado, Historia, cap.13, p. 195; Mena Garcia, La sociedad, p. 417; Guillot, Negros, p. 143.
12 Aguado, Historia, III, lib. 9, cap.13, p. 195; Guillot, Negros, p. 143; Mena Garcia, La sociedad,
p. 242.
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248 BLACK REBELS
13 Roberto Levillier, ed. Gobernantes del Pera, Cartas y papeles, siglo XVI, documentos del Archivo
de Indias, II (Madrid: Sucesores del Rivadeneyra, 1921), pp. 470-471; Garcilaso de la Vega, el Inca, His-
toria General, III, lib. 8, cap. 3, p. 190.
14 Levillier, Gobernantes, I (1921), p. 263; Garcilaso de la Vega, el Inca, Historia General, III, lib.
8, cap. 3, p. 190.
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RUTH PIKE 249
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250 BLACK REBELS
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RUTH PIKE 251
18 Aguado, Historia, III, lib. 9, cap. 13, pp. 193-194; Garcilaso de la Vega, el Inca, Historia General,
III, lib. 8, cap. 3, p. 191.
19 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, The Harkness Collection, Peru, 1531-1651, Docu-
ments, 818-821; Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los regidores perpetuos del cabildo de Lima, 1535-1821
(Seville: La DiputaciOn Provincial de Sevilla, 1985), II: 300; Roberto Levillier, ed., Audiencia de Lima,
Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores, aiios 1549-1564, documentos del Archivo de Indias (Madrid:
Imprenta de Juan Pueyo, 1922), pp. 278, 289, 323, 334; Gobernantes, II (1921), pp. 452, 486, 547, 589.
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252 BLACK REBELS
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RUTH PIKE 253
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254 BLACK REBELS
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RUTH PIKE 255
For most of the first half of the sixteenth century French and English
pirates sailed along the Atlantic coast of the Isthmus attacking Spanish ship-
ping. Motivated by greed, religious hatred and anti-Spanish sentiment, they
found that the cimarrons were willing allies. The cooperation of the cimar-
rons with the pirates was based on their common dislike of the Spaniards.
They believed that the pirates would defeat their oppressors and liberate
them. In order to maintain their friendship, the pirates frequently declared
the black slaves free after taking a town. Of all the pirates, it was Francis
Drake, Captain Francisco, as he became known, who obtained their full
cooperation and loyalty. Before Drake the cimarrons had helped the French,
but reluctantly because as they later told him, the French treated them badly.
It was Drake who cemented this alliance and he was the only English pirate
to use it successfully. Drake's charismatic personality and his use of tact
captivated the cimarrons and his diplomacy won them over.31
Drake's first contact with the cimarrons came about through the media-
tion of a cimarron called Diego who came to the English ships anchored off
the coast of Darien in July 1572 shortly after Drake's arrival on the Isthmus.
According to the English account of this voyage, entitled Sir Francis Drake
Revived and first published in 1626 by Drake's nephew, Diego called out to
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256 BLACK REBELS
Unable to leave because of the Spanish squadrons off the coast, Drake
decided to remain with the cimarrons until the arrival of the fleet in the fol-
lowing year. The cimarrons helped the English to build Fort Diego on the
Isla de los Muertos (Slaughter Island). In January 1573 the cimarrons
brought the news that the mainland fleet had arrived in Nombre de Dios.
By this time Drake had devised a plan to seize the treasure at Panama
rather than at Nombre de Dios, specifically at the way station of Venta de
Cruces between the two towns. This would have the advantage of surprise
because the Spaniards never expected him in the interior of the country,
and there were no Spanish warships on the Pacific Coast that could pre-
vent his escape by sea. Around mid-January 1573 Drake left the Atlantic
Coast with 18 or 20 companions. They were accompanied by 30 cimarrons
including their chief Pedro Mandinga probably from the palenque of Por-
tobelo, near Nombre de Dios. They marched inland on an incredible jour-
ney over mountains and through jungles, and swamps, overwhelmed by
heat, insects and fever. Without the help of the cimarrons they could not
have survived. The cimarrons opened the way across the underbrush, con-
structed the campsites, brought food and water and built the fires. They
also carried the arms of the English as well as their own weapons and all
the necessary implements.33
32 Sir Francis Drake Revived (London: 1628) in Wright, Documents, pp. 264-266; Zelia Nuttal, ed.,
New Light on Drake: A Collection of Documents relating to his Voyage of Circumnavigation, 1577-80,
80 (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1967), pp. 27, 302, 325, 426.
33 Wright, Documents, nos. 19-22, pp. 44-53; Drake Revived, pp. 295-296.
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RUTH PIKE 257
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RUTH PIKE 259
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RUTH PIKE 261
After the elimination of the pirates, Frias began a campaign against the
cimarrons of Vallano. A part of his original commission was to punish the
cimarrons for their aid to the pirates. To accomplish this mission he led his
forces through the whole region of Vallano where the cimarrons were set-
tled, destroying their crops and burning their villages and dispersing their
inhabitants. The first encounters with the cimarrons resulted in the death and
capture of many of them. After their defeats, the cimarrons refused to
engage in direct combat and resumed their old tactics of disappearing into
the jungle, but in effect, the soldiers of Frias had succeeded in destroying the
cimarron organization. When they became tired of continuously fleeing, the
cimarron leaders met with the Spaniards to arrange a truce. Hostilities came
to an end in the spring of 1578, and Frias returned to Peru in September
1578, but pacification came slowly.48
46 Wright, Documents, pp. liv-lxi, no. 51, pp. 178-183, no. 70, pp. 232-234.
47 Wright, Documents, pp. lxi-lxiii, no. 67, pp. 215-222, no. 72, p. 233-234, no. 73, p. 240.
48 Guillot, Negros, pp. 182-183; Levillier, Gobernantes, VI (1924), pp. 64-65.
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262 BLACK REBELS
49 Jopling, Indios y negros, doc. 142, pp. 372-374, doc. 145, p. 378.
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RUTH PIKE 263
When the stipulated time period passed and the cimarrons did not return,
Ortega Valencia decided to send out a small group of men to make contact
with them and discover the reason for the delay. They left before dawn one
day and returned the same night exhausted, stating that they had become
lost. It was decided to let them try again, but this time they were accompa-
nied by a Spanish soldier Alonso Hernandez who said that he knew the way.
They left and for a long time were not heard from. At this point Dean
5o Jopling, Indios y negros, doc. 135, pp. 360-364, doc. 146, pp. 378-379.
51 Jopling, Indios y negros, doc. 135, pp. 362-364.
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264 BLACK REBELS
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RUTH PIKE 265
At the time of the death of Drake, conditions on the Isthmus had changed.
The cimarron revolt had been put down, replaced by a situation of relative
peace and coexistence. Many factors influenced this development. One of the
most important was the weakening of the ability of the cimarrons to continue
to respond to Spanish military pressure. The practice of not permitting any
new black slaves to be introduced into the Isthmus and the long years of war-
fare had reduced their numbers. There was never any specific legislation to
55 Jopling, Indios y negros, doc. 153, pp. 385-387, doc. 154, p. 389; Mena Garcia, La sociedad, pp.
423-424.
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266 BLACK REBELS
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