I.

a. Under Article 523 of the Civil Code, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right while occupation is a mode of acquiring ownership under Article 712 of
the Civil Code and it is effected through: (1) Hunting and fishing; (2) Finding hidden treasures;
(3) Finding of abandoned movables and (4) Finding movables which never had an owner.

b. Easement may be constituted only on an immovable by nature while usufruct may be

constituted on either movable or immovable property; Easement may not be extinguished by the
death of the dominant owner while usufruct may be extinguished by the death of usufructuary;
Easement is non-possessory right over an immovable whereas usufruct involves a right of
possession over an immovable; and Easement is limited to particular of specific use of servient
estate whereas usufruct includes all the uses and the fruits of the property.

c. Under Article 453 (1) of the Civil Code, if both parties are in bad faith, they shall be
treated as if they are both in good faith. The builder in bad faith has the limited right of removal,
this right can only be resorted if no injury is inflicted on the work constructed and right to
reimbursement for the value of materials.

II.

Marciano is correct.
According to Article 456 of the Civil Code, it is provided that, to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the waters.
In the case at bar, considering that accretion was deposited on Marciano’s land by the
natural occurrence in the waters of the river and the latter did not erect nor construct any
structure for purposes of increasing the deposition of soil and silt, Marciano automatically owns
the accretion. Moreover, the occupancy of Ulpiano and his children to the three (3) hectare
unregistered land owned by Marciano are undoubtedly possession not in the concept of an owner
but that of a concept of a holder taking into the consideration the fact that the same are tenants of
the said land based on the foregoing facts. Hence, their possession for more than 30 years is of
no moment since the law requires possession thereof in the concept of an owner. Payment of
taxes and tax declaration are not sufficient to make their possession one in the concept of owner.
III.

Cathy can validly demand for the demolition of Bobby's house.

According to the Civil Code, it is provided that none of the co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even though benefits for
all would results therefrom.
 In the case at bar, considering the fact that the construction of the house by Bobby was done
without the consent of his siblings, the alteration effected is illegal. Because of this, Bobby is
considered to be in bad faith and as a sanction for his conduct, he can be compelled by Cathy to
demolish or remove the said house at his own expense. In the same view, Bobby cannot legally
insist on purchasing the land since he is in bad faith, he will not be given the option to pay for the
price of the lot as mentioned in Article 450 of Civil Code.

IV.

No. Anthony did not yet acquire ownership of the property.

According to Article 526 (1) of the Civil Code, it is provided that, he is deemed a
possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it. In the same view, it is also provided under Article 1134 of the said law
that ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary
prescription through possession of ten years. The possession hereof shall be that of an owner and
strictly should be in good faith.

In the case at bar, Anthony is a possessor in good faith since he was not aware of the
defect in Bert's title and because of that Anthony may acquire ownership and other real rights
over the said property through open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of 10 years.
However, Anthony still needs seven more years of possession to add to his three years of
possession in good faith in order to acquire ownership of the property by acquisitive possession.

Hence, Anthony did not yet acquire the subject property since his possession thereof is
only for three years and it was not shown that he sought the recording of such sale to the Registry
of Property.

V.

a. Only Jenny can claim ownership over the additional one meter of land deposited along her
property.

According to Article 457 of the Civil Code, it is provided that, to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the water.
 In the case at bar, it was shown that Jessica constructed a concrete barrier about 2 meters
from here property line for purposes of extending the same, however, Jenny did not do the same
thing.

Hence, Jessica cannot legally claim ownership of the additional 2 meters of land along her
property because she constructed a concrete barrier about 2 meters from her property causing
deposits of soil and other materials when the water recedes. The increase in her property was not
caused by nature but was man-made.
b. If the properties of Jessica and Jenny are registered properties, the benefit of such
registration does not extend to the increased area of their properties. It is well-established by the
Court that accretion does not automatically become registered land as there must be a separate
application for the same due to the technicalities in the description of the lot.

VI.
a. Don did not acquire an easement of right of way.

According to the Civil Code, easement cannot be claimed by prescription if the said easement
is a discontinuous one. An example of which is a legal easement of a right of way. Only
continuous and apparent easements can be acquired by prescription of 10 years of uninterrupted
use and enjoyment.

In the case at bar, the easement involved is a right of way which is characterized by law as a
discontinuous easement. Don’s passage thereto was by mere acquiescence or tolerance of Ernie.

Concomitant to the said provision, Don cannot claim to have acquired the easement of right
of way by prescription, because this easement is discontinous although apparent.

b. Considering that there is no right of way existing to the land owned by Don, Don may
validly blocked the pathway and refuse to let his buyers pass through the his land.
However, the lot buyers may request Don to establish a right of way as voluntary easement
by entering into a contract with him, or file action to constitute a legal easement by proving
compliance with the four requisites for creating a legal easement of right of way under Articles
649 and 650 of the Civil Code.

VII.
Yes. A can abate extra-judicially the squatter’s hut on the ground that it is a nuisance.
According to the Supreme Court, a squatter’s hut, being an illegal construction constitutes a
public nuisance per se, if it poses problems of health and sanitation and if the squatter’s hut is
built on a private land and hinders or impairs the owner’s use of his or her own property, then it
would constitute a private nuisance.
 Moreover, according to Article 705 of the Civil Code, one of the remedies against a private
nuisance is abatement, without judicial proceedings and that in Article 706 of the same Code, it
tells that any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary by
destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or
doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extra-judicial
abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.

VIII.
a. As a lawyer of Jose, I will ask my client if he can settle the issues extra-judicially
considering the provisions under Article 448 of the Civil Code. If nothing happen, i will
request the barangay council which has jurisdiction over Mike and Jose to conduct a
barangay conciliation and mediation proceedings over the issues involved in the case at bar.
If no settlement was attained, in the interest of my client, i will file an ejectment case against
Mike before the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the properties located
within the Pasay City.
b. Yes. If I were the judge I would consider Mike as a builder in good faith.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that Mike deliberately built his house with a
knowledge that a portion thereof will encroached on Jose's lot. In addition, he cannot determine
the precise boundaries or location of his property by merely examining his title since he is not a
geodetic engineer or any professional to that effect.

Hence, in the absence of contrary proof, the law may presume that the encroachment done by
Mike was in good faith.

c. As a judge, I will abide by what Article 448 of the Civil Code provides.
According to the said law, it is the owner of the land who has the option or choice, not the
builder. The owner may choose between appropriation of what was built after payment of
indemnity, or to compel the builder to pay for the land if the value of the land is not considerably
more than that of the building. Otherwise, the builder shall pay rent for the portion of the land
encroached.
Concomitant to the above-mentioned law, Jose’s preference should be followed. He may
appropriate the building as his own or oblige Mike to buy the land.

IX.
Jose should prevail.
 According to Article 459 of the Civil Code, it is provided that, whenever the current of a
river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers
it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the
ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.
In the case at bar, the disputed area belongs, by right of accretion, to Jose, the riparian
owner. When the very same area was transferred by floodwaters to the opposite bank, it became
an avulsion and ownership thereof is retained by Jose who has two years to remove it. On the
other hand, Vicente’s claim based on prescription is not meritorious since his possession was by
mere tolerance of Jose and, therefore, did not adversely affect Jose’s possession and ownership
pursuant to Article 537 of the Civil Code. So long as Vicente’s possession is merely that of a
holder, he cannot validly acquire the disputed area by prescription.

X.
The complaint for cancellation of easement of right of way should be dismissed.
According to Article 617 of the Civil Code, easements are inseparable from the estate to
which they actively or passively belong. As an exception to the rule, Article 631 enumerated the
ways on how to extinguish easements, to wit: (1) By merger in the same person of the ownership
of the dominant and servient estates; (2) By non-use for ten years; with respect to discontinuous
easements, this period shall be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and,
with respect to continuous easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took
place; (3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be
used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again
permit its use, unless when the use become possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed,
in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number; (4) By the expiration of the term or
the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is temporary or conditional; (5) By the
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate; (6) By the redemption agreed upon between the
owners of the dominant and servient estates.
In the case at bar, although there was a failure to annotate the easement upon the title of the
servient estate however, the same is not among the grounds for extinguishing an easement. Once
easements attaches, it can only be extinguished under Article 631, and they will subsist despite
the fact that they are not stated or annotated as an encumbrance on the Torrens title of the
servient estate.

XI.
Ernesto is correct.
 Under Article 449 of the Civil Code, he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the
land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. In other words,
one who builds on the land of another loses what is built without right to indemnity.
In the case at bar, Demetrio is a builder in bad faith because he already knew that the land
belonged to Ernesto. As a result thereof, Ernesto becomes the owner of the nipa sheds by right of
accession. Hence, Ernesto is well within its right in refusing to allow the removal of the nipa
sheds.

XII.
Yes. Rachelle’s suit for reconveyance will prosper.
According to the rules, the proper time to file action for reconveyance is within one year
from the entry of the decree, however, if the action is based on fraud, rule on indefeasibility of
title will not apply instead the proper time to file the said action is four years from discovery of
such mistake or fraud.
In the case at bar, Rachelle’s contention was that there was fraud in the registration of land
sought by Rommel. It may be added also that Rommel may not be a buyer in good faith.
In view of the foregoing, Rachelle’s action for reconveyance may prosper.
XIII.
I would advise Manuel to file an application for registration under Sec 14 of Pres. Decree
No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree (PRD), specifically Sec14 (1) which requires (a)
that the land applied for forms part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain,
and (b) that the applicant has been in open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. In this case,
regardless if the land subject to registration was not an alienable and disposable land when it
occupied so long as at the time of the filing, the same is alienable and disposable land.

Manuel may also invoke Sec 14 (2) of the same Decree, which allows him to register the
subject land through ordinary acquisitive prescription for thirty years, provided, however, that
the land is patrimonial in character.
Manuel may also file an application for confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
through judicial legalization under Sec. 48 (b) of CA no. 141, or the Public Land Act (PLA).
Manuel may also invoke vested rights acquired under Rep. Act. No. 1942, dated June 2,
1957, which amended Sec. 48 (b) of the PLA by providing for a prescriptive period of thirty
years for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It must only be showed that possession and
occupation commenced on January 24, 1947 and the 30-year period was completed prior to the
effectivity of PD No. 1073 on January 25, 1977. PD No. 1073 now requires possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945.
Another alternative is for Manuel to secure title through administrative proceedings under
the homestead or free patent provisions of the PLA. The title issued has the same efficacy and
validity as a title issued through judicial proceedings, but with the limitations that the land cannot
be sold or disposed of within five years from the issuance of patent.

To show the classification of the land as alienable and disposable, the application must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification; and (2) a certified true copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary. A presidential or legislative act may
also be considered.