Saunders War On The Homefront

War on the
Homefront
State intervention in
Queensland 1938-1948
KAY SAUNDERS
\ ^ ^ ^
iî0^'
Fi^n
5A29NP
III lllllllllll III lllllllllll III II Nil II mill III! nil II

3 UOdT O T T - A I 7 5 0 1
War on the Homefront
Kay Saunders is a Reader in History at the University of
Queensland. Dr Saunders was bom in Brisbane in 1947 and
has travelled extensively through Africa, the southern states
of America, South America, the Caribbean, Europe and the
USSR. Her other major books include Race Relations in
Colonial Queensland (revised edition 1988, 1993, with
Ravmond Evans and Kathryn Cronin), Indentured Labour in
je. Gender
ivans) and
Finch and
University of Queensland
Presented to
The Fryer Memorial Library of

Australian Literature
by
UNIVERSITY o r .JJ_.iiSL,\ND PRESS
199^
Kay Saunders is a Reader in History at the University of
Queensland. Dr Saunders was bom in Brisbane in 1947 and
has travelled extensively through Africa, the southern states
of America, South America, the Caribbean, Europe and the
USSR. Her other major books include Race Relations in
Colonial Queensland (revised edition 1988, 1993, with
Raymond Evans and Kathryn Cronin), Indentured Labour in
the British Empire 1840-1920, Workers in Bondage, Gender
Relations in Australia (with c«. - thor Raymond Evans) and
Australia's Frontline (with Libby Connors, Lyn Finch and
Helen Taylor).
oQp STUDIES IN AUSTRALIAN HISTORY
General Editor: Associate Professor Lyndall Ryan
Women's Studies Unit
Flinders University of South AusU-alia
Also in this series:
Glen St J. Barclay, A Very Small Insurance Policy: The Politics of Australian

Involvement in Vietnmn 1954-67
Margaret Bevege, Behind Barbed Wire: Internment in Australia during World
War II
Tom Cochrane, Blockade: The Queensland Loans Affair 1920-1924
Dennis Cryle, Tlie Press in Colonial Queensland
Kay Daniels and Mary Murnane, Australia's Women: A Documentary History
Ray Evans, The Red Flag Riots: A Study of Intolerance
Ray Evans, Kay Saunders and Kathryn Cronin, Race Relations in Colonial
Queensland: A History of Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination
Gerhard Fischer, Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Home Front Experience in
Australia 1914-1920
Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton, Labor in Queensland: From the 1890s
to 1988
John McNair and Tom Poole (eds), Russia and the Fifth Continent
Denis Murphy, Roger Joyce and Margaret Cribb, The Premiers of Queensland
Stuart Svcnscn, The Shearers' War: The Story of the I89I Shearers' Strike
Jan Walker, Jondaiyan Station: The Relationship Between Pastoral Capital
and Pastoral Labour 1840-1890
In preparation:
Gail Reekie, On the Edge: Women's Experiences of Queensland

Yuriko Nagata, Japanese Internment in Australia during World War II
Bill Thorpe, Colonial Queensland 1840-1900
Douglas Hassall, Australia and Nazism
William Douglass, From Italy to Ingham: Italians in North Queensland
Wendy Sclby, Motherhood in Labor's Queensland 1915-1957
Stuart Svensen, 1890 Maritime Strike
War on the
Homefront
State intervention in
Queensland 1938-1948
KAY SAUNDERS
University of Queensland Press

First published 1993 by University of Queensland Press
Box 42, St Lucia, Queensland 4067 AusU-alia
© Kay Saunders 1993 "'"" " '' ^^''' '-'-^-'-^'^^l-^fJO .ic>.u .ii.L,,^
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing

for the purposes of private study, research, criticism
or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no
part may be reproduced by any process without written
permission. Enquiries should be made to the publisher
The typeset text for this book was supplied by the author in camera-ready form
Printed in Australia by McPherson's Printing Group, Victoria
Distributed in the USA and Canada by

International Specialized Book Services, Inc.,
5804 N.E. Hassalo Su-eet, Portland, Oregon 97213-3640
Cataloguing in Publication Data

National Library of Australia
Saunders, Kay, 1947-

War on the homefront: state intervention in Queensland
1938-1948.
Bibliography.
Includes index.
I. Worid War, 1939-1945 — Queensland. 2. Humanrights•

Queensland. 3. Queensland — Politics and government —
1922-1945, 4. Queensland — Politics and government —
1945-1965.1. Title.
320.9943
ISBN 0 7022 2377 8

CONTENTS
Illustrations vi
Tables vii
Acknowledgments viii
Introduction: War, Society and the State 1

I Managing the Emergency: The Designation and
Delegation of Powers, 1938-48 9
II The Enemy Within? The Process of Internment
of Enemy Aliens, 1939-45 {with Helen Taylor) 33
III The Management of Segregation: Black American
Servicemen in Queensland, 1941-45 {with Helen Taylor) 59
rv The Policing of Morals: State Intervention into
Public Health 1937-45 (with Helen Taylor) 81
V "Red Baiting is an AWU Habit": Surveillance and
Prosecution of Communists, 1939-45 706
VI Who Really Governs This Country? State Intervention During the
1946 Meat Workers' Strike and the 1949 Railway
Strike 124
Conclusion 142
Notes 148
References 175
Index 755
ILLUSTRATIONS
following page 94
"Democracy is in Danger", 1941

V.D. Hello Boy Friend, Coming MY Way?
Typical Dormitory at the Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital, 1944
Treatment Cubicles for Females, 1944
"A Shot in the Back", 1940
"Morale of Stalingrad", 1942
"It Can Happen Here"
"Picket Polka": Fred Paterson's arrest in 1948
TABLES
Following page 86
1 Internees in Australia, 31 October 1940.

2 Enemy Aliens Registered in Australia, 31 December 1942.
3 Number of Aliens and Naturalised British Subjects of Enemy Birth
in Queensland, 1941.
4 Enemy Alien Internees in Australia, April 1942.
5 Numbers of Enemy Aliens in Queensland on Allied Works Council,
1942.
6 Distribution of Black American Troops, March 1942.
7 Numbers of Black US Military Personnel in Australia, 1 April 1944.
8 Incidence of Notified Cases of Venereal Disease among Civilian
Population of Queensland, 1940-46.
9 Percentage of Male and Female Civilians Venereal Disease Notified
Cases in Queensland 1940-46.
10 Incidence of Notified Cases of Venereal Disease among Australian
Civilian and Military Population in Queensland, 1940-46.
11 Percentage of Male and Female Australian Civilian and Military
Notified Cases of Venereal Diseases in Queensland, 1940-46.
12 Incidence of Notified Cases of Syphilis and Gonorrhoea in Queens-
land 1942^3.
13 Percentage of Male and Female notified Cases of Venereal Disease
in Queensland, 1942-43.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I should like to acknowledge the generous financial assistance given by the
University of Queensland and the ARG.
I should like to thank the reference staff at the following institutions - -
Public Records Office, London; Imperial War Museum, London; National
Archives, Washington DC; National Archives, Ottawa; Australian Archive
depositories in Brisbane, Canberra and Melbourne; the Public Record Of-
fice, Laverton (Victoria) and the Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Dr
Ruth Kerr, formerly Deputy State Archivist of Queensland has proven over
the years an invaluable guide and enthusiastic supporter.
Sir Sydney Schubert, when Director General of the Queensland Premier's
Department, kindly allowed me access to files not released to the Archives.
I offer my thanks to Margaret Bevege for permission to consult her
unpublished doctoral dissertation. Daryl Mclntyre shared his work-in-pro-
gress on Australia in World War II. Charles Comer of Toowoomba gener-
ously gave me a copy of his unpublished autobiography.
Catherine Spencer spent more hours than she would ever have voluntarily
chosen on various versions of the manuscript. Her good humour and support
have been a source of strength. My thanks also to Serena Bagley for her
assistance in the final preparation of the manuscript. Suzanne Lewis had the
formidable task of preparing a 'camera ready' text. Their professionalism
and dedication is much valued.
Libby Connors, Bill Thorpe, Lyn Finch and Mark Finnane all gave
valuable criticism on popular chapters. Raymond Evans, with whom I have
been engaged in intellectual debate for over twenty years, gave me practical
advice and creative insight. His own work, constituting as it does the
hallmark of excellence in Australian social history, remains an inspiration
for all of us who labour in that exciting domain. I benefitted greatly from
the careful criticism offered by Geoffrey Bolton who set aside valuable time
while trying to settle into a new job.
Abridged versions of several chapters have appeared in journals. I should
like to thank the editors for permission to include this material: "To Combat
The Plague. The construction of moral alarm and the role of state interven-
tion in Queensland in the Second World War", 77ecare Vol 14 No 1 1988-
"Red Baiting is an AWU Habit! The Prosecution of the Communists in
Queensland in World War 11", JRAHS, Vol. 74, No. 3, 1988: "The Enemy
Within? The Process of Internment of Enemy Aliens in Queensland 1939_
Acknowledgments ix
1945", AJPH, Vol. 34, No. 1, 1988; "Conflict between the American and
Australian Governments over the introduction of Black American Service-
men into Australia during World War 11", AJPH, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1987.
Helen Taylor, with whom I collaborated on earlier shorter versions of
chapters 2-4 made history seem an exciting adventure. Unfortunately her
commitment to her doctoral dissertation prevented her coauthorship of this
book as had been originally intended. I assume full responsibility for the
arguments presented.
Finally, to my daughter, Erin Evans, I extend my deepest appreciation. I
know you endured long (doubtless boring) discussions on the nature of the
state with a remarkable tolerance and perception.
Note on the use of terms. Throughout the text, a State (referring to a political
entity within the Commonwealth) is always designated by using a capital
letter. When referring to the institution of governmental power, lower case
'state' is employed.
To the memory of my father, Eric Saunders (1920-1980), whose own
life was shattered by the call of patriotism at El Alamein on 1
September 1942,
and
my great uncle, Oswald Englander (1893-1956), who pointed me in the

direction of Mozart and Africa.
Introduction: War, Society and the State
Historians tend to discuss the state as a series of static or inert
monolithic institutions.' This book, concentrating upon Queensland in
the years 1938 to 1948, will show that the state, and particularly its
bureaucracy,^ is highly flexible, responding to new crises with alacrity
and resolve; expansive and experimental, it is not monolithic but
possesses complex and contradictory elements. Writing in 1982, the
Sydney History Labour Group in the introduction to an edited
collection of essays lament the lack of attention that the concept of
the state has received from Australian historians.^ Whilst concurring
with the broad parameters of this estimation, however, Kevin Fewster
contends that:
Even if few Australian historians have explicitly incorporated

concepts of the state in their scheme of things, the impact of the
institution is implicit in much that they write.^
Desley Deacon agrees that:
For people who supposedly have a 'characteristic talent for

bureaucracy', Australians have paid little scholarly attention to the
state... We have many studies of the development of parties and
classes, but almost none that examine the construction of the state
and its relationships to other parts of the political and social
system.*
Extending these analyses, Alistair Davidson in a provocative article

entitled "An Invisible State" goes so far as to maintain that:
Until 1975 there was an absence which was not seen in the even
richer literature on Australian history. There was no history of the
Australian state. This absence was aU the more remarkable

because of the degree to which the state ... had been present in
the rest of Australian life - a fact which commentators and
historians have usually noted cursorily as they passed on to their
muttons.*
This is not to assert that any conceptual notion or analysis of the
state was altogether absent. For, given the unique nature of the
British settlement of the continent as a gaol controlled by the military
and navy with a civil polity evolving slowly and unevenly, the state
assumed a far more intrusive and controlling role than it did in the
contemporary metropolitan society. Rather, Australian historians have
impUcitly described and charted the developments of various forms of
the state apparatus and related issues (the granting of separation; the
creation of political institutions; the role of the judiciary; the nature of
state intervention when the dubious allegiance to consensual modes
breaks down such as in major strikes; the provision of welfare).
Being predominantly groimded in an empiricist historiographical
tradition, tihey have not sought to ponder the broader questions
involved in understanding the nature of the state and its powers,
leaving these refined and often theoretical debates to political and
legal theorists. Yet historians should not be singled out for criticism
for their lack of theoretical rigour in an intellectual vacuum. As
David Held remarks "... the nature of the State is hard to grasp. This
may seem peculiar for something so pervasive in public and private
life, but it is this pervasiveness that mês it difficult to understand".'
As Gordon L. Clark and Michael Dear confirm in State Apparatus.
Structures of Language and Legitimacy (1984):
The literamre on the state is highly diverse and often confusing.

It seems that almost every discipline and every ideological
persuasion has attempted to develop its own theory of the state.*"
Theorists from Marx, Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas have been

preoccupied with understanding the abstract structural and ideological
nature of power whilst authors like Miliband, Jessop and Offe have
been concerned with developing taxonomies of the state's apparams
The fimdamental weakness of both approaches, at least when
considermg the disciphne of history, is the assumption that the state is
a series of institutions.' William de Maria contends furthermore that
"... the State is die crystaUisation of cultural, racial and nationalistic
themes that in past eras have joined in a specific way to set rh
Introduction
society on its specific themes. These state themes are aU-powerful

and easily eclipse government and bureaucratic authority ... nations
will go to war for these themes. They do not necessarily go to war
for their governments".'"
Taken at face value the proposition that the state's apparatus is
flexible could appear self-evident; for the nature of modem mass
warfare inherently demands flexibility from traditional restraints
concerning the demarcation of status between the civilian and the
military; the limits of executive authority and independent action; the
dubious sanctity of the individual's liberty. Liberal rhetoric about the
separation of powers in the Westminster system and the right of the
individual to uphold dissenting, albeit unpopular, opinions wiU be
regarded as inappropriate, indeed dangerous, luxuries in a society
experiencing total war. Kathleen Burk in her introductory essay in
the collection entitled War and the State. The Transformation of
British Government, 1914-19 (1982) comments that:
The First World War caused striking changes in the organisation

and procedures of British government... [I]t is probable that few of
the changes would have happened during this period had it not
been for the war... Yet the precedent had been set. The
interventionist ministries were consciously chosen as models when
controls were once more needed in the Second World War, and at
that time, controls survived the war for a much longer period."
Extending this analysis, Neil Stammers in his provocative

monograph, Civil Liberties in Britain during the Second World War
(1983) contends that both political democratic theorists, and in their
wake, historians have been reluctant to study comprehensively
government and the political process during periods of crisis. He
argues that:
This omission is symptomatic, for war and crisis are seen as

aberrations in the history and the development of democracy and
study has therefore concentrated on the 'normal' - periods of
relative peace and stability.'^
Yet during the Second World War and the period immediately
following, serious debate was conducted over the nature of power and
the consequences of enlarged executive rule which operated to the
detriment of parliamentary authority and autonomy. British liberal
legal commentators, most notably John Eaves, Hugh Molson, Maurice
Hankey, Arthur Keith, Harold D. LassweU, Marguerite A. Sieghart, Sir

W. Ivor Jennings and the Americans, Clinton L. Rossiter and Paul U.
Rava, were concerned that the executive was assuming unprecedented
powers." Being predominantly experts in constitutional or
administrative law they identified a regrettable tendency towards
totalitarianism, in this case the almost unrestricted power of the
executive. They were not, except for Lasswell and Rossiter, political
theorists, hence the narrow range of their concerns and argurnents.
Despite the limitations imposed both by the adherence to liberal
ideology and the specifically empirical nature of their enquiries, these
authors tell us much about the extension of power in total war; the
increasing tendency to centralise decision making in a small coterie -
in this case the executive wing of government - and the process of
severely circumscribing individual liberty.
Studies such as Paul Hasluck's monumental Australia in the War
of 1939-45: The Government arui the People in two volumes, which
by virtue of its comprehensiveness, clarity of argument and sound
research must be regarded as the classic text in the broad area of the
nation at war, does deal with the nature and operation of the state.
Yet, given its status as the domestic contribution within the official
history of Australia at war from 1939 to 1945, a certain blandness
pervades the discourse. Hasluck is circumspect and conclusions must
often be drawn inferentially. No doubt his status as an aspiring, and
later, successful Liberal parliamentarian during the period of the
books' long research, gestation and production contributed such a
seemingly bland impartiality. Never does Hasluck allow a personal
opinion to intmde or cloud his judgment. This may ultimately, in
retrospect, be seen as a limitation; for the extension of executive
power and the almost totalitarian thoroughness of the national security
regulations needs far more critical and stringent appraisal and analysis.
Hasluck's inclusion of the general topic of internment and the
prosecution of communist dissidents as appendices rather than his
incorporating them into the text graphically displays the tendency to
cast the dissident figuratively as an outsider. These two areas, which
provide a good deal of the substantive argument of this study, rather
than bemg discrete units that can be regarded as aberrations, instead
reveal die nature of those processes operating in a society under
crisis.
The odier general book. All In! Australia During the Second
World War (1983) by Michael McKeman only deals tangentially with
the issues of state power and their extension during total war. Whilst
acknowledging that McKeman's intention is to provide a well written
Introduction
and illustrated popular text that is not confmed by the rigours of

excessive documentation and detailed analysis, one must also register
he does ignore central questions. The title in itself reveals the
imderlying premises upon which the argument is grounded. Rather
like Arthur Marwick in Britain in the Century of Total War. War,
Peace and Social Change 1900-1967 (1968), McKeman regards the
Second World War as a levelling process where hardship and
tribulation was democratically distributed throughout an unequal
society. Thus the questions of the curtailment of civil liberties for
those deemed security risks, whether political, ethnic or sexual,
disrupts the pattern elaborated upon the theme of "equality of
sacrifice". William de Maria in "From Battlefield to Breadline"
extends this theme. He argues that policy formulation in World War
n there was a noticeable and "active denigration of class and factional
divisions and support for 'all hands on deck' policy. Solidarity was
deemed to be important to the successful prosecution of the war".
Yet this interpretation runs counter to his other contention that the
state reflects all the ethnic nationalistic themes and tensions.'"
The two other substantive studies of the AustraUan homefront
during the Second World War are concerned with the American
presence. John Hammond Moore's Oversexed, Overpaid and Over
Here. Americans in Australia 1941-1945 (1981) suffers from the
author's unfamiliarity with Australian history and society as well as
an excessive concentration upon the diversity among the American
forces here. E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts' superbly researched
study Yanks Down Under, 1941-45. The American Impact on Australia
(1985) relies too heavily upon description and the density of their
argument often obscures the general patterns. Unlike McKeman's
account, both of these books have conflict and accommodation at the
centre of their discussions. Given that the conflict is between
American service personnel - ultimately a foreign force - and
Australians, this in no way challenges the view of a nation united.
In this regard, study of Australian society during World War U
has taken quite a divergent path from analyses of the impact of the
Great War. At the outset it should be acknowledged that, outside of
the special privilege of access accorded to Hasluck as the official war
historian, the main body of documents have only recently been
available for scholarly research. The handicap may not however
reside in access to sources but in the perceptions of and the
conceptualisation of historical problems presented by both cataclysmic
periods. Scholarly studies by authors such as Marilyn Lake, Raymond
Evans, Denis Murphy, Ian Tumer, Kevin Fewster, Verity Burgmann,
Frank Cain and Alan Gilbert all stress the turmoil, conflict and deep
divisions that Austrahan society experienced in World War I.
Five main areas of conflict can be identified during the years 1914
to 1922, the year the War Precautions Act was revoked: first the
campaigns around the conscription referenda in 1916 and 1917 which
led to a fundamental spht in the Labor Party and its loss of office till
1929; secondly, the prosecution of dissidents, in particular the trial
and conviction of twelve members of the Industrial Workers of the
World in 1916; thirdly, the issue of censorship and propaganda;
fourthly, industrial turmoil over wages, conditions and a drastic
reduction in the real standard of living and lastly ideological battles
between Empire loyalists and various groups of pacifists, socialists,
bolsheviks and anti-war campaigners.
Even the most superficial exammation of such issues in the
Second World War reveals a different scenario. Conscription did not
rip the Labor Party or Australian society apart. Under the provisions
of the Defence Act of 1909 compulsory military service within
Australian territory for males of proscribed age was allowed. Given
the immediacy of the threat posed by Japan in early 1942 and the
technicality that Papua and New Guinea were Australian territories,
conscription never presented a major issue. The anti-war movement
was small, but without the issue of conscription and the immediacy of
military operations after 1942, it was destined to remain an unpopular
minority movement. The ban on the Communist and Nazi parties
drew little criticism; though the communists' disavowal of Australian
commitment to the British war effort until the USSR entered the war
m June 1941 provoked intense antagonism. Their position of
influence in key unions, as this study wiU demonstrate, encouraged
both the Queensland and federal governments to mobilise against
them. There was no real equivalent of the Industrial Workers of the
World and the small numbers and circumstances under which the
communists were gaoled never roused widespread protest about
arbitrary or cormpt use of power.
Lasfly, the cost of living issue which ran through the increasing
war weariness in the Great War was later kept under partial control
by the universal use of rationing. Likewise, profiteering was
controUed more effectively, though by no means entirely, by the
provisions of the national security regulations. This is not to suggest
that workers gladly accepted burdens and sacrifices. Studies on the
operation of the WEB, the Manpower authority and industrial
disputation all too clearly demonstrate the discrepancy between the
rhetoric of equality of sacrifice and the realities of die burdens placed
Introduction
upon the working class.

The focus of this study revolves around the manner in which the
state perceived, contained and instimtionalised those deemed to be
impediments to the effective prosecution of the war or threats, in the
case of the Black Americans, to the fundamental ideological and
social premises upon which Australian society depended. As this
study is primarily concemed with States' rights and the tensions
engendered between the Commonwealth and the State of Queensland,
as outiined in Chapter 1, certain nationally based broad issues like
conscription, censorship, the operation of the Manpower authority have
been omitted, though diey provide insightful testimony to the tendency
towards hegemonic and arbitrary control in war. These issues require
a separate study in themselves.
Rather, this monograph falls into three basic subdivisions: first,
die contaiiunent of the ethnic alien. Chapter 2 will deal with
processes of internment to isolate the "enemy within the gates" whilst
chapter 3 is concemed with the elaborate interlocking systems of
segregation initiated to contain the Black American GIs spatially and
symbolically. The control of sexuality, the use of the national
security regulations against women suspected of contracting venereal
diseases and the extension of the candidates incarcerated in the lock
hospitals, forms the basis of chapter 4. Lastly, attention wiU focus
upon the surveillance and suppression of communists, or those
perceived as communists and "fellow travellers", from 1940 to 1948.
The empirical data wiU focus upon Queensland. This is not due
to mere provincial partiality. Queensland historically is the ideal
society to smdy in order to understand those repressive forces
operating during periods of intense crisis and perceived threats to the
body politic. First, Queensland became the base from which die
Allied forces launched the Pacific offensives from 1942 onwards.
Over one million American personnel passed through the northem
State. Secondly, Queensland had a long and enduring history of
isolating, incarcerating and institutionalising those deemed deviant.
Only the criteria changed according to die particular emergency.
Thirdly, Queensland governments, regardless of political allegiance,
have shown a marked tendency towards firm insistence upon the
inviolability of State's rights. Queensland is not alone in this regard.
This brought them into conflict with both die Menzies and, most
particularly the Curtin, governments over the delegation of powers in
war. The Commonwealth wanted to centralise power, a process
fiercely resisted by the States in general and Queensland most
specifically.
8 War on the Homefront
Rather than identifying a clearly efficient delegation of powers,

tills study shows the confusion, duplication, intense territoriality of
various agencies with constitutional and political problems arising over
the uneven demarcation between Commonwealth and State; between
civil and military jurisdiction and between Australian and American
military authority. Under the guise of patriotism and the immediacy
of the emergency, botii die Commonwealth and die Queensland
governments extended their powers. In particular, policing functions,
which were deemed necessary to monitor the ethnic alien, the sexually
active woman and the radical trade unionist can be seen at a premium
during times of war. Yet, as the Sydney Labour History Group
conclude:
The history of the state is the history of the confrontation with

capitalist, patriarchal, racial and familial power relations in
Australian society. It has been a process of many contradictions
and continual change.'^
This study examines and elaborates tiiese processes, in war-time and

its aftermath.
Managing the Emergency:
The Designation and Delegation of
Powers 1938-48
Total war in die twentieth century has presented die state with an
unparalleled crisis as well as opportunity to enlarge and to consolidate
its functions, operations and powers. Speaking in Febmary 1942,
Prime Minister John Curtin asserted diat "We are at a stage in our
history when the stmggle for survival as a nation overrides every
odier consideration."' Referring specifically to the Uniform Tax
proposals in 1942, Treasurer Ben Chifley further added that "...
[d]uring the serious crisis through which the nation is now passing,
every benefit which one section of the nation has over another must
be surrendered in the interests of total war... National rights must take
precedence over all State rights."^ Constitutional and administrative
difficulties in Australia arose over die delegation of powers; for,
aldiough die nation's political leaders at both a State and federal level
recognised and responded to the grave emergency which involvement
in the war presented, no single or unified solution was apparent.
World War Two witnessed an increasing centralisation of power
and control in the hands of the federal government, a process that had
begun in the Great War. Coterminously with a strident assertion of
States' rights and sovereign autonomy, these dual systems produced
conflicts that ran counter to the effective prosecution of the war effort
on the homefront. The Queensland government, though often engaged
in protracted conflict with the Commonwealth over what its leaders
perceived as a violation of State autonomy, at the same time
manipulated war-time federal controls in order to centralise and
expand its own powers, particularly in the area of policing functions.
Ambiguity initially arose in the fundamental domain of
constitutional law because the constitution of the Commonwealth does
not contain provisions relating to general emergency powers. These
are primarily embodied in various State statutes and constitutions.^ At
its most general interpretation, as Lord Dunedin in 1931 commented
that "... a state of emergency is something that does not pernut aiiy
exact legal defmition: it connotes a state of matters calling for drastic
action".* The problem in Australia went far beyond which particular
natural or civil catastrophe should be designated a "state of
emergency". At the outset the problems of which instrumentality
should devise and control the remedies for this "drastic action
presented a grave constitutional crisis not easily demarcated or
resolved. The States in wartime sought to retain their powers from
the incursions of the expanding federal government.
H.P. Lee identifies die three arenas of emergency: "war-time",
"peace-time" and "civil emergencies". These might variously include
war, famine, earthquake, flood and die collapse of civil government.^
The American constitutional theorist, Clinton L. Rossiter in his classic
text, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern
Democracies, first published in 1948, cites war, rebellion and
economic depression as the "three crises of modem democracies". He
demonstrates how, in Great Britain, for mstance, the Emergency
Powers Act of 1920, which extended the powers of die war-time
Defence of the Realm Act, was passed specifically "to forestall a
general strike".* Later it became the basis for war-time regulation and
restriction. Likewise, in Queensland, wide powers were used by
various Labor and conservative governments to break militant
industrial action, for instance, in the 1912 general strike, the railway
strikes of 1927 and 1948, and the meat workers' strike of 1946, the
pastoral strike of 1956, the Mt Isa dispute in 1965 and the power
industry strike of 1985.
But war does not represent a lunited series of events defined by
time, place and participants as a strike usually does. Radier, a society
involved in total war is pushed to its very limit in order to ensure
mere survival. In reviewing procedures in Britain, Neil Stammers
demonstrates diat die concept of "war-time" in itself is far too vague
and problematical. Rather what should be addressed are die questions
of specific and urgent crisis in war-time such as imminent invasion
and why governments are reluctant to relinquish dieir emergency
powers when the crisis abates. He concludes:
Even after die military crisis had passed, in mid 1940 die
contmumg stmctural consensus enabled die government to retain
die powers diat had been taken in spite of pariiamentarv
opposition. In dus context Parliament does not appear to have
acted as a check on die executive in so far as die making of and
retention of regulations, was concemed.'' '
Managing the Emergency 11
Rossiter likewise concluded that "no form of government can

survive that excludes dictatorships when the life of the nation is at
stake".* Hence the normal checks and balances upheld in liberal
parliamentary democracies in peace-time are dangerous luxuries in
times of total war. The distinction that Rossiter makes is between
constitutional and totalitarian dictatorships. He argues that:
The outstanding institution of constitutional dictatorship of a

legislative nature is the delegation of legislative powers. What
this amounts to is a voluntary transfer of law-making authority
fi-om the nation's representative assembly to the nation's
executive.'
Yet this transition is problematical. In both Britain and Australia

this process was fraught with conflict in both the parliamentary arena
and in public discourse. In Australia the question was far more
complex; for, not only was the Commonwealth government, especially
after December 1941, virtually attempting to mle by decree under the
provisions of the wide-ranging national security regulations but the
States of Queensland and Victoria passed their own emergency
legislation in 1940 and 1939 respectively. These could variously
ensure totalitarian executive government at two levels for the duration
of a crisis such as foreign invasion. Rossiter concludes that "States'
rights present distinct barriers to effective crisis action, and in great
emergency, they will be broken down".'" Yet, Australian data would
suggest that this is not a foregone, even an easy, process. The States
do not relinquish their autonomy and competing systems of
Commonwealth and State jurisdiction and instrumentalities interact,
often with friction and inefficiency.
Total war, or indeed any involvement in a declared war in
twentieth century Australia, came under the auspices of the broadly
defined defence powers embodied in the Australian constitution. As
Justice Isaacs pronoimced in a landmark decision in 1916:
It [the defence powers] is the ultima ratio of the nation. The

defence power... passing into action becomes the pivot of the
Constitution, because it is the bulwark of the State (sic). Its limits
then are bounded only by the requirements of self-preservation."
This flexible defence power is embodied in Section 51 which allows

diat:
The Parliament shall, subject to diis Constitution, have power to

make laws for die peace, order, and good government ot the
Conunonwealdi widi respect to: (vi) The naval and military
defence of the Commonwealth and die several States, and the
control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the
Commonwealth.
Various legal commentators such as H.P. Lee, Colin Howard and

Geoffrey Sawer have emphasised the elasticity inherent in the defence
powers to deal with national emergencies such as the threat of
invasion.'^ Lee continues that, unlike other powers in Section 51:
The defence power is remarkable, in that its scope is not static.

Its variable nature can be likened to the mercury column of a
diermometer. As the conditions of war become more intense, the
scope of die defence powers increases. As die war emergency
cools down the scope... similarly contracts.'^
Though, on the surface, the passing of the National Security Bill in

1939-40 and die implementation of extensive and comprehensive
regulations, which ranged over and controlled every aspect of national
life, would seem to have settied any ambiguity over jurisdiction of
State and Commonwealth governments, this was not the case. The
States, particularly Queensland and Victoria, clung tenaciously to tiieir
own autonomy and aggressively defined their spheres of action and
authority in order to deal with possible emergencies.
Australia was not alone in implementing such drastic legislation.
The Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts 1939 and 1940, which operated
in the United Kingdom and colonies with special imperial defence
provisions for New Zealand, Australia, Burma, India and Soutiiem
Rhodesia, gave almost unlimited and unrestricted powers.'* Sir
Samuel Hoare, in the debates in die House of Commons when he
proposed the Bill, commented that its powers were "very wide, very
drastic and very comprehensive"; but he was convinced they would be
appUed witii "moderation, toleration and common sense". Stammers,
m criticising the haste widi which such powers allowing virtual
dictatorship by the Executive were granted, adds:
Thus, after some fifteen years of preparation, die government

could say, and die House of Commons could accept, diat die
circumstances were so urgent diat die Bill would not be properly
considered by Pariiament. A few amendments were proposed
during the committee stage, but those put to a vote were defeated
and the Bill emerged from both Houses unscathed.'^
Coinciding with the Nazi offensive through Westem Europe in

May 1940, further amendments were made to this Act which
considerably restricted Britons' civil liberties.'* Rossiter, writing from
die perspective of 1948, believed that:
One of the most impressive features of the British government of

die recent war was the scmpulous and consistent regard for the
civil liberties of the people throughout die conflict.'^
He does however admit that "perhaps the worst blot... was die
wholesale internment of enemy aliens over eighteen in the dark days
of May 1940"." In Canada, as Robert H. Keyserlingk notes:
Sensitive to the alarms of war and the pressures of an aroused

public opinion, the federal cabinet suspended civil rights in Canada
under the 1927 War Measures Act on 1 September 1939, nine
days before Canada went to war. This state of apprehended war
permitted the govemment to legislate secret orders-in-council and
to determine whose liberties would be retained or removed."
The Australian War Book, prepared by the Defence department

and based on the British model, initially laid down the foundations for
the preparation for war. H. Duncan Hall, writing in 1943, stated diat
"...[t]he closely guarded British War Book... was taken from its safe
and opened in Whitehall just before Mimich, in September 1938". He
adds that "similar War Books were opened at the same time in
Ottawa, Canberta, Wellington, Pretoria, and Delhi".^ As Paul
Hasluck comments:
The book was only intelligible if it was accepted that, when the
United Kingdom was at war, Australia would not remain neutral,
although the control of the nature and extent of Australian
participation in warlike activities would be wholly a matter for the
Australian government.^'
Thus, the Australian War Book must be understood within the

context of imperial strategies. It gave, however, due regard to (but
did not defme) the intemal process of cooperation between the States
and the Conrnionwealdi, and fully recognised the necessity to create
new instrumentalities to cope widi die unforeseen demands made by

modem technological warfare involving die entire civilian population
and not simply an expanded army, airforce and navy. The expMision
of die functions of existing civil departments was envisaged, though
the specific features this process would take were not described.
Basic demarcations were made between the preparation for muitary
defence such as constmction of camps, transport routes and
communication networks, surveillance procedures, the provision of
medical care, the control of munitions, coastal shipping and facilities.
Civil audiority was designated in the areas of air raid precautions,
evacuation, the protection of property, particularly vital defence plants
and utilities, and the expansion of the fire brigades. Hasluck
concludes that "[t]here was scarcely a chapter in the War Book which
did not require State cooperation or assistance at some point".^
Yet, by this bland pronouncement, Hasluck overlooks die vital
areas of dispute between the Commonwealth and the States.
Queensland, as the potential "invasion front-line" State, in particular,
was most aggressive in its reluctance to transfer overriding control
and bureaucratic management to the federal govemment. Police
Commissioner P.J. Carroll in a conference of representatives of all
Essential Services held in Brisbane on 17 April 1939 alerted the
possibility of further demarcation disputes. He stated that:
The Defence Department will be so busily engaged in repelling

the enemy to make any attempt to safeguard the property widiin
this State. The result is the civil power is now called upon to
protect the whole property of the State and that onus is on die
Police Force.^
Queensland had no intention of relinquishing powers to die

Conunonwealdi. Rather bodi politicians and leading public servants
like Police Commissioner Carroll and Sir Raphael Cilento, die director
general of Health and Medical Services, saw die war as an
opportunity to expand dieir domain particularly in the vital area of
policing.
In line widi die parameters laid down in die War Book,
negotiations between Commonwealdi and State Ministers did however
begm in 1935 when plans were made for air raid precautions.^
Queensland implemented its own coordinated plans in mid 1939 when
die Central Air Raid Precautions Committee was formed Headed bv
die under secretary for Healdi and Home Affairs, other members
included die director general for Healtii and Medical Services die
commissioner of police, the coordinator general of Pubhc Works, the

Lord Mayor of Brisbane and senior representative of the Defence
department and the Chief Secretary's office. Committees, usually
comprising the mayor, or shire councillor, a senior police officer and
the govemment medical officer were inaugurated in the larger coastal
towns. Their activities were centrally administered in Brisbane.^ The
Air Raid Wardens Act of 1939 gave the police commissioner authority
to appoint wardens who would be employees of the State govemment
and subject to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.^
Other concems were apparent in the planning for a war that
seemed inevitable. The delegates to a 1936 Australia-wide conference
on defence and planning recommended diat a transport conference was
urgendy needed to consider the question of a uniform railway gauge.
This did not eventuate.^' The premiers' conference of 1938 revived
the issue and expanded concems into areas such as die location of
vital war industrial plants and public utilities; procedures formulated
to assist the operation of essential police, hospital and other
emergency services; the provision of food and other essential
commodities as well as govemment links with munition production.
Hasluck concludes that these discussions in September had not
"produced any substantial results". Yet, a month later prompted by
"political improvisation [rather] than of considered planning". Cabinet
decided that these schedules were a priority.^
On 19 October 1938 Dr Earle Page, the acting leader of the
House of Representatives, stated that an extra-ordinary premiers'
conference was to be established to consider the problems involved in
"defence and development".^' Prime Minister Joseph Lyons asked
these delegates to recommend and order a list of priorities detailing
diose works that could be implemented by State mstrumentalities.
Held in conjunction with the Loans Council, die premiers showed
littie enthusiasm for what seemed to be a peripheral matter compared
to die fmstrating business of allocating funds. Hasluck contends that
diey regarded with hostility these proposals as an attempt by die
Commonwealth to direct and coerce the fmances of the various
States.^" Defence of the Commonwealdi in the final analysis for diem
meant the constitutional and political defence of their own State
priorities, autonomy and authority.
Widiin ten days of this 1938 Loans Council meeting. Premier
William Forgan Smith initiated a State Transport Bill. Supposedly
acting on the 1936 recommendations of the report of the royal
commission on transport, led by Justice William Rood Webb, the
premier moved to "co-ordinate state transport". In the debate on the
first reading, Forgan Smidi asked for increased powers for die
Transport Board to deal widi disasters such as flood, tires ana
cyclones,^' aldiough die recommendations of the royal commission naa
been specifically concemed widi efficiency and protection ot die btate
utilities against die financial incursions of private motor travel.
Forgan Smith further contended that:
It also gives diat authority necessary widi regard to rnaking
provision for defence... It is obviously necessary in a condition of
grave national emergency - which we all hope will never arise -
to have power, not only to mobilise all our railways systems but
also aU our road transports... Of course, that power is contained in
the Constitution of Queensland itself. The usual method adopted
is for the Premier of the day to take such action as he thinks
necessary to deal with any situation, and his actions are validated
afterwards if it is required... I repeat that at a time when die
nation's interests are involved, personal interests must always be
swept aside.^'
His concluding sentiment in this long speech gave forebodings of an

almost total and arbitrary disregard for civil liberties, in areas such as
internment, that would emerge in the war crisis. The main dmist of
his argument pointed to a spirited defence by die Queensland
govemment to preserve its own autonomy.
Section 22 of the Transport Bill contained die exact provisions of
the conservative Moore government's Railway Strike and Public Safety
Preservation Act of 1931 which, as leader of the opposition, Forgan
Smidi had then denoimced as an attempt to destroy all liberty
generally and the union movement specifically. Passionately he asked
the 1931 parliament:
... one would imagine diat a state of revolution existed in

Queensland. The powers diat die Govemment apparentiy desire to
invoke are powers diat die Govemment would only ask for during
a period of serious revolution or during a period when die countty
was at war and die people are in a State of Siege.'*
When he became premier in 1932, Forgan Smidi repealed diis act

which was pertmentiy defended by its initiators on die grounds diat
die McCormack Labor govemment in 1927 had behaved widi greater
severity to sttiking railway workers.^' As Brian Carroll shows fection
22 of Forgan Smidi's 1938 bill become notorious in die suppression
of industrial strikes or civil protest. It was successively employed by

Labor Premiers Haidon and Gair in the 1946 meat workers' strike, the
1948 railway strike and die 1956 shearers' strike and by Country
Party Premier Bjelke-Petersen in the Springbok mgby union tour in
1971.'* Further, clauses of die 1938 Racing BiU, seemingly
inexplicably, conformed to the provisions of the British Official
Secrets ActF Certairdy too, as chapter 6 wiU demonstrate. Labor
governments in Queensland have been prepared as readily as
conservative administrations, to employ drastic state intervention to
quell industrial and political militancy.
Five months before the actual declaration of war in Europe,
Queensland's secretary of Health and Home Affairs, Ned Hanlon had
devised detailed plans to maintain public order in die eventuality of a
"war emergency". This was in response to the conference of
Commonwealth and State ministers on defence and development held
in March 1939 which sought:
... [T]he cooperation of the State governments, and the compilation

of schemes by their authorities... [which] were integral parts of the
national preparation for defence.'*
Hanlon moved specifically to augment the powers, functions and

numbers of die civil police in order to defend Queenslanders' lives
and property. In a report to the premier in April 1939, Haidon
stressed diat "...[a]s the War Book indicates. The Police Force will be
a very important instmmentality in time of war emergency, as it is in
times of peace". Other issues canvassed were air raid precautions,
evacuation procedures, d-affic control and a survey of the extent of
arms and ammunition held by "private persons particularly
foreigners"."
On 21 and 22 June 1939 the sole meeting of the National Council,
a body which might have established the preliminary apparatus for
cooperation in the event of war, convened for discussion between
federal and State ministers. Without even an agendum, no resolutions
or plans of action were forthcoming. Rather, the usual negotiating
mechanism of the Loans Council continued to be used as the most
important negotiating and coordinating body between the States and
the federal government.*" Events overseas overtook the operations of
this nebulous informal body and it never reconvened. Yet, by its own
inaction and impotence it allowed State premiers to continue to assert
die supremacy of State's rights and autonomy.
In conveying die formal declaration of war on 5 September 1939

to die Queensland parliament, Forgan Smidi demonstrated a noticeaoie
lack of patriotic fervour. Radier, he saw die event as an occasion to
reiterate State's rights. He confidentiy maintained diat:
The powers of die Commonwealdi are limited to a certain degree.„
Up to diis date, we are operating under Commonwealdi laws and
certain regulations under Commonwealth laws. We also have
reserve powers in certain statutes to enforce those powers if we, at
any time, require to do so.*'
Hanlon continued stressing the State's overriding supremacy:
The Commonwealth has the task of preventing and combating

enemy attack, and the obligation placed upon the State (sic) of a
civU govemment is to maintain the activities of the community
during die emergency and provide as far as possible for the safety
and care of the civilian population and protection of property.
The function of the State govemment and the instrumentalities
created by the State is that protection and care of the civilian
population.*^
This issue was not simply confined to Queensland. For, in

Victoria, the only other Australian State to pass its ovra emergency
powers legislation that provided effectively for executive govemment
by decree. Premier A.A. Dunstan's ministerial statement on die
declaration of war gave notice of his priorities:
The Govemment is, of course, particularly desirous of co-operating

in every possible way witii die Commonwealth Govemment. At
the same time, diere are certain obligations resting upon die State
Govemment which we propose to discharge by way of legislation
of an emergency character.*'
Labor leader, John Cain pledged his support on diis vital issue of
principle to die conservative govemment and went so far to pledge
"support widiout conditions". He concluded:
The best way to avoid dissension (sic) is to recognise our duty is

to all sections of diis conununity, and that no particular sections -
... should be permitted to exploit eidier die Govemment or their
fellow citizens in this crisis.**
The platitudes of regret concerning the nation at war merged

imperceptibly into a discussion on granting die Executive Council
almost unlimited powers. Unlike Queensland, bipartisan unanimity
reigned.
The following day in Canberra Prime Minister Robert Menzies
presented the National Security Bill to parliament. Unlike Forgan
Smith and Hanlon, who sought to maintain State sovereignty to the
seeming exclusion of wider claims, Menzies framed his concems with
an apparent moderation and an acknowledgement of the dilenuna of
engaging in war and, at the same time, preserving the principles of
freedom and civil liberty. Whilst not referring to the delegation of
powers, Menzies confined his remarks to general broad principles:
... whatever may the extent of the power that may be taken to
govern, direct and to control by regulation, there must be as littie
interference with individual rights as is consistent with concerted
national effort... There is no intention on the part of die
Govemment to use these powers when they are granted... in any
other way dian to promote the security of Australia.
He added that:
I hope diat, when the time comes for me to cease to exercise the
powers, I shall be able to say that they were exercised firmly,
definitely and promptiy but widiout intolerance and widi due
respect for the interests of minorities.*^
Events overtook these high moral declarations. As hostilities became

entrenched and the war escalated from limited involvement aiding the
British effort on distant battie zones, to an immediate direct threat of
invasion which prompted hitherto unprecedented centralisation and
authoritarian measures to deal with die crisis, civil liberties were
stringentiy, if imevenly, curtailed. As later chapters will demonstrate,
Australian society became obsessively intent upon identifying and
punishing diose perceived to be potentially undermining national
security, the war effort or morale: Enemy aliens, communists,
members of the Australia First Movement or women sexually involved
with Allied servicemen were all placed under scmtiny and often
incarcerated. Citing the British experience. Stammers concludes that:
Wartime governments made extensive use of covert or informal

strategies to restrict civil liberties and attempt to manipulate public
opinion. But diese strategies were rarely based on die possible

use of emergency powers. They relied on die^ abihty ot
govemment to intervene in more discreet, subtie ways.
In Australia, state intervention was direct, pubUc and lacking even

a pretence of subtlety. Maurice Blackbum, die radical Labor member
for Bourke, and a life long opponent of totalitarianism, even in its
war-time guise as the agent of national preservation and security, gave
the most trenchant criticism of the 1939 National Security Bill.
Conceding that the original intentions were Uberal, he asked his
parliamentary colleagues whether this legislation could continue for
the duration of hostilities given "...[t]he nervous tension to which die
community and Ministers will be subjected". He specifically referred
to die power to prohibit public meetings and thereby prevent free
speech and the power to conduct trials in closed proceedings. He
believed these provisions contained a dangerous potentiality to destroy
fundamental civil liberties. Blackbum pointed out the paradox diat
was inherent in the process of fighting against repression and
totalitarianism by introducing measures which would severely limit
basic constitutional and common law fi-eedoms.*^ He imsuccessfiilly
introduced a private member's Bill to ensure that regulations
promulgated under the Defence Act, Supply and Development Act and
The National Registration Act should have to pass through parliament
rather than come into effect after being gazetted.**
Hasluck comments that in the first six months of the war, critics
of die National Security Act "could still only attack die existence of
the powers and not dieir use". Specifically, he cites action taken by
die Queensland govemment under die Transport Act of 1938 (which
he mistakenly calls die State Traffic Act) to ban public addresses by
communists. This move was instigated to prevent "public disorder"
when soldiers clashed with communists who, at this time, did not
support die allied war effort and opposed Australia's involvement in
anodier imperialist venttire.*' This issue did not subside; for in late
October 1940 anodier series of serious disttirbances in Brisbane
empted when members of die Second AIF fought communists who
attempted to voice tiieir opposition to die war publicly Tim
Moroney, die State secretary for die Australian Railway Union wrote
to Forgan Smith diat his members were worried diat, not only' was a
repressive State law used, but Major Jackson had audiorised his
mihtary pohce to arrest both military personnel and civilians He
continued that:
This indicates a desire that die control of civilian life should be

subject to Army authority; and Army control and influence of
civilian affairs is generally a preliminary step towards the
Establishment of Dictatorship.
Forgan Smith bmsquely dismissed these criticisms and concem for

civil liberties, by stating that "Major Jackson is not a State Public
Servant and is therefore not subject to my control or interrogation".™
Despite the passing of the National Security Act (1939-40) imder
which the Commonwealdi govemment would ultimately direct and
control all measures to ensure continued "national security and
national safety"'' die Queensland govemment made extensive plans to
determine, manage and command all local procedures. To effect diis
policy, a Public Safety Act was passed in November 1940, based on
legislation in New Zealand, Great Britain and Victoria.'^ An analysis
of the Victorian precedent is useful for it can throw light upon the
rationale behmd the introduction of such measures at the local level.
The National Security (Emergency Powers) Bill was introduced
into the Victorian Legislative Assembly on 5 September 1939. Sir
Stanley Argyle the member for Toorak, argued that:
A democracy finds itself in considerable difficulty in keeping pace

with rapid action so frequently necessary to meet emergencies as
they arise. The ordinary life of the community is disorganised.
He reiterated that the Commonwealth govemment was entmsted with

"die main responsibilities of die defence of die nation". The State
govemment should try to ensure that "as far as we can, we must
endeavour to carry out our normal activities".'' This line of argument
was hardly convincing considering the enormous powers that were
being sought. He admitted later in the extended debate diat "...[i]n
plain language, that means that the Executive Council has absolute
power". Opposition Leader Cain tentatively queried whether die
govemment should be entitied to so many powers." Premier Duns tan
argued that these were permissable since these emergency powers
would be limited to three months' duration, aldiough these could be
extended if a crisis continued.
The question of States' rights featured prominentiy in the lengthy
debate. T.D. Oldham, the member for Boroondara, expressing a
centralist position unusual in State politics, proferred diat:
... at die moment, on account of die national crisis widi which it

is faced, and by reason of its powers, die Commonwealdi should
abrogate ahnost every law of die State ParUaments, and 1 am sure
diat state of tilings will eventuaUy be accepted by die citizens of
diis community as marking die correct differentiation between die
powers of die State Parliaments and diose of die Federal
Parliament.^'
Two central questions emerged which were later repeated in
Queensland: die delegation of powers between tiie Commonwealth
and State parliaments and the preservation of common law rights to
curb untrammelled power by the executive. Fundamental questions
Premier A.A. Dunstan chose to ignore or to trivialise.
In August 1940 the Victorian govemment asked parliament for an
extension of the National Security (Emergency Powers) Act which had
not been proclaimed. Premier Dunstan maintained that this measure
was to "carry into effect... any powers or duties delegated to the State
of Victoria in the Commonwealth of Australia, or taking any measures
complimentary to, or necessary to unplement, steps by the
Commonwealth of Australia in relation to National Security"." He
attempted to diffuse the potentially explosive issue of delegation of
powers and State autonomy by acknowledging that "Commonwealth
regulations at aU times supersede those of the State". The short
debate, rather than continuing with this important constitutional issue,
went off onto an irrelevant tangent about fair rent legislation to aid
working class tenants."
In the second reading of the Bill, Argyle with the support of odier
members from all sides of the Assembly, stated his confidence in the
scmpulous manner in which this unprecedented Act had been
administered. The Labor member for Clifton Hill, H. Cremean
expressed his satisfaction in the arrangements that, whilst possessing
great power, ensured "safeguards diat are not included in the
corresponding legislation in odier States or die Commonwealdi".'' In
Queensland no such unanimity of purpose or resolve was evident in
Parhament; for die proposal diere caused botii a furore in parliament
and in die community, particulariy in die tt-ade union movement
In die mitial reading of die Bill on 12 November 1940 its
proposer. Home Secretary Hanlon assured parliament that it " is
entirely an emergency measure and does not come into operation until
die civihan population is direatened"." The raison d'etre for such an
extt-eme measure was to ensure essential services in die event of
mvasion. Yet as former Country Party Premier A.E. Moore correcdy
pointed out its provisions would entirely eliminate habeas corpus and
destroy an individual's fundamental rights by denying the right of
judicial appeal.*" Hanlon framed his argument within the parameters
of the hazy delegation of powers between the Commonwealth and the
States. In his introductory preamble, Hanlon reassured his colleagues
that the Commonwealth had placed "... very important responsibiUties
and duties in the event of enemy attack upon this country" upon the
shoulders of the State government.*'
A cmcial element in his line of reasoning revealed the Queensland
government's perception of the limits of delegation of powers.
Hanlon continued:
The situation in Australia is complicated by the fact that the States

as well as the Commonwealth are sovereign governments, and,
although the National Security Act gives very wide powers to the
Commonwealth, there is die possibility that the sovereign rights of
the States may in some way interfere with the exercise of powers
of the Commonwealth Govemment, and consequently the
Commonwealth proposes, if necessary, to delegate certain powers
under die National Security Act to either State Governments or to
individual State Governments to overcome the difficulty of
constitutional limitation.*^
Given the comprehensiveness of the national security regulations

Moore asked what "was omitted from the Commonwealth National
Security Act... to call for the introduction of this BiU as a
supplementary measure"?*' Likewise, at a Labor-in-politics convention
held in Febmary 1941, F.J. Waters, former Labor member for Kelvin
Grove, "... deplored many imdemocratic principles contained in the
Public Safety Act". Premier Forgan Smith defended it before the
industrial and organisational wing of the Labor movement:
Public interest was supreme over individual interest. The powers

would not be used unless in the public interest. It has yet to be
proclaimed and it is to be hoped it would not be necessary to do
so.**
He further defended the legislation publicly. In die Sunday Mail of 7

December 1941 he declared diat "[t]his Act is intended for the
efficient conduct of the State under grave war conditions, and for the
protection of its people". He never chose to explore the ramifications
that were inherentiy contained in mle-by-decree of an executive no
longer scmtmised or even accountable to eitiier pariiament or die

judiciary.
The most detailed proposals concerning die intention and contents
of die Act lie in an undated memorandum from Hanlon to the
premier. Leaving all military, air and naval defence solely to die
Commonwealdi, a Committee of PubUc Safety, consisting of die
premier, the treasurer, the secretary for Health and Home Affairs, the
minister for Transport and the commissioners of poUce and electricity
would direct all executive and administrative functions in Queensland,
without resort to parliament, for the duration of a presumably
extended emergency. Unlike previous "state of emergency" legislation
which was intended to cope with specific and limited events like a
strike or a natural disaster, the scope of the Public Safety Act was
unlimited.*' Its provisions were intended, as Forgan Smith averted,
"... to deal expeditiously, effectively and in die public interest widi
any situation that may arise".** Its significance lay therefore in die
breadth of activities it proported to cover. TTie functions and
audiority of the civil police could be augmented to such a degree that
a virtual dictatorship might ensue.
This enabling Bill would not come into force until the govemor-
in-Council proclaimed a state of emergency m the specific advent of
an invasion. In such an eventuality, all those traditional checks and
balances inherent in the separation of judicial and executive functions
would disappear for the duration of the crisis. The Committee of
PubUc Safety, a title reminiscent of the worst excesses of the French
Revolution, would effectively mle by decree. The audiority of
independent judicial review to monitor and restrain the discretionary
powers of administrative officials would be nuUified.
The AustraUan CouncU of Civil Liberties campaigned vigorously
against both die Queensland and Victorian Acts which were seen as
containing die tangible potentiaUty for dictatorship.*^ The Queensland
trade union movement waged a determined campaign against die
Public Safety Act. A pamphlet issued by die Queensland branch of
die Australian Railway Union - an organisation diat held no
tendemess for die parUamentary Labor Party diat had persecuted its
members in the 1925 and 1927 strikes - boldly declared "Democracy
is in danger. Fascism Comes to Queensland". WeU attended protest
meetings were conducted in Brisbane, Maryborough, Bundaberg,
TownsviUe, Mackay and Rockhampton. The poUce made detailed
reports on die major speakers and die content of tiieir declarations **
In a lengdiy article in the Courier Mail of 15 November 1940 tiie
Leader of die Opposition, E.B. Maher criticised the Bill for' not
containing "the safeguards that could reasonably be demanded under a

democratic system of govemment". Maher systematically compared
the provisions, with diose of the Victoria (Country Party) National
Security (Emergency Powers) Act of 1939 (sic) and convincingly
demonstrated how more repressive was the Queensland Act.
On die understanding that the Public Safety Act was only to be
invoked on invasion, the Queensland govemment continued in 1941 to
make plans for the civil defence of the State. These aUowed wide
ranging discretionary administrative powers, particularly to the police.
Witii the implementation of the National Security Act, it was conceded
that the Commonwealth should assume primary responsibiUty for
national defence. This cmcial "Report upon the establishment and
operations of the general organisations for the civil defence of
Queensland" stated that State instrumentaUties particularly the poUce,
local audiority, hospital, fire and ambulance services needed to
expand. SpecificaUy, the report noted:
There wiU also be the functions of the police in war emergency

[operating] in a much greater and more onerous degree. War
Emergency adds many new duties; as upon the Police Force faUs,
to a large extent, the enforcing of the Commonwealth war
emergency legislation. The police force has to work in complete
Uaison with the miUtary service and other Commonwealth
Services.*'
Despite its previous avowal to proclaim die Public Safety Act only
in the advent of a direct enemy invasion. Cabinet proclaimed the Act
on 12 December 1941, five days after the bombing of Pearl Harbour.
Forgan Smidi declared that it was necessary to set the machinery in
motion "if a crisis occurred". Furthermore, any one who committed
offenses under the Firearms Licence Act, the Criminal Code on the
Vagrants and Gaming Act could be artested without a warrant and any
person who obstmcted officers authorised under the Public Safety Act
could be also arrested without a warrant and fined £100. The Act
provided indemnity against the council and its commissioners and no
claim for damages or compensation could be made.™ Yet it would
not seem diat those provisions were actuaUy implemented; for die
national security regulations took precedent over State legislation.
Moreover the Queensland govemment shrewdly twisted die
Commonwealth's overriding supremacy to make regulations in order
to conduct total war to benefit the process of augmentation of its own
local instmmentalities. Rather than diminishing State autonomy.
paradoxicaUy die war presented an opporttmity to expand its powers,

particularly in die vital area of poUcing. The National Security Act,
Section 13, already aUowed State civU poUce to make artests without
specific charges being laid. The Public Safety Act also contamed
diese provisions. Prime Minister Curtin advised Forgan Smitii diat
this power:
... is an exceptional one, and should only be exercised in cases of

such seriousness that it appears highly desirable in the interests of
die community that the person should be immediately deprived of
his liberty, or in cases where diere is reason to believe diat die
person would also disappear if not arrested.^'
An important memorandum of 21 January 1943 by the commissioner

of police pointed out to aU district inspectors that:
... these are not powers to be exercised except in a case of gravest

necessity... to emphasise in the strongest possible manner diat it
was never intended for practical purposes that diese arbitrary
powers should be exercised in trivial matters.
CartoU specificaUy referred to instances such as sabotage in essential

services or enemy agents "acting suspiciously" as justifying tiiis
extreme power.^^
Uidike the Commonwealth govemment which had to estabUsh
entirely new departments like Munitions, Post War Reconstmction,
War Organisation of Industry and the Manpower Authority in order to
mobiUse and direct the material and human resources of the nation
engaged in total war, the Queensland govemment expanded functions
within the existing administrative framework. The poUce in particular
augmented their power often in cooperation with Commonwealdi civil
and military organisations. In TownsviUe, for example, the Civil
Defence Organisation in May 1941 consisted of three major
components - die essential services segment (consisting of
representatives from die Railway, Harbours and Marine, Works and
Water, Electricity and Gas, die Post Master General, and Sewerage,
Roads and Bridges instrumentaUties); social services (consisting of an
inspector of police and die govemment medical officer to oversee die
operation of poUce, fire wardens, hospitals, ambulances, all public
healdi faciUties and pubUc transport); die engineering division
(comprising die city engineers and officers who would be in charge of
the demoUtion of unexploded bombs, decontamination units, the

provision of food, shelter, and accommodation)."
This caused intemal problems within the already depleted police
force operating with a rapidly aging persoimel stmcture. An estimated
twelve per cent of policemen enlisted in the Second AIF, mostly from
the lower ranks.'* State police were required for entirely new duties
in order to monitor new regulations in the areas of munitions, price,
rationing, rent control, and increased responsibility in security,
surveiUance and traffic control. To counter these problems,
suggestions were made to establish an "auxiliary poUce force".
Anticipating the nature of stretched personnel resources in the advent
of war. Home Secretary Hanlon in April 1939 assured the premier
that "these private squads wiU be under police control and vested widi
police powers".^' Unlike the use of "special constables" who were
swom in during major industrial strikes to deal specificaUy widi
sdikers, this proposed force would carry out normal police duties as
weU as those connected with war-time emergencies. A meeting of the
powerful Air Raid Precautions Committee where these poUce
auxiliaries were deployed was disappointed that only eighteen
volunteers had presented themselves by early June 1939. The police
commissioner particularly wanted retumed servicemen from the Great
War, because of their famiUarity with weapons and their readiness to
conttol dissidents as they demonstrated in the Red Flag Riots in
March and April 1919 in Brisbane.'* Instead diey preferred to join
the Diggers Reserve diat operated outside State govemment control.
The 1941 Report on the Establishment and Operation of the
several organisations for civil defence called again for more poUce
auxUiaries. Two particular duties were cited as needing urgent
attention - first, as volunteers in factories, especially munition plants,
to stop sabotage and secondly as senior air raid wardens. No cases
of sabotage that resulted in criminal prosecution and imprisonment
however eventuated. A special branch police report of 19 June 1942,
however, identified problems that arose even widi employing speciaUy
favoured retumed servicemen. Since many workers at the defence
plant m the Northem Territory had abandoned their employment after
the Japanese bombing of Darwin in Febmary, jobs m vital industries
were "pegged" under the national security regulations. Workers could
no longer resign or be dismissed. This had resulted in vandalism and
evidence was cited from the CharleviUe aerodrome. The report
concluded that there was considerable friction between the older
retumed servicemen and "... [t]he younger men who are only there for
what tiiey can get out of it, such as dodging work"."
The delegation of audiority between military and civd police was

anodier area diat demanded urgent attention. Several exanaples
iUustrate die areas of conflict and problems of administration. First,
in die area of internment on enemy aliens, as chapter 3 wiU
demonstrate in far more detaU, clear-cut designations were instihited.
The civil poUce were charged widi numerous duties concemed widi
the surveillance of enemy aUens and dissidents. They gathered local
intelUgence information, frequentiy uicorrect, naive or prejudiced since
the low level of educational attainments of most poUce often
prevented an understanding of die complex political aUegiances of die
Italian community, in particular. "Anarchism", "communism",
"fascism" were all regarded as foreign subversive doctrines unsuitable
for the Australian arena of public discourse and personal allegiance.
The inspector of police at TownsviUe in April 1940 in his Ust of
Italians who should be interned in die event of war widi Italy
described AUio C. as a "Strong Communist" who also possessed
"fascist ideas". Local constables' reports were even more naive and
iU-informed.™ Yet, despite these limitations, poUce were required to
make decisions about whether a naturaUsed British subject of enemy
alien origin or parentage was "loyal" to the British Empire. Local
police reports were sent to district inspectors, then to the
commissioner's office and then to the Commonwealth Investigation
Bureau, (the security section of the Attorney-General's department) or
to the mUitary inteUigence section of Victoria Barracks in Brisbane.
The cumbersome procedures entailed in internment iUustrate die
problems inherent in the delegation of civil and miUtary police powers
in war-time. The civil police would take a person, for whom die
Army had obtained a detention order, into custody before die Army
assiuned authority in the procedure. This meant tiiat detainees could
be kept in Stewart Creek prison near TownsviUe in substandard
conditions for months without ever appearing before a magistrate. A
group of namralised Germans from the TownsviUe district were
detained in diis prison in early 1942. Police Commissioner Cartoll
admitted this gaol was over crowded due to the use of prison
facilities for security incarceration. The intemees later complained to
Mr Justice Macrossan, tiie official visitor to the Gaytiiome internment
camp in Brisbane. Others sent to Loveday camp in South Australia
complained to die Swiss consul who contacted the Army, die
organisation in charge of long-term detention and internment. As Col.
F.H. Sharpe of Victoria Barracks argued, the State department of
Justice had to investigate the charges about prison conditions whUst
die Army had to coordinate investigations widi the poUce
commissioner who acted on advice from the department of Justice.

He added:
This Headquarter is naturaUy concemed that ground should have

been provided for these complaints and that had these matters
remained within the province of this Headquarters, action would
have been taken to prevent any possibility of a recurtence of the
conditions complained of.
Even more annoying, as he tried to unravel the lines of

communication and determine which instrumentality had audiority in
specified domains, was the decision to pass responsibility for
internment from the Army to the federal Attomey-General's security
service on 26 June 1942. He concluded:
No doubt die Security Service will take any necessary action to

ensure that there is no ground for complaint of the above nature
in future."
The armed services had attempted to forestaU administrative

problems that devolved from the inefficient system whereby no one
body oversaw aU procedures and incarceration. The whole operation
of jurisdiction was imponderably complicated with the presence of
three branches of the AustraUan services along witii diose of the
United States. Most American bases were situated in Queensland and
with a ground staff of 90,000 in Brisbane and surrounding areas like
Ipswich and Redbank in 1942 alone, confusion might have occurted.
i i TownsviUe, as soon as the American forces established operation.
Colonel North, the commander of the Uth and 7th Brigades, recaUed:
A special building in town where American and Australian Army,

Airforce and Naval Provosts aU assembled and worked from one
establishment. If a disturbance [occurted]... all went out - each to
handle its own men.*"
In small scale altercations these procedures worked effectively. In

die confusion of a major riot, which also involved large numbers of
civilians, strain was placed upon even the most efficient system of
cooperation and demarcation of spheres and authority. In the Battle
of Brisbane which raged over the three nights of 26, 27, and 28
November 1942 confusion of action and propose was apparent. An
analysis of the build up, explosion and resolution of these intense
patterns of conflict between Australian servicemen and civilian and

United States' military and naval forces which left one Austrahan
service-man dead, eleven soldiers and one civiUan injured is beyond
die scope of tiiis discussion. The court of enquiry, headed by Lieut-
Col. G.R. Hammer, Commanding Officer of 2/2 Australian Hy
Regiment, took extensive evidence in December 1942. In particular,
its report questioned the effectiveness of action pursued by die various
branches of the military police.
The court of enquiry concluded diat on tiie first evening, "the
action taken by [AustraUan] Military PoUce in tiie initial stages was
indecisive, and therefore, ineffectual". A combined effort of
Australian military police, picquet and civil police was needed to
disperse the crowd. Other evidence suggested that the arrival of die
fire brigade helped dampen die enthusiasm of riotous AustraUan
civilians. On the second evening the action by police was more
coordinated, although "groups of disturbing element were aUowed to
go unapprehended". In conclusion, the court of enquiry condemned
the "lack of understanding between Australian military police and civil
police, in diat both appeared to be waiting for the odier to act".
Even more alarming, it continued that "... [t]here is evidence that the
RAN Shore Patrol was not only indifferent, but that one member was
among the inciting element of die disturbance on 26 November".*'
US Brigadier General S.J. Chamberlain, general headquarters of
the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) in reporting to Major-General
F.W. Barryman, die deputy chief of die general staff, allied land
forces was equally unimpressed by the lack of definition for
responsibiUty. He did however centre his remarks upon "the lack of
decisive action by and the inadequacy and inefficiency of AustraUan
MPs in clearing die area".*^ Major-General Barryman added in a
latter report that:
The Provost Marshal's view is diat diere was a marked difference

of opinion as to how die sittiation such as occurred should be
handled. American Provosts are inclined to mediods which are
not favoured by die civil police autiiorities in die handling of a
crowd... Mr CarroU has impressed tiiis view on die American
Provost at conference held during and since die disturbances."
In odier arenas when tensions were low and civil and mUitary
police were not faced widi die extraordinary demands that a riot
places upon diem to ensure order, designation of spheres of mfluence
could proceed smooddy, even acknowledging diose special difficuUies
that arose out of extensive United States presence on Australian soil.

In Febmary 1943 a conference was held in Brisbane in order to
anticipate die problems of jurisdiction and extent of power between
different civil and military organisations in North Queensland. Under
the auspices of the security service, representatives of the federal
shipping department, the Queensland Public Service board, the
railways, die Australian and American armies as weU as
Commissioner CartoU met to discuss "the maintenance of order" and
die operation of Regulation 32 of the National Security (General) Act
which could requisition private property for military use. Captain
Bock of the security service was pleased to aimounce the smoodi-
operation of policies in other areas. Road blocks at Jaffa and
Ravenshoe had been controUed by a US Provost Corps which reported
any breaches or irregularities to the civilian police.**
With north Queensland the cmcial staging post for the SWPA
offensive. Major General Thomas Blamey had wanted the defmed
districts to be placed under martial law. Given die large numbers of
civilians who had already been evacuated to southern districts, it had
not been anticipated diat opposition would prevent such a drastic
measure when Australia had not been invaded. Later, in August
1943, Blamey, successfuUy requested the War Cabinet approve the
complete censorship of aU mails, telegraphs and telephones "from
specified areas of special significance in North Queensland". The
director general of the Post Master General's office reported that:
Sir Thomas proposes in the national interest to ensure the absolute

secrecy of aUied mUitary activities and preparations in defmed
areas in North Queensland. MiUtary Authorities had been alarmed
by the extent and comprehensiveness of leaks by civilians about
military operations on the Atherton Tableland. Blamey concluded
that 'this leakage of information valuable to the enemy is worse
than anticipated'.
The whole area from Ingham north to Cooktown was then subject to
the national security (emergency control) regulations which could
monitor and direct all commimication, travel and residence in the
stipulated area.*' Before 1943 thorough censorship of mail and
telegraphs had been restricted to communists and enemy aliens or
naturalised British subjects of enemy alien origin deemed to have
questionable loyalties to Britain.**
In conclusion, three separate areas that required specific
designation of spheres of authority and action can be identified: first.
die constimtional question of State and Commonwealdi rights widi

respect to jurisdiction in war-time; secondly, die complex mteraction
between die AUied and Australian armed services and lastiy Uiose ot
die CivU and mUitary poUce. Queensland, in its tenacity to preserve
State autonomy and rights, inti-oduced a series of measures, ostensibly
to ensure public safety and civU defence, which could have effectively
resisted die incursions of die Commonwealdi's national security
regulations. IronicaUy, diose federal regulations, rather dian
diminishing State powers, aUowed a process, as subsequent chapters
will demonstrate, whereby powers were centralised specificaUy in
diree departments: Police, Healtii and Home Affairs and die
Premier's. With the direatened invasion of United States troops in
Queensland, which came to be the premier staging ground for die
aUied offensives in the south west Pacific, new policies and new
problems about delegations of powers arose. Rather than a
constitutional dispute between Commonwealth and State, these now
devolved around questions of civil and miUtary jurisdiction.
II
The Enemy Within?
The Process of Internment of Enemy
Aliens, 1939-45
with Helen Taylor
Internment chaUenges the fundamental precepts upon which the entire

system of British justice and law enforcement in peacetime is based.
Unlike arrest for a criminal offence where a warrant is issued on a
specified charge, uitemment aUows an individual to be taken into
custody seemingly arbitrarily for an indefinite period without
presentation before a court. The attempt to balance national security
and individual liberty during war is an onerous undertaking in any
democratic society undergoing the traumas involved in a modem
technological war. As Robert H. Keyserlingk avers "wartime is a
particularly prolific time for distorting political reality as immense
new pressures suddenly bear down upon people and their political
leaders".'
Distortion is manifested most specificaUy in the arena of
aUegiance. Ethnic minorities can be swiftly transformed from ideal,
law-abiding citizens to sinister fifth columnists and potential saboteurs,
"agents within the gate", as Keyserlingk terms them. For the
mobiUsation process involves not simply the recmitment and
transportation of troops to distant battle zones, but equaUy, rapid and
radical intemal organisation, botii stmctural and ideological. The
identification, targeting and containment of those groups in the
community, who are perceived as threats to the security, morale and
the physical, moral and ideological weU-being and cohesiveness of die
society under external threat, is a dominant function of the modem
state during war. The alien, particularly those espousing (or attributed
as espousing) 'foreign' ideologies like fascism, communism or
anarchism, represents the embodiment of aU these fears. Thus the
process involved in the containment of the enemy alien and those of
enemy aUen origins and parentage involve both die most arbitrary,
comprehensive and severe procedures. . .
In analysing the internment of Japanese Canadians in Bntish
Columbia in 1941 and 1942, W. Peter Ward maintains diat:
... if die expulsion was a direct resuU of wartime stress, it was
also the consequence of strained race relations... Since the late
1850s west-coast society had been divided by a deep racial cleavage and,
over the years, only limited integration had occurred in patterns of work,
residential accommodation, and social contact.^
Community arrxiety wiU be most severe and prolonged, and as a

consequence those institutionalised measures to restrain and nuUify the
threatening alien presence, in societies where racism, with aU its
irrational modes of perception and action, is deeply embedded. Like
British Columbia, Queensland contamed distinct ethnic communities:
some, lUce the Japanese, had never been integrated; some, like the
Italians had been tolerated in die sugar districts on the north east
coast, die fmit-growing areas of die granite belt and die tobacco
district of the Atherton tableland whilst the Germans had been
portrayed variously as "Huns" during the Great War and ideal citizens
during peace-time. Responses to the different ethnic groups and die
severity and comprehensiveness of their incarceration was not uniform
but corresponded with the degree to which they supposedly threatened
the Australian war effort.
In Queensland, the fears, which prompted the federal govemment
to identify, monitor and intern diose of enemy alien origin or status in
1939, were more pronounced than in other areas of die
Commonwealth. The concentration of enemy aliens resident in those
very districts most potentiaUy liable to invasion added new dimensions
to the sense of isolation and insecurity in die north. These direats
possessed dierefore botii an extemal focus from Japanese miUtary and
naval aggression and most cmciaUy an insidious, intemal dimension in
die form of communities whose loyalty to die British and AustraUan
war effort was called mto question.
Paul Hasluck argues that die internment of enemy aliens was one
of die^"most unportant measures taken during die first six mondis of
war..." The War Book, prepared by die department of Defence and
modeUed closely on its British counterpart, had akeady indicated those
issues and procedures which were regarded as potentiaUy significant
m die event of declared war.* It laid down diat die interrmient of
resident enemy aliens should be restricted to "die narrowest limits
The Enemy Within 35
consistent with pubUc safety and public sentiment".' Yet, as Maurice

Blackbum observed in the House of Representatives debate on the
pervasive National Security BiU in 1939:
I should say that the most important thing is diat the people of
diis country shaU believe that in this stmggle they are preserving
as much of their freedom, a much of their constitutional rights as
can possibly be preserved for diem; that those rights are not taken
from them; that they are not losing those rights in the stmggle
which this nation is waging.*
This dilemma, which involved the reconciliation of the demands of

national security with the preservation of the individual's civil liberties
(which theoreticaUy constitute the haUmark of the British legal
system), was no more clearly iUustrated than in the question of policy
directives towards enemy aliens and those of enemy alien origin or
parentage. Australia was not alone in this difficult reconciliation. A
report from the Austialian director general of security in 1941
indicated that the British govemment was also experiencing
"considerable difficulties... in devising some suitable means of
reconciling the claims of individuals with national security".
In September 1939 Prime Minister Menzies had assured parliament
diat his govemment had no intention of persuing a policy of general
internment of aU enemy aliens. Rather, it would be concemed only
to intem persons specificaUy "engaging in subversive activities". '
What might constitute "subversive activity" was however iU-defined,
tiius aUowing for considerable flexibility in interpretation and
emphasis. EspeciaUy in 1942, this contained policy was not adhered
to; for panic engendered by fears of a imminent invasion extended the
parameters of potential "disloyalty".
Considerable flexibility in interpretation and emphasis emerged -
aU too often responding to the progress of distant battles in Egypt and
France or, more potently, the rapid advance of the Japanese into the
Pacific sphere of Australian control, rather than from a fair and just
examination of a particular case. In another cmcial document that
articqlated general internment policy Lieutenant Colonel James
Chapman of the MUitary Board, Southem Command in July 1941
averted that:
... power may be defined as the authority to restrict or detain

persons as a precaution - any measure in war-time [is necessary
against a person]... whose loyaUy to die cause for which we are at

war, is reasonably suspect.*
The fundamental difference between "loyalty" - a powerful, if
intangible sentiment of patriotism - and sedition, sabotage, treason,
aiding and abetting the enemy is immense. The latter constitute die
most serious offenses against die state, particularly in war-time;
whereas "disloyalty" is not a legaUy but sociaUy and cultiiraUy
defined offence. In official procedures the hazy concept of
"disloyalty" was aU too readUy and tragicaUy confused wifli
"subversive activities". In Queensland in World War Two no one was
artested for treason, sabotage, or sedition, though several thousands
were detauied in internment camps in the interests of security or
because their "loyalty" to the British empire was questioned.
WiUiam Mackay, the director general of Security in Canberra,
argued that:
The aim and sole justification of aU restrictions upon individual

liberty is to prevent injury to the war effort of the country, not to
punish the individual. In short the object is preventative radier
than punitive... The sole ground... is that the individual, if left
unrestricted, might prejudice the successful defence of this country
against the enemy. The second principle is that individual liberty
is to be restricted ordy if there is a real'^ danger that die individual
will act in a way that prejudices the war effort... FuU internment
being reserved where die possibility of injury to the nation is
undeniable.'
Mackay's statement therefore articulated the broad policy directives

laid down in die War Book and initiaUy foUowed by the Menzies'
govemment. The acttial manner in which diese were subsequentiy
interpreted and readjusted reflected tiiose changes in die wider society
as Australia faced a direct impending crisis in late 1941.
Lieutenant Colonel Sydney Whittington, die chief of military
mteUigence for Soudiem Command, infonned die Aliens Tribunal
hearing number 3 in Febmary 1941 that:
Uitemment is not a punishment; we merely deprive an enemy alien

of his Uberty, odierwise he is treated exactiy as an ordinary
mdividual... Uitemment is just an ordinary form of restraint'°
The Enemy Within 37
This myopic statement totally overlooked the central issue and

minimised the impact of this process of arbitrary incarceration of the
particular individuals involved.
Rather more reaUsticaUy, Paster J.J, Stolz, the president of the
United EvangeUcal Ludieran Church of Australia (UELCA), protesting
over the detention of his frequentiy AustraUan-bom clergy, identified a
key contention:
... without a hearing in an open court; without even being told the
charge laid against them; without permitting their lawyer to know
the accusation raised against them they were deprived of their
liberty."
Several questions present themselves - on what grounds was any

individual intemed? Who decided? Was internment simply a
deprivation of liberty and did this constitute de facto imprisonment?
In whose interests did this selection occur? The issue of the
internment of enemy aUens and naturaUsed British subjects of enemy
aUen origin in Queensland (where more foreigners were proportionaUy
resident) throws light on these important dUemmas.
Some senior public officials, especiaUy those in Queensland, did
not altogether subscribe to these broad principles articulated by
Mackay. Rather, their interpretation of the parameters of "subversive
activity" was so wide-ranging that the category of potential candidate
for internment was considerably enlarged. Police Commissioner
CartoU, writing in March 1941, to Inspector R.F.W. Wake, deputy
director of Security, stationed at Northem Command offices in
Brisbane, stated initiaUy that "... [r]ecommendations involving
deprivation of liberty are not made lightiy". NominaUy adhering to
the letter of die War Book diat incarceration was not "made against
die interests of die individual", CartoU believed, however, the guiding
principles should involve first, the interests of the British empire;
secondly, the preservation of the Commonwealth war effort and lastly,
it was to "ensure peace and harmony in die particular locality, thus
providing for intemal seciuity..."'^ The vigour and relentiessness with
which pubUc officials in Queensland pursued enemy aliens was in
sharp contrast to the moderation, partiality and sound judgement that
die Commonwealth supposedly demanded.
Certairdy, it differed in both degree and emphasis from the
MiUtary Board's "Principles to be observed with internment",
composed in September 1939. Referring particularly to NSDAP
38 War on the Hotnefront
(Nazi) and fascist party members in Australia as prime candidates for

internment, die MiUtary Board's policy further directed diat:
... enemy aliens of mUitary age, or any other persons who are
rationaUy suspected of being likely to act in a manner prejudicial
to die pubUc safety or die defence of tiie Conunoriwealtii, or as
being likely to cause disaffection, are regarded as suitable subjects
for internment on the outbreak of war."
Rexibility and vagueness in die category of "likely to cause

disaffection" could, moreover, sustain broad mterpretation, and, as die
war continued, became increasingly important in the identification and
incarceration of disaffected enemy aliens. In particular, Lutheran
pastors were regarded with acute suspicion.
Specific regulations were promulgated under the National Security
Act (1939-40) to implement these internment procedures. National
security (general) regulations, statutory mle no. 87 of 1939, regulation
26 (amendment 40 in 1941) provided the legal provision for detention
in a general form. National security (alien's control) regulations,
statutory mle number 88 of 1939, regulation 20 (amendment 59 of
1941) applied specifically to enemy aliens. In November 1940 enemy
aUens were permitted to lodge appeals against detention and
internment with the Aliens Tribunal.'* Women and children were not
to be intemed, except in unusual circumstances. In the case of the
Japanese, aU residents were to be taken into custody. These
regulations assumed therefore that ordy European male enemy ahens
were in way politicaUy active, women being concemed only with their
narrow domestic responsibUities.
In September 1939 the minister for Defence recommended that die
State police prepare lists of potential suspects. "The principle to be
observed with internment", the handbook which laid down procedures,
reiterated diat die civil police force should be scmpulous in dieir
investigations, stressing that:
... instmctions have been issued that the suspected person is not to
be intemed, unless his being at large constitutes a potential danger
to die public safety or die defence of die Commonwealth."
In Queensland, the police had aUeady begun investigating potential

alien saboteurs before tiie official declaration of war. In April 1939
Home Secretary Hanlon had ordered die police to check die location
and extent of arms and anmiunition in the possession of private
The Enemy Within 39
citizens, "particularly foreigners".'* Later, under alien control

(prohibited possession order) of regulation 22 of the national security
(alien control) regulation, enemy aliens and naturalised British subjects
were forbidden to possess firearms, transmitters, more than four
gaUons of petrol or any inflammable liquid, cameras, and motor
vehicles except under strictly regulated and defined conditions." In
die process of these investigations, the police were not only able to
monitor and assess the attitudes of enemy aliens and naturaUsed
British subjects of enemy origin but to ascertain who to disarm in
order to prevent possible acts of sabotage. With the Italian
community along the sugar coast of Queensland, this occurred aknost
inunediately after Italy entered the war in June 1940.'*
Whilst instmcting the civil police to assess the "loyalty" of enemy
aliens, the MUitary Board was alert to the potential hazards involved
in diis devolution of power. In July 1941 Lieutenant Colonel James
Chapman of the Military Board wrote that it was often difficult for
die civil police to obtain detailed written reports because citizens
feared intimidation, in terms of both personal safety and economic
retaliation, in areas like the sugar districts where large numbers of
enemy aliens were concentrated and influential. Chapman
acknowledged that:
... The military authorities should never seek to usurp the function
of the civil police authorities in a country not under martial law,
even if the motive is entirely laudable, i.e. to lend the police a
hand in difficult circumstances. Every effort must always be made
to check any tendency to assist the police in carrying out their
normal duties merely with the object of enlisting the wiUing co-
operation of the poUce in retam, on what may be described as a
"quid pro quo".
Difficulty arose because, although the military was ultimately

responsible for the escort and protracted detention of intemees, the
civU police were responsible for the initial determination and
apprehension of suspected persons. Chapman visualised a very real
"gross misuse of the power entmsted to the military authorities" if die
police exceeded their instmctions and recommended the internment of
enemy aliens and naturalised British subjects of enemy origin for
reasons other than those of national security. Three specific situations
could arise where this "gross misuse" could be paramount. First,
unwartanted internment could prove an effective form of economic
retaliation; secondly, its widespread application could operate as a
means of obtaining civU order and diirdly, it would relieve die^ police
of die task of monitoring die activities of "'undesirables' (viz:
suspected criminals or trouble makers)"."
Though Chapman's assessment of internment procedures refers to
die problems of die delegation of powers between the civil poUce and
miUtary authority, die process was more compUcated. Whilst the civU
police did gadier local inteUigence information, die Commonwealdi
Investigation Bureau, a section of tiie federal Attorney General's
department also maintained local inteUigence gatiierers. Iri peace-time
information flowed between die poUce and the CIB; in war-time
surveiUance reports were sent to die intelUgence interpreters or
subversive sections of miUtary inteUigence. Dossiers on mtemees
reveals a complicated series of pattems of information coUation and
decision making, resting ultimately upon die military intelUgence unit
of die Army.
With die declaration of war in September 1939 the security forces
implemented their first objective - to take known nazis and "Friends
of the Third Reich" (a fraternal organisation for Germans and
Austrians who were naturaUsed British subjects), into custody. Nazis
and their sympathisers had been "under notice", to use die parlance of
military security, since the arrive of Dr Rudolf Asmis, the German
Consul in 1932. A comprehensive intelUgence report, forwarded to
Southem Command in March 1940 summarised the combined
knowledge of those federal and State agencies concemed with security
- there were 918 German and Austrian nationals resident in
Queensland, concentrated in distinct communities in the soudi east
comer. In September 1939 there were an estimated 500 pro nazi
sympathisers who were "regarded widi suspicion", with 150 "under die
stiictest surveiUance". By December seventy of diem had been
interned.^ Unfortunately more dian ninety per cent of the crucial
security file on "pro nazi activity in pre-war Queensland" is closed to
scmtuiy by academic researchers and no more specific details can be
provided, except diose diat can be obtained from specific intemee's
and organisations' dossiers.
hi die initial Ust prepared by die CIB in August 1939 seventeen
persons of Gennan origm had been targeted for immediate detention
on die outbreak of hostiUties.'' The arrival of Count Felix von
Luckner, who was assumed to be an emissary of die Gennan
govemment, on two goodwUl visits to Queensland in June and August
1938, was a key event which aUowed die CIB to gatiier an immense
range of (later) incriminating information. A military inteUigence
The Enemy Within 41
report prepared in September 1938 beUeved the Count's visit was

important, as his mission was deUberately, if subtiy:
... to arouse among aU persons of German origin, a sense of their

unity with die (New Germany), with one another and with the rest
of the German race.^
Another military intelUgence report commented that:
In closely knit German communities it is not always easy to get

evidence of what is going on; but the visit of Count von Luckner
brought a good deal to bare on the real sentiments of the people.^
WhUst acknowledging that it was difficult for police or military

intelUgence officers to gather data in the ethnic communities, it can
be readily shown that, particularly the civil police who often lacked
even a basic primary school standard education and minimal political
sophistication, could not discem the political aUegiances of Italians in
particular. Certain individual Italians at Ingham were variously
described as "fascist" or "communist" interchangeably, as if all
"foreign" ideologies were the same.^* Their existence outside of
mainstream AustraUan poUtical parties and processes rendered them
vulnerable to damaging, if inaccurate, appraisals of their beliefs and
intentions.
Despite their ideological confusion, the security forces were
initiaUy most concemed with active Nazis and "Friends of the Third
Reich". Their next priority was to collate information on enemy
aUens of mUitary age and those who had served in the German or
Austrian armies or German navy in the Great War. Arthur Piepjohn
had fled Danzig in 1935, working as a merchant seaman before he
jumped ship in Sydney in 1938. Working as a miU hand in the
North Eton miU at Mackay he had written articles in the Mackay
Mercury exposing national socialism in Germany. He was irate at his
internment in Tatura internment camp in northem central Victoria in
May 1940." Franz Ruff was apprehended in Halifax as he had
formerly served as a junior officer in the German Imperial Army,
diough no curtent evidence could be produced diat he was in any way
curtentiy "disloyal".^
The experience of these two men who had escaped Germany and
then foimd themselves intemed with Nazis reveals a central weakness
in the whole intemment policy and process in Australia. Some
individuals were intemed as security risks on purely political grounds
given dieir membership of die Nazi party or Fascist party and dieir
affiUated associations. Yet tiie national security (aUens conti-ol)
regulations demanded diat any male enemy aUens, regardless of
political persuasion, could be detained. This meant tiie Austiians and
Germans sent from Britain in tiie 55 Dunera, most of whorn had fled
persecution as Jews, were iiutiaUy intemed, untU mobiUsed into
Labour corps or later into die AustraUan MiUtary Forces.^' German
and Austrian Jewish refugees, who had arrived in AustraUa in die
later 1930s but had not yet been naturaUsed, were also intemed,
mosdy at Tatura camp in Victoria. Barbara Winter, in her sttidy of
German POWs despatched by die British Army to AustraUa for die
duration of hostUities, argues tiiat Tatura Camp number 1 contained a
hard core of Nazis who caUed tiiemselves "Reichsteue" or "loyaUsts"."
German and Austrian Jews, staunch anti-Nazis, communists and Nazis
were aU in the same camp, as die Australian Army classified inmates
according to nationaUty not reUgion or political affiliation. Likewise
at Loveday camp in Soutii AustraUa tension between Italian anarchists,
communists and fascists often empted into violence.
By November 1940 some 2387 (1726 ItaUans and 661 Gemians)
out of 22,314 recent arrivals from Germany and Italy had been
intemed from aU over the Commonwealth.
Table 1: Intemees in Australia at 31 October 1940
NSW VIC QLD SA WA TOTAL
Enemy Aliens 595 167 328 118 951 2159
AlUed Aliens 9 1 2 5 - 17
NBS 114 9 55 16 17 211
Total 718 177 385 139 968 2387
Source: Noel W. Laimedy, Aliens Control in Australia 1939-46.
There were at die time some 45,000 persons of enemy birth in

Australia. At diis time, die largest single concentration of intemees
were enemy alien Italians from Westem AustraUa. In late 1941 die
total number incarcerated diroughout AustraUa had only faUen to
2,231.^' Later, as the face of hostiUties overseas altered with die
The Enemy Within 43
end7 of Japan into the global conflict, emphasis moved swiftly to the
nordi-east coast of Queensland.
When Italy entered die war in June 1940, die concentration of
ItaUans in particular regions, rather dian the overall ethruc composition
of Queensland, could have presented particular problems. As
Raymond Evans has argued, the twin spectres of suspected
"disloyalty" from persons of enemy origin and radical politics had
loomed large in Queenslahd in the Great War and its cataclysmic
aftermath.'" PubUc and official hysteria concerning die potential threat
to the allied war effort from resident enemy aliens and namraUsed
British subjects of enemy aUen origin repeated itself with escalating
intensity and fervour as the war progressed.
Until die entry of Japan into die global conflict in December
1941, official scmtiny in Queensland was focused mostly on active
nazis, fascists and selected enemy aliens, particularly those men of
miUtary age who had arrived in Australia since 1933. But from that
date onwards new targets were isolated and contained.
Table 2: Enemy Aliens Registered in Australia, 31 December 1942
Nationality State Total for

Commonwealth
QLD NSW VIC SA WA TAS Total
Albanian 292 28 500 18 248 - 1086

Austrian 38 1.323 940 58 - 28 2387
Bulgarian 15 28 34 122 93 - 292
Finnish 211 186 122 56 59 5 639
German 225 1,951 1,920 298 260 39 4693
Hungarian 5 370 198 22 8 5 608
Italian 1,445 3,322 4,352 1,073 2,132 24 12348
Japanese 5 6 12 - 5 - 28
Rumanian 13 119 85 - 8 2 227
Thailander 1 1 1 _ 3 _ 6
2,250 7,334 8,164 1,647 2,816 103 22,314
Source: Noel W. Lamidey, Aliens Control in Australia 1939-46, p.6.

In die first instance on 8 December 1941, 110 Japanese residents of

Thursday Island were placed "under guard" to await luggers to take
diem to an intemment camp. Two days later, 366 men, twenty six
women and twenty two children of Japanese birtii or parentage mostiy
from Thursday Island, TownsviUe, Cairns, Mackay and Brisbane had
been taken into custody." In May 1941 die War Cabinet had
approved die amended "Uitenunent policy for Japanese" prepared by
die Army, whereby aU Japanese males over sixteen (except consular
officials) were to be intemed immediately at the outbreak of
hostilities. AusU-alia would also accept and incarcerate Japanese from
die British Pacific islands and from New Caledonia.'^ Policy on diis
matter had been determined in Cabinet in July 1941 when an annexe
was inserted into die "PoUcy laid down in the Conunonwealdi War
Book". Unlike die Italians and Germans whose political affiliations
might be readily, if often inaccurately, ascertained, the Japanese did
not have an equivalent to the national socialist or fascist parties.
Furthermore, it was asserted that the "strong national sentiments on
the part of the Japanese would lead to acts of sabotage"." In
Febmary 1939 Inspector Wake had reported in a "general overview"
assessment that diere were 754 Japanese in Queensland, by August
1940 tills number had dropped to 666 and had fallen further to 543
by November, leading to die conclusion that many had fled home as
they had been forewarned about intendmg hostilities.'*
The Truth newspaper of 14 December 1941 congratulated various
agencies on the alacrity of their actions:
With utmost speed and efficiency, officers in the Commonwealth

Investigation Branch, MiUtary InteUigence and the State police co-
operated in a Queensland-wide round-up of Japanese nationals,
hundreds of whom are lodged in intemment camps within a few
hours of the declaration of war with Japan.
Rarely, especiaUy in war-time when censorship was strict, did die

public even leam of these bureaucratic procedures and the mediods of
cooperation between State and Federal agencies and between civil and
miUtary audiority. Only with the gravest emergency and die fear of
mvasion that gripped botii the community and its officials did such
procedures gain public knowledge.
In a post-war assessment in November 1945 by Northem
Command, military mteUigence stressed that the federal govemment
had, in its estimation, acted judiciously in apprehending and
incarcerating the Japanese on a community basis. Various "well
The Enemy Within 45
trained and disciplined laymen who had operated in other parts of the
Pacific" - mostiy using tiie cover of humble laundrymen and market
gardeners - had been active in gatiiering geographic and inteUigence
information about Queensland prior to 1939." Yet a police report
from Caims written on 15 December 1941, during intense community
anxiety, reported that Japanese "... aliens have never been heard to
express any anti-British sentiments"." The local police clearly felt
diat diese often elderly men, who had arrived before die introduction
of the Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 were not
security risks and were certairdy not spies as military inteUigence and
die CIB aUeged.
The surveiUance and assessment of die Italians, particularly those
in the strategicaUy vulnerable areas of die nortii east coast was far
more complicated tiian the processes operating witii respect to die
Japanese who were incarcerated solely as an ethnic group. Various
factors operated widi regard to the intemment of the Italians. Some
Italians, like the Russians m World War One in Queensland, were
rigorously investigated by the local police and recommended as
suitable cases for uitemment or deportation, not so much because of a
potential capacity for sabotage, but rather for their radical political
adherences. In March 1942, Police Commissioner CarroU expressed
his unfeigned delight that the Italian Beniamino M. "a well known
Communist" had been intemed, after aUeging he had been assaulted
by die poUce. CartoU continued: "I am satisfied diat M... is in his
right place, and it is confidently hoped he wiU be kept in intemment
for the duration of the war".'' No evidence whatsoever was presented
that the intemee posed a threat to national security. Rather, his status
as an enemy aUen coupled with his political beliefs made him doubly
suspect as potentially, though not specificaUy, subversive. The
Queensland police, reflecting the broad ideological commitment of the
conservative State Labor govemment, was ultimately to prove far
more antagonistic to Italians like Beniamino M. with communist and
anarchist beliefs than those who were operdy fascist.
Both Diane Menghetti and Gianfranco Cresciani argue that the
majority of Italians ui north Queensland were anti-fascist.'* In 1926
Lega Anti-Fascista was launched in both Sydney and Melbourne
whilst the Comitato Anti-Fascisto deU' Herbert River was formed soon
after." Ross Fitzgerald further argues that from die early 1920s
waves of anti-fascist ItaUans entered Australia, most residing, in
particular agricultural areas of northeastem Queensland. Furthermore:
Among Queensland's etiinic groups, Italians were politicaUy die

most complex. From 1935 on, especiaUy in north Queensland, a
number of Italian immigrants participated in die anti-fascist
popular front which comprised communists, anarchists and
syndicaUsts.*"
Notwidistanding die diversity of ideology, by die mid 1930s die

communists had displaced the anarchists as die vanguard of the anti-
fascist movement in north Queensland.*' In July 1939 a weU attended
anti-fascist conference was held in TownsviUe, with the Innisfail
Italian delegates comprising its most notable participants.*^
Given the size of the ItaUan community in Queensland (4,483 in
1933 though this had dropped to 2,966 m late 1939),*' divided
ideological conunitments and perspectives can be discemed. In 1937
a fascist raUy was held in Babinda** which appeared to operate as die
centre of fascism and ItaUan patriotism in the State. Menghetti
aUeges that fascist raUies were held there as late as 1943.*' Irmisfail
on die odier hand, contained the most active and vociferous anti-
fascist contingent. The fascist consul resident there was forced to
leave at the insistence of miUtant left wing cane cutters and farmers.*'
Throughout die 1920s and 1930s the Italians in Queensland were
subjected to a consistentiy high degree of raciaUy inspired antagonism
as well as poUtical suspicion. In 1925 a royal conunission, headed by
Thomas Ferry, the under secretary of the Chief Secretary's Office,
was established to investigate "the social and economic effect of
increase in number of aUens in north Queensland". This report
expressed serious reservations about the nature of newly arrived
Soudiem Europeans, particularly those from southem Italy and Sicily
who were congregating in the sugar districts.*' Throughout die 1920s
and 1930s campaigns were mounted in the press that Italians were
held in thraU to secret "gangster" organisations. On 15 December
1939 tiie Courier Mail in an article headlined "Black Hand tertorists
in Ingham" gave die impression that die Italian commimities were
kept in perpetual fear with their houses bombed and their lives
endangered. This type of reporting did nothing to convince Anglo-
Australians diat Italians were acceptable residents.
Adherence to nineteenth cenmry doctrines of immutable racial
characteristics had not diminished to any degree. Whilst praising the
supposed good racial stock of die northem Italians, Commissioner
Ferry stated that:
The Enemy Within 47
The admission of races that can never make good Australian

citizens ordy widens the breach between the AustraUan and the
better type of foreigner. It doubles the difficulties of assimilation,
and results in the creation of racial organisations and breeds racial
hatreds that should not exist.*'
In particular. Ferry feared that these ItaUans would organise into

"aUen groups... aU anti-British in sympathy and outiook".*' A
vehement anti foreigner campaign in the press can be detected from
1936. In August 1936 a sUght disturbance in the refreshment rooms
of the Innisfail railway station was portrayed in the north Queensland
press as "foreigners attacking Britishers".'" Nearly one year later a
lead article in Smith's Weekly of 31 July 1937 alleged Italians were
sending over £1 miUion "home to Italy". On 10 Febmary 1938 the
(Brisbane) Telegraph warned diat, whilst 8,578 British immigrants had
arrived in 1937, so too had 5,684 "aliens" of whom 1982 were ItaUan
and 1,179 were Greek. The (Brisbane) Telegraph of 1 September
1937 claimed the "buming question in north Queensland" was the
presence of SicUians and Calabrians whose "mixed blood... makes
diem more alien to the Australian mode of thought than the pure
blooded Tuscans, Lombardese, Piedmontese and other central and
northem ItaUans". Canon Garland, the President of the New Settlers
League, registered his alarm tiiat "AustraUa was losing her British
element"." This theme later assumed an urgency that reverberated
diroughout Queensland after Italy entered the war in 1940.
In August 1941 the director of mUitary inteUigence presented a
"Report on ItaUans in North Queensland" in which he maintained that
"most complaints" and "tensions" in Ingham, TuUy and Caims were
inspired by "the type of ItaUan there is die least agreeable 'Soudiem'
(i.e. Southem Italy) class".'^ This cmcial report endorsed Ferry's
spurious racial categorisation. Taking this schema one step further, it
then attributed innate political and ideological characteristics which
were regarded as either openly detrimental to the Australian war effort
or as constituting an alien unincorporated element. Mr Justice Reed's
judicial enquiry on ItaUan intemees conducted in November 1943
fiirtiier endorsed the dichotomy between northem and southem
Italians. He stated that "... [g]eneraUy speaking the physical
characteristics are different, and there appears to be a marked contrast
in mental caUbre"." Whilst admitting that many Italians had fled
fascism, his report concluded that southem ItaUans' lack of education
and poor understanding of EngUsh rendered diem unsuitable
migrants.'*
Bodi die Ferry and Reed reports mirrored many of die fears and
preoccupations of die wider Queensland population. Italians were
suspect because of tiieir inferted lower "racial" ongms and tiieir
supposed inability to assimUate into die Anglo-Austt-alian community.
Yet when Italians did take out British citizenship, hostility contmued
to be vented towards tiiem. hi 1940, Police Commissioner CartoU
wrote tiiat tiiere was "much antagonism to foreigners especiaUy
Italians in Uigham and TuUy". Furthennore, he revealed tiiat it was
generally acknowledged locally tiiat Italians became nattiralised
"merely for business purposes"." The dual nature of irtational racism
can be clearly discemed in tiiese responses. The minority group is
castigated by the host society whether it conforms to or rejects
dominant cultural pattems.
Hostility was not simply confined to die Italians' ethnic and
national origins. In 1937 tiie Protestant Labor Party was founded, and
expressed its specific opposition to ItaUan cathoUcs.'* Odier
organisations, lUce the Empire Protestant Defence League in Tully
were particularly active in promoting hatred of the cathoUc ItaUan
cane cutters among Australian Workers Union members."
What now appears surprising in retrospect, given these long
standing sectarian, ethnic and political hostUities towards ItaUans, is
that the federal govemment did not target die entire ItaUan community
until March 1942 when invasion by the Japanese appeared imminent."
The raid on the Fascist Club in Brisbane on 15 June 1940 when
supposedly "tiiousands of rifles, 80,0(X) rounds of ammunition and
16,(KX) sheUs of gelignite were confiscated" was a specificaUy political
raid not one directed against the general Italian community." The
Communist Party of AustraUa (CPA) was also raided diat day
although as chapter 5 wiU demonstrate, attention was solely focused
upon the Anglo-Celtic radicals. Though three times as many Italians
as Germans were initiaUy intemed throughout the Commonwealth, this
reflected recent immigration and broad demographic pattems. As both
Menghetti and Cresciani confirm, many Italians, were communist in
sympathy if not specificaUy party members. Moreover, the national
security (subversive associations) regulations aUowed for the
comprehensive investigation, and m some cases, intemment of
communists and members of affiliated or fratemal organisations.
Predominately, however, ItaUans were mtemed because of their
nationality or enemy alien birth rather than on purely political
grounds. Though an increasing proportion of Italians were intemed,
usuaUy temporarily, after June 1940, it was not until early 1942 that
concerted manoeuvres were instigated against them.
The Enemy Within 49
Police Commissioner CarroU, writing to Justice Philp of the

Queensland Supreme Court on 18 December 1941 forcefully expressed
the view that "We need more vigilance with enemy aliens who... we
aUowed to roam at large at the present time of grave national peril".*"
fôrth Queensland, at that time, contained the largest proportion of
enemy aliens and, most particularly, naturalised British subjects of
enemy origin in the Commonwealth. It was not simply their numbers
tiiat caused concem but their location in the north east coast.
Table 3: Number of Enemy Aliens and NBS* of Enemy Birth, 1941 in Queensland
Enemy Aliens NBS of Enemy Alien Origin
Germans 536 1,798
Austrians Si 43
ItaUans 3,156 5.559
Albanians 434 IS
Finns sifi
Rumanians 14
Hungarians 6
Japanese 587
Total 5,395 7,457 12,852
* Naturalised British Subject
Fearing direct invasion by the Japanese, Queensland appeared

particularly vulnerable, a condition exacerbated by these regional
concentrations of enemy aliens. Home Secretary Hardon in an
important memorandum to Premier Forgan Smith in January 1942
stated that pressure needed to be brought to bare on the federal
govemment to place "tighter controls" over this potential fifth column.
Hanlon continued:
I have taken up witii the General Officer commandmg die first

military district over a lengthy period..., both verbally and in
writing, with a view to a firmer intemment policy, particularly in
relation to aliens; but, as pointed out, I always fmd myself up
against the proposition of having to prove a strict case against an
aUen, and practical experience has shown tiiis is ahnost impossible

in an aUen community.*'
Almost a year previously Police Commissioner CartoU had also
written to Inspector Wake on a sunilar matter. CartoU was not as
scmpulous as Hanlon in observing legal convention, beUeving tiiat
"die poUce... should not proceed witii internments to tiie same degree
of particularity and preciseness required m criminal jurisdiction"."
AUowing for die vagueness and legal impreciseness of the general
term "danger to national security", CartoU constantiy urged "strong
action" against potential enemies or tiieir agents. He remarked to die
conference of poUce conmiissioners and inteUigence sections of die
fighting services, held on 20 March 1942, tiiat Queensland intemees
"are notiiing but tiie scum of tiie earth"." Openly critical of die
federal Labor government's poUcy, CartoU maintained tiiat "secur[ing]
intemal security is a State matter" and therefore the police should be
aUowed far more power to detain enemy aliens.** UncharacteristicaUy,
given his scmpulous attention to detail that is evidenced in die
dossiers he compiled. Inspector Wake of Northem Command took die
most extreme view at die meeting, by declaring that he wanted "... all
enemy aliens intemed as they were a real menace to the Army".*'
Not only did senior officials like Wake and Carroll emphasise die
necessity for increasing intemment procedures and facilities, tiiey
strongly condemned provisions for appeal. In November 1940 the
national security (alien control) regulations provided for appeals
through the aliens tribunal. Wake and CartoU botii maintained diat
these provisions were legitunate in peace-time but potentially
irresponsible during the war emergency.** Arguing that such
concessions were "a legal formulation drawn up by legal men in the
Commonwealth Service to give their confreres outside the opportunity
to get additional work", Wake further fumed agamst the difficulties
for stretched Army resources and personnel to "shift large numbers of
aliens at any one tune".*' Home Secretary Hanlon partiaUy concuned
by stressing the necessity for "at least temporary incarceration..." in
order to ensure "die preservation of Intemal Security...".*'
Public pressure was increasingly applied to further augment
intemment procedures in the early montiis of 1942, when invasion
fears were most real and immediate. A weU attended public meeting
in Brisbane in March unrealisticaUy caUed for the immediate
intemment of all enemy aUens in north Queensland.*' The nortiiem
district of the Retumed Soldiers and Sailors Imperial League (RSL)
also tiiat montii had urged the immediate incarceration of naturaUsed
The Enemy Within 51
British subjects of enemy origin, who were regarded as potentiaUy

more subversive because tiiey are "able to cloak... their activities
under... their naturaUsation".'" The Sunday Australian of 8 Febmary
1942 hystericaUy claimed that there were "far too many foreigners in
the north" and declared that the whole north section of the State
should be placed under immediate martial law. The Sunday Sun and
Guardian of the same date, warning that the Italians at Ingham aU
had guns, pleaded for "action before it is too late".'' Yet, as Sub-
Inspector Harman of Caims revealed:
The police worked lUce niggers, big job inteming ItaUans. No

trouble. There was not one instance of sabotage except an
attempted one by one mental case to sabotage a bridge. An
AustraUan. Yugoslavs, ItaUans, Albanians, Austrians etc. gave no
trouble - odd fascist here and there, but no attempts at sabotage.'^
Mr Justice Reed in his 1943 report on intemees believed that the vast
majority of ItaUans "have no real poUtical outiook or opinions at
aU"." Even during the war, albeit m the later stages, the federal
minister for Shippmg and Supply, admitted that:
The overwheUning majority of Italians want to be safeguarded m

their wiUingness to show loyalty to AustraUa, their adopted
country, free from any interference of Fascist as weU as
Commimist or other racial associations.'*
Hannan's considered appraisal made in 1949 mirtored die reality but

in 1942, bodi the pubUc and officials alike responded with instinctive
haste and irtational alarm to the perceived threat of simultaneous
extemal invasion and potential intemal sabotage.
Reaching a peak of 5,643 intemees in mid 1942, by the end of
die year there were ordy 1,0(X) persons incarcerated. W.B. Simpson,
die director general of Security in Canberta, commented m early 1943
tiiat there was an unfortunate unreliabUity in curtent intemment
figures." Presumably, in this number most were Japanese given the
dUigence with which the miUtary incarcerated Japanese nationals.
Odier groups had also been targeted for special consideration in early
1942. Inspector Wake was particularly concemed about the presence
of Russian fascists at Biloela in central Queensland. He argued in
late January 1942 that tiiey were potential saboteurs as pressure could
be brought upon them because the Russian communities at Harbin
were now under direct enemy control.'* The "Russian Nationalist
Revolutionary Party" was regarded as being particularly anti-Semitic,

anti-British and pro-Nazi. A military security inteUigence report in
October 1941, argued that although the Firms had no links with ItaUan
fascists or German nazis m Austi-alia, tiiey did contain a subgroup of
Swedish-speaking Fuins who actuaUy supported nazi principles and
were fiercely anti-Soviet. The report from interpreter section of
military inteUigence of Febmary 1942 tiiat caused tiieir incarceration
regarded diem as "very patriotic over die Russo-Finnish war of 1939-
40"; but presumably because of tiieir residence in TuUy, Ingham and
Mt Isa tiiey were now regarded as potential fifth colunmists." By
May 1942, twenty five Russians had been intemed, along witii eighty
five Finns, and seventy eight Albanians."
Under die national security (general) regulations, number 26, die
Army had power to detain naturalised British subjects and British
bom citizens like members of tiie "AusU-alia First Movement". They
constituted the final category of persons detained, after nazis, fascists
and enemy aliens of recent arrival or military age. Writing to
General Whiteland in June 1940 (a cmcial period in die operation of
the war for it signaUed the fall of France and die high point of axis
power), the commandant of the fourth miUtary district identified
"disloyal AustraUan Germans" as key security risks. Though as
dossiers indicate, the Lutheran pastors were actuaUy taken into
custody in 1942 and 1943. Two interrelated problems present
themselves. First, as W.J. Mackay, the director general of security
declared:
... it may possibly be shown that naturalisation has been obtained

as a mere cloak. In a word, aU the circumstances of a particular
case have to be weighed carefuUy.'"
Given the geographic position of Germans on the Darling Downs, in

the Bundaberg and Brisbane Valley districts, tiiey were never to be
subject to the same widespread detention lUce die ItaUans on the north
east sugar coast.
Secondly, there was the vexing problem in security agencies'
perception of the Lutheran pastors who held great authority in tiieir
parishes. This did not apply to priests in the sugar districts. They
were predommately Irish-Australians, loyal to the war effort and
though vehemently anti-communists, were not fascist in sympathy or
mclination. The Lutiieran clergy were often, on the other hand,
highly poUtical. As a security report on one pastor remarked:
The Enemy Within 53
... since the outbreak of the war the German communities are
Uving in compact groups, and do not fraternise to any great extent
with the British section of the population.*'
Table 4: Enemy Alien Intemees in Australia, April 1942*™
Northem Southem Westem Other Total

Command Command Command
German m 402 150 39 64 655

EA f 1 1 1 3
German m 81 m I 10 121
NBS** f
Italian m 1,680 114 341 34 2,411

EA f 2 2 4
Italian m 206 m m 1 290

NBS f
Japanese m 611 250 861

f .35 - 28(+13c) 16
Other EA m a i
Other 42 7 16 65
Total 3,081 400 622 418 4,521
* These figures do not include POW or persons intemed outside Commonwealth and Territories
** NBS Naturalised British Subject
W.J. Mackay declared tiiat:
... Pastors of the Lutheran Churches are recognised local Nazi

leaders and, in several cases, there is evidence that their behaviour
is more in keeping with a Pmssian guardsman than a man of
God.'^
Given Mackay's pre-eminence m the field of security and his ability

to influence federal muiisters it is not surprising that pastors were
placed under particular scmtiny by the police and local military
intelUgence agents. FoUowing Mackay's direction, evidence was
sought for "disloyalty" and potential subversion emanating from the
pastor's promptings or teachings. In Toowoomba security agents
believed the Germans there were "... passively disloyal with possible
active disloyalty on die part of certain mdividuals and die [entire]

German population is a potential fiftii column"."
Several churches had been under surveiUance of the CIB since die
1930s - die Quakers for tiieir adamant pacifism and die Jehovah's
Wimesses who refused to recognise King George VI, believmg only
God was tiieir spirimal monarch, and more importantiy, later totaUy
abstaining from aidmg die war effort in any manner.'* Quakers and
Jehovah's Wimess were not however intemed. The UECLA came
under particular notice; diough, as Margaret Bevege argues, dieir
journal. The Lutheran Herald stated its aim was to promote Gennan
culture but emphatically disavowed aU links to nazism, claiming its
readers were "Australians having no flag but die Union Jack"." The
Evangelical Ludieran Snyod of Australia (ELSA), which maintained
nineteen pastors in Queensland, was regarded by the CEB and military
intelligence as far less dangerous tiian the larger UELCA, although
"no doubt tiiere is a disloyal element in the Church".**
Dealing with the intemment of several notable UELCA pastors
certain pattems emerge. First, Pastors Anton HiUer of Boonah parish
and E.V.H. Gutenkunst had been under surveiUance since the arrival
of Dr Asmis; tiieir mail had been intercepted by the postal and
telegraphic censor within the Post Master General's office, translated
and then forwarded to interpreter's section of military inteUigence,
Northem Command m Brisbane. Secondly, they had artanged die
visit of von Luckner through their parishes.
The strongest cases assembled by military inteUigence involved
Hiller and Gutenkunst, despite the fact tiiat Gutenkunst's son was an
officer in the Second AIF. Though the local police report stated diat
tiiere was no evidence of Hiller "being anti-British" at die outbreak of
the war he was kept under intense surveiUance. The security service
report sent to die subversive section of Northern Command identified
five factors tiiat ensured his uitemment:- his correspondence in
German "probably anti-British and apparently pro-Nazi"; von Luckner
was his guest; he possessed a large cache of nazi propoganda; he was
associated with a well known Sydney University lecmrer and self-
proclaimed nazi, Dr Neumaim and lastly he subscribed to Die Briicke.
Evidence at his hearing before die Aliens Tribunal in Gaythome
intemment camp in March 1942 showed how he had aUowed Dr
Neumann to make a pro-Nazi speech in his church in June 1939.
When questioned about his political beliefs he naively stated tiiat "As
far as tiie Nazi regime is concemed, I have always contended diat it
may be aU right for diat country but not for Australia". Sent to
The Enemy Within 55
Tatura camp, HiUer was released in Febmary 1944 a very embittered

man."
Together with a commitment to release intemees who were not
actual members of the nazi or fascist parties or Japanese, the War
Cabinet in March 1942 decided that refugee aliens, such as those
from die "Dunera" and some categories of enemy alien should be
made available for employment to the AUied Works Council.
Refugee aliens, neutral aliens and aUied nationals were also eligible to
apply for national service, in some cases in the armed forces.** The
aliens classification and advisory committee established under the
auspices of the Attomey General's department recommended in March
1943 that when the loyalty of "friendly and refugee enemy aliens is
undoubted they be encouraged to join the armed services".*' Some
18,5(X) Italian prisoners of war, mostly captured in Libya in 1941,
were transported to Australia. With the exception of fascist party
members, most were released for private agriculmral and public works
programmes in Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and New South
Wales.'"
The AUied Works Council had been established in Febmary 1942
with E.G. Theodore as its chairman to coordinate and implement the
massive public works and defence instaUations needed to launch aUied
offensives in the Pacific. The Civilian Constmction Corps, under the
control of Theodore's business partner, Frank Packer employed a total
of 53,518 men between Febmary 1942 and June 1942. Most of those
directed to perform labour were men unfit for or over the age of
miUtary service. To supplement tiie chronic shortage of able-bodied
persormel, suggestions had been made to introduce 25,000 workers
from die Netherlands East Indies for the duration of the war."
Widiin the Commonwealth, given the competition between the
Manpower Authorities and die AUied Works Council to control aU
available labour, moves were made to recmit among registered aliens.
Therefore most low-risk intemees were released from incarceration in
order to contribute gauifuUy to die AUied war effort.
In early 1942 the Civil Alien Corps was established as a section
of die AUied Works Council.'^ Released intemees and aliens, whether
of neutral or enemy status, who had been cleared tiirough the security
procedures of die Aliens Tribunals, could be employed by tiiis body.
They were to be paid the basic aUowance of die Australian MUitary
Forces scale and in circumstances tiiat would not contravene
international conventions. They were therefore precluded from
workmg on direct defence work such as aerodrome constmction."
Whilst the Army was required to fumish "adequate security
arrangements", Northem Conunand accepted some 1100 fonner

intemees and otiier aliens who were deployed for ancillary AUied
Works Council projects from March and April 1942 onwards. In
Victoria 550 released Queensland intemees worked at die saltworks at
Underwood and die forestry camp at WerrimilU.'* This entire scheme
which was hoped would supply vital labour demands was a
disappointment. Procedures lapsed when C.K. Wagner and E.
Gmnseitt took their labour conscription cases in late 1942 to die High
Court. Ui May 1943 their objections were upheld."
Table 5: Numbers of Enemy Aliens in Queensland on AUied Works Council 1942.
Disuict Work Number
Westem Creek Protection of State Forests 240
Monto Protection of State Forests 100
Inglewood Protection of State Forests 60
Ravensboume Road Construction 180

West of Roma Road Construction 120
Clermont Road Constmction 400
Total 1100
In August 1942, control of enemy aliens and intemees passed from

the Army to the Attomey General, though the Army remained
responsible for the acmal incarceration procedures. Two new poUcies
were adopted. First, refugee, aUied national and "cleared" neutral
aliens could volunteer for service in the armed forces if they were
released from reserved civil occupations by die Manpower authority.
Secondly, those who were not already employed by the Civil Alien
Corps could be engaged by the Civil Auxiliary Corps for essential,
but non-defence, works.'*
The federal director of Security in January 1943 made it clear that
released enemy aUen intemees should not be aUowed to work for
private mdividuals but radier in groups which could be supervised.
He argued for die maximum degree of regimentation within the
constraints of limited persormel resources. He stated that "I am firmly
opposed to the principle of allocating mdividual aliens to private
The Enemy Within 57
employees. Our responsibiUty is security. When these men are

regimented under the aliens service regulation it is possible to know
where tiiey are and what they are doing."" Yet, tiiis entire policy of
enemy alien employment would appear fraught with contradictions.
On the one hand, captured enemy Italian prisoners of war were
aUowed to work for farmers without any insistence upon daily
supervision. On the other hand, resident enemy aliens or nationalised
British subjects who had been intemed might be released and directed
by die Manpower authority or die AUied Works Council to labour in
supervised gangs on road constmction or other public works in remote
inhospitable regions. Writing to the Attomey General in September
1944, the director general of Security stated that, after die capitulation
of Italy in September 1943 new poUcy directives aUowed Italian
intemees who were incarcerated as "a precautionary measure" to be
released for work speciaUy in their own State but on "essential"
labour."
In April 1943 the War Cabinet re-formed the Civil Aliens Corps
under the direction of the federal miruster of the Interior with
remuneration and conditions set by the director general of AUied
Works." Ordy 1,671 of the 15,601 men eUgible for service were
assigned. 350 were deployed as maintenance men on the
Commonwealth Port Augusta-Kalgoorlie and Port Augusta-Alice
Springs railways."* A further 679 were employed in low security
areas like the munition's factory at General Motor's Holden defence
projects. In May 1945, given the poor numbers and the excessive
adrrunistrative costs it was replaced by the Civil Constmction Corps.
Most potentiaUy eUgible members were exempted because they were
akeady employed on essential agricultural or pastoral labour or
secondary industry. In Febmary 1945 only one per cent of the
16,701 members of the Civil Constmction Corps were refugees and
only eight per cent were enemy aliens.""
In conclusion, cooperation between the civil poUce who gathered
local information, the Commonwealth Investigation Bureau - a
precursor of the AustraUan Security IntelUgence Organisation - and
military intelligence can be readily detected in this sensitive area that
could potentiaUy affect national security. The delegation of powers
often proved a difficult task, with the poUce possessing detailed local
knowledge making assessments on the uidividual level but with policy
ultimately determined in war-tune by military intelligence agencies.
These organisational demarcations were further extended by die very
complex procedures that required the civU poUce to apprehend the
intemee and the Army to maintain the camps. On this particular
issue, die US autiiorities left tiie entire matter of uitemal security to

tiie Ausu-alians. It may be further argued tiiat tiie partem of
intemment of enemy aliens and nattiralised British subjects of enemy
alien origin reveals tiie varying degrees of alarm and insecurity felt in
AusU-alia. Though initiaUy incarceratmg tiiose of direct security risk
like members of tiie nazi party and tiieir most vocal supporters, and
later tiie fascist party, whilst tiie war remained centred extemaUy in
die Middle East and Europe and where die Commonwealdi's role was
in an auxiliary capacity, intemment remained low key. The advent of
total war and the direct tiireat posed by an apparentiy imminent
invasion by the Japanese in late 1941 and early 1942 led to increasing
panic and severity towards aU categories of enemy aUens. All
Japanese were immediately arrested and incarcerated. The Italian
community in Queensland in particular became the subject of intense
official scmtiny and public suspicion. Yet by mid 1942, when die
initial alarm had abated, plans were aUeady underway to utilise die
labour resources of all forms of enemy alien and non British
residents. A pragmatic expediency was to triumph over nationalist
fervour.
Ill
The Management of Segregation: Black American
Servicemen in Queensland 1941-45
with Helen Taylor
The deployment of Black American service personnel in Australia

from December 1941 chaUenged the basic precepts upon which
Commonwealth legislative and administrative policies were
constmcted. Commitment to racial homogeneity had, since 1901,
demonstrated that bipartisan agreement and co-operation, at the
political level, was possible over such a cardinal policy and practice.
Certainly, no other issue in Australian politics and society could
surmount class, gender, regional and sectional interests so unanimously
as adherence to strict principles of racial exclusiveness.' The crisis of
imminent invasion and the concomitant dependence and subordination
to the United States in the early months of 1942 forged new
imperatives and redirected standard approaches and priorities. The
Commonwealth government's capitulation to the wider claims and
powers of American policy directives starkly iUustrates both the
flexibility and the endurance of Austalian intemal procedures. Having
been forced to accept the presence of Black GIs, both the
Commonwealth and Queensland governments negotiated and
established complex, interlinking pattems of segregation to contain this
unwanted inclusion in the Allied forces. As chapter one demonstrates,
in those issues involving the residence, safety and rights of American
military and naval persormel, intricate pattems that could ensure both
cooperation and autonomy, were established.
Aware of Australia's defencelessness and vulnerability, with the
Second AustraUan Imperial Force stationed in the Middle East from
1939 to late 1941, many AustraUans had initiaUy regarded their
Pacific AUies as omnipotent saviours; but the inclusion of Black
troops among their numbers, particularly in the potential role of
avenging warriors, brought to the surface AustraUans' ambivalence
about the nature of their deliverers. On one level, Australian and
American males engaged in long and bitter dispute over access to
Australian women who were thus cast as passive instmments of either
virtue or pleasure in the male dominions of power (as chapter 4 wiU

elaborate) But, on anotiier, while Australian men were m overseas
tiieatres of war, tiie additional dimension of tiiousands of young,
smartly dressed, affluent, resident Black troops, exacerbated die
general disquiet. Botii tiie official and public alarm ensured tiiat an
attempt would be made to prevent Black servicemen associatmg with
local women. To tiiis end. Black American servicemen m Australia
were subject to the restrictions of two interiocking systems of
segregation - die first involved intemal American practices; die second
was imposed by the Australian civilian authorities. Three broad
procedures devolved from tiiese systems - tiie first involved
geographical isolation, tiie second demanded residential zoning and die
diird ensured recreational segregation.
At the commencement of the Australian and United States'
military alliance at die end of 1941, die Australian War Cabinet had
categoricaUy opposed die inclusion of the Blacks among die AUies'
forces. This reflected a politicaUy bi-partisan docttine and community
consensus on die issue of "White Australia". Since the inception of
tiie Commonwealtii in 1901, tiiis had remained a fundamental
cornerstone of domestic policy. The exigencies of total war and die
realities of Australia's subordinate stams m the Pacific AUies' aUiance
meant the restrictive entry provision was suspended, though never
repudiated, for the duration of the national crisis.
Initial reference to this specific dispute over die introduction of
Black GIs into Australia arose three weeks after Pearl Harbour,
Charles Brown, the Sydney-based director of the Matson shipping line,
wrote on 2 January 1942 to General Ely E. Palmer, the US consul,
requesting information and clarification on Australian attitudes towards
the possibility of Black American servicemen labouring on AustraUan
wharves, particularly in the strategically cmcial port of Brisbane. The
foUowing day a conference was held in Melboume attended by US
Generals Bames, Brereton and Brett and the Australian chiefs of staff.
Its aim was to ensure that Australia gained information about die
proposed despatch of American troops and equipment to its shores.^
In a memorandum to the secretary of the department of Defence
Coordination on 7 January 1942, Prime Minister Curtin expressly
forbade the employment of any American servicemen on Australian
wharves until such time as aU local civilian supplies became totally
inadequate.' Clearly Curtin was reluctant to express his more specific
apprehensions that the US might have aUeady despatched labour
battalions that contained Black persormel.
Management of Segregation 61
The departments of the Interior and Labour and National Service

meanwhile considered the specific requests of the Matson line during
die early weeks of January. The secretary of the department of
Labour and National Service firmly rejected die proposition of a
labour shortage on the Brisbane wharves. In line with current federal
policy, he stressed that "any suggestion of importing coloured gangs
from the United States would have disastrous consequences". In a
memorandum from the Administrative Planning Committee, dated 13
January 1942, die minister. Senator CoUins, concurred, stating "any
such proposal is most dangerous".*
Ulysses Lee, in die official history of the US Army in World War
Two, comments that:
AustraUa, with its White Australia Policy, informed the War

Department through the Australian Embassy [sic] that it would not
agree to the despatch of Negro troops to Australian territory. This
was later modified to permit a limited number to enter, with the
stipulation that they were to be witiidrawn at the end of the
AustraUan emergency.'
An examination of the cables that went back and forth between

Washington and Melboume reveals far more complex and sustained
negotiations tiian Lee indicates. The Australian War Cabinet was
alerted to American intentions when the Australian Representative in
Washington, Richard Casey, cabled on 9 January 1942, that:
US govemment considering the despatch of ground troops

principaUy anti-aircraft units to Australia; and in this connection
diey are anxious to know what would be your reaction to a
proposal that a proportion of those troops should be coloured
(negro).*
The foUowing day Casey cabled Dr H.V. Evatt, the minister for
Extemal Affairs, tiiat the War department proposed immediately
sending 2,000 Black troops to Australia.' At the same time as news
of these proposals was being received, seemingly to pre-empt any
AustraUan poUcy directives, die AustraUan Advisory War Council,
entered into negotiations with General Bames. He requested that
Darwm be placed under military control as tiiere were insufficient
civilian residents m this remote township to unload heavy equipment.'
Referring specifically to die issue of Black servicemen, the
Advisory War Council debated Bames's request on 12 January. As
any acceptance chaUenged die foundations of die "White Austt-alia"

policy, die Advisory War Council advised the War Cabinet to adhere
to traditional principles.' Ui view of tiieir united and resolute
determination to assert Australian perspectives, Evatt mformed Casey
die foUowing day tiiat "We are not prepared to agree to die proposal
tiiat U.S. troops to be despatched to Australia should be coloured",'"
At die same time, however, tiie rapid advance of die Japanese tiirough
tiie Pacific region meant tiiat tiie more narrow and restrictive
Australian policy directives were inappropriate. On 22 December
1941, the Pensacola convoy, carrying 4,600 troops needed for the
Philippines, had to be diverted to Brisbane." Under tiiese urgent
circumstances, it was entirely unrealistic for tiie United States to
consult witii AustraUa about whetiier Black troops on board were
acceptable. Major-General Thomas Hardy, die US assistant Chief of
Staff in Washington, DC outiined tiie War Department's overall
policy, stressing that "coloured troops [were to be employed] in all
overseas tiieatres" at a rate of approximately 10 per cent of tiie total
force.'^
On 8 January 1942 General Brett, commander of die United States
Armed Forces in Australia (USAFIA) had urged Washington to
despatch two engineer labour battalions to unload equipment in
Darwin. The War Department was anxious to leam whether Black
units would be acceptable for such operations as they would in the
United States. Friction witii the Australian govemment was
temporarily averted, as General MarshaU informed Brett that a severe
shipping shortage prevented any unmediate consignment.'^ Whilst the
Advisory War Council would not have been aware of die cables
emanating between Brett and MarshaU, it is within this atmosphere
tiiat negotiations between Australia and its aUy were formed.
Anxious to reassure the mmister for Extemal Affairs that Black
troops were a skiUed and disciplined component of the US armed
forces, tiie director of the American legation in Canberta wrote on 13
January that:
The Negro units aU belong to die U.S. Army. They are all
enlisted personnel and are tramed and disciplined men. The
intention is to use them in Darwin for tiie heavy labour in
connection with instaUation of aircraft defences and aerodromes for
which they are peculiarly fitted.'*
This stereotypical racist statement which stressed Blacks' physical

prowess and supposed ability to withstand intense heat and
substandard working conditions, reinforced an ideology already

dominant in Australia. The War Cabinet was faced with a dilemma
in which contradictory stmctural and ideological factors were
operating. On the one hand, the segregative practices in the US
armed forces, endorsed by President Roosevelt in late 1940," ensured
diat any Black personnel sent overseas would usuaUy be relegated to
non-combative manual duties. This confirmed the dominant stereotype
of Blacks as being only capable of arduous menial physical labour.
On die otiier hand, American segregative practices also meant tiiese
units would not be in transit to the battle zones of the Pacific but
actually resident in Australia. Therefore the processes of Blacks'
reception and acceptance required far more sustained readjustment by
the Australian community.
After hearing the US submission about die suitability of Black
persormel, the secretary of the department of Extemal Affairs correctly
interpreted these pronouncements as an indication that the War
Department was about to land these troops very soon. Given, this fait
accompli, Secretary Hodgson advised die secretary of the department
of the Interior on 19 January to adopt a more flexible approach than
previously:
By the decision of the War Cabinet, no coloured troops frorh the

U.S. wiU be stationed in Australia. The Commonwealth
Govemment would have no objection to coloured troops caUing at
an Australian port en route for destinations outside Australia.'*
Though harming the residence of Black troops, this statement

demonstrates a more conciliatory attitude. It did not, however, take
into consideration the actual deployment of Blacks into non-combative
operations. Ultimately this policy proved both unfeasible and
inapplicable.
The foUowing day, the Advisory War Council, in the light of its
previous opposition to Black servicemen, performed a volte-face when
it:
... decided that [though] the Australian reaction to the despatch of

Negro troops to Australia would not be favourable, the
composition of die forces that the U.S. goverrunent might decide
to despatch to Australia is a matter for that govemment to
determine.
It continued:
If tiie U.S.A. authorities find it necessary to mclude certain

coloured labour units or a proportion of coloured troops in tiieir
forces it is not tiie desire of tiie Commonwealtii Government to
make any stipulation which might destroy die natiire of die
organisation of the Army formulation.
Radier timidly, it concluded that:

Nevertheless, it is assumed tiiat tiie U.S.A. autiiorities, being aware
of our views, wiU have regard to AustraUan susceptibiUties in die
numbers tiiey decide to despatch."
Bryan D. Bamett suggests tiiat Australia capittilated because its

"position at this stage of die war left no room for bargaining"." This
explanation does not take mto account die specific diplomatic
manoeuvres or shifts in policy. Roger J. BeU conunents:
Despite its tiieoretical sovereign equality of all mdependent states,

the influence Australia exerted within die wartime aUiance was
seriously restricted by its limited miUtary resources and diplomatic
weight."
It would appear that Australia was forced by the exigencies of die

Pacific war front to re-evaluate and modify even basic tenets of
policy.
Referring to the British situation, Graham Smitii maintains tiiat
initiaUy in early 1942 the British govemment did not voice any
official opinion over the issue of die inclusion of Black troops among
the American forces bound for Northem Ireland. Segregation was
regarded "at the very best [as] a source of wonder to local
mhabitants".^" He continues that the British authorities were forced to
accept American procedures, despite the inefficiency and increased
costs of providmg segregated environments. Smith concludes:
The British govemment, as it saw matters, had to be careful not to

upset its vital aUy by activity encouraging the breakdown of die
American segregation policy... On the other hand, to accept the
American standpoint would be to give offence to British Blacks, to
the NAACP, the British colonial territories and armies, not to
mention significant elements of the British electorate.^'
Australia experienced no such hesitation or dilemmas when faced with

die realities of the diplomatic crisis. Rather, it always sought to
reinforce and extend segregation.
The first significant contingent of Black troops arrived in
Melboume in late January, indicting that they had left die USA in
December, before any consultative procedures had been established.
A meeting of die War Cabinet on 2 Febmary countermanded a
decision by the customs officials at die point of entry refusing
admittance to these troops.^ Ministers argued that the decision made
by die Advisory War Council on 20 January overrode any normal
immigration practices. As Bamett notes, this contingent, as weU as
die Pensacola convoy that landed in Brisbane on 22 December 1941,
had been destined for the Philippines and had to be re-routed to safer
areas.^ As events overtook the formulation of policy, Australia was
forced to accommodate itself to the more urgent reaUties of total war.
Cooperation with its Pacific partner meant accepting unwillingly,
albeit temporarily, aU troops despatched by its aUy. On 25 January,
General Bames informed Washington that Australia no longer had any
serious objection to any type of American servicemen being posted
diere. The following day Eisenhower referted the matter to Casey for
his consideration;^ though clearly this was a matter of diplomatic
protocol rather than consultation.
The Australian federal govemment was forced to accede to US
practices involved in the selection and deployment of American armed
services in overseas tiieatres of warfare. The inclusion of Black
American servicemen could have presented both the Australian
govemment and the people with an opportunity to re-evaluate the
entire raison d'etre for the "White Australia" policy. However, in the
years 1942 to 1945, intemal segregative practices were both
reaffirmed and enlarged. These were not die ordy factors which
determined Black servicemen's reception within and adjustment to
AustraUa. Other issues which bore directiy upon this experience
include US armed forces' policy; domestic American racial attitudes
and practices and the growing assertiveness on the part of Blacks due
to tiieir participation in and perception of the war effort.
US military and naval inteUigence reports sent back to Washington
demonstrate that the AUies fully appreciated and supported Australia's
commitment to policies endorsuig and maintaining racial
exclusiveness. L.D. Causey, the naval attache in Melboume in 1942
testified to the strengtii and resilience of "the doctrines of racial
superiority here".^ A report made by die Office of Strategic Services
in 1943 stated that the Aborigines "have no status in Australian
Society and their existence is scarcely recognised".^ General Patrick

J. Hurley wrote in June 1942 that "I have never seen the racial
problem brought home so forcibly as it is over here in Queensland".^
Since die Americans intended deploying Black troops to the Pacific
theatre of operations, measures were devised whereby they would be
both fully utilised for the war effort whilst, at the same time being
contained in line with intemal Australian practices. Moreover, diis
dilemma needed urgent resolution; for in the early montiis of 1942
more Afro-American troops were despatched to Australia than any
other overseas theatre.
Table 6: Distribution of Black American Troops, March 1942.^'
District Present En Route Projected
Australia 6,346 186

British Isles 81 12,887
New Caledonia 1,376
Trinidad 2,484
Total 10,206 267 12,887
By August tiiere were 7285 Black Americans in Australia.^' They

comprised over one third of die resident American depot personnel.
At tills time tiiere were approximately 90,000 American servicemen in
Australia eitiier stationed on bases or in transit to New Guinea.^"
Three basic procedures were formulated in order to uphold and
reinforce die tenets of "White Australia". First, a process of
geographic isolation would ensure tiiat most Black GIs would be
confined to remote mral districts. Secondly, as Black servicemen
later became concentrated in urban areas like Brisbane and Ipswich in
soutiieast Queensland, specific locations were designated by die US
autiiorities as eitiier exclusively "white" or "coloured" zones. Thirdly,
racially differentiated pattems of recreation and leisure were devised
m order to minimise the contact and intimate association between
white Australian women and Black American troops.
At die inception of the Pacific military aUiance, the US Army had
proposed that two Black labour corps be sent to Darwin to unload
heavy equipment;^' but tiie extensive bombmg of Darwin on 19
Febmary rendered tiiis plan inoperable. On 27 Febmary tiie 810di
and Slldi Engineering Aviation Battalion disembarked in Melboume
to die dismay of die Australian War Cabinet.'' They were foUowed
by die 91st and 96di who arrived in TownsviUe in nortii Queensland

to clear scmb to prepare for an airstrip." As Daryl Mclntyre shows,
tiiese regiments worked "under primitive conditions" and were kept
away from die local civilian population. Twenty-five officers and
1193 'otiier ranks' of tiie 91st Regiment were located near a railway
siding sixty miles south of TownsviUe. Landing without appropriate
equipment and transport, they were forced to borrow unsuitable
machinery from the local sugar-cane farmers. The move to
TownsviUe in July gave them deserved rest, recreation and more
chaUenging work."
In March MacArthur promised tiiat Black troops would be posted
to remote areas. He wrote to General MarshaU in Washington:
I wiU do everything possible to prevent friction or resentment on

die part of the Australian govemment and people with regard to
the presence of coloured troops... their policy of "White Australia"
is universally accepted here... however, by utilizmg these troops in
die front zones away from the great centres of population... I can
minimize the difficulties involved.^'
By mid May 1942 there were 3,500 Afro-Americans located in the

arid region of Cloncurry and Mt. Isa in northwest Queensland in order
to constmct the road between Tennant Creek in the Northem Territory
and Mt Isa." Likewise, as Robert HaU has argued, Aborigmes were
only conscripted into the Australian Military Forces under special
circumstances:
As long as they remained out of the public eye and so long as

they contributed to the defence of a strategicaUy important area
where other manpower was scarce."
They could, however, volunteer for active service in the Second AIF.
Thus, the deployment of Black Americans to remote regions was in
line with intemal Australian procedures.
But this was not always possible. J.A. Beasley, the minister for
Supply and Development, revealed in May 1942 that Black troops
were engaged in wharf labouring at Glebe in central Sydney.^' On
die other hand, as MacArtiiur averred to Prime Minister Curtin m
September, die United States Army Services of Supply (USASOS)
which contained many Black members:
... had been charged witii tiie responsibility of receipt, storage and
distribution of U.S. Army supplies, including unloading from
vessels arriving from the U.S. and tiieir reloading for tt-ans-
shipment when necessary.^'
Under tiiese circumstances, otiier procedures had to be devised

whereby Blacks could be kept segregated from die Australian
community and otiier American service personnel. This necessitated
tiie imposition of zoning in urban areas, a practice which became
most formaUsed in Queensland, hi July 1942, MacArtiiur transferted
his command from Melboume to Brisbane ensuring Queensland's
status as tiie administrative and organisational base for die entire
Pacific offensive. Most US servicemen would henceforth be stationed
in Queensland. It did not augur weU for Black Americans tiiat tiiey
were predominantly located in the particular State where racial
attitudes were highly repressive and intemal segregative procedures
most formalised.
Table 7: Numbers of Black US Military Personnel in Australia, April 1944.'"'
District Officers Other Ranks Total
Darwin, NT 2 100 102

TownsviUe & Caims
(north Queensland) 16 468 484
Brisbane (Queensland) 30 998 1,028
Total 48 1,566 1,614
At die end of die nineteenth century Queensland had formulated

segregative legislation which was subsequently the basis of policy
elsewhere in Australia. Aborigines were confined legaUy to die
reserves and missions which operated as closed institutions. During
die 1930s the Queensland Labor govemment had tightened
discriminatory procedures, thereby confirming that State's reputation as
tiie most raciaUy exclusivist in tiie Commonwealth.*'
In Queensland most Black Americans were initiaUy relegated to
remote areas. By 1944 when they were stationed as base troops in
highly concentrated urban areas, the second system of segregation was
employed - the US autiiorities designated certain areas as a eitiier
"white" or "coloured" in line with segregative practices at home. A
police Criminal Investigation Branch report from Ipswich in
September 1942 highlights the procedures and repercussions of this
second level - die system of locaUy defined residential segregation.

Serious clashes had occurred between die 2,000 Black troops stationed
at Redbank, an outer Ipswich suburb, and die 1,500 white servicemen
located in the nearby airforce township of Amberley. The most
serious fracas had empted in Oxley which was undefined territory.
At die adjacent centre, Wacol, over 150 Blacks from a chemical unit
resident there fought with white American troops when tiiey believed
"dieir territory was invaded".*^ Ipswich's chief inspector suggested
tiiat die whole Redbank and Goodna districts be strictiy out of bounds
to aU white military persoimel in order to minimise these near riots.
In Brisbane, Black servicemen were mostly confmed to the
dilapidated south and east banks of the river where other non-whites,
die "Maoris" (probably Pacific islanders), the Chinese and those few
Aborigines not Uving under the reserve system resided. This area of
Brisbane contained cheap boarding houses, brothels where some urban
Aboriginal women worked as prostitutes, in bars and other drinking
establishments. Street brawls empted when white servicemen, either
AustraUans or Americans, who had the more salubrious and attractive
northem and westem areas of the city, "trespassed" onto the other
side of the river into South Brisbane and WooUoongabba. In
December 1944, a Black serviceman, Lomzie M. was court martiaUed
for "being armed with an offensive weapon". When a group of Black
troops clustered around two white US sailors who were accompanied
by three white Australian women, a brawl ensued when one of the
sailors caUed the defendant "a bloody Negro bastard". M. and his
compatriots retaliated, as "We ... wiU not stand for that". A fortnight
previously there had been a serious fracas on the comer of Stanley
and Grey Streets in South Brisbane between a group of AustraUan
soldiers and Black GIs. US provosts were employed "to quieten the
crowd" .''^
E. Daniel Potts and Armette Potts comment that, because Black
soldiers in service units did not have access to firearms, a situation
which heightened their sense of intense vulnerability and insecurity,
diey carried knives or weU-honed razors. As interracial brawls and
altercations in Brisbane and surrounding districts mounted in intensity
and increased in frequency by mid 1942, the US Army issued a
prohibition on guns and knives in city areas. This measure proved
totally unenforceable and fights resulting in serious injury continued
unabated.**
In Queensland Black Americans were subject to highly formalised
residential, occupational and recreational segregation both within tiie
US armed services as well as those constmcted by tiieir host
community. Confined to die dilapidated areas of AusU-alian towns,

accorded inferior leisure facilities as weU as being subject to daily
verbal abuse and humiliations, these servicemen resented die
discrepancies between tiie rhetoric and die reality of what die AUies
were fighting to ensure. As one anonymous cortespondent to die
North Queensland Guardian wrote on 29 January 1943:
Why must we be relegated to a section of die city (TownsviUe)

tiiat, even in peace time, respectable citizens don't care to
frequent? Is it to be constmed tiiat tiie Negro is of such a base
and degraded character tiiat he is at home and pleased with die
evils and vile part of civiUzation?
He furtiier complained that Black troops were rarely invited into

AustraUans' homes. Mrs Eileen Qumn, die president of die
TownsviUe Women's Progressive Club, a member of die United
Associations of Women and close friend of Jean Devanny, the
prominent communist writer, recalled that she and her husband, unlike
most TownsviUe residents, frequentiy entertained Black servicemen in
tiieir home with meals and conversation. Remembering them as
"tiiorough gentlemen", Mrs Quinn related tiiat tiiey "complained
bitterly and resented aU that dreadful discrimination".*' Oral testimony
gathered by E. Daniel Potts and Armette Potts suggests that some
Black GIs and nurses feU they were less discriminated against in
Australia than in their homeland. This was a matter of degree, for
none felt they were equally treated as white Americans in Australia.*'
Though in some small towns conflict arose between the local
residents and Black GIs impatient with the limited and boring
recreation available, diverse pattems were available m die larger
centres. Australian servicemen did not maintain the rigid lines of
segregation their American counterparts observed. Fratemisation was
common. A cmcial report from an Australian Provost Corps sergeant
in Brisbane dated 16 April 1942 commented adversely on the easy
relationship between Australian enlisted men and Black servicemen
who "are getting on a higher plan than is good for the city's safety".
On the basis of this report, all commanders of units based in
Queensland sent directives to discourage this fratemisation as "[it] is
not permitted or tiiought of on the part of American white troops and
it is undesirable that it should continue on the part of AustraUan
troops".*' This was taken further. At a conference of the State
directors of security held on 26 May 1942, the director general
commented that:
The only \yay to deal widi tiiem [Blacks], according to die

Americans, is to keep tiiem in their proper place. I think you
should give consideration to makmg it an offence for any
Australian member of the Forces to procure for or supply to any
coloured member of the American forces any liquor. The
Americans don't want it and they have put die hotels out of
bounds to the Negroes.*^
At the more formal level, interracial tensions in Australia were

exacerbated by intemal US military procedures. Under national
security (aUied forces) regulations, mle 302 of 1941:
Any member of the U.S. forces arrested or detained by police on

a charge committed against the law of the Commonwealth wiU be
handed over to the appropriate naval or military court constituted
in accordance with the law of the U.S.A.
This poUcy had several important ramifications. First, it placed the

local police force in an ambiguous position in the event of brawls
between AUied servicemen. On Anzac Day 1942, a secular but
sacred day in the Australian calendar of symbolic celebrations, a riot
occurred in Mt Isa when the police attempted to question a group of
Black servicemen about a minor robbery. It was aUeged that some
tiiirty Black US troops were standing outside the Star Theatre "using
obscene language" whilst the Anzac memorial service was being
conducted. When approached by the police, a serious argument
ensued. Constable Stemberg fired his pistol into the air. This
prompted Australian civilians and some members of the Second AIF
who were temporarily stationed there to join the fracas. A riot
ensued with the constable being seriously injured. Some servicemen
were stabbed. The foUowing day the US Army moved the Black
troops even further west to the inhospitable tovm of Camooweal.*' In
diis particular instance, the slender resources of the police force
without even a motor van or car was insufficient to cope with a
serious riot.
Charles Comer, then a young constable stationed in Mt Isa,
recaUed over forty years later ui his memoirs that:
... An American Negro began a disturbance [outside the 'Star']... I

drew my Webley Revolver and holding it by die bartel, I clubbed
the negro around the head, and when he ran away I levelled the
gun at him and fired. I cannot say I hit or missed hun, but I
cannot recaU seeing tiiat negro again altiiough aU negroes seem
alike in the darkness.
Comer was most indignant that, having located die offenders of die
initial altercation, which undoubtedly escalated because of his
summary resort to coercion, "die officer in charge of Mount Isa Police
Station said tiiat tiie Americans were our aUies and to drop the
investigation".'"
Certainly it would seem tiiat rather tiian reevaluatmg the logic and
efficacy of discrimination and segregation, the US autiiorities chose to
intensify tiiese processes. As tiie US deputy director of security in
TownsviUe reported in late 1942:
Having been present at die police station during the period of
these two disturbances (at Ingham), 1 was able to observe die
hostile attitude which is being adopted by the American Negroes
towards the white people. They appear to becommg [sic]
particularly self-confident and insubordinate which may ultimately
cause them to become a serious problem."
Clearly from this analysis, any racial disharmony was the result of
Blacks not moving and keeping in "their place". Bamett argues dial
"Southemers in the U.S. Army in Australia were a major
consideration" in framing both policy directives and establishing
segregated facilities for Black troops.'^ In this regard, practices
occurring in Queensland mirrored those prevalent in tiie US.
Contemporary observers like Florence Murray in her exhaustive survey
of violence directed against Black servicemen and women in the USA
showed that many of the most serious incidences occurted in the
southem States where segregation was most pronounced.'^ Historian
Harvard Sitkoff further comments that:
Racial friction, sporadic conflict, and finaUy outright rioting

became commonplace at nearly every army base in the South,
many in the North, and even a few in Australia, England, and the
South Pacific.'*
This reaction was occurring with increasing frequency in the USA as

well. Sitkoff, tracing die implications of these processes, contends
tiiat:
The tensions and violence within the miUtary mirrored the

mushroommg conflict on the homefront... Many whites intensified
tiieir efforts to keep the Negro "in his place", regardless of the
changes wrought by the war."
Solutions, whether in the USA or in Queensland, were to maintain the

status quo, by reinforcing segregative institutions and practices.
Another factor which led to an increasingly volatile atmosphere
was the use of the US miUtary poUce. Australian traditions and
conventions ensured that the provosts were discreetly and minimaUy
employed but this approach was scorned by their American ally. In
November 1942 a serious brawl empted m Stardey Street, South
Brisbane in which Black American troops threatened other servicemen
with knives. In the ensuing fight, the local civilian police acted with
such restraint and adroitness that two policemen were recommended
for the King's medal for bravery. As the police commissioner later
confirmed, however, US "service police broke up the fight with
batons".'* Sitkoff argues tiiat:
The most chafing practice of the army, however, was its refusal to
protect Negro servicemen off the post and its use of white military
poUce to control blacks."
E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts confirm this practice operating in

Australia, arguing that "Negroes received harsher treatment at the
hands of MPs"."
It is evident from an examination of die many cases forwarded to
die Queensland poUce department by die US Provost-MarshaU's
department that the US military police used an excessive degree of
violence even during a muior scuffle, let alone a brawl or a riot.
Jessie Street, in her memoirs of this period in Sydney, wrote that:
Anotiier very disturbing affair was that some of our members

(United Associations of Women) who lived near the Showground
(in 1942), where the camp for Negro troops was situated, reported
hearing periodic rifle shots m the Negro camps.
Lady Street and Mrs Ema Keighley, the president of the United
Associations of Women, requested an interview with tiie camp
commandant over tiiis issue. Street continued:
As soon as he spoke we knew he came from die deep soudi

where die Ku Klux Klan operates. We told him of die reports we
heard about shootings in die Showground and that die people
reporting it feared tiiat tiie Negro soldiers were being shot. He
did not deny it but said tiiis disciplinary action was necessary to
prevent tiie Negroes becoming uppish - or uppity - I tiiink was tiie
term he used."
The novelist, Ruth Park, tiien a young housebound motiier living in
Surry HiUs, recalled two separate incidents where Black GIs were shot
in cold blood by MPs.*°
Various official sources confirm these aUegations diough they do
not provide substantive details. The - Queensland State PubUcity
Centre, obeying instmctions from the federal department of
Information, on 9 November 1943 ordered tiiat "no broadcast of
shooting of negro soldiers in Sydney by U.S. provost" be issued.
Furthermore, it was deemed tiiat reference to racial problems in
SWPA, riot stories, deaths of Japanese POWs, or any reference to
"Negro, Black, Coloured" soldiers were officially banned.*' Despite
extensive research conducted both in AustraUa and the US no more
information could be obtained about this particular shooting in
Sydney. Interviews, conducted with either prominent or politically
active citizens in various areas of Queensland reveal that diey
believed tiiat US military poUce or shore patrols had, on various
occasions, shot Black servicemen. Charles Comer recaUed an incident
in Mt Isa in 1942 where a "coloured soldier" was publicly shot in
broad daylight by a white MP over some minor infraction of
discipline.*^ In addition, there is evidence that private citizens also
shot them. General Hurley remarked that in mid June 1942, in
TownsviUe, "a Negro's leg was amputated. The records list him as
having accidentally discharged his gun". But Hurley beUeved that he
was "shot by a white man who caught him in bed with his wife".**'
This type of incident highlights one of the key obsessions which
sustained the continued existence of segregation - white women could
ordy be partoers of white men. Whilst Black Americans might be
portrayed as asexual infantile "wild-eyed Al Jolson-like Rastus" in
service joumals like The Aussies and the Yanks^'' the usual stereotype
depicted them as hypersexual. As one correspondent in the US War
department's general staff files in 1943 stated that "You ought to see
a big buck with his ribbons. You can imagine what a big shot he is
with the women - their (sic) weak point".*' Various inteUigence
reports sent back to Washington commented that one of tiie central
issues causing dispute between the AUies in AustraUa was the

question of "white women and colored troops".** As one Office of
Strategic Services report of June 1942 commented:
Few Australians wiU acknowledge that their racial problem in the

presence of our coloured troops in Australia. However, in many
cases, white girls have associated intunately witii coloured troops,
and, of course, the effect is very bad.*'
As Marjorie Halsey pointed out in her book, Colour Blind - A White

Woman Looks at the Negro published in Sydney in 1947, perceptions
of Black Americans were constmcted from enduring stereotypes in the
mass media:
Spirituals, Big Feet, IrresponsibiUty, Deplorable (in die Anglo-

Saxon view) taste in clothes. Uncle Tom, Aunt Jemima, Rochester,
Pullman Porters, Inexhaustible Sexuality, coal black Babies and
Rape.**
Relegated to segregated locations in the major centres. Blacks

were also confined to inferior and separate recreational facilities
where, it was hoped few white women, especiaUy "decent** women
would enter. InitiaUy in Sydney in 1942 when there were few Black
troops, aU American servicemen went to the Trocadero dance haU.
After it was wrecked during an intertacial brawl, the US Provosts
prevented Blacks from attending dances there. The Booker T.
Washington club for Blacks was estabUshed in the mndovra area of
Surry HiUs.*' Dances were held regularly, attended by 200 Black
troops and women "approved by the police". These functions were
monitored by the US shore patiol and military police. As US Major
R. B. RandaU commented in a report to Australian military liaison:
American coloured soldiers are barred by regulations from the

greater part of the city, and some location must be reserved for
them while on leave... If not pestered by street women, whom the
police authorities have no power to control, even isolated trouble
would largely cease.'"
Both military and civilian authorities were caught in a dilemma

about who would constitute suitable escorts for Black troops. A
number of possibUities presented themselves. First, clubs for Black
servicemen would be attended by any Australian women as occurred
in die other clubs. In a deputation to tiie police commissioner from

tiie residents of Darra (an outer working class Brisbane suburb) in
August 1944, tiiey complained that "die Negroes wanted women
irrespective of whetiier tiiey were 20 or 60 years of age". The police
report stated that:
With few exceptions, tiie Darra residents have encouraged die
Negroes. This can be proved by die fact that white women and
giris have attended die dances held by die Negroes at Darta and
also dances tiiat few males apart from Negroes have attended."
At the Dr Carver club in South Brisbane, an organisation established

and maintained by the Red Cross, white women who went to the
dances were later interrogated by police from the vice squad. The
canteen staff were likewise subjected to "mdecent questioning".'^ The
hostility, jealousy, and suspicion with which Australian men received
any social interaction between American servicemen and Australian
women was magnified when die American was Black. Dominant
fantasies of Black virility and insatiable desire to conquer white
women stood in the way of any reasoned assessment of the actual
situation.
Communities were divided over the issue of whether to permit
Blacks to attend dances which were usually officially portrayed as
patriotic occasions. In reality, dances were more frequently excuses
for intense competition between Americans and Australians for the
attention of Australian women. The ChinchiUa shire council wrote to
the American Legation in Brisbane in November 1942:
Unfortunately, some local body has permitted admission to

dances... and has in other directions lionized the Negro to a degree
that is not conducive to the future peace of anyone and is
certainly not in the best interests of the public of die Shire as a
whole nor of the men... Some view them as our AUies, in die vast
stmggle for freedom in which we are now engaged. The objective
should be to find a way out that wiU not create a dismption to the
happy relationship that has hitherto existed in the Shire.'^
The police report alleged that thirty six Blacks in the district were
"given oppormnity to be too familiar witii local giris and women",
diough ludicrously the only evidence presented was that Black soldiers
had given women loUies.'* When Blacks were admitted to dances,
conflict could empt when Australian women refused to dance with
tiiem. In Miles, Queensland in April 1943 a brawl ensued when tiiis

occurred and Australian servicemen jeeringly told tiiese American
troops "You're not wanted here"."
Moves were usually made to ban Blacks from attending regularly
scheduled dances. At the US Army club in Caims, which harmed
Blacks and sailors, the local director defended this policy because:
.;. victorettes [women hostesses] (sic) are not used to dancing with
Negroes, and at the last two dances, where through a
misunderstanding, they were admitted, the girls have objected. I
think we are laying ourselves open to the possibility of very
unpleasant incidences with other servicemen who are not used to
seeing coloured men on the dance floor.'*
Some areas such as Bowen coped with this unprecedented quandary

by simply harming aU Americans from local dances. In Ingham in
late 1942 disturbances broke out when Blacks were banned from
attending dances, even though Ingham was designated an exclusively
"coloured leave centre". When one irate serviceman declared: "Why
shouldn't we go to dances witii white people? We are as good, if not
better, than the white race", an affray foUowed in which two Blacks
drew their guns, and the provosts used their customary degree of
violence."
The second solution, which strove to emulate US policy of
segregated recreational faciUties, after the supposed failures of
experiments like those at Miles and ChinchiUa, was to artange
separate clubs which Aboriginal women could attend. James Curtie,
an Aborigine, organised a club at die Protestant AUiance Friendly
Society hall in Red Hill, a working class iimer city Brisbane suburb.
It was pattonised by Black Americans, Aborigines and a small number
of white women. Australian men were banned by order of the United
States military authorities. Biweekly dances were strictly supervised
inside and guarded outside by the shore patrol and the US military
poUce as well as by the local civUian police." In May 1943 the
Doctor Carver club which included a barber shop, pool room,
cafeteria, bar and dance haU, was opened at 100 Grey Street, Soutii
Brisbane. The American Red Cross witii extensiive community
support hoped that this recreational centre would attract Black
servicemen away from die brothels and pubs of die district. At its
peak in mid 1944 tiiese respectable facilities serviced up to 5,000
troops per day."
Some apprehension was expressed by the director of Native

Affairs. He was concemed tiiat this club was predominantiy staffed
by Aboriginal women from nortii Queensland.*" Presumably, diese
women, and tiiose involved in cases of stabbing and brawls in die
brotiiels of Soutii Brisbane, were no longer considered to be under the
jurisdiction of tiie director of Native Affairs; for the records indicate
that matter lay witii tiie civUian police. Since racial ideology decreed
tiiat white women were unsuitable escorts and sexual partners for
Black men, (though social practice did not mirtor tiiese prescriptions)
tiie Queensland autiiorities were tiius forced to permit some Aboriginal
women to be free of some of die more repressive constraints of the
Aboriginal Preservation and Protection Act of 1939. This occuned
only under special circumstances. Brisbane, where large numbers of
Black servicemen were concentrated, provided such a simation.
In country areas, die local Aboriginal protectors, usually die
police, did not allow this liberaUsation. One case in Mareeba, on die
Atherton Tableland, in 1942, suggests the solutions adopted in less
cosmopoUtan areas of Queensland. George M., a drover who had
been away from home working for several months, retumed to find
his young adolescent daughters, Laura and Trixie, had been
conducting sexual liaisons with American soldiers. Laura was
pregnant. George M. beat his daughters, berated his wife for her lack
of supervision and caUed in die local Aboriginal protector. Sergeant
Miers who admonished the girls and told them to obey their fatiier.
The commissioner of police in Brisbane recommended that die
inspector in Caims, the nearest large town, request that die US
authorities ban their troops from any sexual contact with Aboriginal
women. Under section 29 (1) (a) of the Aboriginal Preservation and
Protection Act all sexual liaisons between white men and Aboriginal
women were prohibited. In August 1943 the US authorities in Caims
agreed to cooperate on this issue.*'
Public alarm over sexuality, particularly in the area of intertacial
liaisons, was clearly expressed in the "Report on Civilian Morale" in
north Queensland of Febmary 1943 conducted by Professor R.D.
Wright and Dr Ian Hogbin. They investigated a wide range of
domestic issues but one key area concemed "the soldier in die city".
After discussing another area of public alarm, venereal disease, die
team stated that:
It is commonly believed in the southem states that tiiere are

licensed brotiiels m Queensland. This is not so, tiiough tiie poUce
insist tiiat girls, living in certain houses, who are known to be
prostimtes, shaU have regular examinations. In Brisbane, there are

some twenty of these houses, and in TownsviUe, two or three.
The American forces have set up several such places, with
Australian girls, for the use of Negro troops, much to tiie disgust
of many civilians.'^
General Patrick Hurley reported in the previous year that in

TownsviUe "white and negroes Ime up together in whore houses
where negroes are accepted". A careful scmtiny of the police
department records reveals however, that most prostitutes who catered
for Black Americans in Brisbane were Aborigines rather tiian Anglo-
Australian. Herbert Lazzarini, the federal minister for Home Security
expressed the widespread sentiment tiiat:
Brothels for Black Americans... seem to me to be something so

outrageous to Australian psychology that it is likely to become the
gravest possible menace to the Australian war effort... the mere
suggestion that the Americans are allowed to use Australian girls
to satisfy the lusts of American negroes seems to me to be
incomprehensible.*^
On the other hand, this procedure "protected" respectable white

women from unwanted glances. One issue that did not elicit any
pubUc reaction was the high mcidence of homosexuality among Black
American troops stationed in Australia.** Certairdy any open
discussion on the subject of homosexuality was sociaUy unacceptable.
Yet, in the light of the obsessive preoccupation with Blacks
supposedly contaminating white women, homosexuality could surely
have been regarded as a means by which decent Australian women
could remain inviolate.
Having been forced to accept the presence of Blacks among the
American forces, the Australian authorities sought to increase
segregative procedures m order to isolate and contain tiiese
unwelcome troops. These service personnel were thus confined within
perimeters designated by two interlocking systems of segregation.
Relegated intemaUy by the US armed forces into menial capacities,
tiiey were furtiier contained geographicaUy and sociaUy by AustraUan
procedures. These involved a complex flexible mteraction between
different agencies. In the delegation of powers, the civil authorities,
especiaUy poUce, resented tiie intmsion of the Commonwealth, but
most particularly, the American military forces. As Inspector Comer
complained in his memoirs "the AustraUan Govemment and its
M 8S
subsidiaries got on tiieir belUes and groveUed to die Americans.,
The Austt-aUan and US Armies basicaUy decided die function and
location of troops, especiaUy tiiose engaged in arduous road
constmction. The State govemment, committed to the doctt-ine of
racial purity and the maintenance of a reserve system, moriitored die
informal segregation process involvmg Black GIs. The civil police
kept tiieir leisure activities in particular under surveiUance that was
hardly discreet or judicious and ensured that the residential zoning
program was enforced.
As Otwin Marenin demonstrates "the police have been wiUing and
active players in the state's orchestra";** not only reinforcing dominant
consensual values (in the case of Queensland in the 1940s, racial
exclusiveness) but, by attaching tiie status of crime to particular
actions, "thereby [they] confer tiie political action of poUcing into die
technical application of the law".*' Given the irtational nature of
community attitudes to Blacks, overlaid as they were with images of
rampant uncontroUable sexuality, criminal violence and disorder,
isolation and containment of those in the ambiguous dual role of both
AUied saviours and dark destroyers was deemed essential.
Interlocking systems of segregation, in the workplace, in residential
location and in recreation, ensured that Black American servicemen,
were confined by die joint forces of American and Queensland racism.
A complex series of procedures involvmg federal govemment
negotiations with the US Army; cooperation between the federal and
Queensland governments; coUaboration between AustraUan civil and
military police and die US shore patrol and provosts ensured die
maintenance of a rigid form of discrimmation. At a time of peril
when human and material resources were strained to their limits,
dominant racial ideologies demanded an elaborate and ultimately
wasteful system.
IV
The Policing of Morals:
State Intervention into Public Health 1937-45
with Helen Taylor
From 1942 to 1945 Australia was subject to a severe and prolonged

moral panic. It began in July 1942 when public apprehension about
die pervasiveness of venereal disease was aroused. SexuaUy
transmitted diseases, it was argued, potentiaUy jeopardised die health
and performance of Australian and AUied servicemen and undermined
die moral fibre of the Australian people. Pronouncements from
politicians, press and preachers precipitated the constmction of a
moral alarm that assumed aU the fervour of an evangelical and
cadiartic enterprise.
In its wake, a complex series of processes, relying upon the co-
operation of the State poUce and public health officials, the Australian
and United States military authorities stationed in Brisbane and
TownsviUe, were set in train to contain what was essentiaUy a
medical problem. Queensland was to witness the most intmsive and
extensive state intervention into the contested area of public health.
State and Commonwealtii, civil and military co-operated to an
extraordinary degree ostensibly in order to ensure a highly efficient
healdiy fighting force which was to be launched from Queensland to
die Pacific war zones. Yet, it was never the mere presence of the
troops or the State's strategic location that was paramount: rather, the
moral and administrative coUusion of Ned Hardon, secretary for
Healdi and Home Affairs and Raphael Cilento, the director general of
Healdi and Medical Services ensured that, not ordy would the debate
publicly express itself in moral terms but the functions of the police
would enlarge and the institutionalisation of those deemed deviant
would continue.
Three distinct but interrelated phases can be discemed. In each
stage, a particular group of women who had supposedly transgressed
and contaminated the conventional moral order became the focus of
die cmsade. Furthermore, die moral arbiters, having identified their
particular target, pronounced judgement and demanded 'appropriate'

chastisement. To accompUsh tiiis, tiie fuU weight of tiie state's
apparatus was mobUised in order to stigmatise, to affix blame and to
accord a punishment which was to vary according to a woman's class
and social status. These dual processes of apprehension and
mobUisation, occurring at tiie ideological and bureaucratic levels in
both civiUan and military spheres, were rendered more visible and,
indeed magnified, by die upheaval and dismption m a society
undergoing the unfamiliar experience of total war. Thus, die
fabrication of tiiis panic aUows scmtiny of those complex ideological,
stmctural and bureaucratic processes which extended peace-time
measures in the area of public health. The constmction of moral
alarm, and more significantiy, the wider stmctural consequences of its
resolution, reveal the irmer logic of administrative processes at a time
of prolonged emergency, challenge, and subsequent reorganisation.
Under the guise of patriotism, Queensland public officials and
politicians were able to implement poUcies which ensured the contiol
of women's sexuality by the intmsion of rigorous policing measures.
The provisions of the Public Health Act of 1937, which aUowed for
the continuance of a "lock hospital" for women suffering from
sexuaUy transmitted diseases, were extended by the use of die
Commonwealth national security (venereal diseases and contraceptives)
regulation of September 1942.
In the fragile moment of consensus engendered in early 1942, die
general national security regulations were expanded m order to cope
witii tills 'emergency' of total war. When tiie sense of national
danger was most acute in those initial montiis of 1942, tiie Australian
people revealed a virtuaUy unanimous and unequivocal wiUingness to
accept tills unprecedented regimentation, restriction and restiaint. As
the extent and comprehensiveness of die various state apparatus were
mcreased to meet the exigencies of 'total war', so too, were die
processes involved rendered more visible. Nowhere were these more
readily discemible tiian the marmer in which the problem of sexually
transmitted disease was consttxicted, contamed and managed. State
intervention was regarded as botii desirable and necessary in areas
which previously had been defined as private for most citizens.
The war-time emergency aUowed for an extension of surveiUance
and apprehension procedures tiiat exceeded those of peace-time which
sought to identify only one group in the community, tiiose deemed by
tiie poUce as "common prostimtes". State and Commonweallb
measures increased the defiiution of the deviant who could be
incarcerated. Patriarchal ideology determined tiiat tiiis new group
Policing of Morals 83
were again women. The issue was moreover constmcted largely in

terais of a moral crisis rather than a medical question, tiiereby
legitimating the widespread use of state intervention into tiie private
sphere.
The parameters of the campaign were initiaUy set at a conference
on "tiie pubUc healtii aspect of venereal disease in Queensland" held
on 30 July 1942 in Brisbane. Haition stated that:
There is a rise in tiie figures showing [venereal disease] in our

State...Everybody reaUses that V.D. infection is just as much a
casualty in the Army as someone who may be injured by enemy
action and possibly causes a greater worry and drain upon medical
services than wounded cases would.
In complete agreement, Cilento added that "[i]t looks as tiiough it

[venereal disease] is a major tiireat not only to the efficiency of our
fighting forces but a very grave social danger as weU".'
The means to confront this supposed crisis were, in Hanlon's
view, readily at hand. He reminded the delegates, who represented
die medical corps of aU branches of the AustraUan and AlUed armed
services, die State and Commonwealth departments of Health and
conservative women's orgarusations like the National Council of
Women, tiiat Queensland "already had regulations [under the Public
Health Act of 1937] to exercise strict control" over sexuaUy
transmitted diseases. It was ortiy a matter of "exercis[ing] strongly"
diese powers in order to curb further its dissemination and proscribe
the activities of those attributed as its purveyors.
In the Australian colonies tiiere was a highly developed tradition
of restiicting tiie civU liberties of tiiose deemed deviant. In die
nineteentii century, Queensland and Tasmania introduced highly
punitive, contagious diseases acts in 1868 and 1879 respectively which
provided for the incarceration of prostitutes suffering from venereal
infection. Unlike the British act, colonial legislation did not solely
apply to prostitutes in garrison towns but to those in the general
community. Queensland's Health Act Amendment Act of 1911
replaced die contagious diseases' legislation, but at die same time it
maintained its most saUent punitive feature - the "lock hospital"
system. This was an enclosed hospital modeUed upon prison
regulations and conditions in which prostitutes suffering from sexuaUy
transmitted diseases were compulsorUy detained. This new act also
provided for the compulsory notification of aU cases of syphilis and
gonorthoea, anonymity of treattnent, and free medication in any
general (i.e. state fimded) hospital or dispensary. Only tiiose women

categorised by die police as "common prostittites" were not accorded
tiiis anonymity. Women so labeUed continued to be mcarcerated in
tiie "lock hospital" which was transferted in 1913 out of tiie grounds
of tiie Brisbane General Hospital to tiie main prison complex on Paik
Road, Dutton Park.^ The location and spatial an^gement of the
Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital, as it was officially caUed,
behind tiie centt-al dormitory for male prisoners, starkly symboUsed its
punitive and segregative character. By tiie 1940s Queeiisland alone in
die Conunonwealtii maintained tiiis type of institution. As die
Queensland director general of Healtii and Medical Services wrote in
his annual report in Jime 1943:
Queensland prides itself on having taken for many years a more

r«aUstic view of die venereal control problem tiian other Australian
States. It alone in the Commonwealth possessed a lock hospital in
active operation prior to tiie war and made an effort to check on
people reputed to be prostittites... Consequentiy, at tiie outbreak of
tiie war with Japan and tiie consequent heavy flow of ttoops, it
was able to meet tiie sittiation much more expeditiously and
effectively tiian would otherwise have been tiie case.'
The period after the outbreak of the war in the Pacific was to
witness in Queensland an expansion of procedures whereby other
groups of women, who were not designated "common prostitutes",
were incarcerated in tiie Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital.
This process occurted directly as a result of two factors: first, the
creation of an atmosphere of moral alarm and morbid preoccupation
with the supposed pervasiveness of venereal infections. Secondly, on
a more general level, in response to die increase in the intensity and
new focus of targets of poUcing procedures. This apprehension
demanded the identification, humiUation and public punishment of
women who transgressed conventional sexual mores. Later sections of
the argument wiU demonstrate how this procedure was dependent
upon class perceptions, for only working class women were treated in
the traditional manner. The question of police discretion in deciding
what were the key areas in which to divert scarce resources was
paramount. Certairdy too tiie use of the national security regulations
in 1942 to achieve these ends was a salient feature of the extended
functions of the state apparatus. Again, this complex issue
demonstrates the marmer in which the State govemment could
increase its powers by implementing Commonwealtii policy and

directives.
In die Australian context, as chapter one reveals, this was an
uneven process because of the constitutional problems involved in the
delegation of powers between Conunonwealth and the States; between
civil and military jurisdiction and between Australian and US
jurisdiction. The area of public health in Queensland demonstrates
how an unusuaUy high degree of unanimity of purpose and action
could be accomplished when addressmg a specific issue. This process
was achieved at the expense of women's autonomy especially in the
area of sexuality. The marmer in which this was achieved was
complex and uneven, relymg upon ideological premises, negotiations
between various agent of tiie state at both the State and
Commonwealth level and the increase of police functions.
Gordon L. Clark and Michael Dean, following Therbom's analysis,
conclude tiiat there exists a "revolutionary dynamic of the apparatus as
it confronts a changing social reality". This emerges from the
variance that persists between state power and the state apparatus as
diey express the class relations of that society.* Modem war-time
witnesses the expansion of both state power (in order to engage in
prolonged mass combat and to mobilise the human and national
resources) and state apparatus ui order to achieve these ends
administratively.
With die mobiUsation of moral arbiters - the first step in the
process - the public constmction of moral alarm was initiated.
InitiaUy, censure was directed towards a relatively amorphous group
of women who were sexuaUy active outside the proscribed bounds of
lawful marriage. Only in the foUowing two stages of the alarm in
1943 and 1944 were specific sub-groups identified, targeted and
chastised. In early July 1942 the Manpower Board, the central federal
body which organised, directed and deployed the civilian labour force,
requested the National Council of Women in Queensland to arrange
suitable lectures on "sex hygiene" for women and girls. Several days
after die request was made, a committee was established under the
guidance of two prominent Queensland medical specialists. Lady
Cilento and Dr Joyce Stobbo.' Other groups in Queensland such as
the Mothercraft Association, the YWCA and the Catholic Youth
Association not only echoed but fuelled anxiety about "this grave
social and moral problem".*
The initial constmction of moral alarm coincided with the release
of die annual parliamentary statistics in July 1942. Though tiiey did
not indicate a vast increase in venereal infections, they were however
widely debated. Ema Keighley, die Australian president of one of the

more progressive women's organisations, tiie United Associations of
Women, reminded Prime Minister Curtm on 31 July 1942, tiiat given
tiie recent mcreasing reference to venereal diseases and the openly
debated suggestion in tiie press tiiat tiie federal govemment mtended
introducing "suitable legislation to deal witii tills matter", tiien sound
and fair policies were necessary. She contmued tiiat, whilst it might
prove advantageous to inttoduce legislation that had federal
appUcabiUty and which did not sunply rely upon differing, conflicting,
and piecemeal State regulations, tiiis should not be the means by
which there was "a setting aside of any woman or women as a
vehicle for die so-caUed sex appetites of men". Keighley furdier
stated that:
Venereal disease is not confmed to die Army or to the girls who

may infect them. It is a very widespread disease among the
whole community and is responsible for much iUness and
morbidity.'
Her observations should have highlighted the need for a thorough-

going medical solution to a communal problem rather than one which
was primarily moral in nature and partial in terms of gender and
class. The implications were increasingly overlooked as societal
apprehension expanded throughout July and August 1942.
The concem of the state and the nature and direction of its
mtervention were obvious from the outset. John Dedman, writing on
behalf to the prime minister on 19 August 1942 to tiie premier of
New South Wales, stated tiiat tiie Commonwealtii govemment was
"dismrbed by reports in respect of tiie incidence of venereal disease".
He noted tiiat this "is not yet alarmmg"; but two factors, he
suggested, required furdier scmtiny and continued monitoring. First, it
was apparent that "normal social and moral standards are being
seriously affected by war conditions". Secondly, most State
legislation, "where it exists, lacks die power to detain and examine
persons suspected of bemg the source of uifection". Both unfortunate
deficiencies would require immediate attention and subsequent
remedial measures.
The annual Queensland figures do suggest tiiat normal peace time
pattems were being changed by die exigencies of a society engaged in
total war. But whetiier a declme m moral standards could be gauged
from such sets of figures was open to question. What is most
apparent in these tables is die decrease in the male rate from 1941 to
o
H
"- 8 2 I
S $ 2
s
OS
t
o
OS
^ en
I
9
I"
^
s
<N 0^ «
u. o
2 OS
cs
• *
•i I
'^ § s
oo
8
^ ss 8
I
I
•3
ii I I 3 O 3
§ CO (2
?
58
o
OS
^ 3
^ 31
00
a CO
S oo S
. S
Z
.5 z
Vi
CO
u
b
•s
M
S
Q
•a
c
> ^ 5
ij
so
•a
(I,
PL,
•a o
5
3
c
.a
I1
CO H
Table 10: Incidence of Notified Cases of Venereal Disease Among Australian Civilian and
Military Population in Queensland, 1940-46
1940-41 1941-42 1942-43 1943-44* 1944-45 1945-46
Male 967 782 1918 Not Stated 1775 2507

Female 367 395 1178 Not Stated 566 408
Total 1334 1177 3096 2780 2341 2915
• Only the incidence of gonorrhoea and syphilis was recorded, not the male-female ratio.
Sources: Queensland Parliamentary Reports, 1940-46; Memoranda of the Incidence of VD in the
AMF submitted by Director General of Australia Army Medical Service, 1944.
Table 11: Incidence of Male and Female Civilian and Australian Military Notified Cases of
Venereal Disease in Queensland, 1940-46: Percentages
1940-41 194M2 1942^3 1943-44* 194445 1945-46
Male 72.5% 66.5% 62% Not Stated 76%

Female 27.5% 33.5% 38% Not Stated 24%
* Only the incidence of gonorrhoea and syphilis was recorded not its male-female ratio.
Table 12: Incidence of Notified Cases of SyphiUs and Gonorrhoea in Queensland, 1942-43
Male Female Total
CiviUan 412 1148 1560

Civilian and Australian
Military 1918 1178 3096
Civilian and Total Military
(includes American
Armed Forces) 3115 1178 4293
Table 13: Percentage of Male and Female Notified Cases of Venereal Disease in Queensland,
1942-43
Male Female
Civilian 26 74
Civilian and Australian
Military 62 38
Civilian and Total military
(includes American
Armed Forces) 73 27
Sources: Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 1943-44; [Military] VD Survey in Queensland - 1943;

US Surgeon Generals Reports: SWPA.
1945, most notably in the incidence of gonorrhoea and the wide

variation in the niunber of female syphilis cases. At tiie official level
die reasons for the changes ui the male rate were easy to detect - the
vast majority of men of military age, who also constituted the age
groups with the peak incidence of this type of mfection, were on
active miUtary or naval service. They were therefore not included in
die armual civilian figures. A carefiil examination of tiie unrefmed
figures referring to the incidence of syphilis reveals that the total
combined number of tertiary cases (i.e. near terminal), decreased from
eighty in 1940-41 to fifty one in 1941-42. Nevertheless concem was
expressed by the director general that there was a notable increase in
"early syphiUs from 90 to 102 cases" in that year. Cilento's assertion
diat "The actual increase in the incidence of syphilis in a numericaUy
depleted population is a significant and somewhat disquieting
circumstance"' demonstrates an apparent and perplexing confusion of
terminology.
Scmtiny of the complete figures clearly reveals a decrease in the
overaU number of cases of syphilis m die civiUan population. In
particular, there was a marked decrease in the number of female cases
(from 124 to 85 from tiie single years of 1940-41 and 1941-42) - a
point which Cilento converuentiy overlooked. This alarm over the
increasing number of new cases of primary syphiUs was thus
misconstmed to give the ertoneous impression that this much feared
and devastating disease was rapidly escalating. As a consequence,
public attention was directed towards the change in the ratio of
civUian male to female notified incidences of venereal disease rather
dian an investigation of the accuracy of medical pronouncements by
pursuing a thorough and exhaustive examination of categories within
die annual statistics presented to parliament. Though, quite clearly,
the overaU number of female cases did not rise substantiaUy, the ratio
of male to female notifications had begun to alter discemibly. The
obvious point that the civiUan male rate was not representative of the
tme male rate, when service men's rates were excluded, was not a
salient point in the constmction of alarm or the attribution of blame
or retiibution. But in this initial stage, tiie response was a relatively
undifferentiated and pervasive one. Clearly, censure was to be
reserved for wonien who transgressed traditional moral precepts. In
die later phases of the moral panic by which time extended poUcing
procedures had been refmed, women were divided into particular
categories in order to be identified, targeted and punished.
At die outset of the alarm, moral arbiters reiterated tiaditional
sexual values. As Captain W. Scott-Young, a medical practitioner.
informed members of tiie Women's Services m his lecture on "Sex

Hygiene" delivered in 1942:
Remember tiiat you are tiie motiiers of tiie next generation. You
owe U to your chUdren to avoid tiiese risks and dangers...
Remember, too, that moral standards are set by die women of tiie
community, NOT the men.'
This simple dictum concerning die foundations and proper

custodianship of moraUty, especiaUy in the sexual sphere, recurted
tiiroughout the public and official debate which accelerated as 1942
progressed.
Throughout August die federal govemment re-avowed its intention
to pass regulations. These, it was argued, would not orUy assuage
public alarm about venereal diseases - an alarm which had aU die
force of uninformed prejudice, bigotry and punitive indignation as its
foimdations - but tiiese regulations would also estabUsh bureaucratic
procedures to remedy, or at least contain, the cause of this moral
outrage. Concem was primarily moral rather than medical in nature.
Some dimensions of the proposed sanctions against recalcitrants were
being mooted in August 1942 when federal ministers canvassed die
opinion of their State coUeagues. On 19 August 1942 Dedman sought
the opinion of the premier of New South Wales concerning die
wisdom of vesting unprecedented powers in each State's chief health
officer.'" Hardon, fulsomely recommended to the prime minister fliat
the Commonwealth incorporate the provisions the Queensland Public
Health Act of 1937 (which aUowed for the incarceration of women
with sexuaUy transmitted diseases)." One week later tiie Acting
Premier, Frank Cooper informed Curtin that he was pleased to leam
the federal national security regulations would incorporate many of
Queensland's stamtes.'^ Nevertheless, "the question of tiie extent to
which arbitrary powers over the liberty of citizens should be vested in
different individuals" which had concemed the Commonwealtii's chief
medical officer, Dr J.H.L. Cumpston when he had assisted in drafting
tiie regulations, was resolved to his satisfaction. As he later confided
to Prime Minister Curtin, it had been wise to vest authority to each
State's chief medical officer ratiier tiian in tiie commissioner of
police." The latter had been tiie practice m Queensland and also in
Victoria under die Venereal Diseases Act of 1928 where police had
autiiority to detain "persons under tt-eatment who continue tiieir
irregular practices".
In September 1942, the national security regulations (venereal

diseases and contraceptives) were proclaimed. They also harmed the
advertising of contiaceptives. Since tiie 'mle creators' were to be
concemed primarily with moral rather than medical solutions in the
civUian population, the whole question of the use of contraceptives as
prophylactics against sexuaUy transmitted diseases was overlooked.
The new regulations empowered each State's chief healtii officer to
compel any person whom he had "reasonable grounds" to suspect was
suffering from a notifiable venereal infection to undergo a medical
examination. If the suspect did not comply, the police would issue a
wartant to enforce it. If foimd to be infected, the person could be
detained in a stipulated hospital or "suitable place". No citizen
wrongfuUy detained or examined could take action against the
Commonwealth." What is clear is that although men suffering from a
notifiable venereal disease could technicaUy be compulsorily confined,
in practice this did not occur. Men continued to be treated as
outpatients, except when they reached tiie tertiary stage of syphilis.
Yet women could be detained and confined for the less serious
disease, gonorthoea.
During the minimal preceding period of debate, certain women's
organisations expressed their misgivings about the intentions and
consequences of the proposed regulations. Ada Bronham, of the
Women's Christian Temperance Uiuon (WCTU) expressed her
determined opposition to the proposals. These, she argued, would not
only drive the problem imdergroimd and specificaUy pimish women
but would tolerate state regulated prostitution which existed already in
Queensland and Westem AustraUa. Pointing out the inequities
inherent in such a system, Bronham continued:
Although tiiere are many more infected men than women in every
state - yet it is the women who are reported by men who have
been their partners in nusconduct - the women who are artested
on suspicion by the police and compulsorily examined, the women,
if found to be suffering from the disease who are detained in
prison hospitals, cleaned up and sent out again for the use of
debauched men.
Finally, Bronham asked: "Is tiiere a lock hospital for men"?'' The
WCTU, perceptively articulated the very core of official intention - to
stigmatise and punish some sexually active women tiiereby reinforcuig
a double standard of moraUty. The Canadian historian, Ruth Roach
Pierson, terms tiiis whole process tiie "double bmd of die double
standard".'*
The validity of sociaUy condoned, indeed often encouraged, active
male sexuality was to be in no way chaUenged by die constmction of
moral alarm or the provision of tiie national security regulations.
Witiiin tiie heightened emotional fervour engendered by die war, die
doctrine of nos morituri was to reign supreme. Women were to
comfort the young warriors, but yet tiiey were to be punished if tiiey
radicaUy violated the traditional moral precepts of feminine chastity
and monogamy. It was within die alarm over venereal infections that
these contradictory moral directives can be most clearly discemed.
Given the duaUty of female stereotypes expressed m Austtalia as
"God's poUce" and "damned whore"," it was an easy process for die
moral arbiters to identify and castigate those deemed deviant.
In consequence, some women were frequently depicted as sexual
predators. As Herbert Lazzarini naively iiiformed his federal
parliamentary coUeagues earlier in the war, "There are, to use a
common expression, female camp followers, who set out to waylay
young fellows and many of them succumb to the temptation"."
Edward HoUoway, the federal minister for Health and Social
Services was to express alarm that "visitors and men on leave would
be confronted with certain types of women and girls"." While Dr J
H L Cumpston, replying to Curtin's enquiry of January 1943 on the
actual operation of the regulations, categoricaUy stated that:
The greatest difficulty of aU, die control of the irresponsible

promiscuous girl, is provided for...with obvious limitations in a
free community.^
It was to be in Queensland specificaUy that few limitations were

observed. Here the lock hospital's capacity and function was to
expand considerably by late 1942. Certainly too the healtii and
fitting capacity of servicemen was a paramount concem to botii the
AUied and Australian nuUtary authorities. The average duration in
hospital at that time for gonorrhoea was thirty-two days and syphilis
fifty-two. At tiiat time there was no certainty of ultimate cure. Not
untU tiie manufacture of peniciUin in 1944 could sexuaUy transmitted
diseases be easily cured. Even witiiin tiie miUtary sphere the
parameters could be and were extended to include otiier social
dilemmas. In August 1942, tiie secretaries of tiie Society of Retiiraed
Medical Officers of Queensland expressed tiieir concem tiiat excessive
alcohol consumption would lead to a high incidence of venereal
infection and crime.^' Yet tiie primary focus of concem was to

remain firrnly on tiie outbreak and control of venereal infection.
The raison d'etre of the national security (venereal diseases and
contraceptives) regulations had been ostensibly to protect die healtii of
troops by eliminatmg sources of possible venereal infection. Yet,
cotenninous witii tiieir enacttnent, tiie Standing Committee of tiie
Services' medical Directors in Melboume held a conference on
venereal infections which in no way concurred with officiaUy
sanctioned and disseminated opinions. Women, it stressed, were not
the primary agents transmitting these diseases which were "common in
all grades of society and do not respect any particular class or
creed".^ However, this recogiution was not to be translated into
either poUcy priorities or bureaucratic procedures. Rather, the
contiadictory attitudes towards male and female sexuality prevalent in
the wider society were to be enshrined and vaUdated in a complex
series of bureaucratic and medical procedures which were instigated
ostensibly to ensure the health of the troops.
Close coordination between the AustraUan and AUied mUitary
forces and civilian health and police departments was established to
achieve tiiis goal. Their agents were specificaUy required to detect
and detain women suspected or accused of infecting soldiers. Charles
Comer, tiien a young constable attached to the police "VD Unit" in
TownsviUe recalls in his memoirs that:
... I worked with an American Colonel, who in civilian life was a

medical practitioner... the American serviceman treated venereal
disease as one would treat a cold, but the Australian was very
secretive... when a woman was located and it was proven she was
suffering from venereal disease she was compeUed to enter die
Lock Ward of the TownsviUe General Hospital where she
remained tiU she was free of tiie disease.^
Wifli regard to specificaUy intemal procedures, the services

maintained an essentially pragmatic medical view of the control and
treatinent of sexuaUy transmitted diseases. Yet the process whereby
service and civiUan agencies co-operated in order to detect female
contacts ensured that a medical problem was constmcted as moral in
the civiUan population. These women were regarded as contaminators
who had to be contained and punished. The bureaucratic procedures
which aUowed this to occur were thus validated by invoking the dual
code of sexual ethics. They in tum remforced the double standard by
facilitating the translation of these ideological premises into concrete
bureaucratic procedures which required close co-operation between

Conunonwealth and State agencies and die Austt-alian and American
services.
UitemaUy in tiie services, a series of educational, religious,
prophylactic, diagnostic and remedial measures were implemented.
InitiaUy, witiim the sphere of preventive education, lectures were
given by service medical officers without reference to moraUty. Later
this was supplemented by tiie introduction of talks by die chaplains
on the "Christian ideal of sex relationships".^ These clergymen
acknowledged ortiy one code of sexual ethics which stressed chastity
and restramt for tiie single and monogamy for the married. Chaplain
P. Wakely attached to die Anti-VD campaign m Brisbane, initiated the
distribution of a series of pamphlets from the AUiance of Honour
("Facts for Men"), YMCA ("Forces for Healtii") and tiie White Cross
League ("Tme Maitiiness"). Over 25,000 copies of "Forces for
Health" were distributed in Queensland alone in 1944." Some insight
into the effectiveness of these talks can be gauged by the remarks of
a service medical officer, when he reminisced that "our first padre...
considered that no such thing as sex existed and also, I fancy,
beUeved in Santa Claus".^ Withm die AustraUan armed forces, as in
the wider society, two apparent codes of ethics were in operation •
die Christian ideal which acknowledged and upheld single standard of
conduct for men and women and, on the other hand, the widespread
system which aUowed men freedom and experience but which divided
women into categories of "good" and "bad" on the basis of their
sexual behaviour. Clearly it was to the latter system of belief and
practice that both armies gave most credence.
"Appropriate" medical films, cartoons and lectures were
compulsorily attended by all enlisted men," a procedure which
required extensive coordination and deployment of scarce medical
persormel. Troops were continuaUy reminded tiiat no harm would
accme from chastity because "every promiscuous intercourse is an
ahnost certain source of infection".^ American GIs in Queensland
were shown fihns such as the "Damaged Goods" whose titie blatandy
suggests a highly derogative depiction of tiieir casual sexual parmers.^
On the other hand, within tiie women's services ortiy one code of
etiiics was officiaUy permitted. Australian servicewomen were
strongly encouraged to remain celibate. Dr Scott-Young concluded
his lecture on "Sex Hygiene" by reinforcing conventional moral
precepts:
Marriage offers opporttmities of sexual satisfaction, of

companionship, and emotional security. It provides a family unit
in which the new generation can shelter during their years of
immaturity... On the other hand to yield to one's impulses towards
sex fulfilment outside die married state, inevitably in the case of
die woman, wiU bring disaster and imhappiness in its wake; both
in the form of venereal infection and/or illegitimate pregnancy.
He ertoneously informed servicewomen tiiat contraceptive devices

were completely ineffective.^"
A "Memoranda on the mcidence of venereal disease in the AMF
[Australian Military Forces]" submitted by the director general of
Austi"alian Army Medical Services in March 1943 commented that its
incidence in the women's services was "low", ranging between two to
eight per 1(X)0 from 1941 to 1943. During the same period
Australian servicemen's rates ranged from a high point of seventy-five
per 1000 in January 1941 to a more controlled nineteen per 1000 two
years later. The low female incidence was due, he concluded, to "the
sense of responsibUity and respect of Women (sic) in the services".^'
It should be noted that in Queensland ortiy one WAAAF contracted
gonorthoea in 1943.^^ Servicewomen infected with gonorrhoea could
be dishonourably discharged but servicemen had to contract the more
serious infection of syphUis in order to be discharged.'^ In NSW ortiy
diose male Army persormel with syphilis were located in a speciaUy
constmcted prison camp at Puckapunyal trainmg reserve.'" This
appears to be the ortiy occasion when treatment for male and female
'medical prisoners' was commensurate. A comparison between
procedures implemented in the men's and women's services suggests
that die operation of the Christian derived moral code was successful
witiiin the women's services in a way that would be judged as both
naive and totaUy unobtauiable in die men's.
Since a realistic assessment that lectures by chaplains on ethics
and the distribution of films and literature of either a pmrient or fear-
inspiring nature would not prove effective in deterring servicemen
from engaging in casual sexual encounters, the Services' directors'
general estabUshed extensive prophylactic programmes. As early as
July 1942 the Queensland conference on venereal diseases discussed
the most advantageous locations of accessible prophylactic stations in
Brisbane. Delegates recommended that lists of the locations should
be widely distributed; that the commissioner of poUce should artange
for police officers in the large towns to be able to "discretely convey"
this information to any serviceman who might enquire; thirdly, that all
brotiiels have the Ust prominently displayed."
A sub-committee of the standing conunittee of Services' directors'
general conference on venereal disease held in Melboume two mondis
later reconunended tiiat tiie chemical "blue light" kits be distiibuted to
aU servicemen on furlough. Botii AustraUan and American enlisted
persormel were routinely issued with condoms, specifically for
prophylactic rather tiian contraceptive purposes and a "blue light" kit.
A network of Prophylactic Ablution Centres (PACs) were established
by both Australian and American authorities also to supply diese
goods and give furdier remedial treatment when necessary. There
were four Australian and eight American centres conveniently located
in Brisbane and a furdier six in provincial towns with large troop
concentrations. The Americans established three PACs specifically for
Black GIs who were spatiaUy, sociaUy and medicaUy segregated.
AUied and Australian mUitary authorities made more tiian ample
provision for their servicemen to engage in casual sexual encounters
without the risk of contracting venereal disease. Their emphasis upon
prophylactic and remedial procedures rather than ethical considerations
can be judged from the supply Ust from one smaU AustraUan PAC in
Brisbane. In the months from April to June 1943, 5679 condoms,
594 "blue light" kits and 314 other prophylactics were issued. This
distribution supplemented intemal divisional distribution of
preventatives. AU PACs were open twenty-four hours per day.^'
Given the dual code of ethics, these were strictiy out of bounds for
servicewomen.
In order to ensure the optimum healthiness of troops, die armed
services established a series of routine medical checks as weU as a
complex network of surveillance and control procedures to deal with
that section of the civilian population who might jeopardise tiiis
objective. Australian servicemen were checked each month for
venereal mfection, though in the AUied forces, individuals were left to
approach medical officers. This may account for SWPA higher
incidence of infection." CiviUan health authorities were more tiian
willing to assist tiie armed services m tiieir endeavours. The Brisbane
conference of July 1942 resolved tiiat:
There should be cooperative interchange of information to die

fullest extent possible between tiie Department of Healtii, die
miUtary autiiorities and poUce, in respect of [infected] women who
were migrating from their known place of residence to otiier towns
and who had disappeared from such areas.'*
DEMOCRACY IS IN DANGER
Fascism Comes to Queensland
THE PUBLIC SAFETY ACT
• Dat'iug Ilia KitilruHh tn M«.>rtli}'r the people of QueensUnd. To ang- save that system they are preparing
electors hv^t' weuk, I'roiiiior Korgnii ôst it dues, in to say that under to oNtablish Fascism in this country
Siiiith made i:ufuruiicti lo n ." iiuw OcDiocracy the intereNls of the people i;nn)ediately they see the lirst rti^rn uf
lYorld oi'Jur " ihiit wan tu bu f.itnb- and the nmiun cannot be protected (lunger to Capitelisni arising either
lUlieJ Kftui- lliu WKI' Uti witH 1)11- properly in K lime uf wai-. Only from its own contradictiuna oV. from
commuiiiciilivu reHpuuliii;; tlie 'J^pu f>f L<'HauistM think that wiiy. Hitler and action by any section of tlieicom^
nevr world uidur he viHimliHed : bul Mussolini any tiiitt Now Koifân Til unity to alter it ^ .. -'
if we are to lie guided by tlm |>n>- Smith endorses tliuir views.
viHioiiB of *' Tlu> I'lililfc Sufoty Act," We do not a>;rue with Hitler, Mua- Socialitm or Faicitm 7
we CHii only uuiicludu Lliiit il wna ii Holini or Smith. We say that under This Act, in'ihe hands of aSocial-
KasciNt world order Smith Imd iu DomociAoy the people's interests can iHt Council uf Public Safety, cuuld be
mind vrheu ho npuku at MorLhyr.. be protecti'd. used to establish Socialism, so wide
. "The Public SiLfety A c t " in said are the powers conferred b y i t . " Itut
There iu auHiciont provision in ex-
to bo iiecesHury ** 'I'u Muko Proviyion tiiose'who will administer it are hot
isting State Icîslution to provide for
fur the Welfare, Order and Publiu Socialists, Thby are opposed to
Safety of the Slate of QueenHbiiul all the tluii;i;H mentioned in the pre-
amble of this Art That mass of Socialism. They believe in (/apilal-
during the preaeut state of War." i.im. They do not say that the p n r -
If that i» the rual purpose of tliu Itifîslation bus \urvu built up in the
cotirce of our til years of self-fôvern- ])ose of thu Act is to^Jntrodoce
Act, then the (jovumntent stand uou- Socialism Therefore, it .is safe to
dodined fur their own nefîect and in- muul and oni of our expurience of
the reqiiiiuntuiilN uf the State in the asfûiue'thal-'.the purpose of thifi'Act
cuiuputoncy. Kouilemi (14) tiionilib in to safognard Capitalism ; and a'urcts
have elapsed since war wau dcolanul; spheiOH'uf ' public 'lirdeV and' public
welfare. SuppluinunLtit); that hiaas the position may be reached, as a
and four iiiunths huvo pasHed niiico result of Ihb pruaeut war, that to
Hitler obtained cuinplule control of of Statu legislation is a muaa of
Federal leiînhttion, including such safeguiird Cupitalisni the establiah-
Kurope. Yet we aru expt'Cted to IIIent of Fascism will be necessary,'
believe that it is only now that it lias mcHsureH as the ;CriiiiUH Act and ttie
tlien il is equally safe tu assume that
beoofne neceaaary to tuake provision National Security Act. Yet we are
I'Vscism is the ultimate objective of
fur the safety of Queensland; and told—and expectinl to h e l i e v e ^ l h a t lliis legislation. If il was thought for
that in order lo iiiaku such [irovisiun, the requirements uf pnldiu or'der and one moment thai the purpose of the
a preliminary requironienl is the the peuple'a v^-plfaie dumiind nnothur .Act was to assist in the establish-
establishment of mauhinery for ilie piece of legiHlation that ernhudies ment of Socialism, it would not have
aoltirijT up uf Fascism iu this State. power and authority far in excess of received the benediction of such
that created by thu Critnes Act. and newspapers as " T h e Courier-Mail"
the National Security Act. and " The Telegraph " ; nor would it
Forgan S m i t h , A g r e e s W i t h " T h e Public Safety A c t " in not
- Hitler and Mutsolini. have been introduced for that par-
necessary to aafugnard the people of pose by the Smith Goverhmeat.
For more than twulve montha the Queenslanil. 'i'hat in not its pur-
Gorernmeiit have buen fcrying^ to pose. Jt is merely another uf tlioae
perfect a whisfle ur siren lo warn pieces of snppreesive and penal legis* Labor Surpastci Tories.
people when " t o d u c k " from air laeiun that have found their way on There is no reason of public safety
raiders. They liavaii't been able to tu our Statute Books in recent years, for the Act. Mr.'-ilanlon said in
obtain a satisfactory alarm yet. as the economic structure of i;a[>- Parliament that ihere was no danger
When they do—if ever—there will italism becomes more unstable. The of this country being invaded. He
be no shelters for the people " t o purpose of i.ti-aa of all such other described the Act as being necessary
duck" into! Hecause the Qoveru- legislation—is to e.ttnblisli machinery to 'eliminate " dead spots " between
ment have not provided them! So for the preservation of the eziHtiu<; (/Ommoiiwealth and State. In other
much for the State Government's econumic aystepi, and to.suppress all words, this Act is intended lo sup*
concern about the safely and wolfnro forces chat wou Id try tu alter or plem'e'nt the provisions of the Nat-
of the people uf QueonHland.'a'nd its reform that system. ional Security Act.'^' If -you. are in-
capacity to provide for llieir safety ^ It is the bust proof—if proof is genious enough to escape the dragnet
and welfare. required—that our leaders believu penal provisions of the Crimes Act
Surely il does not require the es- that this war t,hreHtena the coutinnod and the National Security Act, yo^d*
tablishment of Fascism before such existence of the present (economic will be caught by this State legis-
flftfoty measures can be provided for system;,and that in an endeavour to lation ! Mr. Hanlon said this legi^-
Democracy: Unionists fears of rule by the executive. (Source: QS A File 1268m on Public ô/eryAcr (1941))
Women castigated as pollutants. (Source: Imperial War Museum, London)
Dormitory in the Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital, Brisbane Gaol. (Source: Queensland Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1943-44)
Treatment booths for Women at William Street Venereal Disease Clinic. (Source: Queensland Parliamentaiy
Papers, 1943-44)
A Shot In The Back
The striker as traitor, (Source: Courier-Mail 15 May 1940)
A reassessment of the communist threat. (Source: Courier-Mail 16 September 1942)

it C A N hopp«n here- sy Jock Lusby
(Source: Courier-Mail)
Fred Paterson's arrest at
the St Patrick's Day
March. (Source:
Courier-Mail 17 March
1948)
Violence on the picket line. (Source: Courier-Mail 17 March 1948)
Police clash with railway workers. (Source: Courier-Mail 17 March 1948)
Moreover, all civilian and military agencies cooperated in the

apprehension of women suspected of infecting any serviceman. The
venereal disease control report of 1943 for SWPA revealed that
throughout 1942 the venereal disease control officers of the US and
Australian forces in Queensland had monthly conferences with State
Health and Home Affairs and Police department officials whose duty
it was to locate and detain certain designated female sexual contacts.
For, "by means of close liaison with civilian vice squads... there had
been a continued improvement in contact information". After the
implementation of the national security (venereal diseases and
contraceptives) regulations "an average of 60% of contacts (with US
servicemen) reported have been apprehended and placed under
treatment".^' The aimual report by the Surgeon General for SWPA in
1944 detailed increased efficiency of these methods.''" One year later
Major Arthur Nightingale, a US medical officer, specifically referring
to Brisbane, reported that 105 suspects named in 157 questionnaires
submitted by infected GIs were "contacted and disposed o f and
nearly 80% of those examined were found to be infected."'
The aimual report of the Queensland director general of Health
and Medical Services for 1943-44 proudly declared that "very efficient
methods here" accounted for this "lower rate of venereal disease
among troops".''^ This policy was in line with general Allied
procedures; for the joint British and Canadian conference on venereal
disease held in London in March 1944 stressed the urgency of
"rendering infected women non-contagious".*^ Nowhere in Australia
was this recommendation pursued more efficiently or resolutely than
in Queensland. These procedures and the consequences which
accmed from them need more careful scrutiny.
After the initial alarm was expressed in mid-1942, coinciding with
the release of the aimual statistics and the increasmg presence of
Allied servicemen in Queensland, pubUc attention was then directed
into an examination of the merits or limitations of the national
security (venereal diseases and contraceptives) regulations. Six
months later, apprehension and feminist criticism gave way to almost
hysterical panic. The so-caUed "VD Menace" was portrayed by
Queensland's premier as "a threat to Australia second only to
Japanese".'*'' This second stage in the expression of the moral crisis in
the civiUan population began in the early months of 1943. To the
dismay of the Commonwealth and Queensland Health minsters, figures
released at the end of the first six months' operation of the national
security (venereal diseases and contraceptives) regulations revealed
that the civilian incidence of venereal infection had risen dramatically
in Queensland although it had sunultaneously declmed elsewhere in

Australia and among service personnel, hi a debate in the House of
Representatives on 1 April 1943 Holloway reminded his colleagues
that although the successful collaboration of the director general of
Health and the central medical co-ordinating committee of the
Australian armed services had substantially decreased the problem
nation-wide. Queensland was however proving to be the exception;
for in the six months endmg 28 February 1943 there had ahâdy been
1026 civilian notifications."' It should not have been ahogether
surprising that Queensland statistics differed so markedly from those
of the other States, given the concentration of American troops and
the consequent rise in the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases
among sections of Queensland's female population.
Many political and women's organisations expressed concem
which assumed varied characteristics. The Women's Union of
Service, writing to the prime mmister on 8 febmary 1943, stressed the
need for publicity and widespread debate, whilst expressing regret that
male and female sufferers were accorded such different treatments.
They were dismayed that civilian male patients were allowed their
liberty whilst their female partners were frequently gaoled."' The
Australian Natives' Association at a meetuig on 3 May 1943 "viewed
with alarm the spread of the disease"."^
A week later the Australian Society for the Eradication of
Venereal Disease was launched m Sydney. This body declared that it
earnestly desired prompt and mtensive educational and remedial
action."* In a more reasoned assessment later that month die National
Health and Medical Research Council emphasised that the statements
giving the impression that a "serious proportion" of the population
was venereally mfected were "gravely misleadmg" and could be
refuted "by reliable statistical evidence"."' Tables 8 and 9 confirm the
veracity of this statement. It is apparent that, though the incidence of
sexually transmitted diseases in Queensland was increasmg, it was
never solely due to the actions of women adversely described by the
NSW director general of Social Hygiene, Dr Booth Cooper, as
"reservoirs of venereal disease in the community".'" Sander L
Gihnan, referring specifically to the iconography of AIDS and syphilis
comments in 1987 that:
Icons of disease appear to have an extensive mdependence of the

reality of the disease. This "free-floating" iconography of disease
attaches itself to various illnesses (real or imagined) in different
societies and at different moments m history. Disease is thus
restricted to a specific set of images, thereby forming a visual

boundary, a lunit to the idea (or fear) of disease."
The imagery of pollution and contammation by identifiable agents

who must be isolated from the healthy body of the community runs
like a motif through the discourse on STDs in westem civilisation.
When nations are at risk, externally from attack, these icons become
powerful instruments to nullify the perceived agents of morbidity.
Michael Sturma has recently argued that this whole agitated
campaign can only be understood in the light of anxiety conceming
women's changing role in AustraUan society generaUy and
apprehension about sexuaUty and moral precepts specifically." It is
evident too that the foundations of Australia's conventional moral
code were being severely chaUenged and tested by the exigencies of
total war. The presence of nearly a million American troops
profoundly exacerbated this dislocation.
Certainly too the target group that was specifically under scrutiny
during the second stage of moral alarm were the young women and
adolescent girls who were seen in the company of servicemen. In the
earUer phase of the crisis, alarm was generaUy expressed about aU
sexuaUy active single women. By early 1943 however one particular
subgroup had been isolated for specific condemnation. As Brisbane's
Roman Catholic Archbishop Duhig lamented:
I have heard that it is said that the cheapest thing m Australia is

the girls... Girls have scarcely left school when they find
themselves m a web of temptations for which they are iU-
prepared."
Gregory Forster, the president of the Society for the Eradication of

Venereal Disease, categoricaUy laid blame in May 1943 with those
"young girls mnnmg around the town... attracted by the glamour of a
uniform".'"
A careful exammation of statistics shows that the public and press
continued to confuse the civilian ratio of male to female incidences
with the more accurately combined civilian and Australian military
figures which gave the native Australian trends (see tables 10 and 11).
In the years from 1941-42 to 1942-43 when American miUtary forces
were at their optunum strength in Queensland, the gross female
civUian incidences mcreased three times. The tme male/female ratio
in the Australian population in Queensland clearly shows that the rates
rose only marginaUy from 33.5 per cent female cases in 1941-42 to
38 per cent a year later. If resident or transit American militaiy

incidences of venereal infection were also included m the Queensland
figures, it is indisputable that m this peak year only 27 per cent of
notified mcidences of aU forms of notifiable venereal disease involved
females (see Tables 12 and 13).
Official and public response was not guided by the implication
accming from careful consideration of this evidence. Rather, the
various AUied and Australian military forces, public health,
parliamentary and police agencies, most notably m Queensland,
pressed for an mcreasingly efficient system of identification and
punishment of those deviant "contaminating" women. Differing
procedures were applied according to a woman's social status and
class position. As the Victorian acting commissioner of police wrote
to Gavm Long, (later the editor of the prestigious official war
history):
With the arrival of overseas troops, many young girls from good
homes became caught up in the excitement and vied with
wayward, irresponsible girls m seeking a good time at aU costs."
The variation in the official response to this situation was

substantial. It was never simply a matter of degree - workmg class
women and girls were subjected to scrutmy, vigilance and calculated
retribution through state harassment, segregation and punishment. Dr
Booth Cooper, one sociaUy accredited expert, admitted in December
1942 that "80% of aU reported cases came from quite nice girls who
have been indiscreet"." Middle class women and girls could obtain
anonymous discreet treatment from their local medical practitioner or
could attend as an outpatient at the WiUiam Street clinic for Women.
Ned Hanlon remmded the delegates of the July 1942 conference that
he wished this class distmction in treatment to be rigidly enforced.
Many females, who had been reported as a "contact" by a serviceman,
were very young, often only between thirteen and seventeen years of
age." If girls from "good homes" became mdiscreet "good time girls"
who constantly "frequented the streets looking for excitement", loitered
in bars and hotels where Americans congregated or "often slept with a
different man every night and could be found living in rooms and city
hotels kept by their latest attachments"," they had to face
mvestigation by the vice squad and the department of Health and
Home Affairs. But if the girl m question was under seventeen, the
age of consent, the police would act.
Officials from the Health and Home Affairs department, with

advice from the poUce, employed a class dichotomy when they
decided who would enter the Female Venereal Disease Isolation
Hospital in the compound of the men's prison, or, attend Wattlebrae
hospital for Infectious diseases located in the grounds of the Brisbane
General Hospital. The category of "common prostitute", the only
peacetime clientele for the "lock hospital" underwent serious
modifications when confronted by the unprecedented exigencies of
war. Informed sources all agreed that "enthusiastic amateurs" rather
than the professional prostitute were most likely to transmit venereal
infection to troops. Sir Raphael Cilento cited this category,
specifically identifymg the working class women at the munitions
factory at Wynnum." Yet, it was surely beyond the bounds of the
most enthusiastic dedication and stamina for so few women to infect
so many men. In the aimual report of the director general of Health
and Medical Services for 1942-43 and various conferences held
intemaUy withm the armed services, the sources of infections were
apportioned 5 per cent from professional prostitutes, 85 per cent from
amateurs and 10 per cent from wives.*
Prostitutes themselves were not simply an undifferentiated
category, for they were divided upon class lines as well. Gavin Long
observed, and ttiis was verified from his conversations with top
ranking AUied officers, that caU girls operated m Brisbane's leading
hotels such as Lennons (where General MacArthur had his
headquarters), the Bellevue, across the road from the exclusive
Queensland Club and Parhament House, as weU as in private
residences m eUte suburbs like Hamilton.*' These women did not fmd
themselves incarcerated in the "lock hospital" - the adjective
"common" was never appUed to this category of expensive prostitute.
In contrast, m TownsviUe, catermg for the rank and file men, the
showground had a series of tents grouped in a circle and clients
would queue and march m line for their very brief session. It was
commonly termed "the buU ring"." The evidence suggests that
professional street and brothel prostitutes continued to cater for tiieir
noraial cUentele - AustraUan middle-aged married men. This accounts
for the low mcidence of professionals cited by troops as their source
of infection. It was clearly the category of "entiiusiastic amateur" tiiat
was predominantly placed under vice squad surveillance."
The Healtii department and die police faced difficulties in
determining procedures to be employed in categorising "entiiusiastic
amateurs"; for, on tiie one hand, tiie Australian and AUied military
authorities kept constant pressure to bear at the highest levels to
secure tiie restraint of women and giris accused of mfecting troops.

On tiie otiier hand, it was recognized tiiat tiiese sexuaUy active
women did not constitute a suigle and undifferentiated group.
Discernment and discretion were needed. Not only were police
resources severely overextended but various social control agencies
might find tiiemselves tiie subject of bitter public criticism if more
privileged women were treated like tiiose from tiie workmg class.
In March 1943 Hanlon received a deputation from the WCTU and
tiie Society for Racial Hygiene, concemuig the problem of young girls
suffering from sexuaUy transmitted diseases. Hanlon gave his
assurances tiiat tiiese 'respectable' giris would not be incarcerated at
tiie Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital witii "seasoned
offenders" but would be sent uistead to Wattlebrae Hospital for
Infectious Diseases," which for tiie duration of the war became a
venereal disease hospital for middle class women and girls. This
statement carefiiUy disguised tiie actual policy which had been placed
in operation by eariy 1942. The director general of Healtii and
Medical Services' annual report for 1941-42 stated that:
A number of girls mfecting soldiers has been found to be both

unco-operative and unreliable in respect of regular treatment and
abstention from promiscuous sexual intercourse. As a result of the
stringent necessity to control the sources of infection, many
women have been transferred from the Infectious Diseases Hospital
to tiie VD Hospital at Park Road [tiie lock hospital]."
His next annual report admitted tiiat the facilities to accommodate

around fifty prostitutes at tiie "lock hospital" had been substantially
increased to detain certain "promiscuous amateurs". There were now
90 women residents there.^ By November 1943 there were 105
women under detention m tiie "lock hospital". They constituted
several different categories - the traditional clientele of prostitutes,
"delinquent giris with VD" and secondarily, "any woman found to
have infected personnel of the fightmg forces". Clearly, class
distinctions decided who was designated "delinquent" or merely
"mdiscreet". Upon this basis, females were assigned to either the
"lock hospital" or to Wattiebrae.
The rationale to send a woman to Wattlebrae or the lock hospital
can be starkly represented by the procedures enlisted for botii. At
Wattlebrae, a woman was mdisputably a 'patient' in a hospital; at the
Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital she was arrested by the
police, escorted by them to the "lock hospital" and there compulsorily
detained and confmed as a 'prisoner'. Moreover, a married woman

who contracted syphiUs from her husband would be treated m a
general ward of a public hospital witii no stigma attached to her.
Both class perception and the degree to which a woman adhered to
conventional sexual mores ultimately determined to which institution
she would be sent and whetiier she was labeUed a 'patient' or a
'prisoner'. The Queensland govemment in the year 1944-45
continued to pride itself on its possession of the "only hospital of its
type" (i.e. a "lock hospital") in AustraUa*^ and deplored the less
restrictive operation of other States where infected women and girls
were mostly aUowed liberty on a parole system. The exigencies of
the war had aUowed Queensland to race to the forefront of the
Australian States for the efficiency, diligence and sheer single-
mindedness with which poUcies were implemented to contain and
segregate aU manner of deviants, whether they were Aborigines on the
reserves, the insane and incapacitated in institutions or sexuaUy
promiscuous working class women and girls in "lock hospitals".
A third phase m the constmction of this moral alarm became
apparent by mid-1944. In January the conservative Smith's Weekly
ran a highly emotive article entitled "Guilty Women" which focused
attention upon the latest target group. Concem was redirected from
the overt sexuality of young single women and girls towards married
women who had husbands on active service and who contracted
venereal disease. The article claimed that "Later generations trying to
repair tiie damage wiU be justified m judgmg the women responsible
as 'guilty'".**
Yet there was no marked increase generaUy in cases of venereal
infection tiiroughout the Commonwealth. The severe alarm of the
first two phases now gave way to panic. The key motif which ran
through tiie pronouncements in this year was the increasing incidence
of infection among married women with husbands on active service.
In May 1944 Dr J H L Cumpston and Dr R E Richard m a report of
the National Healtii and Medical Research Council expressed their
regret when tiiey noted tiiis uicrease.*' Further, the report of a survey
of venereal disease in the AMF, detecting an mcreasing proportion of
wives infecting soldier husbands, demanded "more punitive legislation
against women".™
Once again, tiie operation of an mstitutionalised double standard
was evident. The July 1942 conference openly discussed the arniy
surveiUance and regulation of brothels in Syria where members of tiie
Second ADF had been stationed the previous year. This had not been
altogetiier successful for "many soldiers retumed from the Middle East
and infected their wives". At tiie conclusion of tiieir deliberations the

delegates stressed tiie urgent necessity for the department of Health
and Home Affairs to provide a suitable place for "a respectable
woman who had innocently enough incurred venereal ^ disease"."
Cleariy these women would not be sent to a "lock hospital" and even
treatment at Wattlebrae might cast aspersions on tiieir chastity and
honour.
Several explanations may be proffered for tiiis change of focus
towards infected married women. By late 1943 tiie federal
government's attention was directed away from organismg for total
war into post-war reconstmction, tiirough which tiie welfare state,
unprecedented immigration, increasing industrialisation and economic
diversity were to be implemented. Cmcial to tiie whole process was
tiie family. As tiie report of tiie committee of enquiry into the
medical aspect of tiie decline of tiie birth rate remarked in 1948:
When tiie immediate urgency of protectmg Australia from invasion

had passed and when long-range plans for reconstmction and
development of this country were being inaugurated, tiie problem
of a population policy arose once more."
In May 1944 the federal govemment originally had sought the

"opinion and advice of the Council on tiie whole question of the
decline in tiie Australian birth rate". In a society which regarded
itself as an underpopulated British bastion of civilisation which could
have been destroyed by the invading Japanese, more weight was
directed towards increasing the birth rate as well as attracting suitable
migrants from Great Britain and Westem Europe. In 1947, William
Morris Hughes, the former prime minister during World War One
coined the phrase which encapsulated this fear - "populate or perish".
It was within this atmosphere in 1944 that the third stage of moral
alarm was orchestrated and given its first and extended public
performance.
Though this target group m the tiiird phase was clearly identified,
it was never to suffer the same degree of harassment or punitive
incarceration. Police discretionary powers could not challenge the
operation of the dominant ideology. Botii the federal and State
governments were reluctant to adopt a policy which would necessitate
tiie restraint of any married women in the lock hospital. All those
ideological inconsistencies inherent in the application of the double
standard would be revealed for public scmtiny and perhaps
challenged. Married women especially those with children could not
be so easily and publicly labeUed as deviant. They were tiie motiiers

and future mothers of AustraUa. Sentiments such as tiiose expressed
by tiie Association for Moral and Social Hygiene in May 1944 ran
contrary to the cherished beUef that women were the contaminating
agents:
Men and women were equaUy responsible for the irresponsible and
promiscuous relations ui which VD is spread. Any legislation
which either aims or in actual operation encourages in the pubUc
the belief that women are mainly or solely responsible for the
spread of VD wiU not solve this moral problem and will m the
long mn aggravate it.^'
When alarm about sexuaUy transmitted diseases began to abate

later in 1944, it was never due to a reassessment of moral priorities
or civU liberties. What was at hand m late 1944 was a medical
remedy. PeniciUin, first introduced in the armed services in 1943 and
into the civilian population later in tiie foUowmg year, could cure
some venereal mfections m eight hours.^" In the case of syphilis,
arsenic injections over a minimum period of twelve months were no
longer necessary." Despite this medical breakthrough which
potentiaUy could have altered the entire concepmalisation and
treatinent of this disease, h was aU too apparent that conventional
morality contmued to stress chastity, repression and, m its wake,
blame and retribution. The aimual report of the department of Healtii
and Home Affairs for 1946 did not abandon moral preoccupations:
... modem scientific medicine can now cure VD very rapidly and
effectively once it has been contracted. However, the eradication
of VD requires the eradication of promiscuity, and to this end, we
need tiie help of all those agencies fostering idealism, culture,
refinement and a love for the decencies of Ufe.'*
In the constmction of moral alarm no chaUenge to the operation of

the double standard could be countenanced. But beyond tiiis, what is
now even more revealing are the defmed parameters of the debate -
those questions that were permitted, those which remamed unasked
and tiiose which, when mentioned, were not pursued. Two cmcial
aspects which fall witiiin the latter categories require exammation and
appraisal. The first question that was not explored involved male
homosexuality. This is not altogetiier surprising for Australians
generally held male homosexuals m contempt and the taboo on pubUc
discussion ensured silence. Current medical research indicates that

rectal and penile gonorrhoea is far more common among gay men.
They are moreover ten times more likely to suffer from syphilis than
heterosexual men." Despite a significant debate on the extent of
rectal gonorrhoea at the July 1942 conference m Brisbane, remarks
were directed primarily to its presence in female patients.^*
In the annual statistics presented to the Queensland pariiament in
tiie years from 1944 to 1947 only one man indicated tiiat he had
contracted venereal infection through a homosexual encounter. This
reticence is understandable given the long prison terms awaiting those
men convicted of homosexual offenses. Possibly, many gay contacts
were filed under "unknown or unstated" - there were exactly 2000
such entries in those years, by far the largest category.™
The second question that was not permitted concemed the higher
incidence of sexually transmitted diseases among Black American
troops stationed in Austi-alia than among tiieir white compatriots. The
respective rates were 56.7 per 1000 and 9.7 per 1000 for SWPA in
1943 even after tiie initial mti-oduction of peniciUm.*" These rates
were considerably lower than tiie peak of August 1942 in Queensland
specifically, for GIs were later "moved out from large cities to tiie
north where there are few contacts"." In a society obsessed witfi
racial purity and miscegenation, it can only be concluded that tiie
Queensland authorities had no idea of the extent of venereal disease
among Black servicemen. Yet, as Graham Smitii shows in his
detailed analysis, When Jim Crow met John Bull. Black American
Soldiers in World War II in Britain (1987), m 1944 a highly
orchestrated campaign was mounted to stop white British women from
fraternising with Black GIs. In particular, tiie dangers of venereal
disease and miscegenation were employed in highly sensationalised
accounts m the newspapers. He concludes that "... there appears to
have been some official sanction to this policy".'^ Undoubtedly in
Queensland it was hoped that the interlockmg system of segregation
(analysed in chapter 3) would prevent interracial sexual contact. The
concem for the healtii of Aboriginal women did not loom large in
official quarters.
The specific question of sexuaUy transmitted diseases brought
together a complex mterrelated series of ideological and stmctiiral
processes - tiie changing status of women m wartune; tiie role of tiie
family; apprehension about tiie birtii rate; aherations in sexual mores;
fears about Australia's security and vuhierability; tiie effectiveness of
Austi-alian and AUied armies. In tiie period of Reconstmction after
1943, traditional moral precepts, tiiough chaUenged, were ultimately
reinforced. A constricting role for women who were to be primarily

located in the family was envisaged and indeed ensured. Social
control agents refused to relmquish the cherished tenet that they had
acted pmdendy and witiiin the national mterest by detectmg, detammg
and, in Queensland, incarcerating some women who chaUenged
traditional moral precepts. In the war-time period of emergency,
adjustment and reorganisation, the orchestrated constmction of moral
alarm appealed primarily to uninformed prejudice and mismformation
and demanded punitive retribution. But tiie implications of this moral
outcry went far deeper than mere indignation and censure. Most
specifically the procedures, whereby civiUan and military agencies
coordinated their activities m order to detect and punish some women
accused of infecting soldiers, highlights not only aU those
misperceptions about women as "contammators" but also exemplifies
those cmcial processes whereby the apparatus of the state was
expanded and strengthened.
"Red Baiting is an AWU Habit"':
Surveillance and Prosecution of Communists
1939-45
On 17 June 1940 tiie Communist Party of Australia (CPA) was
declared an illegal organisation under tiie provision of the national
security (subversive organisations) regulations promulgated two days
previously. Dawn raids by tiie police, the indiscriminate confiscation
of literamre and documents, surveillance, dismissal from employment
and, in some cases, intemment foUowed inexorably from this
administrative disavowal of a group critical, and in many mstances,
openly antagonistic to Australia's involvement m die war in tiie
Middle East. These actions m 1940 must be understood and artanged
in the wider context of political and ideological suspicion and
rejection of radicals. With tiie establishment of tiie Commonwealtii
police and military intelligence in tiie Great War, elaborate networks
between Commonwealth and the States were established to monitor
and curtail tiie activities of tiiese political dissidents. In particular
times of crisis, such as war and depression, the full weight of tiie
state's apparatus could be applied, in contrast to peacetime, when
systematic surveiUance, but limited mtervention, was more frequent.
Yet these processes were never uniform and again reflected deep-
seated xenophobia. In the first instance, the attention of the civil
police, foUowmg standard procedure whereby they monitored radicals
and identified candidates for intensive scmtuiy by the Commonwealth
Investigation Bureau in the Attomey General's department, and later
in wartime, for military inteUigence, remamed resolutely upon Anglo-
Celtic radicals and their supporters. The diverse activities of tiie
ItaUan communists, socialists, anarchists and their sympathisers in
nortii Queensland were not regarded as politicaUy relevant in 1940 -
ratiier it was tiieir status as enemy aliens that was paramount. Hence,
tiie raids on supposed communists in June 1940 was confined
exclusively within tiie Anglo-Celtic community and devolved around
longstanding intra-union conflicts and those stmctural and ide.nlneical
Red Baiting 107
stmggles between the parUamentary wmg of the ALP and some

miUtant unions.
Nowhere in AustraUa were these antagonisms towards communism,
its adherents and sympathisers more deeply expressed tiian m
Queensland. From its mception m 1920, tiie Communist Party of
AustiraUa was set m tiie patti of conflict and confrontation witii tiie
mainstream labour movement.^ Successive Queensland Labor
governments were dommated by Roman Catiiolics and former trade
unionists with key AustraUan Worker's Union (AWU) affiliations.
Moreover these moderate and cautious reformers eschewed the
imaginative and decisive reforms of the Ryan and Theodore
administrations of 1915 to 1922. Whilst membership of the ALP and
the CPA was mutuaUy mcompatible from 1925 elsewhere in Australia,
this issue was not officiaUy resolved in Queensland until the following
year. K.H. Kennedy argues that the "Anti-Communism Pledge" which
members of the ALP were obUged to take from 1925 onwards
brought to the surface deep intemal conflicts between the conservative
AWU and those unions in sympathy with radical mitiatives lUce One
Big Union (OBU).^ Most notably the powerful Australian Railway
Union (ARU) adopted a radical ideology and affiliations.
The Queensland railway strikes of 1925 and 1927 became the
industrial arenas where these ideological conflicts became explicit and
contested. Although the ARU was influenced by the defunct
Industiial Workers of the World and tiie unpotent OBU, tiie
McCormack Labor admmistration incortectly attributed its aUegiances
to communism. Botii Margaret Bridson Cribb and K.H. Kennedy
argue tiiat the South Johnstone strike of 1927 became tiie first major
industrial dispute m the State where communism and its supposed
threat to the labour movement was articulated and acted upon
decisively." Certainly, the actions of the govemment were far more
aggressive than two years before. Premier WiUiam McCormack, a
former organiser for the AWU, took the vmprecedented move of
unilateraUy dismissing railway workers and effecting a lock out. On
the otiier hand, Raymond Evans, m his attempts to trace the rejection
and repudiation of radicals by mamstream Labor, does not confine his
attentions to particular mdustrial disputes; rather, he seeks to
determine those ideological antagonisms and xenophobic anxieties
arising out of 1916, cuhnmatmg m tiie Red Rag riots of 1919 and
continuing tivough mto tiie 1920s.'
Throughout the 1930s the cabinet continued to be dominated by
men with long service and current affiliations with the AWU.
William Forgan Smitii jomed the AWU m 1913, becommg tiie Labor
member for Mackay two years later and deputy premier in 1925.
Jack Dash, mmister for Transport, had been vice president of die
AWU, whilst "Mossy" Hynes, mmister for Labour and hidustry had
seen service as a senior vice president.* Ned Hanlon, along with
Forgan Smitii, dominated die party tiu-oughout tiie 1930s and 1940s.
His fervent disavowal of communism earned him tiie nickname of
"Anti-Red Ned",'' presumably a pun on the absurdly maccurate epitiiet
for former Premier E.G. Theodore, "Red Ted."
Witii tiie exception of tiie mglorious Moore coalition
administration, which had tiie misfortune to govem during tiie worst
years of tiie depression, Queensland politics m these decades was
dominated by tiiis brand of moderate Labor. In tiie mmds of tiie
pariiamentarians witii contmumg strong affiliation witii tiie AWU,
many trade unionists and Labor members, tiieir tme opposition, and
indeed tiieir real enemy, was not tiie lacklustre members of the
Country Party and the Nationalists (later tiie United Australia Party)
but the communists. In his retirement speech, long-servuig Attomey
General, John MuUan declared:
[The AWU]...has been tiie backbone of tiie Labor movement in

Australia, and it has been particularly helpful m Queensland
because it has a sane and uncompromising policy in respect of...its
opposition to communism.*
Expressing the most overt hostility, party president, C.G. FaUon in his
address to the 1941 Labor-in-Politics convention in Soutiiport
maintamed that:
The chief enemy of the Party was not "the straight out Tory", but
the Communist who would try to obtain trade imion leadership
positions by attacking the ALP.'
In the federal sphere, antagonism to the communists went far

further tiian denunciation and victimisation. Whilst the ScuUin
administration was prepared to go no further than banning Communist
publications like Red Leader under the provisions of the postal
regulations, the Lyons government acted swiftiy agamst communists,
Harold Jones, tiie director of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch
recommended amendments to the Crimes Act m order to declare the
CPA an unlawful association and further extend postal regulations to
prohibit tiie transmission of "undesirable" or subversive material
tiirough the post.'° In May 1932 the Crimes Act was so amended.
Red Baiting 109
Three montiis later the Lyons admmistration, with its zealous anti-
communist renegade Labor men, moved resolutely to disband tiie CPA
altogetiier. These attempts were thwarted m the High Court.
Suggestions were subsequentiy made diat the various States frame
legislation that would effectively nuUify an organised Communist
Party."
Li many respects these manoeuvres seem inappropriate considering
the smaU membership and meffectiveness of the communists at this
particular time. As Diane Menghetti iUustrates, with reference to
nortii Queensland, during the early 1930s at the height of moves to
curtaU or ban the party, the CPA and hs anciUary sorority, the
Women's Progressive Club, was anythmg but a significant or indeed,
revolutionary force. Rather, its members were far more prominent m
assisting the unemployed with relief and Christmas gifts as well as
providing members and sympathisers with an active social Ufe.
Discussion groups, though an ideologicaUy important medium through
which Marxist-Leninist theory could be debated and disseminated,
took second place to these more directly practical aspects.'^
With the establishment of the Movement agamst War and Fascism
and n Gmppo ItaUano contro la Guerra e il Fascismo m 1933, and
the commitment to tiie Popular Front after 1936, tiie wider political
agenda and discourse irrevocably altered.'^ The Spanish Relief
Conunittee, established under the auspices of the Movement agamst
War and Fascism, argued that the Spanish Civil War was "a fight
between democracy and fascism."'" Though only fifty-nme
Austi-aUans fought m Spam, this precursor to global war in 1939,"
marked a change m AustraUan communist policies and mitiatives,
signaUing a commitment to broader based concems lUce defeating
fascism m tiie years from 1936 to 1939.
When tiie USSR signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany
on 23 August 1939 commimists had to perform an extraorduiary
ideological volte-face in order to accommodate tiiis seemingly
inexpUcable event. The most unmediate and direct consequences m
Austi-alia were that the CPA denounced tiie hostiUties as "..a war
between two conflictuig groups of unperialist powers for world
supremacy."'* The fulsome rhetoric about tiie valient fight against
fascism disappeared, publicly subsumed m subservient adherence to
Moscow directives.'^ Privately, m ^ y of tiie communist rank and file
felt uneasy and confused, as their mail mtercepted by tiie mtemal
postal and telegraphic censor m the Post-Master General's department
reveals. An organiser in north Queensland, George Day, bemoaned
the difficulties of trymg to convmce members to foUow impUcitiy
no War on the Homefront
tiiese new and often unpalatable party directives. In tiie end, he

lamented, "[I] have had to keep quiet.""
Direct conflict between communists and tiie Queensland State
govemment was mevitable from 1939 for two reasons. First, tiie CPA
gamed members and mcreased popular support m tiie central and
northem coastal districts. hi 1939 tiie communist barrister, F.W.
Paterson, was elected an alderman on tiie TownsviUe City Council."
Secondly, some unions, whose activities would be cmcial to die
mobUisation for total war production, were controUed by CPA leaders.
At tiie outset of hostilities tiie CPA argued tiiat "militant trade unions
should go onto tiie defensive and mitiate a stmggle in tiie mdustrial
field."^ Federal Labor leader John Curtm informed tiie Advisory War
Council in Febmary 1940 tiiat "a good deal of tiie mdustrial problems
we are now facuig were caused by Communists."^' This disavowal
hardly augured weU for unions led by conununist officials. The
Waterside Workers Federation, tiie Storeman and Packers Union, tiie
Australian Federation of Locomotive Engmeers, tiie Queensland
CoUier Employees Union, tiie Hospital Workers Union, the Brisbane
branch of tiie ARU and tiie AMIEU were all controUed by conununist
officials.^ Suspicions that communists might sabotage or nuUify tiie
aUied war effort were heightened when the Mackay branch of tiie
Waterside Workers Federation m November 1939 refused to load food
bound for England. As Premier Forgan Smith informed parliament:
It must be recognised that Australia is at war against Germany.
To hold up Australian food ships in Australian waters would be
just as effective as if they were sunk by German U-boats.^
Even when the CPA totaUy altered its policy after the USSR was
attacked m June 1941, and ferventiy supported the aUied war effort,
deep hostiUty and suspicion continued to be entertained about the
loyalty and commitment of communists. Paul Hasluck comments tiiat
"...[w]ith the Labour organisation, too, the new situation made it more
difficult for party supporters to see the issues of war sunply and
clearly". He concludes that tiie strong representation of Roman
Catholics among Labor ranks contributed to this deep-seated and
continued rejection.^
Commentmg upon tiie mdustrial sphere, US military inteUigence
officers m their reports to tiie Office of Strategic Services in
Washington constantly referted to tiie presence of communists in key
unions like tiie WWF.^ These reports aU too frequentiy reflected the
mtelUgence officers' total aversion to aU forms of socialist ideology
Red Baiting 111
and practice, even in its most mild expression. Moderate Labor

parliamentarians were often portrayed by tiiem as militants when an
assessment based upon a more tiiorough and mformed knowledge of
die AustraUan labour movement and its traditions would have
modified tiiese views. But it was not sunply these conservative aUies
who regarded radical unionists witii suspicion.
To counteract any potential dismptions on die wharves tiiat might
impede the transport of food, military equipment and troops, die
Australian Army deployed its own transportation crews. In
TownsviUe, for mstance, a port committee was established in early
1942 which consisted of representatives from the shipping company.
Bums Philp, tiie port controller, and the WWF. Moreover, over 1000
soldiers were available at any time for essential work on the railways
and wharves in the event of a strike or stoppage. Colonel North, the
commander of the 7th and 11th Brigades, later stated "wharfies often
stmck or threatened to strike over trivial issues...However, the Army
went straight ahead and would not leave ships unloaded."^
TownsviUe was a particularly cmcial centre during tiie war, with large
deployments of aUied resident and transit troops. Given tiie socialist
conti-ol tiie TownsviUe City Council in 1939 and the presence of
diverse militant unions,^' potential conflict was translated into direct
confrontation during the first two years of tiie war.
Early in 1940 the intelligence sections of aU branches of the
armed services, fearful that communists would engage in acts of
sabotage, requested the War Cabinet to implement the provisions of
the national security (general) regulations 25 and 26 in order to
restrict their freedom of movement, and in some cases ensure
detention. They also recommended invoking regulation 79 which
aUowed for and authorised thorough searches of premises in the hope
of detectmg subversive Uterature and propaganda. Hasluck argues that
initiaUy tiie War Cabinet and Menzies specificaUy were reluctant to
declare illegal any party or organisation. On tiie otiier hand, David
Garment suggests that Menzies, far from bemg reluctant, bowed to
pressure exerted by the Country Party who, after mitiaUy refusing to
serve with hun, entered die coalition on 14 April 1940.^* Menzies's
original stance may be fmitfuUy compared to tiie British method of
dealing with the same problem. Neil Stammers argues that, up to tiie
end of March 1940, "on tiie level of pubhc policy, the govemment
maintained a liberal stance" by their repeated statements implying a
commitment to the basic democratic freedom of expression even
during wartune. Yet secretly tiie police were independently interfering
witii tiiose opposed to the war.^'
The Australian War Cabuiet caUed for a top level conference on

29 January 1940 which was attended by die inteUigence sections of
tiie services, tiie Commonwealtii Investigation Branch of tiie Attomey
General's department. State poUce commissioners and senior officials
from tiie department of Infonnation. The conference recommended
tiiat active measures should proceed in order to detect "subversion."
This loose inflammatory term denoted botii acts and anti-war
sentunent. Furthermore, die delegates proposed that tiie department of
Information produce and distribute counter-propaganda m order to
negate the communists' arguments tiiat Australia's mvolvement in
Malaya and die Middle East constituted a mere repetition of tiie
imperial exercise of World War One. Lastiy, more vigilance should
be undertaken to detect communists m die armed forces and die
public service. Frank Cam comments that Prune Mmster Menzies
was "displeased" witii tihese recommendations and demanded
clarification. The subsequent report was equaUy disappointmg.^"
Hasluck, on the other hand, mamtams that Menzies was unwiUing
to order a general approval to declare the Communist Party an
unlawful association. He quotes Menzies:
...in view of the dangers of uifringement of the rights and

privileges of mnocent persons should approval be given to
principles widiout regard to the details and methods of
implementing them and the provisions of safeguards to prevent
their abuse?"
Never a committed or convincing advocate of civil liberties for

dissidents, Menzies's statement must be understood in die light of his
adherence to a "busmess as usual" poUcy. On 6 Febmary 1940 tiie
War Cabmet, havmg reconsidered the conference's extended
recommendations, decided that no further action be taken at tiiat
tune.^^ Possibly fearing that open action agamst communists could
ensure their status as martyrs to authoritarianism, as the Industrial
Workers of die World had been in 1916, the Menzies' govemment
mstead preferred to bide its time.
Events began to move swiftiy in the comuig months and provided
Menzies with a tangible issue around which communists' activities
could be curtailed. A major strike empted in NSW on 11 March
1940 over attempts to overtum the decision of Mr Justice Drake-
Brockman to grant a 40 hour week m die minmg industry. This
dispute was not resolved until 15 May." Altiiough tiie CPA was not
directiy involved, any major mdustrial dispute could be laid at its
Red Baiting 113
door.^" Westem AustraUan Senator Herbert CoUett, tiien mmister for

Repatiiation and War Service Homes, told his parliamentary
colleagues that:
The cancerous growtiis sappmg die vitals of our established and

democratic mstitutions must be cut from die body of die people,
and die very germ extermmated. The exotic growtii of
communism must not be permitted to spread and give off
poisonous propaganda, nor should strikes for which tiiere is no
justification be tolerated."
The chief of die General Staff, Sir BmdeneU White, erroneously

aUeged tiiat the communists had mstigated die miners' strike. In even
more alarmist terms he mamtained that the strikers would destroy the
mines, vital to war production, if non-union labour was used. Cain
asserts tiiat it was this particular report that prompted the War Cabmet
to ban die Communist Party on 27 May.'*
Secondly, after the initial shock of havmg to readjust tiieir
arguments m Ime with Moscow policy in 1939, the communists had
become the most organised and consistent opponent of Australia's
involvement m anotiier "imperialistic" war. Retaliation m the
conservative press was relentiess. The Sydney Bulletin of die 20
March 1940 criticised these "lawless and impatriotic proceedmgs" and
urged the federal govemment to act swiftly agamst this intemal
political enemy. In line with British policy bemg formulated on this
issue, on 8 April the War Cabinet decided on a general policy of
censorship and confiscation of all communist publications." TTiese
procedures had, however, commenced from the outbreak of war but
had not been fuUy implemented. The controUer of the postal and
telegraphic censorship section of die Post Master General's department
wrote in November 1939 that:
The dissemmation of Communist propaganda throughout Australia

would appear to have mcreased as a result of the war, the
Communists being ever ready to take advantage of abnormal
conditions.
Consequentiy, die PMG's department m Queensland alone had seized

5,000 copies of the "Non-aggression pact" pamphlet and 51,000 copies
of a general manifesto, aU of which had been posted.'* Sir Henry
GuUett, now the mmister for Infonnation, stressed that previous
measures to lunit the party's publications had failed and this more
decisive action was to control "an enemy m our midst openly working
for die defeat of die aUied cause and the destmction of our Australian
overseas troops."'' Communists were prohibited on 19 April from
commentmg on the war, recmitment policy, Russia, any strike in die
British Commonwealtii or fermenting or advocating mdustrial unrest.""
Five days later even more decisive action was instigated to prevent
communist agitation and criticism. Nine papers were banned
ahogether - Tribune, Soviets Today, Communist Review, Wharfie,
World Peace, Militant, Guardian, Workers' Star, and the North
Queensland Guardian. Several other newspapers. Railway Advocate,
Building Workers' Journal and Voice of the Jobless would be
submitted for inspection by the censors. Furthermore, provision was
made to seize and destroy "offendmg" presses."' Craig Johnston
points out tiiat a roneod pamphlet version of Tribune appeared within
a week but does not suggest how effectively this makeshift procedure
continued to operate."^
Concerted action was bemg spearheaded against communists and
not simply their publications. This would reinforce Garment's
mterpretation, for die most beUigerent action occurred after die
Country Party jomed the coalition."' On 17 April tiie governor
general's address to parliament aUuded specificaUy to die unpalatable
activities of the communists. Mmdful that freedom of speech and
Uberty were essential elements to preserve in "the war against
fascism", nevertheless, he mamtained that the lunits of democracy had
been reached when:
...men profess an aUegiance to a coimtry other than tiieir own;

when they plan to overthrow constitutional govemment; when tiiey
direct their activities to the defeat of their own country in a war
to which tiieir country is committed. ...No gentle consideration
can be extended to tiiose whose real desire is that we lost it.""
The acting minster for Information, Sir Henry GuUett, told pariiament
on 24 May that:
In brief die Communists are in every form and guise enemies of

Australia, and they should be treated as such. Every loyal
Australian who wishes to keep his country and die British Empire
from disaster, should repudiate Communists of any degree, and
look upon tiiem as enemies as tiiey would enemies m arms."'
Red Baiting 115
Only a few voices were raised m defence of civil liberties generaUy

and CPA specificaUy. George Martens, die Labor member for
Herbert, guardedly declared m the House of Representative's debate
on 1 May 1940 tiiat:
No govemment has the right arbitrarily to suppress whole

organisations. Such action is as impolitic as forcing strikers to go
back to work. If there is a subversive element in the community
it becomes infinitely more dangerous when it is driven
underground."*
In Britain moves were sunUarly afoot in May 1940 to suppress aU

political dissidents and pacifists. Stammers argues that this arose
directiy out of the invasion crisis and the govemment regarded both
fascists and communists as potential military threats. ChurchiU
proposed that "protective or preventive intemment" might be necessary
if die Germans invaded."' Yet AustraUa at this time, was not
threatened by imminent destmction or invasion and the War Cabinet's
decision to unplement similar procedures appears a distinct
overreaction. In a secret telegram to the Victorian Premier, A.A.
Dunstan on 6 June 1940, Menzies stated that he was:
...considering the use of retumed servicemen and considerable

bodies of other loyal citizens anxious to assist in combating fifth
column and subversive activities in Australia. We feel such
bodies would render useful assistance.
These paramilitary loyalists were to be co-ordinated by State police.

Menzies concluded tiiat he fuUy appreciated that the maintenance of
law and order was primarily a State matter."* Presumably die
Queensland premier was sent a similar communique.
On 27 May Menzies secretiy authorised die regulation bannmg tiie
CPA. State premiers were informed tiiat the order would be
promulgated on 15 June. This would aUow tune to organise a
Commonwealth-wide series of raids, arrests and seizures of presses.
Stan Moran later recaUed tiiat tiie security forces severely damaged
household fumiture like mattresses in tiie search for subversive
literature."' The Courier Mail of 17 June 1940 confirmed tiiat "tiiese
raids were a carefuUy planned drive agamst possible fifth columnists."
Party activist, W.J. Brown rather dramaticaUy describes them as a
"rampage conducted by Hitier's SS men."'" Headlinmg an article,
"PoUce Seize Rifles from Communists", a move calculated to instil
fear and suspicion in the public, the Courier Mail reported tiiat
midnight raids had occurred at Caims, Stratford, Gordonvale, Mareeba,
TuUy and Brisbane. Mackay was not mentioned, though it was in
tills town that the police's actions were publicly criticised. The
Worker, the official organ of the AWU, was predictably silent on tiiis
entire issue.
Indeed, in Queensland a series of blunders surrounded these raids.
Instead of consulting closely with the Investigation Branch of die
Attomey General's department, the body which was to co-ordinate die
national manoeuvre, Premier Forgan Smith constmcted his own list"
and specificaUy targeted leading trade unionists from his hometown of
Mackay, despite a lack of any evidence that Mackay was a prominent
centre for radicalism and disloyalty.
The secretary of die Mackay branch of the ARU, B. Heckson,
wrote to Forgan Smitii five days after the raid that his house had
been searched altiiough he was not a member of die CPA. In furdier
correspondence witii tiie federal Attomey General, W.M. Hughes,
Heckson continued his protest that ARU joumals had been seized and
tiiat private letters and CathoUc literamre belonging to his family had
been confiscated. T.C. Lock of die Mackay Trades and Labour
Council and P. Linsky, president of the Mackay branch of the
Waterside Workers Federation, neitiier of whom were Communists,
had also been raided.'^
Attemptmg to counter criticism, Forgan Smith, apologeticaUy stated
to Hughes, tiiat:
The only desire of the Queensland Govemment is to aid the

Commonwealth in unearthmg subversive activities; but we are of
tiie opinion tiiat the exclusion of any mstimtion or mdividual from
examination, unless specificaUy good grounds exist, would defeat
the purpose of die regulation. ...We have no desire, of course, to
mterfere witii normal union activities witiim tiie law; but it would
be absurd not to recognise diat certain union officials, if not
tiiemselves Communists, are at least wiUmg tools."
It is no comcidence tiiat tiie two union officials selected by Forgan

Smidi, m consultation witii senior police officers m die special branch,
were from tiie ARU and die WWF. Given tiie long-standing
suspicion of mamstream labour, especiaUy members of the
pariiamentary Labor Party, towards these radical unions, his targets
were predictable. In a sense such a move was calculated, particularly
m die case of Heckson, to settle old grievances against the ARU
Red Baiting 117
extending back to the 1927 Soutii Johnstone railway strike. These

pattems contmued after die war as chapter six wiU demonstrate; for,
in 1948, one of die most major mdustrial disputes ever wimessed in
Queensland, empted agaui m the railways, leadmg Premier Hanlon to
declare a state of emergency. As Margaret Bridson Cribb
demonstrates, this strike coincided with the USSR's take over of
Czechoslovakia which "added to the atmosphere of intense hatred and
suspicion of Communists."'"
Under pressure to explain the Queensland blunder in June 1940 to
Hanlon, then secretary for Health and Home Affairs, Police
Commissioner CarroU stated that the problem lay with the unprecise
wording of mles (5(2) of national security [subversive organisation]
regulation, statutory mle, 1940, number 109). On the evening of the
promulgation of the regulation, the police "went out to search for, and
seized, literature relating to a body which had been declared
unlawful." The point at issue was what constituted "relating to" and
could sympathisers or coUeagues of communists be subsumed under
this vague term?" Five days after the 15 June raid Police
Commissioner CarroU wrote to Colonel Jones of the Commonwealth
police for further clarification and suggestions for the destination of
the huge quantity of seized documents, books and pamphlets. With
barrister Fred Paterson, later communist member for Bowen,
attempting to file a civil action agamst these seizures, clarification
was urgently needed.'* In response to this legal vaguery, the
Commonwealth govemment altered the offending term "relating to" to
"belonging to" or "used on behalf of or "a body which had been
declared unlawful."
Six montiiis later Forgan Smitii wrote to Menzies expressing his
dissatisfaction with the amended regulation, stating that "from an
administrative pomt of view these regulations are regarded as highly
unsatisfactory as far as the Queensland police are concemed." Under
the national security regulations the State police could not initiate a
prosecution except when it had been authorised by the responsible
minister of the Commonwealth, such as the Attomey General. The
essential conflict lay not so much in the delegation of powers but, in
the Queensland poUce commisioner's perception, die Commonwealtii's
reluctance to prosecute. Several mcidents were provided to
substantiate tiiis aUegation. First, m the case of WiUiam Gibson who
had been caught, according to the police report, "red handed"
distributing "communist literature of a subversive namre" to the
employees of Hancock and Gore in Brisbane, the Commonwealth
Crown Solicitor did not recommend a prosecution. On another
occasion, after extensive tune consumuig surveiUance, a "large amount

of subversive literamre" was confiscated from Donald Dickie who was
distributing this anti-war material around many mdustrial centres in
Brisbane. Agaui, after a tiiorough exammation by die Commonwealth
Attomey-General's department no charges were laid as it determined
that there was "insufficient evidence of the commission of any
offence."
Forgan Smitii contmued that his senior police officers "regard
[these]...decision[s] [not to prosecute] as most astonishmg under the
circumstances." In only two cases of the many under surveiUance by
die State police did die Commonwealtii proceed with a prosecution.
The State govemment, believing that its thorough monitoring of the
activities of communists, socialists and other radicals gave it an
unparaUeled insight into local activities, baulked at the bureaucratic
restrictions laid down by a distant admmistration. Forgan Smith
petulantly continued:
Consequentiy, however anxious the State authorities might be to

see the law m this connection is vindicated, tiiey are powerless in
the absence of the authority referred to.''
Under the initial promulgation of the national security (subversive

organisations) regulation of 15 June 1940 only die Communist Party,
the Communist League of Australia, die Mmority Movement, the
Revolutionary Worker's League, Australian League for Peace and
Democracy and die Australian Youtii Council were banned.'* The
Communist Party m Queensland changed its name to the Queensland
Political Rights Committee m order to avoid prosecution and
harassment. Under die regulations, "unlawful doctrines" were defined
as:
...any doctrines or principles which are advocated by a body which

has been declared unlawful, and any doctrmes or principles
whatsoever which are prejudicial to die defence of the
Commonwealth or die effective prosecution of die war.
This particular clause tiierefore aUowed police and mteUigence

agencies wide discretion in tiie monitoring and prosecution of fonner
communists, reasonmg tiiat mere changes in tiie title of organisations
m no way nuUified tiieir pemicious beliefs. The definition of what
might reasonably constimte an "unlawful doctrme", given its legal
imprecision and vagueness, aUowed a considerable degree of latitude
Red Baiting 119
in interpretation. Throughout Australia, fifty communists or

sympathisers were arrested m mid 1940, witii prominent activists
Horace RatcUff and Max Thomas bemg intemed."
The otiier issues which arose m June 1940 which possessed
potential ramifications for Queensland, ahnost as significant as
imminent mvasion m May 1940 had been in Britaui, was the entry of
Italy into die war. Only five days elapsed between Italy's declaration
of war on 10 June and the banning of the Communist Party m
Austi-aUa. The Queensland poUce in their security reports described
individual Italians m die sugar belt ahnost mterchangeably as eitiier
'fascist' or 'communist'. This seemingly offered both the State and
federal governments die perfect opportunity to mtem enemy alien
dissidents without regard to the vexmg problem of interpreting the
national security regulations given the unprecision in regulations
conceming iUegal organisations. Yet their categorisation on the basis
of national origms rather than ideology meant that most were intemed
in March and April 1942 when a Japanese mvasion appeared
inuninent (refer to chapter 2).*° Australian authorities were caught in
a dilemma that involved their perceptions of who was potentiaUy
more disloyal to the British Empire - fascists or communists -and
whetiier Australian bom communists were more of a threat to security
and morals than 'foreigners'. On 16 June 1940 four branches of tiie
Fascist Union in Brisbane, Innisfail, Caims and Stanthorpe were
raided, with "thousands of rifles", ammunition and gelignite
confiscated. The Courier Mail of 17 June 1940, widiout
understandmg or exploring these issues, merely informed readers that
these police raids were a "drive against communists and fascists."
Whetiier they were perceived as potential fifth columnists, as they
were in Britam and therefore demanded immediate decisive action,
was not explored.
In his testimony in Febmary 1941 before the newly established
Aliens' Tribunal, Colonel Sydney Whittington of military inteUigence
Soutiiem Command declared that communist enemy aliens had been
intemed in 1939 and 1940 only when their proselytmg activities,
especiaUy m the unions "rendered them dangerous." This occurred
infrequentiy.*' His question reveals the mefficiency and cross
purposes involved m the delegation of powers ui security matters.
The local police mitiaUy made all security assessments. A list
prepared by die TownsviUe poUce district m April 1940 of those
"considered should be interned in the event of hostilities with Italy"
described Alfio C , a labourer residmg m Home HiU as a "strong
Communist" with "fascist tendencies" as already discussed m chapter
2. Military inteUigence at Victoria Barracks m Brisbane decided

agamst his initial uitemment m view of the ideologicaUy confused and
naive police report.*^ Carmelo P. of Ayr described ui a police report
of 6 June 1940 as a "very treacherous" conununist. He was not
intemed untU March 1942. His miUtary inteUigence dossier 'noted'
die civil police assessment but decided he was not a communist nor
"disloyal to die British Empire."*' Generally, Queensland Italians even
when socialists, anarchists or communists were mtemed as enemy
aliens only in the crisis of tiie early months of 1942.
In northem Queensland, particularly m tiiose areas where
communists had been active, local police whose political sophistication
was mdunentary and relied far more upon bigotry than mformed
opinion, after June 1940 continued vigilance agamst what tiiey viewed
as subversion and disloyalty. At Tully, Sergeant Qumn warned
unionists tiiat m his estunation "anythmg Left came under die
National Security Regulations"; whilst ui TownsviUe the pohce
requested tiiat the TownsviUe Bulletin refram from pubUshing
advertisements for the Left Book Club. Members of the ARU
repeatedly complained to W.M. Hughes, that the TownsviUe pohce
were "interfering with the Left Book Club." Pointing out that it was
primarily an "anti-fascist education club", the ARU demanded tiiat
"..until declared a subversive organisation it should be left alone by
Premier Smith's Gestapo Squad."*"
It is ironical to contemplate a radical union appealmg to Hughes
to aid their members m an ideological and tactical stmggle witii a
Labor govemment. Though m Britam, tiie Left Book Club operated
primarily as an anti-fascist educational body, m AustraUa its main
purpose was to distribute and popularise communist beliefs "suitably
diluted to win popular support in a generaUy unpropitious climate of
opinion."*' Yet, this should not m any way have given- the police an
excuse to aimoy and monitor the activities of the club, for it was not
proscribed organisation.
The issue of the harassment of Left Book Club members in north
Queensland extended mto the general discourse on civil liberties under
war. The annual general meetmg of the Australian Council for Civil
Liberties held in Melboume on 20 June 1941 debated die incident.
On diis occasion, Hughes had not taken side with ARU members
agamst die State govemment. He contmued to reiterate general poUcy
antagonistic and beUigerent towards the radical left:
The [Federal] govemment does not propose to permit a section of

die Left Book Club supportmg the Communist (stop the war)
Red Baiting 121
viewpomt, as opposed to die GoUanz-Laski (stop Hitier) viewpomt,

to meet togetiier for the purpose of advocating unlawful doctrines,
and the action of die police authorities in prohibiting any meeting
for that purpose meets with my fuU approval.**
Though the Queensland commissioner of police stated tiiat the

police force "is carrymg out their (sic) duties with tact and discretion
in difficuh and trying circumstances", die evidence suggests odierwise.
Even CarroU's report to the chief secretary's office contradicted tiiis
claim. First, he claimed that there was no recognised branch of the
Left Book Club m TuUy, members being all communists and tiierefore
the club was "a subsidiary of the CPA." This pronouncement defies
logical scmtiny. Secondly, "the preponderance of residents m TuUy
are of alien origins." Whether CarroU meant to imply tiiat therefore
ipso facto foreigners would be attracted to radical or subversive
doctiines or whetiier he believed diat tiiey did not read English is
unclear.
On 22 June 1941 German divisions mvaded die USSR. The CPA
immediately changed its policy of total opposition to the war effort to
fervent support. The official ban on the CPA was not lifted until 18
December 1942 to coincide with the appointment of a minister to the
Soviet Republic.*' Guarantees were sought and promises that
communists would attempt, through their trade union leadership, to
promote war production, prevent stoppages and curtail absenteeism.**
The issue of support for the Soviet Union became a divisive issue
witiiin mainstream Labor ranks. In October 1941 tiie ALP expeUed
two parUamentarians, G.H. Marriott (Bulunba) and George Taylor
(Enoggera) for their continued membership in organisations like die
Austi-alian-Soviet Friendship League and the Aid-To-Russia
Committee.*' These organisations, established and maintamed by
communists, were regarded as anathema to solidly patriotic Labor
ideologues. In 1942 divisions between die pro and anti Soviet
elements witiiin the ALP in Queensland became wider and
increasingly irreparable. Controversy over civilian aid to Russia led
to a split in north Queensland with several branches in TownsviUe
seceding from die ALP. They then formed die North Queensland
Labor Party (Hermit Park Branch).™ It was no coincidence that
TownsviUe witnessed die formation of this dissident movement witii
its concentration of communist aldermen on the local govemment
council and the presence of vocal militant trade unionists.
Queensland was not alone m tiiese ideological wars withm the labour
movement. Previously m April 1940 there had been a split m die
NSW branch of die ALP when former Premier, J.T. Lang led a
breakaway faction to form die ALP (Non-Communist). Six federal
representatives belonged to die Lang party." Despite the 1925 ban on
communist aUegiance witiim die ALP, die issue defied srniple
resolution. Confusion was compounded by the ambiguities
engendered by die European war.
This process of fragmentation m nortii Queensland reveals
mamstream Labor's deep-seated antagonism towards communism.
Whetiier tiie split would have occurred if die ban on tiie CPA had
been lifted when die USSR jomed the aUies is problematical.
Certainly, fierce hostility towards communists did not substantiaUy
abate throughout die war and reached a crescendo m postwar
industrial conflicts like die meatworkers strike of 1946, the railway
strike two years later and attempts to ban the party federaUy by
Menzies m 1951. Communists contmued to be under surveiUance
after die ban was revoked in late 1942, diough suspicion no longer
resulted ui raids, confiscation of property and arrests as it had done in
1940.
Attention m 1943 shifted to die trotskyites. This is hardly
surprising; for die trotskyists "maintamed a revolutionary defeatist
position throughout die war."'^ W.B. Sunpson, die director general of
Security ui Canberra, wrote to the local deputy director in Brisbane in
May requestmg mformation of tiiis group who were regarded as "die
successors to tiie IWW from the last war." Admitting tiiat "tiieir
ideologies...differ", Simpson furtiier contended that "their revolutionary
activities have very much m common." SpecificaUy, he was keen to
lay at the Trotskyites' door recent outbreaks of "sabotage and
mdustrial unrest."" The deputy director m Brisbane, whilst
acknowledgmg tiiat they were "like the extreme IWW m the last war",
nevertheless, stated that there were less than a dozen in Queensland.
He suggested that surveiUance attention be mmed to NSW "where
they have considerable support from their American sources."'" The
Queensland govemment felt m no way threatened by or even
concemed witii the trotskyites. Unlike communists, the trotskyites
held no union positions nor public office in the town councils and
Legislative Assembly.
The surveiUance, harassment and intemment of communists in the
years from 1939 to 1942 represents a contmuation of major policy
directives tiiat emerged in die First World War. The Labor party
denounced communists, refusing them membership in the mainstream
party after 1925. Throughout the 1920s successive conservative
federal governments extended the powers of the 1926 Crimes Act and
Red Baiting 123
postal regulations to tiiwart and contaui the activities of "subversives".

Attempting to ban die party m 1932, federal politicians, witii tiie
initiatives and encouragement of the various inteUigence agencies,
sought to destroy forever an abhorrent ideology. The war provided
the opportunity to put diis policy into effect witii few criticisms from
civU libertarians and radical members of the ALP. In Queensland, in
particular, the Labor Party, dominated by Catholics and members of
the AWU, strove to outdo the conservatives in their hatred and
opposition to communism. What is most ironical to contemplate is
the admonishment of the Queensland govemment by Attomey General
Hughes over its overzealous, misplaced raids upon supposed
communists after the party was declared unlawful m June 1940. With
the ban lifted in late 1942, direct confrontation abated, only to lie
dormant until the intense anti-communist purges of the late 1940s and
early 1950s.
VI
Who Really Governs This Country?
State Intervention During the 1946
Meat Workers' Strike and the 1948
Railway Strike
Since 1938 when specific provisions for the declaration of a state of
emergency were incorporated into the State Transport Act, seven
proclamations have been issued - during the 1946 meat workers'
strike; die 1948 railway strike; tiie 1956 pastoral strUce; tiie 1965
Mount Isa dispute; die 1973 tour of die Soutii African springbok
mgby union team; the 1974 Brisbane and district floods and lastly the
1985 power industry dispute. Premier Johannes BjeUce-Petersen also
threatened publicly to declare a state of emergency during animated
protest, conducted largely by Aborigines and their supporters, when
the Commonwealth Games were staged in Brisbane in 1982. Clearly,
only one occurrence was in response to a natural disaster,
Queensland is hardly unique in the use of extreme measures to deal
with industrial disputes; for instance the British Emergency Powers
Act of 1920, which extended and enlarged the provisions of die
Defence of the Realm Act, was passed specificaUy "to forestaU a
general strike."' In the major strikes of the immediate post-war era in
Queensland, war-time provisions of the national security regulations
could no longer be employed. Rather, extreme peace-time measures
not applicable in war were used. Ultimately Queensland trade
unionists engaged in strikes were treated far more harshly and
repressively under State legislation by a Labor govemment than would
have been the case under the Commonwealth in war tune.
In Queensland, however. Labor govemments have consistentiy
displayed a penchant for employing a variety of measures, supposedly
to counteract civil and mdustrial unrest. Concurrently witii the
unplementation of highly repressive legislation, they aimed, not so
much to destroy unionism, but to render militancy contamed and
passive within the institutionalised framework of the mdustiial
conciliation and arbitration system. In Australia generally
govemments, regardless of whether tiiey are Labor or non-Labor,
Who Really Governs This Country 125
have, moreover, displayed a willingness to use diverse methods,

incorporatmg variable powers of persuasion, propaganda and overt
coercion, to achieve industrial "peace". These procedures achieved
their apotheosis m Queensland m the years 1946 to 1948.
Indeed die metaphor of "peace" and "war" is not misplaced; m
particular, in the post-war period, the war-time rhetoric of loyalty to a
just cause and uncompromisingly fighting a determined enemy, in this
case communists mstead of nazis and fascists, was reappraised,
extended, and refabricated in order to defeat the agents of an insidious
ideology. Charles RusseU, the Country Party member for Dalby, in a
Legislative Assembly debate which occurred at the height of the
railway workers strike on 9 March 1948, categoricaUy stated that:
By die tune...[this strike] is over there will be no one left inside

to fight, and the country wiU be mined. The country wiU be
riddled witii fiftii coliunnists more effective than Hitler even
tiiought of, and we wiU have a situation which has recently taken
place in Czechoslovakia.^
On tiiis pomt, die AWU journal. The Worker concurred with its
ostensible political opponents. The headline of 1 March 1948 issue
declared "Soviet Jackboot Strikes through Czechoslovakia." The
subsequent text warned:
In addition. Communist agents are operating m every country,

includmg those of the British Empire...msidious propaganda [is]
bemg disseminated by the hoodlums who pretend to be
democratic, but who are supportmg a Dictatorship of greater
menace than those of Hitier or MussoUni.
Tom Sheridan, writing in 1987 on the interrelationship between

ti-ade unions and post-war reconstmction, charts some of the broad
aspect of die territory uivolved m analysmg the perception tiiat
communism, through its supposed control of the national tiade imion
movement, was attemptmg to bring dowm die economy by engaging m
complete industrial sabotage.' For any discussion of particular
industrial disputes, m this case die 1946 meat workers' and 1948
railway strikes, must be situated and imderstood withm die
contemporary preoccupation, uideed obsession (culmmating with
Menzies' attempts to ban the conununist party constitutionally in 1951
and die spUts m the ALP from 1955 to 1957) witii tiie imagmed
immmence of communist victory.
Several uiterlinked factors need exploration. First title disavowal

throughout the Commonwealth by mainstream Labor, in both die
industrial and political wings, of any radical mtentions or policies -
the "new order" was to be constmcted within the battered, if
reformed, sheU of a society that had endured a traumatic depression
and six years of war; secondly, the wiUmgness with which Labor
govemments would use extreme measures, whether Hanlon's in
Queensland using "state of emergency" declarations twice m the space
of two years in circumstances that did not constitute severe "civil
unrest" or Chifley's administration in 1949 deploymg the Army in die
coal strike"; lastly, a full exammation of the range, complexity and
consequences of the measures deployed: die manipulation of die
conciliation and arbitration system; new amendments to the Industrial
Conciliation and Arbitration Acts; the introduction of punitive
legislation like tiie Industrial Law Amendment BiU hi March 1948;
the propaganda campaigns launched hi the press to discredit and vilify
union militancy; die use of police coercion, violence and surveiUance;
arrest and detention of selected promment unionists or their legal
advocates and finally, die declaration of a state of emergency.
Sheridan states that:
It is significant testament to the general turbulence of die second

haU of die 1940s tiiat, altiiough tiiese disputes mcluded some of
die largest, longest, and most bitter stoppages in Australian history,
diey have hardly left any impression on die public consciousness.
The most notable of tiiem for our present purpose were a tiiirteen-
week printmg trade dispute m NSW (1945), a fifteen week NSW
Steel Strike (1945-46), and a 25 week Victorian metal trades
dispute (1946-47) witii which were associated several shorter
transport, power and foundry disputes m the south eastern
mamland states.'
Leavmg aside die nebulous concept of "public consciousness", police

action in die St Patrick Day's March 1948 during die Queensland
railway strike is frequently mvoked to diis day by elderiy fomier
unionists, many of whom were never communists nor vaguely
sympathetic to its doctrines or tactics, as an example of the misuse
and mcreasmg power of poUcmg practices. Frank Nolan, die
moderate secretary of die ARU, recaUed bitteriy in 1974:
ff ever tiiere was a weak coUection of salary-chasmg opportunist

humbugs devoid of even a semblance of workmg class prmciples,
it was die members of die Labor Party led by Hanlon. No Tory

government could have been more vicious.*
BjeUce-Petersen's politicisation of the police, in particular their

deployment in order to suppress legitunate pubUc assembly and
freedom of expression, may be regarded as a direct extension of
Hanlon's processes, methods, and examples. This view does however
obscure the manner m which govemments, whether the Liberal-
conservative coalition in 1891, the Liberal administration of Denman
in the 1912 Brisbane general strike or Ryan's Labor admhiistration in
die 1918 meat workers strike at Ross River, TownsviUe, used overt
force to Umit industrial militancy.' Undoubtedly Bjelke-Petersen used
Hanlon's actions as a precedent in the declaration of states of
emergency, when no real emergency existed. As Otwin Marenin
observes:
PoUce practice during times of crisis...are "core events" which

reveal what is hidden m normal times by consensus and apathy,
namely that order and die state rest ultunately on force and that
normal orders are fundamentally inequitable.*
Lastly, die process of die marginalisation of the Queensland

experience (mdeed aU AustraUan history outside of the southeast
crescent) exempUfied by Sheridan's 1987 analysis, aUows die
oversight of valuable data typifyuig the manner in which die state's
apparatus can be mobiUsed against either dissident or militant
unionists.' Ironically, CM. Croft, the senior Canadian trade
commissioner m Austi-aUa wrote to Hanlon m Febmary 1947,
requesting copies of Queensland's mdustrial legislation as "apparently
Queensland is looked upon as a model in these matters."'" Indeed, in
die unreserved use of coercion and propaganda, Queensland was a
"model m these matters" reflecting par excellence the disharmony of
post-war AustraUa.
Queensland legislation might have been considered exemplary; but,
as die Queensland Industrial Registrar, P.J. Wallace admitted later that
montii that "...[w]itii reference to the extent tiiat arbitration has
prevented mdustrial unrest, I must say tiiat this is very difficult to
determme."" Since 1916, hi his estunation, Queensland had
experienced seven major disputes, tiiough his Ust curiously omitted the
1925 railway strike when Premier WiUiam MacCormack personaUy
intervened, countermanded die mkiister for Railway's authority, and
unilateraUy dismissed strUcmg State employees on die railways.
As Douglas Blackmur contends, the issues of communism in

unions (which die CatiioUc Social Smdies Movement hoped
irrevocably to nuUify) and Labor's declming electoral support m die
immediate post war elections (attributed to heightened mdustrial
unrest) form the background scenario for any understanding of tiie
Hanlon admmistration's actions in 1946 and 1948.'^ Blackmur furtiier
mamtams that tiie fragmentation represented by breakaway Labor
groups m north Queensland (dealt with in chapter 5), the continued
electoral success of former Labor radical pariiamentarians, Taylor and
Marriott and the refusal of key imions to either jom or reaffiliate widi
die ALP brought "anger and disiUusionment" to a "boiling point diat
exploded mitiaUy m 1946.""
Since die 1930s when die Communist Party had been primarily
significant m die Unemployed Workers Movement and various popular
front organisations (see chapter 5), a marked change m tactics,
organisational and numerical strengtii and determination can be
wimessed. Direct action hi key sectors of the economy was
advocated in die post-war era as one of the significant means by
which a revolutionary new order would be ushered into Australia.'"
One of their most entrenched opponents who sought only to make
minor, msignificant adjustments to an inequable and unjust society,
was the right wing of the ALP. In Queensland this meant the AWU
and its influence m die caucus of the parliamentary Labor Party." As
Liberal lummary and later Prime Mmister, Harold Holt stated in a
House of Representatives debate hi July 1947, it was the AWU tiiat
had made "a real fight against Conununist infiltration into trade union
affairs."'* Writing m March 1948, Hanlon categoricaUy stated tiiat:
It is obvious that Trade Unionism must face up to die gravity of

die tiireat that the Communist movement is makmg to tiie Labor
Party in both mdustrial and political branches."
Therefore a concerted campaign to obliterate diis grave direat was

regarded as legitimate and life-depending.
Indeed, as WiUiam Morris Hughes stated in the House of
Representatives on 4 July 1946:
The Premier of Queensland has pointed the way the Prime

Mmister should go...he should insist tiiat, once and for aU, tiiere
must be a showdown and diat we could see who reaUy governs
diis country...Conimunism is at die back of tiiis [meat workers']
strike, as of every otiier strike. The Labor Party has repudiated
die Communist and outiawed them from die Labor

Leagues...[Nevertiieless] Communism controls aU but one of the
great mdustiial organisations of tiiis country.'*
Hughes' involved analysis of contemporary events isolates several

important issues: first, as the subsequent argument wUl demonstrate,
Haidon's conservative Labor admmistration did not hesitate to use
extreme measures to suppress mdustrial militancy, tactically but
inaccurately equated with subversive communist agitation; secondly,
fliat his unflmchmg action proved the benchmark of legitunate tactics
which die rest of die Commonwealth could follow and lastly that
Labor and communism, often conflated in the conservative mind, were
distinct and antagonist entities.
Generally, however, conservatives did not acknowledge that
Hanlon's govemment m botiii 1946 and 1948 had used aU the weight
of tiie state's apparatus to destroy imion militancy. In a debate on
die introduction of the repressive Industrial Law Amendment Bill in
March 1948, ostensibly to prevent picketmg and intimidation but
which greatly extended police powers over private citizens, the
Country Party member for Fassifem, Adolf MuUer proclaimed that:
[The government's!... attitude during the meat strUce and during

die last few weeks certahdy does not reflect credit on them... It
[the strike] might end in revolution. Unless you control law-
breakers,you will eventuaUy reach the stage where you are unable
to control them."
RusseU went so far as to assert that: "PersonaUy, I thudc the

Communists have been a God-send to the government. They were
made die scapegoats. The govemment was behmd them and they did
not get any of the blame tiiey should ready have mcurred."^"
This line of argument totaUy obscured die deep antagonism
mamtained by mamstream Labor for the communists and overlooks
die extent and effects of state control during both die 1946 and 1948
stiikes.
Blackmur, m the most detailed analysis of these events to date,
contends that the Amalgamated Meat Industry Employees' Union
(AMIEU) "had a radical tradition. Its mdustrial objectives and
strategies found mspiration in anarcho-syndicaUsm."^' By the war
years, as Terence Cutler argues, there was "growmg enthusiasm for,
or at least tolerance of, Communism witii[m] tiie AMIEU."^ This
process contmued throughout and after the war. The tactics of direct
action and confrontation were remforced in this period. The AMIEU

regarded die 'new order' as a contest for supremacy between
socialism and capitalism m botii Australia and on die mtemational
level.^ Blackmur states tiiat tiie 1945 steel strUce was regarded as die
first round m tiiis bitter and mevitable conflict.^"
On 4 March 1946 die management of die Queensland Co-operative
Bacon Association at Murarrie on die outskirts of Brisbane dismissed
four workers. A dispute ensued after a secret ballot of AMIEU voted
overwhehningly for strUce action after Thomas Bodiwick dismissed
workers widi long seniority at die Oxley meat preservmg works. By
26 March die meat export companies instituted a lock-out. The
dispute lasted until 10 July." Sheridan argues tiiat tiie smaUer scale
bacon and meat preserving companies "moved closer togedier during
die war years" and looked fearfully towards the assumption of peace
when die government's automatic purchase of tiieir products would
cease. Hence they began the season in a beUigerent and anxious
mood.^
Claims tiiat the strike was communist led and mspired would not
appear altogetiier correct; for the CPA was distinctiy uneasy about die
conciliatory attimdes it perceived m die AMIEU executive. As The
Guardian of 26 April 1946 clahned:
The leaders and members alUce must overcome die present

passivity and re-leam how to wage a ready weU-organised and
determined stmggle.
Underlying this scepticism over die handlmg of the strike lay a

suspicion that anarcho-syndicalist fervour, which the communists
viewed as undisciplined and counter-productive, would triumph among
meat workers. Yet die cabmet persisted m the publicly held claim
that the strike was caused by "the present anarchy of Communism."^'
Blackmur states however that the belief tiiat the 1946 meat mdustry
strike was "communist controUed" was "firmly embedded in
conservative political culture m the years after 1946."^ Sheridan
fiindamentally agrees witii this analysis. He concludes tiiat this
particular dispute witnessed the establishment of the Industrial
Groups.^'
In the railway strike, which lasted from 3 Febmary to 6 April
1948, the charge that it was led and orchestrated by communists was
agaui paramount. Comparmg the situation m Queensland with die
revolution occurring simultaneously in Czechoslovakia, a long article
in die Courier Mail of 28 Febmary 1948 stated that:
And here at die seat of die Queensland Govemment communist-led

stiikers were defymg a court of die land...[bringmg] die life of the
State to tiiat chaotic condition m which Red mischief dirives...For
tiie people of Czechoslovakia it has been armed police and violent
suppression. The moral for Australians is: It can happen here. It
has been happening.
The Worker of 9 Febmary 1948, in more general terms commented:
It remains for the rank and file of aU unions to treat the cancer of
communism as it should be treated. They are die industry
physicians and surgeons of their own welfare; they alone can rid
tiiemselves of the "disease" which is just as dangerous to human
society as the malignant tumours which have brought untold
suffering to mankmd.
Certain key players in the scenario lUce Theo Kissick of

Amalgamated Federated Union of Locomotive Engineers (AFULE)
were communists; the ARU had a long history of miUtancy and had
clashed decisively with the McCormack administration in 1925 and
1927 but had been primarily influenced by the One Big Union (OBU)
principle.'" Blackmur concludes, and on tiiis point Margaret Bridson
Cribb would concur, that, whilst the Communist Party "did play a
vital role m the dispute", the bitter confrontation was m no way "a
Communist party plot designed to overthrow constitutional
government"." Moreover, organisers of sympathetic unions like
Claude MerreU of the Amalgamated Enguieering Union (AEU) and
supporters like Harry Harvey of the TLC were moderates within the
ALP.
Writmg on 28 November 1945, die minister for Labour and
Employment, V.C. Gair outiined the proposals of a conference on
"industrial unrest" which was to be held m Canberra on 10 December
1945. In this important document which articulates the Hanlon
government's rhetoric (though hardly the reality as events m 1946 and
1948 revealed subsequentiy), detailed, if udierentiy contradictory,
premises were proffered. On the one hand, at the outset, the
document stated that "mdustrial unrest m the Commonwealtii is more
intense now as compared to the unrest existmg in normal tunes". Yet
in die next paragraph in an overview of the "last 20 or 30 years",
Gair claimed that "if tiiere has been any change it has been in favour
of improvmg mdustrial relations". This relative harmony m
Queensland he attributed ahnost exclusively to:
The Uidustiial Court, hi its early Ufe, having to a large extent

captured the confidence of employees and employers causmg both
to look to it for justice when disputes arise.'^
This document iUummates several cmcial themes in any estunation

of die Hanlon government's approach to mdustrial relations. First, it
sU-essed tiiat it was the Industrial Court tiiat could only successfully
arbitrate upon any areas of mdustrial conflict. The mdustrial registi-ar,
writmg m Febmary 1947, was not so confident about the ability of
the court to control conflict -
1 may say, without fear of contradiction, that aU major disputes

that have taken place since this Court has been established have
eventually been settied by die Court ... I thhik it canreasonablybe
contended that the establishment of an mdustrial tribunal has been
a large factor in shortening the length of these disputes."
Though not explicitly enunciated, the minister and the mdustiial

registrar stressed quite separate pomts. Gair articulated the tenet tiiat
the court was an independent body that arbitrated without govemment
mterference. Further it was mamtained as govemment poUcy that:
It is considered that legislative action is unnecessary to regulate

industrial matters excepting where anomalies or evils beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court exist.'"
Hanlon, replying to die senior Canadian trade conunissioner in

April 1947, stated categoricaUy:
The Industrial Court is set up under the (ConciUation and

Arbitration Acts) as an independent body which may speedily
solve industrial disputes."
The farcical notion that die courts operated mdependendy of

govemment pressure and mtervention was mamtained, despite
overwhehning evidence from 1946 to die contrary.
WaUace, the mdustrial registrar, took die more accurate, if subtiy
acrimonious view that the court only settled disputes "eventuaUy". hi
his summation of die 1946 meat industry confrontation which he
termed "a more or less general strike", die industrial registrar
concluded that:
The dispute eventuaUy spread to the waterside workers and

coahnmers, and was settied by an Order-in-CouncU issued by die
Govemment, directing the men to return to work and submit their
dispute either to the Industrial Magistrate or to the Court.'*
Clearly, as events unfolded, the government did not preserve the

autonomy of the industrial courts but rather over-rode their authority
by issuing the extreme measure of an Order-in-Council.
A second point that the November 1945 document stressed was
the difficult reconcUiation of Commonwealth and State jurisdiction m
industrial affairs. Gair beUeved relations were most poor in those
industries, like coalmining, shipping and the waterfront which were
govemed by awards determined by the Commonwealth Industrial
Court. Queensland industrial relations "could be improved.,.if the
Commonwealth Industrial Court canceUed the awards applying to them
and permitted the Industrial Court of Queensland to prescribe wages
and woikmg conditions..."." As chapter I demonstrated, successive
Queensland govemments were both parochial and eager to maintam
or, if circumstances presented themselves, extend State powers. In the
meat woikers strike the federal government had made overtures to
Hanlon enquhing whether he needed "Commonwealtii assistance".
None was needed, Hanlon assured Chifley, as the issue was "covered
by a State award of the State Industrial Council".'*
The whole issue of jurisdiction was fraught with contradictory
often antagonistic demands. Arthur Fadden, die federal leader of the
Country Party, wanted the Commonwealtii to mtervene to protect
graziers' livelihood and restore mdustrial harmony in 1946." Despite
tills plea, the conservatives were invariably staunch advocates of the
inviolabUity of States' rights and integrity. Chifley, somewhat
facetiously mquired whether Fadden:
...wants me to override the State Industrial Court, die State

Govemment by die exercise of a power possessed by the
Commonwealth... If the Commonwealth were to engage hi a fight
not only with the strikers but also...with employers, the
Queensland Govemment, die State Industrial and Arbitration Court,
a state of affairs akin to hidustrial anarchy would be created.""
Yet m some respects, the federal govemment may have doubted the
abUity of the Queensland govemment to settie its industrial affairs
judiciously. E.J. HoUoway, die federal minister for Labour and
National Service, registered alarm m July 1946 tiiat:
The Queensland Govemment has taken action to deal drasticaUy

with die men on strike. The union has already been deregistered
which means that its members have been deprived of die
protection of the Court. That is a most serious matter ...*'
Interference and intervention in the operation of the Industiial

Registry, and die Industrial ConcUiation and Arbitration Courts was
inevitable, not just hi the extreme example of a general strike but in
the comer-stone policy of wage determination. The basic wage was
not determined by parliament but by the industrial court. This
aUowed the basic wage ostensibly to be mdependentiy determined
without the demands that election promises might make."^ When die
issues of stagnant wage levels and increased cost of livmg moved
outside the mstitutionalised framework and slow deliberations of die
overworked courts"' mto die political arena, explosive conflict, which
the government would seek to contain by various degrees of coercion
and restramt, was inevitable. Blackmur asserts that:
To a significant degree, die strikes that empted m the raUway

workshops and runnmg sheds on 3 Febmary 1948 were die
expression of years of fmstration with the application of tiiese
principles, and were mtended to force the court to abandon tiiem
altogether.""
The Industrial Court established new rates for metal trade workers on
8 September 1947. Ten days later, AEU and die Blacksmitii's
Society applied to die mdustrial registrar for a flow-on of marginal
rates. This was opposed by the commissioner of railways m early
October. A hearing was delayed because die court had to adjust all
Queensland awards to provide for die newly mtroduced forty hour
week."' Blackmur states tiiat tiie action of the commissioner of
railways, who failed to consuU die unions over die new State
application to the court, "produced a violent reaction from die
unions"."*
^ The president of die Combmed Railway Union (CRU), Mick
O'Brien, questioned die court's mediods and its manipulation by die
Railway department:
How can any union have respect for the hnpartial attimdes of die
court when we find tiiat the Employers' representatives are able to
use backdoor methods to have tiieir request granted by die court?...
If die Commissioner is dissatisfied witii die Court - the Unions are
- he should foUow the same procedure as the unions are

compeUed to foUow by law, and apply for a variation. This latest
mstance does not enhance the prestige of die Court, or the
Government's policy of arbitration."'
Addressmg a large meeting of railway workers at the Brisbane

Stadium on 18 November 1947, O'Brien pubUcly criticised the
interference by the raUway commissioner in the court's activities and
die extent to which its partisan attitudes favoured the employer, in
tills case a Labor State government.*' Further resentment existed as
die State Industrial Court took action agamst union officials who
advocate a twenty-four hour stoppage on 17 November."'
Unionists felt they needed to take direct action for two reasons;
first, because die raUway commissioner had mterfered in the operation
of the Industrial Court to the detriment of then- legitunate clahns.
This was seen as outside of the law, for ostensibly, as Hanlon told
Mick Healy, the president of the Trades and Labour Council, on 11
December 1947:
[Provisions of the Conciliation and Arbitration Aci\ ... apply

equaUy to employers as weU as employees ... The Government
does not intend to mterfere m any way with die Industrial Court
m die exercise of its functions and jurisdiction. ... The Court
generally tries to suit the convenience of aU parties and if
appUcation are made for hearings, I am sure the Court wiU deal
with such application as speedily as possible.'"
Hanlon continued to maintain the rhetoric and not the reaUty of

govemment policy. The Industrial Court, m reviewing a previous
minor raUway dispute on 30 June 1946, stated diat:
... the Coiut is bound to take action when ... unions registered hi
the Court appear likely to become involved in an iUegal strike by
iUegal methods and at die dictation of die Strike Committee
controUed, we beUeve, by Communists, whose policy is opposed
to Arbitration ... This is not any way to fight for better conditions
for the workers."
This pronouncement reflected the realities of Queensland's hidustrial

relations which Labor poUticians myopicaUy, at least pubUcly, ignored.
Secondly, unionists were dismayed about the increashigly ptmitive
provisions contamed m die 1946 amendments to the Industrial
Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The Industrial Court could, for

mstance, deregister unions and control the intemal mechanisms of a
union, like the scmtiny of the secret baUot and impose heavy fines
upon mdividuals for breaches of the regulations. In particular, die
amendment section 21A of the 1946 Act appeared only to require any
industrial "disagreements" (as Gair euphemisticaUy dubbed them) to be
reported to the industrial registrar or an industrial magistrate. As he
stated ingenuously to H.L. Edmonds of the AFULE on 24 May 1948:
This section has operated very successfuUy and has been the cause
of preventing minor disagreements from becoming the causes of
major industrial disputes.'^
The AFULE suggested that a liaison officer between the union and
die railway commissioner "with die object of caUhig the Arbiti-ation
Court togetiier m order to prevent direct action" might prove a more
sensible practice." Conservative poUticians Uke RusseU Ukewise
disputed the claims made by Gair concemmg the effectiveness of
tiiese amendments, regardmg them as an essentiaUy element of
compulsion directed agamst unions.'"
Hanlon defended tiiese amendments, passed m December 1946,
which could control union activities far more effectively, as measures
to mmimise "die possibility of mdustrial stoppages m this State"."
He further commented m April 1947 diat:
... the Arbitration system does not envisage the elhnmation of

strikes, or the abolition of industiial unrest, is borne out by die
provisions of die Industrial Arbitration and Conciliation Act for
legal strikes, die procedure to be foUowed, die takmg of a secret-
baUot.'*
The £100 fine for any person advocatmg an iUegal stoppage or strike
was also deeply resented. As Labor moderate, A. Neumann, secretary
of tihe AMIEU, stated to Hanlon on 1 December 1947:
Action against Union officials carrymg out the wishes of tiieh

members, is damnable in the extreme and repulsive to aU
unionists, and should be to aU Laborites, and, if carried out and
extended ...then such action must surely totaUy destroy die
workers' regard and aUegiance to die ParUamentary Labor Party in
diis State. The whole thmg smacks far too strongly of die
repressive acts seen m die past, of vicious anti-worker

Govemments m this country and overseas."
During die railway strike, Jun Healy of die WWF and Frank Nolan of
die ARU were fmed under tiiese provisions and under the 1938 State
Transport Act.
The most repressive measures however were contamed in the
Industrial Law Amendment Act initiated by Hanlon on 9 March 1948.
He defended the need for such additional legislation on the grounds
diat picketmg during an Ulegal strike needed to be dealt widi firmly.
Provisions aUowed for stiff penalties for any person who compeUed or
counseUed (or attempted to) any person "to disobey an order of die
[industrial] court and take part m an illegal strike". Police were able
to arrest without warrants and to enter private property without a
warrant to remove persons who were suspected of intimidating
workers who wished to continue tiieir employment.'* A fine of £100
and/or six montiis imprisonment was aUowed. The leader of the
Opposition, Frank Nicklm pertmentiy asked why new legislation was
needed when vast emergency powers were available imder the State
Transport Act of 1938. Moreover, even the 1899 Criminal code
provision for a term of three months imprisonment for "intimidation"
and "molestmg" workers for the purpose of compeUing a worker to
leave his employment or preventing hun from acceptmg employment
had been repealed by the Ryan govemment in 1915." Blackmur
believes that:
... tiie need to suppress mass picketing was becommg urgent [m

early March] since it was threatening to dismpt the preparation
and distribution of fuel supplies essential for the operation of die
emergency road transport system.*"
What makes the provisions and tuning of this Act even more
extraordinary are the unmediate circumstances that preceded its
inaiuguration. A state of emergency had already been proclahned on
Friday 27 Febmary. An Order-hi-CouncU, specifically banning mass
picketmg and otibier activities designed to promote and prolong the
railway strike, was gazetted that day.*' As Walter Sparkes, die
Country Party MLA for Aubigny sardonicaUy commented during the
debate on die first readmg of die Industirial Law Amendment BiU:
What is die use of givmg furtiier power to a Govemment who are

not game enough to exercise the powers tiiey have today?*^
Cribb, Blackmur, Knight, Sheridan and Shearman aU suggest reasons.

The strike, radier tiian abating, escalated when die Waterside Workers
Federation, die Seamen's Union and tiie mmers jomed die raUway
workers.*' This move tiu-eatened to dismpt aU forms of transport.
Furthermore, as tiie Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia occuned
almost simultaneously, comparisons were made in die press, die pulpit
and pariiament tiiat Queensland was to suffer die same fate.*" hi an
alarmist broadcast to die State on Sunday evenmg of 29 Febmary,
Hanlon clahned tiiat Queensland was "on die brink of a civU war"
witii a communist-led takeover through control of die dispute's
committee of die railway stiike.*' Blackmur correctiy assesses die
broadcast, die press campaign and die declaration as "a dismal
failure"** for die strike base broadened and its participants' resolve
firmed under such adversity and coercion.
Doubtiessly, tiie Hanlon govemment predicted victory over miUtant
and defiant unionists given die events m 1946. Agahi, a barrage of
hostility from press, pulpit and parliament was conducted m order to
discredit unionists on strike. Archbishop Duhig denounced those who
promoted "rebeUion" agamst lawful autiiority, whether govemment,
court or employer.*' In an attempt to alarm tiie pubUc, tiie Courier
Mail's headUne for Wednesday 26 June 1946 read "Drastic Cuts at
Midnight: 100,000 face loss of jobs". Later provocative titles
claimed diat "Meat Strikers Bash Volunteers. 50 Attack 12 witii boot,
iron and wood".** Agam, reference was clearly made between die
Australian democratic tradition, that was seen m perilous danger, and
totalitarian communism. The Courier Mail of a 9 July 1946 clahned
that die communist mspired and led strUcers were "... out to destioy, if
they can, everythuig that mamtams democracy m this land - its laws,
die right to the baUot, free speech, trade unionism ...".
A state of emergency had been declared on 28 June 1946,
ordering a fuU resumption of meat production by 12 July along widi
"restrictive regulations" that were subsequently repealed on 9 July.
The AMIEU was ordered to take a postal baUot of aU its members.*'
Blackmur pertmentiy comments that Hanlon used a military metaphor,
demandmg diat the meatworkers "... take a sane view of die position
and cease making war on the community".'" The war against
miUtancy and communism needed firm handluig and drastic measures.
The strike did not end hnmediately; for, after a mass meeting
which rejected the government's ulthnatum, a deputation caUed upon
the premier who refused a plea for a resumption on pre-strike
conditions with aU remstatements guaranteed. Haidon did schedule a
conference between employees and unions for late July." This proved
a faUure for unionists refused to relmquish rights won during the

war.'^ The meat strike ended ignommiously in defeat. Blackmur
comments that:
IronicaUy, m die 1946 Queensland meat dispute it had finally been

die government, not the Queensland mdustrial court, despite the
govemments constant assertions tiiat it would have to be settied m
accordance widi die processes of arbitration."
The unplementation of die state of emergency m both cases under

discussion did not produce the desired results. In parliamentary
debate in 1948, on die repeal of the Industrial Law Amendment Act,
Hanlon clahned diat:
... m dealmg with an emergency you must have the widest

possible freedom of action. No one can say how an emergency
situation is likely to develop. You cannot generalise about it. No
one can say exactiy what action should be taken m some future
disturbance. The Govemment are (sic) preserving that right to
deal witii any emergency that might arise and to deal with it m
tiie way tiiat the Government might think proper.'"
This admission tihat the govemment should possess undefined, open-

ended powers under unspecified circumstances demonstrates
conclusively the manner m which the state could intervene and
conti-ol. Unfortunately, die file entitied "state of emergency" held the
in premier's office in the executive building could not be located,
hence vital mformation on die plannmg, rationale and strategy behmd
die declarations in 1946 and 1948 could not be included. PubUc
statements and other more accessible archival material have constituted
die sources on this cmcial issue.
Yet m 1948 circumstances did not sunply mirror those two years
previously. On the one hand die union movement was far more
united and organised, though the Toowoomba branch of the AFULE
refused to join die strike." Sheridan believes that the mamtenance of
a skeleton service from Toowoomba weakened the effectiveness of
concerted action.'* On die other hand, m diis instance the employer
was the State govemment, the very instrument that could effect a
lock-out (which occurred on 7 Febmary), mtroduce punitive legislation
which destroyed the very concept of habeas corpus (by aUowing
arrest without a warrant and poUce powers to enter private property)
and declare a "state of emergency"; and as die Sydney Morning
Herald of 1 March 1948 clahned, total censorship was imposed on

the press and radio by the Premier's department." Despite die
provisions of the Industrial Law Amendment Act, picketmg became far
more organised and extensive. In early March, Mick Healy, E.G.
Englart (WWF) C. Graham, B.B. Bennett and T, Esler were arrested
and sentenced under the new law, '* defended by Max Julius (who
was later to be arrested and gaoled for contempt of court) and
communist MLA, Fred Paterson.
The energy of the strikers, m particular the central disputes
committee, was however diverted mto attackuig the so-caUed "anti-
picket law". Marchers in a peaceful procession conducted on 15
March from Trades HaU in Upper Edward Street were baton-charged
by die police. The [Brisbane] Telegraph of that evening claimed die
"Communist factions" had "provoked the police", who had no
alternative but to defend themselves. The most serious confrontation
occurred on the "St Patrick day's march" of 17 March when around
200 imionists and their supporters, mostly members of the CPA,
proceeded mto central Brisbane. Over one hundred police met them
m Roma street where a serious fracas ensued. Paterson, actmg as a
legal observer, was stmck by a baton-wielding police officer, an event
from which he never fuUy recovered."
The Courier Mail of 18 March 1948 headlined the previous day's
events as "Police Clash with Reds' City March", esthnatmg that die
"clash" lasted for "45 second(s)". The foUowing day die headlme was
even more alarmist: "Reds Try to Force National Unrest but State
gets more Trains". The communists were accused of attemptmg "to
stampede Australia wide mdustrial unrest over the Queensland rail
strike". From the opposing ideological perspective, The Guardian of
19 March 1948 declared tiiat tiie assauU on Paterson was a
premeditated and deliberate murder attempt by "Hanlon's tiiugs" (tiie
police).
The next move, foUowing from this unambiguous use of tiie
state's power of coercion, were protests, cuhnmathig m an iUegal raUy
on 19 March tiirough Brisbane. This tune nearly 2000 marchers
attended die proceedings, led by 1500 members of die WWF. On
this occasion police activity was low-key, though their presence was
visible.*" The otiier mam issue concemed die sheriff's attempts to
retrieve union papers after Federal AEU official, E.J. Rowe was found
guilty of contempt in die mdustrial court hearing.*' The strike fmaUy
ended on 5 April when Hanlon conceded marginal increases to all
workshop employees retrospective to 18 September 1947.*82
Subsequentiy a special bureau was formulated witiim die Crimmal

Investigation Branch of the State pohce to gather systematicaUy
intelUgence on union activity.*' Botii die State and federal
govemments maintained co-ordinated inteUigence monitoring services
which scmtmised the ideology, operation, persoimel and performance
of radicals and dissidents (see chapters 2 and 5). Previously the State
police did not usually keep union activities per se under surveiUance.
The atmosphere of the later 1940s, with hs siege mentaUty, the
pervasive obsession with a communist revolution and socid and
industrial dislocation and conflicts were conclusive to the
estabUshment of ASIO and shnUar local mteUigence services.
In conclusion, the pattems of suspicion, disavowal and antagonism
diat had characterised mamstream Labor's interaction widi radicals
were heightened m the post-war period of social, economic and
industrial dislocation. The Labor govemment m Queensland under the
premiership of Ned Hanlon used a series of ideological tactics to
discredit communists and militant tiade unions who were perceived as
one and the same group of agitators ready to destioy democratic
ti-aditions like the conciliation and arbitration system. While
ostensibly allowmg the industrial courts autonomy and mdependence
from direct govemment interference, events in the 1946 meat strike, in
particular, revealed the hoUowness of the rhetoric. Moreover, punitive
and restrictive amendments were mtroduced m 1946 mto the
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act to aUow direct govemment
involvement m union affairs. Legislation which acted as a weapon to
bludgeon unions mto docUity was intiroduced. These measures vastiy
increased pohce powers. The Hanlon government, in its deployment
of die force m the St. Patrick day's march m 1948, die establishment
of a counter-surveiUance unit m the Criminal Investigation Branch to
monitor tiie activities of radical unions and particular union leaders,
politicised die police. This legacy was bequeathed to the Bjelke-
Petersen govemment two decades later. Lastly, die proclamation of a
state of emergency on two occasions during hidustrial disputes attests
to die degree to which governments intervene, control and attempt to
limit civU liberties.
Conclusion
Writing about the American Civil War, Brace Catton notes tiiat:
A singular fact about modem war is that it takes charge. Once

begun it has to be carried to its conclusion, and carrymg it there
sets in motion events beyond men's control. Doing what has to
be done to win, men perform acts tiiat alter the very soU m which
society's roots are nourished.
Total war m this century has presented the state m Westem poUtical
systems with an unprecedented crisis that paradoxically both
chaUenged its ability to mobUise and defend its own sovereign
territory and, at the same time consolidated its functions, apparatus
and powers. Antiiony Giddens m The Nation State arui Violence
maintams that:
One of the major characters of the modem state... is the vast

expansion of the capabiUty of state admmistrators to influence
even the most ultimate feature of daily activity.
In war-time these processes of intmsion, surveiUance and control are

more pronounced. The survival of die nation allows die State hugh
extensions in the scope, power and thoroughness of hs operations.
In the Second World War this process of consolidation and
centralisation ensured mcreasmg and unscmtinised executive control.
In openly totalitarian regimes lUce Germany and the USSR, tiiis did
not present a poUtical crisis as U did in die liberal democracies like
Great Britam, die USA or Australia which were ostensibly fighting for
'liberty', botii at an individual and national level. Yet, as CUnton L.
Rossiter in his classic smdy. Constitutional Dictatorships. Crisis
Government in the Modern Democracies averred in 1948, the very
Conclusion 143
mediods necessary to fight extemal totalitarian regimes ensured tiieir

emergence m the parliamentary democracies. Rossiter also mamtamed
diat, m order to mobUise for total war, States' rights had to become
secondary to the overriding supremacy of any central federal
govemment.
In Australia this process was by no means uniformly or easily
achieved. The States clung tenaciously to tiieir traditional rights
enshrined m the federal Constitution, reiteratmg that the
Commonwealth's prhnary arena of responsibility and power lay ahnost
solely m defence. Indeed, a Uteral readmg of the Constitution could
render such an mterpretation valid, if unrealistic and uhhnately
dangerous, given the extraorduiary demands and challenges presented
by a total war extendmg over six years. The fundamental
constitiitional and administrative problem lay in the Constitution itself
which gave the Commonwealth defence powers, albeit elastic and
open-ended ones, but allowed aU other emergency powers to remain
with die States.
Total war demands centraUsed co-ordination of aU decision-
making, a factor at variance with the political and constitutional
realities of Australia in 1939. Ultimately, by the provisions of the
National Security Act of 1939-40 and The High Court's upholding of
die Uniform Income Tax Act of 1942, control was vested m the
Commonwealth. The States did not relinquish their basic or residual
powers without protracted negotiation, conflict and resistance to
federal mcursion. An examination of Queensland's practices during
die war however does reveal a complexity and unevermess of both
policy and procedure that is not at first apparent.
TTiis arose out of the basic constitutional stmcture. Emergency
powers to deal with specific crises such as natural disasters or general
stiikes rest fimdy witiiin the jurisdiction of the States. In Queensland,
in particular, governments generally smce 1891 have readily resorted
to tiie use of extraordinary emergency powers to nuUify the activities
of militant trade unionists engaged in a strike. Labor administrations
since 1918 have not hesitated to employ stringent and repressive
measures to deal widi mdustrial miUtancy, despite their supposed
aUegiance to working class soUdarity.
IronicaUy, although die period of Reconstmction after 1943
wimessed numerous hidustrial disputes, stoppages and strikes,
extraordinary emergency powers were not employed despite the
manpower strictures contamed in die national security regulations
pertammg to die conthiuity of the labour force. In tiiis regard.
Commonwealth jurisdiction meant far less aggressive and severe
measures agamst strikers, even diough mdustrial stoppages m wartune

were porti-ayed as acts underminmg die war effort. The most
extensive use of repressive legislation, arrests, curtaihnent of
fundamental civil liberties such as freedom of assembly and speech,
and die declaration of a state of emergency was confined to peace-
tune post-war strikes. Mostiy notably, as chapter six demonsttates,
diese measures were deployed to nuUify die refurbished 'enemy of die
state', die mUitant Communist organiser. During die war Uself, such
measures had not been deemed appropriate. Given the overridmg
autiiority of tiie Commonwealtii to deal witii security matters, die
Menzies' govemment had to reprimand die Forgan Smitii
administration for its arbitrary targeting of supposed Communists m
1940.
In other areas such as intemment, the delegation of spheres of
mfluence was not clear cut. The State pohce acted mitiaUy as
mteUigence gatiierers, tiiiough often tiieir estunation of an enemy
alien's political beliefs reveals an astonishmg degree of ignorance and
political naivety. After a detention order was issued by die Army, the
candidate for intemment was apprehended (though not technicaUy
arrested) and taken mto custody by die police. Intemees could be
lodged m the State prisons whUst awaiting transit to die central
uitemment camps admhiistered by the Army.
The question of die mtroduction of Black American service
personnel into Australia m December 1941 presented yet another
dUenuna. The bipartisan adherence of Labor and conservatives to the
"White Australia" policy ensured tiiis move by the AUies would be
staunchly opposed. Yet here again another series of contradictions
presented themselves. Was fighting for "liberty and democracy"
solely for and by those with white skuis? If tiiis was tiie case, tiien
how could the AUies present a public rhetoric opposing Nazi doctrines
when they simultaneously held similar white supremacist views and
policies? In Australia the implications of this contradiction did not
enter into public discourse. What was deemed cmcial was whetiier
the Commonwealtii should temporarily suspend a fundamental tenet of
policy m order to accommodate the practices of the US Army.
Bowuig inevitably to the might of tiieir AUies, the Australian
govemment aUowed Black GIs to enter Australian soil. Yet, given
die segregative practices existmg in die US armed forces, this meant
tiiat tiie unwanted contmgent would be base troops. As Queensland
was a primary stagmg camp for the entire Pacific campaign hi 1942
and 1943 in particular, these troops would be located m the State
which most rigidly maintamed its own segregation system for many of
Conclusion 145
its Aborigmal hdiabitants. Complex pattems of co-operation between

Commonwealth and State civU and miUtary pohce and between die
Austi-aUan and American Armies were needed m order to mahitam
and ensure a highly inefficient system of zonal segregation.
Agam m the area of sexuality, shnilar contradictions were
manifested. Australian women were expected to be hospitable
towards American service personnel. Yet any woman who contracted
a sexually transmitted disease was seen as a contaminator destroying
die fightmg capacity of the AUies. Queensland already possessed its
own solution in the form of a "lock hospital" which in peace-time
incarcerated prostitutes with syphUis. The national security
regulations, pertaming to venereal diseases and contraceptives, passed
in September 1942, aUowed for detention of persons suffering or
suspected of suffering from a STD. Yet "persons" essentiaUy meant
only women, given the operation of a double standard of sexual
moraUty. Mirroring the pattems of co-operation and designation of
die delegation of powers employed with reference to Black service
persoimel, mfected women would be targeted by the State police on
die advice of a US Uaison committee and, on the basis of their class,
could be incarcerated in either the "lock hospital" or a special
infectious diseases ward of the public General Hospitals.
In aU these procedures which involved the containment of those
who were perceived as threats to the AUied war effort, (defined in the
broadest terms), complex pattems of co-operation and demarcation
needed to be established between the States and the Commonwealth,
and between the AustraUan and American armed forces. The
Queensland govemment, espousing a parochial commitment to the
supremacy of State sovereignty and autonomy, did not easily
relinquish its ovm powers and was often in conflict with both the
Menzies and Curtin federal government.
Ultunately, however, war measures planned and executed centraUy
aUowed some sections of die Queensland state apparatus, for instance,
die police to expand its functions and powers. The police monitored
and took mto custody, when it was deemed appropriate, security risks
like enemy aliens and political dissidents like communists and fascists,
as weU as those who threatened the physical and moral weU-being of
die community, namely unmly Black American GIs and some women
with STDs. By enthusiasticaUy admmistering the various provisions
of the national security regulations, especiaUy those m tiiese cmcial
and sensitive domams, policing practices were enlarged and
consolidated. Ultunately this process strengtiiened the autonomy and
power of the Queensland govemment.
This is not to suggest tiiat tiie process was even and uniform. Up
until December 1941 no serious reaUgnment between die
Commonwealtii and die States is visible. The war, conducted on
distant battie zones m die aid of the British war effort, essentiaUy
aUowed for die continued appearance of a "busmess as usual" policy.
The Commonwealtii assumed most of die powers it needed m die
period from September 1939 to December 1941 under Section 51 of
die Constitution witii little reference to die aU-encompassing
dunensions of die national security regulations. It is in diis period
tiiat Queensland and Victoria passed Public Safety biUs to ensure
State supremacy in the advent of an mvasion.
Yet die eariy mondis of 1942, when mvasion appeared imminent,
wimessed the conclusive supremacy of the Commonwealtii's
jurisdiction, a pattem tiiat extended mto and mcreased m the post-war
era. Contermhiously, diough die High Court ultunately upheld die
Commonwealtii's enlarged spheres of control, die actual enforcement
of federal policy relied upon the mcreasing use and power of die
States' civil police. In no otiier area of tiie Commonwealth can tiiis
complex pattem be more clearly observed tiian m Queensland which
contained die highest proportion of enemy aliens in strategicaUy
vulnerable areas as weU as active and powerful communist ti-ade
unionists. Moreover, witii tiie deployment of die South West Pacific
Area campaign from Queensland, and die obsession with a racial and
sexual purity which manifested itself m attempts to segregate
variously Black GIs and Australian women witii STDs, civil poUce
and officials withm the Health department also enlarged the scope and
extent of dieir activities and powers.
Whether these processes were uniform throughout Australia has
not yet been researched in depth. Given its ethnic and ideological
composition along with its political economy, furtiier research wiU
probably reveal that Queensland, as in the First World War, provides
the most clear-cut and extreme examples of the national situation.
This prolonged "State of Emergency" may however, on the contrary,
reveal both a persistent state of mind and a process whereby any
deviation or dissention has been curtailed and nullified. Certainly die
roots of the Bjelke-Petersen style of govemment, characterised by a
paranoid suspicion and suppression of foreigners, radicals, Blacks and
women who transgress the traditional codes of behaviour, may also be
identified m die Forgan Smith and Hanlon years. The war simply
brought to the surface and helped resolve those contradictions withm
the publicly proclaimed commitment and adherence to democratic
forms and the visible and blatant disregard of fundamental civU
Conclusion 147
liberties and those checks and balances witiim the Westtnuister

system. War emergencies dierefore can reveal diose underlying
processes that lie dormant in peace-time.
Notes
Introduction: War, Society and the State
1. Sydney History Labour Group, What Rough Beast? The State and Social
Order in Australian History (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 9.
2. Kevin Fewster, "The Operation of the State Apparatuses in Times of Crisis:
Censorship and Conscription, 1916", War and Society, 3, No. 1, (1985): 37.
3. Desley Deacon, Managing Gender. The State, The New Middle Class and
Women Workers 1830-1930, (Melboume: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.
vii; William Thorpe, "An Invisible State? A Reply to Alastair Davidson",
unpublished paper, p. 1.
4. Alastair Davidson, "Historical Reconsiderations VI: An Invisible State",
Australian Historical Studies, 23, No. 90, (1988): 85.
5. David Held, "Essential Perspectives on the Modem State" in G. McLennan ei
al (eds), The Idea of The Modern State, (Milton Keyes: Open University,
1984), p. 29.
6. Gordon L. Clark and Michael Dear, State Apparatus. Structures of Language
and Legitimacy (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), p. 14.
7. For a good assessment of the literature see William de Maria, "From
Battlefield to Breadline. The State of Charity, 1938-1945", PhD, University
of Queensland, 1988, pp. 41-135 specifically.
8. Held, "Central Perspectives on the Modem State", p. 57 states that the
bureaucracy is the key arena in which to chart the real operation of the state.
9. de Maria, "From Battlefield to Breadline", pp. 41-135.
10. de Maria, "From Batdefield to Breadline", p. 131.
11. Kathleen Burk (ed.), War and the State. The Transformation of British
Government, 1914-19 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 6.
12. Neil Stammers, Civil Liberties in Britain during the Second World War
(London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 2. (Emphasis added.)
13. John Eaves Jr., Emergency Powers and the Parliamentary Watchdog:
Parliament and the Executive in Great Britain, 1939-51 (London: The
Hansard Society for Parliamentary Govemment, 1957); Hugh Molson,
Delegated Legislation (London, The Hansard Society, 1946); Maurice Hankey,
Government Control in War (Cambridge University Press, 1945); Harold D.
Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1950); Marguerite A. Sieghart, Government by Decree (London, Stevens,
1950); Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship (Princeton University
Press, 1948); Paul B. Rava, "Emergency Powers in Great Britain", Boston
University Law Review, 21, June 1941, pp. 403-51; Sir W. Ivor Jennings,
"The Rule of Law in Total War", Yale Law Journal, 50, 1941, pp. 365-86;
Arthur Keith, The Constitution Under Strain (London: Stevens, 1942).
14. de Maria, "From Battlefield to Breadline", p. 101. He further states (p. 105)
that "the war temporarily neutralised (militarised) pre-existing class divisions".
15. Sydney Labour History Group, What Rough Beast? p. 12.
Notes to pages 9-12 149
Chapter 1. Managing the Emergency
1. Digest of Decisions and Announcements, p. 18 quoted in Paul Hasluck,

Australia in the War of 1939-45, Vol. 2 The Government and the People 1942-
45 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1970), p. 116.
2. L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley. A Political Biography (Sydney: Angus and
Robertson, 1977), p. 157.
3. H.P. Lee, Emergency Powers (Sydney: Australian Law Books, 1984), p. 5,
passim.
4. ibid., p. 4.
5. ibid., p. 5.
6. Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorships. Crisis Government in
Modern Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 173;
John Eaves Jr., Emergency Powers and the Parliamentary Watchdog:
Parliament and the Executive in Great Britain, 1939-1951 (London: The
Hansard Society for Parliamentary Govemment, 1957), pp. 9-10; Marguerite
A. Sieghart, Government by Decree (London: Stevens and Sons, 1950);
Maurice Hankey, Government Control in War (Cambridge at the University
Press, 1945), p. 66, passim: Paul B. Rava, "Emergency Powers in Great
Britain" Boston University Law Review 21 (1941): 403-451.
7. Neil Stammers, CIVJ7 Liberties in Britain During the Second World War
(London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 28-30. Arthur Marwick in his classic text
Britain in the Century of Total War. War, Peace and Social Change 1900-
1967, (Penguin Books, 1968) is not particularly concemed with these
questions - he focuses on the social impact upon the community rather than
upon its regulation. He stresses therefore an interpretation which is concemed
with showing how total war involves all citizens in sacrifice and struggle.
8. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 5.
9. ibid pp. 9-10 (Original emphasis)
10. ibid p. 289.
11. Isaacs J. in Farey vs Bumett (1916) 21, Commonwealth Law Reports 1916, p.
433, R. Menzies, Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth (London:
Cassell, 1967), pp. 64-5.
12. Colin Howard, Australian Federal Constitutional Law, (Sydney: Law Book
Co., 1972 2nd edition) p. 429; Geoffrey Sawer, The Australian Constitution
(Canberra, AGPS, 1975), and his Cases of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Australia, selected and annotated. (Sydney, Law Book Co.,
1964, 3rd edition); G. Greenwood, The Future of Australian Federalism: A
Commentary on the Working of the Constitution (Melboume University Press,
1946).
13. Lee, Emergency Powers p. 9.
14. Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts of 1939 and 1940 Appendix 1. William
Yandell Elliott and H. Duncan Hall (eds). The British Commonwealth at War
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943), pp. 484-491; Eaves Emergency Powers
Chapter 2 for a comprehensive discussion of the ramification of these powers
in Britain; for Canadian data refer to Public Records, Ottawa, Vol. 816 file
652, Report on Emergency Legislation, July 1939; Vol. 821 file 698 for a
150 Notes to pages 12-18
broader discussion of emergency measures emanating from the British

precedent.
15. Stammers, Civi7 Liberties in Britain during the Second World War, pp. 13-14.
16. ibid- pp. 22-27.
17. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 196.
18. ibid., p. 200.
19. Robert H. Keyseriingk "'Agents within the Gates': The Search for Nazi
Subversives in Canada during Worid War 11", Canadian Historical Review,
66, no. 1. (1985): 211; These measures dealt with espionage; public safety
and order, essential supplies and "general and supplementary provisions"
which referred to the power to arrest without warrant. Refer to Public
Records, Ottawa, R625, Extemal Affairs, Vol. 816 file 652.
20. W. Duncan Hall, "The British Commonwealth of Nations in Peace and War"
in Elliott and Hall, The British Commonwealth at War, p. 10.
21. Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-41 (Canberra: AustraUan
War Memorial, 1956), p. 122.
22. ibid., p. 125.
23. Commissioner of police speaking at conference of essential service
representatives, 17 April 1939. Queensland State Archives (QSA) PRE
190/24.
24. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-41, p. 125.
25. Clem Lack, Three Decades of Queensland Political History 1929-60,
(Brisbane: Govemment Printer, 1962 (?)) p. 173.
26. ibid., p. 174.
28. ibid., p. 127.
29. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hereinafter CPD), 157, 1938, pp. 903-
5.
30. Hasluck, The Government and the People I939A1, pp. 128-29.
31. Queensland Parliamentary Debates, (Hereinafter QPD), 153, 1938, p. 1325.
32. Report of the Royal Commission on Transport. Queensland Parliamentary
Papers (Hereinafter QPP), 1937, 1, p. 1353, passim.
33. QPD, 153, 1938, p. 1326.
34. (2PD, 140, 1931, p. 2276.
35. ibid., p. 2280. Premier A.E. Moore speaking.
36. Brian Carroll, "William Forgan Smith. Dictator or Democrat?" in D.J.
Murphy et al (eds) Queensland Political Portraits 1859-1952 (St. Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1978), p. 421.
37. ibid., p. 420.
38. Conference of Commonwealth and State ministers on defence and
development, 31 March 1939. Australian Archives, (hereinafter AA),
Canberra. Attomey General's Department CRS N608 item L29/1/2.
39. Hanlon to premier 12 April 1939 QSA Premier's Department PRE 90/24.
(Original emphasis)
41. QPD, 154, 1939, pp. 267-8.
42. ibid., pp. 268-9.
43. Victorian Parliamentary Debates (Hereinafter VPD), 207, 1939, p. 1173.
44. ibid., p. 1176.
45. CPD, CLXI, 1939, p. 182.

46. Stammer. Civil Liberties in Britain, p. 236.
48. ibid., p. 178.
49. ibid.; The Canadian War Measures Act initially dealt specifically with
communists through a sweeping revision of 9 November 1939 and changes
following a cmcial report on subversive activities four days later, ensured that
organisations were not named. Public Records, Ottawa, RG25 Extemal
Affairs, 816 file 652.
50. Secretary, Australian Railways Union (Queensland branch) to premier, 21
November 1940, QSA PRE 190/22.
51. QPD, 157, 1940, p. 1329.
52. Carroll, "Forgan Smith", p. 421.
53. VPD, 207, 1939, p. 1249.
54. ibid., pp. 1251-2.
55. ibid.
56. VPD, 209, 1940, p. 423.
57. ibid- p. 424-5.
58. ibid., p. 476-7.
59. QPD, 157, 1940, p. 1298.
60. ibid.
61. ibid- p. 1297.
62. ibid.
63. ibid., p. 1300.
64. Lack, Three Decades, p. 194.
65. Memorandum from secretary of Health and Home Affairs to premier, undated,
QSA PRE 90/24.
66. QPD, 157, 1940, p. 1328.
67. Ross Fitzgerald, Queensland from 1915 to the Present (St. Lucia: University
of Queensland Press, 1983), pp. 96-97.
68. Refer to police dossier on protest against Public Safety Act, QSA Police file
1268M.
69. Report upon the Establishment and Operations of the Several Organisations
for the Civil Defence of Queensland, 1941. QSA PRE 190/23.
70. Courier Mail 13 December 1941, p. 4.
71. Prime Minister to premier, 25 November 1942. QSA PRE 190/21.
72. Memorandum from commissioner of police on "Action to be taken when
police make arrests under Section 13 of the National Security Act (1939-40)",
ibid.
73. Civil defence organisation. May 1941. Australian War Memorial Hasluck
Papers, file 3/501; In Victoria, the State Emergency Council for Civil
Defence, established under the broad ranging powers of the Public Safety Act
of 1939, was abolished on 17 Febmary 1942, at the very time when invasion
seemed imminent. PRO, Laverton. Premier's correspondence series 1163 box
640.
74. Report by Detective Const. J.A. Vogelsang, ibid.
75. Secretary of Health and Home Affairs to premier, 11 April 1939. QSA PRE
190/24.
76. Raymond Evans, The Red Flag Riots: A Study of Intolerance (St. Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1988), Introduction; "'Some Furious Outbursts
of Riot': Retumed Soldiers and Queensland's 'Red Flag' Disturbances." War
and Society, 3, (1985): 75-98.
77. Special Branch Report, 16 June 1942. QSA Police File A12003.
78. List of Italians in the TownsviUe police district who it is considered should
be intemed in the event of war with Italy 30 April 1940. QSA Police File
A/12001. (Emphasis in original document.)
79. Col. F.H. Sharpe, Col. i/c administration, Victoria Barracks to director general
of security, Brisbane 12 July 1942. QSA Police File 1286M.
80. Interview with Col. North by Nancy Penman. AWM, Hasluck papers file
3/8051.
81. Report of the Court of Enquiry, AMF 18-23 December 1942. A A,
Melboume MP508 Army Correspondence Files, multiple mumber series, 1939-
1942, file 85/701/383, p. 46.
82. Brigadier General S.J. Chamberlain to Major-General F.W. Barryman, 28
November 1942, ibid.
83. Report on "Disturbances in Brisbane" by Major-General F.W. Barryman, 1
December 1942, ibid.
84. Report on conference held by secret service in Caims, 22 Febmary 1943.
AA, Canberra. CRS 373, Secret Service Central Office, file 6354.
85. Director General of PMG to PMG. 28 July 1943. AA, Melboume. MP
721/1 PMG department records Box 1 item W20.
86. Report by controller of post and telegraphic censorship to PMG. 3 November
1939, ibid.
Chapter 2. The Enemy Within?
1. Robert H. Keyseriingk, "'Agents within the Gates': The Search for Nazi
Subversives in Canada during World War n", Canadian Historical Review,
66, no. 1, (1985): 1166, refer also to Robert H. Keyseriingk, "The Canadian
Governments" Attitude towards Germans and Govemments German Canadians
in World War Two", Canadian Ethnic Studies, 16, no.l, (1984): 16-28.
2. W. Peter Ward, "British Columbia and Japanese Evacuation", Canadian
Historical Review, 57, no. 3, (1976): 305; refer also to Ann Gomer
Sunahara, The Politics of Racism. The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians
during the Second World War (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1981); Ken Adachi,
The Enemy that Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians (Toronto:
McClelland and Stewart, 1976); Barry Broadfoot, Years of Sorrow, Years of
Shame: The Story of Japanese Canadians in World War II (Toronto:
Doubleday, 1977); W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes
and Public Policy towards orientals in British Columbia (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's Press, 1978). The one difference between the Australian and
Canadian experiences was that, in the former, property was not automatically
confiscated.
3. Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-41 (Canberra: Australian
War Memorial, 1956), p. 593; Kay Saunders and Helen Taylor, "The Enemy
WiUiin? The Process of Intemment of Enemy Aliens in Queensland, 1939-

45", AJPH, 34, no. 1, (1988): 16-27.
4. ibid-, p. 122; refer also to Margaret Bevege "Intemment in Australia during
Worid War 11", PhD thesis. La Trobe University, 1986 for an excellent
overview.
5. Secretary of Cabinet to sect. dept. of Extemal Affairs, Extract from annexure
B to supplement no 1 to War Cabinet agendum 109/1941. Australian
Archives (Melboume) dept. of Defence [II] and the Dept. of the Army. MP.
729/6. Secret correspondence files, multiple series (class 401), 1936-1945;
file 65/401/135.
6. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (Hereinafter CPD), CLXI, 1939, pp.
182-83.
7. Report by director general of Security, Canberra, 1941. AA, Brisbane CA
753 Investigation Branch, Queensland BP242/1. Correspondence series 'Q',
1924-54. File 30579, "Intemment Information".
8. Lieutenant Colonel James Chapman, report on Intemment Policy 13 July
1941. ibid (original emphasis)
9. Director General of Security, Canberra to Deputy Director, Brisbane, 11
September 1942. ibid, (emphasis added).
10. Lieutenant Colonel S. Whittington before Aliens Tribunal hearing number 3,
Febmary 1941. AA, Melboume. Department of Defence MP529/3.
11. Pastor J.J. Stoltz, Adelaide to federal Attomey General, May 1942. UELCA
Archives, Adelaide.
12. Commissioner of police, Brisbane, to Inspector R.F.W. Wake. 31 March
1941. QSA, Premier's department. PRE/6481.
13. "Principles to be Observed with Intemment". Military Board policy. 15
September 1939. AA, Melboume department of Defence [II] and dept. of the
Arniy. MP 729/6. Secret correspondence files multiple number series (class
401) file 65/401/7.
14. Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-41, p. 594.
15. Secretary of Defence to minister for Defence. 15 September 1939. AA,
Melboume. Department of Defence [II] and dept. of the Army. MP 729/6.
Secret correspondence files, multiple number seris (class 401) file 65/401/7.
16. Home Secretary to premier, 11 April 1939. QSA, Premier's department.
PRE 190/23.
17. Commissioner of police to district police officers, Queensland. 25 November
1940. QSA, Premier's department. PRE/A6477 item 188/27; refer also to
PRO, Victoria. Chief secretaries office, file W9918 on police confiscation of
wireless sets.
18. Commissioner of police to military intelligence section, Northern Command.
7 August 1940. QSA, Premier's department. PRE/6481; Noel W. Lamidey
Aliens Control in Australia, 1939-1946, typescript 1974, pp. 36-42.
19. "Report on Intemment Policy" by Lieutenant Colonel James Chapman,
Military Board, Melboume. 13 July 1941. AA, Brisbane CA 753
Investigation Branch, Queensland. BP 242/1. Correspondence "Q" 1924-
1954. File 30579 "intemment information".
20. Security reports September-December 1939. AA, Melboume. Army records
MP729/6, file "Pro nazi activity in pre-war Queensland"; Kay Saunders
"Enemies of the Empire? The Intemment of Germans in Queensland during
Worid War 11" in Manfred Jurgensen and Alan Corkhill (eds) The German
Presence in Queensland 1838-1988 (St. Lucia: The Research Unit of
German/Australian Relations, 1988), pp. 53-72.
21. Dossiers on suspected nazis in Queensland. AA, Melboume department of
Defence. MP729/6 Box 136 item 63/101/15.
22. Military intelligence report, September 1938. AA, Brisbane. CA753
Commonwealth Investigation Branch correspondence, series Q 1924-54.
BP242/1 item 3128.
23. Military intelligence report 12 March 1940 ibid-
24. Reports by police at Innisfail, March 1942. QSA Premier's department
records file A6481.
25. Aliens Tribunal no.2 Evidence of Arthur Piepjohn before Dr T.C. Brennan, 28
May 1941. AA, Melboume, Aliens Tribunal MP529/3 box 3.
26. Northem Command to police, Halifax, 8 August 1940. QSA Police
department A11917.
27. B. Patkin, The Dunera Refugees (Sydney: Casell, 1980).
28. Barbara Winter, Stalag Australia: German POWs in Australia (Sydney:
Angus and Robertson, 1986), p. 26.
29. Hasluck, The Government and the People, vol. I, p. 594.
30. Raymond Evans, Loyalty and Disloyalty. Ideological Conflict on the
Queensland Homefront 1914-1918 (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1987).
31. Report on intemment of Japanese. 8-10 December 1941. AA, Brisbane.
CIB series. BP242/1 file Q39362 'Intemment of Japanese'.
32. Cabinet approval on 9 May 1941 of Army's intemment policy ibid; see also
Yuriko Nagata "Japanese Intemees at Loveday", JHSSA, no. 15, (1987): 65-
81.
33. Secretary of Cabinet to secretary, department of Extemal Affairs, 7 July 1941.
AA, Melbourne, department of Defence [II] and department of the Army.
MP729/6 Secret correspondence files, multiple numbers series (class 401),
1936-1945, file 65/401/135.
34. Report by Major General Jackson, November 1940 ibid: Inspector R.F.W.
Wake's report on Japanese activities in Queensland, 20 Febmary 1939. AA,
Brisbane. CIB series BP242/1 file Q30589.
35. Report on Japanese activities in Queensland, 21 November 1945 ibid.
36. Caims police report on internment of Japanese, 15 December 1941. QSA
Police department file A/12001.
37. Police commissioner of under secretary. Chief Secretary's Office, 4 March
1942. QSA Premier's department PRE/A.6481.
38. Diane Menghetti The Red North. The Popular Front in North Queensland
(TownsviUe: James Cook University, 1981), p. 88 passim: G. Cresciani, "The
Italian Resistance to Fascism in Australia 1922-1940", Teaching History 7,
part 2 (1983): 39-40; for a good overview refer to G. Cresciani Fascism, Anti
Fascism and Italian-Australians 1922-1945 (Canberra: Australian National
University Press, 1980).
39. G. Cresciani, "The Proletarian Migrants: Fascism and Italian Anarchists in
Australia", Australian Quarterly, 51, no. 1 (1979): 6.
40. Ross Fitzgerald, Queensland from 1915 to the Present (St. Lucia: University
of Queensland Press, 1984), p. I l l ; Menghetti, The Red North, pp. 79-81.
41. ibid- p. 88.
42. Fitzgerald, Queensland from 1915, p. 112.

43. Registration of aliens in Queensland report, AA, Melboume department of
Defence [II] and dept. of the Army, MP 729/6, Secret correspondence files,
multiple numbers series (class 401), 1936-1945; file 65/401/58.
45. Menghetti, The Red North, pp. 81-82.
47. "Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into and Report on
the Social and Economic Effect of Increase in Number of Aliens in North
Queensland", Queensland Parliamentary Papers, (hereinafter QPP), IE, 1925,
p. 16.
48. ibid- p. 17.
49. ibid., p. 25.
50. Cairns Post 3 August 1936; Herbert River Express 4 August 1936.
51. (Brisbane) Telegraph 26 November 1937.
52. Report on Italians in north Queensland by director of military intelligence,
August 1941, AA, Melboume, dept. of, Defence, [11] and dept. of the Army:
secret correspondence files, 1936-1945. MP729/6 FUe 605/401/133.
53. Report on intemees of Italian origin by Mr Justice Reed, November 1943,
included in Lamidey Aliens Control, p. 73.
54. ibid- p. 74.
55. Commissioner of police to military intelligence section, Northem Command, 7
August 1940. QSA, Premier's dept. PRE.A/6481.
56. Fitzgerald, Queensland Since 1915, p. H I ; see also chapter on Protestant
Labor Party in D.J. Murphy et al (eds). Labor in Power: The Labor Party
and Governments in Queensland 1915-1957 (St Lucia: University of
Queensland Press, 1980). :
57. ibid., p. 112.
58. Hasluck, The Government and the People, Vol. 1, p. 594.
59. Courier Mail 17 June 1940.
60. Police commissioner, Brisbane, to Justice Philp. 18 December 1941. QSA
Premier's department. PRE A/6481.
61. Home secretary to premier, January 1942. "Alien Intemment Policy", ibid.
62. Police commissioner to Inspector Wake, 31 March 1941. ibid.
63. Conference of police commissioners and intelligence sections of the fighting
services. 20 March 1942. AA, Melboume. Dept. of Defence [II] and dept.
of the Army. MP 729/6, file 65/401/157.
64. Police commissioner to Justice Philp. 18 December 1941. QSA. Premier's
dept. PRE. A/6481.
65. Contained in memorandum by under secretary. Premier's department, 27
January 1942. ibid.
66. Police commissioner to Inspector Wake, 31 March 1941. ibid.
67. Under secretary, Premier's department. Memorandum on conversations with
Inspector Wake, 30 January 1942. ibid.
68. Home secretary to premier, "Report on enemy intemment", 30 January 1942.
ibid.
69. (Commonwealth) Hansard, 25 March 1942.
70. Secretary of nortiiem Queensland RSL to prime minister, 2 March 1942, A A,

Brisbane. Attomey General's department, correspondence W series. CRS
A472. file W6190. "Digger's association - Queensland. Protest against ban
on public meetings".
71. Newspaper clippings in AA, Brisbane, CIB BP242/1 file Q30577 "Fascism -
general".
72. Interview with Sub Inspector Hannan conducted by Nancy Penman, 27
November 1949. AWM, Canberra. Hasluck Papers. 3/8051. Written
Records.
73. Reed "Report on intemees of Italian origin", p. 74.
74. Federal minister for Shipping and Supply to Attomey General. 7 Febmary
1944. AA, Canben-a. Attomey General's dept., CRS A472 item 26127.
75. W.B. Simpson, director of Security, Canberra to deputy director, Brisbane, 20
January 1943, ibid.
76. Under secretary Premier's dept. Memorandum on conversation with Inspector
Wake 30 January 1942. QSA PRE A/6481.
77. Security report 11 October 1941, 25 Febmary 1942. AA, Brisbane CIB
records BP242/1. File Q32586 "Fascism and nazism".
78. Intemment figures, Queensland. 31 May 1942. AA, Brisbane. CA 753,
Investigation Branch, Queensland, BP242/1. Correspondence series "Q".
1924-1954. File 30579.
79. General headquarters intelligence summary 172. 10 April 1942. AA,
Brisbane. CIB BP242/1 File Q30579.
80. Director general of Security report, 20 January 1943 op.cit.
81. Security report on pastor E.V.H. Gutenkunst, 26 March 1943. AA, Brisbane
CA753 CIB, (Q) correspondence 1924-54. BP242/1 item 28011.
82. W.J. Mackay report June 1940 op.cit.
83. Security report on Pastor Gutenkunst 26 March 1943 AA Brisbane CA753
CIB (Q) correspondence 1924-54. BP242/1 AWM 28011.
84. Peter Strawhan "The Closure of Radio 5KA, January 1941" Historical Studies,
21, no. 85 (1985): 550-564.
85. Bevege, "Internment in Australia", p. 34.
86. Military intelligence dossier on ELSA 17 September 1941. AA, Brisbane.
CIB correspondence 1924-54. BP242/1. Item 10299.
87. Military intelligence dossier on Pastor A. Hiller. AA., Brisbane, CIB
correspondence 1924-54. BP242/1. Item Q25389.
88. Hasluck, The Government and the People, Vol. 1, p. 545; Marcus E. Ahrends
"The Fourth Service - The Allied Works Council, 1942-45". BA Honours
Thesis, University of Queensland, 1980, p. 24.
89. ibid., p. 23.
90. ibid.. AA, Melboume, Manpower Directorate, general correspondence files
1946-1949. MP24/2 File 43/79/6381.
91. Alan Fitzgerald, The Italian Farming Soldiers: Prisoner of War in Australia
1941-47 (Melboume: Melboume University Press, 1981), p. 29 passim:
Lamidey Aliens Control, pp. 53-54.
92. Interim report of Aliens Classification and Advisory Committee, March 1943,
included in Lamidey Aliens Control appendix; AA, Melboume dept. of Works,
"Allied Works Council, Personnel Directorate, Civil Aliens Corps, History of
the Civil Aliens Corps 1941-August 45". MP960/2, item 3.
93. Clem Lack, Three Decades of Queensland Political History, 1919-1960

(Brisbane: Govemment Printer, n.d. circa 1962), p. 166.
94. Director of security to director general of Manpower, 29 October 1943.
QSA, Police dept. A/11916.
95. Coordinator general of Public Works to chief secretary, Brisbane, 17 March
1943 QSA, Home secretary's office, bundle 190/17 in letter 02304 of 1942.
96. Hasluck, The Government and the People, Vol. 1, pp. 595-96.
97. Du-ector of security to deputy director, Brisbane, 5 Febmary 1943. AA,
Brisbane, CA 753 Investigation branch, Queensland, BP 242/1.
Correspondence series ' Q ' 1924-54. File Q30579. "Intemment information".
98. Director general of security to Attomey General 5 September 1944. A A,
Melboume. Manpower Directorate, general correspondence 1946-49. MP24/2
File 42/2/379.
99. Chief of General Staff, Allied Land Forces, Melboume to headquarters,
Northem Command, Brisbane. 14 October 1942, AA, Brisbane. CA 753
Investigation branch, Queensland BP242/1. Correspondence series "Q" 1924-
1954. File Q30579. "Intemment information".
100. Director of Allied Works Council to minister for the Interior, 20 October
1944. AA, Melboume. Manpower Directorate, general con-espondence files
1946-1949. MP24/2 file 42/2/379.
101. For preliminary estimate of the CCC inefficiency see minister for the Interior
to minister for Labour and National Service. 10 March 1944. AA,
Melboume. Manpower Directorate, general correspondence files, 1946-49.
File 42/2/379; Hasluck, The Government and the People, Vol. 1, pp. 596-597.
Chapter 3. The Management of Segregation
1. Kay Saunders, "Conflict between the American and Australian Govemments

over the Introduction of Black American Servicemen into Australia during
Worid War Two". AJPH, 33, no. 2 (1987): 39-46.
2. Brown to Palmer, 2 January 1942. Australian Archives, (hereinafter AA)
Canberra. Defence Department IE. War Cabinet Secretariat agenda files:
"Australian-American cooperation". CRS 2671 War Cabinet agenda number 5
of 1943; E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts, "The Deployment of Black
American Servicemen Abroad during World War Two" AJPH, 35, no. 1,
(1989): 92-96.
3. Prime Minister to secretary of department of Defence Coordination, 7 January
1942. AA, Canberra. Department of Interior: "suggested use of coloured
labour gangs from the US for waterfront work". CRS A433 item 42/2/258.
4. Memorandum, department of Labour and National Service to department of
the Interior, 13 January 1942 AA, Canberra department of Interior
correspondence ibid.
5. Ulysses Lee, The United States in World War Two: The Employment of Negro
Troops, (Washington, DC: Office of Military History, 1966), p. 429.
6. Casey to Evatt, 9 January 1942, AA, Canberra. Department of Defence, War
Cabinet Secretariat, War Cabinet agenda series, "Australian-American
cooperation in 1942". CRS A2671 War Cabinet agenda no. 6 of 1942;
contained also in department of Defence Advisory War Council minutes' files
"Presence of US Coloured Troops in Australia in 1942", CRS A2684 item
1330. For a detailed analysis of tiiis crisis refer also to Bryan D. Bamett,
"Race Relations in Queensland during the Second World War - Pertaining to
American Negro Regiments". BA Thesis, University of Queensland, 1977,
Chapter 2.
7. Casey to Evatt, 10 January 1942, ibid.
8. Advisory War Council memo 669 of 12 January 1942. AA, Canberta.
Department of Defence: Advisory War Council minutes, 16 December 1941
to 16 March 1942. CRS A2682 Vol. 4.
9. ibid. Memor 673 of 12 January 1942.
10. Evatt to Casey 13 January 1942. AA, Canberra. Prime Minister's
department. "American Coloured Troops 1942-43". CRS A1608 item
B45/1/10; also contained in Defence department III, Advisory War Council
files: "Presence of US Coloured Troops in Australia 1942". CRS A2684
item 1330.
11. Bamett, "Race Relations in Queensland during the Second World War", pp.
14-15; see also J.H. Moore, Oversexed, Overpaid and Over Here. Americans
in Australia 1941-1945 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland, 1981).
12. Major General Thomas Hardy, Assistant Chief of Staff to Col. McBride 9
August 1942. National Archives - Washington DC, War Department -
General Staff: OPD "Coloured Units: Policy", 322/97.
13. Cited in Bamett, "Race Relations in Queensland...", p. 23.
14. Memo from department of Extemal Affairs to secretary of Department of the
Army, 13 January 1942, AA. Department of Defence III, Advisory War
Council minutes "Presence of Coloured Troops in Australia 1942", CRS
A2684 item 1330.
15. H. Aptheker, (ed.), A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United
States 1933-1945 (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1974), pp. 390 and 403.
16. Memo - secretary of department of Extemal Affairs to secretary of
department of the Interior. 19 January 1942. AA, Canberra. Department of
Interior, file "Coloured American Troops calling at an Australian port", CRS
A433.
17. Advisory War Council minutes no. 685 of 20 January 1942, AA, Canberra.
Department of Defence III, Advisory War Council minutes cited in a cable of
18 August 1942 to Commonwealth representative in London, CRS item 2684
item 1330.
18. Bamett, "Race Relations in Queensland...", p. 25.
19. Roger J. Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific
War (Carlton: Melboume University Press, 1977), p. 4.
20. Graham Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull. Black American Soldiers in
World War II (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987), p. 39; Bernard C. Nalty, Strength
for the Fight. A History of Black Americans in the Military (New York: Free
Press, 1986).
21. ibid, p. 42.
22. War Cabinet agenda minutes of 2 Febmary 1942. AA, Canberta.
Department of Defence. War Cabinet Secretariat: War Cabinet agenda files -
"Australian-American Cooperation in 1942". CRS A2671. War Cabinet
minutes 1848 of 1942.
23. Bamett, "Race Relations in Queensland...", pp. 27-28.
24. Cable 116 Bames (Melboume) to Adjutant General (Washington) 25 January

1942 in National Archives, Washington DC: War Department Adjutant
Generals office AG381 (11/27/41) section 1, "Far Eastem Situation" cited in
Bamett, p. 28.
25. L.D. Causey, US Naval Attach^, Melboume. Report on Australian simation
November 1942. National Archives, Washington DC. Naval Intelligence
records file 1503813.
26. Office of Strategic Services. National Archives, Washington DC: file
"Survey of Australia" 15 November 1943.
27. General P.J. Huriey, MS on conditions in Australia 1942. Lyndon Baines
Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. A copy of this manuscript was kindly
supplied by Professor J.H. Moore of Washington DC.
28. MacArthur to Marshall 29 March 1942. National Archives, Washington DC
War department. Operations Divisions, OPD Exec. 10 item lOD.
29. Minister for Foreign Affaris, H.V. Evatt to Australian Representative in
Washington, R.G. Casey, 15 August 1942. AA, Canberra. CRS A1608 item
B45/1/10.
30. Gavin Long diary, August 1942. AWM Diary 4, p.4.
31. Radio Message 42. 8 January 1942 to CO USAFIA. "Use of Coloured
Labour in Australia". National Archives, Washington DC. War Department,
War Plans Division (WPD) 4630; see also Bamett, "Race Relations in
Queensland during the Second World War", p. 23 passim for a general
discussion of this question.
32. Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, p. 595.
33. ibid, p. 433.
34. Daryl Mclntyre "U.S. Negro Servicemen in Australia, 1942-1945" Work in
Progress towards PhD dissertation. University of Queensland, pp. 18-20.
35. MacArthur to Marshall 29 March 1942, National Archives, Washington DC
War department. OPD Exec. 10 item 19D.
36. General Brett June 1942. Report on the organisation activities of the
USAFIA, National Archives, Washington DC, War dept. file 98; see also AA,
Canberra, Prime Minister's department. Prime Minister's secret war series -
"Defence of Queensland 1939-45" CRS A1608 item AJ/27/1/1.
37. Robert Hall, "Aborigines, the Army and World War 11", Aboriginal History,
IV, no. 1-2 (1980): 83.
38. War Cabinet minute 15 May 1942: AA, Canberra. War Cabinet Secretariat,
War Cabinet minutes (Books) Vol.H. CRS A2673, item 2140-41; Bamett,
"Race Relations in Queensland..." p. 32.
39. MacArthur to Curtin, 25 September 1942. AA, Canberra. Department of
Defence Coordination "Stevedoring of US ships - representations from the
Waterside Workers' Federation in 1943" CRS A816 item 40/301/395.
40. War Council Advisory minutes: Report by Chiefs of Staff on operations in
SWPA, April 1944. AA, Canberra. Department of Defence III: Advisory
War Council minutes. "Presence of US Coloured Troops in Australia" CRS
A2684 item 1330.
41. Raymond Evans, "The Duty We Owe...: Aborigines" in D.J. Murphy et al.
(eds.) Labour in Power. The Labor Party and Government in Queensland
1915-57 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981), pp. 330-349.
42. Criminal Investigation Branch, Ipswich report to commissioner of police,

Brisbane, 15 September 1042. QSA Police department. "American Negro
Soldiers, conduct of; also supply of liquor to". A/12035 item 231/18.
43. Case of Lonzie M. charged with being witii an offensive weapon. CIB
report, Brisbane. 20 December 1944. QSA Police department: "Places of
Entertainment, clubs for Americans, black and/or white". A/12039 item
231/33.
44. E. Daniel Potts and Annette Potts. Yanks Down Under 1941-45. The
American Impact on Australia (Melboume: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.
30.
45. Interview with Mrs E. Quinn of TownsviUe, conducted by Dr K.E.B.
Saunders on 12 January 1982; Potts and Potts Yanks Down Under, p. 111.
46. Potts and Potts, Yanks Down Under, p. 187.
47. Report Serg. D. Foster to deputy assistant provost marshall, 16 April 1942
and instraction from assistant Adjutant General, HQ I L of G area to all
brigades in I L of C area 18 May 1942. AWM, Northem Command security,
files, item 59/1/730 quoted in Mclntyre (work in progress), p. 25-26.
48. Minutes of Conference of deputy directors of Security, 26 May 1942, Sydney.
AA, Canberra. CRS A373 item 2034 quoted in iWd, p. 25.
49. Report on the Anzac Day riot, 1942 by Mt Isa police inspector to
commissioner of police, Brisbane, 26 April 1942. QSA Police department:
"American Negro Soldiers, conduct of, also supply of liquor to" A/12035,
item 231/16.
50. Charles Comer "Behind the Blue Line" unpublished MS (in possession of Dr
K.E.B. Saunders), pp. 29-30.
51. M.B. Forrester's security report to assistant deputy Intelligence director,
TownsviUe, 23 November 1942. A A, Canberra. Security Service files -
"Unrest among US Negro soldiers, 1942" CRS A373 item 2837 cited in
Bamett, "Race Relations in Queensland during the Second World War", pp.
100-101.
52. Bamett, "Race Relations in Queensland...", pp. 91-92.
53. Florence Murray (ed.) The Negro Handbook 1946-47 (New York: A.A. Wyn,
1947), pp. 347-356; Thomas Saction, "The Race Riots", New Republic, 5 July
1943, pp. 9-13.
54. Harvard Sitkoff, "Racial Militancy and Interracial Violence in the Second
World War", Journal of American History, 58 (1970-71): 668.
55. ibid., p. 669; Harvard Sitkoff, New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil
Rights as a National Issue, Vol. 1; The Depression Decade (New York, 1979);
for the broader perspective refer to Kenneth O'Reilly, "The Roosevelt
Administration and Black America" Pylos 48, No. 1, (1987): 12-25.
56. Report by commissioner of police, Brisbane to nAiister for Health and Home
Affairs, 18 November 1942. QSA Police department "American Negro
Soldiers; the Conduct of, also supply of liquor to". A.12035 item 231/16;
Courier Mail 11 November 1942.
57. Sitkoff "Racial Militancy", p. 667; W.Y. Bell, Jr. "The Negro Warrior's
Home Front". Phylon, V (1944): 272.
59. Jessie M.G. Street, Truth or Repose (Sydney: Australasian Book Society,
1966), p. 237.
60. National Times, 22-28 April 1983.

61. State Publicity censor's report, 31 August 1943; 9 November 1943; 1
December 1943. QSA Premier's department, A/6465 item 183/4.
62. Interview with (former) inspector Charles Comer conducted by Dr K.E.B.
Saunders and K.H. Taylor, Toowoomba, 25 November 1987; Interviews
conducted (separately) with Mrs E. Clayton and Mrs E. Quinn of TownsviUe
on 14 January 1982 by K.E.B. Saunders.
63. General Patrick J. Hurley's memoirs. Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Texas.
64. Moore, Oversexed, Overpaid and Over Here, p. 214.
65. Name deleted, included in Col. J.S. Leonard, Report on Advisory Committee
on special troop policies to assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, divisions, 29
May 1943. National Archives, Washington DC, War Department: General
Staff - Coloured Units. (Australia) series 322/97.
66. Col. A.E. Ahrends to Edward Angley of Chicago Sun, 22 December 1942;
anonymous MID report on 3 January 1943. National Archives, Washington
DC: War department: General and special Staffs: intelligence series,
Australia box 138; For the British comparison refer to Smith, When Jim
Crow..., pp. 187-216.
67. MiUtary IntelUgence division report on AustraUa 4 June 1942. National
Archives, Washington DC, Office of Strategic Services, File 226 18509.
68. Marjorie Halsey, Colour Blind: A White Woman Looks at the Negro (Sydney:
Peter Hutson, 1947), pp. 88-89.
69. Street, Truth or Repose, p. 226; Potts and Potts, Yanks Down Under, pp. 187-
189.
70. Major R.P. Randall to AustraUan Military liaison, 27 April 1943, AA,
Canberra. Prime Minister's department: secret war series. CRS A/1608 item
B45-1010.
71. Deputation to police commissioner by residents of Darra, Brisbane. 15
August 1944. QSA Police department: "Regarding American Forces" file
A/12029 item 230.
73. Chinchilla Shire Council to sect., American Legation, Brisbane 12 November
1942. QSA Police department: "American Negro Soldiers; conduct of, also
supply of liquor to". A.12035 item 231/16.
74. Police Report, Chincilla. 9 December 1942, ibid-
75. Police Report on brawl at Miles, 5 April 1943, ibid.
76. American club director, Caims to American Club supervisor; FETO
Australia - Clubs. National Archives, Washington DC. File 900 item 1616
quoted in Bamett, "Race Relations in Queensland..." pp. 89-90.
77. American Club supervisors reports, November 1942; May 1943. National
Archives, Washington, DC, FETO - Australia - Clubs. "Ingham leave for
Negro Troops" file 900 item 11/61610, cited in ibid, p. 82.
78. Report from Roma Street police station to commissioner of police, 3 May
1943. QSA Police department, "Places of entertainment, clubs etc. for
Americans 1943-1944; black and/or white", A/12039 item 231/33.
79. Bamett, "Race Relations in Queensland...", p. 89.
80. Segt. C.E. Miers of Mareeba police station to commissioner of poUce, 13
October 1942; Det. Segt. Tomlinson, Caims to commissioner of police, 11
August 1943. QSA Police dept.: "American Forces behaving in an indecent

manner 1942-1945". A/12031 item 231/4.
81. "Report on Civilian Morality in North Queensland." Febmary 1943. AA,
Canberra. Prime Ministers department. CRS A/816 item 37/301/199.
82. Hurley MS, p. 9.
83. Minister for Home Security to prime minister, 14 April 1943. AA,
department of Defence Coordination. CRS A/816.
84. Moore, Oversexed, Overpaid and Over Here, p. 213.
85. Comer, "Behind the Blue Lines", p. 30.
86. Otwin Marenin, "PoUce Performance and State Rule: Control and Autonomy
in the Exercise of Coercion", Comparative Politics (October, 1985): 111.
87. ibid., p. 112, Refer also to Stuart Hall, Charles Cricher, Tony Jefferson, John
Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law
and Order (New York: Homes and Meier, 1978), p. 189. passim.
Chapter 4. The Policing of Morals
1. Conference on "The Public Health Aspects of Venereal Disease in

Queensland" held in Brisbane on 30 July 1942 AWM, Canberra. Written
Records; Refer to Kay Saunders and Helen Taylor "'To Combat the Plague':
The Construction of Moral Alarm and the Role of State Intervention in
Queensland in World War Two", Hecate 14, no. 1, (1988): 5-30; Rosemary
Campbell, Heroes and Lovers. A Question of National Identity (Sydney:
George Allen and Unwin, 1989), pp. 99-105.
2. Queensland Parliamentary Papers (hereinafter QPP) 1947-48, 11, p. 928; see
also Mary Mumane and Kay Daniels, "Prostitutes as 'Purveyors of Disease':
Venereal Disease Legislation in Tasmania, 1868-1945" Hecate, V, no. 1
(1979): 5-19; Raymond Evans, "Soiled Doves: Prostitution and Society in
Colonial Queensland - An Overview", Hecate, 1, No. 2 (1975): 6-23.
3. Annual report of the director general of Health and Medical services for
1942-43, QPP, 1943, p. 673; under the NSW Prisoners Detention Act of 1908
and the Police Offences Act of 1908, any person charged with an indictable
offence found to be suffering from a notifiable sexually transmitted disease
could be detained for nine months. Whereas in Queensland, "common
prostitutes" whether or not they had been indicted or convicted of a criminal
offence, were liable to be detained in the "lock hospital".
4. Gordon L. Clark and Michael Dean, State Apparatus. Structures of Language
and Legitimacy, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 47.
5. Courier Mail, 11 and 14 July 1942; July 1942 Conference on VD, AWM.
6. Courier Mail, 14 July 1942.
7. United Associations of Women to prime minister, 31 July 1942. AA,
Canberra. Prime Minister's dept., correspondence files, 1930-1942. CRS
A.461 item E 347/1/7 part 1: see also Daniel E. Potts and Annette Potts,
Yanks Down Under 1941-1945. The American Impact on Australia
(Melboume: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 325-326.
8. Annual report of the director general of Health and Medical Services 1941-42
in QPP, 1942-43, p. 682.
9. W. Scott-Young "Lecture on Sex Hygiene", in AWM, Canberra file
481/12/99.
10. John Dedman to premier of NSW, 19 August 1942. AA, Canbeira. Prime
minister's dept., correspondence files 1930-1942. CRS A461 item E347/1/7
part I.
11. Hanlon to prime minister 14 August 1942, ibid.
12. Frank Cooper to prime minister 27 August 1942, ibid.
13. Dr J.H.L. Cumpston to prime minister 5 May 1943, ibid.
14. Mumane and Daniels, "Prostitutes as 'Purveyors of Disease'...", p. 16.
15. A Bronham, president of South Australian branch of WCTU to prime
minister, 19 August 1942. AA, Canberra. Prime minister's dept.,
correspondence files, 1930-1942. CRS A461, item E347/1/7 part I; J. Allen
"PoUcing since 1880. Some Questions of Sex" in M. Finnane Policing in
Australia (Kensington: University of New South Wales Press, 1987), p. 213.
16. Ruth Roach Pierson, "The Double Bind of the Double Standard: VD Control
and tiie CWAC in World War 11", Canadian Historical Review, LXII, no. 1
(1981); 31-58; refer to her book 'They're Still Women After AW: The
Second World War and Canadian Womanhood (Toronto: McClelland and
Stewart, 1986), Chapter 3; refer also to Paula A. Treichler, "AIDS,
Homophobia, and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of Significance",
October, no. 43 (1987): 18-30; Simon Watney, Policing Desire:
Pornography, AIDS, and the Media (Minneapolis: Minneapolis University
Press, 1987) for comparative data on the constt-uction of AIDS as a metaphor
of poUution and contamination; Lincoln C. Chen, "The AIDS Pandemic: An
Internationalist Approach to Disease Contt-ol", Daedalus, 116, no. 2 (1987):
185-6; Roy Porter, "History Says No to the PoUceman's Response to AIDS"
British Medical Journal, 293 (1986): 1599.
17. Refer to Ann Summers, Damned Whores and God's Police: The Colonization
of Women in Australia (Ringwood, Penguin Books, 1975).
18. [Commonwealth] Hansard 9 April 1940.
19. Courier Mail, 11 January 1943.
20. Dr J.H.L. Cumpston to prime minister 20 January 1943, AA Canberta, Prime
Minister's department correspondence files 1930-1942. CRS A461 item
E347/1/7 part 1.
21. Secretaries of the Society of the Retumed Medical Officers of Queensland to
General Douglas MacArthur 18 August 1942. MacArthur Memorial Archives,
Norfolk, Virginia.
22. Sub committee of the standing committee of the Services' medical directors,
Melboume: conference on venereal diseases held on 4 September 1942.
AWM, Canberra. File 267/6/17, part 3.
23. CFS Comer, "Behind the Blue Line", pp. 41-42 (MS in possession of Dr
K.E.B. Saunders).
24. Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1943.
25. Report of Chaplain P. Wakely of anti-VD Campaign, Queensland, 1944. AA,
Melboume. Army HQ, general correspondence 1943-1951, accession
MP742/1 file 211/6/236.
26. AWM, Canberta, file 481/7/1 part 1.
27. Sydney Morning Herald, 15 May 1943.
28. Sydney Morning Herald, 24 Febmary 1943.
29. Report of venereal disease control in SWPA for 1943. US Archives,

Suitland, Maryland. Records of tiie Office of the Surgeon General - Army
for Worid War II. Administration records SWPA; Pierson, "The Double Bind
of the Double Standard", pp. 46-47 for Canadian comparisons.
30. Scott-Young "Lecture on Sex Hygiene", AWM.
31. Memoranda on the incidence of venereal disease in the AMF by die director
general Australian Army Medical Services, March 1943, AWM, file 481/7/1
part 1; US Army Intelligence Report: Australian MID report from military
attache to Office of Strategic Services (hereinafter, OSS) 3 April 1944. US
Archives, Washington DC, Modem Military Section, OSS Records: Australia.
32. VD Survey, Queensland - 1943. AA, Melboume. Department of the Army,
Series CA 36. File MP742 item 211/6/236.
33. In March 1942 the Canadian Army discontinued its practice of pursuing
different policies for males and females. The principle of equal access to
medical services was established. See Pierson, "The Double Bind of the
Double Standard", p. 34.
34. N.M. Gibson, "Control of Venereal Diseases in the Army", Australian
Medical Journal, 26 September 1942.
35. Conference held in July 1942, AWM Written Records.
36. Sub Committee of the Standing Committee of the Services' Medical Directors.
Conference on Venereal Diseases July 1942, AWM file 481/7/1 part 1.
37. ibid.
38. VD survey, Queensland - 1943, AA Melboume Department of the Army CA
B6 series MP742 item 211/6/236.
39. Refer to (US) venereal disease control report for SWPA, 1943, US Archives
Suitland, Maryland. Records of office of Surgeon General of the Army -
WWII Administration records for SWPA.
40. Annual report of the Surgeon-General: Army, SWPA 1944: venereal disease
control report. US Archives, Suitland, Maryland. Records of the Office of
the Surgeon General: Army World War II, Administrative Records, 1940-
1949.
41. Report of Major A. Nightingale to Chief Surgeon AFWESPAC 30 July 1945
in US Archives, Suitland, Maryland Office of the Surgeon General - Army.
World War II. Administrative records 1940-1949.
42. Annual report of the director general of Health and Medical Services,
Queensland for 1943-44, QPP 1944-45, p. 914.
43. Minutes of the conference on venereal diseases held in London, March 1944.
AA, Melboume. Department of Defence: correspondence file 1943-1951.
MP742/1 file 211/6/619.
44. Courier Mail, 14 January 1943.
45. Courier Mail, 8 April 1943.
46. Women's Union of Service to prime minister 8 Febmary 1943 in AA
Canberra. Prime minister's department correspondence 1943-1946. Series
CRS A461 file E347/1/7 part II.
47. Australian Natives' Association to prime minister, 3 May 1943, ibid.
48. Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 1943.
49. Sydney Morning Herald, 31 May 1943.
50. Daily Telegraph, 6 May 1943.
51. Sander L. Oilman, "AIDS and SyphiUs: The Iconography of Disease",

October, no. 43 (1987): 88.
52. Michael Sturma "Venereal Disease and Moral Order in AustraUa during
World War U" unpublished paper from AWM History Conference, Canberra,
8-12 Febmary 1983, p. 1; "Public Health and Sexual Morality: Venereal
Diseases in World War U Australia", Signs, 13 no. 4 (1988).
53. Courier Mail, 15 December 1942.
54. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 May 1943, Michael Sturma "Loving The Alien:
The Underside of Relations between American Servicemen and AustraUan
Women in Queensland, 1942-1945", Journal of Australian Studies, no. 24
(1989): 10-11.
55. Acting commissioner of police, Victoria to Gavin Long, 22 October 1948,
Hasluck's papers, AWM, "Unpublished notes and correspondence of chapters
on social conditions for the Official War History".
56. Courier Mail, 15 December 1942.
57. July 1942 Conference, AWM.
58. Age, 13 July 1943; Smith's Weekly, 30 May 1942; QPP, 1942-43, p. 682;
Sturma, "Venereal Disease and Moral Order".
59. July 1942 Conference AWM.
60. QPP 1942-43, p. 682; Enquiry held to enquire into sexual offences 1944,
QPP 1944-45, p. 944; Sub committee of the standing committee of Services'
medical directors, September 1942, AWM, VD Survey, Queensland - 1943,
AWM.
61. Gavin Long diaries 29 October 1942, AWM; interview with Ms B. Campbell
of Brisbane.
62. Interview, with "Joan" by Dr K.E.B. Saunders, Caims January 1982. "Joan"
was north Queensland's most well-known and wealthy madame from 1942 to
the mid 1960s.
63. Acting commissioner of poUce to Gavin Long, 1948, AWM.
64. Courier Mail, 2 March 1943.
65. Annual report of director general of Health and Medical Services, 1941-42,
QPP, 1942-43.
QPP, 1943, p. 673.
QPP, 1944-45, p. 914.
68. Smith's Weekly, 22 January 1944.
69. Report of the National Health and Medical Research Council, May 1944, p. 7.
70. memoranda of Incidence of VD in AMF, March 1943 AWM file 481/7/1 part
1.
71. July 1942 Conference, AWM.
72. Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Medical Aspect of the DecUne in
the Birth Rate, National Health and Medical Research Council, 1948, p. 1.
73. Association for Moral and Social Hygiene to prime minister. May 1947. AA,
Canberra. Prime minister's department correspondence 1943-1946. Series
CRS A461, item E347/1/7 part U.
QPP 1944-45, p. 914.
75. July 1942 Conference, AWM written records.
76. Annual report of the director general of Healtii and Medical Services 1946-47,
QPP 1947-48, n, p. 927.
77. David Bradford, VD in Australia. What You Should Know about Venereal
Diseases (Melboume: Melboume University Press, 1981), pp. 100-101, 108.
We can postulate tiiat had AIDS existed in the 1940s the target of the state
would have transferred from women to particular categories of men; refer Leo
Bersani "Is tiie Rectum a Grave?" October, no. 43 (1987): 197-222.
78. July 1942 Conference, AWM Written Records.
79. Annual report of director general of Health and Medical Services 1946-47,
QPP 1947-48, n, p. 927.
80. Annual report of tiie Surgeon General WWai: Administrative Records. Chief
Surgeon's report SWPA 1942. US Archives, Suitiand, Maryland.
81. Annual report of Surgeon General: Army, SWTA 1944: Venereal disease
control report US Archives, Suitiand, Maryland. Records of the Office of the
Surgeon General: Army World War 11, Administrative Records.
82. Graham Smith, When Jim Crow Met John Bull. Black American Soldiers in
World War II Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987), p. 196. Rosemary
Campbell, Heroes and Lovers, p. 114, 128, 87.
Chapter 5. "Red Baiting is an AWU Habit"
1. Premier Cooper quoted in Courier Mail, 17 January 1946.

2. Miriam Dixson, "Reformists and Revolutionaries: The First Communist
'United Front' in Australia", Labour History, no. 10 (1960): 20-31; Robin
Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists: Communism and the Australian
Labour Movement 1920-1955 (Canberra: ANU Press, 1975), p. 6 passim.
3. K.H. Kennedy "The Anti-Communist Pledge Crisis" in D.J. Murphy et al
(eds.). Labor in Power: The Labor Party and Governments in Queensland
1915-1957 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980), pp. 369-370.
4. Margaret Bridson Cribb, "Ideological conflict in the 1927 and 1948 Strikes",
ibid., p. 396; K.H. Kennedy "The South Johnston Strike, 1927" in D.J.
Murphy (ed.). The Big Strikes: Queensland 1889-1965 (St Lucia: University
of Queensland Press, 1983), pp. 174-185.
5. Raymond Evans, Loyalty arid Disloyalty. Social Conflict on the Queensland
Homefront, 1914-18 (Sydney: George AUen and Unwin, 1987), refer
particularly to Chapters 6-8; Raymond Evans, The Red Flag Riots (St Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1988), Chapter 1.
6. Brian CartoU, "William Forgan Smith. Dictator or Democrat?" in D.J.
Murphy et al (eds.), Queensland Political Portraits 1859-1957 (St Lucia:
University of Queensland Press), pp. 399-407; pp. 423-424.
7. Kenneth W. Knight, "Edward Michael Hanlon: A City Bushman", ibid., p.
448; Douglas Blackmur, "Industrial Relations Under an Australian State Labor
Govemment: The Labor Govemment in Queensland 1946-52", PhD,
University of Queensland, 1986, p. 363.
8. The Worker, 18 Febmary 1941; Refer also to Blackmur, "Industrial Relations
under an Australian State Labor Govemment", pp. 69-72.
9. Report of the Labor-in-Politics convention, Southport, 17 Febmary 1941, p. 8;
for a full account of AWU hostility refer to C.W. (Edgar) Williams, The 'Isa.
Yellow, Green and Red (Brisbane: The Worker Press, 1967).
10. Frank Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia (Sydney:

Angus and Robertson, 1983), p. 245 passim.
11. ibid-, p. 448.
12. Diane Menghetti, The Red North. The Popular Front in North Queensland
(TownsviUe: James Cook University of North Queensland, 1980), pp. 111-
116; Andrew Jones, "Electoral Support for tiie Communist Party in North
Queensland: A Study of Fred Paterson's Victory in Bowen in 1944", BA
Thesis, University of Queensland, 1972, Introduction.
13. Gianfranco Cresciani, Fascism, Anti Fascism and Italians in Australia 1922-
1945 (Canberra: ANU Press, 1980), pp. 121-122; Diane Menghetti, "North
Queensland Anti Fascism and the Spanish Civil War" Labour History, no. 42
(1982): 63-73.
14. Len Fox, "The Movement against War and Fascism: A View from Inside"
Labour History, no. 39 (1980): 78-82; Ralph Gibson, The People Stand Up
(Ascot Vale: Red Rooster Press, 1983); Gollan, Revolutionaries and
Reformists, p. 66.
15. Menghetti, The Red North, p. 65; Lloyd Edmunds, Letters from Spain (ed.)
Amirah Inglis (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1986). Amirah Inglis,
Australians in the Spanish Civil War (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin,
1987).
16. J.D. Blake in Communist Review, December 1939; for British and American
comparisons see also Neil Stammers, Civil Liberties in Britain During the
Second World War (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 87; Maurice Isseman,
Which Side Were You On? The American Communist Party During the Second
World War (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1982).
17. W.J. Brown's, The Communist Movement and Australia. An Historical Outline
1890s to 1980s (Sydney: Australian Labour Movement History Publications,
1986) persists in reiterating this line of argument, by asserting that [wjhile
there were new features. World War II in its basic content was a continuation
of World War I and should therefore have been opposed (pp. 98-99).
18. George Day's intercepted mail, dates deleted. AA Melboume Post Master
General's department. Report by Comptroller of Post and Telegraphic
censorship to PMG, 3 November 1939. MP 721/1; Len Fox, Broad Left,
Narrow Left (Sydney: privately published by author, 1982) p. 63.
19. Ian Moles, A Majority of One: Tom Aikens and Independent Politics in
TownsviUe (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979), p. 58; James
Beatson, "Communism and Public Opinion in Queensland 1939-1951: An
Explanation of the Queensland's Vote in the 1951 Anti-Communist
Referendum." BA Honours thesis, University of Queensland 1974, pp. 1-4,
Ian Moles, "The Expulsion of Tom Aikens", in Murphy, Labor in Power, pp.
454-462.
20. Quoted in David Garment, "Australian Communism and National Security
September 1939-June 1941", JRAHS 65, part 4, (March 1980): 248.
21. AA, Canberra. Attomey General's department, CRS A467, special file 42,
bundle 89, item 43 (quoted in ibid.)-
22. Beatson "Communism and Public Opinion in Queensland 1939-51", pp. 25-26.
23. QPD, CLXXV (1939) pp. 1642-3, 16 November 1939.
25. Lieut. Col. W.J. Clear, US military intelligence, Melboume to Office of

Strategic Services, Washington. National Archives, Washington. Office of
Military History. OSS Records: Australia.
26. Interview witii Col. North (Commander 11th and 7th Brigade, TownsviUe) by
Nancy Penman. AWM, Hasluck papers, Chapter 1, file 3/8051.
27. Moles, A Majority of One, p. 59; Beatson "Communism and Public Opinion",
p. 1.
28. Garment, "Australian Communism", pp. 251-252.
29. Stammers, Civil Liberties in Britain, p. 95; M.J. Heale, "Red Scare Politics:
CaUfomia's Campaign against Un-American Activities, 1940-1970" Journal of
American Studies, 20, no. 1 (1988): 5-22.
30. Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance, p. 265.
31. Hasluck, The Government and the People I939-194I, vol. 1, pp. 588-589.
32. ibid., p. 589.
33. Dr WiUiam Mahoney (Melboume) CPD 163, (1940), pp. 432-435.
34. Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists, p. 93.
35. Sen. H. Collett, CPD, 163, 23 April 1940, p. 349.
37. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, Vol. 1, p. 588.
38. Controller of Post and Telegraphic Censorship to PMG, 3 November 1939.
AA, Melboume Post Master General's department, MP 721/1, Box 1;
Stammer, Civil Liberties in Britain, p. 95.
39. Sir Henry GuUett in Argus, 20 April 1940, quoted in Garment "Australian
Communism", p. 251; Fox, Broad Left, Narrow Left, p. 62 passim.
40. Hasluck, The Government and the People, Vol. 1, pp. 588-589.
41. Cain, The Origins of Political Surveillance, p. 268; Sir Henry Gullett, acting
minister for Information, CPD, 163, 24 May 1940, p. 1273.
42. Craig Johnston "The 'Leading War Party': Communists and World War 11"
Labour History, no. 39 (1980): 67.
43. Garment, "Australian Communism", p. 251.
44. CPD, 163, 17 May 1940, p. 8.
45. ibid., p. 1273.
46. ibid., p. 435.
47. Stammer, Civil Liberties in Britain, pp. 96-97.
48. Prime Minister to premier, Victoria, 6 June 1940. PRO, Victoria. Chief
Secretary's Office (Secret') Correspondence file T5767.
49. Stan Moran, Reminiscences of a Rebel, (Sydney: Altemative PubUshing Co-
op, 1979), p. 20; Fox, Broad Left, Narrow Left, p. 63, passim.
50. Brown, The Communist Movement, p. 107.
52. B. Heckson to Forgan Smith, 20 June 1940; Heckson to W.M. Hughes. QSA
Premier's department correspondence. PRE/A6477 item 188/25. World War
II: Sabotage, subversion and propaganda.
53. Forgan Smith to Hughes. 5 July 1940, ibid-
54. Cribb, "Ideological Conflict", p. 400 passim: see also Blackmur, "Industrial
Relations Under an Australian State Labor Govemment"; Tom Sheridan, "The
Trade Unions and Postwar Reconstmction" in Ann Curthoys and John Merritt
(eds.) Better Dead than Red. Australia's First Cold War' 1945-1959 (Sydney:
Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp. 3-17.
55. PoUce commissioner to secretary for Healtii and Home Affairs. 15 July 1940.
QSA Premier department correspondence. PRE/A6477 item 188/25. World
War H: Sabotage, subversion and propaganda.
56. ibid.
57. Forgan Smith to Menzies. 18 December 1940. ibid.
58. Commissioner of police to under secretary. Chief Secretary's department. 2
May 1941. ibid.
59. Brown, The Communist Movement, pp. 112-113.
60. Kay Saunders and Helen Taylor "The Enemy Within? The Intemment of
Enemy Aliens in Queensland 1939-45". AJPH, 33, no. 3 (1987); Cresciani,
Fascism, Anti Fascism, p. 130 passim.
61. Col. S.F. Whitington, evidence before the Aliens' Tribunal, Melboume, 5
Febmary 1941. AA, Melboume, department of the Army, MP 529/3 box 2.
62. List of Italians in the TownsviUe district who it is considered should be
interned in the event of hostilities with Italy, (Emphasis in the original) 30
April 1940. QSA Police department file A 12001.
63. Det. Serg. J.J.A. Brown's list of Italian "communists", at Ingham 6 June 1940
to commissioner of police ibid; military intelligence dossier on C. Papelardo 2
March 1942. A A, Brisbane. Common weahh Investigation Bureau records
CA753, series BP242/1 file Q21051.
64. ARU (Queensland) branch to Commonwealth attomey general, 3 March 1941,
Premier's department correspondence PRE/A6477 item 188/25 World War II:
Sabotage, subversion and propaganda.
65. Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists, p. 70.
66. [Federal] attomey general to state secretary of ARU, Queensland quoted in
commissioner of police to under secretary. Chief Secretary's department. 15
July 1941. QSA Premier's department correspondence. PRE/A6477 item
188/25. World War II: Sabotage, subversion and propaganda.
67. Minutes of meeting of full [Commonwealtii] Cabinet 26 August 1942 A A,
Canberra. CRSA 2703XR item 324 Cabinet Secretariat (1) Curtin, Forde and
Chifley Ministries, folder of Cabinet minutes (with Indexes) "Curtin Ministry
Cabinet Minutes 8 January to 18 December 1942".
68. Hasluck, The Government and the People, Vol. 1, p. 591.
69. Clem Lack, Three Decades of Queensland Political History 1929-1960
(Brisbane: Govemment Printer, 1962 (?)), pp. 194-195; M.G. Sullivan, "The
Expulsion of George Cuthbert Taylor", in D.J. Murphy, Labor in Power, pp.
445-453.
70. Beatson, "Communism and Public Opinion", pp. 28-29; Moles, A Majority of
One, pp. 83-99.
71. Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists, pp. 92-93; Heather Radi and Peter
Spearritt (ed.). Jack Lang (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger and Labour History,
1977); Craig Johnston, "The Communist Party and Labor Unity, 1939-1945"
Labour History, no. 41 (1981): 77-92.
72. Johnston, "The 'Leading War Party'", p. 70.
73. Director general of Security, Canberra to deputy director of Security,
Brisbane. 13 May 1943. AA, Brisbane. CA 753 Investigation Branch of
Attomey General's department. BP 242/1 file "intemment information".
74. Deputy director of Security, Brisbane to director of Security, Canberra, ibid.
7 70 Notes to pages 124-128
Chapter 6. Who Really Governs This Country?
1. CUnton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorships. Crisis Government in

Modern Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), p. 173.
2. QPD, 192, 1947-48, p. 1908.
3. Tom Sheridan, "The Trade Unions and Post War Reconstmction" in Ann
Curthoys and John Merritt (eds). Better Dead Than Red. Australia's First
Cold War: 1945-1959, Vol. 2, (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1987),
pp. 3-17; Tom Sheridan, Division of Labour. Industrial Relations in the
Chifley Years, 1945-1949 (Melboume: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 2,
12, 17, 89-90, 165-166. Refer also to Sheridan "Servant and Masters?
Chifley and the Unions, 1945-1949" in Eric Fry (ed). Common Cause. The
Labour Movement in Australia and New Zealand (Sydney: George Allen and
Unwin, 1986).
4. Phillip Deery (ed). Labour in Conflict. The 1949 Coal Strike (Society for the
Study of Labour History, 1978); Sheridan, Division of Labour, chapter "'Boots
and AU': Mr Chifley and the Miners", pp. 291-316.
5. Sheridan, "The Trade Unions and the Post War Reconstt-uction", p. 11.
6. Frank Nolan, D.J. Murphy (ed). You Only Pass This Way Once: Reflections
of a Trade Union Leader (Stafford, 1974), p. 78; Viv Daddow of the ARU
stated also that the railway strikes "...showed to the world a government's
tyranny and contempt for the first principles of the labour movement..."
quoted in Knight "Edward Michael Hanlon", p. 452.
7. Otwin Marenin, "Police Performance and State Rule. Control and Autonomy
in the Exercise of Coercion", Comparative Politics (October, 1985): 103.
8. Refer to Ross Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Present (St Lucia: University of
Queensland, 1983).
9. CM. Croft, senior Canadian trade commissioner to premier, 13 Febmary
1947. Premier's department (held in Premier's department) file 536
"Industrial matters".
10. In his magnus opus. Division of Labour, Sheridan does rectify his early
concentration upon New South Wales and Victoria. He deals at length with
the 1946 and 1948 strikes in Queensland and provides a cogent analysis of
the 1946-1949 Pilbara dispute in Westem Australia.
11. Industrial registrar to under secretary Chief Secretary's Office, 25 Febmary
1947, Premier's department records file 536 "Industrial Matters".
12. Douglas Blackmur, "Industtial Relations under an Austt-alian State Labor
Govemment. The Hanlon Govemment in Queensland 1946-1952", PhD,
University of Queensland, 1986, pp. 69-72, I have relied extensively upon
Blackmur's detailed analysis of intemal trade union activities and policies in
this chapter. Full acknowledgement and citation is included in the endnotes.
Blackmur is primarily concemed with the industrial relations aspects of the
strikes whilst my focus is upon the specific deployment of the state's
apparatus. Blackmur and I conducted similar research in the Premier's,
Railway's, and Labour and Industry departments' correspondence and in the
newspapers. I have not pemsed any trade union documents. Our
interpretations and conclusions are hopefully complementary rather than
dealing with questions of industrial management in a singular fashion.
13. Knight, "Edward Michael Hanlon", p. 455; see also Douglas Blackmur, "The
Meat Industty Sttikes, 1946" in D.J. Murphy (ed). The Big Strikes,
Queensland 1889-1965 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), pp.
217-218. Margaret Bridson Cribb, "Ideological Conflict: 1927 and 1948
Strikes" in D.J. Murphy et. al. (eds). Labor in Power The Labor Party and
Governments in Queensland 1915-57 (St Lucia: University of Queensland
Press, 1980), p. 398.
14. AUstair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History
(Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1969), p. 99, passim for post war
strategies of tiie CPA; Cribb "Ideological Conflict", p. 397.
15. Blackmur, "Industrial Relations", p. 77; Sheridan, Division of Labour, pp. 117-
118.
16. CPD, 1947-8, 193, 9 July 1947, p. 515; Sheridan, Division of Labour, pp. 88-
89.
17. Premier to secretary, Vehicle Builders Employees Federation of AustraUa
(Rockhampton sub branch) 15 March 1948. Premier's department Executive
Building, file 536 "Industrial matters".
18. CPD, 1946-7, 187, 4 July 1946, p. 2223.
19. QPD, 192, 1947-8, p. 1909; One headline of The Worker, 1 March 1948 read
"You cannot play with communism and miss the grim penalty".
20. ibid., p. 1917.
21. Blackmur, "Industiial Relations", p. 120; Terence Cutier "Sunday, Bloody
Sunday" in John Iremonger et.al. (eds). Strikes: Studies in Australian Social
History (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973) for more details.
22. Terence Cutler, "The History of the AusQ-alasian Meat Industry Employees
Union", p. 273, quoted in ibid., p. 127.
23. AMIEU Federal Council federal secretary's report 12-15 November 1945
quoted in Blackmur, "Industrial Relations", pp. 132-133.
24. ibid-, p. 134, for details on this confrontation refer to Tom Sheridan, "A Case
Study in Complexity: The Origins of the 1945 Steel Strike in New South
Wales", Labour History, no. 41 (1981); Tom Sheridan, "The 1945 Steel
Strike: Trade Unions, The New Order and Mr Chifley", Labour History, no.
42 (1982); Sheridan, Division of Labour, pp. 90-115.
25. Blackmur, "Industrial Relations", p. 140 passim for details; see also his
chapter "The 1946 Meat Strike", p. 230-2; Kenneth Knight "Edward Michael
Hanlon. A City Bushman" in D.J. Murphy, et.al. (eds) Queensland Political
Portraits (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978), pp. 448-451.
26. Courier Mail, 13 May 1946; 11 May 1946.
27. Sheridan, Division of Labour, p. 117.
28. Blackmur, "Industtial Relations", p. 210. He quotes Victorian, G. Piera who
claimed that during the meat strike "a Communist minority was called to use
the unions in its attempts to overthrow the Govemment". The Herald, 16
July 1947.
30. Cribb, "Ideological Conflict", pp. 382-396; K.H. Kennedy "The South
Johnstone Stiike 1927", in Murphy The Big Strikes, pp. 174-185.
31. Blackmur, Industtial Relations, pp. 249, 252; Cribb, "State in Emergency", pp.
225-248.
32. Minister of Labour and Industiy, 28 November 1945. QSA department of

Labour and Industiy, A9896.
33. Industrial registi-ar to under secretary. Chief Secretary's Office, 28 Febmary
1947. Premier's department file (held in Executive Building) 536 "Industiial
Matters". (Emphasis added.); see also Sheridan's chapter "Federal Arbitration:
Reform, Personnel and Sanctions", Division of Labour, pp. 149-180.
34. T.A. Foley to J.J. Healy, 6 August 1943. PLP correspondence files.
Parliament House quoted in Blackmur "Industrial Relations", p. 86.
35. Premier to senior Canadian trade commissioner, Sydney, 10 April 1947,
Premier's department. Executive Building, file 536 "Industiial matters".
(Emphasis added.)
36. Industrial registi-ar to under secretary. Chief Secretary's Office 25 Febmary
1947, ibid.
37. Minister for Labour and Industiy report, 28 November 1945 ibid.
38. Frank Forde, acting prime minister, 4 July 1946, CPD, 1946, 187, p. 2224.
39. A. Fadden, ibid., p. 2221.
40. CB. Chifley, ibid., p. 2222.
41. E.J. HoUaway, ibid- p. 2231.
42. Notes on Trades and Labour Council deputation to minister for Labour, 17
October 1947, QSA. Department of Labour and Industiy file A/9894; for a
detailed discussion on the basic wage 1946-1952 refer to Blackmur "Industrial
Relations", p. 86 passim.
43. Notes on deputation from annual meeting of ARU: Subject "Improvements in
the Working of the Arbitration Court". 17 March 1948 and secretary AMIEU
to premier 1 December 1947; Premier's department. Executive Building, file
536 "Industrial matters". In 1917 there were 46 awards and by 1923, 261.
In 1945, some 328 applications were placed before the court and only 299
had been finalised. As the record of this interview stressed, there were even
more applications in 1947 and 1948 creating a high workload for tiie court's
officers and an almost insurmountable back-log; see also report in Courier
Mail, 19 November 1947 "Rail Men Say Act 'Disgrace'"; refer also QSA
department of Labour and Industry file A/19145 which deals with procedures
in the courts.
44. Blackmur, "The Railway Stiike, 1948", p. 235.
45. ibid., pp. 238-9.
46. ibid., pp. 242-3.
47. Mick O'Brien, president of CRU to premier, 22 December 1947. QSA
department of Labour and Industiy, file A/9892.
48. Courier Mail, 19 November 1947. The Courier Mail of 4 May 1948 claimed
that the govemment had decided "to speed up hearing of the Arbiti-ation
Court", implying that the court could not schedule its own hearings.
49. Courier Mail, 18 November 1947.
50. Premier to president, TLC, 11 December 1947. Premier's department.
Executive Building, file 536 "Industrial matters".
51. (Emphasis added.) Railway award-State. Judgement Queensland Industiial
Court, 30 June 1946, p. 230, quoted in Blackmur "Industiial Relations", pp.
175-6.
52. Department for Labour and Industry to H. Edmonds, AFULE 24 May 1948,
QSA Department of Labour and Industiy, file A/9892; refer also to QPD,
193, 1948, p. 220, 206-7; Subsequent amendments prohibited iUegal strikes
and lock-outs and institutionaUsed the cumbersome procedure of the secret
ballot. See The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, 193246
(Govemment printer, 1947) for specific details see also QSA, Department of
Labour and Industiy file A/6625 which deals solely with the legislation and
amendments.
53. AFULE to minister for Labour and Industiy. QSA, Department of Labour
and Industiy, file A/9892; refer also to Sheridan, Division of Labour, p. 124.
54. QPD, 193, 1948-49; p. 220; pp 206-7 Russell speaking.
55. QPD, 189, 1946, p. 1933. Premier Edward Hanlon speaking.
56. Hanlon to senior Canadian trade commissioner, 10 April 1947, Premier's
department file 536.
57. A. Neumann, AMIEU to premier, 1 December 1947; J. Bethel, ARU,
Mareeba branch to premier 9 December 1947, ibid.; Courier Mail, 18 and 19
November 1947; 6 December 1947.
58. QPD, 192, 1948, p. 1897. E. Hanlon speaking; press report contained in
Courier Mail, 10 March 1948.
59. ibid., pp. 1897-8, 1932; Knight, "Edward Michael Hanlon", pp. 452-55.
60. Blackmur, "Industrial Relations" p. 273. A major feature in the Courier Mail
3 March 1948, entitied "Break Strikers' Blockade of State" would lead to this
conclusion also.
61. Queensland Government Gazette, Extraordinary, CLXX, 27 Febmary 1948, p.
649, 653.
62. QPD, 192, 1948, p. 1903.
63. Cribb, "Ideological Conflict", p. 400; Blackmur, "Railway Stiike, 1948", p.
247; Dick Shearman, "The Politics of the 1948 Railway Sttike", BA,
University of Queensland, 1974; Knight, "Edward Michael Hanlon", pp. 453-
4. Sheridan, Division of Labour, pp. 213-224.
64. Courier Mail, 28 Febmary 1948; Sunday Mail, 29 Febmary 1948.
65. A full and lurid account of this extraordinary broadcast can be found in
Courier Mail, 1 March 1948; see also Blackmur's account "Industrial
Relations", pp. 261-2. R. Gollan, "Revolutionaries and Reformists", p. 232,
passim.
66. Blackmur, ibid., p. 265.
68. Courier Mail, 15 May 1946.
69. Queensland Government Gazette, 28 June 1946, p. 1660; QPD, 193, 1948-9,
p. 222 for Hanlon's rationale.
70. Blackmur, "Industiial Relations", p. 185.
71. Courier Mail, 29 June 1946.
73. Blackmur, "Meat Stiike, 1946", p. 229.
74. QPD, 193, 1948-9, p. 272. Premier's E.M. Hanlon speaking.
75. Blackmur, "Industtial Relations", p. 279.
77. See also, QPD, 193, 1948-9, p. 220 on this issue of censorship.
78. See Courier Mail, 12 and 13 March 1948 for initial proceedings; QPD, 193,
1948-9, pp. 201-3.
79. Interview widi Dr Raymond Evans whose uncle, Harvey Collins of the
(CoUinsville branch) Miners Union accompanied Paterson and JuUus at the
march.
80. Courier Mail, 20 March 1948, Sheridan, Division of Labour, p. 220.
81. Sheriff to Industrial Registi:ar 10 September 1948. QSA Department of
Labour and Industiy file A/9892.
83. Blackmur, "Industrial Relations", p. 310.
References
Abbreviations
AA Austi-alian Archives
ACTU Austi-alian CouncU of Trade Unions
AEU Amalgamated Engineering Union
AFULE Australian Federation Union of Locomotive Enginemen
ALP Austi-aUan Labor Party
ARU Austt-aUan RaUway Union
AWU Australian Workers' Union
CPA Communist Party of Australia
CPD Commonwealtii Parliamentary Debates
CRU Combined Railway Union
ETU Elecoical Trades Union
OBU One Big Union
QPD Queensland Parliamentary Debates
QPP Queensland ParUamentary Papers
QSA Queensland State Archives
SWPA Soutii West Pacific Area
TLC (Queensland) Trades and Labour CouncU
VPD Victorian ParUamentary Debates
WWF Waterside Workers' Federation
Primary Sources
Australian War Memorial. Canberra.
Conference on "The public health aspects of venereal disease in Queensland." 30

July 1942.
Conference on venereal diseases held 4 September 1942. File 267/6/17
Gavin Long Papers (diaries and notebooks)
Paul Hasluck Papers
Dr W. Scott-Young, "Lecture on sex hygiene." File 481/12/99.
Austi-alian Archives. Brisbane
Attomey General department. CA753 Investigation Branch, Queensland, BP242/1

Cortespondence 'Q', 1924-54.
Attomey General's department. CRS A472. Correspondence 'W' series. "Digger's
Association - Queensland. Protest on ban of public meetings."
Austialian Archives- Canberra
Attomey General's department. CRS N608 Conference of Commonwealth and State

ministers on Defence and Development, 31 March 1939.
Cabinet Secretariat (1) Curtin, Forde and Chifley Ministries, Folder of Cabinet
minutes (with indexes) CRS A2703 XR: Curtin ministiy minutes, 8 January
to 18 December 1942.
7 76 References
Department of Defence: Advisory War CouncU minutes 16 December 1941 to 26

March 1942. CRS 2682 vol. 4.
Department of Defence Coordination. CRS A816: Correspondence 1942-43.
Department of Defence: Security Service Office, CRS A373 "Unrest among Negro
Soldiers".
Defence Department III. War Cabinet secretariat agenda files: Australian-American
Cooperation. CRS 2671: War Cabinet agenda, 1942-43.
Department of Interior. CRS A433: Suggested use of coloured labour gangs from
the US for waterfront work.
Prime Minister's Department: General correspondence, 1943-1946. series CRS 461.
Prime Minister's Department: General correspondence files, 1930-1942. CRS A461.
Prime Minister's department. Prime minister's secret war series. CRS A1608:
Defence of Queensland 1939-45.
War Cabinet Secretariat: War Cabinet minutes (books) vol. II, CRS A2673, 1942.
Austialian Archives. Melboume
Department of the Army. Army HQ: General correspondence, 1943-1951.

MP742/1
Department of the Army: Correspondence files 1939-42; MP508: Report of the
Court of Enquiry, AMF. 18-23 December 1942 into riots in Brisbane.
Department of the Army, series CA36. MP742 venereal disease survey -
Queensland.
Department of Defence [II] and the department of the Army. MP726/6 secret
correspondence files, multiple series (class 401) 1936-45.
Department of Labour and National Service: Manpower Directorate. General
Correspondence, 1942-1949 MP24/2.
Department of Defence. MP529/3. Aliens Tribunal proceedings (3 boxes).
Department of Works. General correspondence series 1942-6. MP906/2.
Post-Master General's department: MP721/1 Box 1 (Report by comptroller of Post
and Telegraphic Censorship. November 1939)
Victorian Public Records Office. Laverton
Chief Secretary's Office. (Secret) correspondence on national security. Files

W9918, T5767
Premier's department: (Secret') correspondence. Box 640 series 4652/Rl Box 1,
series 3841/Rl Box 1.
Imperial War Museum. London
Poster and iUusttations: Second World War
MacArthur Memorial Archives. Norfolk. Virginia
Correspondence and papers relating to SWPA, 1942-45.
Duke University Library. North Carolina
General R. Eichelberger Papers

References 177
Public Records. Ottawa
Department of Extemal Affairs
Vol. 721 file 47. Defence policy: policy

Vol. 770 file 338. Canadian League for Peace and Democracy
Vol. 780 file 391. Defence of Canada, 1940-41
Vol. 817 file 660. Defence preparation
Vol. 818 files 664-667. Defence: State of preparedness
Vol. 820 file 686. War-defence policy in Canada, 1940-42
Vol. 821 file 698. Emergency measures
Queensland State Archives. Brisbane
Premier's department
File 536. Industrial Matters (held in Premier's department Offices,

Executive Building, Brisbane)
File 180. Compulsory unionism
PRE/A6477. "WWII: Sabotage, subversion and propaganda."
PRE/6481. Intemment policy
PRE/190/23.
PRE/190/24. "Communist Party."
PRE/A6465. State Censor's reports
Police Department
A/11917
A/12001. Intemment (General).
A/12035. "American Negro Soldiers, conduct of; also supply of
Liquor to."
A/12039. "Places of entertainment, clubs for Americans, black
and/or white."
A/12029. "Regarding the American Forces."
A/12031. "American Forces behaving in an indecent manner 1942-
1945."
A/44831. Strikes
1268M. Public Safety Act (1941)
RaUway Department
Hard Batch Series 1948 Stiike A/9367 and A/9368
Department of Labour and Industry
Files A/9894-7. General cortespondence, 1927-55

File A/9892. General correspondence, 1945
File A/9893. General correspondence, 1946-54
778 References

File A/6625. Labour (industiial conciliation and arbiti-ation)
US National Archives: Washington DC
Navy Department - Naval InteUigence: Austi-alia (file 1503813)

Office of Strategic Services - General series on Austi-aUa: "Survey of Austi-alia
1942-45
War Department - Adjutant General's Office series AG381 (1/27/41) section 1. "Far
Eastem situation."
War Department - General and Special Staffs: IntelUgence series; AustiÛa Box 138
War Department - General Staff: OPD series 322/97. "'Coloured Units', policy."
War Department - War Plans division A (4630): series, Australia/SWPA
US National Archives: Suitiand. Maryland
Records of the Office of tiie Surgeon General Army for World War Two -
Adminiso-ation Records: SWPA: 1940-1949.
Annual Reports
Annual Report of the director general of Health and Medical Services, Queensland,
1938-39 to 1947-48
Royal Commissions and Select Committees
Enquiry held to enquire into sexual offences, 1944. QPP, 1944-45

Report of the committee of enquiry into the medical aspect of the decline in the
birth rate. National Health and Medical Research Council, 1948.
Report of the royal commission appointed to enquire into and report on the social
and economic effect of increase in number of aUens in north Queensland.
QPP, 1925, Vol. 3.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates
1939-1946
Queensland Parliamentary Debates
1938-1948
Victorian Parliamentary Debates
1939-1941
References 179
Theses and Unpiihlish^,d Manu.script<;
Ahrends, Marcus. The Fourth Service - The AUied Works CouncU, 1942-45. BA,
University of Queensland, 1980.
Bamett, Bryan, D. Race Relations in Queensland during tiie Second Worid War -
Pertaining to American Negro regiments. BA, University of Queensland,
1977.
Beatson, James. Communism and public opinion in Queensland, 1939-1951: An
Explanation of Queensland's vote in the 1951 anti-communist referendum.
BA, University of Queensland, 1974.
Bevege, Margaret. Intemment in Australia during Worid War II. PhD, La Trobe
University, 1986.
Blackmur, Douglas. Industiial Relations under an Australian State Labor
Govemment: The Hanlon Govemment in Queensland 1946-1952. PhD,
University of Queensland, 1986.
Comer, Charles. Behind the blue line, (in possession of author.)
de Maria, William. "From Battiefield to Breadline. The State of Charity, 1939-
1945." PhD, University of Queensland, 1988.
Hurley, Patrick J. Conditions in Austtalia in 1942. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library,
Austin, Texas.
Jones, Andrew. Electoral support for the communist party in north Queensland: A
study in Fred Paterson's victory in Bowen in 1944. BA, University of
Queensland.
Mclntyre, Daryl. US Negro servicemen in Australia, 1942-45: Work in Progress.
PhD, University of Queensland.
Secondary Sources: Books
Aptheker, Herbert (ed.) A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United
States, 1933-45. Secaucus: Citadel, 1974.
Bell, Roger J. Unequal Allies: Australian American Relations in the Pacific War.
Carlton: Melboume University Press, 1977.
Brown, W.J. The Communist Movement in Australia. An Historical Outline - 1890s
to 1980s. Sydney: AustraUan Labour Movement History, 1986.
Burk, Kathleen (ed.) War and the State. The Transformation of British Government,
1914-19. London: George AUen and Unwin, 1982.
Cain, Frank. The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia. Sydney: Angus and
Robertson, 1983.
Campbell, Rosemary. Heroes and Lovers. A Question of National Identity. Sydney:
George AUen and Unwin, 1989.
Campion, Gilbert et.al. Parliament. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952.
Clark, Gordon L. and Michael Dean. State Apparatus. Structures of Language and
Legitimacy. Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1983.
Cresciani, Gianfranco. Fascism, Anti-Fascism and Italians in Australia. Canberra:
ANU Press, 1980.
Crisp, L.F. Ben Chifley. A Political Biography. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin,
' 1977.
Curthoys, Ann and John Merritt (eds.) Better Dead than Red. Australia's First Cold
War, Vol. 2. Sydney: George AUen and Unwin, 1986.
780 References
Davidson, Alistair. The Communist Party of Australia. A Short History. Stanford:

Hoover University Press, 1969.
Eaves, John. Emergency Powers and the Parliamentary Watchdog: Parliament and
the Executive in Great Britain, 1939-51. London: The Hansard Society for
Parliamentary Govemment, 1957.
Edmunds, Lloyd (ed. A. IngUs) Letters from Spain. Sydney: George Allen and
Unwin, 1986.
EUiott, W.Y. and H. Duncan Hall, (eds.) The British Commonwealth at War. New
York: Alfi^d K. Knopf, 1943.
Evans, Raymond. Loyalty and Disloyalty. Social Conflict on the Queensland
Homefront, 1914-18. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1987.
Evans, Raymond. The Red Flag Riots. A Study of Intolerance. St Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1988.
Fitzgerald, A. The Italian Farming Soldiers: POWs in Australia 1941-47. Carlton:
Melboume University Press, 1983.
Fitzgerald, Ross. Queensland from 1915 to the Present. St Lucia: University of
Queensland Press, 1983.
Fox, Len. Broad Left, Narrow Left, privately printed, 1982.
Fry, Eric (ed.) Common Cause: The Labour Movement in Australia and New
Zealand. Sydney: George AUen and Unwin, 1986.
Gibson, Ralph. The People Stand Up. Melbourne: Red Rooster Press, 1983.
Gluck, Sherma B. Rosie The Riveter Reconsidered. Women, War and Social
Change. New York: Meridan, 1988.
GoUan, Robin. Revolutionaries and Reformists. Communism and the Australian
Labour Movement, 1920-1955. Canberra: ANU Press, 1975.
Greenwood, Gordon. The Future of Australian Federalism: A Commentary on the
Working of the Constitution. Melboume: Melboume University Press, 1946.
JHall, Stuart et.al. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order. New
York: Homes and Meier, 1978.
Halsey, Marjorie. Colour blind. A White Woman Looks at the Negro. Sydney:
Peter Hutson, 1947.
Hankey, Maurice. Government Control in War. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1945.
Hasluck, Paul. The Government and the People, 1939-41. Vol. 1. Canberra:
Austi-alian War Memorial, 1956.
Hasluck, Paul. The Government and the People, 1942-45. Vol. 2. Canberra:
Austialian War Memorial, 1970.
Hayes, D. Challenge to Conscience. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1949.
Howard, Colin. Australian Federal Constitutional Law. Sydney: Law Book Co.,
1972.
Isseman, Maurice. Which Side Were You On? The American Communist Party in the
Second World War. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1982.
Johnston, W. Ross. The Call of the Land. A History of Queensland to the Early
1980s. Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1982.
Jurgenson, Manfred and Alan CorkhUl (eds.) The German Presence in Queensland,
1838-1988. St Lucia: The Research Unit of German-AustraUan Relations,
1988.
Lafitte, F. The Internment of Aliens. London: Penguin Books, 1940.
Lamidey, Noel. Aliens Control in Australia, 1939-46. NPD, 1974.
References 181
Lasswell, Harold D. National Security and Individual Freedom. New York:

McGraw HUl, 1950.
Lee, H.P. Emergency Powers. Sydney: Austtalasian Law Books, 1984.
Lee, Ulysses. The United States Army in World War Two. The Err^loyment of
Negro Troops. Washington DC: Office of MiUtary History, 1966.
McKeman, Michael. All In! Australia during the Second World War. Melboume:
Nelson, 1983.
McLaine, I. Ministry of Morale - Homefront Morale and the Ministry of Information
in World War Two. London: George AUen and Unwin, 1979.
Marwick, Arthur. Britain in the Century of Total War. War, Peace and Social
Change. Penguin books, 1967.
Menghetti, Diane. The Red North. The Popular Front in North Queensland.
TownsviUe: James Cook University of Nortii Queensland, 1980.
Menzies, Robert. Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth. London:
Cassell, 1967.
MiUcman, Ruth. Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation in World War
II. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987.
Moles, Ian. A Majority of One: Tom Aikens and Independent Politics of TownsviUe.
St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1979.
Molson, Hugh. Delegated Legislation. London: Hansard Society, 1946.
Moore, J.H. Oversexed, Overpaid and Overhere. Americans in Australia, 1941-45.
St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1981.
Murphy, D.J. (ed.) The Big Strikes: Queensland 1889-1965. St Lucia: University
of Queensland Press, 1983.
Murphy, D.J. et.al. (eds.) Labor in Power: The Labor Party and Governments in
Queensland, 1915-1957. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980.
Murphy, D.J. eLal. (eds.) Queensland Political Portraits, 1859-1952. St Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1978.
Pascoe, Rob. Bongiorno Australia. Our Italian Heritage. Richmond: Greenhouse,
1987.
Patkin, B. The Dunera Refugees. Sydney: CasseU, 1980.
Pierson, Rutii R. 'They're StiU Women After All': The Second World War and
Canadian Womanhood. Toronto: McCleUand and Stewart, 1986.
Potts, E. Daniel and Annette Potts. Yanks Down Under. Melboume: Oxford
University Press, 1985.
Rossiter, Clinton L. Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern
Democracies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948.
Sawer, Geoffrey. The Australian Constitution. Canberra: AGPS, 1975.
Scales, JuUus I. and M. Nixon. Cause at Heart. A Former Communist Remembers.
Atiiens: University of Georgia Press, 1987.
Sheridan, Tom. Division of Labour. Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years, 1945-
1949. Melboume: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Sieghart, Marguerite A. Government by Decree. London: Stevens and Sons, 1950.
Smith, Graham. When Jim Crow met John BuU. Black American Soldiers in World
War II in Britain. London: Tauris, 1987.
Stammers, NeU. CivU Liberties in Britain during the Second World War. London:
Croom Helm, 1983.
Street, Jessie M.G. Truth or Repose. Sydney: Austi-alasian Book Society, 1966.
Sunahara, Ann Gomer. The Politics of Racism. The Uprooting of Japanese
Canadians during the Second World War Toronto: James Lorimer, 1981.
182 References
Sydney Labour History Group. What Rough Beast? The State and Social Order in
Australian History. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1982.
Tittnuss, R. Problems of Social Policy. History of the Second World War. HMSO,
1950.
Wamey, Simon. Policing Desire: Pornography, AIDS and the Media. MinneapoUs:
University of MinneapoUs Press, 1987.
WiUiams, C.W. (Edgar). The 'Isa. Yellow, Green and Red. Brisbane: The Worker
Press, 1967.
Winter, Barbara. Stalag Australia: German POWs in Australia. Sydney: Angus &
Robertson, 1986.
Secondary Sources - Articles
Allen, Judith. "Policing Since 1880: Some Questions of Sex" in Mark Finnane
(ed.) Policing in Australia. Historical Perspectives, (Sydney, UNSW Press,
1987).
Blackmur, Douglas. "The Meat Industiy Stiike, 1946" in D.J. Murphy The Big
Strikes, pp. 217-234.
Blackmur, Douglas. "The Railway Sttike, 1948" in Murphy, The Big Strikes, pp.
235-252.
CarroU, Brian. "WiUiam Forgan Smitii. Dictator or Democrat" in D.J. Murphy eLal
(eds.) Queensland Political Portraits.
Garment, David. "Austtîan Communism and National Security, September 1939 -
June 1941", JRAHS, 65, No. 4, 1980.
Chen, Lincoln C. "The AIDS Pandemic: An Internationalist Approach to Disease
Conti-ol", Daedalus, 116, no. 2, 1987.
Cresciani, Gianfranco. "The Proletarian Migrants: Fascism and Italian Anarchists in
Austi-alia." Australian Quarterly, 51, no. 1, 1979.
Cribb, Margaret B. "State in Emergency: The Queensland Railway Strike of 1948"
in J. Iremonger et. al. (eds.) Strikes: Studies in Twentieth Century Australian
Social History.
Cribb, Margaret B. "Ideological Conflict in die 1927 and 1948 Railway Stiikes" in
D.J. Murphy (ed.) The Big Strikes.
Cutier, Terence. "Sunday, Bloody Sunday" in J. Iremonger et. al. (eds.) Strikes:
Studies in Twentieth Century Australian Social History.
Davidson, AUstair. "Historical Reconsiderations 6: An Invisible State", Historical
Studies, 23, No. 90, (1988).
Dixon, R. "Reformism and the fight for the United Front", Communist Review, No.
58, (1946).
Dixson, Miriam. "Reformists and Revolutionaries. The First Communist United
Front in Australia" Labour History, No. 10, (1960).
Evans, Raymond. "SoUed Doves: Prostitution and Society in Colonial Queensland -
An Overview" Hecate, 1, No. 2, (1975).
Fewster, Kevin. "The Operation of the State Apparatuses in Times of Crisis:
Censorship and Conscription, 1916" War and Society, 3, no. 1, (1985).
Fox, Len. "The Movement Against War and Fascism. A View from Inside",
Labour History, No. 39, (1980).
Gibson, N.M. "Contix)l of Venereal Diseases in tiie Army", Australian Medical
Journal, 26 September 1942.
References 183
GUman, Sander L. "AIDS and SyphiUs. The Iconography of Disease", October, No.
43, (1987).
Hall, Robert. "Aborigines, the Army and the World War 11", Aboriginal Journal, 4,
Nos. 1-2, (1979).
Heale, M.J. "Red Scare PoUtics: California's Campaign against Un-American
Activities, 1940-1970", Journal of American Studies, 20, No. 1, (1986).
Heale, M.J. "The 'Leading War Party': Communists and Worid War fl", Labour
History, No. 39, (1980).
Johnston, Craig. "The Communist Party and Labour Unity, 1939-45", Labour
History, No. 41, (1981).
Kennedy, K.H. "The Anti-Communist Pledge" in D.J. Murphy eLal. (eds.) Labour in
Power.
Kennedy, K.H. "The Soutii Johnston Sttike, 1927" in D.J. Murphy (ed.) The Big
Strikes.
KeyserUngk, Robert H. "'Agents within the Gates': The Search for Nazi
Subversions in Canada during World War 11", Canadian Historical Review,
66, No. 7, (1985).
KeyserUngk, Robert H. "The Canadian Government's Attitude towards Germans and
German Canadians in World War Two", Canadian Ethnic Studies, 16, No. 1,
(1984).
Knight, Kenneth W. "Edward Michael Hanlon: a City Bushman" in Murphy et.al.
(eds.), Queensland Political Portraits.
Marenin, Otwin. "Police Performance and State Rule: Conttol and Autonomy in the
Exercise of Coercion", Comparative Politics, October 1985.
Menghetti, Diane. "North Queensland Anti-Fascism and the Spanish CivU War",
Labour History, No. 42, (1982).
Mitchell, R. "Austtalian Industrial Relations and Labour Law Policy: A Post War
Review", Australian Quarterly, 52, No. 1, (1980).
Morantz-Sanchez, Regina. "ConsoUdating the Spheres: Exploring the History of the
Twentieth Century American Woman", Reviews in American History, 15, No.
4, (1987).
Mumane, Mary and Daniels, Kay. "Prostitutes as 'Purveyors of Disease': Venereal
Disease Legislation in Tasmania, 1868-1945", Hecate, 5, No. 1, (1979).
Nagata, Yuriko. "Japanese Intemees at Loveday, 1941-46", Journal of Historical
Society ofSA., No. 15, (1987).
Pierson, Ruth Roach. "The Double Bind of the Double Standard: VD Conttol and
the CWAC in World War U", Canadian Historical Review, 62, No. 1, (1981).
Pierson, Ruth Roach. "'Ladies or Loose Women?' The Canadian Women's Army
Corps in World War 11", Atlantis, 4, No. 2, (1979).
Porter, R. "History Says 'No' to the Policeman's Response to ADDS" British
Medical Journal, 293, (1986), pp. 1589-90.
Potts, E. Daniel and Annette. "The Deployment of Black American Servicemen
Abroad during World War Two", AJPH, 35, No. 1, (1989).
Saunders, Kay. "Conflict between tiie American and Austtalian Govemments over
the Inttoduction of Black American Servicemen into Austtalia during World
War Two", AJPH, 33, No. 2, (1987).
Saunders Kay "'Red Baiting is an AWU habit': SurveUlance and Prosecution of
Communists in Queensland during World War TL", JRAHS, 74, Part 3, (1988).
Saunders Kay. "A Model in These Matters. State Intervention During the 1946
Meatworker's and tiie 1948 Railways Sttikes", JRAS, 76, No. 2, (1990).
184 References
Saunders, Kay and Helen Taylor. "'To Combat the Plague'. The Construction of
Moral Alarm and the Role of State Intervention in Queensland in World War
Two", Hecate, 14, No. 2, (1988).
Saunders, Kay and Helen Taylor. "The Enemy Within? The Intemment of Enemy
Aliens in Queensland, 1939-45", AJPH, 33, No. 3, (1987).
Saunders, Kay and Helen Taylor. "Policing in Total War: The Queensland
Experience" in Mark Finnane (ed.) Policing in Australia Sydney, University of
NSW Press, (1987).
Sheridan, Tom. "A Case Study in Complexity: The Origins of the 1945 Steel
Sttike in New Soutii Wales", Labour History, No. 41, (1981).
Sheridan, Tom. "The 1945 Steel Stiike: Trade Union, The New Order and Mr
Chifley", Labour Policy, No. 42, (1982).
Sheridan, Tom. "Servant and Masters? Chifley and tiie Unions 1945-49" in Eric
Fry (ed.) Common Cause: The Labour Movement in Australia and New
Zealand, Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1986.
Sitkoff, Howard. "Racial MUitancy and Intertacial Violence in the Second Worid
War" Journal of American History, 58, 1970-71.
Sturma, Michael. "Public Health and Sexual MoraUty: Venereal Diseases in World
War U Austtalia", Signs, 13, No. 4, (1988).
Sturma, Michael. "Loving the Alien: The Underside of Relations Between
American Servicemen and Australian women in Queensland, 1942-45",
Journal of Australian Studies, No. 42, (1989).
Treichler, Paula A. "AIDS, Homophobia and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic
of Significance", October, No. 43, (1987).
Ward, Peter W. "British Columbia and Japanese Evacuation", Canadian Historical
Review, 57, No. 3, (1976).
Index
Aboriginal Preservation and Proleclion Act Battle of Brisbane, 29, 30

(1939), 78 Beasley, J.A., 67
Aborigines, 65, 67 Bevege, Margaret, 54
Administrative Planning Commillcc, 61 Birth Rate fears, 102
Advisory War Council, 61-65 Bjelke-Petersen, Johannes, 17, 127, 141,
AEU. 131, 134 146
AFULE, 131, 136 Blackbum, Maurice, 20, 35
AIDS - iconography of, 96-97 Blackmur, Douglas, 128-130, 134, 137-8
Aid-To-Russia Committee, 121 Blacksmith's Society, 134
AIF (Second), 20, 27. 59, 106 Blarney, General Sir Thomas, 31
Air Raid Precautions, 14, 27 Brereton, US Gen., 60
Albanians, 52 Brett, US Gen., 60
Aliens' Tribunal, 54, 119 Brisbane. 44. 68-69, 76-77, 116, 135, 140
Allied Works Council. 53-57 Brothels, 79. 101
ALP, hatred of Communists, 107. 122-3, Brown, Charles, 60
126-7 Bundaberg, 52
split in, 125 Burgmann, Verity, 5
American Civil War, 142 Burk, Kathleen, 3
American Red Cross, 77 Bums Philip Co., 111
Americans -
attitudes lo socially, 91 Cain, Frank, 5, 112
conllicl with AusUalians, 59-60, 71-72, Cain, John, 18
77-78 Caims. 44, 47. 115
presence of, 29, 77 Canada, 13
Americans, Black, 59-80 policy towards ethnic minorities, 34-35
opposition lo, 7, 144 Cannent, David, 111
cnlerlainmcni of, 70, 75-79 Carroll, Brian, 16
stereotyping of, 73-74 Carroll, PJ., 14, 28, 37,
AMIEU, 129, 136 attitudes to enemy aliens, 45, 49-51
sec Meat Workers Suike attitudes to Communists, 121
Anarchists, 42, 122 sec also; Policing
Argyle, Sir Stanley, 22 Casey, Richard, 61-62
ASIO, 141 Catholic Social Studies Movement, 128
Asmis, Dr Rudolf, 40 Catholic Youth Association, 85
Association for Moral and Social Hygiene, Catton, Bruce, 142
103 Censorship, 6. 7, 31. 54, 74, 109
Auorncy General's department sec also Propaganda and Security
(Commonwealth) Chapman, Lt Col James (Military Board),
inielligcncc services 28, 117-8 39-40
policy on enemy aliens, 40, 56 Chief Secretaries Office (Q)
policy towards Communists, 108, 115-9 expansion of powers, 15
Australia First Movement, 19, 52 Chifley, Ben,
AusUalian Council for Civil Liberties, Coal Suike, 126
24, 120 conflict with Queensland government, 133
Australian Natives Association, 96 indusU'ial policy, 133
Australian Railway Union, 20, 24, 107, Chinchilla, 76-77
116, 120 Cilento, Dr Phyllis, 85
and 1948 Suikc, 137, Cilento, Sir Raphael, 81, 88, 99
sec also Suikcs; Railway Suikc 1927 sec also Health and Medical Services
Ausu-alian Society for the Eradication of Civil Aliens Corps, 53-57
VD, 96, 97 Civil Construction Corps, 53-57
AusUalian-Soviet Friendship League, 121 Civil defence, 27
Civil Liberties
AWU, haued of Communism, 107, 128
resu-ictions of, 13, 16, 17, 22, 35, 37-41,
Barnes, US Gen., 60 83, 108, 111, 114, 115, 137, 139-141
BarneU, Bryan, D, 64 Ihcorics of, 3, 19, 33-34
186 Index
see also Security de Maria, William, 2, 5

Clark, Gordon L. and Michael Dean, 2, 85 Democracy
Cloncurry, 67 threats to by total war, 11, 20-21, 23,
Coal Strike, 1940 (NSW), 112 24, 142
Collett, Herbert, 113 see Totalitarianism; Total War
Combined Railway Union, 134 Department of Information, 119
Comitato Anti Fascisto, 45 see also censorship, propaganda
see also Italians Deportation, 45
Commissioner of Railways, indusoial policy, Die Briicke, 54
134 Doctor Carver Club, 77
Committee of Public Safety, powers of, 24 see also Americans, Black
Commonwealth "Double Standard", 87, 89-93
powers of 20-21, 32, 114-116 on class bias, 99-102
see also State Rights see also sexuality; men
Communist Party of Ausuîa "Dunera" refugees, 42, 53
Ban on, 6, 106, 107. 113, 115, 118 Dunstan, A.A., 22, 115
attacks on, 19, 125, 135
change of policy, 110, 112, 113. 114 Eaves, John, 4
Italians in, 48, 51, 106 Eisenhow, Gen. D., 65
and ALP, 107, 130 Emergency Powers Act of 1920 (GB), 10,
and unions, 130 124
Condoms, 90 Emergency Powers Defence Act of 1939
see also, Men, Sexuality (GB), 12
Constitution of Australia see also Delegation of Powers
difficulties within, 9, 143-4, 146 Enemy Aliens
powers of, 12, 19, 21, 145 control of, 38-39, 45-46
Stales rights, 9, 19, 21 surveillance of, 45-46
see also Commonwealth, State Rights Slate attacks on, 19, 33-58
Cooktown, 31 see also Albanians; Finns; Italians;
Cooper, Dr Booth, 92, 98 Germans; Japanese
Cooper, Frank, 89 Essential Services
Comer, Charles, 71-72, 74, 79, 91 provision of, 26
Country Party, 114, 128, 133 Evans, Raymond, 6, 107
attitudes to unions, 137 Evatt, Dr H.V., 61
Cresciani, Gianfranco, 45, 48 Executive rule
Cribb, Margaret, 107, 131, 138 extensions of in war-time, 4-5, 8,
Crimes Act (1926), 108, 123 10. 12, 23-24
Criminal Investigation Branch, Qld Police see also Delegation of Powers;
and surveillance, 141 Constitution
Croft, CM., 127
Cumpston, J.H.L., 88, 90, 101 Fadden, A., 133
Curtin, John, 7, 9, 26, 60, 67, 86, 110 Fallon, C.G., 108
Czechoslovakia Fascist Club, Brisbane, 124
communist lake-over, 125, 130-1, 138 raid on, 48
Female Venereal Disease Isolation Hospital,
Darling Downs, 52, 125 84, 99-101
Darwin, 27 see also VD; Hanlon; Cilento
Dash, Jack, 108 Ferry Report, 46-48
Davidson, Alistair, 1 see also Italians; stereotyping
Deacon, Desley, 1 Fewster, Kevin, 1, 5
Dean, Michael and Gordon L. Finns, 52
Clark, 2, 85 see also Enemy Aliens
Dedman, John, 8, 81, 84 Fitzgerald, Ross, 45
Defence Act of 1909, 6 Friends of Third Reich, 40 41
Defence of the Realm Act (GB), 10, 124 see also Germans
Defence Powers (Commonwealth), 11, 12,
16, 18, 34 Gair, Vincent
see also Constitution attitudes to union, 131-2, 136-7
Delegation of Powers, 8, 11, 23 use of State powers, 17
between civil and military, 28, 29-32, 91 see also ALP
see also Constitution; Stales Rights Germans (or German-Australians)
Index 187
inlemmcni, 28, 34, 42-43 policy, 35, 38, 44-45

surveillance of, 40 procedures, 40-59
Gilbert, Alan, 5 Invasion
Oilman, Sander L., 96 threats by Japan, 6, 43-44, 49, 58,
Gonorrhoea, 83 62, 128
cure of, 90 sec also Civil Defence
Gordonvale, 116 Ipswich, 68
GullcU, Sir Henry, 114 Isaacs, Sir I., 11
Habeas Corpus Italians
concepts of, 139 attitudes towards, 39, 46-49, 51
Hall, Duncan H., 13 attacks upon, 41, 120
Hall, Robert, 67 intemment of, 39, 42-43
Halsey, Marjorie, 75 sec also Stereotyping
Hankey, Maurice, 3 Italy
Hanlon, Ned enters war, 39, 43, 128
attitudes to communists, 108, 117,
127-9 Japanese
aliitudes to enemy aliens, 38, 49 fear of, 34, 43, 58
altitudes lo unions, 132. 138-9 intemment of, 44-45
Slates rights, 23, 26, 27 Jennings, Sir Ivor, 3
use of State powers, 17, 38, 81 Johnston, Craig, 114
control of sexuality, 81, 98-100 Julius, Max, 140
sec also Slate's Rights; ALP
Hasluck, Sir Paul, 4, 14, 20, 110 Keighley, Ema, 73, 86
Health Act Amendment Act (1911), 83 Keith, Sir Arthur, 3
Health and Home Affairs department Kennedy, K.H., 107
expansion of powers, 14, 32 Kessick, Theo, 131
Health and Medical Services Keyseriingk, Robert H., 13, 33
expansion of, 14
functions of, 84, 103, 105-6, 108 Labour and National Service Department
see also Cilento, Raphael; Hanlon, Ned 61
Healy, Jim, 137 Lake Marilyn, 6
Heckson, B, 116 Lang, J.T., 122
High Court, 143 Lasswell, Harold D., 3
Hogbin, Ian, 78 Lazzarini, Herbert, 91
Hollaway, EJ., 134 Lee, H.P., 12
Holl, Harold, 128 Lee, Ulysses, 61
Homosexuality, 79, 103-6 Left Book Club, 120
Howard, Colin, 12 sec also Censorship; Policy; Communist
Hughes, William Morris Parly
and communism, 116, 128 Lega Anti-FascisUi, 45
conflict with Queensland government, sec also Italians
116, 120 Loans Council, 15, 17
sec also Attomey General sec also States Rights
"Lock Hospitals", 82, 90, 98-102
Ideology sec also Policing; Venereal Disease
confusion over, 28, 33, 40, 102, 118 Loveday Inlemmcnt Camp, 42
sec also Italians; Germans sec also Enemy Aliens
Immigration policy - 1930s, 47 Lutheran Pastors
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration attacks upon, 52-54
Act, 125, 135-6, 141 sec also Germans
Indusu-ial Court, 132, 134
Industrial Law Amendment Bill of 1948, MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 67, 68
126, 137, 139 sec Americans - presence of
Industrial Registiar, 127, 132, 134 McCormack, William, 16, 107, 127
Indusu-ial Workers of the World, 6 sec also Railway Suikc 1927
112, 122 Mclntyre, Daryl, 67
sec also Security Mackay, 41, 44
Ingham, 3 1 , 4 1 , 4 7 , 51.72 Mackay, William, 36, 53
Internment McKeman, Michael, 4
Maher, E.B., 24
attitudes towards, 34-36
188 Index
Manpower Authority, 7, 26, 85 attitudes to communism, 110

Mareeba, 78 sec also Security
Marenin, Otwin, 80 One Big Union, 107
Man-iotl, G.H., 121 sec also ALP; Communism
Marwick, Arthur, 5
Masters, George, 115 Pacific Offensives, 7
Meal-Workers Strike (1946), 130-141 Pacifists, 54
see also Gair, V.; ALP sec also Civil Liberties
Men Page, Dr Earle, 15
internment policy towards, 38 Papua and New Guinea, 6, 66
policy of sexuality towards, 89 Park, Rulh, 74
Menghetti, Diane, 45 Paterson, Fred, 110
Menzies, Robert G., 7. 19, 35 see also Communism; St Patfick's Day
altitudes to Communism, 111, 117 March
Military Board, 35, 37-39 Philippines, 65
see also Inlemmcnt Pierson, Ruth, 89-90
Military Police, 30, 73 Planning
Molson, Hugh, 4 civil defence, 15, 16, 17, 25
Moore, A.E., 22 Policing
Moore, John Hammond, 5 increase in functions, 27, 78, 81-2,
Morale, 78-79 112, 118, 127, 140-6, 145-148
Morality see also Carroll, PJ.; Hanlon, Ned
changes in. 98-100 Post Master General
Ml Isa, 67 and censorship, 31
Movement against War and Fascism. and surveillance, 54, 109, 113
109 Post War Indusuial Turmoil, 136-141
MUllcr, Adolf, 129 sec also Chifley, Ben; Strikes
Murphy, Denis, 6 Post War Reconstruction, 26, 143
Murray, Florence, 72 and family, 102
Polls, E.D., and Polls, A., 5, 69-70, 73
NAACP, 64 POW, 74
National Council, 17 Premiers' Conference (1938), 15
National Council of Women, 83 see also State's Rights
National Health and Medical Research Propaganda, 6, 111, 113
Council, 101 sec also Censorship
see also Sexuality Prostitution
National Security Act of 1939-40 defmidons of, 82, 99
debate on, 20, 23, 35 Protestant Labor Parly, 48
effects of. 143-145 Public Health Act (1937), 82
sec also Civil Liberties Public Safety Act (1941), 23, 25-26, 146
National Security (Emergency Powers) sec also Habeas Corpus; Constitution;
Bill [Victoria], 21 Queensland-government
National Security Regulations
conu-ols, 6, 116, 117 Queensland
implementation, 31, 38 8, 9, 14, 17, 84. 124-5, 143-6
provisions of, 31, 38, 52 sec also Commonwealth
sec also Civil Liberties Queensland Co-operative
National Security (venereal diseases Bacon Association, 130
and conu-aceptives) regulations, Queensland Govemment
1942, 82, 90, 95 conflict with Commonwealth, 9, 14, 17,
Nazis 25, 50, 84, 116-119, 129, 133
in Australia, 37, 40, 42 indusurial policy, 124-141, 143-6
ban on party, 6, 38, 53
sec also Germans Railway Suikc (1927), 10, 16. 107, 117
Neumann, Dr., 54 sec also McCormack, W.
Nolan, Frank, 126, 137 Railway Suikc (1948), 10, 124-141
North Queensland Labor Party, 121 sec also Hanlon, Ned
sec also ALP Rava, Paul B., 3
Red Flag Riols (1919). 27, 107
O'Brien, Mick, 134 sec also Evans, Raymond
Office of Sualegic Services Reed Report, 48, 51
Index 189
Refugees concepts of, 9-10, 126

Jewish, 42 legislation, 10, 125
Rossiter, Clinton L., 3, 11, 142 declaration, 137, 139, 140
RSL, 50, 90 States Rights, 9, 11, 13. 14, 15, 17, 18,
Russell, Charles, 125 22-26, 32, 50, 80, 133
Russians, 45 see also Commonwealth; Queensland -
fascists, 51 govemment
see also Enemy Aliens State Transport Bill, 15, 16, 20, 124, 137
Sabotage Steel Strike (1945), 130
measures to prevent, 27, Stereotyping - racial
37,44 Black Americans, 73-75
see also Security Iiahans, 4548
St Patrick's Day March (1948), 126, women and sexuality, 89
140-141 Stabbo, Dr Joyce, 85
sec also Paterson, Fred Street, Jessie, 73
Sawer, Geoffrey, 12 Strikes
Scott-Young, Dr W., 88, 92 coal su-ike 1940, 112
Scullin Govemment shearers suike 1891, 127
and communism, 108 General strike Brisbane 1912, 10, 127
Security Mt Isa 1965, 10, 124
civil, 50, 57 Railway strike 1925, 10,
provision of, 29, 44, 57 Railway strike 1927, 10, 16, 107, 117
military intelligence, 36, Railway strike 1948, 124
40,44, 105, 118-120 Pastoral suike 1956, 10, 124
surveillance, 29, 45-47, 116 Power industry 1985, 10, 124
see also MiUtary Board; TownsviUe meat suike 1918, 127
Military Police Steel suike 1945, 126, 130
Segregation see also Post War Indusuial TurmoU
of Black American GIs, 60 Sturma, Michael, 97
in Britain, 64-5 SWPA, 30
see also Americans - Black Sydney History Labour Group, 1, 8
Sex Educauon, 85, 87, 92-93 Syphilis, 83
Sexuality cure of, 90
control of, 78, 86, 99-105
fears of, 78, 81, 84 Tasmania, 83
Sheridan, Tom, 125, 126, 127, 130, 138 Taylor, George, 121
Sieghart, Marguerite A., 3 Tennant Creek, 67
Simpson, W.B., 51 Theodore, E.G., 53
Sitkoff. Harvard, 72-73 Thursday Island, 44
Smith, Graham, 64, 99 Toowoomba, 54-55
Smith, William Forgan Totalitarianism, 11, 21, 111, 142
attacks on civil liberties, 20, 24 see also Civil Liberties; Constitution
increase State powers, 16, 18, 24, Total War
144 concepts of, 9, 11, 14, 21, 33, 85, 124
haired of communism, 108,116-7,144 results of, 142-147
see also Queensland-Government; see also Civil Liberties; Delegation of
Policing; Civil Liberties Powers
Society for Racial Hygiene, 100 TownsviUe, 28,44, 91, HI
Spanish Civil War, 109 Trades and Labour Council, Brisbane, 135
Sparkes, Walter, 137 TuUy, 47,48, 116, 120
Stammers, Neil, 3, 10, 12, 19, 111, 115 Tumer, Ian, 6
Standing Committee of the Services
medical directors, 91, 94 Unemployed Workers Movement, 128
State Uniform Income Tax Act (1942), 143
concepts of, 1-2, 9 United Associations of Women, 73
theories of, 2 United Evangelical Lutheran Church of
State Apparatus, 2 Australia, 37, 54
expansion of, 14, 81, 105, 129, 133, 137 see also Germans
State Hospitals US Intelligence
use of, 84, 98-99 in Australia, 65-66
State of Emergency see also Security
790 Index
USSR Western Australia

invasion by Germany, 6 numbers of enemy aliens, 42
pact with Nazi Germany, 109, 121 Wesuninstcr System, 3, 7, 146-7
see also Delegation of Powers
VD Conference July 1942. 83. 93-94, 101 White Ausualia Policy, 59-66, 144
Venereal Disease sec also Americans - Black;
control of, 93-94, 98, 103, 145 Stereotyping - Racial
fears of, 78, 86, 88 White, Gen. Sir B., 113
male/female rates, 87, 9 Women
statistics, 86 internment policy towards, 38
in Australian Army, 93-4 entertainment of Americans,
in American Army, 92-5 76-78
Venereal Diseases Act (1928) Victoria, 88 Stale attacks on sexuality, 19
Victorian Govemment Women's Progressive Club, 70, 109
conflict with Commonwealth, 20-24 Women's Union of Service, 96
Violence World War One, 3, 5-6. 9, 34, 41.
towards Black Americans, 73-75 45. 106, 112, 122
against unionists, 140-1 Wright. Prof. R.D., 72
von Luckner, Count Felix, 40-41, 54 WWF, 110, 116. 137, 140
YMCA, 85
Wake, R.F.W., 37, 50
War Book
AusU-alia, 13, 14. 34, 36
Britain, 13
War Cabinet, 31, 44, 53, 57, 60-66, 111
War Precautions Act, 6
Waters, F.J., 23
Wattlebrae Hospital, 100
WCTU, 89
UQP Studies in Australian History
This book explores why war divides rather than unites the homefront
community.
While Queensland soldiers were away fighting in World War II,
other battles were fought at home as the state government used the
emergency to grab more power from the commonwealth and the
citizens.
The war also gave the majority an opportunity to persecute
minorities.
It should have been a time for cooperation, tolerance and sacrifice
evenly shared. Instead, on the homefront, previously hidden
prejudices were celebrated.
This study focuses on those specially targeted by the Queensland
government: the Black GIs who were not allowed on the north side
of the Brisbane River; the working-class women with venereal
diseases who were locked in hospitals; the unionists and
communists who found themselves harassed and arrested; and of
course the resident Japanese and Germans who were incarcerated
without trial.
The Queensland government was thus increasing its powers of
surveillance, intrusion and control at a time when soldiers were away
fighting totalitarian regimes in Europe and the Pacific.
Cover design by Craig Glasson
ISBN 0-7022-2377-
yQFmPEElSKS
Australian History
9 780702 22377

Saunders War On The Homefront

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Saunders War On The Homefront

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

War on the

III lllllllllll III lllllllllll III II Nil II mill III! nil II

The Fryer Memorial Library of

UNIVERSITY o r .JJ_.iiSL,\ND PRESS

Also in this series:

Glen St J. Barclay, A Very Small Insurance Policy: The Politics of Australian

Gail Reekie, On the Edge: Women's Experiences of Queensland

University of Queensland Press

This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing

Distributed in the USA and Canada by

Cataloguing in Publication Data

Saunders, Kay, 1947-

I. Worid War, 1939-1945 — Queensland. 2. Humanrights•

ISBN 0 7022 2377 8

Introduction: War, Society and the State 1

"Democracy is in Danger", 1941

1 Internees in Australia, 31 October 1940.

my great uncle, Oswald Englander (1893-1956), who pointed me in the

Even if few Australian historians have explicitly incorporated

Desley Deacon agrees that:

For people who supposedly have a 'characteristic talent for

Extending these analyses, Alistair Davidson in a provocative article

Australian state. This absence was aU the more remarkable

The literamre on the state is highly diverse and often confusing.

Theorists from Marx, Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas have been

society on its specific themes. These state themes are aU-powerful

The First World War caused striking changes in the organisation

Extending this analysis, Neil Stammers in his provocative

This omission is symptomatic, for war and crisis are seen as

Hankey, Arthur Keith, Harold D. LassweU, Marguerite A. Sieghart, Sir

and illustrated popular text that is not confmed by the rigours of

upon the working class.

Rather than identifying a clearly efficient delegation of powers,

The history of the state is the history of the confrontation with

This study examines and elaborates tiiese processes, in war-time and

Rossiter likewise concluded that "no form of government can

The outstanding institution of constitutional dictatorship of a

Yet this transition is problematical. In both Britain and Australia

It [the defence powers] is the ultima ratio of the nation. The

This flexible defence power is embodied in Section 51 which allows

The Parliament shall, subject to diis Constitution, have power to

Various legal commentators such as H.P. Lee, Colin Howard and

The defence power is remarkable, in that its scope is not static.

Though, on the surface, the passing of the National Security Bill in

Thus, after some fifteen years of preparation, die government

Coinciding with the Nazi offensive through Westem Europe in

One of the most impressive features of the British government of

Sensitive to the alarms of war and the pressures of an aroused

The Australian War Book, prepared by the Defence department

Thus, the Australian War Book must be understood within the

new instrumentalities to cope widi die unforeseen demands made by

The Defence Department will be so busily engaged in repelling

Queensland had no intention of relinquishing powers to die

commissioner of police, the coordinator general of Pubhc Works, the

His concluding sentiment in this long speech gave forebodings of an

... one would imagine diat a state of revolution existed in

When he became premier in 1932, Forgan Smidi repealed diis act

of industrial strikes or civil protest. It was successively employed by

... [T]he cooperation of the State governments, and the compilation

Hanlon moved specifically to augment the powers, functions and

In conveying die formal declaration of war on 5 September 1939

Hanlon continued stressing the State's overriding supremacy:

The Commonwealth has the task of preventing and combating