I.

a. Yes. The marriage between Harry and Elizabeth is valid.

According to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

In the case at bar, Wilma was already a foreign national having been naturalized
as a citizen of that small country in Europe when he got the divorce decree. Harry then,
is already capacitated to remarry when he married Elizabeth hence, their marriage is
valid.

b. I will advise Harry to dissolve and liquidate his property relation with Wilma as
soon as possible and petition the court to recognize the foreign divorce decree obtained
by Wilma in order that his capacity to remarry will no longer be questioned.

II.

a. As a judge, I will apply the doctrine of processual presumption.

According to the rules, the doctrine of processual presumption refers to the right
of the court to presume that in the absence of the proof, the alleged foreign laws shall
be treated as the same as that of the laws in the Philippines.
In the case at bar, Chin alleged that under the laws of China, village leader has
authority to solemnize marriage however she failed to present evidence supporting her
allegations hence, the court will presume that the laws of China with respect to
solemnization of marriage is the same as that of Philippine marriage laws which
however provides that village leader is not among those who are authorized to
solemnize marriage hence, we apply Article 35 of the Family Code, which says that
marriages solemnized by a person not authorized to do so shall render the marriage
void.

b. The marriage between Chin and Jon is valid.

According to the Article 35 of the Family Code, when one or both of the
contracting parties believe in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so where in fact the same has none, the marriage will still be valid.
 In the case at bar, Chin and Jon did not have an idea that the authority of the
Baptist minister who solemnized their marriage was already expired a month before the
celebration of their marriage. This will not be case of ignorance of the law since Chin
and Jon relied on the fact that the Baptist minister has the authority to solemnize
marriage which is provided under Article 7 of the Family Code.
Hence, their marriage is valid.

III.

a. Gemma’s suit will not prosper.

According to the Supreme Court, it is not enough to prove the commission of the
acts or the existence of abnormal behavior. It must be shown that those said acts or
behavior was manifestation of a serious mental disorder and that it is the root cause
why he was not able to perform the essential duties of married life. It must also be
shown that such psychological incapacity, as manifested in those acts or that behavior,
was existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In the case at bar, there was no showing that Arnell was suffering from a
manifestation of that disorder, that his behavior was a manifestation of that disorder,
and that such disorder prevented him from complying with duties as a married person.

Hence, the acts of Arnell complained about do not by themselves constitute

psychological incapacity.

b. Still no.

According to the Court, statement of expert witness conforming to the alleged

suffering of the spouse’s personality disorder may be given great weight however, such
statements alone will not render the marriage void on the ground of psychological
incapacity since there are other matters to consider. It must be shown that those said
acts or behavior was manifestation of a serious mental disorder and that it is the root
cause why he was not able to perform the essential duties of married life. It must also
be shown that such psychological incapacity, as manifested in those acts or that
behavior, was existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

IV.

a. No. John is not correct.

 According to Article 45 of the Family Code, impotence may be a ground for
annulment of marriage if either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable and
under Article 47 of the same Code, the period to file for such action shall be within 5
years from the celebration of the marriage however failure to do so shall not render the
marriage ratified since this ground is not subject of ratification.

In the case at bar, Marsha filed an action to annul their marriage on the ground
of impotency at the end of the 2 nd year of their marriage. The action was filed within
the five year prescriptive period. However, even if no action was filed, the marriage
cannot be ratified.

Thus, John’s contention is not correct.

b. No.

According to the Supreme Court, in case the potent spouse is aware of the
impotency of his or her spouse before the celebration of their marriage, it is implied
that he/she renounced copulation by consenting to the marriage, hence, he may be
estopped from filing the action.

V.

a. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, Salaries and wages, properties acquired
by both through work and industry and properties presumed to be acquired jointly while
living together, shall be divided equally while properties acquired through exclusive
funds shall remain exclusive to either parties.

b. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, Salaries and wages shall be separately
owned by parties, properties acquired through exclusive funds shall remain exclusive,
properties acquired by both through work and industry shall be owned in common in
proportion to respective contribution however, there will be no presumption of joint
acquisition as to the properties acquired while living together.

c. No. In so far as Art. 148 of the Family Code is concern, properties

acquired while living together shall not be presumed as joint acquisition and such will
not be offset by efforts of the other in the care and maintenance of the family and
household.
 d. The properties shall be divided depending upon the ground for
termination of marriage. In case of death, Article 103 of the Family Code will apply, in
case of Legal Separation, Articles 63 and 64 will apply and in case of Annulment or
judicial declaration of nullity, Articles 50 and 52 will apply.

VI.
a. Ed is the father of Alvin because Alvin was conceived and born during the
marriage of his mother to Ed. Under the law, the child born during the marriage of the
mother to her husband is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband. While it is
true that there was no written consent by the husband to the artificial insemination,
absence of such consent may only give the husband a ground to impugn the legitimacy
of the child but will not prevent the child from acquiring the status of legitimate child of
the husband at the same time of its birth.

b. Under the Family Code, Children born out of a bigamous marriage shall be
considered illegitimate.

Hence, Alvin is an illegitimate child and Andy is his biological father.

VII.
Yes, Joey has such a cause of action against Tintin.
While the Family Code has repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on proof of
filiation, said repel did not impair vested rights. Under the Civil Code, as an illegitimate
child may file an action to compel his recognition even after the death of the putative
father when the father died during the minority of the child. While the Family Code has
repealed this provision, it will not operate to prejudice those who has already acquired a
vested right thereto.
In the case at bar, Joey was born an illegitimate child in 1981. As an illegitimate
child, he had acquired, at birth, the right to prove his filiation in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code in force at that time.

VIII.
a. Yes, the position of the government is tenable.
Foreigners are disqualified to adopt unless they fall in any of the exceptions
provided for in the law.
 Eva and Paul are both foreigners. Eva, falls in one of the exceptions. She is
qualified to adopt because she is a former Filipino citizen who wishes to adopt a
relative by consanguinity. Unfortunately, Paul is not qualified to adopt because he
does not fall in any of the exceptions. Hence, they cannot adopt jointly. When
husband and wife are adopting jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt in
their own right. Eva cannot, alone by herself, adopt her niece because husband and
wife must adopt jointly unless they fall in any exceptions provided for in the law.
They cannot adopt separately because they do not fall in any of the exceptions.
Hence, whether separately or jointly, Eva and Paul cannot adopt Vicky in the
Philippines.

b. No, my answer would be different.

Eva is qualified to adopt her illegitimate daughter, because she falls in one of her
exceptions that allow foreigners to adopt. She is a former Filipino citizen adopting her
relative by consanguinity. Eva can adopt separately her illegitimate child because her
case is also an exception to the rule that husband and wife should adopt jointly.

IX.
As a judge, I would rule that the first marriage settlement was valid because it
was in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the
marriage. Second, the subsequent agreement of the parties was void as a modification
of their marriage settlement. To be valid, the modification must be executed before the
celebration of the marriage. The subsequent agreement of the parties did not effect a
dissolution of their conjugal partnership and a separation of their properties because it
was not approved by the court. To be valid, an agreement by the parties to dissolve
their conjugal partnership and to separate properties during the marriage has to be
approved by the court.
Considering that the marriage settlement was binding between the parties,
conjugal partnership of gains was the regime of their property relations. Under the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains, all properties acquired by the spouses during
the marriage, jointly or by either one of them, through their work or industry are
conjugal. Therefore, the residential house and lot, and the condominium unit are
conjugal having been jointly acquired by the couple during the marriage. Inasmuch as
the subsequent agreement on dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of
property was invalid, conjugal partnership subsisted between the parties. Therefore,
the mansion and the agricultural land are also conjugal having been acquired by one of
the spouses during the marriage.
 The marriage settlement cannot prejudice third parties, such as the creditors,
because it was not registered with the local civil registered with the local civil registrar
where the marriage was recorded. To bind third parties, the Family Code requires
registration of the marriage settlement not only with the proper register of deeds but
also with the local civil registrar where the marriage was recorded. Hence, if the rules
on conjugal partnership will prejudice the creditors, the rules on absolute community
will be applied instead. However, insofar as debts contracted by one spouse without the
consent of the other are concerned, the rule is the same for both conjugal partnership
and absolute community. The partnership or community is liable for debts contracted
by one spouse but only to the extent that it benefited to the family. Therefore, if the
debts contracted by Mila redounded to the benefit of the family, all the conjugal
partnership properties are liable to pay them but only to the extent the family was
benefited. The separate properties of Mila may be held answerable for Mila’s debts and
obligations that did not redound to the benefit of the family.

X.
Both parents of Sam and Cathy shall be held liable for damages.
According to Article 221 of the Family Code, parents and other persons
exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their personal authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law.