I.

a. Yes. The marriage between Harry and Elizabeth is valid.

According to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine Law.

In the case at bar, Wilma was already a foreign national having been naturalized as a
citizen of that small country in Europe when he got the divorce decree. Harry then, is already
capacitated to remarry when he married Elizabeth hence, their marriage is valid.

b. I will advise Harry to dissolve and liquidate his property relation with Wilma as soon
as possible and petition the court to recognize the foreign divorce decree obtained by Wilma in
order that his capacity to remarry will no longer be questioned.

II.

a. As a judge, I will apply the doctrine of processual presumption.

According to the rules, the doctrine of processual presumption refers to the right of the
court to presume that in the absence of the proof, the alleged foreign laws shall be treated as the
same as that of the laws in the Philippines.
In the case at bar, Chin alleged that under the laws of China, village leader has authority
to solemnize marriage however she failed to present evidence supporting her allegations hence,
the court will presume that the laws of China with respect to solemnization of marriage is the
same as that of Philippine marriage laws which however provides that village leader is not
among those who are authorized to solemnize marriage hence, we apply Article 35 of the Family
Code, which says that marriages solemnized by a person not authorized to do so shall render the
marriage void.

b. The marriage between Chin and Jon is valid.

According to the Article 35 of the Family Code, when one or both of the contracting
parties believe in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so where in
fact the same has none, the marriage will still be valid.
In the case at bar, Chin and Jon did not have an idea that the authority of the Baptist
minister who solemnized their marriage was already expired a month before the celebration of
their marriage. This will not be case of ignorance of the law since Chin and Jon relied on the fact
that the Baptist minister has the authority to solemnize marriage which is provided under Article
7 of the Family Code.
Hence, their marriage is valid.

III.

a. Gemma’s suit will not prosper.

According to the Supreme Court, it is not enough to prove the commission of the acts or
the existence of abnormal behavior. It must be shown that those said acts or behavior was
manifestation of a serious mental disorder and that it is the root cause why he was not able to
perform the essential duties of married life. It must also be shown that such psychological
incapacity, as manifested in those acts or that behavior, was existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

In the case at bar, there was no showing that Arnell was suffering from a manifestation of
that disorder, that his behavior was a manifestation of that disorder, and that such disorder
prevented him from complying with duties as a married person.

Hence, the acts of Arnell complained about do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity.

b. Still no.

According to the Court, statement of expert witness conforming to the alleged suffering
of the spouse’s personality disorder may be given great weight however, such statements alone
will not render the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity since there are other
matters to consider. It must be shown that those said acts or behavior was manifestation of a
serious mental disorder and that it is the root cause why he was not able to perform the essential
duties of married life. It must also be shown that such psychological incapacity, as manifested in
those acts or that behavior, was existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

IV.

a. No. John is not correct.

According to Article 45 of the Family Code, impotence may be a ground for annulment
of marriage if either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable and under Article 47 of the
same Code, the period to file for such action shall be within 5 years from the celebration of the
marriage however failure to do so shall not render the marriage ratified since this ground is not
subject of ratification.

In the case at bar, Marsha filed an action to annul their marriage on the ground of
impotency at the end of the 2nd year of their marriage. The action was filed within the five year
prescriptive period. However, even if no action was filed, the marriage cannot be ratified.

Thus, John’s contention is not correct.

b. No.

According to the Supreme Court, in case the potent spouse is aware of the impotency of
his or her spouse before the celebration of their marriage, it is implied that he/she renounced
copulation by consenting to the marriage, hence, he may be estopped from filing the action.

V.

a. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, Salaries and wages, properties acquired by both
through work and industry and properties presumed to be acquired jointly while living together,
shall be divided equally while properties acquired through exclusive funds shall remain exclusive
to either parties.

b. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, Salaries and wages shall be separately owned
by parties, properties acquired through exclusive funds shall remain exclusive, properties
acquired by both through work and industry shall be owned in common in proportion to
respective contribution however, there will be no presumption of joint acquisition as to the
properties acquired while living together.

c. No. In so far as Art. 148 of the Family Code is concern, properties acquired while
living together shall not be presumed as joint acquisition and such will not be offset by efforts of
the other in the care and maintenance of the family and household.

d. The properties shall be divided depending upon the ground for termination of
marriage. In case of death, Article 103 of the Family Code will apply, in case of Legal
Separation, Articles 63 and 64 will apply and in case of Annulment or judicial declaration of
nullity, Articles 50 and 52 will apply.

VI.
a. Ed is the father of Alvin because Alvin was conceived and born during the marriage of his
mother to Ed. Under the law, the child born during the marriage of the mother to her husband is
presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband. While it is true that there was no written
consent by the husband to the artificial insemination, absence of such consent may only give the
husband a ground to impugn the legitimacy of the child but will not prevent the child from
acquiring the status of legitimate child of the husband at the same time of its birth.

b. Under the Family Code, Children born out of a bigamous marriage shall be considered
illegitimate.

Hence, Alvin is an illegitimate child and Andy is his biological father.

VII.
Yes, Joey has such a cause of action against Tintin.
While the Family Code has repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on proof of
filiation, said repel did not impair vested rights. Under the Civil Code, as an illegitimate child
may file an action to compel his recognition even after the death of the putative father when the
father died during the minority of the child. While the Family Code has repealed this provision, it
will not operate to prejudice those who has already acquired a vested right thereto.
In the case at bar, Joey was born an illegitimate child in 1981. As an illegitimate child, he
had acquired, at birth, the right to prove his filiation in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code in force at that time.

VIII.
a. Yes, the position of the government is tenable.
Foreigners are disqualified to adopt unless they fall in any of the exceptions provided for
in the law.
Eva and Paul are both foreigners. Eva, falls in one of the exceptions. She is qualified to
adopt because she is a former Filipino citizen who wishes to adopt a relative by
consanguinity. Unfortunately, Paul is not qualified to adopt because he does not fall in any of
the exceptions. Hence, they cannot adopt jointly. When husband and wife are adopting
jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt in their own right. Eva cannot, alone by
herself, adopt her niece because husband and wife must adopt jointly unless they fall in any
exceptions provided for in the law. They cannot adopt separately because they do not fall in
any of the exceptions.
Hence, whether separately or jointly, Eva and Paul cannot adopt Vicky in the Philippines.

b. No, my answer would be different.

 Eva is qualified to adopt her illegitimate daughter, because she falls in one of her exceptions
that allow foreigners to adopt. She is a former Filipino citizen adopting her relative by
consanguinity. Eva can adopt separately her illegitimate child because her case is also an
exception to the rule that husband and wife should adopt jointly.

IX.
As a judge, I would rule that the first marriage settlement was valid because it was in
writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. Second, the
subsequent agreement of the parties was void as a modification of their marriage settlement. To
be valid, the modification must be executed before the celebration of the marriage. The
subsequent agreement of the parties did not effect a dissolution of their conjugal partnership and
a separation of their properties because it was not approved by the court. To be valid, an
agreement by the parties to dissolve their conjugal partnership and to separate properties during
the marriage has to be approved by the court.
Considering that the marriage settlement was binding between the parties, conjugal
partnership of gains was the regime of their property relations. Under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, all properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, jointly or by
either one of them, through their work or industry are conjugal. Therefore, the residential house
and lot, and the condominium unit are conjugal having been jointly acquired by the couple
during the marriage. Inasmuch as the subsequent agreement on dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and separation of property was invalid, conjugal partnership subsisted between the
parties. Therefore, the mansion and the agricultural land are also conjugal having been acquired
by one of the spouses during the marriage.

The marriage settlement cannot prejudice third parties, such as the creditors, because it
was not registered with the local civil registered with the local civil registrar where the marriage
was recorded. To bind third parties, the Family Code requires registration of the marriage
settlement not only with the proper register of deeds but also with the local civil registrar where
the marriage was recorded. Hence, if the rules on conjugal partnership will prejudice the
creditors, the rules on absolute community will be applied instead. However, insofar as debts
contracted by one spouse without the consent of the other are concerned, the rule is the same for
both conjugal partnership and absolute community. The partnership or community is liable for
debts contracted by one spouse but only to the extent that it benefited to the family. Therefore, if
the debts contracted by Mila redounded to the benefit of the family, all the conjugal partnership
properties are liable to pay them but only to the extent the family was benefited. The separate
properties of Mila may be held answerable for Mila’s debts and obligations that did not redound
to the benefit of the family.

X.
Both parents of Sam and Cathy shall be held liable for damages.
According to Article 221 of the Family Code, parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their personal
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.