Facts: Lucio Adriano was married to Gliceria Dorado in 1933; they had 3 children, respondents in the case.

They
separated in 1942; Gliceria died in 1968. Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa since 1942 and were married in 1968
five months after death of Gliceria; they had 8 children, the petitioners in this case. During cohabitation in 1964,
Lucio purchased properties subject of litigation. When Lucio died, he apportioned thru his will part of subject land
to Vicenta and his children with her, and his children with Gliceria. Petitioners argued that the land was co-owned
by Lucio and Vicenta, hence the will should be declared without legal effect, and rules on co-ownership must be
applied. This would effectively reduce the portion of Lucio’s children with Gliceria. Petitioners offered the TCT of
land named after Lucio and Vienta, as well as deed of sale naming Vicenta as co-vendee with Lucio. Respondents
presented account of money used to purchase the property which came from earnings in business partnership entered
by Lucio while marriage between him and Gliceria was subsisting. They further presented proof that the initial
capital infused to the said business partnership came from common fund maintained by Lucio and Gliceria.

Issue: W/N the property was conjugal (between Lucio and Gliceria), or co-owned (between Lucio and Vicenta) –
CONJUGAL between Lucio and Gliceria.

Ratio: CONJUGAL between Lucio and Gliceria. Property was presumed to be conjugal since the same was
bought in 1964, while the marriage between Lucio and Gliceria was subsisting. The petitioners failed to overcome
this presumption. Additionally, the respondents provided sufficient evidence to support their allegation that property
was purchased with conjugal fund. The Court also held that the “bare and expedient assertions” of the petitioners
that by the fact that Vicenta was named in the TCT must mean that she was indeed an owner was unmeritorious.
“[E]vidence apart from or contrary to certificate of title bears considerable importance.”

Doctrine: The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is
not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.