CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 2019 CASE DIGESTS

LECTURE 2

ARTICLE VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision
on initiative and referendum.

1) Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660

FACTS

The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.

The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the
provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with
section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior
as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE

Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it
unconstitutional?

RULING

NO.

The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised
by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the
"necessity" of the case.

In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary
authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor and the
provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge “when such
as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites
which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in
a backward state.

Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

2) SEC v. Interport, 567 SCRA 354

FACTS

The Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with GHB(Ganda Holdings
Berhad). Under said memorandum of agreement, RC acquired100% of the entire capital stock of GEHI
(Ganda Energy Holdings Inc.) which would own and operate a 102 megawatt gas turbine power
generating barge.In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC.

On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital of PRCI (Philippine Racing Club).- It is alleged
herein that a press release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent to the Philippine Stock
Exchange through facsimile and the SEC, but the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it.
However, the SEC received reports that the IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its
negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this material
insider information.

For this reason, the SEC required the directors to appear before the SEC to explain the alleged failure to
disclose material information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. Unsatisfied with
the explanation, the SEC issued an order finding that the IRC violated the Rules in connection with the
then Old Securities Act when it failed to make timely disclosures of its negotiations with GHB. In
addition, the SEC found that the directors of IRC entered into transactions involving IRC shares in
violation of the Revised Securities Act.

Respondents, however, questioned the authority of the SEC to investigate on said matter since
according to PD 902-A, jurisdiction upon the matter was conferred upon the PED (Prosecution and
Enforcement Department) of the SEC – however, this issue is already moot since pending the disposition
of the case, the Securities Regulation Code was passed thereby effectively repealing PD 902-A and
abolishing the PED. They also contended that their right to due process was violated when the SEC
required them to appear before the SEC to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed upon them
since such requirement shifted the burden of proof to respondents. The case reached the CA and said
court ruled in favor of the respondents and effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or
administrative cases against respondents. In its resolution, the CA stated that since there are no rules
and regulations implementing the rules regarding DISCLOSURE, INSIDER TRADING OR ANY OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED SECURITIES ACT, the SEC has no statutory authority to file any suit against
respondents. The CA, therefore, prohibited the SEC from taking cognizance or initiating any action
against the respondents for the alleged violations of the Revised Securities Act.

ISSUE
Whether or not the SEC has authority to file suit against respondents for violations of the Revised
Securities Act.

RULING

YES.

Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of implementing rules
to make them binding and effective.

The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents
without violating their right to due process and equal protection, citing as its basis the case Yick Wo v.
Hopkins.26 This is untenable.

In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and binding. It is well settled that
every law has in its favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific provision of the law is
declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.27 The
mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
construction that will support the law may be given. In People v. Rosenthal,28 this Court ruled that:

In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid
on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it
effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no
adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can
devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the
reach of those intrusted therewith." (25 R.C.L., pp. 810, 811)

In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,29 the Court underlined the importance of the presumption of validity
of laws and the careful consideration with which the judiciary strikes down as invalid acts of the
legislature:

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To
doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as
the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and
determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.

The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations is based
on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations for various and varying details of
management.30 To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render ineffective an act of
Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the
legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things
future and impossible to fully know.31 It is well established that administrative authorities have the
power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies,
provided such rules and regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as
well as purport to carry into effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the rules and
regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of
the statute.32 Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as
in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its
implementation.

The reliance placed by the Court of Appeals in Yick Wo v. Hopkins33 shows a glaring error. In the cited
case, this Court found unconstitutional an ordinance which gave the board of supervisors authority to
refuse permission to carry on laundries located in buildings that were not made of brick and stone,
because it violated the equal protection clause and was highly discriminatory and hostile to Chinese
residents and not because the standards provided therein were vague or ambiguous.

This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities
Act, such that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be understood by a person of ordinary
intelligence.

3) Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 1

FACTS

The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in
full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land
transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways
without any appropriate early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence;
[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the
United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by the
Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices.

President Marcos instructed that the Land transportation Commissioner shall require every motor
vehicle owner to procure from any and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a
reflectorized early warning device, of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land
Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to
effectively implement this order.

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already
properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of
Instructions No. 229 as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1
issued by the land transportation Commission, alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229 "clearly
violates the provisions and delegation of police power." For him they are "oppressive, unreasonable,
arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New
Society." He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and
unconscionable to the motoring public.”

ISSUE

W/N Letter of Instruction No. 229 as well as Land transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1
violates the provisions and delegation of police power.

RULING

NO.

The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally
without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself
with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an
assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid
the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the
charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to
be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector Law clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be
attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition
given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into
force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself to the complexities
of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern
governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the
legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual
approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.

4) Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328

FACTS

San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, is considered as
the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. Fishing method used here is trawl
which, on account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused
the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of
the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay.

In response to the clamor, the President issued EO 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay,
and the EO 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for injunction and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil
Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
CFI declared that EO 22, 66, and 80 are invalid.

ISSUE

1. Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80,
banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay,

2. Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the
exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President.

RULING

Trawl is a fishing net made in the form of a bag with the mouth kept open by a device the whole affair
being towed, dragged, trailed or trawled on the bottom of the sea to capture demersal, ground or
bottom species

1. YES.

In the Fisheries Act, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has authority to regulate or ban
the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, obnoxious for it carries away fish eggs and fry's which should be
preserved. Can the President of the Philippines exercise that same power and authority? Section 10(1),
Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines prescribes:

SEC. 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.

Section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:

SEC. 63. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATION. — Administrative acts and commands of
the President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or
rearranging or readjusting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and
commands governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of
general concern shall be made in executive orders.

Section 74 of the Revised Administrative Code also provides that:

All executive functions of the government of the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the
Executive Departments subject to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in
matters of general policy.
One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources which by law is placed
under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general
supervision and control of the President of the Philippines (Sec. 75, R. A. C.). Moreover, "executive
orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction
of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the
Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective
Department" (Sec. 79-A, R.A.C.), and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of the questioned
Executive Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and that is why said Secretary, who was and is called upon to enforce said executive
Orders, was made a party defendant in one of the cases at bar (G.R. No. L-9191).

2. YES.

The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or
discretion as to the execution of law:

Delegation of the power to legislate- involves a discretion as to what the law shall be

Conferring of authority or discretion- the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law

The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also held, the power to delegate - the Legislature
cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into
effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act
remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General,
the act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the
waters of the Philippines and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide
regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the
Sec. to carry into effect its legislative intent. The President did nothing but show an anxious regard for
the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of general concern which were in consonance and
strict conformity with law.

5) Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410

FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public
office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private
offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant
to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to
the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx xxx xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the
provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator?

2. Corollary, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution?

RULING

1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator

2. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art.
VI of the Constitution. It unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect.
The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed,
therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in
the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled
before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early
as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative
power in the following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however,
as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x
are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the
shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which
it cannot leap.”

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates
for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

6) Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.

FACTS
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto
Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise
known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected under
the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-
mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.

Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government,
the Executive Director of the Information Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine
National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.

Petitioners argue that Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 8, 7, 12, 19, 26 (21 sections total) of The Cybercrime Act violate
the petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal
protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy,
and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure; and that Congress invalidly delegated its power
when it gave the CICC the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow under Section 26 of the Act.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sections 8 and 26 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 are constitutional.

RULING

YES.

Section 8: Section 8 provides for the penalties for the crimes punished under the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012. The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as
deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to
determine penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time
the act or omission was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected with
another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to
modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Section 26: In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law
must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.103

Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a
national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient
standards for the CICC to follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training,
best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and
organization and user’s assets.104 This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should
work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent
and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both
the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international
cooperation."105 This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been
considered as sufficient standard.106 Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.

7) Quezon City PTCA v. Department of Education, G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016

FACTS

On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued
Department Order No. 54, Series of 20093 entitled Revised Guidelines Governing Parents-Teachers
Associations (PTAs) at the School Level. Petitioner Quezon City PTCA Federation filed the present
Petition in the belief that the provisions undermine the independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively
amend the constitutions and by-laws of existing PTAs and PTCAs, and violate its constitutional rights to
organize and to due process, as well as other existing laws. Petitioner assails the Department Order as
an inordinate exercise of the Department of Education’s rule-making power. Petitioner insists that the
Department Order is an invalid exercise of the rule-making power delegated to the Secretary of
Education as it supposedly disregards PTAs’ and PTCAs’ purposes, not only as partners of the
Department of Education in the implementation of programs, but also as a watchdog against "abuses,
mismanagement, inefficiency[,] and excesses of public officials within the public school system."

ISSUE

Whether or not the Department Order is constitutional.

RULING

YES.

The three powers of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—have been generally viewed as
non-delegable. However, in recognition of the exigencies that contemporary governance must address,
our legal system has recognized the validity of "subordinate legislation," or the rule-making power of
agencies tasked with the administration of government. Administrative agencies, however, are not given
unfettered power to promulgate rules. As noted in Gerochi v. Department of Energy, two requisites
must be satisfied in order that rules issued by administrative agencies may be considered valid: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. In addition to the substantive requisites of the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test, the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative
Code) requires the filing of rules adopted by administrative agencies with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.

Apart from the Education Act of 1982, Book IV, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code provides for the
rule-making power of the secretaries heading the departments that comprise the executive branch of
government:

SECTION 7. Powers and Functions of the Secretary.—The Secretary shall:

....

(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient administration of the offices under
the Secretary and for proper execution of the laws relative thereto. These issuances shall not prescribe
penalties for their violation, except when expressly authorized by law;
It was pursuant to this rule-making authority that Former Secretary of Education Jesli A. Lapus
promulgated Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009. As its title denotes, the Department Order
provided revised guidelines governing PTAs at the school-level.

The Department Order does not exist in a vacuum. As underscored by the Department of Education, the
Department Order was issued "in response to increasing reports of malpractices by officers or members
of PTAs."Among these "malpractices" are those noted in a resolution adopted by the "Regional
Education Supervisors in-charge of THE [sic] Student Government Program (SGP), selected Teachers-
Advisers and the Officers of the National Federation of Supreme Student Governments (NFSSG)" during
a conference held from February 4 to 8, 2008. This same resolution formally sought to "review and
[revise] the Guidelines Governing PTAs/PTCAs at the School Level as contained in DepED Order No. 23, s.
2003.

8) People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 628

FACTS

Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O. Oil Company. The
main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural
gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling
their shares to individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from the
Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act
No. 2581, commonly known as the Blue Sky Law.

Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to
offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under
obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated
therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.

Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that “whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied,
either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or
corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the
Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or
permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the
provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents
are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer
shall furthermore have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said
certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within
the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.”

The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon a promise of future
promotion and development of the oil business, rather than on actual tangible assets. On appeal,
Rosenthal & Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes undue
delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer.

ISSUE

Whether there is undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer

RULING

NO.

The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the
issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act
must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied
with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of
the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions
of Act 2581 have been complied with.

Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.” In view of the intention and
purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public against “speculative schemes which have no more basis than
so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells,
distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, the Supreme Court held that “public
interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a
matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.

Also, Act 2581 allows appeal from the decision of the Treasurer to the Sec of Finance. Hence, it cannot
be contended that the Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence.

The maxim “delegatus non potest delegare” has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate
legislation”, in practically all modern governments. Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the
authority. While courts have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest is to decide each case
according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be
achieved.

The Supreme Court upheld the assailed decision.

9) Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533

FACTS

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2
(MC 2) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

The POEA ruled in her favor. She was awarded a substantial sum of money for the death of her husband
pursuant to MC 2 which prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment as well as stipulations on
death benefits and burial for the families of overseas workers.

The Petitioner and former employer of deceased, Eastern Shipping is questioning the validity of
Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as a violation of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that the POEA had no authority to promulgate the MC No. 2; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle,
is not subject to delegation.

ISSUE

W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 (MC 2) violates the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

RULING

NO.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.

2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

In the case at bar, MC 2 actually complies with the given tests. The model contract prescribed by MC 2
has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of
the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as
there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."

Specifically, the authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of
the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the spread of specialized activities and their respective peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by
filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
given effect by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulation (i.e. implementing
rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code) These regulations have the force and
effect of law.
10) Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

FACTS

Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into
colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did
not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical
Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987,
Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or
successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which
established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate
of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-
1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition
for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT
was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil
Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the
petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. 2382 offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the
delegate, the Board of Medical Education.

RULING:

No. The general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from and
reinforces the more fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great
departments of government, must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the
Medical Act of 1959, deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the
practice of medicine in our present day world.

SC held that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the
body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the non-delegation principle.
 Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take
and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power.

11) Viola v. Alunan, 277 SCRA 409

FACTS

Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art III, Sec.1-2 of
the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third vice presidents and for
auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.

He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493 which
mentions as elective positions only those of the president, vice president, and five members of the
board of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision,
and national levels and thus the implementing rules expand the numbers in the LGC in violation of the
principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law
they are designed to implement.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sec 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid.

RULING

The creation of these positions was actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng Mga
Barangay, which was adopted by the First Barangay National Assembly with the proviso in Section 1
thereof that “The Board may create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management
of the chapter” and Section 2 thereof specifically provides that the National Liga shall be composed of
the presidents of the provincial Liga chapters, highly urbanized and independent component city
chapters, and the metropolitan chapter who shall directly elect their respective officers, namely, a
president, executive vice president; first, second, and third vice president, auditor, secretary general;
and five (5) members to constitute the Board of Directors of the National Liga.

Furthermore, the creation of additional positions is authorized by Sec. 493 of the LGC which in fact
requires – and not merely authorizes – the board of directors to “create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter”. To begin with, the creation of these positions was
actually made in the Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga barangay which was adopted by the
First Barangay National Assembly.

There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC decisions have upheld the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish, or merge offices
in the executive management.
While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the needs
of the chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to create
additional positions not only for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal,
city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be no
different from the local chapters. The fact is that Sec. 493 grants the power to create positions not only
to the boards of the local chapters but to the board of the Liga at the national level as well.

12) Abakada v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1

FACTS

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the
Constitution.

RULING

1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives,
the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when
it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise
and franchise taxes.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority;
in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

13) Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168

FACTS

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a
primordial governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the
State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily
determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating
against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made
arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994.
The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and
by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15,
1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on
August 23, 1994.

On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks
shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a
maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. ” Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. — The
Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years,
extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to
extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and
public safety.”

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been
operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating the
Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks
and Blood Processing Laboratories.”

The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed
physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories.

On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for
certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the
aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;

RULING

As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention
of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because
it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was
incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the
Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the
two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of
commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus
constituting undue delegation of legislative power.

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee
or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the
Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the
provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and
has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial
blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the
Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a
safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred
the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.

Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The Secretary of Health has been
given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of
the Act states:

'SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. ' The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance
with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the
approval hereof

This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body's
authority and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled
in the details of the law for its proper implementation.

Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial
blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 'based on the result of a careful
study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the
existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said
phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and
discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as
to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.

In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-
out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the
state:

a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public
consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service
and not a sale of commodity;

c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and
blood products;

d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards caused by
the commercial sale of blood;

e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health
subjects of the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the non-formal
system;

f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary and
non-profit collection of blood;

g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood

Transfusion Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and safe
supply of blood;

h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and
providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for costs from patients
who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and non-governmental entities;

i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit
basis;

j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection units
and blood banks/centers in the Philippines;

k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and
banking of blood; and,

l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and education to

control the spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases.
14) Abakada v. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251

FACTS

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A.
9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).
It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless
of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, which a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and
bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these
officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There
is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides
that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the
target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the
fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or
BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law, when
legislative function should have been deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the
law. Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the creation of the congressional
oversight committee under the law enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures
the fulfilment of the legislative policy.
ISSUES

1. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.

2. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.

RULING

1. NO.

To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate’s authority to announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under
which it is to be implemented.

R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act.
Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and
equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” In this case, the
declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
BOC is infused with public interest.

2. YES.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 having approved the IRR formulated by the
DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC on May 22, 2006, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing
the law may be considered moot and academic. Nevertheless the Court confronted the constitutionality
of the Joint Congressional.
Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation
of power in the executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment
“beyond the legislative sphere,” the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the “single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures” specified under the Constitution, including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.

In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on
Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to
ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter
pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a
congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has
by law initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution‘s
diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own
laws.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive
or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby partially granted. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of
RA 9335 is upheld.

15) Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, 242 SCRA 192

FACTS

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a TRO, where petitioners
assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and its authority to
issue the same.

Petitioner Fernandez was the Director of Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit while co-petitioner de
Lima was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Relations both at the Central Office of CSC. While
in service, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by respondents Patricia Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr. –
chairman and commissioner, respectively. The resolution merged some of the CSC departments; it
renamed other departments; basically, it reorganized the functions and personnel assigned in some
departments. Such changes were justified under Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides
that ". . . as an independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization
as the need arises.

During the general assembly of officers and employees of the CSC, Sto. Tomas expressed the
implementation of the resolution unless restrained by higher authority. Hence, Petitioners filed this
petition. During the pendency of the petition, petitioners filed for issuance of a TRO alleging that they
received office orders from CSC assigning Fernandez to Region V and de Lima to Region III. The Court
granted the TRO.

Petitioners alleged that CSC has no legal authority to issue the subject resolution. They also argued that
the resolutions effected the abolition of public offices, something which may be done only by the same
legislative authority which created those public offices in the first place.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CSC has the legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710?

RULING:

YES.

The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept petitioner’s argument. The term "public
office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by
that individual for the benefit of the public.

We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the
law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by
Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of
public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it very
difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different
"Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it
were, the internal organization of the commission until it might please Congress to change such internal
organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the
legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization,"
as the need [for such changes] arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative
authority was necessary to carry out the kinds of changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and
the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated
to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected
in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need
arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987
Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel
agency of the Government [to] establish a career service, adopt measures to promote — efficiency —
[and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel functions shall be decentralized,
delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies where such functions
can be effectively performed.

16) Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253

Background
In 1968, R.A. 5435 authorized the President of the Philippines, with the help of Commission on
Reorganization, to recognize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned
or controlled by it.

Purpose was to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.

FACTS

The Congress passed the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RA 6743)
pursuant to Article 10, Section 18 of the Constitution. A plebiscite was called in some provinces which
resulted in 4 provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi) in favor of creating an
autonomous region and therefore became the ARMM. The RA says that those provinces and cities who
did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their existing administrative regions provided, however, that
the President may merge the existing regions through administrative determination.

President Cory then issued the EO containing the provinces/cities that will be “merged,” transferring
provinces from their existing region to another. The petitioners who are members of the Congress
representing legislative districts protested the Executive Order, saying that there is no law which
authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within existing regions and restructure them
to new administrative regions. The transfer of one province under its current region to another (ex:
Misamis Occidental from Region X to IX) is a form of reorganization, an alteration of the existing
structures of the government.

The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president to merge existing regions and cannot be construed as
reorganizing them.

ISSUE

W/N the power to merge administrative regions is legislative (petitioner’s stand) in character or
executive as the respondents contend

ARGUMENTS

Petitioners:
It unduly delegates power to the President to merge regions through administrative determination or at
any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated

Respondents:

No undue delegation but only a grant of power to fill up or provide the details of legislation because the
Congress did not have the facility to provide for them

RULING

Petition is DISMISSED.

The creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President
pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power to merge the
existing regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,

Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of
administrative regions in 1972. (RA5453)

This was also the basis for the sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise
of power. Standard can be gathered or implied. Standard can be found in the same policy underlying
grant of

power to the President in RA No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department:

“to promote simplicity, economy, efficiency, in the government to enable it to pursue its programs
consisted with the national goals for accelerated social and economic development.”

17) Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, 677 SCRA 408

FACTS

On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,... among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division
(IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affidavit[2] for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities

Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely,
Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose
from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred

Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order[3] signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In
compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to

Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of
grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-
10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the

Ombudsman.

Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course
of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition

ISSUES

I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC
OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO APPROPRIATE
FUNDS.

III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-
JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

ARGUMENTS

In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized
under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a... new, additional and distinct
office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to
create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies
but has also encroached upon the... powers of the Ombudsman.

Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292
for him to reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the
abolition of an office but the creation of one as well.

Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is reserved to
the Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the legislature, to
administrative agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof
itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.

RULING

The President has Continuing Authority... to Reorganize the Executive Department... under E.O. 292.

Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following... actions undertaken for such
purpose:
 1. Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or... transferring
functions from one unit to another;

2. Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies;
and

3. Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within
the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated
legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.

Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office
or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way
around. Only Section 31(1) gives the President a... virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure
of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition,
consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices
from one unit to... another.

The Reorganization Did not Entail... the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.

The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the
duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the
ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization
required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the
establishment of a third division the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA
could take on the additional functions it has... been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.

The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued
in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy
and efficiency. It appears in this case... that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the
President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind. In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases
for the reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the government and... promoting
economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economic effects of the reorganization is shown
by the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the
2010 annual budget, no separate... or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required
after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.

Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and
maintain its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's
Offices under the General Appropriations Act of 2011.

Petitioner asseverates, however, that since Congress did not indicate the manner by which the
appropriation for the Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational
funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President.

The contention is without legal basis.

There is no usurpation of the legislative... power to appropriate public funds.

In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to
recommend the budget necessary for the operation of the Government,.which implies that he has the
necessary authority to evaluate and determine the structure that... each government agency in the
executive department would need to operate in the most economical and efficient manner. Hence, the
express recognition under Section 78 of R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the
President's authority to

"direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." The aforecited
provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of
the President's power to reorganize the executive offices and... agencies under him, which is, "even to
the extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose."

And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given
constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in
other items of the appropriation for his office.

In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any funds appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau... or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IADODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for
the IADODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget... without committing
any illegal appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds
when the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his
office.

The IAD-ODESLA is a fact- finding... and recommendatory body not vested... with quasi- judicial
powers.

while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve
cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of... reports and
submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers,
functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."

Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the
President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.

The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator
cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive
Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of... the Constitution
provides:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive
department.
18) Arroyo v. DOJ, 681 SCRA 181

NATURE:

These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R. No.
199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our
September 18, 2012 Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against
respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino
M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint
Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases

In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14,
2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed
perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected
to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.

On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:

1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules
of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and
2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the
preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the
Comelec.

2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the
Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction
RULING

1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in
the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for
election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot consider the creation of the
Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction"
authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to
deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition
on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation
where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for
preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of
substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of
jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that
the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.

Petition is denied

19) La Suerte v. CA, 739 SCRA 489

FACTS

These cases involve the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco imported and locally purchased by cigarette
manufacturers for use as raw material in the manufacture of their cigarettes. Under the Tax Code, if it is
to be exported or to be used in the manufacture of cigars, cigarettes, or other tobacco products on
which the excise tax will eventually be paid on the finished product.

La Suerte was assessed by the BIR for excise tax deficiency amounting to more than 34 million pesos. La
Suerte protested invoking the Tax Code which allows the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco as raw material
by one manufacturer directly to another without payment of the excise tax. However, the CIR insisted
that stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to excise tax "unless there is an express grant of exemption from
[the] payment of tax."
La Suerte petitioned for review before the CTA which cancelled the assessment. The CIR appealed to the
CA which reversed the CTA. The CIR invoked a revenue regulation (RR) which limits the exemption from
payment of specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco to sales transactions between manufacturers classified
as L-7 permittees.

ISSUES

[1] Is stemmed leaf tobacco subject to excise (specific) tax?

[2] Is purchase of stemmed leaf tobacco from manufacturers who are not classified as L-7 permittees
subject to tax?

[3] Is the RR valid?

[4] Is the possessor or owner, or importer or exporter, of stemmed leaf tobacco liable for the payment
of specific tax if such tobacco product is removed from the place of production without payment of said
tax?

[5] Does the imposition of excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco under Section 141 of the 1986 Tax Code
constitute double taxation, considering they are paying the specific tax on the raw material and on the
finished product in which the raw material was a part?

RULING

[1] Yes, excise taxes on domestic products shall be paid by the manufacturer or producer before[the]
removal [of those products] from the place of production." "It does not matter to what use the article[s]
subject to tax is put; the excise taxes are still due, even though the articles are removed merely for
storage in some other place and are not actually sold or consumed.

When tobacco is harvested and processed either by hand or by machine, all itsproducts become subject
to specific tax. Section 141 reveals the legislative policy to tax all forms of manufactured tobacco — in
contrast to raw tobacco leaves — including tobacco refuse or all other tobacco which has been cut, split,
twisted, or pressed and is capable of being smoked without further industrial processing.

Stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to the specific tax under Section 141(b). It is a partially prepared
tobacco. The removal of the stem or midrib from the leaf tobacco makes the resulting stemmed leaf
tobacco a prepared or partially prepared tobacco.
Despite the differing definitions for "stemmed leaf tobacco" under revenue regulations, the onus of
proving that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to the specific tax lies with the cigarette
manufacturers. Taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception.

[2] Stemmed leaf tobacco transferred in bulk between cigarette manufacturers are exempt from excise
tax under the Tax Code vis-a-vis RRs.

Section 137 authorizes a tax exemption subject to the following: (1) that the stemmed leaf tobacco is
sold in bulk as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another; and (2) that the sale or transfer
has complied with the conditions prescribed by the Department of Finance.

The conditions under which stemmed leaf tobacco may be transferred from one factory to another
without prepayment of specific tax are as follows: (a) The transfer shall be under an official L-7 invoice
on which shall be entered the exact weight of the tobacco at the time of its removal; (b) Entry shall be
made in the L-7 register in the place provided on the page for removals; and (c) Corresponding debit
entry shall bemade in the L-7 register book of the factory receiving the tobacco under the heading,
"Refuse, etc.,received from the other factory," showing the date of receipt, assessment and invoice
numbers, name and address of the consignor, formin which received, and the weight of the tobacco.

[3] Yes, valid. Under Section 3(h) of RR No. 17-67, entities that were issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue with an L-7 permit refer to "manufacturers of tobacco products." Hence, the transferor and
transferee of the stemmed leaf tobacco must be an L-7 tobacco manufacturer.

The reason behind the tax exemption of stemmed leaf tobacco transferred between two L-7
manufacturers is that the same had already been previously-taxed when acquired by the L-7
manufacturer from dealers of tobacco. There is no new product when stemmed leaf tobacco is
transferred between two L-7 permit holders. Thus, there can be no excise tax that will attach. The
regulation, therefore, is reasonable and does not create a new statutory right.

Moreover, although delegation is not allowed as a rule, the power to fill in the details and manner as
to the enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to various specialized
administrative agencies.

[4] Importation of stemmed leaf tobacco not included in the exemption. The transaction contemplated
in Section 137 does not include importation of stemmed leaf tobacco for the reason that the law uses
the word "sold" to describe the transaction of transferring the raw materials from one manufacturer to
another.
[5] In this case, there is no double taxation in the prohibited sense because the specific tax is imposed by
explicit provisions of the Tax Code on two different articles or products: (1) on the stemmed leaf
tobacco; and (2) on cigar or cigarette.

20) People v. Vera 65 Phil. 56

FACTS

This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for the issuance of the writ

of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may

review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled "The
People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more particularly the application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and
thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further
the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may
be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this
court in said case (G. R. No. 41200).

The Court of First Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction

sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years

and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with

reservation of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking

Corporation. The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the

herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936, before the trial court, under the

provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of

the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent

Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19,

1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of

legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution)
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, herein
petitioners allege that the respondent judge has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his
jurisdiction:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probation for the following reason:

(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only to the
provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the
City of Manila.

ISSUE

Whether or not Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional? (YES)

RULING:

YES. Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

RATIO: In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual
to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature. To a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be
adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. For the purpose of
Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to
determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. They are the agents or
delegates of the legislature in this respect.

That a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is
true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or
the adoption by the people of a particular community. The power to ascertain facts is such a power
which may be delegated.
But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the Prohibition Act contingent
upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have
already said, the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. the discretion
vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate
conditions or find any fact, or await the happening of any specified contingency. The various provincial
boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation
Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdiction, constitutions provided that laws may be
suspended only by the legislature or by its authority.

True, the statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the
Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority to
appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers, they thereby are given
absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect or operate in their
respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the
operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance until the provincial
boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested
by what has been done but by what may be done under its provisions.

We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.

21) United States v. Barrias, 11 Phil. 32

FACTS

In the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the defendant was charged within a violation of
paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs, duly published in the
Official Gazette and approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice. 1 After a demurrer to the
complaint of the lighter Maude, he was moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden, in
the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external
power. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows:

No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River
without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.
Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine
of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

In this court, counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: First that it
is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission
bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as
constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.

By sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 1136, passed April 29, 1904, the Collector of Customs is authorized to
license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands,
and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed. Sections 5
and 8 read as follows:

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and
directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to
regulate the business herein licensed.

SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and
issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more
than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both
such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be
punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section
or by both.

ISSUE

Wheher or not Act 1136 is Constitutional. (YES)

RULING
YES. So much of the judgment of the Court of First Instance as convicts the defendant of a violation of
Acts Nos. 355 and 1235 is hereby revoked and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a
fine of 25 dollars, with costs of both instances. So ordered.

RATIO

The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor
regulations is recognized throughout the world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use
more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the
proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power.

The complaint in this instance was framed with reference, as its authority, to sections 311 and 319 [19
and 311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and
1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to
"fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.

This provision of the statute does, indeed, present a serious question.

One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to
make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign
power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency
alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted can not relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its
substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the
people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.)

This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right
but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. Having
reached the conclusion that Act No. 1136 is valid, so far as sections 5 and 8 are concerned, and is
sufficient to sustain this prosecution, it is unnecessary that we should pass on the questions discussed in
the briefs as to the extend and validity of the other acts. The reference to them in the complaint is not
material, as we have frequently held that where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an
additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.

22) United States v. Panlilio, 28 Phil. 608

Doctrine:

The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officer or body issued pursuant to a statute have
the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not an offense punishable
by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.

FACTS

The defendant was notified in writing on February 22, 1913, by a duly authorized agent of the Director
of agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga
Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were
accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent of the
Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the Director of
Agriculture. It appears from the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that the defendant fully
understood that, according to the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, he was not to remove the
animals, or to permit anyone else to remove them from the quarantine in which they had been placed.
In spite, however, of all this, the carabaos were taken from the corral by the commands of the accused
and driven from place to place on his hacienda, and were used as work animals thereon in the same
manner as if they had not been quarantined.

The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not
constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof. Hence, this appeal from a judgment of the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga convicting the accused of a violation of the law
relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases
and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs of the trial.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture.

RULING

NO.
The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760 committed
by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were in quarantine, to
be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda. An amended
information was filed. It failed, however, to specify that section of Act No. 1760 alleged to have been
violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial.

The only sections of Act No. 1760, which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and 5. This
case does not fall within any of them. Section 3 provides, in effect, that it shall be unlawful for any
person, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal
suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any of the effects
pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands. Section 4
declares, substantially, that it shall be unlawful for any reason, firm, or corporation knowingly to ship,
drive or otherwise take or transport from one island, province, municipality, township, or settlement to
another any domestic animal suffering from any dangerous communicable diseases or to expose such
animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway where it may come in contact with other
domestic animals. Section 5 provides that whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall declare that a
dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island, province, municipality, township, or
settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease by shipping, driving or otherwise
transporting or taking out of such island, province, municipality, township, or settlement any class of
domestic animal, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive or otherwise
remove the kind of animals so specified from such locality except when accompanied by a certificate
issued by the authority of the Director of Agriculture stating the number and the kind of animals to be
shipped, driven, taken or transported, their destination, manner in which they are authorized to be
shipped, driven, taken, or transported, and their brands and distinguishing marks.

A simple reading of these sections demonstrates clearly that the case at bar does not fall within any of
them. There is no question here of importation and there is no charge or proof that the animals in
question were suffering from a dangerous communicable disease or that the Secretary of the Interior
had made the declaration provided for in section 5 or that the accused had driven or taken said animals
from one island, province, municipality, township or settlement to another. It was alleged had been
exposed to a dangerous communicable disease and that they had been placed in a corral in quarantine
on the premises of the accused and that he, in violation of the quarantine, had taken them from the
corral and worked them upon the lands adjoining. They had not been in highway nor moved from one
municipality or settlement to another. They were left upon defendant's hacienda, where they were
quarantined, and there worked by the servants of the accused.

The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not applicable to
the case at bar and also admits that section 7 of the said Act is not applicable. This section provides:
"Whenever the Director of Agriculture shall order any animal placed in quarantine in accordance with
the provisions of this Act, the owner of such animal, or his agent, shall deliver it at the place designated
for the quarantine and shall provide it with proper food, water, and attendance. Should the owner or his
agent fail to comply with this requirement the Director of Agriculture may furnish supplies and
attendance needed, and the reasonable cost of such supplies and attendance shall be collectible from
the owner or his agent."

We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect to this section, as we
are with his opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. the law nowhere makes it a penal offense to refuse to
comply with the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so phrased as to warrant the conclusion
that it was intended to be a penal section. The section provides the means by which the refusal of the
owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the punishment, if we may call it punishment, which
he shall receive by reason of that refusal. It has none of the aspects of a penal provision or the form or
substance of such provision. It does not prohibit any act. It does not compel an act nor does it really
punish or impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be
inflicted are so phrased as to make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 provides the punishment
for any act declared unlawful by the law.

The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar. Section
6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph (c) "to
require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed
thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to
prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation
of such orders.

Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." A
violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of
the provisions of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to
have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is
not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and
penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture

However, the accused is accordingly convicted of a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal
Code, and is sentenced to pay a fine of seventy pesetas (P14) and censure, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and the costs of this appeal. So ordered.

23) People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450

This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.

Doctrine:

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be

sanctioned.

FACTS

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura and four others, were charged by a Constabulary investigator in
the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It
was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro
fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped
with motor; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire
on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the
dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish through electric current,
which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the
populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance
at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that,
since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider it unlawful.

Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in
fishing.Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance
in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years. The Fisheries Law does not
expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63
O.G. 9963).Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by
the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes,
swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water."

The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable
under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other
violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender
to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in
the discretion of the court." In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84
and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes
fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Fisheries Administrative Order 84 was within the authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries to promulgate.

RULING

NO.

The Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of
fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.

The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law;
(2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the
regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the
purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and
[h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our
fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides
that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
"shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not
warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law
does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In
other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any
legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect
could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking
of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and
quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing
electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations"
because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for
fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as
the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).

Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against
electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that
electro fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances
strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing.

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law
and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704,
which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which
was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and
salt water areas.

The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of
the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive
regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil.
419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel
vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).

The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-
46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78
Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).

There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers.
Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions,
orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the
provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the
Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704. Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower
the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purpose" of that
enactment "and for the development of fisheries."

Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the
power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and
other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict
enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said
Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except
as expressly authorized by law."

Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law
(Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs.
Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of
the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute
for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his
own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries
Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro
fishing.

24) People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90

Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase, of an
alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by law but without a specification as to the term or
duration thereof.

As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks to set aside the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte penned by herein respondent judge granting the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by herein private respondents.
Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670,
otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32
thereof.

FACTS

A criminal case was filed against herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval
and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of
Hindang, Leyte for violation of Republic Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers.

Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the
former Court of First Instance of Leyteto restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of
Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case upon the ground that the
former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.

In an amended petition, they further alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for
the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being
unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if
the latter were the legislative department of the Government.
Respondent judge rendered the challenged decision holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is
valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city
courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary
investigation.

The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:

Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher
in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to
defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than
one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court. (Emphasis supplied).

Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging from P100.00
to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment.

It is apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of
imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no
equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the
phrase "in the discretion of the court.

CONTENTIONS

PRIVATE RESPONDENTS:

Sec. 32 is unconstitutional because it is an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the Government

PETITIONER:

The discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to determine the period of
imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue delegation of legislative power.

The prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned only with the delegation of
power to make laws and not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670
vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to choose which of the
alternative penalties shall be imposed.
RESPONDENT JUDGE:

The principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of
sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime.

In such instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use legislative
power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration of justice and the
application of existing laws to the facts of particular cases.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional

RULING

YES, SECTION 32 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Section 32 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that legislative power
cannot be delegated:

One is the doctrine of separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers of
government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion?

The second is the concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to
private persons.

Lastly, there is the maxim of agency "Delegata potestas non potest delegari.”

An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the
courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when
the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a MERE LEGAL DISCRETION which is exercised in
discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to
follow.
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of
imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to
ascertain the term or period of imprisonment.

It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature.

What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of
service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law, the ABSENCE OF WHICH DESIGNATED LIMITS WELL CONSTITUTE SUCH EXERCISE AS
AN UNDUE DELEGATION, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with
neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority.

The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even
the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of
respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be
allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as
applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability
of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality has to yield.

On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act
No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby,
declared unconstitutional.

25) Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS

In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao and
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat InspectionCommission may see fit for the
carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as theDirector of Animal Industry may see fit in the
case of the carabaos.

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see
fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal
Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty.

On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo inviolation of EO 626-A. He
issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of saidEO. The trial court sustained the
confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked
authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.

ISSUE

(1) Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause.

RULING

(1) YES. EO 626-A is unconstitutional.

To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present: (a) that the interests of the
public, generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b)
that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose.

In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—that is, the
carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a
lawful subject of the order, and that the method chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those
seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately works for the
conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion.

Here, while EO 626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably,
said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The
object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial
transport of the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be killed anywhere, with
no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining them in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them
there.

Even if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid
as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio
case, here, no trial is prescribed and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when
notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement of a public nuisance,
summary destruction of pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However,
these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the
need to correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present.

The manner by which the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid
delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and Director of the NMIC and AI
respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said
officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about
it as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even
corruption.

26) Philippine Coconut v. RepublicG.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

27) Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013 (See Lecture 1)

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 5: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.

1. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

2. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative.

3. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

1) Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6, 2001

Facts: Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government --
the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or
organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list
representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives
as regular members.4 In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list representative.5 Specifically, this system of representation is
mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.

Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy declaration,
the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House
of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. The
requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in
this wise:

"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines
shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the
party-list system.

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent
of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the]
Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up
of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the
two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional
provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives
who should actually sit in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking
the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA’s
Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998.

On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it
disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it
identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52
seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should
represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party
system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent
threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x
should have at least one representative.
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of
having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that
(1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two
percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives;
and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered
the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as
provided by said Section 11.

In its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three
commissioners concurring11 and two members12 dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second
Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS),
"pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors."

Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this
Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system. In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38
parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to
party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of
additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec "to CEASE and
DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other
date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions
enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court."

ISSUES:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

RULING:

1. It is merely a ceiling.

We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally
simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the
percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.

In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress
declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes."
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House
of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:

"(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats."

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical
impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this
percentage requirement rests in Congress.17 Our task now, as should have been the Comelec’s, is not
to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to
craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the
context of the actual election process.

Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to
apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional,
ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command
of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.

2. It is constitutional

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We
quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:

"SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised
by, I think, Senator Osmeña when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum
percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.

They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5
percent or 10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political
party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to
represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the
backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the
following shows:

"MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five
percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors.
There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other
parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany."

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine.
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and
the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them.21 But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation,
and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.

2) Philippine Guardians v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2009

FACTS:

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution
No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected
was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate
in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional
sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its
authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the
admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List
System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:

(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke Section 4
of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered with the
Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the Commission, not
later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-
list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the
2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose
whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed;

(2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association,
also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections – cannot apply in the instant controversy for two
reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI’s; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting,
was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by
Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the
Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other
party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to prevent
a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the same Section
6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.

The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941.3
The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization does
not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or
coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment
would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly
gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to
have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in
Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC
when it moved to reconsider its delisting.
The Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety
Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero);4 we said that
no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and
jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following
reasoning:

Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at
all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in
the two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.

PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI
claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing
jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow
the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on
October 19, 1994.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Minero Ruling may be used as legal basis for delisting PGBI.

RULING: NO.

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.6 The word
"or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s
cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-
participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold
party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate
in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a
confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative
intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two
different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law – in
jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and
hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.8

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for
Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC9 (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2%
party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold
in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to
garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat
ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and
applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is,10 and as an exception to the
application of the principle of stare decisis.

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly
an erroneous application of the law – an application that the principle of stability or predictability of
decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent
of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by
the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from
our ruling case law.

3) BANAT v. COMELEC, 586 SCRA 210

Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

FACTS:

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20%
shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2%
of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the
2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported
by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-
list seat prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with
the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed
20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be
discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat
rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are
allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUE

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

RULING

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution
provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However,
the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in
fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May
2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio,
there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to

Party-List Representatives

Hence,

(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-
list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house.
However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only
party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less
than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the
ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the
100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats
to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number
of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of
occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is
guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get
a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all
the additional seats are allocated.

LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats
for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less
the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all
party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one
seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total
available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total
55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text
of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for
the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20%
allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number
of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted
for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the
total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank
in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc)from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their
deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections
provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation),
Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who
ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections
of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the
party-list system.

4) Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

FACTS

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are
even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual
orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field
personnel.

ISSUE

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds

RULING

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that
only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration
of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage
the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at
best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and
a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

5) Magdalo v. COMELEC, 673 SCRA 651

FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC,
seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital
Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO where it held
that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section
2(5) of the Constitution. It is common knowledge that the party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator
Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent civilian personnel
were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly
show their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the
process defying the laws of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC En Banc for
resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009,
in which it clarified its intention to participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a
party-list group. COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.

ISSUE

Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the Petition for Registration
filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to achieve its goals through violent or unlawful
means?

RULING

No.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: election

To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step process of registration
and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws;
accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to
qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated
otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once
registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that
"seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall be denied registration. This
disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which
seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of
vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that
force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the
other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that
the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the
COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the
elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to
assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by
employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although this
process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only limited to the
evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless
analogously applicable.

6) Dayao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193643, January 29, 2013

FACTS

LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in the LPG and
energy sector. It sought to register as a party-list organization for the May 10, 2010 elections and was
approved by the COMELEC.

Petitioners filed a complaint and petition before the COMELEC for the cancellation of LPGMA’s
registration as a party-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector
of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or
underrepresented citizens.
In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require
that party-list representatives must be members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector
of the society. It also averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost chance to oppose
the petition for registration.

The COMELEC dismissed the complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the
petitioners is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the
complaint is actually a belated opposition to LPGMA’s petition for registration which has long been
approved with finality. Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were denied.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for registration bars the action of complainants.

2) Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System Act (RA 7941) require that incorporators,
officers and members of a party-list must be marginalized or underrepresented citizens.

RULING

There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation. However, in light of
COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought to be dismissed.

1) An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint
for cancellation.

Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list
accreditation, viz:

Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.

The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious

purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.

For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a party-list group,
the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1) due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group
concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.

2) In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,36 the Court explained that the "laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections" referred to in paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941,37 which
declares the underlying policy for the law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens
become members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does
not comply with this policy must be disqualified.

The party-list system of representation was crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented and
their alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no need to categorically mention that
"those who are not marginalized and underrepresented are disqualified."

All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for
cancellation of LPGMA’s party-list accreditation. In the ordinary course of procedure, the herein
complaint should be remanded to the COMELEC. However, on August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 9513 which subjected to summary evidentiary hearings all existing and registered
party-list groups, including LPGMA, to assess their continuing compliance with the requirements of
R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines set in Ang Bagong Bayani. The Resolution stated, among others, that
the registration of all non-compliant groups shall be cancelled. LPGMA submitted to a factual and
evidentiary hearing before the COMELEC and was deemed to have complied with all requirements for
registration.

7) Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R.No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos.
9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed
the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc
scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that
filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong
Bayani).

39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC to
include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

RULING

No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that
the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to
non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first
"three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties
only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate
in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the
party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only
option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941

8) Abang Lingkod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013

FACTS

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and
fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain
the number of votes needed in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of Representatives.

On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC August 9, 2012 resolution,
filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941.

In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKOD
registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track
record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered
photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.

ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated
with the separate petitions filed by 51 other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or
who were denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list groups, including ABANG
LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from the court.

The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including
that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system
pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to
participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.

On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which, inter alia, affirmed the
cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the
Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May
13, 2013 elections as the reason therefor. ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the
COMELEC's Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew
the motion for reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition
with this Court, alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits
of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were already being canvassed
and consolidated by the COMELEC.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?

2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s
registration under the party-list system.

RULING

ABANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.

Administrative due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative or

quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the
absolute lack of notice or hearing.

In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds that
the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing
its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration
was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent
and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A.
No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its claim that it
was denied due process.

There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to assess
the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of
Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list group are already
in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole
purpose of determining ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system pursuant to Atong
Paglaumwould just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require the
COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications
of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups.

Cancellation of party-list registration

R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit proof
of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani
where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration
under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia, track record that they truly represent
the marginalized and underrepresented.

In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who may
register under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional
parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizations
that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature,
economically marginalized and underrepresented.

Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no
longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have
undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient
that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent.

9) Lico v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205505, September 20, 2015

FACTS

Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization registered under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,
also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
for the 10 May 2010 Elections. It filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico
as first nominee

COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.

Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath
of office and thereafter assumed office.

Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, Ating Koop
issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed
by its nominees

Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term

Ating Koop introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was
the composition of the Central Committee. The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an
election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second NationalConvention.

In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to
hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee.

The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group. Almost one year
after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop
for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as
cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.

Rimas Group filed before COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico which prayed that petitioner Lico
be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives

COMELEC dismissed the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the House of
Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second Nominee of ATING KOOP
Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party Representative, for lack of jurisdiction

ISSUE

Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction

RULING

NO.
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the
House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the
validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview.

The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list representative as a
disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction,
insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires
jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the
nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.35 In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he
assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has
jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

10) Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106

FACTS

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”.

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 767.,
President Ramos signed it into law.

Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The people of Mandaluyong were
asked whether they approved the conversion. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of these
results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect.
Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46 thereof, is
unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one bill” rule which states that
every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof They also alleged that the subject law embraced two principal subjects, namely: 1. the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the division of the congressional
district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said
division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained
the minimum population requirements.

ISSUE

Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may increase

RULING

YES.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The present composition of the Congress may
be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.

The provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation
mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

11) Mariano v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS

Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail
Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Another petition which contends the
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and
concerned citizen.

ISSUE

Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article
VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow
the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the
Constitution

RULING

No. Increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in RA No. 7854 is
not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution.—

Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in
R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1,
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned
in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows: “Within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.” In short, the clause refers to a general
reapportionment law.

12) Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700

FACTS

The 1987 Constitution apportioned two (2) Legislative Districts to the province of Maguindanao
(which is part of the ARMM).

The first legislative district is composed of Cotabato City and 8 Municipalities, however Cotabato City
is not part of ARMM but Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM.
On August 28, 2006, the ARMM regional assembly (ARMM’s legislature) exercised its power under
Section 19 of RA 9504 [Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA 201)] creating the province of
Shari Kabunsuan.

On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the first
legislative district into its own separate province of Shari Kabunsuan.

On March 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. (RN) 07-0407 maintaining the status quo of
Cotabato City as part of the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

On March 29, 2007, the COMELEC promulgated RN 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative
district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA 201

On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued RN 7902 by renaming the first legislative district as the
province of Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City.

The petitioner, Sema, was a candidate in the May 14, 2007 elections for representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City. The petitioner prayed for the nullification of the RN 7902 and
exclusion of the votes casted by the inhabitants of Cotabato City in that office.

1. Sema contended that Shari Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in the congress under
Article 6, Section 5, paragraph 3 of the Constitution and section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. The petitioner claimed that in issuing RN 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power
to create or reapportion legislative districts.

The COMELEC through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contended:

1. The Petitioner wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify RN 7902 because the
COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial,
power

2. The writ of prohibition became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen
Dilangalen as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan province
with Cotabato City.
 2.

3. The respondent (Dilangalen) countered that the petitioner is estopped from questioning RN
7902, since in the petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, Sema indicated that she was seeking
election as representative of the province of Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City. The
respondent added that the RN 7902 is constitutional because it only renamed Maguindanao’s
first legislative district. The respondent further claimed that the COMELEC could not
reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to solely Cotabato City since the power of
reapportion lies exclusively with congress. Not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet
the population requirements under Article 6, Section 5, paragraph 3 of the Constitution (at
least 250,000 inhabitants).

ISSUE

Issues relating to Article VI, Section 5:

1. If the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan (created under MMA 201) is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives (HOR) without the need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province.

2. If the COMELEC resolution no. 7902 is constitutional, can the COMELEC reapportion
Maguindanao’s first legislative district to solely Cotabato City.

RULING
1. As mentioned earlier, Article X, Section 20, the ARMM Regional assembly may not create a
representative district nor may it create a province, because under Article VI, Section 5, paragraph 3
provinces automatically gets one representative district.

Each city with a population of at least two hundred and fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least have one representative in the House of Representatives. There is no provision in the
Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays, provided section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However,
the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or
any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”

A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the
power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to
create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves
the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city
automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create
a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

2. The court ordered the consolidation of GR 177597 and GR 178628 (If the COMELEC act in Ultra
Vires in issuing RN 7902). The petition in the latter echoed Sema’s contention that the COMELEC acted
ultra vires in issuing RA 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City a representative in the HOR.

The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative
districts out of existing ones.—Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power
to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises
these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local
legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased,
and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by
Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the “power of redistricting x x x
is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested
exclusively in Congress.

COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for
Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed
Maguindanao’s first legislative district.

Court Ruling:

The court declared Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities. Thus, the court declared VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating
the Province of Shari Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

13) Herrera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999

FACTS
In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have
the province subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election
Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay
captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. A
consensus was reached in favor of the division.

The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.

Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1
issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to
Guimaras—1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia,
and Sibunag)= 5 seats.

The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:

1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.

2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.

3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.

4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.

ISSUE

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?

RULING

COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and
adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching
along boundaries often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the
municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.

2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. As
required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members.
Also, under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for
purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being
a 4th class province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan
members and 2 districts.

4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the
number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters. The
districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified
by the National Statistics Office.

14) Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53

FACTS

RA 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City.
Petitioner Moises Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, challenged the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535 and sought to enjoin its implementation, the holding a
plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the disbursement of funds for said plebiscite,
on the following grounds:

a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a) of the
Local Government Code, as to the requirements of income, population and land area; seat of
government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its Implementing
Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of
barangay resolution; an

b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not the proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will result in a prohibited amendment
of the Constitution.

RULING
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed
by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites therefor.

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, we had occasion to stress that:

All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the
statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.

Every statute is presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular congressional
processes. A person asserting the contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and
unmistakably. Having this in mind, we now proceed to examine whether or not petitioner was able to
successfully overcome the presumption of validity accorded R.A. No. 8535.

The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited amendment of
the Constitution, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The ordinance appended to the Constitution
merely apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the
country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or appendix of the
Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.

Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof
to defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to
convince the Court with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to grant the reliefs he seeks.

15) Aldaba v. COMELEC G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts:

May 1, 2009, RA 9591 passed into a law, amending the Malolos Charter by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos is a contested fact given that the house bill
for this law relied on the undated certification issued by NSO that the population of Malolos will be
254,030 by year 2010 due its current population growth rate.

Petitioners, taxpayers and registered residents of Malolos filed this petition contending that RA 9591
is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250k for a city to merit
representation in Congress.

OSG contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a

determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance
with constitutional requirement.

Issue: Is RA 9591 unconstitutional as the population of Malolos has not met the population
requirements set forth by the Constitution?

Ruling:

RA 9591 is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district,
the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.[5] The only issue here is
whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the
purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections.
If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without
legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate assumption, the
population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic
projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to
250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately following election after the
attainment of the 250,000 population.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he
certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the
Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by
the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year
2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of
every year. In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by
the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence
of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by
this Court.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on
an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the
population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:

Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

16) Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated
from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12
October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (
250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:

Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a

new legislative district in a province.
HELD:

NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.”

There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and
the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a
representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a
population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province

17) Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

FACTS: On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the
province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and
63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del
Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).

On November 10, 2006, herein petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on
technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the
area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square
kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.

On May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province
consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land
area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

The Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

Movant-intervenors then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing
several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged that, prior to
the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case.

On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this
case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence the above motion. At the outset, it
must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for reconsideration of the original
parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, which states that the land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands", is
valid, for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC

RULING: Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which,
with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In
effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355
creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive
in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance,
which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must
be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court
should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.

Ratio legisest anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to
its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute, although it is not within its letter,
and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within
the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation
that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch
of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of
constitutionality of statutes. This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government
and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government
to accord a becoming courtesy for each other’s acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the
exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the
validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory
in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no
constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is
nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the
Court.

18) Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179670, December 8, 2008

FACTS: In 2006, Cagayan de Oro Congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts
in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. COMELEC
promulgated Recolution No. 7837 implementing RA 9371. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said
law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. Petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot
implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of
a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed
for the issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No.
9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801
which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro. The Court didn’t grant the
petitioner’s prayer for TRO thus the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to RA
9371.
Respondent averred that R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in
the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution; that the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries
of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition
or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and that R.A. No. 9371 did not bring
about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required.

Petitioner countered that Cagayan de Oro City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - the material
change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well as
of the people therein; that a voter's sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire
city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and
resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; and
that a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city
council for the other legislative district.

ISSUE: Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City
or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?

RULING: No, Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of
the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of
voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.

Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative
apportionment under its Section 5 which provides: xxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.xxx

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are
the local government units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that
the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. The creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X).

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has
been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment
of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting the standards for their
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing,
merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation.

Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently
represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative
apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power among districts." Hence, emphasis is given
to the number of people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the
representative districts. To ensure continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment,
Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.

In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10
expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the
modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of
two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria
established in the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement
of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry
out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit
because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of
the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of
government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a representative unit that may
or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate
unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in
their national affairs. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the
people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not
being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved
and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or
any other similar action on a legislative district.

The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the
territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the authority of the
Constitution and by action of the Legislature. As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an
"instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of government." As a corporate entity with a
distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole
benefit of its constituents.

Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even
imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite
requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local
Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment.

Section 6: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which
he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.

1) Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001

FACTS

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipinoparents. On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the UnitedStates
Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the UnitedStates. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippinecitizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. He
won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the Houseof Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondentCruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly electedRepresentative of the Second District of Pangasinan. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino whobecame an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-bornFilipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

RULING

YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are
those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has
to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On
the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

2) Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400

FACTS

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In
his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284
Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked
the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of
the election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate
of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed
the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes,
won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.

Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter
acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue.
On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office
for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Aquino then filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

ISSUE

1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant

disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the
sense of the COC)in the district he was running in

RULING

1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only
under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.

Mr. Nolledo:

I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide:

This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in
effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.

Mrs. Braid:

On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as
a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes

So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence.

Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile,
is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain.

While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting
election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through
assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate
falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.

Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC agreed
with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and
not just residence. The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of
residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .

Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident
and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election.
His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a
registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the
filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.

Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is
evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to
be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences
in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District
of Makati City.

Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which
is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.

Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year
residence in the district.

Decision

3) Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300

FACTS

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was
seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with
the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for
residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that
she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte.
The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of
petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile
in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different
places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as
required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to
petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed
to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

4) Perez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133944, October 28, 1999

FACTS

On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative
of the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998,
petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the district for at least
one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art. VI, §6 of the
Constitution.

On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,[11] dismissed the
petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative
for the Third District of Cagayan.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and
eventually pass upon private respondent’s eligibility for the office of Representative of the Third
District of Cagayan?

RULING:

…the following provision of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. ¾ Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
(COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

“As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private respondent was decided by the
First Division of the COMELEC on May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections
were held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already been proclaimed on May
16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for
reconsideration on May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11, 1998. Clearly,
this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for
disqualification even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The COMELEC
en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion because the proclamation of private respondent
barred further consideration of petitioner’s action. In the same vein, considering that at the time of
the filing of this petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a member of the House
of Representatives, this Court has no jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the
Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive original jurisdiction
over the petition for the declaration of private respondent’s ineligibility. As this Court held in
Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[14]”

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

When does section 6 of R.A. 6646 apply to petitions for disqualifying a candidate and when does it
not apply?
In the case supra, R.A 6646, section 6 cannot be applied since there was already a decision made by
COMELEC based on substantial evidence, dismissing the petition for disqualification, finding private
respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third District of
Cagayan.Accordingly he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office. It
thereforebarred further consideration of petitioner’s action.

“Petitioner’s remedies should have been:

1) to reiterate her prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the issuance of an
order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private respondent pending the hearing of
the said petition and, in the event the motion was denied before the proclamation of private
respondent, file a petition for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining order to enjoin
the proclamation of private respondent;

2) to file a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal within
ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as Representative-elect on May 16,
1998.”

“In the case of Lonzanida where this court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC
should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until
judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the
election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be
disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delayin g
tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.”

“…In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court held- ‘Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the
principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally
made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the
exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid
proclamation. Since private respondent’s petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the
annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the
area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation
to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of
office thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.”

“It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the
candidate from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election
laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his
disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.”
5) Fernandez v. HRET, 608 SCRA 733

FACTS: This petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court stems from
the Decision[1] in HRET CASE No. 07-034 for quo warranto entitled Jesus L. Vicente v. Danilo Ramon S.
Fernandez promulgated by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on December 16,
2008 as well as Minute Resolution No. 09-080 promulgated on April 30, 2009, likewise issued by the
HRET, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the questioned
Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DECLARES respondent Danilo Ramon S. Fernandez ineligible for the Office
of Representative of [the] First District of Laguna for lack of residence in the district and [ORDERS] him
to vacate his office.

Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of
Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he indicated his
complete/exact address as “No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision, Barangay Balibago, Sta.
Rosa City, Laguna” (alleged Sta. Rosa residence).

Private respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course to
and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification” before the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. This was forwarded to the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and docketed therein as SPA No. 07-046 (PES). Private respondent sought the cancellation
of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an alleged
material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections,
he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative
District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained
another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also outside the First District. The COMELEC (First
Division) dismissed said petition for lack of merit. Petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Laguna on June 27, 2007, having garnered a total of 95,927
votes, winning by a margin of 35,000 votes over the nearest candidate.

On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET, docketed as
HRET CASE No. 07-034, praying that petitioner be declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the
House of Representatives representing the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that
petitioner’s election and proclamation be annulled and declared null and void.
Since the HRET ruled in favor of private respondent, this petition was filed before us.

ISSUE: whether petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a
Member of the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution. (YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
HRET in HRET CASE No. 07-034 promulgated on December 16, 2008, and its Minute Resolution No. 09-
080 promulgated on April 30, 2009 in the same case, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

RATIO: Anent the second issue pertaining to petitioner’s compliance with the residency requirement
for Members of the House of Representatives, after studying the evidence submitted by the parties,
we find for petitioner, taking into account our ruling in Frivaldo v. COMELEC, which reads in part:

This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to
give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot.
Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. xxx
Emphasis supplied)

The qualifications of a member of the House of Representatives are found in Article VI, Section 6 of
the Constitution, which provides: Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Emphasis supplied)

We find the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution to be
overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of this case. The evidence
presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly suffices to prove that petitioner failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement under the Constitution. Private respondent’s
documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly consisted of (a) petitioner’s certificates of
candidacy (COCs) for various positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004, which all indicated his residence as
Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth District of said province; (b) his application for a driver’s license
in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan, Laguna as his residence; and (c) the statement in his COCs
including his 2007 COC for Congressman for the First District of Laguna that his place of birth was
Pagsanjan, Laguna.

The only thing these pieces of documentary evidence prove is that petitioner’s domicile of origin was
Pagsanjan, Laguna and it remained his domicile up to 2005, at the latest. On the other hand, what
petitioner asserted in his 2007 COC is that he had been a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna in the First
District of Laguna as of February 2006 and respondent’s evidence failed contradict that claim. If it is
true that petitioner and his family had been living in Sta. Rosa, Laguna as of February 2006 with the
intent to reside therein permanently, that would more than fulfill the requirement that petitioner be a
resident of the district where he was a candidate for at least one year before election day, which in
this case was May 14, 2007.

In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa, Laguna beginning at
least in February 2006, petitioner’s evidence included, among others: (a) original and extended lease
contracts for a townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b) certification
issued by the President of the Villa de Toledo Homeowners Association, Inc, that petitioner has been a
resident of said Subdivision since February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioner’s neighbors in Villa de
Toledo attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said subdivision since February 2006; (d)
certification of the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna that petitioner is a
resident of Villa de Toledo within the said barangay; (e) certificates of attendance of petitioner’s
children in schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2005; and (f) DTI certificates of business issued in
the name of petitioner and his wife to show that they own and operate businesses in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna since 2003.

The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in
another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino, this Court held that the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his
residence.

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of choice of a
candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a congressional
candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new one in the place where he
seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we see the
fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier
for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to
be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at
least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative
indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish
compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property
requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.

To summarize, private respondent’s own evidence did not categorically establish where petitioner’s
domicile is nor did said evidence conclusively prove that for the year prior to the May 14, 2007
petitioner had a domicile other than where he actually resided, i.e. Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

6) Tagolino v. HRET, G.R.No. 195540, March 19, 2013

FACTS: Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
March 22, 2012 Decision 1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No.
10-031 (QW) which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez’s
substitution as the Liberal Party’s replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative
(Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.

November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy 2 (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth
Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009,
one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, 3 alleging
that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro
Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this
regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be
denied due course and/or cancelled. On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a
Resolution qualification.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc
through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010. 7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard
accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the
necessary documents for substitution."
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC 9 together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official
substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to
various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department), the
COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 8890 on May
8, 2010, approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the
substitution of private respondent.

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution (May 9, 2010 Pending resolution of
Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled on May
10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250
votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino,
obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard’s
votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-
elected Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private
respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one (1) year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering that the transfer of
her voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for on
July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3) private
respondent’s CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial requirements i.e.,
she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing officer. After due
proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision which dismissed the quo warranto
petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte
Representative (Fourth Legislative District).

ISSUE: whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was validly
substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in
view of the former’s failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided under Section 6,
Article VI of the Constitution. (YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision
rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO: The petition is meritorious. A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition
to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy.

The Omnibus Election Code 23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for
public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for
disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have
been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which
do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance
with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in
question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction
brought by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses. On the other hand, a denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a
person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office
aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have also
made a false representation of the same in the CoC.

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due
course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The
reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes.

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to
his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed
from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private
respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short,
a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or
cancelled – would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby
legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated the
COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s substitution. It should be
stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s "disqualification" is his failure to comply
with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for
the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation
contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for
elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First
Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s finding that Richard
was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the
way for the approval of private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC
First Division’s ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence, disallowed
the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s substitution. Consequently, in perpetuating
the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-discussed, the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion,
warranting the grant of the instant petition.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide
candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office,
which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no
cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondent’s own qualification
to office.

7) Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

FACTS

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October
31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC
contained material misrepresentations, specifically:

(1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;

(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas
which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P.
Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House
of Representatives;2

(3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July
1959 or 3 July 1960;
(4) that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an
immigrant4 of the United States of America;

And

(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.

In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of Congressman
Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage between
them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was solemnized
in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code,
rendering it void ab initio. Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with
Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her. As to her date of birth, the
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. Lastly,
petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United
States of America is not supported by evidence.

Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on
the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC
en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5,
2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume
office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.
Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her case.

2. Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the
residency requirement for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

3. Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,
it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives
as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

RULING

1.) Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her case.

Yes. The COMELEC has jurisdiction and not the HRET.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of
the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as
well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said
tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET
begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The court has consistently held that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath,
and (3) assumption of office.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a
Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.”28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction

2.) Whether or not Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet
the residency requirement for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

NO. COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives

For respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid
requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of proof
regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She,
however, specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen
of the USA.

Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence however, establishing the fact that
respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30, 2012,
petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present
substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the
conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by
becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and
hold any elective public office in the Philippines.

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born
status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be
considered a resident of Marinduque:

“Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency
shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the
Philippines. There being no proof that [petitioner] had renounced her American citizenship, it follows
that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the one-year residency
requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim
that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13,
2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has never
regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her
stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the USA.

3.) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No.
9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

NO. The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of
Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed
by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case,
the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A.
No. 9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied
the constitutional provision and nothing more.

8) Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, supra.

FACTS

In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is challenged insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1)
candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government;
(2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private offices;
and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The drug testing shall employ, two testing methods, the screening test which will determine the
positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic
laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec
Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period,
the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory
drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein
required.

Petitioner Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10,
2004 elections,1filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to
be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates
for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

ISSUE

Whether or not Congress can enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

RULING

No.Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as unconstitutional. The

unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as
senator.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution. It unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug
clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the
provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need
not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of
the Senate.

The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify the qualification standards for senators as
written in the Constitution, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate,or alter or enlarge the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be declared as
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge
of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield
obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without
such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug
clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The
COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the
1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.

The Court declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Section 7: The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779

MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO v. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives,
and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of
representatives

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections.

He took his oath of office and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges
pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code.

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

According to the speaker, by the very act of filing his certificate of candidacy, Ali Dimaporo removed
himself from the Rolls of the House of Representatives.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner wrote to respondent Speaker, expressed
his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress."

Petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this petition praying for such relief was
subsequently.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:

He did not lose his seat as congressman when he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Regional Governor of Muslim Mindanao because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative
under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present
members of Congress.

The term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the
incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. On the other
hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries;

b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;

c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election

contest; and,

d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

Under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant
to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of
office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the intention of the framers to
include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among the means by which the term
of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple matter to incorporate it in the
present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional Commission only
reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and deliberately omitted
the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.

He cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or
employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding
another office or employment.

RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION:

Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary
act of resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of
office enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

The ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the
grounds mentioned therein are not exclusive.

There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of Congress, among
which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of disqualification to
hold public office.
Petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which estops him from claiming
otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws.

ISSUE:

WON SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 IS OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION
(AND THEREFORE PETITIONER IS CONSIDERED IPSO FACTO RESIGNED)

RULING:

YES.

1. Only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective
public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their
certificates of candidacy for another office. The advocates elucidated on the rationale of this
inclusion, thus:

MR. PEREZ (L.):

I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating it. The purpose is
that the people must be given the right to choose any official who belongs to, let us say, to the
Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However, because of the practice in the past where
members of the legislature ran for local offices, but did not assume the office, because of that
spectacle the impression is that these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people…

xxxx

MR. GARCIA (M.M.):

…officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not
because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our
Constitution, we have this new chapter on accountability of public officers.

…Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers? This only
means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have gotten from the
people…we have precisely included this as part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan
Member who hold (sic) himself out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should
not be allowed to deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or
abandons his office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a
Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an office other
than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic) intention to service the
mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto
resigned. I think more than anything that is the accountability that the Constitution requires of
elective public officials…

Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it for? If a
Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not want to serve,
otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was elected to? The mere fact
therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt act of abandoning or relinquishing his
mandate to the people and that he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which
he feels he could be of better service.

…primarily because under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public
officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition…

XXX

Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer
operative does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, the statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their
entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby
cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go
back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials
must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have
received from their constituents.

2. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a
Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office.

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it
may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term.
The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
3. The ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution
itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its
application to present members of Congress.

Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the
Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive.

As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the
circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does
it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution
or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant
not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be
preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the
grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such
absurdity.

4. Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881. The act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of
candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
elective office.

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the
permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner
opines, that the other position be actually held.

The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the
forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Section 9: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may
be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

1) Lucero v. COMELEC, 234 SCRA 280

WILMAR P. LUCERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ONG, JR.

FACTS:

The petitioners were two of the five candidates for the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar
in the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.

The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L. Ong, Jr.
with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes. However,
this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, where the
submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of
Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held.

The COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
desist from reconvening until further orders.

On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution calling for a special election in the
last remaining Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by
the result of the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notify the
parties of the schedule of election activities for that precinct.

Both Lucero and Ong filed with SC special civil actions for certiorari to challenge the Resolution.

In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his chances
in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the returns for Precinct
No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.

In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in
Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special election in Precinct
No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more specifically after one (1) year and ten (10) months,
following the day of the synchronized elections

RULING:

YES.

On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special election, Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. — If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and if in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 likewise provides:

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. — The postponement, declaration of
failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority votes of its members.
The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or
on the day of the election.
1. There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under Section 6 of
the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a failure of election, and (2) that such failure would
affect the results of the election.

The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box snatching
and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the necessity and inevitability of the holding of
a special election in said precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the
questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election returns.

The COMELEC held:

Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in favor of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las
Navas, the results of the recount of votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 16 (Silvino Lobos), and the votes
reflected in the available copy of the election returns for Precinct No. 7 (Silvino Lobos), it is safe to
predict that when the special Provincial Board of Canvassers will reconvene to sum up the votes of
the contending parties, the original lead of private respondent Ong of two hundred four (204) votes
against petitioner Lucero — 24,272 as against 24,068 — will be reduced to either 175 or 173
depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a high of 31 votes as reflected in the
election returns of Precinct No. 7.

Without preempting the exact figures which only the special Provincial Board of Canvassers can
correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election will have to be held in Precinct
No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos.

xxxxxxx

Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over petitioner Lucero, We answer in the
affirmative. According to Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13 is two
hundred thirteen (213). Since the lead of respondent Ong is less than the number of registered
voters, the votes in that precinct could affect the existing result because of the possibility that
petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in that precinct and that majority might be more
than the present lead of Ong.

On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, the following computation is in
order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of 24,274,
while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from Precinct No. 16, for
a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is admittedly less than the
213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13.

The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
have indeed been met.

2. In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible
application, by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no special
election in the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called
if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election," and
of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1)
year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill
the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of
the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the underlying
philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy occurred within a certain
period before the next presidential election or the next regular election, as the case may be, is
obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred in the holding of a special election when a
regular election is, after all, less than a year away.

The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and statutory proscriptions are
inapplicable to special elections which may be called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.

First, the special election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the President,
Vice President, and Members of Congress occurring after the election, while the special election
under the latter is due to or by reason of a failure of election.

Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it is limited to only
the precincts involved and to the candidates who, by the result of the election in a particular
constituency, would be affected by the failure of election. On the other hand, the special election
for the Offices of the President, Vice President, and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a
Representative, district-wide.

Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that no candidate had
been proclaimed and therefore the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar
would be unrepresented in the House of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately
determine the winning candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation until
the end of the term. Under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected
officials have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office.

Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the holding
of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166.

3. Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the COMELEC's

disposition of Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would then be declared and
proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar
despite the fact that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and
the results of the district elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the
election in Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an
incomplete canvass where the final result would have been affected by the uncanvassed result of
Precinct No. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people of
the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the very
least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.

2) Ocampo v. HRET, 432 SCRA 114

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
Section 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.

1) People v. Jalosjos, 432 SCRA 689

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) Trillanes v. Pimentel, 556 SCRA 471

FACTS:On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as
the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in
the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court
to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to
attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion.
Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case

2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and
serve his mandate as senator

3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail

RULING: No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases, both being punishable
by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s
application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the
evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported
from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the
right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.”

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally
to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in
People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final
sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office,
elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of. In
a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal
charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to
the Senate, “they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty conferred by the voice
of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed
by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the
mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern
all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of
the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest
in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification
from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a
voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14,
2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming
attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-
around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions
and blanket authorizations.

3) Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876

FACTS: This is an ordinary civil action for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez,
Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication
of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. At the time of said publication,
defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on
National Defense.

ISSUE: whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; whether the

aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase “speech or debate therein” of
Article VI, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which provides that “[t]he Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place”

RULING: No. The phrase “speech or debate therein” refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced
in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen,
either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties
as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions
as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
 The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14,
1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be
published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.

4) Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 13: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2001

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
Section 14: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.

1) Puyat v. De Guzman, 112 SCRA 31

FACTS

On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries (IPI), a
private corporation, was held – six of the elected directors were herein petitioners that may be called
the Puyat Group, while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat
Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.

On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings questioning the
election.

Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds
the appearance of Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as
counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no
Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an
administrative body. The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his
appearance.

When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased
on 15 May 1979 ten shares of IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30
May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by
the SEC Commissioner.

ISSUE
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case, is in effect appearing as
counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional
provision.

RULING

The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez.
He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on
30 May 1979, after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed,
and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he
moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which
was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an
administrative body, which is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention"
was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution. Respondent Commissioner's Order granting
Assemblyman Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.

2) Baguilat v. Alvraez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017

FACTS

The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news
articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative
minority" in the House of Representatives.

Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the candidate who
garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the
Minority Leader - Rep. Baguilat would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However,
despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as such.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be
recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House where the
candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's election to said
Minority Leader position.

For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal matter to the
House of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion, the Court cannot interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of the
govemment.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep.
Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only
legitimate members of the House Minority.

RULING

The petition is without merit.

In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda,11 the Court explained that the peremptory writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary
course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal
right to the performance of the act to be compelled.12

The deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid rules is not averse to the Constitution.

Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote
of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to
have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control.

Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold
the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate
cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government."

However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the
questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed
to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and
large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would
not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the separation of
powers doctrine.

Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself."

3) Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17

(can’t find topic related to Sec. 14 in this case huhu)

FACTS

On February 21, 1949, Sen. Tanada filed with the Senate Secretary charges against Senate President
Avelino. Sen. Tanada requested to give a privilege speech during the session. Sen. Tanada’s motions
were continuously denied of the common courtesy and ruling Sen. Sanidad and Tanada “out of
order!”. Senator Avelino along with other Senators, walked-out of the session hall. Senate President
Pro-Tempore Arranz issued Resolution No. 67 and 68 declaring the vacancy of the position of Senate
President and installing Hon. Cuenco as Acting Senate President. These resolutions were voted and
unanimously approved.

Thus, Avelino filed a petition before the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court with a vote of 6
out of the 10 Justices present, decided to deny the petition stating that the Court has no jurisdiction
on the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The SC with a majority vote of seven,
granted the motion and took cognizance over the case.

ISSUE

WON the 12 Senators who installed Cuenco as the Acting President of the Senate constituted a
quorum?

RULING

YES. Supreme Court held that there is a quorum that the 12 senators being the majority of 23
Senators. Resolution Nos. 67 and 68 are valid. Sen. Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President. PETITION DISMISSED.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When
the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House: does
not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri
Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House",
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members
of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum,
they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so
arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just
the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

NOTE:

Quorum has been defined as that number of person of the body, which legally assembled in their
proper places, will enable the body to transact its lawful business, or, in other words, that number
that makes the lawful body and gives it power to pass a valid act. Unless otherwise validly provided, it
ordinarily refers to one-half plus one of the entire membership of the body. (Agpalo, 2005.)

Although the Supreme Court’s initial findings that there was no quorum originally constituted, the
Supreme Court finds light in the dissenting opinions of the Justices that even if a new quorum were to
be established, Sen. Cuenco would still be elected Senate President because of the 12 Senators
supporting him and only 11 Senators supporting Sen. Avelino.

4) Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Phils., G.R. No. 169271. Oct. 18, 2011

(can’t find also Sec. 14 topic here huhuhu)

FACTS

On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao."The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a
date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

Thereafter, R.A. No. 9054 was passed to further enhance the structure of ARMM under R.A. 6734.
Along with it is the reset of the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001.

RA No. 9333was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2ndMonday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and
RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held onAugust 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected.But onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the
ARMM elections.

Several cases for certiorari, prohibition and madamus originating from different parties arose as a
consequence of the passage of R.A. No. 9333 and R.A. No. 10153 questioning the validity of said laws.

OnSeptember 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation
of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their
functions should these cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA
No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements
prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited
as grounds are the alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the
failure to adhere to the "elective and representative" character of the executive and legislative
departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of the power
to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials until the officials elected
under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the
power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete
violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections?

Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING

Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of R.A. 10153 in toto. The Court agreed
with respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on its position that the Constitution mandates
synchronization, citing Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to
attain synchronization of elections.

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others
through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to
synchronize the holding of all future elections whether national or local to once every three years.This
intention finds full support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.
Furthermore, to achieve synchronization, Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the
ARMMs regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with
the fixed schedule of the national and local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

In Osme v. Commission on Elections, the court thus explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-
President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of
synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise
intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion.This common termination date
will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under
Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President
(under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x xrecords of the proceedings in the
Constitutional Commission.

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly
representatives fall within the classification of "local" elections, since they pertain to the elected
officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the Constitution,
autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article
Xof the Constitution entitled "Local Government."Autonomous regions are established and discussed
under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
Second issue: Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate.
Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness
in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be
accused of any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty nor is there reason to
accord merit to the petitioners claims of grave abuse of discretion.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local
elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the
other.If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization
operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly
carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or objective in sight in a manner that
does not do violence to the Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under these limitations,
the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

However, the holdover contained in R.A. No. 10153, for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have
chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the case of the terms of
local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)
years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

RA No. 10153, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets outs
in terms of structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to"appoint officers-in-
charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office."This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption
to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. It must be therefore emphasized that the
law must be interpreted as an interim measure to synchronize elections and must not be interpreted
otherwise.

5) Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268

FACTS

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation
is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives.
The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed
to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair, Deputy
Speaker Daza, declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for
the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.

Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI,
Section 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently,
violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

RULING

No. Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have
the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in
character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.The matter complained of
concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

6) Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863

FACTS

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House
making serious imputations of bribery against the President Carlos Garcia. Because of this, a
Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth
of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in
case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by
the House.

Osmeña then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that
it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House.
Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a
chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House
resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE

Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?

RULING

No. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other
place.” This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be
questioned in any other place” than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which
petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member
responsible "for words spoken in debate.”

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

7) Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636

8) United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729

FACTS

ISSUE
RULING

9) Casco Philippines Commercial Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347

FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of
synthetic resin glues. Petitioner asked for a refund of its payment of margin fee on foreign exchange
transactions under RA 2609. Sec 2 of RA 2609 exempts the payment of margin fee on the sale of
foreign exchange for the importation of Urea formaldehyde.Respondent, however, refused on the
ground that the exemption from margin fee refers to “Urea formaldehyde” and not “Urea and
Formaldehyde”. Petitioner contends that “Urea formaldehyde” in Sec 2 of RA 2609 should be
construed as “Urea and Formaldehyde” based on the intention of the Senate during the consideration
of the bill.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner’s contention is correct

RULING: No. "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different
from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as "urea formaldehyde".

It is well settled that the enrolled bill, which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress
and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

10) Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131

FACTS: The Petitioner is the chief of the detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds
the rank of lieutenant colonel. Upon the resignation of the chief of police, Petitioner was designated
acting chief of police and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by
the Mayor of Manila. The respondent Commissioner of Civil Service rejected his appointment for
“failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said
position”due to lack of a bachelor’s degree based on section 10 of the Police Act of 1966.

Petitioner asserted that he is not required to be a bachelor’s degree holder. He posits that what was
approved by the Senate in the third reading of House Bill 6951 is different in what now appears in Sec.
10 of the Police Act of 1966. It would thus appear that the Bill was change during the course of its
engrossment and such change was not made by Congress but by a mere employee in rewriting to suit
some stylistic preferences. Hence, the petitioner would like the SC to look into the matter.

ISSUE: Whether the Judiciary can assail the validity of an enrolled bill by investigating the legislative
process

RULING: No. under the Enrolled Bill Doctrine, the signing of the bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the secretaries of both Houses that it was passed are
conclusive as to its due enactment. The enrolled bill imports absolute verity and is binding on the
courts. With respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill
prevails in case of discrepancy.

The court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the
other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers
of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would
be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen
in the labyrinth of law-making with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress.

11) Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of Representatives, was passed
on third reading without amendments. But when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial
amendments were introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by
the Senate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator Roxas but this does not appear
in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of H.B.9266 containing the amendments recommended by Senator
Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The
printed copies of the bill were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the
Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by way of approval. The bill became
RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B. 9266 signed into law by the
President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the
amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate
President invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President withdrew his signature on
H.B. 9266.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bill has become a law

RULING: No.

In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a
bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as
conclusive proof of its due enactment.7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held
that the enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not required by the
Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States are thus not
unanimous on this point.

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has
passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of
the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill
not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate,
and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative
and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when
the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that
if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the
logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether the
journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does
not require the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the
following provisions:

Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal."

Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except
when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last
reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, 11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature
on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature
meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration
should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason
that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends
when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill
or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and
not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]
very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In
Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State
Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it
follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the
proof that it has "passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional requirement."

12) Abakada v. Ermita, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered

1) Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 134

FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a
resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an election protest prior to
the adoption of the said resolution.
On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the
petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9,
1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it will not consider any
election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the
dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?

RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner
toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the
filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the
one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

2) Reyes v. COMELEC, supra.

FACTS

Facts:

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October
31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC
contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of
birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in
February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last
exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on
the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the
requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC
en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5,
2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume
office at noon of June 30, 2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

ISSUE
1 Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative.

2 Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office

RULING

The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.

1 Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election
returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative.

2 In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office,
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with
the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the
oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the
ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons
his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to
establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be
counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the
petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the
petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency
for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile
of choice in the USA.

3) Vera v. Aquino, 77 Phil. 192 (per checking title should be Vera v. Avelino)

FACTS

After The elections, Comelec submitted its report to Congress & the President. The Report state that
there was terrorism and violence in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, which prevented the expression of
the
popular will. That there was coercion and intimidation, that most of the residents left their homes in
order not to be subjected to oppression (many of them voted for Roxas as president and that there
was terrorism to ensure the election of the members of the Nationalista party)

A protest against the election of VERA DIOKNO & ROMERO was filed with the SET. The Senate
convened and THE PENDATUN RESOLUTION was approved. Under the Resolution, pending the
termination of the protest against their election, VERA, DIOKNO, ROMERO (who had been included
among the 16 senators who won, and proclaimed by Comelec), SHALL NOT BE SWORN IN, NOR
SEATED AS SENATORS.’

The 3 filed this case for the annulment of the Pendatun Resolution, and for them to be able to occupy
their seats and exercise their senatorial prerogatives.

ISSUE

1. Whether the SC has jurisdiction?

2. Does prohibition lie?

3. Assuming that the SC had jurisdiction, did Senate exceed its powers in adopting the Pendatun
Resolution?

RULING

1. No.

Petitioners further invoke the ANGARA DOCTRINE which they claim grants SC jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission.

The Court provides that previously, under the ALEJANDRINO DOCTRINE, mandamus will not lie against
the legislative body, and its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in
character. The courts cannot dictate their legislative functions, over which they have exclusive control.
When there is a member who has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power,
irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement.
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in pursuance of a power committed
exclusively to that department by the constitution.

HOWEVER: The Organic Act had some innovations which established additional exceptions to the well
known doctrine of SEPARATION OF POWERS, for instance the CREATION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS,
wherein the Justices of the SC participate in the decision of congressional election protests. Under
Marbury vs. Madison, the court may annul any legislative enactment that fails to observe the
constitutional limitations. A legislative enactment is the act of an agency of sovereign authority. If it
conflicts with the Constitution, then it must fall. Invalidating it is a plain exercise of judicial power, that
power vested in the courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. THIS IS NOT THE
EXERCISE OF SUBSTANTIVE POWER to review and nullify the acts of Congress. It is simply a NECESSARY
CONCOMITANT OF THE POWER TO HEAR AND DISPOSE OF A CASE and to determine its validity
against the law.

The Angara Doctrine is not applicable. In Angara, the Court took jurisdiction because there was a
conflict of

jurisdiction between 2 constitutional bodies, hence the SC was compelled to determine the character,
scope and

extent of their respective spheres of action. IN THIS CASE, there is actually no antagonism between
the Senate and the SET. Consequently, the SC cannot intervene. Following the ALEJANDRINO
DOCTRINE, the court cannot entertain this petition and order the branch of legislature to reinstate a
member. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance and to UPSET THE CLASSIC PATTERN
OF CHECKS AND BALANCES WISELY WOVEN INTO OUR INSTITUTIONAL SETUP. There are undoubtedly
many wrongs that the judiciary may not correct, for instance, those involving political questions.

2. NO. prohibition refers only to proceedings of tribunals exercising judicial or ministerial functions,
NOT

LEGISLATIVE functions.

3. No.

The discussions of the Con-Con showed that instead of transferring to the Electoral Tribunal all the
powers of the
House or Senate as the “sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications” of its members, it was
GIVEN ONLY JURISDICTION OVER “ALL CONTESTS” relation to election, etc.

According to the deliberations, a compromise plan / amendment was submitted limiting the power of
the ET to judging all cases contesting the election, returns and qualifications of members. In rejecting
the Labrador Amendment (which seemed to give to the ET the power to determine also the election
of members who have not been protested), the Con-Con thus did NOT INTEND TO GIVE IT ALL THE
FUNCTION OF THE ASSEMBLY on the subject of election and qualification of members.

An ELECTION CONTEST relates only to statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not only to out
the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into the office.

Thus, since the power to defer-oath taking, until the contest is adjudged, does not belong to the ET,
then it must be held that the Senate or the House still retains such authority, for it has not been
transferred to, nor assumed by the ET. This can be interpreted in 2 ways:

•that such power to delay oath taking stemmed from the former privilege of either House to be

the judge of election returns and qualifications of members, OR

•that it is an inherent power to every legislative body as a measure of self-preservation.

3 points:

1. the authority of the ET is only over all contests relating to E,R,Q of its members, it does not extend
to all matters and functions of legislative on the subject.

2. Congress still retains the authority to defer oath taking of members, pending an election contest

3. Congress, under parliamentary practice, has the power to inquire into the credentials of any of its

members. But the power of the ET is a limited power.

4) Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 59 SCRA 434

FACTS

Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong ran as a Representative in the first district of Negros Oriental. Her rival Olivia
Paras, and some other concerned citizens filed a disqualification case against Limkaichong before the
COMELEC. The latter allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was
born, her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of
her marriage to Limkaichong’s dad. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization
of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Hence,
she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. During the
pendency of the case, election day came, and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won
over Paras. Comelec after due hearing, declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Notwithstanding their
proclamation of disqualification, Comelec issued a proclamation declaring Limkaichong as the winner.
This is in compliance with Resolution no. 8062 adopting the disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation, filed a petition before the Comelec

ISSUE

1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case

2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case

3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based
on citizenship

RULING

1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the
competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil
Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent
residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his
native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall
be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the
same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of
the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring
them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization
certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the
President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of
the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use
or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute,
that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an
election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be
a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution.
Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking
Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due
process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a
Member of the House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in
whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing
ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the
election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise,
and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of government.

2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of
office, and she was allowed to officially assume the. Accordingly, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) should now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party
questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word
"sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been
tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.

3. No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification
based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of
Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their
entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it
may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

5) ChaveZ v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 315

FACTS

Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial
candidate.

May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case “Francisco Chavez v. Comelec , et al.,”
disqualifying Melchor Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. The petitioner
then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate to all its agents and the
general public the resolution; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor
Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates, tally sheets, election returns and “to count all
votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . .”
May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from
the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all “Chavez” votes in favor
of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. On
Election Day, Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified candidates. Commissioner
Rama issued a directive over the radio and TV ordering that all “Chavez” votes be credited to the
petitioner however it did not reach all the precincts.

Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166
which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the Commission to
instruct without delay the deletion of the name of said candidate.

Confusion arose as the “Chavez” votes were either declared stray or invalidated by the Boards of
Election Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, “Chavez” votes were not credited in favor of petitioner.

May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city election registrars
throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting submitted by the BEIs and to credit all the
“Chavez” votes, which have been declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach all the various BEIs
throughout the country on time for implementation and that the minutes of voting did not indicate
the number of “Chavez” votes which were declared stray or invalidated.

May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the latter to
(1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes to scan
for the “Chavez” votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate
entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation of the 24
winning candidates.

Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed this urgent
petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the Comelec
from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate, without first implementing Comelec’s
resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioner 􀀀s letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and
urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously
and whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion.
June 8, 1992, Sen. Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that
the law does not allow pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of members of the Senate.

ISSUE

Whether or not SC has jurisdiction over the case

RULING

Jurisdiction - The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavez’s
name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court’s function of judicial
review. The Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of
discretion committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the
exercise of its administrative functions.

Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone. Comelec has
ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavez’s name not only on the official list of candidates, but also on
the election returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioner 􀀀s allegation that
respondent Comelec failed to implement the resolutions does not hold water.

Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of a pre-proclamation.
While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials, such are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member
of the House of Representatives.

Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:

Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the
authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested
person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
xxx xxx xxx

Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the
municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial boards of canvassers or district board of
canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings.

What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns.”
To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns
sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of
canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

The petitioner’s prayer does not call for the correction of “manifest errors in the certificates of
canvass or election returns” before the Comelec but for the reopening of the ballot boxes and
appreciation of the ballots contained therein. He has not even pointed to any “manifest error” in the
certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, the proper
recourse is to file a regular

- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: “… (1) Errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of
inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or re-appreciation of ballots. (2)
The appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of
ballots appreciation is performed by the board election inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The scope
of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under Sec. 243 OEC. The
complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid
for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.

“The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in
pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of “Sanchez” votes intended for him bear
no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the
Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass
of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes v.
Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256).”

Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvas s or election returns
before the Comelec which would warrant their correction.
Note:

Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as “any question pertaining to or affecting the

proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered
political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.” [Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code).

6) Guerrero v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137004, July 26, 2000

FACTS

Guillermo Ruiz file a petition to disqualify respondent Rodolfo Fariñas as a candidate for the position
of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been campaigning as
a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of
candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998 or 3 days before the election, Farinas filed his certificate of
candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998,
the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz.

After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the
official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his
oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. Comelec dismissed the MR on the ground
that the matter is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal.

ISSUE

Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of
the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?
RULING

There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction
over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for
the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a
certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption
of the position by Farinas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC
and the HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus,
the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference
to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.

In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken
his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressmanis raised, that issue is best addressed to the
HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of
jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate.

7) Barbers v. COMELEC, 460 SCRA 569

FACTS

Robert Barbers and Rodolfo Biazon were candidates in the 2004 Senatorial elections. After a partial
canvass of the votes, the first eleven senators were duly proclaimed by the Comelec. Barbers and
Biazaon battled for the 12th and final spot.

After canvassing the remaining Certificates of Canvass (COCs), Comelec proclaimed Biazon as the 12th
Senator. Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. While there were certain precincts where
there was failure of elections, the COMELEC stated that this difference will not materially be affected
by the votes in said precincts.

Barbers assailed the proclamation of Biazon arguing that it was illegal and premature being based on
an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the
results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results
of the elections.

Comelec denied Barbers’ petition and declared Biazon to be the winner for the 12th and final slot in
the Senate. Barbers sought the review of the Comelec’s Resolution before the SC by filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.

ISSUE

Can the Supreme Court take cognizance over Barbers’ petition?

RULING

NO.

The alleged invalidity of Biazon’s proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the election
returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within the sole
jurisdiction of the SET. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against Biazon would
usurp the constitutional functions of the SET.

Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Xxx”

Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides: The Senate Electoral Tribunal is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
Senate.

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. The word sole in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) underscores
the exclusivity of the SETs jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The
authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that the SC has no
jurisdiction to entertain Barbers’ petition. Since Barbers contests Biazons proclamation as the 12th
winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET, which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers
complaint.

EXISTENCE OF OTHER REMEDY PRECLUDES DIRECT RESORT TO THE SUPREME COURT VIA CERTIORARI.
Where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy
of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal. In like manner, where as in the
present case, Barbers assails Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th duly elected Senator, Barbers’ proper
recourse is to file a regular election protest with the SET.

Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering that there is an available and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul the COMELECs assailed proceedings.

8) Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010

FACTS

G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents
filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was
just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal
concerns of Aangat Tayo.

G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that
won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the
others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee
because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
(CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan

RULING

YES.

Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that
sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution,5 identifies who the “members” of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and
pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

9) Abbas v. SET, 166 SCRA 651

FACTS

On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before Senate Electoral Tribunal an election contest against 22
candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed senators-elect. With the exemption of Senator
Estrada, the senators filed for motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing and resolution
on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.

ISSUE

Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in the
tribunal?

RULING

NO.

Composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; The Constitutional provision clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme
Court.

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the
Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial” and
“legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part
of this proposition when it held that said provision “x x x is a clear expression of an intent that all
(such) contests x x x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators’) peers in that
Chamber are represented.” The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly
mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of
the Supreme Court.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators
and no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.—

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may
inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member
of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective
and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that
no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

10) Pimentel v. HRET, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002

FACTS

On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance with the
Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time, the election
through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members
of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations, including
Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q. Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M.
Sarenas from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the
votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list
groups had one representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various
political parties. Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination
by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available records, it does
not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of
their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the present petitions for
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the House contingents to
the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the different
political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to
the Senate President Blas F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President
Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include
party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In its
meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator
Pimentel’s letter to the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives. On the same day, HRET
Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of
Representatives Secretary General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with
this Court their Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its
Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act,
party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. They
charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on
the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8 February 2000, the Court en banc directed the
consolidation of GR 141490 with GR 141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a
motion to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional
respondent, in his capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court
granted both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present
petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his
capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from
APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.

ISSUES

1. Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in
the HRET.

2. Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

RULING

1. NO.

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those
who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. These
constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET
and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere
with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise,
‘the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge
its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if
party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions
are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from
participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the
11 May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in
the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House
at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list representatives
did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the petitions, with the predictable
result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA.
As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, ‘the
Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

2. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response to the
letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their
internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

11) Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792

FACTS

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP
were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members
of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).
Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura
of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said
political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUE

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
may change that party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely
reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

RULING

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political
party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary
enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of
office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member
may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another.
12) Lerias v. HRET, 202 SCRA 808

FACTS

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. wrote a letter to Senate President and Chairman of HRET requesting
them to restructure the CA and HRET to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the Constitution.

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court their Petitions for Prohibitions, Mandamus, and
Preliminary Injunction against HRET, and its corresponding Chairman and Members contending that
party-list representatives should have at least 1.2 or 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 setas in the CA
contending that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the
letter of Senator Pimentel.

ISSUE:

Whether the present composition of the HRET violates the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET.

The court cannot pass upon the petition because it finds no violation of the constitution. Under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of the
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in
the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it
appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from
seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-
list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The
party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant
petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for
election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the
House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
Section 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,
as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

1) Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496

FACTS:

Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments and was listed as representative of
the Liberal Party. LDP was reorganized and 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP.
Because of this, the House of Representatives revised its representation by withdrawing the seat
given to Daza and giving it to the newly-formed LDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in
accordance to proportional representation.

Issues

1. Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable political party

2. Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to be entitled to proportional

representation in the CA

RULING and Ratio

Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v. Tan. In the said case, 25 Members of
the Nacionalista Party reorganized themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3 Nacionalista
Congressmen, originally chosen, were deprived of their seats by colleagues who joined the Allied
Majority. Carlos Cunanan’s ad interim appointment was rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan was designated
in his place. Cunanan contended the validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority
was merely a temporary combination; officially, they were still part of the Nacionalista Party. Thus,
the reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on proportional representation. The Court
held that mere shift of votes should not affect the organization of the CA, or else, it would forever be
at the mercy of the House of Representatives.
The petitioner argues that LDP is not a permanent party and has not yet achieved stability. However,
the LDP has already been in existence for a year. They command the biggest following. They not only
survived but prevailed.

Regarding being a duly registered party, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party by the
COMELEC. Thus, shattering the argument of the petitioner that registration is required.

2) Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377

Facts:

Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA,
wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA)
and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine congressmen.

Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA
and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the
House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP)
with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs
(considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of
respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their
election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New
Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their
parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other
congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside
the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art
VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of
the Coalesced Majority.

Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:

Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but
because revision in House representation in CA was based on proportional representation.

The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House,
comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and
left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the
Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone
member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her
a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.

Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of
her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and
elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the
House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution
conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.

3) Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 316

FACTS: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate for
the Commission on Appointments (COA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC—2.5; LAKAS-
NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator
Romulo. In so doing, one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving
the latter’s representation in the COA to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
Respondents filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration, alleging, among others, that decision
ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the 1935 and
1987 Constitutions; It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments;
The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Tañada to the
Commission on Appointments; and that the election of the respondents Senators is in compliance
with the multi-party system which contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove
fractional membership of any party in the Commission.

The court denied the MR, stating that the respondent's claim to membership in the Commission on
Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not
in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties represented therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of Article VI, Sec. 18

RULING: The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada in the Commission on Appointments for
the year alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the
former Senator's Membership in the Commission during his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. In
the following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying
membership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of
the rival groups within their own ranks.

His membership in the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the
Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as member of the Commission was constitutionality
valid or not never reached the Court. The older Tañada's membership in the Commission on
Appointments cannot thus be considered by respondent Senator Tañada as a precedent sufficient to
overrule the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution.

His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the
Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his being the lone
representative of the Citizens' Party. The Senate recognized the rule on proportional representation in
the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional
membership in the Commission.

The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Tañada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect
any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of
the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No
practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a
doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of
the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice the repeated erroneous legislative
interpretation of a constitutional provision, does not vest power on the legislature.

This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-party
system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a
minimum membership in each house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political party
does not ipso facto entitle such a party to membership in the Commission on Appointments.

We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be
elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions
and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article
VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the
membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to
constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of
proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual
situations like the case at bar.

Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions
even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full
complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and
transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator
Tañada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional
representation, the party he represents still has representation in the Commission in the presence of
house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.

4) Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1

FACTS: In 2005, the anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project(NRP) as well as the Graci
tapes surfaced, which prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing and investigate the said
scandals, particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The Senate committee issued invitations to
certain department heads and military officials to speak before them as resource persons. Ermita
submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend due to pressing matters. AFP
Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the Senate President, excepted the letters.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. It prohibited the Department
Heads, Senior Officials of Exec. Dept, flag officers of AFP, PNP with rank of chief superintendent and
others as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by
Congress without first securing the President’s approval.

Those department heads and military officers invited by the Senate invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it allegedly infringes on the rights and duties of
Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional

RULING: EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of the subject EO,
SC distinguished Sec. 21 and 22 of Art 6 of the Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is
expressed in Sec. 21. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function
as to be implied. Stated differently, the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information; and where the body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be
had to others who do possess it.

Sec. 22 provides for the Question Hour which is closely related to legislative power and it is precisely a
complement to or a supplement of the legislative inquiry. The appearance of the members of the
Cabinet is essential not only to the application of check and balance but also in aid of legislation.

A distinction was thus made between Sec. 21 and 22. One specifically relates to conduct of inquiries in
aid of legislation – the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation; while the
other aims to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. While attendance is
discretionary in Question Hour, it is mandatory in Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. The power of
Congress to compel appearance under Sec. 21 but the lack of it under Sec. 22 is based in the principle
of Separation of Powers. While Exec. Branch is a co-equal branch, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress
exercises its power to inquiry, the only way to be exempted is by a valid claim of privilege. Only one
Exec. Official may be excused – the President.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent as per EO 464, limited as it is only to
appearances in the Question Hour, is valid on its face. However, this shall not be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department heads to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid
claim is subsequently made by either the President of the Exec. Secretary.

5) Gudani v. Senga, 498 SCRA 671

FACTS

Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col.
Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
to shed light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the
hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an
order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General
(OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired
from military service.

After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War
65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the
charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons
acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a
consequence of their having testified before the Senate.

ISSUE

1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry?

2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the
President desires otherwise?

3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October
2005?
RULING

1. Yes. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces of the Philippines. Outside the limitations of provisions such as Sec. 5, Art. XVI, the
President has absolute authority over members of the armed forces, and can restrict their mobility
and speech. Both restrictions are necessary to insulate the military from partisan politics and to
ensure that they are ready to be called in times of emergency. The military must follow the
President’s authority pursuant to the principles of discipline and obedience to the chain of command,
with violation of the latter punishable under Art. 65 of the Articles of War.

The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief,
and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice.
Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule
unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant
control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-
rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief
and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that
the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President,
and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s
functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did
not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right
to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of
the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a
modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The
remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative
creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so.
There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this
relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular
mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar
dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial
power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that
it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other
branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside
the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him
before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues
until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both
the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he
compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005.

6) NOEC II v. Sangguniang Panlungsod, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987

FACTS

Assailed is the validity of a subpoena sent by the respondent Committee to the petitioners Paterio
Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager, respectively,
of petitioner NegrosOriental II Electric Cooperative (NORECO II), requiring their attendance and
testimony at the Committee's investigation.

The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with pending
legislation related to the operations of public utilities" in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner
NORECO II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of business. Specifically, the inquiry was to
focus on the alleged installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that
city. Respondent Antonio S. Ramas Uypitching, as Chairman of the Committee on Public Utilities and
Franchises and Co-Chairman of the respondent Ad Hoc Committee, signed both the subpoena and the
Order complained of.

Petitioners moved to quash the subpoena on the following grounds:

a. The power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and

b. Neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code grants (the
Sangguniang Panlungsod) any specific power to investigate alleged inefficient power lines of NORECO
II.
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the
power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of
witnesses who fail to obey the subpoena. It is further argued that assuming the power to compel the
attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it cannot be exercised in the
investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted to NORECO II
which are beyond the jurisdiction of the SangguniangPanlungsod.

Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and
with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction. It is also the
position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily implied
from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Furthermore, the respondents assert that an
inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines and its effect on the power consumption
cost on the part of Dumagueteresidents is well-within the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and its committees.

ISSUE

Whether the Sanguniang Panlungsod has the power to mandate the testimony of witnesses and order
arrests who fail to observe the subpoena?

RULING:

NO

1. A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power
under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government
units, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess
delegated legislative power. While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the power
to punish non-members for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the
legislative body as a means of preserving its authority and dignity, in the same way that courts wield
an inherent power to "enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and
ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice.

The Court proceeded to delve deeper into the essence of the contempt power of the Philippine
Congress in a subsequent decision arising from the same factual antecedents:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise
of legislative power. When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have
intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority
or power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every
act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith,
with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . .

Whether or not the reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be applied
mutatis mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the respondent committee of
a city council is the threshold issue in the present controversy.

3. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that
branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch,
asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is,
therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same
reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative
functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which
are creations of law.

4. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible
justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for
contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of
delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial
nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere
incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.

Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the subpoena power in any
government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of individual rights, i.e. compulsion of
testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the law cannot be liberally construed to have
impliedly granted such powers to local legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the
sovereign people, the ultimate source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in all
government agencies. The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in the
legislature, to share these unique and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must
therefore clearly appear in pertinent legislation.

There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian
Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitionersTorres and Umbac for
contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can
exercise these powers.

5. Even assuming that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc
Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would
still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power if actually possessed, may only be exercised
where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body. As
admitted by the respondents in their Comment, the investigation to be conducted by the Ad-Hoc
Committee was to look into the use by NORECO II of inefficient power lines "of pre-war vintage"
which the latter had acquired from the Visayan Electric Company, and "to hear the side of the
petitioners". It becomes evident that the inquiry would touch upon the efficiency of the electric
service of NORECO II and, necessarily, its compliance with the franchise. Such inquiry is beyond the
jurisdiction of the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent committee.

There is no doubt that a city government has the power to enact ordinances regulating the installation
and maintenance of electric power lines or wires within its territorial jurisdiction. The power subsists
notwithstanding the creation of the National Electrification Administration (NEA), to which body the
franchise powers of local government units were transferred by Presidential Decree No. 269.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate the
installation and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient power lines, in
order to protect the city residents from the hazards these may pose. In aid of this ordinance-making
power, said body or any of its committees may conduct investigations similar to, but not the same as,
the legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature. As already discussed, the
difference lies in the lack of subpoena power and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of
the local legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons who are willing to supply
information which may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. The type of investigation which may
be conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not include within its ambit an inquiry into any
suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise.

In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct hearings and investigations, issue subpoenas and
invoke the aid of the courts in case of disobedience to its subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54, P.D.
269). Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot look into any suspected failure
of NORECO II to comply with the standards of electric service prescribed by law and in its franchise.
The proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II if there be sufficient basis
therefor. The legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void
for being ultravires. The respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee
are without power to punish non-members for contempt.

7) Standard v. Senate, 541 SCRA 456

FACTS

SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in
his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to
prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an
initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly
involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of
respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial
powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.

RULING:

Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in
the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices
committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of
the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be
enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees
of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is
overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or
remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its
Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best, the
recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be persuasive, but
it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

8) Dela Paz v. Senate, 579 SCRA 521

FACTS

Gen. Dela Paz was apprehended at the Moscow airport departure area for his failure to declare in
written form the 150, 000 euros found in his possession. As a result, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations conducted an inquiry and issued warrants of arrest in connection with the “Euro-
General’s” detention in Moscow. However, Dela Paz contended that the said Senate Committee
chaired by Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, was devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow
incident as it does not involve state to state relations as provided in par. 12, sec. 13, Rule 10 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure. He added that the arrest warrants issued by the Senate against him
were invalid as these lacked the required signatures of the majority of the members of respondent
committee. Are the contentions of the Dela Paz tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. In a nine-page unanimous resolution penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, the Court
enumerated six reasons why the petition of the spouses Dela Paz “must inevitably fail.”

The Court cited sec. 16(3), Art. VI of the Constitution, which states that each House shall determine
the rules of its proceedings. “The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee…in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the
Senate….[I]t is not for this Court to intervene in what is clearly a question of policy, an issue
depended upon the wisdom, not the legality, of the Senate’s action,” the Court said.

Second, the Court said that even if it is within the Court’s power to inquire into the validity of the
exercise of assailed jurisdiction, it is convinced that respondent Committee has acted within the
proper sphere of its authority. Citing the same provision raised by dela Paz, the Court said that the
Senate provision “unmistakably shows that the investigation of the Moscow incident is well within
its committee’s jurisdiction.” visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court cautioned that the Moscow
incident could create ripples in the relations between the Philippines and Russia, noting that
country is a state-party to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United
Nations Convetion Against Transnational Organized Crime. The two conventions contain provisions
dealing with the movement of considerable foreign currency across borders. The Moscow incident
would reflect on our country’s compliance with the obligations required of state-parties under
these conventions, noted the Court.

Third, the Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted by the
respondent Committee and the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee). Pursuant to par. 36, sec. 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules,
the Blue Ribbon Committee may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance in office by officers and employees of the government.
Fourth, the Philippine Senate has issued a formal written order of arrest signed by 10 senators, with
the Senate President himself approving it, in accordance with the Senate Rules.

Fifth, the Philippine Senate has already published its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation in two newspapers of general Circulation.

Lastly, the arrest order issued against the Dela Paz coupled has been rendered ineffectual when
Gen. Dela Paz voluntarily submitted himself during the Senate inquiry held on November 15, 2008.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations initially scheduled the hearing on the Moscow incident
on October 23, 2008. (GR No. 184849, Spouses Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
February 13, 2009

OR

FACTS

Petitioner Gen. dela Paz was detained by the local authorities at the Moscow departure area for the
failure of declaration and the discovery of 105, 000 Euros in his luggage. Waiting upon his arrival in
Manila is a subpoena from the Senate Committee for an investigation with regards to the incident
in Moscow.

ISSUE

Whether the Senate Committee has jurisdiction over a matter involving state to state relations?

HELD

YES. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question that is to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. The Senate has the capacity to set its own rules
of proceedings as the provision of the Philippine Constitution. The exercise of its power is exempted
from any interference and supervision from the Judiciary.

The Senate Rules provide that the Senate Committee shall cover in its jurisdiction all matters
relating to the relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular
services; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its
agencies; multi-lateral organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and
overseas Filipinos.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and for being moot and academic.
9) Romero v. Estrada, 583 SCRA 396

FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and other
compulsory processes issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and Human Resources
Development (Committee) in connection with its investigation on the investment of Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. On August 15, 2006,
petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee an invitation,
1 signed by the Legislative Committee Secretary, which pertinently reads as follows:

Dear Mr. Romero:

Pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 537, entitled: "RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT
RAMOS AND OTHERS, FOR THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF OWWA FUNDS IN THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN
PROJECT, CAUSING A LOSS TO OWWA OF P550.86 MILLION".

The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible
amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act" and to craft a much
needed legislation relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned
Resolutions.

On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar
the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear
before it pursuant to the invitations thus issued.

Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition, petitioner Romero II appeared at the
September 4, 2006 Committee investigation.

Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO.

ISSUE: Whether or not the senate committee hearing was constitutional. (YES)
RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO: The Court petition. resolves to dismiss the instant petition. A legislative investigation in aid of
legislation and court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like
adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of
legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and,
thus, legislate wisely and effectively; 17 and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing
laws or enact new or remedial legislation, 18 albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential
legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need not belabor the other issues raised in this recourse.
Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear
before it in connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to
its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the
Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate
committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. 21 Sabio emphasizes the
importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally
incriminating questions are expected to be asked:

Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that ["this right may be] invoked by
the said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x x only when the incriminating question is being asked,
since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of
them. That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate
Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may
be presented before the courts.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be
respected by respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts
to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen
is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify
fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation. 22 (Emphasis supplied.)

As a matter of long and sound practice, the Court refrains from touching on the issue of
constitutionality except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis mota 23 of the controversy. So it
must be here. Indeed, the matter of the constitutionality of the assailed Committee invitations and
subpoenas issued vis - à-vis the investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543
has ceased to be a justiciable controversy, having been rendered moot and academic by supervening
events heretofore indicated. In short, there is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of said
resolutions; there is no more investigation the constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge.

10) Garcillano v. House, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

11) Neri v. Senate, 564 SCRA 152

FACTS

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate
vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest
and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE

Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING

YES. The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers,
the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential

power.”

2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases
are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or
foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three
(3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications
relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all.
But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
12) Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 25

FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known as Buenavista
and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent
irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the
total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to
determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was one of the
witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner
repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing
to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00

2. Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session.

3. Whether or not the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination

RULING
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information –
which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has
shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which
is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the
Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate
Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special
Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the
P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought
to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry
but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it
is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the
matter under inquiry.

xxx xxx xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry
and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process
may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period
of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end
of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very
reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to
perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be
and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for
which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to
is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the
life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing
body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no
limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00]
to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon
which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no
conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least,
it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge
of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all
the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of
the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a
direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend
to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution
and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful
excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely
on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to
decide that question.

13) Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704

SABIO v. GORDON (related to Art. VI, Section 21 not Section 18)

FACTS:

Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by
issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates.

Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's unhampered
performance of its task.

Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon
the Senate's power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.
455 (Senate Res. No. 455), "directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred
by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors." According to said Resolution,
the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat
has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive
committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an
estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004.

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon,
wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of
the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public
meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.

Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by Senate President Manuel Villar,
requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and
Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they
know relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Similar subpoenae were issued against
the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.

Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he
reiterated his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors and
officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the position paper they previously filed, which
raised issues on the propriety of legislative inquiry.

This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order requiring Chairman Sabio and Commissioners
Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the
Senate.

They submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation, which partly reads:

Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule of
law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly
provides:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative
inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to
ensure the unhampered performance of its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b)
of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way.

XxxxxxX

Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order directing
Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the Senate.

The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the Committees'
members.

Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA,
Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services,
their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.

Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGG's nominees to
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the same respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel
Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 174318.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting
respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry.

It reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry
by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted
provisions that warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a
brief consideration of the Congress' power of inquiry is imperative.

Chairman Sabio also argues that respondent Senate Committees have no power to punish him and
his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.

ISSUE:

1. Whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution

This issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their
refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified

2. Whether respondent Senate Committees have power to punish petitioner Sabio and his
Commissioners for contempt of the Senate
RULING:

1. YES.

The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our
shores through McGrain v. Daugherty, cited in Arnault v. Nazareno. In those earlier days, American
courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs
v. MacKellar explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:

Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies
composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable them
to legislate….It is well-established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may institute
any investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its
members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which
it may be important that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be
competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain
information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. It is essential to the full and
intelligent exercise of the legislative function….In American legislatures the investigation of public
matters before committees, preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house
appointing the committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and the
right of either house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to punish
for disobedience has been frequently enforced….The right of inquiry, I think, extends to other
matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for legislative
aid.

XXXXXXX

Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the
power of inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function," thus:

Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information
– which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who possess it."

XXXXXXXXX

Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made
their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution. Then came the 1987
Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the
1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions.

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of
"any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory
power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where
it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government,
being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power
of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."

CONSIDERING THESE JURISPRUDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS, WE FIND SECTION 4(B) DIRECTLY

REPUGNANT WITH ARTICLE VI, SECTION 21.

Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot
be countenanced. NOWHERE IN THE CONSTITUTION IS ANY PROVISION GRANTING SUCH
EXEMPTION. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns
the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends
"to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to this class.

CERTAINLY, A MERE PROVISION OF LAW CANNOT POSE A LIMITATION TO THE BROAD POWER OF
CONGRESS, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating
that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and
other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only
institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability.

2. YES

Article VI, Section 21 provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of Senate Committees and the Philippine
Senate" was approved by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it
can be concluded that the Order is under the authority, not only of the respondent Senate
Committees, but of the entire Senate.

At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House
of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees.

Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to the committees.

Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its significance:

It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just
of Congress but also of "any of its committees." This is significant because it constitutes a direct
conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means which the
Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the
Committees.

XXXX

This is a reasonable conclusion.

The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it
all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will be
meaningless.

The indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored
in a catena of cases, foreign and local.

In Arnault v. Balagtas, the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress is founded
upon reason and policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every contumacious
act, Congress has to resort to judicial interference, thus:

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise
of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which
to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of
the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme
within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to
be full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power. And how could the authority
and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate
remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed
against its authority or dignity.43

In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, the Court
characterized contempt power as a matter of self-preservation, thus:
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch
of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its
authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui
generis x x x.

14) Balag v. Senate, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018

ARVIN R. BALAGv.SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CASE: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin
the implementation of Senate P.S. Resolution (SR) No. 504 and the Order (Contempt Order)of the
Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs citing Arvin Balag (petitioner) in contempt.

FACTS:

On September 17, 2017, Horacio Tomas T. Castillo III (Horacio Ill), a first year law student of the
University of Sto. Tomas (UST), died allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity
(AJ Fraternity) of the same university.

SR No. 504, was filed by Senator Juan Miguel Zubiri condemning the death of Horacio III and
directing the appropriate Senate Committee to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, to hold
those responsible accountable.

· The Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs chaired by Senator PanfiloLacson
together with the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Constitutional Amendment and
Revision of Codes, invited petitioner and several other persons to the Joint Public Hearing.

· Petitioner, however, did not attend the hearing scheduled.

· On October 11, 2017, Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on Public Order and
Dangerous Drugs, and as approved by Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III, issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum addressed to petitioner directing him to appear before the committee and to testify as
to the subject matter under inquiry. Another Subpoena Ad Testificandum was issued on October 17,
2017, which was received by petitioner on the same day, requiring him to attend the legislative
hearing on October 18, 2017.

· On said date, petitioner attended the senate hearing.

· In the course of the proceedings, Senator Grace Poe (Senator Poe) asked petitioner if he was
the president of AJ Fraternity but he refused to answer the question and invoked his right against
self-incrimination.

· Senator Poe repeated the question but he still refused to answer. Senator Lacson then
reminded him to answer the question because it was a very simple question, otherwise, he could be
cited in contempt.

· Senator Poe retorted that petitioner might still be clinging to the supposed "Code of Silence"
in his alleged text messages to his fraternity. She manifested that petitioner's signature appeared
on the application for recognition of the AJ Fraternity and on the organizational sheet, indicating
that he was the president.

· Petitioner, again, invoked his right against self-incrimination.

· Senator Poe then moved to cite him in contempt, which was seconded by Senators Joel
Villanueva (Senator Villanueva) and Zubiri. Senator Lacson ruled that the motion was properly
seconded, hence, the Senate Sergeant-at-arms was ordered to place petitioner in detention after
the committee hearing.

· Thus, petitioner was placed under the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms by virtue of a
Contempt Order.

· Hence, this petition.

PETITIONER:

· The legislative inquiry conducted by respondent committees was not in aid of legislation; rather,
it was in aid of prosecution.

· He properly invoked his right against self-incrimination as the questions propounded by Senator
Poe regarding the officers, particularly the presidency of the AJ Fraternity, were incriminating because
the answer thereto involves an element of the crime of hazing.

· The Senate illegally enforced and executed SR No. 504 and the Contempt Order, which caused
him grave and irreparable injury as he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
Respondents did not exercise their power of contempt judiciously and with restraint.

SUPREME COURT:

· Petition is moot and academic. Respondent committees have terminated their legislative
inquiry. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of petitioner likewise
ends.Accordingly, there is no more justiciable controversy regarding respondents' exercise of their
constitutional power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, their power of contempt, and the
validity of petitioner's detention.

· Nevertheless, there were occasions in the past when the Court passed upon issues although
supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic. In this case, the petition
presents a critical and decisive issue that must be addressed by Court: what is the duration of the
detention for a contempt ordered by the Senate?This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's
exercise of its power of contempt without a definite period is capable of repetition. Moreover, the
indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt impairs their constitutional right to liberty. Thus,
paramount public interest requires the Court to determine such issue to ensure that the
constitutional rights of the persons appearing before a legislative inquiry of the Senate are
protected.

ISSUE:

WHAT IS THE DURATION OF THE DETENTION FOR A CONTEMPT ORDERED BY THE SENATE?(To know
the answer right away, skip the discussion below and go directly to “SUPREME COURT RULING”)

JURISPRUDENCE RE: CONTEMPT POWER

In Arnault v. Nazareno (Arnault), where the Senate's power of contempt was discussed, the Court
held that the Senate "is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical
dissolution of Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time [with] the
Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted
xxx" It was ruled therein that had contempt been exercised by the House of Representatives, the
contempt could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the said Congress.

Notably, Arnault gave a distinction between the Senate and the House of Representatives' power of
contempt. In the former, since it is a continuing body, there is no time limit in the exercise of its
power to punish for contempt; on the other hand, the House of Representatives, as it is not a
continuing body, has a limit in the exercise of its power to punish for contempt, which is on the final
adjournment of its last session.

Later, in Neri v. Senate (Neri), the Court clarified the nature of the Senate as continuing body:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body", this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing'', as it is not dissolved
as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and
independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take
up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be
bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a
continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be
deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into
the next Congress with the same status.

Based on the above-pronouncement, the Senate is a continuing institution. However, in the conduct
of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
Senate of the Congress before it. Due to the termination of the business of the Senate during the
expiration of one (1) Congress, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time.

WHY IS THERE A NEED TO LIMIT THE PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT?

SC:There is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be
imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of
legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in
aid of legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein.

Under Arnault, however, a witness or resource speaker cited in contempt by the Senate may be
detained indefinitely due to its characteristic as a continuing body. The said witness may be
detained for a day, a month, a year, or even for a lifetime depending on the desire of the perpetual
Senate.Certainly, in that case, the rights of persons appearing before or affected by the legislative
inquiry are in jeopardy. The constitutional right to liberty that every citizen enjoys certainly cannot
be respected when they are detained for an indefinite period of time without due process of law.

As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-preservation
and does not extend to the infliction of punishment as such. It is a means to an end and not the end
itself. 48 Even arguendo that detention under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is not
entirely punitive in character because it may be used by Congress only to secure information from a
recalcitrant witness or to remove an obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said
witness. It is when the restrictions during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer
intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related
rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. An
indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and will certainly
violate any person's right to liberty.

It is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of contempt is of utmost importance. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislations are intended to affect or change. Mere requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed through the power of
contempt during legislative inquiry.

While there is a presumption of regularity that the Senate will not gravely abuse its power of
contempt, there is still a lingering and unavoidable possibility of indefinite imprisonment of
witnesses as long as there is no specific period of detention, which is certainly not contemplated
and envisioned by the Constitution.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

WHAT IS THE DURATION OF THE DETENTION FOR A CONTEMPT ORDERED BY THE SENATE?

1. The Court finds that THE PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE INHERENT POWER OF
CONTEMPT BY THE SENATE DURING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION SHOULD ONLY LAST UNTIL
THE TERMINATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY UNDER WHICH THE SAID POWER IS INVOKED.

In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if
the subject of investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony called relates to that subject. Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate
legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised.
Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of
contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.

2. The Court further rules that THE LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY OF THE SENATE TERMINATES ON TWO
INSTANCES:

First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report.

Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules state:

Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report…

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.

Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred to the
Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases supplied)

As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after the conduct of
the legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in the Senate Rules
because it mandates that the committee begin the consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days
from the conclusion of the inquiry. The said Committee Report shall then be approved by a majority
vote of all its members; otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject matter of the
next order of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the Committee Report is
the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or disapproval signifies the end of such
legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate whether or not to act upon the said Committee
Report in the succeeding order of business. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously
ceases and the detained witness should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the
detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.
Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress.

As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in
the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing
institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final
adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the
imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.

3. In Arnault, there have been fears that placing a limitation on the period of imprisonment
pursuant to the Senate's power of contempt would "deny to it an essential and appropriate means
for its performance." Also, in view of the limited period of imprisonment, "the Senate would have
to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt
proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed xxx."

The Court is of the view that these fears are insufficient to permit an indefinite or an unspecified
period of imprisonment under the Senate's inherent power of contempt. If Congress believes that
there is a necessity to supplement its power of contempt by extending the period of imprisonment
beyond the conduct of its legislative inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of the last session, then
it can enact a law or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify or
produce papers during inquiries in aid of legislation. The charge of contempt by Congress shall be
tried before the courts, where the contumacious witness will be heard. More importantly, it shall
indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which may include a fine and/or imprisonment, and the
period of imprisonment shall be specified therein. This constitutes as the statutory power of
contempt, which is different from the inherent power of contempt.

Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the refusal of a witness to answer any legal inquiry before Congress, to wit:

Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or
subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions. - The
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from two hundred to one thousand pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who, having been duly summoned to attend as a
witness before the National Assembly, (Congress), its special or standing committees and
subcommittees, the Constitutional Commissions and its committees, subcommittees, or divisions, or
before any commission or committee chairman or member authorized to summon witnesses, refuses,
without legal excuse, to obey such summons, or being present before any such legislative or
constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation or to answer any
legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or records in his possession, when
required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon
any person who shall restrain another from attending as a witness, or who shall induce disobedience
to a summon or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Verily, the said law may be another recourse for the Senate to exercise its statutory power of
contempt. The period of detention provided therein is definite and is not limited by the period of the
legislative inquiry. Of course, the enactment of a new law or the amendment of the existing law to
augment its power of contempt and to extend the period of imprisonment shall be in the sole
discretion of Congress.

Moreover, the apprehension in Arnault - that the Senate will be prevented from effectively
conducting legislative hearings during recess - shall be duly addressed because it is expressly
provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings
while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus,
the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the
same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be
indefinite.

Sec. 22

Senate v. Ermita,supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
Section 23: 1. The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled,
voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

2. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

1) SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued
Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5).
The said law was issued declaring a state of national emergency and aimed to suppress lawlessness
and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation
of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to
his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such
is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over
power.

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued
Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5).
The said law was issued declaring a state of national emergency and aimed to suppress lawlessness
and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation
of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to
his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA
news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his
actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no
factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such
is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over
power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

RULING: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP.
It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the
said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC
ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A
reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of
the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the
Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence
Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold
her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their
faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of
speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or
even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a
law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion
are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial
overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here,
the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that
‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.
The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these
are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however
violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such
power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted
that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers
(as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency
can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take
care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the
Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid
exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

WHEREFORE, the Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However,
the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as
well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the
provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined
and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

3) Ampatuan v. DILG Secretary Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011

FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence” in the named places. Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring”
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO
273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to
“delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy, petitioners Datu
Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this
petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s proclamation and orders
encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take
over ARMM’s operations and to seize the regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the
President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the
deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the
President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and
273-A be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE: 1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the
AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City

3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

RULING:1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over
control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent Governor
of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre, the ARMM Vice‐
Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec. 2009 pursuant to the rule on
succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then
Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor.
The DILG Secretary therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places
mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not
need a congressional authority to exercise the same.

3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the
power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and
suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse
of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without
factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several
factors which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that
the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also
prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might
decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather
information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the
state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed,
the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly
and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling
out” power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were
placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG
Secretary had no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too
grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places
mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-
powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears
and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed
forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of emergency in the
subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence there
have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect the President’s actions

4) Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 -See MR Feb. 6, 2018

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

1) Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630

FACTS

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various
suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2
distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

RULING
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required
by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the
revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation
of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending
receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But
this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative
practice.

3) Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331

FACTS

Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon
the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction
and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and
as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned
subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private
respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any
government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is
that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from
the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed
to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.
ISSUE

Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an
expenditure of the government?

RULING

No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from
the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not
justify their aid by the use public money.

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute
is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.

Section 25: 1. The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for
the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.

2. No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

3. The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
4. A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposal therein.

5. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.

6. Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.

7. If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations
bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.

1) Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517

FACTS

Petitioner Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

When RA 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5
months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of RA
2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial
proceedings;

From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has
neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever
employed in the Government in any capacity;

Garcia brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to
compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due to him from the time of his
reversion to inactive status.
He contended that his reversion was contrary to Par. 11 of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion to
inactive status of reserve officers on active duty w/ at least 10 years of accumulated active
commissioned service.

However, the respondents contend that the paragraph 11 “Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines” has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in question or to any
appropriation item contained law since RA 1600 is about appropriation of money for the operation of
the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, while the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental
government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve
officers in the AFP. and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 4 of the 1935 Constitution of
the Philippines, which reads:

No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to such appropriation.

ISSUE

WON paragraph 11 RA 1600 is unconstitutional. Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

RULING

YES.

The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the
relevance to any appropriation item.

RA 1600 is , is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the government while Section 11
refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive
statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

… That reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are
still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except
for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request;…

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of

the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was a completely
unrelated provision attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the
title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the
act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

2) Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003

FACTS

The petition seeks to declare Section 14 of RA no. 9006 (The Fair Elections Act) unconstitutional as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code )which provides:

Sec. 67 Candidates holding elective office-Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and
Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.

Reason for the petition: The unconstitutionality rose upon the violation of Section 26 of article 6 of
the constitution requiring every law to have only one subject, which should be expressed in its title.

RA No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda
and the elimination of unfair election practices, while section 67 of the Omnibus election code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office rather than the one they are holding in
a permanent capacity

Petitioners also asserted that Sec 14 violates equal protection clause because it repeals Section 67
only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving Section 66 intact which imposes similar limitation to
appointive individuals.

Sec. 66 Candidates holding appointive office or position- Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including members of the AFP, and officers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing his certificate of
candidacy.
Respondents’ defense:

Section 14 of RA No. 9006 as it repeals Section 67 of Omnibus Election Code is not a proscribed
rider nor does it violate Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. The title “An Act to Enhance
the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices”
is broad and could encompass entire election exercise including the filing of candidacy of elective
officials.

The effectivity clause of RA No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process clause of the Constituion
as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and property.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 be rendered unconstitutional because it as it expressly

repealed Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and violated the “one-subject-one title” rule?

Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider?

*rider- additional provision added to a bill or other measure under the consideration by a legislature
having little connection with the subject matter of the bill.

RULING

NO and NO

Sec 26(1), Article IV provides:

“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.”

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing
each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object.

The title of RA no. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible elections through Fair Election Practices.”
Section 2 provides the principles and objectives thereof: The State shall, during the election period,
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service,
including access to media time and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information
campaigns and for among candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.

The Court is convinced that the title and objectives of RA no. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Sec. 67 within its contemplation.

RA no. 9006 does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. An act having a single general subject ,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions as long as they are not inconsistent or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject.

3) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that
JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
"ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – Social Justice Society President Alcantara filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking
that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued
permanently.
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer
For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of
2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and
void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO
against respondents.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public
Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized
to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same
implementing unit and same project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not
yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence
of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5)
calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be
limited within the same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special
Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions
of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet
been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the BTr.

Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created
under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has
been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on accountability.

2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could,
after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these
intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence,
outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This
kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of
a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the
President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.

Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a
mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control,
etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.

The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors
from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or
amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

Article VI, Section 25 (2) provides that “No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.”

Moreover, Article VI, Section 25 (5) provides that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”

2. YES.

Regarding the Malampaya Fund:

The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase
gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that
the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3)
reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory
reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be
limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds
for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own
position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government.”

Regarding the Presidential Fund:

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be
used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.” The second indicated purpose
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for
restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him
carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as
a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development
projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the
delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term
could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD
910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are
severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.

Article VI, Section 25 (4) provides “A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.”

4) Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208

FACTS

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977) as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general
interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayer. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD
No. 1177 provides:

“The president shall have authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment”.

In particular, petitioners claim that the provision violates the following constitutional provision:

Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution — No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.

The petition additionally argues that:

• The provision infringes upon fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public funds

• It is repugnant to the Constitution as it fails to specify objectives and purposes for which
proposed transfer of funds are to be made

• It allows the President to override safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by the
Constitution in approving appropriations

• It amounts to an undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive

• The threatened, continuing transfer of funds by the President and the implementation
thereof by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer of the Philippines are without or in excess
of their authority and jurisdiction.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners
and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in
its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has
become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in
pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.”

ISSUE

Whether Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 constitutional?

RULING

No. In the 1973 Constitution, it is explicitly stated that one cannot transfer an appropriation for one
item to another. However, it allowed enactment of a law which authorized transfer of funds in
order to augment an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the govt. branch or
constitutional body concerned. This leeway is limited, and was only granted to allow heads of govt.
branches some flexibility in the use of public funds and resources. This limitation stems from the
fact that the PURPOSE and CONDITION for fund transferring was required. Paragraph 1 of The
Budget Reform Decree of 1977 unduly overextends the privilege granted in sec. 16(5) because the
President can indiscriminately transfer funds from the Executive Dept.’s branches to any branch in
the General Appropriations Act without regard as to whether or not 1) the funds are actually
savings in the item from which it is taken, 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item
to which the said transfer is made. Although there is no complete disregard of the standards in the
fundamental law, it goes beyond the tenor thereof. It puts the bypasses the safeguards in Sec. 16
and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution on the release of money from the Treasury.

5) Liga v. COMELEC 232 SCRA 219

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

6) Sanchez v. COA, 552 SCRA 471

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

7) Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014. -See MR, Feb. 3, 2015

FACTS: On September 25, 2013, Sen. JinggoyEjercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech to reveal
that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional ₱50 Million each as "incentive"
for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Corona.The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the
reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) to the
consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable.The DAP
was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
spending.

The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and implemented the DAP
violated the mandate of Section 29(1) and Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether DAP violated the Constitution

RULING: Yes. The adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the President as the Chief
Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed. Although no law was necessary for the
adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but
a program or an administrative system of prioritizing spending, anytransfer of appropriated
fundsshould conform to Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.

The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon a
concurrence of the following requisites, namely:

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices; (2) The funds to be transferred are
savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices; and(3) The purpose of the
transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices.

Section 25(5), not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing law
for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of a given fiscal
year. To comply with the requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
However, the 2011 and 2012 GAA contravened with the Constitution. It did not contain the phrase
“for their respective offices” allowing transfer of funds from one branch to another branch of the
government which is not allowed under Sec. 25 of Art. 6 of the Constitution. The transfer should only
be within their respective offices.To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5),
refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate
President; the House of Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to
the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.

There was also no savings from appropriation. The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased
or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not
yet ripened into categories of items from which savings can be generated. Appropriations have been
considered "released" if there has already been an allotment or authorization to incur obligations and
disbursement authority.The Executive could not circumvent the law by declaring unreleased
appropriations and unobligated allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year. Further, no
funds from savings could be transferred under the DAP to augment deficient items which are not
provided in the GAA. An appropriation for any program, activity or project (PAP) must first be
determined to be deficient before it could be augmented from savings. However, there were certain
PAP that was supported by DAP that had not been covered with appropriations in the respective
GAAs. The Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
but such authority did not translate to unfettered discretion that allowed the President to substitute
his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs,
given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a delegation to him from Congress.
Section 26: 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

2. No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.

1) Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418

FACTS: Tenancy Counsel Unit of the Mediation Division of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice, thru its Trial Attorney the herein petitioner Manuel A. Cordero as counsel for
indigent petitioner tenant Vicente Salazar, filed with the Second Regional District of the Court of
Agrarian Relationsagainst private respondent landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana. Upon a motion by the
private respondent, the respondent Judge issued an order disqualifying petitioner from appearing as
counsel for the tenant on the ground that a tenant who cannot afford to pay should be represented
by the public defendant of the Department of Labor and the circular issued by the Agricultural
Tenancy Commission creating the Tenancy Unit Counsel is ultra vires and has no legal force.
Subsequently, RA 2263 "AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT
OF THE PHILIPPINE” was enacted which provides that in case a tenant cannot afford to be represented
by counsel, it shall be the duty of the trial attorney of the tenancy mediation commission to represent
him. Petitioner manifested that the issue is now moot and academic since petitioner, on the basis of
RA 2263 section 19 and 20,is now allowed to represent the tenant. Respondent, in his comment,
contends that before the enactment of RA 2263, there was no Tenancy Mediation Division in
existence nor was there any law creating the same and defining its functions, and that its only basis
for existence, therefore, are sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 which are null and void
because the Constitution under Article VI Section 1 provides that "no bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." He
contended further that nowhere in the titles of Republic Act No. 1199 and Republic Act No. 2263 is
the creation of the Tenancy Mediation Division ever mentioned, thereby indicating that section 19,
Republic Act No. 2263 falls under the first class of prohibited bills.
ISSUE: Whether the contention of the respondent is correct

RULING: No. The constitutional requirement under Article VI section 1, is complied with as long the
law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with
or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid. The provisions of sections 19 and 20 of
Republic Act No. 2263 are certainly germane to, and are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the one general subject, agricultural tenancy.

2) Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172

FACTS

Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company, both re-suppliers of power
produced by NAPOCOR, assails the power vested in NAPOCOR that "in any contract for the supply
of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least 50% of its electric power and energy from
it to require as a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a net profit of more than
twelve percent annually of its investments plus two-month operating expenses." Also it could
“renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply of electric power and energy,".
This is all in pursuant to RA 3043 and the amendments it offered to RA 2641. This statutory
provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision
requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject, which
shall be expressed in its title and is only meant to increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR. The lower
court sustained its validity.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 3043 is constitutional.

RULING

Yes. No bill "which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in [its] title . . ." This provision is similar to those found in many American State
Constitutions. It is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills as log-rolling legislation as
well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to a
particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people should be informed of the subject of
proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill. Alalayan asserts
that the provision objected to is such a rider.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or
impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical,
it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means
necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not
required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for
all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title. More specifically, if the law
amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be
amended, there being no need to state the precise nature of the amendment. "Of course, the
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body
of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise
or fraud upon the legislators."

4) Insular Lumber Co. v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710

FACTS

These two (2) cases are appeals by way of certiorari from the decision dated July 31, 1969 of the Court
of Tax Appeals ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund to the Insular Lumber
Company the amount of P10,560.20 instead of P19,921.37, representing 25% of the specific tax paid
on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by said company in the operation of its forest concession
in the year 1963.
Insular Lumber Company (Company for short). a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
New York. U.S.A., and duly authorized to do business in the Philippines is a licensed forest
concessionaire. The Company purchase manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the
operation of its forest concession on which specific tax was paid.

The commissioner denied the Company's claim for refund on the ground that the privilege of partial
tax refund granted by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 to those using oil in the operation of forest
and mining concessions is limited to a period of five (5) years from June 14, 1956, the date effectivity
of said Act.

Respondent court, however, did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the
Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period
from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, the Company was credited the
refund of P10,560.20 only.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Tax Appeals err in its previous decisions (denying the tax exemption to Insular
Lumber Company)?

RULING

The Commissioner contends that the first proviso in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 is
unconstitutional. In claiming the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid section, the Commissioner
anchored its argument on Article VI, Section 21(l) of the 1935 Constitution which provides:

No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed
in the title of the bill

The title of R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund." The
Commissioner contends that the subject of R.A. No. 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund.
However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners
and loggers.

Partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title
of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of
the Highway Special Fund.

The Court finds NO MERIT in the arguments.

Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy - the necessity for
increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on
manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the
imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is nor, a
deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional
provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the
legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation.

Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled, every

presumption favors the validity of the Act. As is true republic in cases presenting other constitutional
issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever possible. Where there is any
doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Art, the legislation should be sustained.

5) Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208

FACTS Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by Presidential Decree
No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board".

P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a 30% tax on the
gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local government (Sec. 10).

ISSUE

The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and

RULING

1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express
each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts
of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied and
germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the law,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in
its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a
tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the
decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an activity.
At the same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which the
government may validly tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8,
quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also
an objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board)
has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and
deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform
enforcement functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as
to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the
decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the
deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."
The petition was DISMISSED.

6) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 27: 1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members
of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined
by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.

2. The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

1) Abakada v. Ermita, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
2) CIR v. CTA, 185 SCRA 329

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452

FACTS

Congress passed the General Appropriations Bill 1989. It eliminated or decreased certain items
included in the proposed budget as submitted by the president.

When presented to the President for her signature, it was signed but 7 SPECIAL PROVISIONS and Sec
55 (General Provision) were VETOED.

The senate then passed a resolution saying that the President’s Veto was unconstitutional.

Sec 55 provided:

“Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations / Disapproved or

Reduced by Congress” – No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget which
has been disapproved or reduced shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations
authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item for appropriation for any purpose
recommended by the President shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in the GAB”

The reason why the President vetoed the provision was that it violates Section 25(5) – nullifying the
power of the President to augment any item from savings in other items.

Gonzales et al claim that the President’s Line-Veto in appropriation bills is limited to items and does
not cover provisions.

They claim that Cory exceeded her authority when she vetoed Sec 55 which are PROVISIONS, such
that when the President objects to a PROVISION of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the
ITEMVETO POWER but should veto the entire bill.

They further claim that the Item-Veto Power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions
or restrictions for that would be legislation.
Lastly they claim that Sec 25(5) of the Constitution (which provides for the President’s Augmentation
Powers) – has to be provided for by law thus Congress has the prerogative to limit the exercise of the
same.

On the other hand the Solgen claims that Sec 55 is actually a rider because it is extraneous to an
appropriation act, therefore the President validly vetoed it. Solgen further claims that the constitution
empowers the President to veto PROVISIONS or other distinct and severable parts of an
Appropriations Bill

ISSUE

Did the President exceeded the item-veto power?

RULING

No. In Article VI Sec 27 of the Constitution:

Paragraph 1 = refers to the general veto power of the President. If exercised, it would result to
the veto of the ENTIRE BILL.

Paragraph 2 = refers to the ITEM VETO power or LINE VETO. It allows the exercise of veto over
particular items in an APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL. The power given to the President to
disapprove any item in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item
and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

The terms ITEM and PROVISION are different. An ITEM refers to the particulars, details, the distinct
and severable parts of the bill. It is the indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. It
obviously means an item which in itself is a SPECIFIC APPROPRIATION of money, not some general
provision of law, which just happens to be put in an appropriation bill.

The claim of the petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill
not

only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be subject of a
separate veto,

but also overlooks the constitutional mandate that any PROVISION in the general appropriations bill
shall relate specifically to some particular provision therein, and that any such provision shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

In short, A PROVISION in an appropriation bill is limited in its operation to some particular

appropriation, and DOES NOT RELATE TO THE ENTIRE BILL. (The President may veto provisions.)

Even assuming that provisions are beyond veto powers,

Sec 55 may still be vetoed following the DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE PROVISIONS.

As to the claim that Congress should be allowed to impose restrictions or conditions in an
appropriations bill (which they claim is beyond veto-powers), it cannot be denied that Legislature has
the power to provide qualifications and conditions in Appropriation Bills as to limit how the money
shall be spend, etc. Also, it cannot be denied that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or
qualification but allowing the appropriation

itself to stand. HOWEVER, for these to apply, THE RESTRICTIONS SHOULD BE SUCH IN THE REAL SENSE
OF THE TERM, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation.
Restrictions or Conditions must exhibit a CONNECTION WITH MONEY ITEMS IN A BUDGETARY SENSE
IN THE SCHEDULE

OF EXPENDITURES. Thus the test is one of APPROPRIATENESS. Sec 55 appears to be a condition but
actually they are GENERAL LAW MEASURES MORE APPROPRIATE FOR a substantive, separate
legislation.

4) Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra.

FACTS

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork
barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the
President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and
on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly
done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign
or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics
Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the
AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of the
Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not
be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers”

6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
gratuity funds.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the
Congress.

ISSUE

Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a)
for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human
Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional

RULING

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There
is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the
court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations
law.

In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that
purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special
laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the
National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.

The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply
with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
“appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on
purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without
also vetoing the said item.

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program
that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper
occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions
Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being
“inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of
the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of
contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said
special provision is therefore valid.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for
the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections
25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged
Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer
or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even
if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such
intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of
the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the
Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the
guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry
into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

5) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS

(same as previously discussed)

ISSUE

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on.. checks
and balances.

RULING

YES. It is unconstitutional for violation of the Consitutional provision on checks and balances.

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an
item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval
through a process known as “bill presentment.” The President’s item–veto power is found in Section
27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

Petitioners claim that “[i]n the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump–sum appropriation, the
legislator’s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance
to veto that item later on.”212 Accordingly, they submit that the “item veto power of the President
mandates that appropriations bills adopt line–item budgeting” and that “Congress cannot choose a
mode of budgeting [which] effectively renders the constitutionally–given power of the President
useless.The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and
distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination
in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

The Court agrees.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump–sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after
the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump–sum/post–enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the above– described system forces the President to decide between (a)
accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole
PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

Moreover, even without its post–enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump–sum
appropriation as above–characterized. In particular, the lump–sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical
missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood
control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes
of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible
item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.

Section 28: 1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.

2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to
such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-
profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.

1) Commissioner of Internal Reveue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power, 164 SCRA 27

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

2) Abra Valley College v. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106

FACTS

Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice
of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment
of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said “Notice of Seizure” by respondents
Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the
said taxes thereon.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the
building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used and
rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is not
being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of
the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme
Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE

Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.

RULING

Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by
law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern
Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the
purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes
mentioned in the Constitution.

3) John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, Oct. 24, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioners filed their Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief assailing

(1) the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 420 and

(2) the legality of the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement previously entered
into between public respondent BCDA and private respondents.

Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no
legal force and effect.

Intervener Camp John Hay Development Corp. (CJHDC) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene alleging
that it, together with its consortium partners, entered into a Lease Agreement with respondent BCDA
for the development of the John Hay SEZ; and that it “stands to be most affected” by this Court’s
Decision “invalidating the grant of tax exemption and other financial incentives” in the John Hay
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) since “[i]ts financial obligations and development and investment
commitments under the Lease Agreement were entered into upon the premise that these incentives
are valid and subsisting.”

CJHDC, proffering grounds parallel to those of public respondents, prays that: (1) it be granted leave
to intervene in this case; (2) its attached Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention be admitted; and
(3) this Court’s Decision of October 24, 2003 be reconsidered and petitioners’ petition dismissed.

CJHDC’s Motion for leave to Intervene was granted and noted its Motion for Reconsideration in
Intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether the tax exemptions and other financial incentives granted to the Subic SEZ under Section 12
of R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), are applicable to the John Hay SEZ.

RULING:

CJHDC’s argument that the President’s “power to create Special Economic Zones carries with it the
power to provide for tax and financial incentives,” does not lie. It is the legislative branch which has
the inherent power not only to select the subjects of taxation but to grant exemptions.

Paragraph 4, Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution is crystal clear: “[n]o law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.”

Hence, it is only the legislature, as limited by the provisions of the Constitution, which has full power
to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation. The Constitution itself may
provide for specific tax exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances providing for
exemption from local taxes, but, otherwise, it is only the legislative branch which has the power to
grant tax exemptions, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.

There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7227 which can be considered a grant of tax exemption in favor
of public respondent BCDA. Rather, the beneficiaries of the tax exemptions and other incentives in
Section 12 (the only provision in R.A. No. 7227 which expressly grants tax exemptions) are clearly the
business enterprises located within the Subic SEZ.

Contrary to public respondents’ interpretation, the Decision of October 24, 2003 does not “tie the
hands” of executive or administrative agencies from implementing any present or future legislation
which affords tax or other financial incentives to qualified persons doing business in the John Hay SEZ
or elsewhere. The second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 was declared null and void
only insofar as it purported to grant tax exemptions and other financial incentives to business
enterprises located in John Hay SEZ. However, where there is statutory basis for exemptions or
incentives, there is nothing to prevent qualified persons from applying for and availing thereof.

4) Lung Center v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

5) CIR v. De La Salle University, G.R. No. 196596, November 9, 2016

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Section 29: 1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
2. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

3. All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and
paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

1) Guingona v. Carague, supra.

FACTS

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service,
it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than
the budget for education.
HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to
protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional

2) Belgica v. Ochoa, supra.

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

3) Philippine Coconut v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
Section 30: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

1) First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC.

CASE: Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction is the novel question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the Board
of Investments (BOI) should be filed.

A thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as
the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226, also known as the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called for.

FACTS:

· BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic
tiles."

· Eventually, oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision
which was denied. So,Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals
pursuant to SC Circular 1-91.

· Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition on the ground that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over the BOI case, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Article 82 of E.O. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

PETITIONER:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of
E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with
this Court.

Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a
substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this
Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems.

(NOTE: During the transitional period after the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the
lawmaking power was lodged on the Executive Department.According to SC in its decision in the
herein case, the obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the
deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to
promote. In exempli gratia, Executive Order No. 226 or the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987
provides that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order or decision.)

PRIVATE RESPONDENT:

Whatever "obvious inconsistency" or "irreconcilable repugnancy" there may have been between
B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal has already been resolved by
Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years
after E.O. 226 was enacted.Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

WHICH COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE BOARD OF
INVESTMENTS (BOI)?

RULING:

COURT OF APPEALS
1. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions
or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such
appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court
has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers.

The case of Bustos v. Lucero distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and those
arising from procedural law:

Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J.,
980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their invasion.

Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be
brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal
granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI
under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of
appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different
period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive
right to appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and
method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE BOI, WHICH BY STATUTE WAS PREVIOUSLY ALLOWED TO BE
FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT, SHOULD NOW BE BROUGHT TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS.

2) Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

Section 32: The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws
or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body
after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters thereof.

1) Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492

FACTS: · On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992), which created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement
the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive
uses.

·
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left
by the American navy.

·
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA
7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.

·
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.

·
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to
join the Subic Special Economi Zone, b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
·
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions
of RA 7227.

·
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

·
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

·
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds
of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Municipality of Morong.

·
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845 and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern
the conduct of the referendum

·
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution
No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes
an amendment of a national law

ISSUE: 1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10

2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of
Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

RULING:1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made
preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum"
is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the
exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee";
the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was
the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the
right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the
people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content
of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the
people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and
obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and
the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No.
2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the
same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved,
or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission
on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.
2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which
this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.

2) Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106

FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

3) Lambino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174299, October 25, 2006

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING