TENCHAVEZ vs ESCAÑO
- W/N the divorce sought by Vicenta
FACTS:
- Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged
marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The
marriage was duly registered with
the local civil registrar.
- However, the two were unable to live
together after the marriage and as of
June 1948, they were already
estranged. Vicenta left for the United
Stated in 1950.
- On the same year she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on
the ground of “Extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character.” A
decree of divorce, “final and
absolute” was issued in open court
by the said tribunal.
- She married an American, lived with
him in California, had several
children with him and, on 1958,
acquired American Citizenship.
- On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a
complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against Vicenta F.
Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband,
and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church,
for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in
damages.
- Vicenta’s parents denied that they
had in any way influenced their
daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed
for moral damages.
ISSUES:
Escaño is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
RULING:
- No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor
Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent
and undissolved under the
Philippine Law.
- Pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil
Code, laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
- Escaño’s divorce and second
marriage cannot be deemed valid
under the Philippine Law to which
Escaño was bound since in the time
the divorce decree was issued,
Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen.
- The acts of the wife in not complying
with her wifely duties, deserting her
husband without any justifiable
cause, leaving for the United States
in order to secure a decree of
absolute divorce, and finally getting
married again are acts which
constitute a willful infliction of
injury upon the husband’s feelings in
a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
- Thus, it entitles Tenchavez to a
decree of legal separation under our
law on the basis of adultery.
VAN DORN vs ROMILLO
ISSUES:
FACTS: - W/N the divorce obtained the
spouse valid to each of them.
- Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a
- W/N Richard Upton may assert his
citizen of the Philippines while
right on conjugal properties.
private respondent Richard Upton is
a citizen of the United States. RULING:
- They were married in Hong Kong in
1972 and established their residence - As to Richard Upton the divorce is
in the Philippines. binding on him as an American
- They begot two children born on Citizen.
April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, - As he is bound by the Decision of his
respectively. own country’s Court, which validly
- But the parties were divorced in exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not
Nevada, United States, in 1982 and
repudiate, he is estopped by his own
the petitioner had remarried also in
representation before said Court
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van
from asserting his right over the
Dorn.
alleged conjugal property.
- On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed
a suit against petitioner, asking that
- Only Philippine Nationals are
covered by the policy against
Alice Van Dorn be ordered to render
absolute divorce the same being
an accounting of her business in
considered contrary to our concept
Ermita, Manila and be declared with
of public policy and morality.
right to manage the conjugal
property. - Alicia Reyes under our National law
- Petitioner moved to dismiss the case is still considered married to private
respondent. However, petitioner
on the ground that the cause of
should not be obliged to live together
action is barred by previous
with, observe respect and fidelity,
judgement in the divorce proceeding
and render support to private
before Nevada Court where
respondent.
respondent acknowledged that they
had no community property. - The latter should not continue to be
- The lower court denied the motion one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not
to dismiss on the ground that the
be discriminated against her own
property involved is located in the
country if the ends of justice are to
Philippines, that the Divorce Decree
be served.
has no bearing in the case.
- Respondent avers that Divorce
Decree abroad cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines.
SOMERA vs PILAPIL directing to move for the dismissal of
the complaints against petitioner.

FACTS:
ISSUES:
- On September 7, 1979, petitioner
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino - W/N private respondent Geiling can
citizen) and respondent and prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, ground of adultery even though they
German national, were married at are no longer husband and wife as
Federal Republic of Germany. They decree of divorce was already issued.
lived together in Malate, Manila and
had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
RULING:
- Unfortunately, after about three and
a half years of marriage such - The law provides that in prosecution
connubial disharmony eventuated in for adultery and concubinage, the
respondent initiating divorce person who can legally file the
proceeding against petitioner in complaint should be the offended
Germany. He claimed that there was spouse and nobody else.
failure of their marriage and that - In this case, it appeared that private
they had been living apart since respondent is the offended spouse,
April 1982. the latter obtained a valid divorce in
- On the other hand, petitioner filed his country, the Federal Republic of
an action for legal separation before Germany, and said divorce and its
a trial court in Manila on January legal effects may be recognized in the
23, 1983. Philippines in so far as he is
- The decree of divorce was concerned.
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on - Thus, under the same consideration
the ground of failure of marriage of and rationale, private respondent is
the spouses. The custody of the child no longer the husband of the
was granted to the petitioner. petitioner and has no legal standing
- More than five months after the to commence the adultery case
issuance of the divorce decree, under the imposture that he was the
Geiling filed two complaints for offended spouse at the time he filed
adultery before the City Fiscal of suit.
Manila alleging that while still
married to Imelda, the latter had an
affair with a certain William Chia as
early as 1982 and another man,
Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
- Petitioner filed a petition asking to
set aside the cases filed against her
and be dismissed. Thereafter,
petitioner moved to defer her
arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings. Justice Secretary
Ordoñez issued a resolution
FUJIKI vs MARINAY
FACTS:
- Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a
Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki
could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
- In 2008, Marinay met another
Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15
May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.
- Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan
and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.
- On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled:
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage).”
- The decision of the lower courts
(RTC): dismissed the petition for
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru
Fujiki, to file the petition.
ISSUES:
- W/N a husband or wife of a prior
marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage
between his or her spouse and a
foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
- W/N the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages is applicable.
RULING:
(1)
- Yes, the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a
particular fact.”Rule 108, Section 1
of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
- There is no doubt that the prior
spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from
it.
(2)
- No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages
does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen
of a foreign country.
- Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
Republic, this Court held that the
rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage “does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is
bigamy.”
- While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
- Bigamy is a crime under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. 
- Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.
MEDINA vs KOIKE
FACTS:
- Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla
(Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and
respondent Michiyuki Koike
(Michiyuki), a Japanese national,
were married on June 14, 2005 in
Quezon City, Philippines.
- On June 14, 2012, Doreen and
Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of
Japan, filed for divorce in Japan.
- They were divorced on even date as
appearing in the Divorce Certificate
and the same was duly recorded in
the Official Family Register of
Michiyuki Koike.
- Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a
petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of
capacity to remarry pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code before the RTC.
- Doreen presented several foreign
documents, namely, "Certificate of
Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance
of Divorce" and "Family Register of
Michiyuki Koike” both issued by the
Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly
authenticated by the Consul of the
Republic of the Philippines for
Osaka, Japan.
- She also presented a certified
machine copy of a document entitled
"Divorce Certificate" issued by the
Consul for the Ambassador of Japan
in Manila that was authenticated by
the Department of the Foreign
Affairs, as well as a Certification
issued by the City Civil Registry
Office in Manila that the original of
said divorce certificate was filed and
recorded in the said Office.
- On July 31, 2014, the RTC denied
Doreen's petition, ruling that in an
action for recognition of foreign
divorce decree pursuant to Article 26
of the Family Code, the foreign
divorce decree and" the national law
of the alien recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce must be
proven
- The RTC ruled that she nonetheless
fell short of proving the national law
of her husband, particularly the
existence of the law on divorce.
- The RTC observed that the "The
Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The
Civil Code of Japan 2009,"
presented were not duly
authenticated by the Philippine
Consul in Japan.
- Since no expert witness on the
subject matter was presented and
considering further that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and law, Doreen's
motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated
November 28, 2014.
- Hence, the petition.
ISSUES:
- W/N the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce.
RULING:
- Article 26 of the Family Code - which
addresses foreign marriages or
mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner - allows a Filipino
spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is
validly obtained abroad by an alien
spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
- This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's
 applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.
- Both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Since our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law
of the alien must be alleged and
proven like any other fact.
- Considering that the validity of the
divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, the issue raised in the
instant appeal is obviously a
question of fact that is beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition for
review.
- It is settled that appeals taken from
judgments or final orders rendered
by RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction raising questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and law
should be brought to the Court of
Appeals (CA).

- The case is hereby REFERRED to

the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action including the reception of
evidence to DETERMINE and
RESOLVE the pertinent factual
issues in accordance with this
Decision.
LLAVE vs REPUBLIC
FACTS:
- Around 11 months before his death,
Sen. Tamano married Estrellita
Juliano-Llave twice – initially under
the Islamic laws and tradition on
May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993.
- In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano’s civil status was indicated
as “divorced”.
- Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole
world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
- On November 23, 1994, private
respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their
own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children
with Zorayda, filed a complaint with
the RTC for the declaration of nullity
of marriage between Estrellita and
Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
- The complaint alleged that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31,
1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when
he married Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUES:
- W/N the marriage between Estrellita
and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous.
RULING:
- Yes. The civil code governs the
marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen.
Tamano; their marriage was never
invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.
Tamano s subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
- The marriage between the late Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated
in 1958, solemnized under civil and
Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims
alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given
time. Under the marriage provisions
of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394
which was not availed of during its
effectivity.
- As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen.
Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda
has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083, the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD
1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.
Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides
that the law applies to “marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male
party is a Muslim and the marriage
is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part
of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of
PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim
rites.”
- The petition is DENIED.
KALAW vs FERNANDEZ (September 19, truthfulness of the factual
2011) allegations regarding Malyn’s
“habits” because he believed it is the
court’s duty to do so.
FACTS: ISSUES:
- Tyrone Kalaw and respondent Malyn - W/N Tyrone has sufficiently proven
Fernandez met in 1973 and that Malyn suffers from
eventually married in Hong Kong in psychological incapacity.
1976.
- Tyron had an affair with Jocelyn RULING:
Quejano, who gave birth to a son in
1983.
- NO.
- In 1985, Malyn left the conjugal
home and her 4 children with
- The burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the plaintiff.
Tyrone.
- Then Tyrone started living with - The plaintiff must prove that the
Jocelyn, who bore him 4 more incapacitated party, based on his or
children. her actions or behavior, suffers a
serious psychological disorder that
- Nine years since the de facto
completely disables him or her from
separation from his wife, Tyrone
understanding and discharging the
filed a petition for declaration of
essential obligations of the marital
nullity of marriage based on Article
state.
36.
- The psychological problem must be
- Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr.
grave, must have existed at the time
Gates, and a Catholic canon law
of marriage, and must be incurable.
expert, Fr. Healy, to testify on
Malyn’s psychological incapacity.
- Petitioner failed to prove that his
- Dr. Gates explained on the stand
wife (respondent) suffers from
that the factual allegations regarding
psychological incapacity.
Malyn’s behavior – her sexual
infidelity, habitual mahjong playing,
- He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who
and her frequent nights-out with
concluded that respondent is
friends – may reflect a narcissistic
psychologically incapacitated, but
personality disorder (NPD).
the conclusions of these witnesses
- Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the
were premised on the alleged acts or
facts revealed by her interviews with
behavior of respondent which had
Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s
not been sufficiently proven.
sister-in-law), and their son. Fr.
Healy characterized Malyn’s
- Petitioner’s experts opined that
psychological incapacity as grave respondent’s alleged habits, when
and incurable. performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of
- He based his opinion on his
time devoted to her duties as mother
interview with Tyrone, the trial
and wife, constitute a psychological
transcripts, as well as the report of
incapacity in the form of NPD.
Dr. Dayan, Malyn’s expert witness.
He clarified that he did not verify the
- But petitioner’s allegations, which
served as the bases or underlying
premises of the conclusions of his
experts, were not actually proven.
- In fact, respondent presented
contrary evidence refuting these
allegations of the petitioner. What
transpired between the parties is
acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity,
which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their
children.
- There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not
psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.
REPUBLIC vs QUINTOS
FACTS:
- Eduardo and Catalina were married
in civil rites. However, the couple
were not blessed with a child
because Catalina had a hysterectomy
following her second marriage.
- Eduardo filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage
citing psychological incapacity as a
ground.
- He alleged that Catalina always left
the house without his consent; that
she engaged in petty arguments with
him; that she constantly refused to
give in to his sexual needs; that she
gambled away all his remittances as
an overseas worker.
- He also presented the results of a
neuro-psychiatric evaluation
conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes
stating that Catalina exhibited traits
of a borderline personality disorder
that was no longer treatable.
- Catalina did not appear during trial
but admitted her psychological
incapacity. She denied flirting with
different men and abandoning the
conjugal home.
ISSUES:
- W/N Catalina was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill marital duties
RULING:
- No. Marriage remains valid.
- In Republic v CA (Molina), the
Supreme Court has established
guidelines involving the nullity of
marriage based on the ground of
psychological incapacity. These were
not met in the instant case since the
gravity, root cause and incurability
of Catalina's purported psychological
incapacity were not sufficiently
established.
- Catalina's behavior of frequent
gossiping, leaving the house without
Eduardo's consent, refusal to do
household chores, and take care of
their adopted daughter were not
established. Eduardo presented no
other witness to corroborate these
allegations.
- Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied
on Dr. Reyes' evaluation despite any
factual foundation to support this
claim.
- The report was vague about the root
cause, gravity and incurability of the
incapacity.
- Even the testimony of Dr. Reyes
stated a general description of
borderline personality disorder
which did not explain the root cause
as to why Catalina was diagnosed as
such.
- They did not specify the acts or
omissions or the gravity which
constituted the disorder.
- What was established was that
Catalina was childish and immature.
- Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had only one
interview with Catalina. This lacks
the depth and objectivity of an expert
assessment.
- It can be adduced that Catalina's
immaturity and apparent refusal to
perform her marital obligations do
not constitute psychological
incapacity alone.
- It must be shown that such immature
acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the
spouse completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.
CAMPOS vs CAMPOS

FACTS:

ISSUES:

RULING:
PARTOSA-JO vs CA
FACTS:
- The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is
the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein
private respondent.
- The latter admitted to have cohabited
with 3 women and fathered 15
children.
- Prima filed a complaint against the
husband for judicial separation of
conjugal property in addition to an
earlier action for support which was
consolidated.
- RTC decision was a definite
disposition of the complaint for
support but none of that for the
judicial separation of conjugal
property.
- Jose elevated the decision to CA
which affirmed rulings of the trial
court. The complaint on the
separation of property was dismissed
for lack of cause of action on the
ground that separation by agreement
was not covered in Art. 178 of the
Civil Code.
- Prima contested that the agreement
between her and Jose was for her to
temporarily live with her parents
during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for him to visit and
support her. They never agreed to be
separated permanently. She even
returned to him but the latter refused
to accept her.
ISSUES:
- W/N there is abandonment on the
part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial
separation of conjugal property.
RULING:
- SC is in the position that respondent
court should have made the
necessary modification instead of
dismissing the case filed.
- For abandonment to exist, there must
be an absolute cessation of marital
relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation.
- The fact that Jo did not accept her
demonstrates that he had no intention
of resuming their conjugal
relationship.
- From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused
to provide financial support to Prima.
- Hence, the physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by
the private respondent to give
support to the petitioner, sufficed to
constitute abandonment as a ground
for the judicial separation of their
conjugal property.
- Wherefore, the petition was granted
and in favor of the petitioner and that
the court ordered the conjugal
property of the spouses be divided
between them, share and share alike.
GOITIA vs CAMPOS-RUEDA decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant.
- The plaintiff appealed.
FACTS:
- Eloisa Goitia De La Camara and Jose ISSUES:
Campos Rueda were legally married
- W/N Goitia can compel her husband
in the City of Manila on January 7,
to support her outside the conjugal
1915.
home.
- They established their residence at
115 Calle San Marcelino, where they RULING:
lived together for about a month,
- YES. The obligation on the part of
when the plaintiff returned to the
the husband to support his wife is
home of her parents.
created merely in the act of marriage.
- It was alleged that respondent
- Article 149 of the Civil Code
demanded her to perform unchaste
provides that the person obliged to
and lascivious acts on his genital
give support may, at his option,
organs. The plaintiff spurned the
satisfy it, either by paying the
obscene demands of the defendant
pension that may be fixed or by
and refused to perform any act other
receiving and maintaining in his own
than legal and valid cohabitation.
home the person having the right to
- Since Goitia kept on refusing,
the same.
defendant maltreated her by word
- However, this option granted by law
and deed, inflicting injuries upon her
is not absolute. The law does not
lips, face and different parts of her
permit the husband to evade or
body; and that, as Goitia was unable
terminate his obligation to support
by any means to induce her husband
his wife if the wife is driven away
to desist from his repugnant desires
from the conjugal home because of
and cease from maltreating her, she
his wrongful acts.
was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of
- In the case at bar, the wife was
her parents.
forced to leave the conjugal home
abode because of the lewd designs
- Goitia filed a complaint against
and physical assault of the husband.
defendant for support outside the
- Therefore, it is only but right, to
conjugal home.
claim support from the husband for
separate maintenance albeit outside
- The CFI ruled in favor of defendant
the conjugal home.
Rueda and held that the defendant
cannot be compelled to support the
plaintiff, except in his own house,
unless it be by virtue of a judicial
PEOPLE vs ZAPATA
FACTS:
- A complaint for adultery was filed
by Andres Bondoc against his wife
Guadalupe Zapata and Dalmacio
Bondoc, for cohabiting and having
sexual intercourse during the period
from 1946 – March 1947, even
though Dalmacio knows that his co-
defendant is a married woman.
- The defendant wife entered a plea of
guilty. In September 1948, Andres
filed another complaint for adultery
committed from March 15, 1947 to
September 17, 1948.
- Defendants filed a motion to quash
on the ground of double jeopardy.
ISSUES:
- W/N there was a double jeopardy.
RULING:
- No. Adultery is an instantaneous
crime which is consummated and
exhausted or completed at the
moment of the carnal union.
- Adultery is a crime of result and not
of tendency
- Each sexual intercourse constitutes a
crime of adultery.
- It is true, two or more adulterous acts
committed by the same defendants
are against the same person — the
offended husband, the same status —
the union of the husband and wife by
their marriage, and the same
community represented by the State
for its interest in maintaining and
preserving such status.
- But this identity of the offended
party, status society does not argue
against the commission of the crime
of adultery as many times as there
were carnal consummated, for as
long as the status remain unchanged,
the nexus undissolved and unbroken,
an encroachment or trespass upon
that status constitutes a crime.
- There is no constitutional or legal
provision which bars the filing of as
many complaints for adultery as
there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one
crime.
- In the instant case the last unity does
not exist, because as already stated
the culprits perpetrate the crime in
every sexual intercourse and they
need not to another or other
adulterous acts to consummate it.
- After the last acts of adultery had
been committed as charged in the
first complaint, the defendants again
committed adulterous acts not
included in the first complaint and
for which the second complaint was
filed.
- Another reason why a second
complaint does not constitute a
double jeopardy is that, if the second
complaint places the defendants
twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense, the adultery
committed by the male defendant
charged in the second complaint,
should he be absolved from, or
acquitted of, the first charge upon the
 evidence that he did not know that
his codefendant was a married
woman, would remain or go
unpunished.
- The defense set up by him against
the first charge upon which he was
acquitted would no longer be
available, because at the time of the
commission of the crime charged in
the second complaint, he already
knew that this defendant was a
married woman and he continued to
have carnal knowledge of her.

- The order appealed from, which

quashed the second complaint for
adultery, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
ARANETA vs CONCEPCION filing of the petition. (Now Art 58,
Family Code)
ISSUES:
FACTS:
- W/N the rule prohibiting the hearing
- Luis Araneta filed an action for legal
of an action for legal separation
separation on the ground of adultery
before the lapse of six months
against his wife Emma Benitez
preclude the court from acting on an
Araneta.
omnibus petition for support and
- Emma filed an omnibus petition,
custody.
supported by her Affidavit, to secure
custody of their three minor children, RULING:
a monthly support for herself and
- It is conceded that the period of six
said children, the return of her
months fixed therein is evidently
passport, to enjoin Luis from
intended as a cooling off period to
ordering his hirelings from harassing
make possible a reconciliation
and molesting her.
between the spouses.
- Luis opposed the petition, denying
- But this practical expedient,
the misconduct imputed to him and
necessary to carry out legislative
alleging that Emma had abandoned
policy, does not have the effect of
the children.
overriding other provisions such as
the determination of the custody of
- Judge Concepcion resolved the
the children and alimony and support
omnibus petition, granting the
pendente lite according to the
custody of the children to Emma and
circumstances. (Article 105 CC,
a monthly allowance for support for
Article 49 FC)
her and the children, for house and
- The law expressly enjoins that these
attorney’s fees.
should be determined by the court
according to the circumstances. If
- Luis filed a petition for certiorari
these are ignored or the courts close
against said order and for mandamus
their eyes to actual facts, rank
to compel the respondent judge to
injustice may be caused.
require the parties to submit
evidence before deciding the
- Thus the determination of the
omnibus petition.
custody and alimony should be given
- Judge refused Luis’ request that
effect and force provided it does not
evidence be allowed to be introduced
go to the extent of violating the
because the prohibition contained in
policy of the cooling off period.
Article 103 of the Civil Code:
- These should be allowed that the
ART. 103. An action for legal separation court may determine which is best
shall in no case be tried before six for their custody.
months shall have elapsed since the - The court’s order fixing the alimony
and requiring payment is reversed.
PACETE vs CARRIAGA - W/N the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner’s
motion for extension of time to file
FACTS: their answer, in declaring petitioners
in default and rendering the decree of
- Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint legal separation of Pacete and
on October 1979, for the Declaration Alanis, and held to be null and void
of Nullity of Marriage between her the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.
erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and
one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well RULING:
as for legal separation between her
- The Civil Code provides that “no
and Pacete, accounting and
decree of legal separation shall be
separation of property.
promulgated upon a stipulation of
- She averred in her complaint that she
facts or by confession of judgment.
was married to Pacete on April 1938
In case of non-appearance of the
and they had a child named
defendant, the court shall order the
Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently
prosecuting attorney to inquire
contracted a second marriage with
whether or not collusion between
Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
parties exists. If there is no collusion,
learned of such marriage only on
the prosecuting attorney shall
August 1979.
intervene for the State in order to
- Reconciliation was impossible since
take care that the evidence for the
he evidently preferred to continue
plaintiff is not fabricated.”
living with Clarita.
- The defendants were each served
- Article 103 of the Civil Code, now
with summons. They filed an
Article 58 of the Family Code,
extension within which to file an
further mandates that an action for
answer, which the court partly
legal separation must “in no case be
granted.
tried before six months shall have
- Due to unwanted misunderstanding
elapsed since the filing of the
in communication, the defendants
petition,” obviously in order to
failed to file an answer on the date
provide the parties a “cooling-off”
set by the court.
period. In this interim, the court
- Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a
should take steps toward getting the
motion to declare the defendants in
parties to reconcile.
default, which the court forthwith
granted.
- The significance of the provision is
- After trial, the court rendered a
furthered by Rule 18 of the Rules of
decision in favor of the plaintiff on
Court which provides that no
March 17,1980.
defaults in actions for annulments of
ISSUES: marriage or for legal separation.
- Therefore, “if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation fails to answer,
the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not
a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see
to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.”
DE OCAMPO vs FLORENCIANO
FACTS:
- Jose de Ocampo and Serafina
Florenciano were married in 1938.
- In March 1951, latter discovered on
several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining
illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.
- Having found out, he sent the wife to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture where she stayed for one
year.
- Again plaintiff discovered that the
wife was going out with several
other man other than Arcalas.
- In 1952, when the wife finished her
studies, she left plaintiff and since
then they had lived separately.
- In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his
wife in the act of having illicit
relations with Nelson Orzame.
- He signified his intention of filing a
petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity
provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action.
- Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition
for legal separation in 1955.
committed adultery, in the existence
of evidence of adultery other than
such confession, is not the
confession of judgment disallowed
by Article 48 of the Family Code.
- What is prohibited is a confession of
judgment, a confession done in court
or through a pleading.
- Where there is evidence of the
adultery independent of the
defendant’s statement agreeing to the
legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it
would not be based on the confession
but upon the evidence presented by
the plaintiff.
- What the law prohibits is a judgment
based exclusively on defendant’s
confession.
- The petition should be granted based
on the second adultery, which has
not yet prescribed.

ISSUES:
- W/N the confession made by
Florenciano constitutes the
confession of judgment disallowed
by the Family Code.
RULING:
- Florenciano’s admission to the
investigating fiscal that she
SOMOSA vs VAMENTA
RULING:
FACTS:
- Petititioner Lucy Somosa-Ramos
filed a case for legal separation
against private respondent Clemente
Ramos on the ground of concubinage
and an attempt by him against her
life.
- She likewise sought the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction for the return to her of
what she claimed to be her
paraphernal and exclusive property,
then under the administration and
management of Clemente.
- Clemente opposed the motion based
on Article 103 of the Civil Code
which provides:
Article 103. An action for legal separation
shall in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition. (Now Article 58 FC)
- He manifested that if the motion
were heard, the prospect of the
reconciliation of the spouses would
become even dimmer.
- Judge Vamenta granted the motion
of Clemente and suspended the
hearing of the petition for a writ of
mandatory preliminary injunction.
- Thus, Lucy filed a petition for
certiorari.
ISSUES:
- W/N rule prohibiting the hearing of
an action for legal separation before
the lapse of six months preclude the
court from acting on a motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction
applied for as an ancillary remedy to
such a suit.
- No. Article 103 the Civil Code is not
an absolute bar to the hearing motion
for preliminary injunction prior to
the expiration of the six-month
period.
- The court where the action is
pending according to Article 103 is
to remain passive.
- That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases
for judicial power to assert itself is
discernible from what is set forth in
the following article.
- It reads thus: "After the filing of the
petition for legal separation, the
spouse shall be entitled to live
separately from each other and
manage their respective property.
The husband shall continue to
manage the conjugal partnership
property but if the court deems it
proper, it may appoint another to
manage said property, in which case
the administrator shall have the same
rights and duties as a guardian and
shall not be allowed to dispose of the
income or of the capital except in
accordance with the orders of the
court." (Now Article 61 FC)
- There would appear to be then a
recognition that the question of
management of their respective
property need not be left unresolved
even during such six-month period.
- There is all the more reason for this
response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom
 she accused of concubinage and an
attempt against her life would in the
meanwhile continue in the
management of what she claimed to
be her paraphernal property, an
assertion that was not specifically
denied by him.

- What was held by this Court in

Araneta v. Concepcion, thus
possesses relevance: It is conceded
that the period of six months fixed
therein is evidently intended as a
cooling off period between the
spouses.
- But this practical expedient,
necessary to carry out legislative
policy, does not have the effect of
overriding other provisions such as
the determination of the custody of
the children and alimony and support
pendente lite according to the
circumstances. (Article 105, Civil
Code, now Art. 49, Family Code)
- The law expressly enjoins that these
should be determined by the court
according to the circumstances. If
these are ignored or the courts close
their eyes to actual facts, rank
injustice may be caused.
LERMA vs CA the date of the filing of the
complaint; and
- (2) The amount of such monthly
FACTS: support was reduced from P2,250.00
to P1,820.00.
- Petitioner Teodoro Lerma and
private respondent Concepcion Diaz ISSUES:
are husband and wife. They married
- W/N the adultery is a good defense
on May 19, 1951.
against the respondent’s claim for
support pendente lite.
- On August 22, 1969 petitioner filed a
complaint for adultery against the RULING:
respondent and a certain Teodoro
- The right to separate support or
Ramirez.
maintenance, even from the conjugal
partnership property, presupposes the
- The respondent filed with the lower
existence of a justifiable cause for
court, presided by Judge Leonor Ines
the spouse claiming such right to live
Luciano, a complaint against the
separately.
petitioner for legal separation and/or
- This is implicit in Article 104 of the
separation of properties, custody of
Civil Code, which states that after
their two children and support, with
the filing of the petition for legal
an urgent petition for support
separation the spouses shall be
pendente lite for her and their
entitled to live separately from each
youngest son, Gregory, who was
other.
then and until now is in her custody.
- A petition in bad faith, such as that
- The respondent’s complaint for legal
filed by one who is himself or herself
separation is based on two grounds:
guilty of an act which constitutes a
concubinage and attempt against her
ground for legal separation at the
life.
instance of the other spouse, cannot
be considered as within the
- The petitioner filed his opposition to
intendment of the law granting
the respondent’s application for
separate support.
support pendente lite, setting up as
- In fact under Article 303 of the same
defense the adultery charge he had
Code the obligation to give support
filed against the respondent.
shall cease “when the recipient, be
- Judge Luciano granted the
he a forced heir or not, has
respondent’s application for support
committed some act which gives rise
pendente lite in an order dated
to disinheritance.”
December 24, 1969, which she
- And under Article 921 one of the
amended in an order dated February
causes for disinheriting a spouse is
15, 1970 to the following effect:
“when the spouse has given cause for
- (1) the respondent was declared
legal separation.”
entitled to support pendente lite from
- The loss of the substantive right to incompatible with any claim for
support in such a situation is support pendente lite.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC             March 4, 2003

RE: PROPOSED RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION

RESOLUTION

          Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court
submitting for this Court's consideration and approval the Proposed Rule on Legal Separation, the
Court Resolved to APPROVED the same.

          The Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation not later than March 7, 2003

          March 4, 2003

Davide Jr. C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ.
Ynares-Santiago, on leave,
Corona, officially on leave.

RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION

Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall govern petitions for legal separation under the Family Code of
the Philippines.

          The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

Section 2. Petition. - (a) Who may and when to file. - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed
only by the husband or the wife, as the case may be within five years from the time of the
occurrence of any of the following causes:

(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious
or political affiliation;

(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a

child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;

(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six
years, even if pardoned;
 (e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or

outside the Philippines;

(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;

(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or

(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one year.

(b) Contents and form. - The petition for legal separation shall:

(1) Allege the complete facts constituting the cause of action.

(2) State the names and ages of the common children of the parties, specify the
regime governing their property relations, the properties involved, and creditors, if
any. If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the
petitioner may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support
of common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal
property, and other similar matters requiring urgent action,

(3) Be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The

verification and certification must be personally signed by the petitioner. No petition
may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact. If the petitioner is in a
foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping shall be
authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or legation,
consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country

(4) Be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall, within five days from such filing, furnish
a copy of the petition to the City or Provincial Prosecutor and the creditors, if any,
and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

          Failure to comply with the preceding requirements may be a ground for

immediate dismissal of the petition.

(c) Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing "or in The case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.

Section 3. Summons. - The service of summons shall be governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
and by the following rules:

(a) Where the respondent cannot be located at his given address or his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service of summons may, by leave of
court, be effected upon him by publication once a week for two consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines and in such place as the court may order.
 In addition, a copy of the summons shall be served on respondent at his last known address
by registered mail or by any other means the court may deem sufficient.

(b) The summons to be published shall be contained in an order of the court with the
following data; (1) title of the case; (2) docket number; (3) nature of the petition; (4) principal
grounds of the petition and the reliefs prayed for, and (5) a directive for respondent to
answer within thirty days from the last issue of publication.

Section 4. Motion to Dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any
other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in
an answer.

Section 5. Answer. - (a) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from receipt of
summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by
publication. The answer must be verified by respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-
fact.

(b) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him in default.

(c) Where no answer is filed/or if the answer does not tender an issue the court shall order
the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.

Section 6. Investigation Report of Public Prosecutor. - (a) Within one one month after receipt of the
court order mentioned in paragraph (c) of the preceeding section, the public prosecutor shall submit
a report to the court on whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.

(b) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his
report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten
days from receipt of copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if
convinced that parties are in collusion,-it shall dismiss the petition.

(c) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for
pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Section 7. Social Worker. - The court may require a social worker to conduct a case study and to
submit the corresponding report at least three days before the pre-trial. The court may also require a
case study at any stage of the case whenever necessary,

Section 8. Pre-trial. -

(a) Pre-trial mandatory.-A pre-trial is mandatory. On motion or motu proprio, the court shall
set the pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed, or upon receipt of the
report of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties on a date not
earlier than six months from date of the filing of the petition.

(b) Notice of Pre-trial.-(1) The notice of pre-trial shall contain:

(a) the date of pre-trial conference; and

 (b) an order directing the parties to file and serve their respective pre-trial
briefs in such manner as shall ensure the receipt thereof by the adverse party
at least three days before the date of pre-trial.

(2) The notice shall be served separately on the parties and their respective counsels
as well as on the public prosecutor. It shall be their duty to appear personally at the
pre-trial.

(3) Notice of pre-trial shall be sent to the respondent even if he fails to file an answer.
In case of summons by publication and the respondent failed to file his answer,
notice of pre-trial shall be sent to respondent at his last known address.

Section 9. Contents of pre-trial brief. - The pre-trial brief shall contain the following:

(1) A statement of the willingness of the parties to enter into agreements as may be allowed
by law, indicating the desired terms thereof;

(2) A concise statement of their respective claims together with the applicable laws and
authorities;

(3) Admitted facts and proposed stipulations of facts, as well as the disputed factual and
legal issues;

(4) All the evidence to be presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose thereof;

(5) The number and names of the witnesses and their respective affidavits; and

(6) Such other matters as the court may require.

          Failure to file the pre-trial brief or to comply with its required contents shall have the same
effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial under the succeeding section.

Section 10. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (1) If the petitioner fails to appear personally,
the case shall be dismissed unless his counsel or a duly authorized representative appears in court
and proves a valid excuse for the non-appearance of the petitioner.

(2) If the respondent filed his answer but fails to appear, the court shall proceed with the pre-
trial and require the public prosecutor to investigate the non-appearance of the respondent
and submit within fifteen days a report to the court stating whether his non-appearance is
due to any collusion between the parties/ If there is no collusion the court shall require the
public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the.merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence.

Section 11. Pre-trial conference. - At the pre-trial conference, the court may refer the issues to a
mediator who shall assist the parties in reaching an agreement on matters not prohibited by law.

          The mediator shall render a report within one month from referral which, for good reasons, the
court may extend for a period not exceeding one month.
          In case mediation is not availed of or where it fails, the court shall proceed with the pre-trial
conference, on which occasion it shall consider the advisability of receiving expert testimony and
such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the petition.

Section 12. Pre-trial order. - (a) The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination
of the pre-trial, the court shall issue a pre-trial order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up
in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed on the pleadings, and, except
as to the ground of legal separation, the agreements or admissions made by the parties on any of
the matters considered, including any provisional order that may be necessary or agreed upon by
the parties.

(b) Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall contain a recital of the following:

(1) Facts undisputed, admitted, and those which need not be proved subject to
Section 13 of this Rule;

(2) Factual and legal issues to be litigated;

(3) Evidence, including objects and documents, that have been marked and will be
presented;

(4) Names of witnesses who will be presented and their testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and

(5) Schedule of the presentation of evidence.

          The pre-trial order shall also contain a directive to the public prosecutor to appear for
the State and take steps to prevent collusion between the parties at any stage of the
proceedings and fabrication or suppression of evidence during the trial on the merits.

(c) The parties shall not be allowed to raise issues or present witnesses and evidence other
than those stated in the pre-trial order. The order shall control the trial of the case unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

(d) The parties shall have five days from receipt of the pre-trial order to propose corrections
or modifications.

Section 13. Prohibited compromise. - The court shall not allow compromise on prohibited matters,
such as the following:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or of a legal separation;

(3) Any ground lor legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts; and

 (6) Future legitime.

Section 14. Trial. - (a) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of the reception of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.

(b) The grounds for legal separation must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.

(c) The court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including members
of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made if the
court determines on the record othat requiring a party to testify in open court would not
enhance the ascertainment of truth; would cause to the party psychological harm or inability
to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity; would violate the party's
right to privacy; or would be offensive to decency

(d) No copy shall be taken nor any examination or perusal of the records of the case or parts
thereof be made by any person other than a party or counsel of a party, except by order of
the court.

Section 15. Memoranda. - The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of
the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.

Section 16. Decision. - (a) The court shall deny the petition on any of the following grounds:

(1) The aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of or has
consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;

(2) There is connivance in the commission of the offense-or act constituting the
ground for legal separation;

(3) Both parties have given ground for legal separation;

(4) There is collusion between the parties to obtain the decree of legal separation; or

(5) The action is barred by prescription.

(b) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the
Decree of Legal Separation shall be issued by the court only after full compliance with
liquidation under the Family Code.

          However, in the absence of any property of.the parties, the court shall forthwith issue a
Decree of Legal Separation which shall be registered in the Civil Registry where the
marriage was recorded and in the Civil Registry where the Family Court granting the legal
separation is located.

(c) The decision shall likewise declare that:

 (1) The spouses are entitled to live separately from each other but the marriage bond
is not severed;

(2) The obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases; and

(3) The offending spouse is disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by
intestate succession, and provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will
of the innocent spouse are revoked by operation of law.

(d) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served
with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall also be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

Section 17. Appeal. -

(a) Pre-condition. - No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has
filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.

(b) Notice of Appeal - An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the
decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal upon
the adverse parties.

Section 18. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, and support of minor children. - Upon
entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of
judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party,
shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including
custody and support of common children, under the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

Section 19. Issuance of Decree of Legal Separation. - (a) The court shall issue the Decree of Legal
Separation after:

(1) registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition tor legal separation in
the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry where
the Family Court is located; and

(2) registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and
attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.

Section 20. Registration and publication of the Decree of Legal Separation; decree as best
evidence. -

(a) Registration of decree.-The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in
the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, in the Civil Registry of the place where
the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report
 to the court compliance with this requirement within thirty days iron receipt of the copy of the
Decree.

(b) Publication of decree.-- In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties
shall cause the publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(c) Best evidence.-The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the legal
separation of the parties and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties
of petitioner and respondent.

Section 21. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. - (a) In case a
party dies at any stage of me proceedings before the entry of judgment, the court shall order the
case closed and terminated without prejudice to the settlement of estate proper proceedings in the
regular courts.

(b) If the party dies after the entry of judgment, the same shall be binding upon the parties
and their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.

Section 22. Petition for revocation of donations. - (a) Within five (5) years from the date the decision
granting the petition for legal separation has become final, the innocent spouse may file a petition
under oath the same proceeding for legal separation to revoke the donations in favor of the
offending spouse.

(b)The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds of Deeds in
the places where the properties are located.

(c)Alienations, liens, and encumbrances registered in good faith. before the recording of the
petition for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected.

(d)After the issuance of the Decree of Legal Separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the
designation of the offending spouse as a beneficiary in any insurance policy even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation or change shall take effect upon
written notification thereof to the insurer.

Section 23. Decree of Reconciliation. - (a) If the spouses had reconciled, a joint manifestation under
oath, duly signed by the spouses, may be filed in the same proceeding for legal separation.

(b) If the reconciliation occurred while the proceeding for legal separation is pending, the
court shall immediately issue an order terminating the proceeding.

(c) If the reconciliation occurred after the rendition of the judgment granting the petition for
legal separation but before the issuance of the Decree, the spouses shall express in their
manifestation whether or not they agree to revive the former regime of their property
relations or choose a new regime.

          The court shall immediately issue a Decree of Reconciliation declaring that the legal
separation proceeding is set aside and specifying the regime of property relations under
which the spouses shall be covered.

(d) If the spouses reconciled after the issuance of the Decree, the court, upon proper motion,
shall issue a decree of reconciliation declaring therein that the Decree is set aside but the
 separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected
subsists, unless the spouses have agreed to revive their former regime of property relations
or adopt a new regime.

(e) In case of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d). if the reconciled spouses choose to adopt a
regime of property relations different from that which they had prior to the filing of the petition
for legal separation, the spouses shall comply with Section 24 hereof.

(f) The decree of reconciliation shall be recorded in the Civil Registries where the marriage
and the Decree had been registered.

Section 24. Revival of property regime or adoption of another. -

(a) In case of reconciliation under Section 23, paragraph (c) above, the parties shall file a
verified motion for revival of regime of property relations or the adoption of another regime of
property relations in the same proceeding for legal separation attaching to said motion their
agreement for the approval of the court.

(b) The agreement which shall be verified shall specify the following:

(1) The properties to be contributed to the restored or new regime;

(2) Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and

(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses, and the amounts owing
to each.

(c) The creditors shall be furnished with copies of the motion and the agreement.

(d) The court shall require the spouses to cause the publication of their verified motion for
two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.

(e) After due hearing, and the court decides to grant the motion, it shall issue an order
directing the parties to record the order in the proper registries of property within thirty days
from receipt of a copy of the order and submit proof of compliance within the same period.

Section 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15,2003 following its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.