Table

 of  Contents  
General  Approach  to  Interpretation  ...........................................................................  5  
Literalists:  ........................................................................................................................................  5  
1. The  courts  are  not  law  makers,  it’s  undemocratic  
2. A  relaxed  approach  leads  to  uncertainty  and  inequity,  therefore  the  construction  should  be  
strict  
3. Public  interest  is  served  by  the  strict  approach,  the  public  wants  certainty  in  the  laws  made  
by  elected  officials.  
 
Non-­‐literalists:  ...............................................................................................................................  6  
1. Purposive  approach  –  looks  beyond  the  strictness  of  language,  flexibility  is  key  
2. Legislature  and  judicial  arm  work  together  to  achieve  just  results  (partnership)  
3. Discretionary  feature  is  essential  and  is  in  the  public  interest    
Internal  Interpretation  ...................................................................................................  6  
1)  The  Literal  Approach  (Sussex  Peerage  1844)  .................................................................  6  
Gather  the  meaning  from  the  words  alone,  don't  look  to  purpose.  Advantage  is  
predictability.  
 
2)  The  Mischief  (Purposive)  Approach  (Heydon’s  Case  1584)  .......................................  6  
What  mischief  is  this  change  in  legislation  mean  to  remedy.  Look  to:  
1) What  was  the  common  law  rule  before  the  Act  was  made?  
2) What  was  the  mischief  and  defect  the  Act  was  meant  to  address?  
3) What  remedy  Parliament  had  resolved  and  appointed  to  cure  the  disease?  
4) The  true  reason  for  the  remedy  
Look  to  Rizzo  and  notes  for  what  should  be  evaluated.    
 
3)  The  Golden  Rule  Approach  (Grey  v  Pearson  1857)  .......................................................  6  
When  the  grammatical  meaning  would  lead  to  an  absurdity.  
1) Would  too  literal  an  interpretation  lead  to  an  absurdity?  
2) Absurdity  of  the  alternate  interpretation.  “It  is  a  well  established  principle  of  statutory  
interpretation  that  the  legislature  does  not  intend  to  produce  absurd  consequences.”  
(Rizzo).  
3) Use  common  sense  (Zacks)  
Modern  Approach………………………………………………………………………………………4  
Words  of  a  provision  are  to  be  read  in  their  entire  context  and  in  their  grammatical  and  
ordinary  sense  harmoniously  w/  the  scheme  of  the  Act,  the  object  of  the  Act  and  the  intention  of  
Parliament  
1)  Context  
i. plain  meaning  
ii. context  (ejusdem  generis)  
iii. intention  
2)  Purposive/mischief/intention.  
3)  Grammatical  or  ordinary  sense  
Language  Aids:  ...................................................................................................................  7  
Noscitur  a  sociis:  A  general  word  takes  its  colour  from  the  preceding  specific  words  with  which  
it  is  used.  

  1  
 Ejusdem  Generis:  A  general  phrase  gets  its  colour  from  the  word  or  words  that  follow  OR  
proceed  it.  Ie)  use  of  the  words  “or  other”  at  the  end  of  a  list  might  restrict  the  list  to  a  genus  
which  is  exhausted  or  there  may  be  no  commonality  b/w  the  list.    
  Rebuttals:  
1) There  are  no  similar  characteristics  to  provide  a  common  background,  then  it  is  not  
possible  for  these  words  to  give  meaning  to  the  general  words.  
2) If  the  category  is  exhaustive,  such  that  the  general  words  following  must  refer  to  a  larger  
genus  and  are  not  restrictive  (Rascal  Trucking)  
 
Expressio  unius  est  exclusio  alterius:  a  general  word  of  phrase  takes  its  colour  as  well  from  
the  specific  words  or  phrases  which  follow  it  as  from  those  that  precede  it.  Express  mention  of  
one  thing  implies  exclusion  of  another.  (Fisher  v  Bell).  
 
Other  aids:  .......................................................................................................................................  8  
Marginal  notes,  head  notes,  tables  of  contents,  preamble.  
 
Re  Rizzo  and  Rizzo  Shoes  [1998]  (Application  of  Modern  principle;  interpret  in  the  
entire  context,  grammatical  and  ordinary  sense  harmoniously  with  the  scheme  and  
objective  of  the  Act  and  intention  of  Parliament)  .....................................................................  8  
 
Ratio:  Rejected  the  plain  meaning  b/c  of  absurdity.  Instead  chose  to  read  the  Act  in  its  
entire  context  and  in  harmony  w/scheme  and  objective  and  Parliaments  intention,  in  a  
way  that  would  cause  no  conflict.  Didn’t  rely  on  Hansard  or  ministers  statements.  As  
benefits  confering  legislation  it  should  be  read  in  favor  of  the  employees  ...........................  8  
 
Bell  ExpressVu  Partnership  v  Rex  [2002]  (Modern  approach,  grammatical  &  
ordinary  sense  -­‐>  broader  context)  .............................................................................................  9  
 
Rule:  Apply  the  modern  approach  1st,  then  use  other  principles  such  as  strict  
construction  of  penal  statutes  and  Charter  values  presumption.    You  only  go  to  
external  aides  when  there  is  ambiguity,  and  when  internal  are  exhausted.  .........................  9  
 
United  Taxi  Drivers  Fellowship  of  Southern  Alberta  v  Calgary  [2004]  (affirms  that  
courts  are  bound  to  Modern  Approach)  ...................................................................................  10  
 
Rule:  Courts  are  bound  to  apply  approach  from  Bell  ExpressVu  (modern  approach)  
unless  there  is  a  constitutional  challenge,  a  contextual  approach.  .........................................  10  
 
Wigglesworth  v  The  Queen  [1987]  (how  to  use  marginal  notes)  ...................................  10  
 
Rule:  In  assessing  context  of  a  statute/provision  can  look  to  the  headers,  headings,  and  
marginal  notes.  Headings  are  considered  integral  to  a  statute  (Charter  cases  
especially),  marginal  notes  are  not.  Headings  have  more  weight  than  marginal  notes.  10  
 
City  of  Nanaimo  v  Rascal  Trucking  [2000]  (application  of  Ejudeem  generis,  genus  
wasn’t  exhausted,  supported  by  the  Golden  Rule,  (absurdity))  ..........................................  11  
 
Rule:  Modern  approach  doesn’t  preclude  courts  from  common  law  context  tools,  
applies  ejusdem  generis,  looking  at  the  other  words  within  the  Act,  and  applies  the  
Golden  Rule  to  avoid  absurdity.  .............................................................................................................  11  
 

  2  
 Grini  v  Grini  [1974]  (Exhaustion  of  ejusdem  generis,  uses  the  context  and  purposive  
approach)  ........................................................................................................................................  12  
 
Rule:  When  the  words  in  a  provision  exhaust  a  genus  then  the  general  words  that  
follow  must  be  understood  as  referring  to  a  larger  genus  and  can’t  be  interpreted  in  a  
restrictive  manner.  Illness  and  disability  exhausted  the  genus  and  on  a  purposive  
(mischief)  approach  education  was  found  to  be  within  the  category  of  “other  cause.”  12  
 
R  v  Strahl  [1967]  (Application  of  ejusdem  generis)  ..............................................................  12  
 
Rule:  The  ejusdem  generis  rule  can  be  rebutted  by  looking  at  the  legislative  purpose  of  
the  Act  as  a  whole  (mischief  argument,  contextual)  .....................................................................  12  
External  Context  of  the  Legislation  ..........................................................................  13  
1)  Social  Context  
R  v  Oakes  [1986]  (example  of  the  courts  looking  to  the  social  situation  for  context  
about  why  a  statute  was  developed)  .........................................................................................  13  
 
Rule:    Assessing  whether  a  provision  is  in  conflict  with  the  Charter  consider  the  
reasoning  for  the  intrusion  in  the  social  context  The  court  can  look  at  extrinsic  
material  to  understand  why  a  provision  has  been  enacted,  in  this  case  a  reverse  onus  
clause  based  on  the  social  concern  about  the  increase  in  drug  trafficking.  ........................  13  
 
2)  Legal  context  
R  v  Popovic  and  Askov  [1975]  (look  to  legislative  history  for  context)  .........................  14  
 
Rule:  In  assessing  a  provision  the  Court  will  look  at  the  current  meaning  but  when  this  
isn’t  sufficient  b/c  there  is  still  ambiguity  they  can  look  to  previous  enactments  for  
clarity  about  the  definition  or  substance  of  the  word.  .................................................................  14  
 
Statutes  in  Pari  Materia  ............................................................................................................  14  
Statutes  must  work  together  even  when  they  don’t  refer  to  one  another  and  therefore  it  can  be  
assumed  that  the  legislative  intent  was  that  they  be  consistent.    
 
Fisher  v  Bell  [1960]  (common  law  applied  when  needed,  use  of  expressio  unis)  .........  15  
 
Rule:  An  offer  for  sale  w/o  further  definition  will  be  construed  in  accordance  with  the  
common  law  and  other  definition  was  expressly  exlcuded  .  .....................................................  15  
 
Re:  Section  94(2)  of  the  Motor  Vehicle  Act  [1985]  (speeches  and  extrinsic  evidence  
from  legislators  will  be  given  minimal  weight)  ......................................................................  15  
 
Rule:  In  constitutional  cases  minutes  from  meetings  and  speeches  can  be  given  some  
weight  (minimal)  b/c  there  is  no  necessary  connection  b/w  the  intent  in  the  legislature  
and  the  Act  on  paper.  ..................................................................................................................................  15  
 
R  v  Sullivan  [1991]  (use  of  Hansard  and  legislative  history  in  examining  current  
statutes)  ...........................................................................................................................................  16  
 

  3  
 Rule:  If  there  is  a  question  about  a  word  or  provision  the  court  may  look  to  the  
Hansard  and  previous  legislative  history  to  determine  the  intention  behind  the  change.
 ..............................................................................................................................................................................  16  
 
R  v  Heywood  [1994]  (Preference  to  use  statutory  context,  purpose,  precedent  over  
legislative  history  and  Hansard  evidence)  ...............................................................................  16  
 
Rule:  Admissibility  of  Parliamentary  debates  is  weak  and  of  little  value,  as  is  legislative  
history  b/c  of  the  lack  of  proof  of  legislative  intent.  Legislative  history  can  be  used  to  
show  the  mischief  the  Legislature  was  trying  to  remedy,  these  rules  are  more  flexible  
in  evaluating  a  Constitutional  enactment.  The  provision  should  be  given  its  ordinary  
meaning  in  context  as  read  consistently  w/the  rest  of  the  Act  (modern  approach)  ......  16  
 
R  v  Morgentaler  [1993]  (approves  use  of  Hansard  evidence)  ..........................................  17  
 
Rule:  The  court  can  use  extrinsic  evidence  in  determining  the  purpose  of  a  statue  b/c  
this  helps  to  give  context  as  long  as  the  court  is  aware  that  this  evidence  has  limited  
weight.  ...............................................................................................................................................................  17  
 
Canada  AG  v  Mowat  [2009]  (Fundamental  principle  that  legal  authority  must  be  
granted  and  the  grounds  for  this  must  be  found  using  the  modern  approach  looking  at  
the,  context,  using  extrinsic  evidence  or  even  the  common  law.)  .......................................  17  
 
Rule:  The  Tribunal  doesn’t  have  the  inherent  authority  to  grant  “costs”  because  it  must  
be  granted  its  powers  as  a  delegated  authority,  and  nowhere  in  the  context  or  extrinsic  
evidence  (similar  statutes)  does  it  appear  that  this  authority  was  meant  to  be  granted.
 ..............................................................................................................................................................................  17  
Retroactivity,  Retrospectivity  and  Vested  Rights  ...............................................  18  
Retroactive  ....................................................................................................................................................  18  
Retrospective  legislation  is  legislation  that  applies  in  the  past.    There  is  a  strong  
presumption  against  it.  
•   Rebutted  if  it  is  expressed  in  the  statute  expressly  that  it  is  applied  
  retroactively.  
•   Also  if  the  provision  is  for  the  public  interest.  
 
Retrospective  ...............................................................................................................................................  18  
Retrospective  legislation  changes  the  legal  consequences  of  actions  but  going  forward.  
There  is  no  presumption  against  these.    
 
There  is  a  presumption  against  either  if  they  interfere  w/a  vested  right.  This  
presumption  can  be  rebutted  if  it  is  expressed  in  the  statute  that  it  will  be  interfered  with  
 
Mandavia  v  Central  West  Health  Care  Institutions  Board  [2005]  (application  of  
retrospective/retroactive  arguments,  examination  of  vested  rights,  the  three  
presumptions)  ................................................................................................................................  19  
 
Rule:  For  something  to  be  retroactive  it  must  change  the  past  legal  affect  of  an  action,  
it  is  retrospective  if  it  simply  changes  the  legal  consequences  in  the  future.  The  

  4  
 provision  here  was  held  retrospective.  The  express  fact  that  it  was  retrospective  
rebutted  the  presumption  against  interference  w/vested  rights.  ..........................................  19  
 
Dikranian  v  Quebec  AG  [2005]  (test  for  vested  rights)  .....................................................  20  
 
Rule:  The  court  finds  that  rights  were  vested  b/c  it  was  a  clear,  concrete  individual  
situation  and  therefore  the  Act  as  amended  could  not  apply  to  him.  ....................................  20  
 
The  test  for  whether  there  are  vested  rights.  
1. The  relevant  legislation  must  be  reasonably  susceptible  of  two  interpretations.  
2. The  judicial  situation  must  be  tangible,  concrete  and  distinctive.  
3. The  situation  must  be  sufficiently  constituted  at  the  time  of  the  statutes  commencement,  
it  must  have  materialized  (in  a  contract).  
4. It  must  be  related  to  a  specific  individual.  
 
Angus  v  Hart  [1988]  (If  vested  rights  are  substantial  there  will  be  a  presumption  
against  interference  w/them)  ....................................................................................................  21  
 
Rule:  Whether  a  provision  substantive  or  procedural  is  determined  looking  at  whether  
it  affects  substantive  or  procedural  rights..  ......................................................................................  21  
 
Brosseau  v  Alberta  Securities  Commission  [1989]  (Public  interest  trumps  the  
presumption  against  retroactive  application)  ........................................................................  21  
 
Rule:  If  the  purpose  of  an  enacted  statute  is  to  protect  the  public  interest  then  a  
punishment  can  be  applied  retrospectively  .....................................................................................  21  
 
Presumption  against  Substantial  Alterations  ...........................................................................  22  
There  is  a  presumption  that  the  legislature  doesn’t  intent  to  make  substantial  changes  beyond  
what  is  explicitly  declared  
 
Wener  v  Davidson  [1972]  (common  law  will  be  relied  on  to  fill  gaps  in  statutes  that  
are  not  strict).  .................................................................................................................................  22  
 
Rule:  A  statute  is  a  code  if  it  embraces  all  of  the  common  law.  If  not  then  the  common  
law  can  step  in  to  fill  in  gaps  and  the  common  law  is  understood  to  continue  unless  
there  is  clear  intention  to  change  it.  .....................................................................................................  22  
Strict  Construction  of  Penal  Statutes  .......................................................................  22  
If  there  is  any  ambiguity  in  a  penal  statute  it  is  meant  to  be  found  in  favor  of  the  accused.  
Interpretation  Act  Excerpts  British  Columbia  ......................................................  23  
 

General  Approach  to  Interpretation  

Literalists:  
1. The  courts  are  not  law  makers,  it’s  undemocratic  
2. A  relaxed  approach  leads  to  uncertainty  and  inequity,  therefore  the  
construction  should  be  strict  

  5  
 3. Public  interest  is  served  by  the  strict  approach,  the  public  wants  certainty  in  
the  laws  made  by  elected  officials.  

Non-­‐literalists:  
1. Purposive  approach  –  looks  beyond  the  strictness  of  language,  flexibility  
is  key  
2. Legislature  and  judicial  arm  work  together  to  achieve  just  results  
(partnership)  
3. Discretionary  feature  is  essential  and  is  in  the  public  interest    

Internal  Interpretation  
1)  The  Literal  Approach  (Sussex  Peerage  1844)  
The  intent  of  the  legislature  should  only  be  gathered  from  the  words  alone.  “Words  
are  to  be  given  plain  and  ordinary  meaning  whatever  the  consequences.”    The  
objective  or  purpose  are  not  considered.  An  advantage  is  that  this  creates  
predictability.    
Look  at  the:  
1) Meaning  in  the  Act  
2) Ordinary  meaning  in  the  dictionary  (Popovic)  
3) Natural  and  ordinary  usage  –  plain  meaning  
4) French  version  (there  are  commonly  problems  w/French  versions  –  a  
weaker  argument)    
5) Definition  in  the  Interpretation  Act  s.35(1)  

2)  The  Mischief  (Purposive)  Approach  (Heydon’s  Case  1584)  

The  act  should  be  read  in  a  way  that  considers  the  object/purpose  of  the  legislation,  
and  construed  in  a  way  that  suppresses  the  mischief  and  advances  the  remedy.      
In  examining  these  things  consider;  
1. What  was  the  common  law  rule  before  the  Act  was  made?  
2. What  was  the  mischief  and  defect  the  Act  was  meant  to  address?  
3. What  remedy  Parliament  had  resolved  and  appointed  to  cure  the  disease?  
4. The  true  reason  for  the  remedy  
A  judge  wants  to  suppress  the  mischief  and  advance  the  remedy.  To  do  this  look  at:  
  General  purpose  of  the  Act  (Rizzo)  
  Purpose  of  specific  provisions  (Rizzo)    
  Purpose  of  other  provisions  in  the  Act  
  Intention  of  the  legislature  
  Transitional  provisions  (Rizzo)  
  Policy  concerns  (do  these  out  weigh  other  concerns)  

3)  The  Golden  Rule  Approach  (Grey  v  Pearson  1857)  

The  grammatical  meaning  should  be  followed  unless  the  grammatical  meaning  
would  lead  to  an  absurd  result  or  inconsistency.  This  rule  allows  the  court  to  depart  

  6  
from  Literal  Approach  when  the  result  would  be  absurd.  If  this  occurs  then  the  
grammatical  rule  can  be  modified.    Look  to:  
4) Would  too  literal  an  interpretation  lead  to  an  absurdity?  
5) Absurdity  of  the  alternate  interpretation.  “It  is  a  well  established  
principle  of  statutory  interpretation  that  the  legislature  does  not  intend  
to  produce  absurd  consequences.”  (Rizzo).  
6) Use  common  sense  (Zacks)  

Modern  Approach  (Sullivan’s  article):  Preferred  approach.    

The  words  of  an  provision  are  to  be  read  in  their  entire  context  and  in  their  
grammatical  and  ordinary  sense  harmoniously  w/  the  scheme  of  the  Act,  the  object  
of  the  Act  and  the  intention  of  Parliament.  (adopted  in  Rizzo)  
1. Context  
i. Plain  meaning  
ii. Context  (ejusdem  generis)  
iii. Intention    
2. Purposive/mischief/intention  of  legislature  
3. Grammatical  or  Ordinary  sense  (literal)  
 
John  Willis  statute  Interpretation  in  a  Nutshell:  leading  Canadian  article  on  statutory  
interpretation.  
• Courts  will  use  literal,  golden  and  mischief  rules  to  achieve  a  result.  
• However  b/c  these  rules  are  open  ended  and  inconsistent  they  are  incapable  
of  producting  predictability  and  determining  outcomes.  Outcomes  are  really  
determined  by  the  politics  and  arbitrary  preferences  of  judges.  (Sullivan’s  
article)    

When  trying  to  understand  the  meaning  a  court  will  use  in  a  statute:  
Rule  1)  Don’t  just  look  at  plain  meaning  –  court  will  use  liter,  golden  and  mischief  
Rule  2)  Beware  of  putting  too  much  trust  in  previously  decided  cases  
Rule  3)  Don’t  be  misled  when  court  refers  to  “intent  of  the  legislature”  this  is  the  
  social  policy  behind  the  act,  not  actual  intent.  

Language  Aids:  
Noscitur  a  sociis:  A  general  word  takes  its  colour  from  the  preceding  specific  words  
with  which  it  is  used.  
Ejusdem  Generis  (General  Principle):  A  general  phrase  gets  its  colour  from  the  word  
or  words  that  follow  OR  proceed  it.  Ie)  use  of  the  words  “or  other”  at  the  end  of  a  list  
might  restrict  the  list  to  a  genus  which  is  exhausted  or  there  may  be  no  commonality  
b/w  the  list.    
This  principle  can  be  rebutted  if:  
1. There  are  no  similar  characteristics  to  provide  a  common  background,  then  it  
is  not  possible  for  these  words  to  give  meaning  to  the  general  words.  
2. If  the  category  is  exhaustive,  such  that  the  general  words  following  must  refer  
to  a  larger  genus  and  are  not  restrictive  (Rascal  Trucking)  

  7  
Expressio  unius  est  exclusio  alterius:  a  general  word  of  phrase  takes  its  colour  as  well  
from  the  specific  words  or  phrases  which  follow  it  as  from  those  that  precede  it.  
Express  mention  of  one  thing  implies  exclusion  of  another.  (Fisher  v  Bell).  

Other  aids:  
1) Marginal  notes:  given  limited  weight  (Wigglesworth),  typically  not  used  but  
the  court  may  use  these  to  support  interpretations  its  already  reached  (give  
weight)  
2) Headings:  essential  part  of  the  internal  context  (Wigglesworth)  
3) Preamble:  Shall  be  read  as  part  of  the  enactment,  its  intention  is  to  assist  the  
explanation  of  purpose  and  objective  (Interpretation  Act  s.13)(Provincial  
Interpretation  Act  s.12(1))  
4) Table  of  Contents:  not  part  of  the  enactment,  used  for  convenience.  

Re  Rizzo  and  Rizzo  Shoes  [1998]  (Application  of  Modern  principle;  interpret  in  
the  entire  context,  grammatical  and  ordinary  sense  harmoniously  with  the  
scheme  and  objective  of  the  Act  and  intention  of  Parliament)  
Ratio:  Rejected  the  plain  meaning  b/c  of  absurdity.  Instead  chose  to  read  the  Act  in  its  
entire  context  and  in  harmony  w/scheme  and  objective  and  Parliaments  intention,  in  a  
way  that  would  cause  no  conflict.  Didn’t  rely  on  Hansard  or  ministers  statements,  only  
mentioned  in  passing  or  in  absence  of  other  evidence.    
Facts:  Rizzo  shoe’s  goes  bankrupt  and  the  company’s  trustee  is  asking  if  they  are  
still  entitled  to  pay  termination  and  vacation  pay  to  employees  under  Ontario  
Employment  Standards  Act.  
 
Issue:  Is  bankruptcy  termination  under  the  Ontario  Employment  Standards  Act?  
 
Interpretations:  
Trial  Court:  looked  @  plain  meaning,  found  YES.  
Appeal  Court:  used  literal  approach,  termination  by  an  operation  of  law,  NO.  
SCC:  Applied  the  modern  approach:  
-­‐ Context:  the  legislature  was  intended  that  termination  and  severance  pay  
obligations  should  arise  if  employer  went  bankrupt.  The  inclusion  of  this  
implies  that  the  severance/termination  pay  obligation  does  extend  to  
bankrupt  employers.  *Plain  meaning  words  of  Act  in  context.  
-­‐ Purpose:  of  the  Act  was  to  protect  the  interests  of  employees.  
-­‐ Literal/Ordinary  meaning:  applied  the  Golden  Rule  otherwise  there  would  
be  an  absurd  result.  An  employee  terminated  a  day  before  bankruptcy  
would  be  titled  benefits  but  not  one  after  bankruptcy.  S.40  and  s.2(3)  
would  be  incompatible  w/object  of  the  Act  and  termination  provisions  in  
paragraph  27.    
-­‐ S.10  of  the  Interpretation  Act  applied;  every  Act  shall  receive,  fair,  large  and  
liberal  construction  and  interpretation.  Modern  Principle.  
 

  8  
Conclusion:  SCC  affirmed  preference  of  modern  approach;  the  context,  the  
grammatical  and  ordinary  sense  of  words,  the  scheme,  object  and  intention  
(mischief).  Also  that  legislation  doesn’t  intent  to  create  absurd  consequences,  b/c  it  
is  benefits  incurring  legislation  it  requires  a  broad  and  purposive  approach.    Held  in  
favor  of  employees.  

Bell  ExpressVu  Partnership  v  Rex  [2002]  (Modern  approach,  grammatical  &  

ordinary  sense  -­‐>  broader  context)  
Rule:  Apply  the  modern  approach  1st,  then  use  other  principles  such  as  strict  
construction  of  penal  statutes  and  Charter  values  presumption.    You  only  go  to  external  
aides  when  there  is  ambiguity,  and  when  internal  are  exhausted.  
 
Facts:  A  Bell  competitor  gets  around  the  regulatory  requirements  (for  a  signal)  and  
sells  de-­‐coders,  that  can  be  used  in  Canada.  Bell  brings  this  case  forward  because  
they  want  an  injunction  against  Rex.    
 
Issue:  Does  s.9(1)(c)  of  the  Radiocommunication  Act  prohibit  the  decoding  of  all  
encrypted  satellite  signals  (i.e.  those  that  emanate  from  within  Canada  as  well  as  
foreign  signals)?  
  -­‐  essentially  does  the  Radiocommunications  Act  s.9(1)(c)  prohibit  the  
  decryption  of  encrypted  signals  from  the  US?    
 
Holding:  Yes  it  does  prohibit.  
 
Interpretation:  Applies  the  Modern  approach,  which  highlights  the  ambiguity.  
-­‐ We  apply  this  approach  b/c  of  an  ambiguity:  Where  “the  words  are  
ambiguous  enough  to  induce  2  people  to  spend  good  money  in  packing  
opposing  views  about  the  meaning”  190.  
-­‐ When  it  is  applied  to  resolve  ambiguity,  if  the  ambiguity  is  established  then  
the  courts  have  to  consider  the  breadth  of  the  context  of  the  provision  
through  the  modern  approach.    
-­‐  If  the  ambiguity  still  exists  then  the  courts  may  resort  to  subsidiary  
principles  of  interpretation  to  resolve  the  ambiguity.    
-­‐  This  case  is  an  example  of  where  the  modern  approach  is  used  and  the  court  
finds  that  the  interpretation  they  use  fits  w/Parliaments  intended  purpose,  
on  the  plain  meaning.    
 

  9  
United  Taxi  Drivers  Fellowship  of  Southern  Alberta  v  Calgary  [2004]  (affirms  
that  courts  are  bound  to  Modern  Approach)  
Rule:  Courts  are  bound  to  apply  approach  from  Bell  ExpressVu  (modern  approach)  
unless  there  is  a  constitutional  challenge,  a  contextual  approach.    
Facts:  Calgary  enacts  a  by-­‐law  that  requires  taxi’s  to  have  taxi  license  plates  and  
limits  the  number  of  plates  to  1,300.    As  a  result  of  the  freeze  there  is  a  monopoly  
b/c  more  people  want  plates  than  exist  and  as  a  result  they  become  expensive  to  get.    
 
Issue:  whether  s.9  of  the  Municipal  Government  Act  gave  municipalities  power  to  
enact  bylaws  over  the  broad  range  of  matters  outlined  in  s.7  of  the  Act  including  the  
limit  of  taxi  license  plates?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ SCC  states  that  the  proper  approach  is  a  “broad  and  purposive  approach  to  
the  interpretation  of  municipal  powers.”  Modern  approach  and  the  
Interpretation  Act.    
-­‐ S.7  and  8  when  read  together  give  the  whole  meaning  about  a  part  of  the  Act  
and  that  “it  is  well  established  that  the  legislature  is  presumed  not  to  alter  the  
law  by  implication.”  
-­‐ The  SCC  holds  that  on  an  ordinary  and  grammatical  meaning  the  words  “to  
regulate”  give  the  authority  to  enact  bylaws  but  not  narrow,  broad  and  
purposive.    
-­‐ In  this  Act  the  wording  was  changed  to  comply  w/broad  and  general  
standards  set  in  the  statutes,  so  that  “where  a  legislature  intends  to  depart  
from  prevailing  law,  it  will  do  so  expressly.”  However  there  is  no  indication  
that  the  Act  was  intending  to  remove  the  power  from  the  Municipality  about  
the  Taxi  Plate  Licenses.    
-­‐ The  approach  that  United  Taxi  takes  is  too  narrow.  

Wigglesworth  v  The  Queen  [1987]  (How  to  use  Marginal  Notes)  

Rule:  Assessing  the  context  of  a  statute/provision,  can  look  to  the  headers,  and  marginal  
notes.  Headings  are  considered  integral  to  a  statute  (Charter  cases  especially),  while  
marginal  notes  are  not.  Headings  have  more  weight  than  marginal  notes.    
Facts:  Wigglesworth  was  convicted  of  a  major  offence  under  the  RCMP  Act  and  
charged  w/common  assault  under  the  Criminal  Code.  He  tried  to  argue  in  his  
defence  that  there  is  difference  in  the  terms  criminal  offence  and  offence.  Where  
offence  is  seen  as  having  a  broader  application  under  s.11  of  the  Charter.  In  the  
marginal  note  on  s.11  it  reads  “proceeding  sin  criminal  and  penal  matters.”  
 
Issue:  Can  the  words  of  the  marginal  notes  be  used  to  interpret  the  word  offence  in  
s.11  as  meaning  only  criminal  and  quasi-­‐criminal  offences?  
   
Interpretation:  

  10  
 -­‐ The  court  holds  that  while  they  aren’t  an  integral  part  of  the  Charter  they  
should  be  recognized  and  have  some  weight.  So  there  is  some  support  that  the  
opening  words  of  s.11  “charged  w/an  offence”  restricts  the  application  of  the  
s.  to  criminal  or  quasi-­‐criminal  proceedings  and  proceedings  giving  rise  to  
penal  consequences.  
-­‐ The  court  recognizes  that  headings  have  been  used  in  interpretations  in  the  
past.    
-­‐ The  courts  decision  to  allow  the  interpretation  of  marginal  notes  is  in  direct  
contrast  w/s.14  of  the  Federal  Interpretation  Act  that  says  they  shouldn’t  be  
considered.    

City  of  Nanaimo  v  Rascal  Trucking  [2000]  (application  of  Ejusdem  generis,  genus  
wasn’t  exhausted,  supported  by  the  Golden  Rule,  (absurdity))  
Rule:  Modern  approach  but  this  doesn’t  preclude  courts  from  common  law  context  
tools,  applies  ejusdem  generis,  looking  at  the  other  words  within  the  Act,  and  
application  of  the  Golden  Rule  to  avoid  absurdity.  
Facts:  Rascal  Trucking  leased  some  land  and  had  a  permit  from  the  municipality  to  
deposit  some  soil  w/the  intent  of  conducting  soil  processing.    There  were  
complaints  about  noise  and  dust  from  neighbours.  After  a  public  meeting  the  council  
passed  a  resolution  declaring  the  pile  of  soil  a  nuisance  pursuant  to  s.936  as  an  
“other  matter  or  thing”  and  that  it  had  to  be  removed.    S.936(1)  “The  council  may  
declare  a  building,  structure,,  or  erection  of  any  kind,  or  a  drain,  ditch,  watercourse,  
pond,  surface  water  or  other  matter  or  thing….”  
 
Issue:  Whether  s.936  empowered  the  appellant  to  pass  the  resolutions  declaring  
the  pile  of  soil  a  nuisance  and  ordering  its  removal?  
  If  yes,  upon  what  standard  must  the  appellant’s  decision  be  reviewed?  
 
Interpretation:  
Trial  Court:  Held  Nanaimo  had  jurisdiction  to  declare  the  soil  a  nuisance.  
Court  of  Appeal:  Held  that  Nanaimo  lacked  jurisdiction  to  declare  a  pile  of     soil  a  
nuisance  and  order  its  removal.  
SCC:    
-­‐ The  cities  argument  is  they  have  the  authority  to  declare  the  soil  a  nuisance  
b/c  it  fits  into  the  category  of  “other  matter  or  thing.”    Based  on  the  fact  that  
there  used  to  be  a  comma  before  this  phrase  and  that  the  legislation  should  
be  read  as  if  the  comma  still  remains  b/c  it  should  be  read  in  a  broad  and  
benevolent  manner.    
-­‐ The  court  rejects  this  argument  and  instead  prefers  the  appellants  argument  
based  on  the  ejusdem  generis  (limited  class)  principle.  Whereby  the  classes  of  
things  that  other  matter  or  thing  can  apply  to  must  be  erected  things  or  
watercourses.  This  would  be  a  narrow  interpretation.    
-­‐ However  then  the  court  recognized  that  s.932  give  the  municipality  to  pass  a  
by-­‐law;  declaring  something  a  nuisance,  this  process  is  significantly  more  
onerous  and  therefore  an  absurd  result  would  be  reached  if  the  soil  can’t  be  

  11  
 defined  as  a  nuisance  (golden  rule,  Rizzo  Shoes)  and  this  absurdity  can’t  have  
been  intended.  
-­‐ So  the  court  looks  to  the  definition  of  an  erection  and  finds  that  the  pile  of  
soil  fits  within  this  definition  because  the  soil  would  not  appear  on  its  own.  

Grini  v  Grini  [1974]  (Exhaustion  of  ejusdem  generis,  uses  the  context  and  
purposive  approach)  
Rule:  When  the  words  in  a  provision  exhaust  a  genus  then  the  general  words  that  follow  
must  be  understood  as  referring  to  a  larger  genus  and  not  be  interpreted  in  a  restrictive  
manner.  Illness  and  disability  were  found  to  exhaust  the  genus  and  on  a  purposive  
(mischief)  approach  education  was  found  to  be  within  the  category  of  “other  cause.”  
Facts:  The  husband  wants  to  marry  someone  new,  he  petitions  for  a  divorce.    In  the  
separation  agreement  he  agreed  to  make  maintenance  payments  to  his  former  wife  
and  their  daughter.  The  wife  is  arguing  on  s.9(1)(e)  and  (f)  of  the  Divorce  Act.  The  
husband  argues  that  he  has  the  right  to  terminate  the  payments  to  his  former  wife  if  
the  divorce  is  granted  and  that  he  has  no  legal  obligation  to  his  daughter  who  is  not  
a  child  of  the  marriage  within  the  meaning  of  s.2(b)  of  the  Act.    
 
Issue:  Whether  the  respondent  by  the  terms  of  their  separation  agreement  defeated  
her  claim  to  maintenance?  And  more  importantly  whether  the  daughter  continues  
to  receive  maintenance?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ Before  the  daughter  can  receive  maintenance  the  court  must  find  her  to  fit  
within  the  category  of  s.2(b)(ii)  by  being  unable  “by  reason  of  illness,  
disability  or  other  cause”  to  withdraw  herself  from  parental  charge  or  
provide  herself  with  the  necessaries  of  life.    
-­‐ The  father  argues  that  based  on  ejusdem  generis  “other  cause”  must  take  its  
meaning  from  illness  or  disability  and  going  to  school  doesn’t  fit  in  this  
category.    
-­‐ Court  holds  that  “other  cause”  must  apply  to  something  outside  the  illness  or  
disability  genus  because  that  category  is  exhausted.    
-­‐ Therefore  “other  cause”  must  be  read  literally  and  this  can  include  attending  
school.  

R  v  Strahl  [1967]  (Application  of  ejusdem  generis)  

Rule:  The  ejusdem  generis  rule  can  be  rebutted  by  looking  at  the  legislative  purpose  of  
the  Act  as  a  whole  (mischief  argument,  contextual)  
Facts:    A  youth  pleads  guilty  to  a  disturbance  charge  under  the  Juvenile  Delinquents  
Act.  The  judge  serves  punishment  by  depriving  him  of  his  driving  privileges  for  a  
period  of  time,  pursuant  to  s.20(1)(g)  of  the  Act.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  judge  had  the  jurisdiction/authority  to  suspend  the  license  
under  the  Act?  

  12  
  
Interpretation:  
-­‐ The  delinquent  argues  that  ejusdem  generis  applies  in  that  the  conditions  the  
judge  can  impose  are  limited  to  those  in  the  prior  paragraphs  of  s.20(1).    
-­‐ The  court  finds  that  this  principle  doesn’t  apply  here  because  s.20(1)(g)  
should  be  given  a  liberal  construction  by  looking  at  the  Act  as  a  whole.    
-­‐ The  Act  as  a  whole  advocates  for  the  court  to  act  like  a  wise  parent.  Therefore  
the  court  finds  with  this  purpose  in  mind  then  restricting  driving  privileges  is  
something  a  wise  parent  would  do  and  is  within  the  purpose  of  the  Act.  
-­‐ **for  exam  look  at  how  it  could  have  been  EG  and  why  it  was  found  not.  

External  Context  of  the  Legislation  

1)  Social  Context:  Important  in  Charter  analysis.  
R  v  Oakes  [1986]  (example  of  courts  looking  to  the  social  situation  for  context  
about  why  a  statute  was  developed)  
Rule:    Assessing  whether  a  provision  is  in  conflict  with  the  Charter  consider  whether  the  
reasoning  for  the  intrusion  in  the  social  context  Therefore  the  court  can  look  at  extrinsic  
material  to  understand  why  a  provision  has  been  enacted,  in  this  case  a  reverse  onus  
clause  based  on  the  social  concern  about  the  increase  in  drug  trafficking.    
Facts:  s.8  is  a  reverse  onus  provision  whereby  someone  will  be  considered  guilty  of  
trafficking  if  they  are  caught  w/possession,  unless  they  can  prove  they  weren’t  in  
possession  for  this  purpose.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  reverse  onus  provision  in  s.8  of  the  Narcotic  Control  Act  is  a  
reasonable  limit  on  the  right  to  be  presumed  innocent  until  proven  guilty?  
 
Interpretation:    
-­‐ The  court  first  invokes  a  social  context  and  considers  the  aim  of  Parliament  
in  enacting  this  Act  at  a  time  when  the  prevalence  of  drugs  was  a  concern.  In  
doing  this  they  look  at  the  Special  Committee  on  Traffic  in  Narcotic  Drugs  
and  a  number  of  other  reports.        
-­‐ There  is  also  a  mention  of  similar  methods  being  adopted  internationally  to  
curb  drug  trafficking.    
2)  Legal  Context:  in  considering  legislation  you  can  consider  other  legislation  in  
that  area;  past  or  present,  current  or  repealed.  

  13  
R  v  Popovic  and  Askov  [1975]  (look  to  legislative  history  for  context)  
Rule:  In  assessing  a  provision  the  Court  will  look  at  the  current  meaning  but  when  this  
isn’t  sufficient  b/c  there  is  still  ambiguity  they  can  look  to  previous  enactments  for  
clarity  about  the  definition  or  substance  of  the  word.  
Facts:  The  accused  charged  w/  2nd  degree  murder  under  s.213  of  the  1970  revision  
of  the  Criminal  Code.    S.213  provided  that  the  offence  of  murder  occurred  where  the  
death  of  a  person  was  caused  during  the  course  of  a  variety  of  offences,  in  this  case  a  
burglary.    As  the  death  occurred  after  the  accused  had  broken  into  a  restaurant.  
 
Issue:  Whether  or  not  the  accused  had  been  engaged  in  a  burglary  within  s.213?  
Was  a  restaurant  considered  a  dwelling  that  a  burglary  could  occur  within?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ The  court  relies  on  the  Interpretation  Act  s.36,  which  states  that  where  an  
enactment  is  repealed  and  substituted  w/a  new  one  then  the  new  statutes  
should  be  interpreted  in  a  way  that  is  consistent.  
-­‐ In  this  case  there  was  ambiguity  about  whether  a  burglary  could  occur  in  a  
restaurant,  and  the  court  found  that  a  burglary  within  the  meaning  of  s.213  
had  consistently  been  only  applied  to  a  dwelling-­‐house  (consistent  within  the  
social  context.    
-­‐ The  court  finds  that  while  there  seems  to  be  some  inconsistency  with  the  
social  understanding  of  a  burglary  and  the  Criminal  Code  this  is  up  to  the  
legislation  to  change.    

Statutes  in  Pari  Materia  

-­‐ Statutes  must  work  together  even  when  they  don’t  refer  to  one  another  and  
therefore  it  can  be  assumed  that  the  legislative  intent  was  that  they  be  
consistent.    
-­‐ In  Capital  Growers  v  Register  of  Land  Titles  the  court  held  that  the  Land  Titles  
Act  and  the  Community  Planning  Act  must  be  read  together  b/c  they  both  
relate  to  the  transfer  of  land.  Though  there  was  no  explicit  reference  in  the  
Land  Titles  Act  that  permitted  the  Registrar  to  refuse  to  register  a  title  that  
didn’t  meet  the  requirements  of  the  Community  Planning  Act.  
-­‐ The  principle  was  stated  by  Lord  Mansfield  in  R  v  Loxdale,  which  stated  that  
“where  there  are  different  statues  in  pari  materia  though  made  at  different  
times,  or  even  expired,  and  not  referring  to  each  other,  they  shall  be  taken  
and  construed  together,  as  one  system,  and  as  explanatory  to  each  other.”  
-­‐ This  is  because  “statutes  that  are  in  pari  materia  relate  to  the  same  person  or  
thing  or  to  the  same  class  of  persons  or  things.”  
 
Common  Law  Context:  can  get  clues  about  the  meaning  of  legislation  from  the  
common  law.  

  14  
Fisher  v  Bell  [1960]  (the  common  law  will  be  applied  when  needed,  also  use  of  
expressio  unis)  
Rule:  An  offer  for  sale  w/o  further  definition  or  expression  will  be  construed  in  
accordance  with  the  common  law  (current,  Amato  v  The  Queen).    
Facts:  The  defendant  displays  a  knife  in  his  shop  window,  a  police  officer  notices  it  
and  upon  inspection  finds  that  it  is  a  flick  knife  and  is  contraband  pursuant  to  s.1  of  
the  Restriction  of  Offensive  Weapons  Act.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  display  of  the  knife  in  the  window  is  an  offer  of  sale?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ The  court  found  that  when  the  Act  was  enacted  the  term  “offer  for  sale”  was  
not  defined  and  in  the  absence  of  a  definition  it  should  be  construed  using  
the  laws  of  contracts  (common  law).  Based  on  this  reasoning  the  display  in  
the  window  would  be  an  invitation  to  treat  not  an  offer,  as  that  could  only  
occur  upon  sale.    
-­‐ The  court  recognizes  that  this  contradicts  the  ordinary  ROP  meaning  and  
looks  to  the  intent  of  Parliament  but  finds  that  when  Parliament  had  desired  
to  change  the  definition  of  a  word  it  has  included  a  definition  section.    
-­‐ Therefore  applying  expressio  unis  a  term  that  has  been  left  out  has  been  left  
out  on  purpose.  

Re:  Section  94(2)  of  the  Motor  Vehicle  Act  [1985]  (speeches  and  extrinsic  
evidence  from  legislators  will  be  given  weight  but  minimal)  
Rule:      when  deciding  constitutional  cases  the  minutes  from  meetings  and  speeches  can  
be  given  some  weight  (minimal)  because  there  is  no  necessary  connection  between  the  
intent  in  the  legislature  and  the  Act  on  paper.    
Facts:  There  is  a  question  about  the  meaning  of  “the  principle  of  fundamental  
justice”  in  s.7  of  the  Charter  and  whether  those  words  mean  purely  procedural  
“rules  of  natural  justice”  or  were  more  substantive.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  minutes  and  proceedings  from  the  Special  Joint  Committee  have  
any  weight  as  interpretive  aids  in  the  court?  And  if  so  what  weight?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ The  court  finds  that  there  is  no  general  rule  of  admissibility,  that  traditionally  
these  things  were  not  given  any  weight  but  this  has  been  relaxed.    
-­‐ The  court  determines  that  whether  they  will  be  given  any  weight  depends  on  
the  constitutional  issue  at  question  and  therefore  the  court  will  be  open  to  
considering  extrinsic  evidence  but  the  weight  it  will  be  given  will  vary  
because  of  the  inability  to  quantify  legislative  intent.    
-­‐ The  court  determines  that  speeches  from  legislator  will  be  given  minimal  
weight  otherwise  the  court  would  have  to  make  significant  assumptions.    

  15  
R  v  Sullivan  [1991]  (use  of  Hansard  and  legislative  history  in  examining  current  
statutes)  
Rule:  When  there  is  a  question  about  a  word  or  provision  the  court  may  examine  it  by  
looking  at  the  Hansard  and  previous  legislative  history  to  determine  the  intention  
behind  the  change.  
Facts:  The  accused  were  charged  with  criminal  negligence  causing  death  “to  
another  person.”  They  were  midwives  and  the  fetus  they  were  helping  to  deliver  
died  due  to  their  alleged  negligence.    
 
Issue:  Whether  a  fetus  is  a  person?  
 
Interpretation:      
-­‐ The  terms  “person”  and  “human  being”  were  used  interchangeably  pre-­‐1954.    
-­‐ The  court  looks  at  the  House  of  Commons  Debates  (Hansard)  to  see  that  
there  was  no  indication  that  the  difference  between  “person”  and  “human  
being”  was  even  considered  relevant.  They  find  that  the  members  of  the  
house  didn’t  even  address  this  issue.    
-­‐  The  courts  find  that  the  introduction  in  criminal  negligence  provisions  was  
not  intended  to  change  the  meaning  of  person  in  the  Code.    

R  v  Heywood  [1994]  (Preference  to  use  statutory  context,  purpose,  precedent  

over  legislative  history  and  Hansard  evidence)  
Rule:  Admissibility  of  Parliamentary  debates  is  weak  and  of  little  value,  as  is  legislative  
history  b/c  of  the  lack  of  proof  of  legislative  intent.  Legislative  history  can  be  used  to  
show  the  mischief  the  Legislature  was  trying  to  remedy,  though  these  rules  are  more  
flexible  in  evaluating  a  Constitutional  enactment.  The  provision  should  be  given  its  
ordinary  meaning  in  context  as  read  consistently  w/the  rest  of  the  Act  (modern  
approach)  
Facts:    Appellant  was  a  sex  offender  and  was  charged  under  s.179(1)(b)  of  the  Code  
for  being  near  a  school  yard.  
 
Issue:  What  the  definition  of  loiter  is  in  s.179(1)(b)?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ For  the  majority  Cory  holds  that  the  legislative  history  of  the  meaning  of  
loiter  has  little  weight  b/c  of  the  unreliability  of  the  Hansard  as  evidence  of  
consistent  intent.    
-­‐ He  holds  that  the  legislative  history  should  only  be  admissible  for  the  
purpose  of  showing  the  mischief  that  the  Legislature  was  trying  to  remedy.  
Therefore  the  ordinary  meaning  of  loiter  should  be  used.    
-­‐ Dissent:  Gonthier  argues  using  several  techniques;  they  look  at  the  purpose  
of  the  provision,  which  was  to  keep  sex  offenders  away  from  these  areas.    
-­‐ Determine  this  purpose  using  extrinsic  evidence  whereby  precedent  and  the  
statutory  context  around  why  the  provision  was  established  are  examined.    

  16  
 -­‐ Gonthier  also  discusses  the  legislative  history  and  the  removal  of  the  word  
wander,  as  a  sign  of  the  legislatures  intent  to  narrow  the  scope.    
-­‐ ***can  use  this  case  to  argue  against  the  inadmissibility  of  legislative  history  
because  Cory  J  did  support  using  them  in  the  majority  in  the  decisions  of    
Sullivan  and  Morgentaler.  

R  v  Morgentaler  [1993]  (approves  use  of  Hansard  evidence)  

Rule:  Court  can  use  extrinsic  evidence  in  determining  the  purpose  of  a  statue  b/c  this  
helps  to  give  context  as  long  as  the  court  is  aware  that  this  evidence  has  limited  weight.  
Issue:  Whether  Hansard  debates  were  admissible  as  evidence?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ The  court  determines  that  the  rule  to  exclude  extrinsic  evidence  has  been  
relaxed  and  that  it  can  now  be  used  as  an  aid  in  determining  the  background  
and  purpose  of  the  legislation.  
-­‐ The  courts  can  use  the  Hansard  and  other  legislation  to  determine  the  
purpose  of  legislation  and  the  mischief  to  which  it  is  aimed.    The  court  simply  
has  to  be  mindful  that  the  weight  of  this  evidence  is  limited.    

Canada  AG  v  Mowat  [2009]  (Fundamental  principle  that  legal  authority  must  be  
granted  and  the  grounds  for  this  must  be  found  using  the  modern  approach  
looking  at  the,  context,  using  extrinsic  evidence  or  even  the  common  law.)  
Rule:  The  Tribunal  doesn’t  have  the  inherent  authority  to  grant  “costs”  because  it  must  
be  granted  its  powers  as  a  delegated  authority,  and  nowhere  in  the  context  or  extrinsic  
evidence  (similar  statutes)  does  it  appear  that  this  authority  was  meant  to  be  granted.    
Facts:  The  respondent  brought  an  action  forward  that  the  Canadian  Forces  for  
harassment.  Her  claim  was  largely  unsuccessful  and  she  was  only  awarded  $5000.    
She  however  also  sought  compensation  for  her  various  expenses  including  her  legal  
costs.  The  Tribunal  awarded  her  $47,000  for  her  legal  costs,  the  AG  is  appealing  this.    
 
Issue:  Do  the  words  “expenses  incurred  include  legal  costs  within  the  provisions  of  
the  Canadian  Human  Rights  Act?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ Issue  here  is  the  distinction  between  legal  costs  and  expenses;  if  the  former  is  
within  the  category  of  the  later.  This  is  because  the  Human  Rights  Tribunal  is  
a  delegated  authority  and  therefore  does  not  have  inherent  authority  to  grant  
costs  like  courts  do.  
-­‐ Therefore  the  authority  to  grant  costs  must  be  expressed  in  the  statute  and  
the  AG  is  arguing  that  it  is  not  and  that  “costs”  have  a  different  legal  
definition,  a  legal  art.  
-­‐ The  court  recognizes  that  costs  are  not  mentioned  anywhere  else  within  the  
Act  and  that  this  is  indicative  of  Parliaments  intention  not  to  include  it.  They  
also  briefly  look  at  the  argument  that  nostris  the  word  would  get  its  colour  

  17  
 from  those  around  including  “compensation”  but  find  that  this  narrows  the  
scope  and  that  the  term  costs  is  a  legal  art.  
-­‐ The  court  then  looks  to  extrinsic  evidence,  particularly  similar  legislation  in  
the  provinces  and  the  wording  of  these  provisions  and  finds  that  they  are  
very  similar  but  the  mention  of  costs  is  explicit  and  as  a  result  the  lack  of  
inclusion  here  can  be  seen  as  intentional  by  Parliament.    
-­‐ Based  on  the  context  and  the  internal  evidence  the  court  holds  that  the  
exclusion  of  the  words  “costs”  was  intentional  and  therefore  the  tribunal  
must  be  explicitly  granted  this  authority  before  it  can  grant  costs.  

Retroactivity,  Retrospectivity  and  Vested  Rights  

-­‐ The  overall  presumption  is  that  an  Act/statute  will  not  be  retrospective  or  
retroactive  unless  necessary  for  construction.  
Retroactive  
-­‐ A  retroactive  statue  is  one  that  operates  at  a  time  prior  to  its  enactment,  it  
changes  the  legal  nature  of  an  activity  in  the  past,  offends  fairness  and  justice.  
-­‐ A  statute  will  only  be  applied  retroactively  if  it  is  expressly  in  the  statute.  
-­‐ A  retrospective  statute  is  one  that  operates  only  in  the  future,  it  attaches  new  
consequences  to  something.      
-­‐ There  are  two  key  presumptions  about  retroactive  statutes:  
o A  strong  presumption  against  retroactive  statutes  
o A  presumption  against  an  interference  w/vested  rights:  the  rule  that  a  
statute  shouldn’t  be  enacted  in  a  way  that  it  would  impair  existing  
right  unless  the  language  of  the  statute  requires  such  construction.  
(this  is  a  weaker  presumption  b/c  it  also  applies  to  retrospective).  
§ Exceptions  to  these  presumptions:  
1. Procedural  in  nature  
2. Beneficial  to  everyone  and  not  prejudicial  
3. Can  be  rebutted  w/clear  legislative  intent,  clear  express  
language.  
4. Protection  of  the  public  (Brosseau)  
5. Maybe  in  Charter  cases  that  confer  rights.  
-­‐ As  a  result  the  general  rule  is  that  statutes  shouldn’t  be  construed  as  being  
retrospective  unless  this  construction  is  necessary  b/c  of  ambiguity  or  
inconclusivity  within  the  Act.    

Retrospective  
-­‐ A  retrospective  changes  the  legal  consequences  of  something  in  the  past  but  
is  only  applied  going  forward.    
-­‐ There  is  a  presumption  against  either  if  they  interfere  w/vested  rights.  
-­‐ However  this  presumption  can  be  rebutted  if:  
o The  legislation  clearly  expresses  its  intention  to  take  away  this  right  
or  diminish  it.    

  18  
 o Vested  rights  are  rights  that  have  accrued  or  settled  in  a  person  and  
are  of  such  a  nature  that  the  law  recognizes  them  as  rights  that  cannot  
be  easily  defeated.    

Process  of  Analysis  

1. Was  the  provision/legislation  retrospective  or  retroactive?  
a. Retrospective  –  no  major  presumptions  against  this  
b. Retroactive  –  presumptions  against  this.  
2. If  retroactive  it  must  either:  
a. Be  expressly  stated  by  the  legislation  that  the  Act  is  meant  to  be  
retroactive,  or  
b. By  procedural  in  nature,  in  which  case  it  is  presumed  retroactive  
(Angus  v  Hart)  
c. Be  enacted  in  order  to  serve  the  public  interest  (Brosseau)  
3. Party  can  argue  against  these  presumptions  if  they  interfere  w/vested  rights  
(Dikranian)  which  a  statute  is  not  meant  to  do,  
a. This  presumption  against  vested  rights  can  be  rebutted  if  the  
legislature  explicitly  states  an  intention  to  interfere  w/the  right.  

Mandavia  v  Central  West  Health  Care  Institutions  Board  [2005]  (application  of  
retrospective/retroactive,  examination  of  vested  rights,  the  three  presumptions)  
Rule:  For  something  to  be  retroactive  it  must  change  the  past  legal  affect  of  an  action,  
and  retrospective  if  it  simply  changes  the  legal  consequences  in  the  future.  The  
provision  here  was  held  retrospective  and  rebutted  the  presumption  that  vested  rights  
were  interfered.  
Facts:  The  plaintiff  was  injured  in  Jan.  1989,  as  a  result  he  was  permanently  
disabled.  His  contract  provided  that  his  workers  compensation  benefits  would  be  
supplemented  to  make  up  the  difference  until  he  reached  65.    In  1993  he  retires,  
w/o  knowledge  that  doing  so  will  mean  that  his  retirement  pension  will  no  longer  
be  offset  by  the  workers  compensation  benefits  (top  ups).    When  he  discovers  this  
he  brings  an  action  against  his  employer  for  negligent  misrepresentation.    A  law  is  
passed  Jan,  1993  that  states  that  a  person  can  get  above  their  salary  but  only  until  
1995.  The  argument  is  this  shouldn’t  apply  to  Manadiva.    
 
Issue:  Whether  s.81.1(3)  which  states  “Where,  prior  to  the  coming  into  force  of  this  
section”  …  “continues  until  operation  of  agreement  ceases  but  in  any  event  until  Jan.  
1,  1995,”  of  the    Workplace  Health,  Safety,  and  Compensation  Act  is  retrospective  or  
retroactive  and  thus  interferes  w/his  vested  rights?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ Mandavia  holds  that  he  wouldn’t  have  retired  until  later  if  he  had  known  this  
information.  The  defendant  holds  that  s.81.1(3)  means  that  these  top  ups  
would  have  ceased  on  Jan.  1,  1995.  
-­‐ The  court  examines  the  presumptions  about  retroactive  application  and  its  
common  law  application;  where  there  is  a  strong  presumption  against  

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 retroactivity  and  a  weaker  presumption  against  interference  w/vested  
rights.  However  there  is  no  presumption  against  retrospectivity.      
-­‐ The  defendant  argues  that  his  claims  to  vested  rights  are  rebutted  because  
the  law  was  intentionally  retrospective.    

Dikranian  v  Quebec  AG  [2005]  (rules  for  whether  or  not  someone  has  vested  
rights)  
Rule:  The  court  finds  that  his  rights  were  vested  b/c  it  was  a  clear,  concrete  individual  
situation  and  therefore  the  Act  as  amended  could  not  apply  to  him.  
Facts:  A  student  from  Quebec  took  out  a  student  loan  from  the  government.    He  
finished  his  studies  in  1998.  In  1997  the  Government  of  Quebec  changed  the  terms  
of  the  agreement  shortening  the  period  that  students  were  exempt  from  interest  
payments.  In  1998  it  was  amended  again.  As  a  result  the  government  stopped  
paying  his  interest  payments  and  he  immediately  had  to  start  making  payments.    
 
Issue:  Whether  the  QB  government’s  changes  to  the  AFAS  and  RFAS  applied  to  the  
student?    
 
Interpretation:      
-­‐ The  court  recognizes  that  while  the  government  signs  on  to  make  the  interest  
payments  for  a  period  of  time  the  loan  contract  actually  takes  place  b/w  the  
student  and  the  financial  institution.    
-­‐ Therefore  the  question  is  can  this  contract  be  modified  by  legislation  enacted  
by  the  government  changing  the  terms  of  interest  repayment  and  the  court  
determines  that  if  the  government  intended  to  do  this  then  it  must  be  
expressed.    
-­‐ It  then  sets  out  the  criteria  for  vested  rights:  
5. The  relevant  legislation  must  be  reasonably  susceptible  of  two  
interpretations.  
6. The  judicial  situation  must  be  tangible,  concrete  and  distinctive.  
7. The  situation  must  be  sufficiently  constituted  at  the  time  of  the  statutes  
commencement,  it  must  have  materialized  (in  a  contract).  
8. It  must  be  related  to  a  specific  individual.  
-­‐ The  plaintiff  was  arguing  that  in  making  him  pay  the  interest  the  Act  was  
retroactive  and  that  his  vested  rights  were  interfered  w/because  they  were  
formed  when  he  signed  the  original  contract.    
-­‐ However  the  court  finds  that  his  loan  was  not  a  “judicial  situation  in  
progress”  because  he  had  already  signed  the  document  and  therefore  he  did  
have  a  previously  granted  vested  right.    
-­‐ This  case  contrasts  Mandavia  where  there  was  a  presumption  against  vested  
rights.  

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Angus  v  Hart  [1988]  (If  a  provision  is  substantial  there  will  be  a  presumption  
against  it  that  it  cannot  be  applied  retrospectively  b/c  of    sub  rights).  
Rule:  Whether  a  provision  is  substantial  or  not  is  determined  looking  at  whether  it  
affects  their  substantive  rights.  A  purely  procedural  provision  will  not  have  the  
presumption  against  it  that  it  cannot  be  applied  retrospectively  because  no  substantive  
rights  are  affected.  
Facts:  The  wife  is  injured  in  a  car  accident  while  her  former  husband  is  driving.  At  
the  time  of  the  accident  she  cannot  recover  against  her  husband  or  her  father  (the  
car  owner)  because  of  s.7  of  The  Married  Woman’s  Property  Act  and  s.214  of  the  
Insurance  Act.  Two  months  after  the  accident  the  Family  Law  Reform  Act  was  
amended  and  she  would  have  been  able  to  sue  her  husband  in  tort.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  amendments  to  the  Family  Law  Reform  Act  are  retrospective  so  
that  she  could  sue  her  husband?  Whether  the  provisions  are  substantive  or  
procedural?  
 
Interpretation:  
-­‐ The  court  finds  that  s.7  is  substantive  because  it  affects  his  ability  to  have  a  
defence  against  her  claim  in  tort,  and  because  of  this  a  presumption  against  
retrospectivity  is  applied.    
-­‐ If  it  was  purely  procedural,  it  would  only  be  concerned  with  the  application  
and  practice  of  the  courts.    
-­‐ The  key  to  determining  whether  a  provision  is  substantive  or  not  is  done  but  
looking  at  its  substantive  effect  and  whether  it  affects  someone’s  rights.    

Brosseau  v  Alberta  Securities  Commission  [1989]  (Public  interest  trumps  the  

presumption  against  retroactively  applying  punishments)  
Rule:  If  the  purpose  of  an  enacted  statute  is  to  protect  the  public  interest  then  a  
punishment  can  be  applied  retrospectively  to  protect  the  public.    
Facts:  Plaintiff  was  accused  of  issuing  a  false  prospectus.  He  was  never  convicted  
b/c  of  the  statute  of  limitations.  In  1981  a  new  Securities  Act  was  passed  and  the  
question  was  whether  under  s.165  of  the  Act  he  could  be  ordered  to  cease  trading.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  Act  applies  retrospectively?  And  if  so  could  the  penalties  be  
applied?  
 
Interpretation:  
-  The  general  rule  is  that  to  be  applied  retrospectively  it  must  be  explicit.    
- The  court  outlines  three  types  of  statutes  that  can  be  said  to  be  retrospective:  
1. Statutes  that  attach  benevolent  consequences  –  no  presumption.  
2. Statutes  that  attaché  prejudicial  consequences  to  a  prior  event  –  
presumption  against.  

  21  
 3. Statutes  that  impose  a  penalty  on  a  person  who  is  described  by  reference  
to  a  prior  even  but  the  penalty  isn’t  intended  as  further  punishment  –  no  
presumption.  
- Based  on  this  the  court  finds  that  Brosseau  can’t  be  punished  retroactively  
for  things  he  has  done  in  the  past  however  there  is  no  presumption  against  
him  being  punished  retrospectively  to  protect  the  public.    

Presumption  against  Substantial  Alterations  

- There  is  a  presumption  that  the  legislature  doesn’t  intent  to  make  substantial  
changes  beyond  what  is  explicitly  declared.  (Questionable  because  generally  
the  purpose  of  legislation  is  to  change  the  law).  
- Also  there  is  a  presumption  that  there  is  a  gap  as  a  result  of  a  substantial  
alteration  it  will  be  filled  by  the  common  law.    

Wener  v  Davidson  [1972]  (common  law  will  be  relied  on  to  fill  gaps  in  statutes  
that  are  not  strict).    
Rule:  A  statute  is  a  code  if  it  embraces  all  of  the  common  law.  If  not  then  the  common  
law  can  step  in  to  fill  in  gaps  and  the  common  law  is  understood  to  continue  unless  
there  is  clear  intention  to  change  it.  
Facts:  A  wife  is  trying  to  bring  an  action  against  her  husband’s  mistress  for  damages  
as  a  result  of  her  enticing  the  husband  away.  She  is  suing  in  consortium.  
 
Issue:  Whether  the  wife  has  a  cause  of  action  against  the  mistress?  Will  the  common  
law  provide  a  course  of  action  if  there  isn’t  one  in  the  statutes?  
   
Interpretation:  
- The  court  begins  by  determining  whether  the  Domestic  Relations  Act  is  a  
code,  to  which  it  finds  it  is  not  and  therefore  she  isn’t  barred  from  a  course  of  
action  for  this  reason.  
- The  court  then  tries  to  construe  the  Act  within  the  common  law  such  that  the  
wife  would  have  a  cause  of  action  for  loss  of  consortium.    
- The  Court  finds  that  as  the  Act  is  not  a  strict  code  and  this  would  seem  
available  in  the  common  law  then  this  action  must  exist.  
- Basically  unless  a  statute  expressly  prevents  a  cause  of  action  (Angus  v  Hart)  
then  the  common  law  will  be  looked  to  in  determining  whether  this  right  
should  exist  or  not.    

Strict  Construction  of  Penal  Statutes  

- Penal  statutes  are  meant  to  be  construed  in  favor  of  the  accused,  such  that  
any  ambiguity  is  found  in  the  accused  favor.    
- King  v  Robinson,  Cartwright  stated,  “ambiguity  must  be  resolved  in  favor  of  
the  liberty  of  the  subject,  but  whether  or  not  such  ambiguity  exists  is  to  be  
determined  after  calling  in  aid  the  rules  of  construction.”  
- The  plain  and  rational  meaning  should  be  used  to  promote  the  objective.  

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Interpretation  Act  Excerpts  British  Columbia  
Enactment  remedial  
8 Every enactment must be construed as being remedial, and must be given such fair, large and
liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects
 
Amending  enactment  part  of  enactment  amended  
34 An amending enactment must be construed as part of the enactment that it amends.

Repeal  
35 (1) If all or part of an enactment is repealed, the repeal does not
(a) revive an enactment or thing not in force or existing immediately before the time
when the repeal takes effect,
(b) affect the previous operation of the enactment so repealed or anything done or
suffered under it,
(c) affect a right or obligation acquired, accrued, accruing or incurred under the
enactment so repealed,
(d) subject to section 36 (1) (d), affect an offence committed against or a contravention of
the repealed enactment, or a penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred under it, or
(e) affect an investigation, proceeding or remedy for the right, obligation, penalty,
forfeiture or punishment.
(2) Subject to section 36 (1), an investigation, proceeding or remedy described in
subsection (1) (e) may be instituted, continued or enforced and the penalty, forfeiture or
punishment imposed as if the enactment had not been repealed.

Repeal  and  replacement  

36 (1) If an enactment (the "former enactment") is repealed and another enactment (the "new
enactment") is substituted for it,
(a) every person acting under the former enactment must continue to act as if appointed
or elected under the new enactment until another is appointed or elected in his or her
place,
(b) every proceeding commenced under the former enactment must be continued under
and in conformity with the new enactment so far as it may be done consistently with the
new enactment,
(c) the procedure established by the new enactment must be followed as far as it can be
adapted in the recovery or enforcement of penalties and forfeitures incurred under the
former enactment, in the enforcement of rights existing or accruing under the former
enactment, and in a proceeding relating to matters that happened before the repeal,
(d) when a penalty, forfeiture or punishment is reduced or mitigated by the new
enactment, the penalty, forfeiture or punishment if imposed or adjusted after the repeal
must be reduced or mitigated accordingly,
(e) all regulations made under the former enactment remain in force and are deemed to
have been made under the new enactment, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the
new enactment, until they are repealed or others are made in their place, and
(f) a reference in an unrepealed enactment to the former enactment must, for a subsequent
transaction, matter or thing, be construed as a reference to the provision of the new
enactment relating to the same subject matter, but if there is no provision in the new
enactment relating to the same subject matter, the former enactment must be construed as
being unrepealed so far as is necessary to give effect to the unrepealed enactment.
(2) If all or part of an enactment of any other province of Canada or of Canada is repealed and
another provision is substituted by way of amendment, revision or consolidation, a reference in an
enactment of the Province to the repealed enactment must, for a subsequent transaction, matter or
thing, be construed to be a reference to the provision of the substituted enactment relating to the
same subject matter

  23  
Enactments  Remedial  
Enactments deemed remedial
12. Every enactment is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal
construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.
 

  24