The Richard Paradox

Author(s): Alonzo Church

Source: The American Mathematical Monthly, Vol. 41, No. 6 (Jun. - Jul., 1934), pp. 356-361
Published by: Mathematical Association of America
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2301551 .
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356 THE RICHARD PARADOX [June-July,

IA'1,where
f-i ~ ~ ~ )n,P +n
k-i
p = E(it- 1)P1? + (ik- 1)-P +i+-= (it - 1)Pt+1
t=l nk nk t=j+1
8-1
+(ii - 1)Pk+ + E (it - 1)1't+l + is.
t=k+l

The differencebetween r and p is given by

d = Pk+i [(ij ik)(Pk+I - 1)

(1) + ( -nk - f3) - 1)Pi+2 + k-(it - 1)Pt+l

t= 1+1

The theoremfollowsfromequation (1) and Theorem 2.

In the previous illustration the formulas for I NJ and I N'l give
d = (2ii-i2- 1). Hence the congruencesof Theorem 3 imply the equality of the
minorofaili2i, in IN withtheminorofail 2i3 in IN'| if i2 is even; if i2 iS odd
the minorof a 1i2i in N| is equal to the negative of the minorof ai,i2s3in I N'l .

THE RICHARD PARADOX'

By ALONZO CHURCH, PrincetonUniversity
A system of symboliclogic must begin with a list of undefinedsymbols, a
list of formalaxioms, and a list of rules of inference.
Let us call any finitesequence of the undefinedsymbols of the system a
formula.Then each of the formalaxioms is a formula.And each of the rules of
inferencestates an operationwhichenables us, out of given formulas,to obtain
new ones. The theoremsof the systemare the formulaswhich can be obtained
fromthe formalaxioms by a finitenumberof applications of the rules of infer-
ence.
It would seem natural to requirethat the list of undefinedsymbolsand the
list of formalaxioms should each be finite,but, as a matterof fact, in most of
the systemsof symboliclogic which have actually been proposed, one or both
of these lists is enumerablyinfinite.
Now it is well known that in any particularsystemthe set of all formulas
is enumerable.For we may arrangethe list ofundefinedsymbolsin a fixedorder,
and then definethe grade of a formulato be the least positive integern, such
that the formuladoes not contain more than n symbols and does not contain
any symbol beyond the nth in the list of undefinedsymbols. The set of all
formulasof a particulargrade is then always finite.And therefore,afterfixing
I An addressdeliveredat themeetingoftheMathematicalAssociationin Cambridge,Mass.,
Dec. 30, 1933.

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1934] THE RICHARD PARADOX 357

upon a rule fororderingformulasof the same grade (as is easily done), we can
enumeratethe set of all formulasby arrangingthemin the orderof theirgrades.
For convenience,let us use the phrasefunctionofpositiveintegersto mean a
single-valuedfunctionof one variable,f(x), which takes on a value which is a
positive integer,wheneverx takes on a value which is a positive integer.We
can prove, by a familiarargument,that the set of all functionsof positive in-
tegers is not enumerable. For, iffi(x), f2(x), f3(x), * * * is any enumerationof
functionsof positiveintegers,then 1+f:(x) is a functionof positiveintegersnot
included in the enumeration.
Since, in any systemof symboliclogic, the set of all formulasis enumerable,
whereas the set of all functionsof positive integersis not enumerable,it seems
to followthat,in the case of any systemofsymboliclogic,thereexistsa function
of positive integerssuch that thereis no formulawhichstands forit. And surely
the existence of a functionof positive integerswhich has no representationas
a formulain the systemmeans that the systemis inadequate even forelemen-
tary numbertheory.
The Richard paradox can be said to consist in the followingproblem.How
is it possible that a systemof symboliclogic, in which the set of all formulasis
enumerable,should be adequate for any branch of mathematics which deals
withthe membersofa non-enumerableset (in particularforelementarynumber
theory)?
Given a system of symbolic logic, let us try to constructthe functionof
positive integerssuch that thereis no formulain the systemthat stands forit.
What we must do is firstto enumerateall formulas,by the method which we
have described,and then,going throughthis enumeration,to pick out in order
those formulaswhich stand forfunctionsof positive integers.The resultis an
enumerationof all formulaswhich stand forfunctionsof positiveintegers.And
ifwe letfn(x)be the functionof positiveintegersrepresentedby the nthformula
in this enumeration,then 1+fx(x) is the functionof positive integerssuch that
there is no formulain the systemthat stands forit.
But this function1+f$(x) is not, in general,definedin such a way that it is
always possible to calculate its value fora given positive integerx. For, in the
processofgoingthroughthe listofall formulasand pickingout thosewhichstand
for functionsof positive integers,we may at some stage finda formulaabout
which we do not know whetheror not it stands fora functionof positive in-
tegers. For example, we may finda formulawhose intuitivemeaning is, "The
least positive integern, greaterthan x, such that the equation Un+Vn= Wn has
a solution in positive integralvalues of u, v, w." And we could not determine
whether this formula stood for a functionof positive integerswithout first
proving,or disproving,Fermat's last theorem.Indeed, to be sure of always be-
ing able to determinewhethera given formulastands fora functionof positive
integers,we must have discovered a method of procedurewhich would enable
us to solve any problemof numbertheorywhatever. Thereforethe infinitese-
quence (about whichwe have been talking)ofall formulaswhichstand forfunc-

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358 THE RICHARD PARADOX [June-July,

tions of positive integersalmost certainlyis not such an infinitesequence that

it is possible to calculate as many termsof it as we please. And thereforethe
function1+fc(x) has not been definedin a way whichcould be called construc-
tive, but has merelybeen proved by an indirectargumentto exist.
Now a particular system of symbolic logic could be adjudged inadequate
only in the presence of a particular functionof positive integers,which could
be definedintuitively,but had no formulain the systemto stand forit. We re-
quire of our formalsystemmerelythat it shall be adequate to defineany func-
tion ofpositiveintegerswhichcan be definedintuitively.And hence an existence
proofwhich cannot be supportedwith an effectiveconstructionhas no signifi-
cance forour presentproblem.
Hence it appears to be possible that there should be a system of symbolic
logic containinga formulato stand forevery definablefunctionof positive in-
tegers,and I fullybelieve that such systemsexist.
But surelya functionof positive integerswhich cannot be definedby any
means whateveris no functionof positive integersat all. If you agree, then it
seems to followthat the non-enumerableset of all functionsof positiveintegers
can be put into one-to-onecorrespondencewith a subset of the enumerableset
of all formulasof an adequate symboliclogic. In fact,we are presentedwiththe
alternativeof supposingthat thereis no adequate systemof symboliclogic or of
supposingthat an enumerableset can contain a non-enumerablesubset. Of the
two alternativesuppositionsthe latteris clearlypreferableand (as we have seen)
by no means untenable.
Let us turn,however,to another aspect of the problemof the possible ade-
quacy of a system of symbolic logic. In order that a systembe adequate it is
necessarynot only that it contain a formulato stand foreveryfunctionof posi-
tive integers,but also that, in the case of every formulaf which stands fora
functionof positiveintegers,the formaltheoremN(x) n , N(f(x)) shall be prov-
able; where N(x) is the formulawhose intuitivemeaning is "x is a positive in-
teger,"and v = is the formulawhich stands forthe relation of implicationbe-
tween propositional functions,so that N(x) = xN(f(x)) is to be read, "x is a
positive integerimplies thatf(x) is a positive integer."
But in the case of any systemof symboliclogic the set of all provable the-
orems is enumerable.
This is most easily seen in the case of a systemof the simplestsort,forwhich
the numberofformalaxioms and thenumberof rulesofinferenceare alike finite.'
For in such a case the numberof theoremsprovable in n steps is finite,forany
fixedvalue of n. By inspectionof the rules of inferenceand the formalaxioms
we can obtain a complete list of the theoremsprovable in one step. And, in
general,by inspectionof the rulesof inference,the formalaxioms,and the.finite
1 We assumethatwitha fixedpremise or premisesand a fixedruleofinference theformula
obtainedas conclusionis unique(a suggestiondue to J. B. Rosser).This propertyby no means
holdsofall systemswhichhaveactuallybeenproposed.But at thepossiblecostofincreasing the
numberofrulesofinference,itcanalwaysbe madetohold,withoutessentially altering
thesystem.

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 1934] THE RICHARD PARADOX 359

list of theoremsprovable in not morethan n -1 steps, we can obtain a complete

list of the theoremsprovable in n steps. Hence we may enumerateall the theo-
rems of the systemby enumeratingfirstthe formalaxioms, then the theorems
provable in one step, then the theoremsprovable in two steps, and so on.
In the case of a systemof a morecomplicatedsort,forwhichthe number of
rules of inference,or the number of formal axioms, or both, are infinite,an
evident modificationof the foregoingmethod will still enable us to obtain an
enumerationof all the formaltheorems.
Out of this enumerationof all theoremsselect those which have the form
N(x) D N(f(x)). This gives an enumerationN(x) , N(fi(x)), N(x) n .N(f2(x)),
N(x) n xN(f3(x)), * v v . And hence we obtain an enumeration fi(x), f2(x),
f3(x), * * *, of all formulasabout which we can prove the formaltheoremthat
they are functionsof positive integers; whereas the set of all (intuitivelyde-
finable) functionsof positive integersis not enumerable.
Since the enumerationof all formaltheoremsis effective,and since thereis
a uniformprocedureby whichwe can recognizewhetherany given formulahas
the formN(x) 3;N(f(x)), it followsthat in the case of any particularsystem
of symbolic logic, we can actually carry out the enumerationf1(x), f2(x),
f3(x), * * * to as many terms as we care to. Hence we cannot escape fromthe
presentdilemma in the same way that we did before.
Since the set of all formulasabout which we can prove the formaltheorem
that theyare functionsof positiveintegersis (effectively)enumerable,whilethe
set of all functionsof positive integersis not enumerable,we conclude, either
that thereis some functionof positiveintegerswhichis definableintuitivelybut
about whichwe cannot prove the formaltheoremthat it is a functionof positive
integers,or else that thereis some formulaabout whichwe can prove the formal
theoremthat it is a functionof positive integersbut which on the basis of the
intuitivemeaningsgiven to our undefinedtermsdoes not stand fora function
of positive integers.That is, briefly,every system of symbolic logic either is
inadequate to prove all theoremswhich are intuitivelytrue or else sufficesto
prove theoremswhich are intuitivelyfalse.
Or, if we prefernot to assume the existence of an intuitivelogic which is
rightin an absolute sense, then it is sufficientto observe that in any systemof
symbolic logic not hopelessly inadequate there would be a formalequivalent
of the intuitiveargumentwhichwe have just set forth,and hence that this sys-
tem of symboliclogic would contain the formaltheoremthat this same system,
regardedobjectively,was eitherinsufficient or over-sufficient.This means that
the assumptionthat this systemof symboliclogic was a true and completerep-
resentationof what is logically correctwould defeat itself.
This, of course, is a deplorable state of affairs.It plainly implies that the
whole programof the mathematicallogician is futile.
For in the presenceof such a situation,not only is it impossibleto obtain a
single set of postulates which would lead to all mathematics (as, forexample,
the authors of Principia Mathematicawould do), but it is even impossibleto

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360 THE RICHARD PARADOX [June-July,

obtain a set of postulates adequate to a particularbranchof mathematics,such

as numbertheory,analysis, or Euclidean plane geometry.That is, provided we
assume, as I thinkwe must,that a satisfactoryformalizationof,say, Euclidean
plane geometry,means formalizing,not only the geometric terms, such as
"point" and "line," which appear in its propositions,but also the logical terms,
such as "if," "and," "is."
Indeed, ifthereis no formalizationof logic as a whole, then thereis no exact
descriptionof what logic is, forit is in the very nature of an exact description
that it impliesa formalization.And ifthereis no exact descriptionof logic,theii
there is no sound basis forsupposing that thereis such a thingas logic.
Under these circumstances,a definition,forinstance of Euclidean plane ge-
ometry,as that body of propositionswhich followslogicallyfroma certain set
of axioms, is altogethervague and unsatisfactory,because any attempteddefi-
nitionof the adverb "logically" is necessarilyincomplete.We are led to despair
of the currentlyaccepted search for mathematical rigor,which amounts es-
sentiallyto an appeal fromthe realmof spatial and otherintuitionsto the realm
of logic.
Fortunately,however,thereis a way out of this conditionof nihilism.The
theoremwhichled us to such pessimisticconclusionsdoes not reallyapply to all
systemsof symboliclogic but only to systemswhichsatisfycertainconditions.
And one of these conditionsis, either that there shall be a unique symbol for
implicationbetweenpropositionalfunctions,or that thereshall be a set of sym-
Lols forimplicationand an effectiveway by which we can always determine
whethera given formulais one of the symbolsforimplication.For, in the con-
trarycase, therewould be no effectiveway of pickingout froma list oftheorems
those whichhad the formN(x) v xN(f(x)), and hence we could escape fromour
second dilemma in the same way that we did fromour firstone.
Thereforewe seek a systemof symboliclogic in whichthe notionof implica-
tion between propositionalfunctionsis obtained by definition,and in which
thereare a varietyof notionsof implication,obtainable by different definitions.
In the case of each definitionwe desire that it shall be possible by an intuitive
argumentto prove the characterof the definedsymbol as an implicationsym-
bol. But there shall be no uniformmeans of determiningwhethera given for-
mula is an implicationsymbol.
A systemof this sort not only escapes our unpleasant theoremthat it must
be eitherinsufficient or oversufficient,but I believe that it escapes the equally
unpleasant theoremof Kurt Godel to the effectthat, in the case of any system
of symboliclogic which has a claim to adequacy, it is impossible to prove its
freedomfromcontradictionin the way projected in the Hilbert program.This
theoremof G6del is, in fact,morecloselyrelated to the foregoingconsiderations
than appears fromwhat has been said.
As I speak, I have in mind a particularset of postulates forsymboliclogic,
whose freedomfromcontradictioncan be proved, and which lead to a non-
enumerable multiplicityof definitionsof implication,in the mannerwe desire.

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1934] THE THEORY OF THE CHESHIRE CAT 361

It seems probable that the system of logic which resultsfromthese postulates

is adequate at least forelementarynumbertheory,but how far it is adequate
foranalysis there is at presentno safe basis forconjecture.
Apparently,however,in view of the theoremof Godel, and of the difficulties
arising in connectionwith the Richard paradox, a systemof symboliclogic of
this kind is the most general which can be regarded as satisfactoryfromour
presentpoint of view. If it be true that no systemof this kind can lead to anal-
ysis, thenit seems to followthat the indictmentagainst the soundnessof analy-
sis which is contained in the Richard paradox must be allowed to stand.

THE THEORY OF THE CHESHIRE CAT'

By D. E. RICHMOND, WilliamsCollege
"This time the Cheshire Cat vanished quite slowly,beginningwith the end
of the tail, and endingwith the grinwhich remainedsome time afterthe rest of
it had gone. 'Well! I've oftenseen a cat withouta grin,' thoughtAlice, 'but a
grinwithouta cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life!"'
I must now confess that I am going to talk about mathematics,which I
have chosen to characterizeas the theoryof the Cheshire Cat, or better,the
theoryof the CheshireCat's Grin. The appropriatenessof this characterization
will, I trust,soon become apparent. It is no accident that I should finda text
formy remarksin Lewis Carroll. It is well known that in real life Carroll, or
ratherDodgson, was a mathematicianand a logician. In his nonsensebooks he
has contrived to say a great deal of mathematical and logical importance. I
have here a littlebook2 on the philosophyof mathematics,in which practically
all of the referencesare to the works of Lewis Carroll.
This delightfullittlebook beginsas follows:"The view that the fundamental
principlesof logic consist solely of the law of identity was held by Leibniz,
Drobisch, Uberweg and Tweedledee. Tweedledee, it may be remembered,re-
marked that certainidentities'are' logic." The referencegiven is to Throughthe
LookingGlass. "'Contrariwise,' continuedTweedledee, 'ifit was so, it mightbe;
if it were so, it would be: but as it isn't it ain't. That's logic.' " There are two
otherreferenceson the law of identityboth to Sylvia and Bruno. "The professor
said: 'The day is the same lengthas anythingthat is the same lengthas it' " and
"Bruno observed that when the Other Professorlost himself,he should shout.
He'd be sure to hear hisself,'cause he couldn't be far off." I think that this
combinationof high seriousnessand nonsense is almost unique.
But to returnto the CheshireCat, I should like to suggestthat the progress
of mathematicshas leftus with somethingalmost as unsubstantial as the grin
without the cat. The content of mathematics like the body of the cat fades

1 Delivered as a public lecture at Williams College, February, 1932.

2 Jourdain, The Philosophyof Mr. BertrandRussell.

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