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J.J. Gibson and the ecological

approach to perception
Article in Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A · July 1981

DOI: 10.1016/0039-3681(81)90016-9 · Source: PubMed
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AARON BEN-ZEEP
J. J. GIBSON AND THE ECOLOGICAL
APPROACH TO PERCEPTION
“Whom he loves he rebukes” (Proverbs, 3, 12)
THE CONTRIBUTION of J. J. Gibson to psychology spans half a century; his

first article was published in 1929, and his last book appeared in 1979. In this
paper, I deal with his mature theory as it is expressed in his two last books: The
Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems (1966), and The Ecological
Approach to Visual Perception (1979); occasionally, earlier claims will be
mentioned (especially from his book The Perception of the Visual World
[1950]).’ The aim of this paper is to examine the conceptual foundations,
rather than the empirical claims of Gibson’s view. Concerning the empirical
level, Gibson’s contributions to the understanding of perceptual processes are
extremely significant, but. this is not the place to describe them. His conceptual
contribution has been less often evaluated, and there has been little agreement
over such evaluation. I attempt, in this paper, to clarify some theoretical issues
concerning his view.
Gibson’s approach already has advocates who clarify and elaborate
different aspects and implications of this approach. Due to limitations of
space, I will not deal with their views separately, but merely discuss them when
they clarify Gibson’s own position.2
In the first section of this paper, I compare Gibson’s approach to perception
with the traditional ones; I indicate that Gibson suggests solutions to
traditionally basic difficulties. Then I deal with some basic conceptual issues in
*Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa 31999, Israel.

‘All these works published by Houghton Mifflin, Boston. These books will be referred to by
date in the text. On the development of Gibson’s ideas from 1929 to 1973 see T. J. Lombardo,
J. J. Gibson’s Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Its Historical Context and Development
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1973).
‘The papers most relevant for our discussion were written by R. E. Shaw and his colleagues:
R. E. Shaw and J. Bransford, ‘Introduction: Psychological Approaches to the Problem of
Knowledge’, Perceiving, Acting and Knowing: Toward an Ecological Psychology, R. E. Shaw and
J. Bransford (Eds) (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1977); R. E. Shaw, M. T. Turvey and W. Mace,
‘Ecological Psychology: The Consequence of a Commitment to Realism’, Cognition and Symbolic
Processes, II, W. Weimer and D. Palermo (Eds) (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, in press); R. E.
Shaw and M. T. Turvey, ‘Coalitions as Models for Ecosystems: A Realist Perspective on
Perceptual Organization’, Perceptual Organization, M. Kubovy and J. Pomerantz (Eds)
(Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, in press); M. T. Turvey and R. E. Shaw, ‘The Primacy of
Perceiving: An Ecological Reformulation of Perception for Understanding Memory’, Perspectives
on Memory Research, L. G. Nilsson (Ed) (Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1979).
Stud. Ifist. Phi/. Sci., Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 107- 139, 1981. 0039-3681/81/020107-33$02.00/O
Printed in Great Britain. 0 1981 Pergamon Press Ltd.
107
108 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
Gibson’s view, viz. the notions of ‘information’ and ‘affordance,’ the

causal- functional distinction, the problems of errors in perception, and
Gibson’s attitude toward memory and representation. I conclude the paper
with a general evaluation.
I highly esteem the ecological approach of Gibson and his followers; it is a
novel and fruitful approach written with admirable theoretical sensitivity (not
only when measured against other psychological writings). Nevertheless, I
believe that the view still possesses serious flaws. But as the cited proverb
indicates, only views that we appreciate, though wish to modify, deserve a
careful critique. I desire the reader to keep this in mind while considering my
(sometimes harsh) comments.
Gibson and the Traditional Theories of Perception
Traditional theories of perception, according to Gibson, consider the senses as

passive channels of sensation; the senses merely transmit - from ‘outside’ to
‘inside’ - meaningless inputs which later are processed to yield perceptions.
The later processing activity has often been described metaphorically:
‘filtering,’ ‘organizing,’ ‘grouping,’ ‘integrating,’ ‘interpreting,’ ‘decoding,’
‘problem solving,’ ‘ computing,’ etc. All these metaphors presuppose that ‘the
eye sends, the nerve transmits, and a mind or spirit receives’ (1979, p.61). Such
an assumption implies a little man in the brain (homunculus) who interprets
(judges, decodes, etc.) the sensory messages.
The above traditional view has, in my opinion, two basic tenets:
(1) The sensation - perception distinction, i.e. the distinction between
passive reception of sensory input (sensation), and active cognitive operations
on that input (perception).
(2) The causal theory of perception, i.e. the assumption of a unidirectional
causal chain beginning in the physical world and ending in mental perceptions.
Let us now elaborate on these two tenets. The first discerns in the perceptual
process two mental entities: (a) sensations which are the immediate correlate of
(or the inevitable result from) physiological processes in the brain; and (b)
perceptions which derive via sensations and supplementary cognitive
processes. These cognitive processes constitute the main difference between
sensation and perception. Examples of sensation are qualities such as color,
sound, and smell, and feelings such as pain and thirst. Examples of perception
are qualities such as distance and movement, and meaningful objects such as
chairs and trees. The sensation - perception bifurcation implies what we may
call the ‘passivity assumption,’ according to which sensation is devoid of
cognitive activities, i.e. the cognitive-agent is not involved in that process.3
3To use the expression ‘activities of the cognitive-agent’ as a synonym for ‘cognitive activities’
may unwittingly lead to the homunculus-hypothesis. In spite of this danger, I occasionally use the
J. J. Gibson and the Ecological Approach to Perception 109
From the standpoint of the cognitive-agent, sensation is a passive reception of

a given material.4 This assumption is expressed in terms of conceiving
sensation as a process, and in terms of the outcomes of this process, i.e. having
a sensation.5 Neither in the sensory process nor in the sensory qualities can we
find, according to this view, any activity of the cognitive-agent; such activities
can be found only in perception.6
A major difficulty in the distinction is the gap between the (nearly)
noninformative meaningless sensations which are devoid of cognitive aspects
and the informative meaningful perceptions which do result therefrom.
Sensations, we may recall, are the immediate correlate of the physiological
processes in the brain, whereas perceptions should yield the properties of the
objects in the world. These properties, however, are not in the brain and hence
cannot be found in sensation. To overcome this gap, the perceptual cognitive
activities came to be regarded as supplementary ones, i.e. they supply
sensations with the missing information.
Since the expression ‘cognitive activity’ will be central to our discussion,
further comments on the nature of such activity are needed. Cognitive
activities are those whose performance requires the use of faculties such as
memory, judgment, comparison, discrimination, deliberation, reason,
imagination, etc. These faculties are constitutive in that the final cognitive
product could not be produced without their active participation. Thus,
activities such as picking up or receiving a given content (a final product) are
not cognitive activities. The constitutive feature in cognitive activities does not
necessarily mean that they are supplementary activities, viz. that they
mechanically add content to a given content (in such a way that one can
mechanically put the one beside the other).
Let us now turn to the traditional causal theory of perception which
conceives of the perceptual process as a unidirectional causal chain of events.
In the visual domain this chain is more or less as follows: light reflected from
an object enters the eye; a retinal image is created in the eye; the image is
term ‘cognitive-agent’ since equivalent terms (‘mind’ or ‘understanding’) were used in traditional
theories, and since using this term may help to clarify the different aspects of perceptual passivity
and activity in Gibson’s views. Futhermore, once the danger is stated, it is easier to avoid it.
‘Thus, e.g. regarding the simple ideas of sensation, J. Locke writes that ‘the understanding is
merely passive; and whether or no it will have these beginning, and as it were materials of
knowledge, is not in its own power .’ (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690 [New
York: Dover, 19591, II, 1, 25).
Gibson (1966, p. 1) distinguishes between two meanings of the verb to sense: (a) to have
sensation; and (b) to detect something. This is a theoretical distinction between two different
realms: (a) the sensory level; and (b) the informative level. Gibson’s distinction, which will be
discussed below, is different from the distinction I mention above.
eFor example, B. Russell says, ‘But although sensation is a source of knowledge, it is not itself,
in any usual sense, knowledge . . . “Perception”, as the word is used by most psychologists, is of
the nature of knowledge, but it is so because of the adjuncts which are added to pure sensation by
experience, or possibly, by congenital dispositions’ (Human Knowledge [New York: Simon &
Schuster, 19481, p. 422).
transferred through the optic nerve to the brain; brain activity; and sensation
of patches of color.7 The most problematic event is the last one. This states a
sudden and unexplainable causal transformation from physical processes in
the ‘depths of the brain’ to mental sensation. One cannot find preparatory
activities of that transformation in the sensory processes preceding what
happens in the ‘depths of the brain,’ nor can one find any activity in the
‘depths of the brain’ which explains this causal transformation.
To sum up, the traditional view contains two types of gaps: (a) a gap
between the sensory material presented to the understanding (cognitive-agent)
and the meaningful informative perceptual outcomes; and (b) a qualitative gap
between physical brain activities and mental sensations.8 Closely connected
gaps are those suggested by Shaw et a1.9 between the sensory input and the
objects in the world: (a) a quantitative gap between the specification which the
energy media can provide and the properties of the objects; and (b) a
qualitative gap between the mental character of sensations and the physical
character of objects in the world.
Actually the stage of sensation was postulated in order to posit, among
other things, an intermediate stage in the aforementioned gaps. In regard to
the first gap, sensations such as colors and pains are not completely
noninformative (meaningless), but they do convey certain primitive
information. Sensations are also an intermediate stage between physical and
mental events. Indeed, sensations are mental events, but they are devoid of
typical mental activities (such as cognitive ones), and they are determined by
the physical stimuli.‘0
Such considerations indicate the strong affinity between the sensa-
tion - perception distinction and the causal theory of perception. In a sense,
even the perceptual stage is conceived as another stage in the causal chain.
The sensation - perception distinction (along with its derived passivity
assumption) and the causal theory of perception merged together to form the
traditional view of perception. Gibson’s ecological approach rejects these two
tenets and suggests alternate ones. Before I examine Gibson’s position, an
historical clarification is in order. When did the traditional view begin to
prevail? Gibson apparently believes that it has always prevailed: ‘It has always
been assumed that the senses were channels of sensation’ (1966, p.1).
‘See, e.g. R. Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, 1628 (The Philosophical Works of
Descartes, Vol. 1, E. S. Haldance and G. R. T. Ross [Edsl [Cambridge: The University Press,
1955]), pp. 36 - 40.
‘1 hesitate to call the first gap a quantitative gap since, to a certain extent, it is a qualitative gap
between nearly meaningless and fully meaningful materials.
‘Shaw, Turvey and Mace, op. cit., note 2.
“The intermediate stage of sensation in the above gaps is clearly demonstrated in the following
quotation from B. Russell: ‘Sensations are what is common to the mental and physical worlds;
they may be defined as the intersection of mind and matter . Sensation is not itself knowledge,
but it supplies the data for our knowledge . . .’ (The Analysis of Mind [London: George Allen &
Unwin, 19211, p. 144).
Lombard0 too contrasts Gibson’s view with all the great traditions in Western
history. I incline, in this connection, to trace different lines of historical
similarity. Indeed, Gibson suggests a new approach to perception, but his
approach contrasts essentially with the seventeenth century view and with the
ancient one. Thus, the above two basic tenets can be found in most of the
perceptual theories since the seventeenth century, but seldom in Greek
theories.” The problem of determining the borders of the traditional view
becomes more complicated in light of the somewhat different tenets
Lombard0 and I ascribe to this view. Lombard0 argues that the traditional
view is a ‘perceiver - world dualism’ which proposes the following
assumptions (rejected by Gibson): the causal theory of perception, the
homunculus hypothesis, and the belief in epistemological meditation in
perception. Even if I should accept this depiction, I would still believe that this
view (as depicted by Lombardo) has mainly prevailed since the seventeenth
century. Moreover, as I will point out below, Gibson’s solutions to traditional
difficulties are sometimes in an important sense similar to positions held by
Greek philosophers.
I will not examine here all the difficulties involved in the traditional’* view,
but instead will outline some alternatives to it. When suggesting such
alternatives one needs to take into account two issues which derive from the
above-mentioned gaps: (a) the role of cognitive activities in acquiring
perceptual information; and (b) the way perceptual information (or meaning)
is related to sensory physiological processes. Here are some alternatives which
refer to these issues:
(Al) Reduction of sensation to perception, i.e. cognitive activities are
involved already in sensation.
(A2) Reduction of perception to sensation, i.e. cognitive activities are not
involved even in perception.
“It is beyond the scope of this paper to sustain my historical interpretation; therefore, I merely
appeal to ‘authority’. Regarding the sensation-perception distinction, D. Hamlyn says, ‘the
classical Greek philosophers had no way of distinguishing between sensation and perception.
Moreover . . . they had in general no idea of the necessity of distinguishing the two concepts’
(Sensation and Perception [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 19691, p. 3). See also, H. M.
Chapman, Sensations and Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 72.
Concerning the causal theory, S. Toulmin describes its neurological model as follows: ‘a sensory
nerve was a material fiber or tube through which some intermediate causal agency was transmitted
linearly to the depths of the brain, where all the mental processes of ‘perception’ were actually
initiated.’ This model has prevailed, according to Toulmin, since the seventeenth century.
Toulmin points out that the odd-men-out in that widely accepted model were Leibniz and Harvey,
‘both of whom retained strong affinities with Aristotle’. (‘Neuroscience and Human
Understanding’, Neuroscience: A Study Programme, G. Quarton, F. Schmitt and E. Melnechuk
[Eds] [New York: Rockfeller University Press, 19671, p. 825.) G. C. Hatfield and W. Epstein also
indicate that the notion of ‘sensory core’ (which is somewhat similar to our depiction of sensation
which is devoid of any cognitive activities) emerged in the seventeenth century (‘The Sensory Core
and the Medieval Foundations of Early Modern Perceptual Theory’. Isis 70 119791.)
“From now on, I use the term ‘traditional’ to denote the period which begins’mainly with
seventeenth-century philosophy.
(Bl) Perceptual information (meaning) gradually emerges from the sensory

physiological processes.
(B2) The distinction between perceptual information (meaning) and sensory
physiological processes is a distinction between two different realms of
description.
The first two alternatives challenge the traditional description of the
sensation - perception distinction, namely the contention that the cognitive-
agent is passive in sensation, but not in perception. These alternatives attempt
to overcome the traditional gap between nearly noninformative sensations and
fully informative perceptions. The last two alternatives challenge the
traditional description of the causal theory of perception, i.e. the assumption
that the connection between the physiological and informative realms is a
linear causal connection which takes place in a sudden and unexplainable
manner at a particular point in the ‘depths of the brain.’ The last two
alternatives attempt, in a sense, to overcome the traditional mind - body gap.
Since the above alternatives refer to different aspects of the traditional view,
they are not mutually exclusive alternatives; a combination between one of the
first two alternatives and one of the last two, is required for a comprehensive
theory of perception. In order to better understand Gibson’s view, I describe
now in greater detail the above alternatives.
Aristotle (like almost any other thinker until the seventeenth century) holds
Alternative Al. He argues that cognitive activities of judging and
discriminating are necessary conditions for any kind of perception
(sensation13): ‘Each sense has one kind of object which it discerns budges];“4
therefore, ‘Thinking . . .is regarded as akin to a form of perceiving; for in the
one as well as the other the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something
which is.‘15 R. L. Gregory, too, apparently holds the first alternative: ‘we must
suppose that our prior knowledge of objects affects even elementary
sensations and perceptions. It implies that perhaps all sensory inputs, or
channels, are affected by the kind of objects assumed to be sensed.‘16
Alternative Al does not necessarily assume that we can find already in the
retina all the typical cognitive activities which exist in conscious thinking.
Moreover, a moderate version can even claim that the term ‘cognitive-agent’
“As previously mentioned, Artistotle does not have the sensation-perception distinction.
“De Anima 418a15; in R. McKeon (Ed) The Basic Works of Artistotle (New York: Random
House, 1941).
“Ibid., 427a18ff; see also 429a13, 431a8, 432a15.
‘O‘The Confounded Eye’, Illusion in Nature and Art, R. L. Gregory and E. H. Gombrich (Eds)
(London: Duckworth, 1973). p. 60. Gregory does not refer at length to the above distinction, and
some other passages in his writings may imply preserving the sensation - perception distinction.
Thus, he speaks about ‘sensory signals’ which are ‘used as data for perception’ (ibid., p. 66).
Incidentally, in his three books Gibson does not mention Gregory’s name, whereas Gregory does
mention Gibson’s view; he conceives it to be the least plausible paradigm for perception (R. L.
Gregory, ‘Choosing a Paradigm for Perception’, Handbook of Perception 1, E. C. Carterette and
M. P. Friedman [Eds] [New York: Academic Press, 19741).
does not have definite borderlines; however, the typical activities of the
cognitive-agent reside in conscious processes of thinking. The question
whether all (or only some of) the sensory processes (or outcomes) can be
regarded as activities of the cognitive-agent, depends on how far we are ready
to stretch the analogy to conscious thinking. Undoubtedly, there are
similarities and dissimilarities between the two processes (as between any two
things); but we should decide whether, and in what cases, the similarities
justify the common term. In short, such a moderate version of Alternative Al
does not have to insist on calling the retinal activities ‘cognitive (or intellectual)
processes,’ but it must reject the existence of pure sensation, viz. sensation
which is devoid of any activity of the cognitive-agent.
Right from the beginning of his career Gibson rejected the
sensation - perception dichotomy. Already in 1937, when he ostensibly still
held most of the basic traditional assertions, Gibson argued that ‘this
historical dichotomy is a false one.“’ It assumes that sensation, but not
perception, is completely determined by the physical stimulus; in order to
explain perception by this view, one would have to invoke a subjective, mental
process ‘which in some way constructs the world out of the “raw material”
presented to the mind’ (1950, p. 13). Gibson also sees as a major problem in
the dichotomy that of the connection between the two stages. That is, how can
the mind construct a meaningful world of objects and events out of the
meaningless material presented to it?
As an alternate position to the sensation-perception dichotomy Gibson
suggests Alternative A2. The elimination of the cognitive-agent from
perception assumed in Alternative A2, can be found already in Gibson’s first
book: ‘perception, at least of the type called “literal,” is primarily dependent
on stimulation rather than on meaning or mental elaboration’ (1950, p. 11).
The same assertion is stated in his second book: ‘The senses can obtain
information about objects in the world without the intervention of an
intellectual process’ (1966, p. 2). And again, in his last book Gibson rejects the
assumption that ‘either innate ideas or acquired ideas must be applied to bare
sensory inputs for perceiving to occur’ (1979, p. 253).
The passivity of the cognitive-agent does not imply, in Gibson’s theory, the
passivity of the perceptual system. It is an essential feature of Gibson’s
empirical explanations that only a mobile and active organism can extract
environmental information. Thus, we have to move our body, head, or eyes in
order to extract any visual information. However, Gibson believes that this
activity does not involve cognitive activity. (This may be doubted. The
movement which the organism performs while ‘extracting information’ is not
a random movement but a purposeful, guided search. The organism samples
“J. J. Gibson, ‘Adaptation with Negative After-Effect’, Psycholog&/ Review, 44 (19371, 230.
On Gibson’s view in this period see Lombardo, op. cit. note 1.
the input and purposefully follows up items which are significant to it; thus,
our visual system tends to fixate on contours. Hence, there is a good case for
claiming that even what Gibson views as the activity of extracting information
is a kind of cognitive activity.)
A clear comprehension of the different aspects of passivity and activity in
Gibson’s view may resolve some of the misunderstandings between Gibson
and his critics. These latter characterize his view as a passive theory of
perception, while he consistently rejects such a claim and states that ‘the
notion of a wholly passive observer. . . is a myth’ (1966, p. 290).” The critics
are right if they take ‘passivity’ to refer only to the cognitive-agent, but they
are wrong if they also conceive the perceptual system (the perceiving-agent) in
Gibson’s view to be passive. Indeed, Gibson says that ‘The only kind of
perceptual activity that my critics are willing to admit is mental activity.“g
Gibson actually does not discuss the passivity of the cognitive-agent in
perception, but rather the absence of intellectual activities in it. Thus, he may
not have to admit any passive element in his view (‘absence’ in many cases is
different from ‘passivity’). Furthermore, in speaking of absence of intellectual
(cognitive) activities we do not implicitly assume the existence of an
homunculus (an assumption we may make when using the expression
‘cognitive-agent’). Hence Gibson claims that we should dismiss altogether the
notion of ‘contribution of the agent:’
it is false to put into opposition the contribution of the perceiver and the
contribution of the external stimulation. It is impossible to weigh the subjectivity of
perception against the objectivity of perception. They are not commensurable. If
perception is essentially an act of attention, as I maintain. . . then the perceiver does
not contribute anything to the act of perception, he simply performs the act.*O
Gibson’s claim that the perceiver’s and the environment’s contributions are
not commensurable and cannot be weighed is correct (probably because both
are necessary conditions, and there is not a relative weight to a necessary
conditiot?), but it implies neither the absence of such contributions, nor the
impossibility of separating them. Giving up the attempt to separate the
different contributions is giving up a major task of the whole philosophical
and psychological enterprise. (Needless to say that I am speaking about
conceptual and not mechanical separation.) Furthermore, Gibson’s claim that
‘%ee also, R. J. Richards, ‘James Gibson’s Passive Theory of Perception’, and J. J. Gibson,
‘The Myth of Passive Perception: A Reply to Richards’, Phil. Phenomenol. Res., 37 (1976).
IsIbid., p. 234; Gibson writes this in reply to Richards’ criticism, however, Richards explicitly
admits other kinds of activity, saying, e.g. that ‘Gibson’s is an active theory in one sense’ (p. 219).
Also J. W. Gyr’s criticism is only in regard to the passivity of the cognitive-agent: ‘Gibson’s theory
of perception assumes a passive process in the sense that the organism itself does not contribute to
the perceptual information through its voluntary activity’ (‘Is a Theory of Direct Visual
Perception Adequate?‘, Psychol. Bull. 77 [1972], 225).
‘OJ. J. Gibson, ‘On Theories for Visual Space Perception’, Scund. J. Psychol., 11 (1970), 78.
“1 owe this observation to M. Strauss.
perception is an act performed by the agent does not mean that the way he
performs it is not affected by his cognitive framework. However, the claim
that perception is an act of attending to information which is already ‘over
there’ considerably reduces (but, in my opinion, does not completely
eliminate) the scope of cognitive contributions in perception. Gibson’s
preference for the term ‘intellectual (cognitive) activity’ over ‘contribution of
the cognitive-agent’ may be understandable; but if we remember that the latter
term is, in this case, a linguistic convention for the former, there will be no
significant harm in using the latter.
Gibson’s followers reject, as Gibson does, the necessity of assuming
additional cognitive activities in perception: ‘cognitive judgments are parasitic
on perceptual experiences; they are logically posterior to perception rather
than either anterior to it or part of it.’ Hence, ‘perception is an epistemically
pure act. . .[i.~.] perceptual experience is uncontaminated by memorial or
inferential constituents.‘22 However, since these thinkers (along with Gibson)
identify perceiving with knowing, they do not wish to admit the passivity of
the cognitive-agent (‘knowing-agent’ in their terminology) in perception, and
claim that ‘the knowing-agent is the totalitk of the process itself.‘23 Since the
only activity in which such an agent is supposed to engage is to collect
information already available in the sea of energy, it seems better to call him
the ‘collecting-agent’ and not the ‘knowing-agent.’
Gibson’s rejection of the existence of cognitive activities in perception can
be subdivided (I believe) into two claims: (i) there is not any process of
cognitive elaboration which is prior to perception; and (ii) there is not any
cognitive elaboration which takes place in the course of perception. It is clear
that (ii) is not derived from (i). Even if we assume that all cognitive activities
occur after perception takes place, these activities change, to a certain extent,
the agent (like all other activities of his do), and hence his later perception. In
this model, the cognitive activities directly influence the structure of the
perceptual system, and only indirectly influence the perceptions themselves.
(As we shall see below, Gibson uses a similar model while explaining memory.)
Such a model does not need the additional assumption of unconscious
cognitive processes which are prior to perception; it assumes that the cognitive
elaboration is done at the point of perception. Hence, while (i) seems a
plausible proposal which deserves careful consideration, I believe we must
reject (ii). Below I will return to the issue of the role of cognitive activities in
perception.
I now turn to the alternatives to the causal theory of perception.
Alternatives Bl and B2 refer to the relation between the sensory physiological
processes and the perceptual information (meaning); i.e., whether and how the
YShaw and Bransford, op. cit. note 2, pp. 17, 36.

231bid.,p. 10.
latter is derived from the former. The traditional approach answers the
‘whether’ question in the affirmative, but has no satisfactory reply to the
‘how’ question. Alternative Bl also answers in the affirmative to the former
question, but suggests a gradual solution to the latter. Alternative B2 answers
in the negative to the former question and claims that the two factors belong to
different realms of description.
Alternative Bl conceives the perceptual process (beginning with the stimulus
impinging on the sensory receptor and ending in the actual perceiving) as a
process in which information gradually emerges from more and more complex
physiological processes. Thus F. Ratliff speaks of information existing at the
retinal level: by means of ‘simple calculus the retina abstracts information
about significant features of the spatial and temporal pattern of light and
shade on the receptor mosaic.‘24 Gibson would accuse such a statement of
assuming the retina to be a kind of homunculus. Whilst the adherents of this
alternative admit to the charge, they do not see a better way of describing what
is going on. The gradual solution seems to them an adequate one for the
homunculus problem. Thus, D. Dennett writes:
Homunculi are bogeymen only if they duplicate entire the talents they are rung in to
explain. . . If one can get a team or committee of relatively ignorant, narrow-
minded, blind homunculi to produce the intelligent behavior of the whole, this is
progress.
The function of each homunculus is accomplished ‘by subdividing it. . . into

still smaller, more stupid homunculi.’ Eventually this lands you with
homunculi so stupid that they can be ‘replaced by machine.’ ‘One discharges
fancy homunculi from one’s scheme by organizing armies of such idiots to do
the work.‘25
Alternative Bl, like the traditional view, admits that perceptual information
(or other similar outcomes) somehow derives from the sensory processes; there
is however a difference in regard to the nature of that derivation. First,
Alternative Bl speaks of an emergence and not of a causal connection.26
Secondly, it assumes a gradual process of emergence, and not an abrupt act of
creation. Alternative Bl, which is held by many artificial intelligence
researchers, is often connected with Alternative Al.
Gibson holds Alternative B2, which claims that sensory processes and
perceptual information belong to two different realms of description; hence,
one cannot speak about the derivation of the latter from the former. We will
“F. Ratliff, ‘Illusions in Man and his Instruments’, J. Phil., 68 (1971), 592.
15D. C. Dennett, Brainstorms (Montgomery: Bradford, 197&X),pp. 123 - 124.
2*On the difference between the paradigm of causal (stimulus -response) mechanism and the
paradigm of emergent properties, see K. Oatley, Perceptions and Representations (London:
Methuen, 1978). Oatley, like Gibson, attempts to replace the Cartesian paradigm in psychology
and nemophysiology; their suggestions, however, are different: whereas Oatley holds a
combination of Alternatives Al and Bl, Gibson proposes a combination of A2 and B2.
now see how Gibson arrived at this view. Because of the denial of any role to
cognitive, or other mental processes in perception, the burden of explaining
perceptual content, in Gibson’s view, must be carried by stimulation alone. If
stimulation is to carry the burden, its description must be extended. Indeed,
that is what Gibson does in his first book. There he introduces the term
‘ordinal stimulation,’ which denotes the traditional atomistic points of
stimulation, plus the order among these points. The stimulus of order
(structure) is of the same kind as the usual physical stimulus: ‘order exists in
stimulation as well as in experience. Order is just as much physical as mental’
(1950, p. 187). Here Gibson still holds a version of the causal theory of
perception.” Apparently, the above extension was not enough to explain the
richness of perception; in his later books, Gibson suggests different kinds of
stimulation for sensory processes and perception. Concerning the first book,
Gibson writes:
I thought I had discovered that there were stimuli for perceptions in much the same
way that there were known to be stimuli for sensations. This now seems to me a
mistake. I failed to distinguish between stimulation proper and stimulus
information, between what happens at passive receptors and what is available to
active perceptual systems (1979, p. 149).
Here appears Alternative B2 which rejects the causal theory of perception and
states that sensory processes and perceptual information belong to different
realms of description. This alternative may be easily applied to the
mind-body dichotomy: whereas sensation refers to the bodily processes,
perception refers to the mental ones. However, Gibson cannot accept such a
suggestion since he believes that the mind- body dichotomy ‘is a false
dichotomy’ (1979, p. xiii), and since he still holds Alternative A2 which rejects
the existence of mental, intellectual operations in perception. What is Gibson’s
alternate application? I believe that Gibson’s application is to the causal
anatomical, and the informative functional realms; however, further
description of that must await our treatment of Gibson’s notions of
‘information’ and ‘affordance.’
In a metaphorical way, we may describe the traditional view as assuming
one causal line which starts from the physical stimulus and ends in the mental
perception, Alternative Bl as assuming many small mental lines which emerge
from the physical line (probably as we get closer to the brain these lines
become bigger), and Alternative B2 as assuming two separate lines, one causal
(physical) and another functional (mental).
3ee his book of 1950, pp. 44 - 51. Gibson held here also the traditional assumption of one-to-
one correspondence between the stimulation of receptors and the experience which resulted from
that stimulation (the ‘constancy hypothesis’ as Kohler termed it). At that time Gibson testified that
he attempted ‘to reassert the constancy hypothesis on the basis of a broader conception of
stimulation’ (1950, p. 62).
The above short discussion of the alternatives to the traditional view was
introduced mainly for the sake of clarifying Gibson’s own views. Further
discussion is needed to explore the advantages and shortcomings of each
alternative. At this point I will merely mention that a plausible view, to my
mind, is the combination of Alternatives Al and B2. That is, to distinguish as
Gibson suggests, the causal from the functional realm, but to reject Gibson’s
claim that the latter is devoid of cognitive activities. I believe that Aristotle
holds some version of that combination. Some advantages of this view will be
indicated below, during my discussion of the merits and difficulties of
Gibson’s view.
Before leaving the traditional view, I wish to mention another of its
consequences. It has been a common claim in traditional theories that one can
only experience a single atomistic (uniform) sensation at a given time.
Relational properties were excluded from the initial sensory stage since
experiencing them requires comparing and distinguishing activities; such
activities were assumed to be cognitive activities, and hence are not to be found
in the pure sensory stage. As we have already seen, Gibson rejects the
traditional atomistic characterization of sensation, and stresses the importance
of the assumption that relational properties e.g. gradients, are perceived
directly as other properties. Moreover, perceiving relational properties such as
change (transformation) and invariants of change are, according to Gibson’s
approach, the primary source of perceptual information.
The rejection of the atomistic nature of sensation for the most part results
from the investigation of Gestalt psychology. However, as Lombard0 points
out, Gestalt psychology has rejected only the atomistic nature of perceptual
consciousness but not of visual stimulus. In this sense, Gibson goes one step
further: in contrast to Gestalt theory (and most other traditional theories), he
does not assume that the brain organizes an unorganized input.Z8 Gibson, in
my opinion, rightly rejects the traditional contention that all relational
properties exist only for the perceiver (or the cognitive-agent) and hence that
they are not real features of the world. However, this rejection should not
imply the more extreme claim (which, however, Gibson seems to makeZQ)that
all perceptual relations have their origin ‘out there’ in the environmental
relations. The active participation of the perceiver in the perceptual process
could create relational properties which are unique to the perceptual realm.
To sum up, Gibson rejects the following related features of the traditional
view: (a) the assumption that the senses are merely channels of sensation; (b)
‘“Lombardo, op. cit. note 1, pp. 172- 176, 187- 189. But to do justice to the Gestalt
psychology, I may note that the sensory organization in this view is not an arbitrary one but a kind
of reproduction or reconstruction: ‘sensory organization tends to produce results which agree with
the actual makeup of the given physical situation.’ (W. Kohler, Gestalt Psychology [New York:
Mentor, 19751, p. 97.)
2oE.g. his book of 1966, p. 267.
the sensation - perception distinction; (c) the causal theory of perception; (d)
the homunculus hypothesis; and (e) the atomistic nature of the sensory
stimulus. However, Gibson accepts an expanded version of the traditional
passivity assumption; that is, he claims the absence of cognitive activities not
only in sensation (as according to the traditional theories) but also in
perception. Because of this absence the traditional theories assume the
atomistic nature of sensation. In Gibson’s case, the result of the absence
moves in the opposite direction, since one cannot assume an atomistic nature
of both sensation and perception. Thus, Gibson first expanded the borders of
the perceptual stimulus, and then he postulated a different kind of stimulus, in
order to include in it all properties which are usually considered to be
consequences of cognitive activities.
The Notion of ‘Information’
Gibson characterizes perception as an act of picking up information. In

addition to the process of picking up information, which is performed by the
active perceptual organs (systems), there is the physiological process of
stimulating the passive sensory receptors. Consequently, there are two levels of
stimulation: (a) stimulus energy; and (b) stimulus information. What is the
relation between the two levels? The negative characteristics of this relation are
easy to state, for they are the positive characteristics of the traditional
sensation -perception relation. The first stimulus, in Gibson’s account, is
neither the ‘data’ nor the ‘basis’ for the second. The stimulus information can
remain the same despite radical changes in stimulus energy, and vice versa:
there are cases, e.g. that of reversible figures, in which we can find ‘two
counter-balanced values of stimulus information in the same ‘stimulus’
[energy]’ (1966, p.247). Each kind of stimulus is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for perception. I will return below to the problem of the
relation between the two types of stimuli.
‘Stimulus energy’ is a physical (or physiological) notion which is neither
novel nor problematic in discussions of perception; the case is different with
respect to Gibson’s notion of ‘stimulus information’. The term ‘information’,
according to Gibson’s use, refers to ‘specification on the observer’s
environment not to specification of the observer’s receptors or sense organs’
(1979, p.242). Gibson tries very hard to eliminate any reference to subjective
activity when describing information. According to its usual meaning, the
term ‘information’ can be understood only in connection with a cognitive-
agent, or some other information system. By this usual meaning, there is no
such thing as pure information floating freely in the air without reference to
any information system. Gibson admits that the meaning he ascribes to
‘information’ is not the common one:
The term information cannot have its familiar dictionary meaning of knowledge
communicated to a receiver. This is unfortunate, and I would use another term if I
could. The only recourse is to ask the reader to remember that picking up
information is not to be thought of as a case of communicating (1972, p. 242).
I do not know why Gibson could not use another term, but it is clear that much
confusion arises from his use of this term; and behind such confusions there
would appear to be real difficulties in Gibson’s view.
Gibson defines information by saying that ‘information about something
means only specificity to something;’ by the ‘conveying of environmental
information’ he means that ‘a property of the stimulus is univocally related to
a property of the object by virtue of physical law’ (1966, p. 187; emphasis
added in the second quotation). By this characterization, everything in the
world is information because everything in the world has a certain ‘specificity’
to something else, and every physical object is ‘univocally’ (if we can use this
term3’) related to a property of another object by virtue of physical laws. But
when everything is information, then information is nothing.
In what realm does information exist? According to Gibson, ‘the
information is obviously in light’ (1979, p. 47); it is ‘in the sea of energy
aroundeachof us. . . It is simply there’ (1979, p. 242). But Gibson also claims
that ‘information is not energy-specific’ (1979, p. 243), and that ‘stimuli
[energy] as such contain no information’ (1979, p. 53). Hence, in contrast with
his own claim, information is not ‘simply in the sea of energy’, but it exists in
that sea either in a metaphorical or in some other special sense.
The unclarity regarding the status of information in the light is increased
because of the different verbs used by Gibson to denote this status. In 1966 he
uses the verbs ‘carry’ and ‘contain’ interchangeably; the verb ‘convey’ also has
a somewhat similar meaning at that time. He writes: ‘The heart of the
question, however, is to explain how stimulus energy may carry or contain
information’ (1966, p. 186). On the following page, after defining the term
‘information’, Gibson states that ‘This is what I mean by the conveying of
environmental information’. An initial differentiation which ‘can be made
regarding these verbs is that ‘convey’, but not ‘carry’ or ‘con&n’, generally
should require an indirect object to complete its sense. Thus, we convey
something to someone; ‘convey’ (like ‘communicate’) requires an agent who
JoRichards rightly points out that it is ‘improper to speak of stimulus characteristics as
themselves being equivocal. Words and other signs are equivocal when they can be understood in
two or more senses. But a physical event in se cannot have the property of equivocity. That is
simply not one of the concepts one finds in contemporary physical theory’ (op cir. note 18, p. 227).
In his reply to Richards, Gibson does not refer to this objection; maybe he also uses the term
‘equivocity’ not in its ‘familiar dictionary meaning’. Historically speaking, Gibson’s contention
concerning univocal relations between a property of the stimulus and of the object has developed
as an opposition to the traditional belief that the stimulus is a cue to the object; hence the relations
between them are probable and not univocal (see Lombardo, op. cit. note 1, pp. 253 - 258,
278 - 295).
can receive the information. This is in obvious contrast to Gibson’s opinion,

and, therefore, in 1979 he writes: ‘the information in the sea of energy. . . is
not conveyed. It is simply there’ (1979, p. 242). The more ‘objective’ verbs of
‘carry’ and ‘contain’ have a different difficulty. They imply a certain
mechanistic relation between the energy and the information. Hence, the
Cartesian dualism, which Gibson’s view attempts so hard to dismiss, appears
again not in the human mind, but in the sea of energy. The verb ‘carry’ has a
stronger mechanistic connotation, and therefore Gibson discovered its
inadequacy earlier. In 1970 he writes that the multiply reflected light does not
‘so much carry information as contain information’.” However, in 1979
Gibson hardly uses either the verb ‘contain’ or ‘carry’; he mainly paraphrases
with very general and ambiguous terms such as ‘in’. Thus, he writes that the
information is ‘simply in the sea of energy’; ‘the information is obviously in
light’; or information ‘is simply available’. The repeated use of the adverbs
‘simply’ and ‘obviously’, in addition to the use of the ambiguous term ‘in’, do
not remove my doubts concerning Gibson’s position in this connection.
Contrary to Gibson’s contention, the problem in his use of the term
‘information’ is not merely with the adjacent meaning of ‘communicating’,
but also with the core meaning of ‘knowledge’. If Gibson were to use, instead
of the sophisticated term ‘information’, its common equivalent term
‘knowledge’, his formulations would be seen to be even more dubious. It is
inappropriate (to say the least), even metaphorically speaking, to claim that
knowledge simply exists in light waves. Knowledge cannot be conceived of as
floating freely in the sea of energy. The above claim of Gibson is absent even
in Popper’s fantastic (again, to say the least) theory of the objective existence
of the third world (which contains libraries - including ‘poetic thoughts and
works of art’ -, theories, etc.). Popper admits that ‘in order to belong to the
third world of objective knowledge a book should - in principle, or virtually
- be capable of being grasped. . . by somebody’.32 In Gibson’s definition of
information - ‘specificity to something’ - even this minimal reference is
absent.
Gibson’s followers do not clarify his ambiguous use of the term
‘information’;33 however, their central term is not ‘information’ but
‘knowledge’. The latter term - while having its own traditional problematic
“J. J. Gibson, op. cit., note 20, p. 75.

‘zK. Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). p. 116.
“Thus, Shaw and Turvey (op. cit. note 2) are not sure what exactly is the connection between
the notions of energy states and information states of a system. Shaw and Bransford (op. cit. note
2, p. 32) assert that ‘perception is the act of apprehending the properties of the message conveyed’
by the medium. This assertion involves two ‘forbidden’ (by Gibson’s view) terms: ‘convey’ and
‘message’. Still, even greater misreading appears in P. K. Machamer’s claim that ‘Gibson’s talk of
information is unproblematic, since it is deletable in favor of purely causal talk’ (‘Gibson and the
Conditions for Perception’, Studies in Perception, P. K. Machamer and R. G. Turnbull [Eds]
[Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 19781, p. 440).
connotations - possesses a more definite meaning, and hence its use clarifies
the issues in question. I will deal below with some of the formulations of these
thinkers regarding ‘knowledge’.
The only way the expression ‘information in the light’ can make sense to me
is in a relational way. That is, only where there is an agent who has the
(cognitive) capacity to make sense from the light array can we (metaphorically)
say thatfor him information potentially exists ‘in the light’. Gibson does speak
sometimes of available information as potential stimuli, but he does not admit
that this kind of potentiality necessarily refers to a cognitive-agent.
The Notion of ‘Affordance’
The notion of ‘affordance’ is central to Gibson’s view, since, according to

him, what we perceive is what things afford; moreover, ‘The hypothesis of
information in ambient light to specify affordances is the culmination of
ecological optics’ (1979, p. 143). Gibson states that ‘The affordances of the
environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes. . . If
a terrestrial surface is nearly horizontal. . . nearly flat. . . and sufficiently
extended. . . and if its substance is rigid, then the surface affords support
(1979, p. 127). The above properties - horizontality, flatness, extension, and
rigidity - are physical properties of a surface; however, if they should be
‘measured relative to the animal’, we would not have a physical property, but
an affordance of support. What is the status of that property? Gibson’s
answer is novel:
an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both

if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and
helps us understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact
of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither (1979, p. 129).
The origin of the concept of ‘affordance’ lies, as Gibson notes, in the

contention of Gestalt psychology that the meaning or value of a thing is
perceived just as immediately as its color; thus, e.g. we directly perceive one’s
emotions. However, in opposition to Gestalt psychology, Gibson claims that:
The affordance of something does not change as the need of the observer changes.
The observer may or may not perceive or attend to the affordance, according to his
needs, but the affordance, being invariant, is always there to be perceived (1979, p.
139).
Gibson’s followers have further developed his notion of ‘affordance’.34
“In the following discussion I mainly refer to Shaw, Turvey and Mace, and Shaw and Turvey
(op. cit. note 2).
They schematize the notion as follows: ‘A situation or event X affords action

Y for animal Z on occasion 0 if certain relevant mutual compatibility relations
between X and Z obtain.’ They emphasize that this notion requires an
irreducible minimum of three logical terms: a term for surfaces and
substances, for animal activity, and for relevant dimensions of compatibility.
That is, the context in which affordances can be found (‘ecosystem’ in the
authors’ terminology) must include these factors. Only in this context does an
animal’s behavior take place. A valuable clarification of the description of
affordances lies in the similarity of this description to a functional definition,
i.e. ‘it makes no attempt to answer the ontological question of what the
environment is in any absolute sense (i.e. metaphysics) but rather attempts to
answer the pragmatic question of what an environment means to an animal.‘35
Also emphasized is the view that the realm of affordances has no necessary
existential import, but rather a potential one; it is the realm of ‘possible
worlds’.
The above claims seem to be similar to Koffka’s distinction between the
behavioral and the geographical environment; the former is the environment
relevant and meaningful for the animal’s behavior, and the latter is the
environment as described by physics.3s Moreover, the notion of affordance, in
the above explanation, is very similar to the Gestaltist notion of functional
significance.3’ The significance (meaning) of a given constituent in a Gestalt
(configuration) derives from the function which that constituent has in the
whole Gestalt. In this way, a point may have the meaning of an eye in a
drawing of a face. However, the point has the functional significance of an eye
only in the perceptual context which includes the drawing and the perceiver.
Outside this context it is meaningless to speak of functional significance. The
notion of ‘affordance’ seems quite similar but emphasizes rather the
implications for a certain activity of the animal. Thus, a given terrestrial
surface affords support (i.e. has the functional significance of being able to
support) only in a behavioral context which includes broader characterizations
of the surface (its being horizontal, nearly flat, and sufficiently extended) and
the animal activity. Again, outside such a context it seems meaningless to
speak of affordances.
Gibson’s followers - like Gibson himself - view the above approach of
Gestalt psychology as loaded with too much subjective flavor, and hence as
assuming a dualism which the very notion of ‘affordance’ attempts to
overcome. Therefore these thinkers support Gibson’s claim that:
‘5haw, Turvey and Mace, op. cit., note 2.

%x, K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Harcourt, 1935).
“E.g. on the latter notion, A. Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1964), pp. 114- 123.
the affordance of a given thing is always there to be perceived. An affordance exists

as a real property of the ecosystem and not by virtue of its being perceived; nor does
the affordance of something change with a change in the animal’s needs. What does
change with an animal’s needs is the attensity or perceptual salience of an
affordance, its likelihood of being attended to.38
No doubt, an affordance ‘exists as a real property of the ecosystem’, but

perception and animal’s needs are essential factors of that ecosystem.
Perception is one of the animal’s activities, hence, the ecosystem offers certain
(perceptual) affordances for that kind of activity. These perceptual
affordances (for example, the joy which a given piece of music offers) by
definition cannot exist without being perceived (heard). The claim that the
affordance ‘is always there to be perceived’ is thus contrary to the very notion
of affordance. The claim implies an exclusion of the animal from determin-
ation of affordances, but an affordance is determined, among other things, by
the animal, e.g. its behavior, perceptions, needs, etc.
The assertion that affordances do not change as the needs of the agent
change seems odd too. Take for example the case in which a given situation
affords threat to an agent who is very insecure, viz. he has an exaggerated need
for security; but this very same situation will not afford such threat to that
agent when he does not have this need. True, the environment still offers the
affordance of food even if the animal is not hungry on the particular occasion;
but if the animal should not need to eat on any occasion, we would not be able
to say that the environment offers him food (something which in no way can
be accepted is not an offer). It is plausible to assume that there are
affordances, e.g. support, which depend on the more basic structure of the
animal, and hence do not change when short-term needs change; but by the
same token we can assume affordances, e.g. threat, sadness, which do change
with the short-term needs. In a sense, one’s needs constitute what he is.
Consequently, a change in an animal’s needs changes the animal itself as well,
and hence also the affordances (which are ‘measured relative to the animal’).
In response to this point, Gibson might claim that when the individual is
being changed he does not change the affordances of things, but merely selects
a different affordance which in any case ‘is always there (in the medium,
substances, surfaces, objects, and other persons and animals) to be perceived’.
In addition to the aforementioned exclusion of the animal from the
determination of affordances, this position (which indeed Gibson seems to
hold) suffers from the following difficulty. It implies that there is an infinite
number of affordances offered by a thing, and hence that before we specify
the animal’s needs, practically everything offers anything; but here the notion
of ‘affordance’ loses its descriptive value. Moreover, before this specification,
the same thing may offer inconsistent affordances, e.g. danger and security. In
Yhaw, Turvey and Mace, op. cit., note 2.
his approach, Gibson tries to overcome the traditional problem of how one
can derive meaning from meaningless data; now Gibson is confronted with a
problem which is no less severe: how can one derive meaning from the sea of
infinite meanings? It seems that the activity of selecting (extracting) a meaning
(affordance, information) out of the sea of meanings (affordance, infor-
mation) is no less a cognitive activity than that of constructing a meaning out
of meaningless data. Indeed, Gibson writes - regarding the affordance of
things - that ‘it is not always easy to perceive which will be provided’ (1979,
p. 137). Gibson’s attempt to get rid of cognitive activities brings them back by
the back-door.
Generally speaking, I am not very enthusiastic about the idea of populating
the world with so many additional entities waiting to be perceived. I am even
less so about accepting Gibson’s suggestion regarding the independent
existence of negative affordances. Concerning this, one may conceive of
perceiving absence, e.g. when I see that something is missing from a certain
configuration, as the existence of negative affordances. Conversely, I believe
that there is a difference between the two cases. ‘Negative’ and ‘positive’, like
other normative attributes (‘true’, false’, ‘good’, ‘ill’, etc.), are second-order
attributes; they apply only to a certain attitude (claim, evaluation) of an
organism toward something. Perceiving is such an attitude; therefore, I may
say that I perceive absence, i.e. that, regarding my normal attitude (way of
perceiving), something is missing; but it is odd to say that the absence (or any
negative fact) exists independently of the perceiver.
The Causal - Epistemic (Functional) Distinction
As I noted above, Gibson conceives of the sensation -perception distinction

as, in a sense, a distinction between two different realms of description: the
causal realm which includes the energy medium and the anatomical processes,
and the informative realm which includes the process of extracting
information from the energy medium. Thus the sensory processes should be
distinguished from perceiving affordances or picking up information.
The above view is similar in certain features to that of Aristotle. Aristotle
distinguishes between sensing and an organ of sense; the organ denotes the
anatomical (causal) aspect of perception, and sensing the functional aspect.3g
Hence, only the organ of sense, but not sensing, has ‘spatial magnitude’. To
sense (or to perceive in terms of the functional aspect) is to receive ‘the sensible
30De Animu, II, 12, Also G. Berkeley somewhat similarily distinguishes three realms in
discussing vision: geometrical, physiological and philosophical. The first two realms can be
incorporated into the causal explanation; the latter explains ‘how the mind or soul simply sees’
(The Theory of Vision Vindicated, p. 43).
forms of things without the matter’. Therefore, an essential feature of

perception, in this respect, is the separation of forms from matter, viz. a
discriminating activity.4o Aristotle’s depiction of perception as the reception of
‘sensible forms of things without the matter’, and the Gestaltist notion of
‘functional significance’ (and hence ‘affordance’) are, in an important sense,
similar. A form of an object (like an affordance of the environment, I claim) is
not an eternal property of that object, but it depends on the purpose and
nature of the way it is handled by an agent. Thus, the same thing (say, a sawed
block of wood) can be form for one person (a carpenter) and matter for
another (a sculptor). The agent is the cause of ‘that which was potentially, to
be actually’, i.e. of the determination of form from given matter.d1 As we saw
above, the consideration of the agent’s context is also an essential feature in
the determination of functional significance or affordances. Aristotle’s
description of perception as a discriminating activity is also similar to one of
Gibson’s claims, viz. the claim that perceptual learning involves differentia-
tion. But whereas Aristotle considers that activity to be a cognitive activity of
judging, Gibson conceives it to be that of merely attending to given
information, i.e. as not involving cognitive activities.
Gibson’s followers have developed his insight concerning the two realms of
description into an important distinction: that between the causal support for
perception and the epistemic act of perceiving. 42The traditional causal theory
of perception mainly ignores this distinction and assumes a causal process
which begins with the meaningless physical realm, and ends with meaningful,
mental perceptions. An explanation of the causal chain encounters, as
previously mentioned, many difficulties. As an example of such difficulties,
Shaw and Turvey discuss the causal chain analysis of a human conversation in
which the speaker says something meaningful to the listener. Such an analysis
unavoidably introduces discontinuities in descriptors, and raises the following
perplexing puzzles: How meaning is lost in the transmission, and how meaning
is recovered later on? (As D. M. MacKay notes: discussion of the transmission
level ‘proceeds in exactly the same terms whether the air is handling the
outpouring of a genius or the jabber of a monkey.‘43) To avoid these puzzles
Shaw and Turvey suggest that we distinguish the causal process of
transmission from the epistemic act of identifying the voice heard. The former
constitutes the causal support needed for the epistemic act, but it does not take
part in that act, i.e. it is not an epistemic mediator. By the same token, the
causal process of transmission of the structured light array consiitutes the
causal support for seeing but is different from such seeing.
‘OSee, e.g. De Anima 426b8ff, 427a18.
“Metaphysics, 1045a20ff.
4’1 mainly refer here to Shaw and Bransford, and Shaw and Turvey, op. cit., note 2.
43D.M. Mackay, Information, Mechanism and Meaning (Boston: MIT Press, 19691, p. 20;
quoted by Shaw and Turvey (op. cit. note 2).
The need for the above distinction seems by now to be obvious; however, we
still have two tasks: (a) to indicate the nature of the epistemic act; and (b) to
indicate the relation between the two realms (a third task of depicting the
causal process, is an empirical one not to be performed here).
Regarding the first task, Shaw and Bransford characterize the epistemic act
in perception as an act of identification or apprehension of the properties in
question. (This, we may recall, is contrary to Artistotle’s depiction of
perception as an act of discrimination; I will discuss this difference below.)
Before the act of identification takes place, the transmission signal is merely a
noise; that is, we do not perceive it as meaningful object (as my friend’s voice,
or as a chair). In this sense the epistemic act in perception (or perception in its
non-physiological aspect) is an achievement - activity. (This is also Gibson’s
view: ‘Perceiving is an achievement of the individual, not an appearance in the
theater of his consciousness.’ - 1979, p. 239) As in other cases of achievement
activities, the act of identification does not take time; like becoming pregnant,
it happens at a certain point of time, but it does not have a certain duration.
However, contrary to the explanation of becoming pregnant, the explanation
of the epistemic act in perception has some conceptual puzzles regarding both
its time-dimension and its epistemic nature. We shall consider first the time-
dimension problem.
Aristotle, as mentioned above, conceives perceiving to contain a
discriminating activity, and he claims that it is not possible to discriminate two
separate objects ‘in separate moments of time’; ‘Both the discriminating
power and the time of its exercise must be one and undivided.“” Also Shaw
and Bransford claim that the epistemic act is not a ‘time-dependent process’.
However, both Artistotle and the ecological psychologists stop short of saying
that perception (in the functional sense) does not have temporal magnitude
(Aristotle only says that it lacks ‘spatial magnitude’). The reason for this is
that perception is not an isolated momentary act but a continuous one. Thus, I
have seen the objects in front of me as books for the last five minutes and not
only now. Gibson clearly explain why we should conceive perceiving as a
continuous act:
The sea of energy in which we live flows and changes without sharp breaks. Even the
tiny fraction of this energy that affects the receptors in the eyes, ears, nose, mouth,
and skin is a flux, not a sequence. The exploring, orienting, and adjusting of these
organs sink to a minimum during sleep but do not stop dead. Hence, perceiving is a
stream. . . (1979, p. 240).
This description, though very plausible, raises two difficulties: (a) whether it
is not in conflict with the Gibsonian claim that ‘dreams and hallucinations are
not perception’; and (b) whether it does not imply continuous cognitive
“De Anima, 426b23ff.
activities in perceptual experience. I discuss below, in the section on ‘Errors in

Perception’, the first difficulty. As for the second difficulty, the problem is
whether characterizing perception as a continuous act does not run counter to
the assertion that ‘perception is an epistemically pure act’. Shaw and
Bransford, in defending this assertion, distinguish between constitutive and
preparatory experience, and argue that ‘Epistemic mediation is always
preparatory to accomplishing an act but never constitutive of the experience of
the act.‘45 But the issue here is whether indeed cognitive (epistemic) activities in
perception are mediatory, and hence preparatory and not constitutive.
In the traditional sensation - perception distinction, Shaw’s and Bransford’s
depiction is adequate. Sensation, in this distinction, is an intermediate
cognitive stage between perception and the world; experiencing sensations and
the subsequent cognitive activities are preparatory and mediatory to the
experience of perceptions. However, in my opinion, once we abandon this
distinction, the cognitive activities should be regarded as constitutive.
Meaningfully to perceive something means placing it in a broad relational
context which requires cognitive activities such as remembering, imagining,
judging, comparing, discriminating, etc. 46 Thus, in order to perceive the object
in front of me as a chair, I must have in mind more or less what is the usual
shape of a chair, what is the difference in shape between chairs and other
objects, what is the function of a chair, etc.; all this requires the involvement
of cognitive factors not before the perceptual act but during the act. Only in
this way can we understand why perception must be a continuous act which is
‘ceaseless and unbroken’ (to use Gibson’s terms), and not an isolated,
momentary one. Shaw’s and Bransford’s view that cognitive activities ‘can
bring us to the threshold of perceptual experience’ but can in no way
participate in such experience, implies that perception is an isolated
momentary act taking place only after we arrive at a certain threshold.
However, this is precisely the traditional view rejected by the ecological
approach.
Let us now return to the question of whether the perceptual act is one of
identification or discrimination. At first sight, the term ‘identification’ seems
to imply less previous cognitive activity than ‘discrimination’ (this probably
explains the use of the former by advocates of ecological psychology), but a
short scrutiny reveals, on the contrary, that both terms imply the same amount
of cognitive activities. Acts of identification require previous activities of
discrimination, and acts of discrimination require previous activities of
identification. Hence, it is not important whether we characterize the epistemic
act as identificatory or discriminatory. This, again, is in contrast to the
‘5Op. cit., note 2, p. 34.

‘%ee, for example, the same argument in R. G. Collingwood’s rebuttal of the notion of ‘pure
sensation’ [‘Sensation and Thought’, Proc. Aristotelian Sot. 24 (1923 - 1924)].
assertion that ‘perception is an epistemically pure act’.

A problematic issue for the causal-functional distinction is the relation
between the two realms. Artistotle argues that these are two different aspects
of the same thing.47 This formula would be objectionable if we admit that
certain stages in the causal chain precede the functional act; in that case, there
will be a time when the causal, but not the functional, exists. Gibson seems to
reject such a formula for different reasons. He writes: ‘There is reason to
believe that the inflow of information does not coincide with the inflow of
sensation; they are at least semi-independent. . . Sensation is not a prerequisite
of perception’ (1966, pp. 47, 48). Gibson calls his theory the ‘theory of the
non-relation of sensation to perception’ (1966, p. 48). But this assertion is too
strong. It is one thing to claim that perception does not derive from sensation,
but it is another thing to claim that perception does not relate to sensation
(after all, as Gibson argues, they are only ‘semi-independent’). The latter
seems false since it implies that perception can (and does) take place without
any physiological processes. Indeed, in 1979 Gibson’s claim is more moderate:
‘perceptions are not based on sensation’ (1979, p. 57); sensory stimulation may
be a ‘necessary condition for seeing, but it is not sufficient’ (1979, p. 55).
Hence, there are relations between the two realms, but their description is not
clear (at least to me). This is a troublesome issue which must be discussed.48
Errors in Perception
The phenomena of illusions and other misperceptions are very disturbing to

Gibson’s view, as to any other direct realist view. The common sense view
conceives misperceptions and other kinds of mistakes as connected somehow
to a mistaken contribution of the cognitive-agent. Since Gibson denies any
activity of that agent in perception, he has a problem in this connection. He
may either accept some version of the common sense view (and by this deviate
from his own theory), or try to explain the misperception ‘objectively’, i.e. by
assuming the existence of ‘false facts’. As we shall see Gibson hesitates
between these two unpleasant alternatives, and it is not clear which he
chooses.48
Gibson states that:
” De Anima, 424a25.
“Shaw and Turvey in a recent article (op. cit., note 2) attempt to overcome this problem by
introducing the concept of ‘coalition’ to model the organization of perceptual systems. They
define coalition as a superordinate system consisting of eight pairs of subsystems nested at four
exclusive ‘grains’ of analysis (bases, relations, orders, values), and closed at each grain under a
(duality) operation. Their suggestion is very complex, and commenting on it here would be too
superficial.
4sIt is interesting to note that while Gibson (as well as his followers) discusses perceptual
illusions only very briefly, his rival Gregory, gives them a central place in his writings.
Since the present theory is primarily a theory of correct perception, it must explain
incorrect perception by supplementary assumptions. The classical theories of
perception, on the contrary, explain both perception and misperception, both
detection and illusion, with the same assumptions (1966, p. 287; first emphasis
added).
Without describing in detail the different theories, I believe that the classical
approach is more fruitful. To ask where and why a system goes wrong seems,
as a heuristic research-method, more promising. Moreover, Gibson’s claim
contrasts with his aforementioned characterization of perception as a
continuous act which does not ‘stop dead’ (even during sleep).
According to Gibson, there are two kinds of reasons for misperceptions: (a)
the available stimulus information for perception can be inadequate; and (b)
the physiological process of information pickup can be deficient (1966, chap.
14).50 To begin with let us examine the first kind (a). The term ‘inadequate
information’, even more than ‘information’, seems to be meaningful only in
relation to a certain agent. Information adequate for one agent may be
inadequate for another. Take, for instance, the first two examples of Gibson’s
list of inadequate information: ‘The energy may be minimal, or the structure
of an array may be blurred’. For a human being a given amount of odor-
stimulus energy may be minimal or insufficient, while for a dog it is not. By
the same token, an array of light may be seen by one observer as blurred, while
by another as clear. Two other reasons from class (a) are ‘conflicting stimulus
information’, and ‘biased or distorted structure of light or sound’. Let us
recall that Gibson’s definition of information is ‘specificity to something’ and
unequivocal relation ‘by virtue of physical law’. All the phenomena which
Gibson regards as inadequate information fulfil these characterizations in the
same way as ‘normal’ phenomena do. As Helmholtz rightly remarks, ‘there is
nothing wrong with the activity of the organ of sense and its corresponding
nervous mechanism which produces the illusion. Both of them have to act
according to the laws that govern their activity once for all.‘51 One can call
information ‘inadequate’, ‘conflicting’, ‘biased’, or ‘distorted’ only in regard
to a given agent (perceptual system) which usually perceives it differently. The
second kind of cause of misperceptions - deficiencies in the physiological
process of information pickup - creates the same difficulty. Even the
outcomes of the so-called ‘deficient’ physiological process have ‘specificity’
just as the ‘normal’ processes do; hence, from Gibson’s point of view, they
cannot be considered as misperceptions.
Gibson seems uneasy about the problem of misperceptions. He admits that
‘The misperceiving of affordances is a serious matter’ (1979, p. 244).
‘OGregory too, distinguishes between cognitive and physiological factors as the two kinds of
causes for i&ions (e.g. op. cit., note 16).
“H. von Helmholtz, Treatise on Physiological Optics, Vol. III (New York: The Optical Society
of America, 1925), p. 4.
J. J, Gibson and the Ecological Approach to Perception 131
Concerning a related issue he writes: ‘These cases of incomplete constancy

[e.g. the railroad tracks that are really parallel but appear to converge] seem to
pose a very real difficulty for the present theory since they imply that objective
facts cannot be fully registered by the perceptual system’ (1966, p. 306).
Gibson indicates that at one point he changed his mind regarding the
explanation of these cases. In regard to the general problem of misperceptions,
he says:
1 am only sure of this: it is not one problem but a complex of different problems. . .
Optical misinformation enters into each of these cases [of misperception] in a
different way. But in the last analysis, are they explained by misinformation? Or is it
a matter of failure to pick up all the available information, the inexhaustible
reservoir that lies open to further scrutiny? . . , The line between the pick up of
misinformation and the failure to pick up information is hard to draw (1979, pp.
243, 244).
Gibson clearly is not sure which answer to choose since each implies different
unpleasant theoretical consequences. It seems that in 1966 he tended to choose
the second answer, close to the traditional contention of a two level process:
revealing the data, and imposing meanings on it. Thus, he characterizes the
activity of the perceptual system in the case of inadequate information as a
‘search for meaning’, ‘the perceptual system hunfs. It tries to find meaning, to
make sense from what little information it can get’ (1966, p. 303). But in 1979,
he tended rather toward the first answer. Thus he writes, ‘if information is
picked up perception results; if misinformation is picked up misperception
results’ (1979, p. 142). That is to say, according to Gibson, information and
misinformation exist ‘in the light’; hence, his position assumes the existence of
false facts.
As it remains impossible for me to understand how information
(knowledge) can exist in the ‘sea of energy’, I will not attempt to understand
how misinformation (false knowledge) can exist there.
Gibson’s followers recognize that the problem of errors in perception is a
central difficulty for the ecological approach to perception. They develop a
solution whose details are not to be found in Gibson’s writings. This solution
deserves a careful examination because of the importance of the issue for
Gibson’s approach. At the heart of the solution is the assumption that the
proper domain of perception is ontology rather than epistemology; if this is
indeed the case:
then perception would be characterized as a state of affairs, and like other states of
affairs that constitute the facts of the world (such as galaxies, water, living things,
etc.), it would be necessarily true by force of existence rather than possibly true by
force of argument.5’
S’Turvey and Shaw, op. cit., note 2, p, 182; see also Shaw, Turvey and Mace, op. cit., note 2.
The notion of ‘true by force of existence’, which is central to the above

solution, confuses the concepts of ‘truth’ and ‘existence’. The assertion that
every existing entity (state of affair) exists is a tautology; but the assertion that
every existing entity is true, or makes truth-claims, is respectively meaningless
and false. The truth-attribute is a second-order attribute, it does not refer to
things themselves (which merely exist or do not exist) but to our descriptions
(claims, theories, etc.) regarding these things.53 Among the existing states of
affairs there are some which have an epistemic aspect; they describe
(characterize, make claims about, etc.) other states of affairs. The truth-
attribute refers to the epistemic, and not the ontic, aspects of this group of
states of affairs. Thus, both a written (or uttered) proposition and water are
states of affairs, but it is only meaningful to apply the truth-attribute to the
former. This is so because only (some) propositions, but not water, have an
epistemic aspect (e.g. the claims they make) which can receive that attribute.
Therefore the truth-attribute does not apply to the ontic aspect of a
proposition (viz. its being a certain state of affairs), or of any other state of
affairs. It is interesting to note that Gibson himself does not seem to commit
this confusion between ontology and epistemology; he asserts that ‘events in
the world should not be confused with the information in light corresponding
to them’ (1979, p. 102).
The above considerations apply also to perception. I, of course, admit that
perception is a certain state of affairs, but this fact cannot solve any
epistemological problem. If we deny the existence of epistemic aspects in
perception, perception, like water, would be neither true nor false. Advocates
of the ecological approach cannot hold this alternative, since a basic tenet of
their approach is that perception is ‘the activity of obtaining information from
the ambient array of light’. Still, these advocates may (and do) claim that there
is a certain kind of epistemic activity (such as perception) which is always true;
I will now turn to this claim, but it is important to see that such a claim differs
from the previous claim that ‘the proper domain of perception is ontology
rather than logic or epistemology’.
Adherents of ecological psychology state that:
perceptual experiences, like the awareness of one’s pains and beliefs are self-
presenting facts, that is, facts which neither require nor allow any justification by
argument since they draw their validity from the force of existence itself.54
“The same holds for the attributes ‘contingent’ and ‘necessary’. Shaw, Turvey and Mace claim
that since perceptions, but not judgments, are themselves states of affairs then ‘judgments
contingently exist’, while ‘perceptions must necessarily exist’. I accept Kant’s position that modal
attributes are second-order attributes which do not apply to states of affairs themselves.
Moreover, judgments too are states of affairs.
Yhaw, Turvey and Mace, op. cit., note 2.
Such experiences comprise direct acquaintance with (in contrast to indirect

description of) things; hence, according to these thinkers, they comprise
knowledge and not merely beliefs. 55Perceptual experiences are a certain kind
of ‘noticing’ (awareness); as such they have ‘a privileged epistemic position in
that, unlike the propositions asserted about other things, they cannot be
impeached by argument or by any other source of evidence.‘5B
Let us now examine the notion of a ‘noticing with a privileged epistemic
position’. The agent (usually) has a privileged epistemic position in regard to
noticing the existence of some of his experiences (in many cases others can
notice his experiences too); however, he does not have such privilege in regard
to the claims implicit in those experiences. Thus, the agent has privilege in
regard to the existence of his beliefthat Aristotle is the son of Plato, or the fact
that he feels pains in his amputated leg; but he does not have any epistemic
privilege beyond the mere being of his own experiences. The claims implicit in
these experiences may be false, as they are in the above examples. Similarly,
the agent has epistemic privilege in regard to hisperception of a certain object
as a cube, but not regarding the claim that it is indeed a cube.
In short, the notion of privileged noticing (or direct acquaintance) may only
refer to the fact that the agent has certain experiences, but not to the
object - reference claims implicit in these experiences. Since the ecological
approach adopts a realist stance concerned with a realm beyond subjective
experience, the above notion of noticing is not of much help. In terms of
‘objective’ reality, Gibson’s dilemma as to the explanation of misperception
remains unsolved.
Memory
Remembering and imagining are cognitive activities; thus, as part of his

attempt to remove all cognitive activities from perception, Gibson denies any
essential role to memory and imagination therein:
Evidently the theory of information pickup does not need memory. It does not have
to have as a basic postulate the effect of past experience on present experience by
“Regarding the knowledge-belief distinction Shaw, Turvey and Mace hold the traditional
characterization of the expression ‘someone knows a proposition’: (a) the person in question
accepts this proposition; (b) the proposition is justified (has adequate evidence); and (c) the
proposition is true; they add a fourth condition: (d) the person in question understand this
proposition. Belief implies only that (a) and (d) be satisfied, and that (b) be modified. This
traditional characterization has been the subject of extensive criticism, refering to the nature of
truth and epistemic justification, to the necessity or sufficiency of these conditions, to examples
counter to such characterization, etc. (e.g. G. S. Pappas and M. Swain [Eds], Essays on
Knowledge and Justificution [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 19781).This criticism questions the
traditional characterization; Shaw et al. do not refer to the former, and do not doubt the latter.
5%haw, Turvey and Mace, op. cit., note 2.
way of memory. . . An image of the past, if experienced at all, would be only an

incidental symptom of the altered state. This is not to deny that reminiscence,
expectation, imagination, fantasy, and dreaming actually occur. It is only to deny
that they have an essential role to play in perceiving (1979, pp. 254, 255).
Gibson has no detailed theory to substitute for traditional views regarding the
influence of past experience, memory, and imagination on perception; he
himself calls his alternate suggestions ‘tentative proposals’. One can formulate
the main claim of Gibson’s alternative as follows: since perception is
awareness of environment, past experience influences perception only through
education (by way of practice) of the perceptual system to attend to finer and
richer aspects of the environment. According to Gibson, information exists
already ‘in the light’, and therefore, we do not need to assume cognitive
activities which qualitatively change this information. The only conceivable
change in the perceptual system is a quantitative one: the extraction of more or
less information, i.e. attention to more or less details. While denying that
memories are stored somewhere, Gibson assumes that past experience changes
(usually improves) the structure of the perceptual system which picks up
information; by this view, he hopes that all the common problems of how and
where memories are stored, disappear.
It seems to me that Gibson’s suggestion is adequate in some cases, but in
spite of this and in spite of its apparent simplicity, it has the following
difficulties. (A) Since Gibson rejects only the role of memory in perception,
but not the existence of memories in general, he will still have to explain how
and where the memories are stored. This point holds also regarding other
kinds of cognitive activities. The rejection of such activities in perception does
not help us understand their nature; on the contrary, it creates a gap between
their absence in perception, and their sudden appearance after it. (B) Many
short-term memories are a constant feature of our cognitive system. Since,
according to Gibson, the only influence of past experience on perception is
through changing the structure of the perceptual system, that structure would
have to be in a constant state of rapid change. This seems a very inefficient
system, and an alternate model which accepts some kind of memory storage,
without changing immediately the structure of the perceptual system, seems
more plausible. (C) There exists a vast and fruitful field of psychological
research regarding the connection between memory and perception; Gibson’s
position must view this research as inappropriate.
Representation
The notion of ‘representation’ is likewise problematic for Gibson’s view. TO

assert the existence of perceptual representation implies that perception is not
merely a picking-up of information, but that it is also some sort of decoding

(or other cognitive) process. Gibson grows hesitant in face of this problem.
While in 1966 he still uses the term ‘representation’, in 1979 he writes:
the term representation is misleading. There is no such thing as a literal re-

presentation of an earlier optic array. . . Even a photograph. . . cannot preserve all
the information at a point of observation in a natural environment, for that
information is unlimited (1979, p. 279).
Gibson is here attacking a straw-man. No one would assert that a

representation has exactly all the properties of its referent (otherwise the two
would be the same thing). The assertion is rather that a representation can
convey to us information about its referent provided that we know the
representational relation in question, i.e. provided that we can decode the
representation. Gibson admits that letters are ‘coded stimulus information’,
but still claims that ‘the structure of light reflected from a series of adjacent
letters . . . carries information, as does the structure of light reflected from
naturally pigmented or contoured surfaces. . .’ (1966, pp. 243, 244). But
contrary to this claim, a representation in itself (e.g. a given combination of
letters) does not carry or contain information; it may convey information,
when there is an agent acquainted with the representational relation in
question (knowing, for example, the meaning of that letter-combination in
English). Moreover, if Gibson admits the existence of decoding activity in the
case of perception of meanings of letter-combinations, I do not see any reason
to reject the existence of similar activity in other kinds of perception.
Gibson has particular difficulties regarding the kind of representation we
call ‘pictures’, testifying that he had to change repeatedly the definition of a
picture; he suggested during his career five diverse definitions. According to
the latest one ‘a picture is a record of what its creator has seen or imagined,
made available for others to see or imagine’ (1979, p. 291). But this definition,
like the earlier ones, is not satisfactory, in my opinion. The term ‘record’ -
which has at least two meanings - does not solve the problem of
representation. This term signifies either the preservation or the representation
of certain properties. The first meaning (which is more common) has the same
difficulties found in the formulation about light that contains (carries)
information. The second meaning is the one Gibson rejects. There is no third
intermediate meaning. Furthermore, approaching the matter from a different
angle, the above definition is too subjective. A picture can be a record (or
representation) of many things which its creator did not see or imagine. The
creator might record certain items without seeing that their combination
records additional things. Generally speaking, it seems to me that a theory
which must deny any form of representation remains seriously flawed.
Shaw et al. try to salvage the notion of ‘representation’. They distinguish
between representation for, which implies a user, and representation by, which
does not; only the latter (they maintain) is a legitimate concept in explaining
perception.5’ Without getting into the details of their elaborate discussion, 1
merely wish to point out that instead of laboring over this distinction, they
might simply present the (in my opinion) equivalent distinction between
‘correspondence’ and ‘representation’: only the latter implies a user. In this
familiar distinction, the connotations of the two terms are well known, and
meanings which belong only to the term ‘representation’ will not contaminate
‘correspondence’ (a contamination which can more easily happen when we
speak of ‘representation for’ and ‘representation by’).
General Evaluation
My criticism of some basic issues of Gibson’s approach to perception has

been drawn not (only) because I enjoy finding inconsistencies and implicitly
implausible assumptions in great works, but (also) because 1 think that this
approach is in many respects on the right track - it just goes too far. In order
to demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional theories of perception, Gibson -
like many (conceptual and non-conceptual) revolutionists before him - takes,
or is pushed to, positions radically opposed to the current ones. This tactic is
useful (and probably inevitable) as a means of throwing away the present
corrupted regime; but once this task has been accomplished, a more moderate
position is often required. No doubt Gibson’s theory, and its further
development by advocates of ecological psychology, accomplishes the task of
persuading us not to hold the traditional theories of perception; this in itself is
a valuable merit of Gibson’s theory. However, in order to be crowned as ‘the
current conceptual framework’, the theory must be modified by a partial
return to some of the traditional claims; in this paper I have tried to indicate
some of the necessary modifications,
A basic difficulty in the traditional framework is, as mentioned throughout
this paper, the gap between meaningless sensory input and meaningful
perception. In order to overcome this gap the traditional theories postulate
homunculi or other unexplainable mental or cognitive constructions. This kind
of explanation was unacceptable for Gibson from the beginning:
The fundamental modern difficulty is this. If the solid visual world is a contribution
of the mind, if the mind constructs the world for itself, where do the data for this
construction come from, and why does it agree so well with the environment in
which we actually move and get about? (1950, p. 14).
“Op. cit., note 2.

To avoid this problem is a main goal for Gibson. He does it by denying, in the
first place, the necessity for assuming any activity of the mind (or more
precisely the cognitive-agent) in perception. All the informative content is
given in the light array, and therefore (says Gibson) there is no need to
postulate additional cognitive activities.
There is in this attitude a complete reduction of the ‘how’ factor to the
‘what’ in perception. Perceptual outcomes are determined solely by the
perceptual content (‘what’) that the agent attends to, and not by the way
(‘how’) the agent refers to that content.58 A somewhat similar attitude can be
found in Plato’s Charmides. Plato rejects the existence of second-order
knowledge, viz. ‘knowledge which knows itself’, since there is nothing in
knowledge beside the ‘what’ factor, and this factor is already described in
first-order knowledge. But rejection of the ‘how’ raises, among other
difficulties, that of explaining what seems to be an obvious result of the ‘how’,
namely errors, illusions and other kinds of misperceptions. Gibson’s answer to
that difficulty is (essentially) similar to Plato’s - an admittance of the reality
of false facts. (In Plato’s view this reality resides in the sphere of the ‘objects
which partake equally of the nature of being and not-being’.5s)
Reduction of the ‘how’ to the ‘what’ is, in my opinion, unjustifiable, just as
the opposite reduction of the ‘what’ to the ‘how’ (which can be found in
extreme constructive theories). As Neisser rightly notes: perception ‘is surely a
matter of discovering what the environment is really like’, but on the other
hand, ‘There must be definite kinds of structure in every perceiving organism
to enable it to notice certain aspects of the environment rather than others, or
indeed to notice anything at a11.‘60 An adequate approach to perception must
assume that neither the ‘what’ factor nor the ‘how’ factor determine
perceptual outcomes alone. Neisser’s own suggestion (in which the notion of a
‘schema’ stands for the ‘how’ factor) seems a promising movement in the right
direction. Gibson would reject the suggestion, along with his rejection of ‘the
tiresome contradiction of supposing that perception comes only partly from
outside the perceiver and partly from inside’.‘j’
In suggesting some epistemological implications of his view, Gibson writes:
The theory of information pickup makes a clear-cut separation between perception

and fantasy, but it closes the supposed gap between perception and knowledge. The
extracting and abstracting of invariants are what happens in both perceiving and
knowing. To perceive the environment and to conceive it are different in degree but
not in kind. One is continuous with the other. . . . Knowing is an extension of
perceiving (1979, p. 258).
Tndeed, Shaw and Bransford claim that the traditional approach emphasizes the ‘how’ of
psychological processing, while the ecological approach the ‘what’ (op. cit., note 2, p. 1).
38See, .e.g. Republic V, 478 -480, and Timaeus 27-28, 51 -52.
YJ. Neisser, Cognition and Reality (San Francisco: Freeman, 1976), p. 9.
61J. J. Gibson, ‘Letter’, Leonardo 4 (1971). 198.
In light of the large gap between perception (or more precisely sensation) and
knowledge in the traditional view, any attempt to close the gap should be
welcomed. However, one might raise one’s eyebrows regarding Gibson’s
version of such an approach. Is knowing similar to perceiving in the sense that
it does not involve cognitive activities such as interpretation and problem
solving? Or is it similar because of a presumed absence of memory and any
kind of representation in both cases? At first sight, Gibson’s identification of
knowing and perceiving seems similar to Artistotle’s claim that ‘To perceive
then is like bare asserting or knowing’.62 However, while Aristotle bases his
identification on the existence of cognitive (judging, discrimination) activities
in both perceiving and knowing, Gibson bases his identification on the absence
of these activities. Aristotle’s position seems more plausible, even if only
because Gibson’s position implies that cognitive activities can occur only in the
realm of fantasy.
Gibson’s aim of avoiding the assumption of homunculi and other
unexplainable cognitive constructions, has pushed him to an extreme
‘objective’ position which seems to deny any subjective role in perception.
Hence the accusation - constantly denied by Gibson - that his theory is a
passive theory of perception. Kant found himself in similar circumstances but
in a reverse way. 63 His attempt to avoid talk of the thing-in-itself (the reality
outside any cognitive framework) pushed him into what seemed to his critics
an extreme subjective, idealist position. Kant also constantly denied this
accusation. Such accusations go against the very foundations of Kant’s and
Gibson’s systems, and hence are rightly rejected. In Kant’s case, the rejection
of the subjective interpretation can be based on at least two main features: (a)
Kant never denies either the existence of the thing-in-itself, or its role in our
cognition; and (b) contrary to the common idealistic position, it is not the
empirical subject that is an important factor in determining the nature of the
content of knowledge, but rather the transcendental subject. Kant’s position is
a complex alternative to the simple subjective-objective dichotomy. He
successfully shows that our everyday reality is neither purely subjective nor
purely objective, but rather both subjective and objective or neither of them.
Hence, the terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ in their usual meaning are useless
in that context. Likewise Gibson is not a ‘simple-minded objectivist’ in the
traditional sense of this term: (a) he never denies either the existence of the
subject or a certain limited role for it in perception; and (b) in contrast with the
common materialistic position, he does not speak about physical reality but
about the environment ofthe subject. Like Kant’s view Gibson’s is similarly a
complex alternative to the simple subjective - objective dichotomy.”
%‘DeAnima, 431a8.
B’I owe this comparison to S. Toulmin.
“Gibson is not aware of the similarity with Kant; in the few places where he mentions Kant, he
criticizes his ‘subjective’ claims.
However, contrary to Kant’s system, Gibson’s system seems not to be

developed and sophisticated enough to overcome the basic difficulties (some
of which I have pointed out) of such a complex alternative. As I indicated
above, both Kant’s and Gibson’s attempts to formulate alternatives to the
subjective-objective (inside-outside) dichotomy have led their readers
(unjustifiably) to accuse them of taking either one side or the other of that
dichotomy; an indication of how hard it is to formulate an adequate
alternative. But positions like those of Kant and Gibson certainly indicate the
necessity for such an alternative.
In summary, Gibson’s approach reveals an important dimension which is
absent in recent artificial intelligence and information processing theories: the
perceiver - environment interrelation. These theories focus on what is inside
the head, while neglecting what is going on outside the head. The interrelation
between the organism and its environment should be (as Gibson shows) an
essential feature of every theory of perception; the theory, however, should
not neglect (as is occasionally done in Gibson’s theory) the organism’s role in
that interrelation. The interrelation indicates another important perceptual
feature (which is also well emphasized by Gibson): the relational nature of
perception; perception does not deal with subjective sensory atoms, but with
objective complex relations. The heart of my criticism of Gibson’s approach
lies in his contention that perception is devoid of cognitive contributions since
it merely involves ‘picking up’ or ‘taking notice of’ existing relationships. This
contention neglects one aspect of the perceiver (viz. his cognitive framework)
which plays an important role in the organism - environment interrelation.B5
“I am very grateful to S. Toulmin, M. Strauss, G. Buchdahl, S. Monsell, R. Richards and

W. Wimsatt for helpful comments and discussions of.earlier versions of this paper. I also thank
R. Golb for helpful revisions of the manuscript. The paper was written during a stay at the
University of Chicago. This work was supported by a grant from the Rothschild Foundation.
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J.J. Gibson and the ecological

Article in Studies In History and Philosophy of Science Part A · July 1981

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THE CONTRIBUTION of J. J. Gibson to psychology spans half a century; his

*Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Mt. Carmel, Haifa 31999, Israel.

Gibson’s view, viz. the notions of ‘information’ and ‘affordance,’ the

Gibson and the Traditional Theories of Perception

Traditional theories of perception, according to Gibson, consider the senses as

From the standpoint of the cognitive-agent, sensation is a passive reception of

(Bl) Perceptual information (meaning) gradually emerges from the sensory

YShaw and Bransford, op. cit. note 2, pp. 17, 36.

The function of each homunculus is accomplished ‘by subdividing it. . . into

The Notion of ‘Information’

Gibson characterizes perception as an act of picking up information. In

can receive the information. This is in obvious contrast to Gibson’s opinion,

“J. J. Gibson, op. cit., note 20, p. 75.

The Notion of ‘Affordance’

The notion of ‘affordance’ is central to Gibson’s view, since, according to

an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both

The origin of the concept of ‘affordance’ lies, as Gibson notes, in the

Gibson’s followers have further developed his notion of ‘affordance’.34

They schematize the notion as follows: ‘A situation or event X affords action

‘5haw, Turvey and Mace, op. cit., note 2.

the affordance of a given thing is always there to be perceived. An affordance exists

No doubt, an affordance ‘exists as a real property of the ecosystem’, but

The Causal - Epistemic (Functional) Distinction

As I noted above, Gibson conceives of the sensation -perception distinction

forms of things without the matter’. Therefore, an essential feature of

activities in perceptual experience. I discuss below, in the section on ‘Errors in

‘5Op. cit., note 2, p. 34.

assertion that ‘perception is an epistemically pure act’.

The phenomena of illusions and other misperceptions are very disturbing to

Concerning a related issue he writes: ‘These cases of incomplete constancy

The notion of ‘true by force of existence’, which is central to the above

Such experiences comprise direct acquaintance with (in contrast to indirect

Remembering and imagining are cognitive activities; thus, as part of his

way of memory. . . An image of the past, if experienced at all, would be only an

The notion of ‘representation’ is likewise problematic for Gibson’s view. TO

merely a picking-up of information, but that it is also some sort of decoding

the term representation is misleading. There is no such thing as a literal re-

Gibson is here attacking a straw-man. No one would assert that a

My criticism of some basic issues of Gibson’s approach to perception has

“Op. cit., note 2.

The theory of information pickup makes a clear-cut separation between perception

However, contrary to Kant’s system, Gibson’s system seems not to be

“I am very grateful to S. Toulmin, M. Strauss, G. Buchdahl, S. Monsell, R. Richards and

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