DELICT the amount of P608,532.46.

 Respondent Villegas for estafa without having reserved the filing of the
entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an civil action.
FIRST DIVISION
employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit
with the teller of petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent The Courts Ruling
[G.R. No. 129282. November 29, 2001] Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a On the first issue, Circular No. 28-91 [10] of the
complaint[3] against Carmen Mandawe and Supreme Court requires a certificate of non-forum
DMPI-ECCI), petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and shopping to be attached to petitions filed before
M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, damages with preliminary attachment arising out the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This
Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought circular was revised on February 8, 1994[11] by
VILLEGAS, respondents. the dismissal of the civil case on the following extending the requirement to all initiatory
grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal case pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial
DECISION in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, agencies other than the Supreme Court and the
and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a Court of Appeals.
PARDO, J.: certification against forum shopping as required
by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.[4] Respondent Villegas failure to attach a
certificate of non-forum shopping in her complaint
The Case On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued did not violate Circular No. 28-91, because at the
an order[5] dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94- time of filing, the requirement applied only to
214. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the
In this special civil action for certiorari, motion for reconsideration[6] of the order. Court of Appeals.[12] Likewise, Administrative
petitioner DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative, Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable for the reason
Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the annulment of the On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued
an order[7] granting respondents motion for that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994,
order[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis three days before April 1, 1994, the date of
Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of effectivity of the circular.[13]
reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, the case.
and thus reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Hence, this petition.[8] On the second issue, as a general rule, an
Case No. CV-94-214. offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first
is the social injury produced by the criminal act
which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition
The Issues
The Facts of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the
personal injury caused to the victim of the crime
The issues raised are: (1) whether the which injury is sought to be compensated through
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting plaintiffs failure to attach a certification against indemnity which is civil in nature.[14]
attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, forum shopping in the complaint is a ground to
Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for dismiss the case;[9] and, (2) whether the civil case Thus, every person criminally liable for a
[2]
estafa  against Carmen Mandawe for alleged could proceed independently of the criminal case felony is also civilly liable."[15] This is the law
failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas governing the recovery of civil liability arising
from the commission of an offense. Civil liability right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed
includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, action prior to the criminal action.[17] independently even if there was no reservation as
and indemnification of consequential damages.[16] to its filing.
There is no more need for a reservation of the
The offended party may prove the civil right to file the independent civil actions under
liability of an accused arising from the Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
The Fallo
commission of the offense in the criminal case the Philippines. The reservation and waiver
since the civil action is either deemed instituted referred to refers only to the civil action for the
with the criminal action or is separately instituted. recovery of the civil liability arising from the WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of petition. The Court AFFIRMS the order dated
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of February 21, 1997.[20]
Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the
December 1, 2000, provides that: No costs.
same act or omission which may be prosecuted
separately even without a reservation.[18] SO ORDERED.
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising Rule 111, Section 3 reads: Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
from the offense charged shall be deemed Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
instituted with the criminal action unless the Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the independently. In the cases provided in Articles
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Republic of the Philippines
action prior to the criminal action. [Emphasis Philippines, the independent civil action may be SUPREME COURT
supplied] brought by the offended party. It shall proceed Manila
independently of the criminal action and shall
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that  require only a preponderance of evidence. In no SECOND DIVISION
case, however, may the offended party recover
After the criminal action has been damages twice for the same act or omission G.R. No. 165496             February 12, 2007
commenced, the separate civil action arising charged in the criminal action.
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner, 
has been entered in the criminal action. [Emphasis The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal vs.
supplied] Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.
which became effective on December 1, 2000 are
However, with respect to civil actions for applicable to this case. DECISION
recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34
Procedural laws may be given retroactive
and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same CARPIO MORALES, J.:
effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
act or omission, the rule has been changed.
time of their passage. There are no vested rights in
Under the present rule, only the civil liability the rules of procedure.[19]
arising from the offense charged is deemed
Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an
instituted with the criminal action unless the
independent civil action for damages on account
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
of the fraud commited against respondent Villegas
Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court
of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated May 20,
20041 and September 28, 20042 in CA G.R.
CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and
denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.
In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000,
respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine
National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated
August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000
which was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds.
Upon arraignment, respondent, with the
assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to
the offense charged. Following the pre-trial
conference, the prosecution presented its
evidence-in-chief.
After the prosecution rested its case,
respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court
to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he
attached his Demurrer, asserting that the
prosecution failed to prove that he received
the notice of dishonor, hence, the
presumption of the element of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds did not arise.4
By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati,
Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and
dismissed the case. The prosecution’s Motion
for Reconsideration was denied.6
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect 7 of the
case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, contending that the dismissal of the Municipal [sic] Trial Court’s Order dismissing
criminal case should not include its civil Criminal Case No. 294690) as would support
aspect. the allegations of the petition (Sec. 2, Rule
42, ibid.).
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch
60 of the RTC held that while the evidence 3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of
presented was insufficient to prove the Regional Trial Court attached to the
respondent’s criminal liability, it did not petition is an uncertified and illegible mere
altogether extinguish his civil liability. It machine copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule
accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner 42, ibid.).
and ordered respondent to pay him the
amount of P1,875,000 with legal interest.8 4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of
the Philippines as party-respondent in the
Upon respondent’s motion for petition.10
reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside
its decision and ordered the remand of the In his present petition, petitioner assails the
case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so above-stated reasons of the appellate court in
that the defendant [-respondent herein] may dismissing his petition.
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case."9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration The manner of verification for pleadings
of the remand of the case having been which are required to be verified, such as a
denied, he elevated the case to the CA which, petition for review before the CA of an
by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his appellate judgment of the RTC,11 is
petition for the following reasons: prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court:
1. The verification and certification of non-
forum shopping attached to the petition does Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise
not fully comply with Section 4, as amended specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules need not be under oath, verified or
of Court, because it does not give the accompanied by affidavit.
assurance that the allegations of the petition
are true and correct based on authentic A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the
records. affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his
2. The petition is not accompanied by copies personal knowledge or based on authentic
of certain pleadings and other material records.
portions of the record, (i.e., motion for leave
to file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to A pleading required to be verified which
evidence and the opposition thereto, and the contains a verification based on "information
and belief," or upon "knowledge, information Contrary to petitioner’s position, the range of fair results are to be expected therefrom.
and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall permutation is not left to the pleader’s liking, Utter disregard of the rules cannot just be
be treated as an unsigned but is dependent on the surrounding nature of rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
12
pleading. (Emphasis and underscoring the allegations which may warrant that a construction.20 While the requirement is not
supplied) verification be based either purely on jurisdictional in nature, it does not make it
personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic less a rule. A relaxed application of the rule
Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a records, or on both sources. can only be justified by the attending
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and circumstances of the case.21
independence, hence, he chose to affirm in As pointed out by respondent, "authentic
his petition he filed before the court a quo that records" as a basis for verification bear To sustain petitioner’s explanation that the
its contents are "true and correct of my own significance in petitions wherein the greater basis of verification is a matter of simple
personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis portions of the allegations are based on the preference would trivialize the rationale and
of authentic documents. records of the proceedings in the court of diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would
origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely play on predilection and pay no heed in
On the other hand, respondent counters that on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. providing enough assurance of the
the word "or" may be interpreted in a To illustrate, petitioner himself could not have correctness of the allegations.
conjunctive sense and construed to mean as affirmed, based on his personal knowledge,
"and," or vice versa, when the context of the the truthfulness of the statement in his On the second reason of the CA in dismissing
law so warrants. petition16 before the CA that at the pre-trial the petition – that the petition was not
conference respondent admitted having accompanied by copies of certain pleadings
A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of received the letter of demand, because he and other material portions of the record as
Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be (petitioner) was not present during the would support the allegations of the petition
verified under either of the two given modes conference.17 Hence, petitioner needed to rely (i.e., Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
or under both. The veracity of the allegations on the records to confirm its veracity. Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the
in a pleading may be affirmed based on either Opposition thereto, and the MeTC February
one’s own personal knowledge or on Verification is not an empty ritual or a 27, 2003 Order dismissing the case) –
authentic records, or both, as warranted. The meaningless formality. Its import must never petitioner contends that these documents are
use of the preposition "or" connotes that be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience immaterial to his appeal.
either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the
verification and, needless to state, the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an Contrary to petitioner’s contention, however,
concurrence of both sources is more than oath18to secure an assurance that the the materiality of those documents is very
sufficient.14 Bearing both a disjunctive and allegations in the pleading have been made in apparent since the civil aspect of the case,
conjunctive sense, this parallel legal good faith, or are true and correct and not from which he is appealing, was likewise
signification avoids a construction that will merely speculative.19 dismissed by the trial court on account of the
exclude the combination of the alternatives or same Demurrer.
bar the efficacy of any one of the alternatives This Court has strictly been enforcing the
standing alone.15 requirement of verification and certification Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he
and enunciating that obedience to the subsequently submitted to the CA copies of
requirements of procedural rules is needed if the enumerated documents, save for
the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order, as Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse the dual purpose of a criminal action, this
attachments to his Motion for to him even with respect to the civil aspect of Court ruled:
Reconsideration. the case, petitioner was mandated to submit
them in the required form.23 Unless the offended party waives the civil
The Rules, however, require that the petition action or reserves the right to institute it
must "be accompanied by clearly legible In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance separately or institutes the civil action prior to
duplicate original or true copies of the with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, the criminal action, there are two actions
judgments or final orders of both lower courts, the mandatory tenor of which is discernible involved in a criminal case. The first is the
certified correct by the clerk of court."22 thereunder and is well settled.24 He has not, criminal action for the punishment of the
however, advanced any strong compelling offender. The parties are the People of the
A perusal of the petition filed before the CA reasons to warrant a relaxation of the Rules, Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In
shows that the only duplicate original or hence, his petition before the CA was a criminal action, the private complainant is
certified true copies attached as annexes correctly dismissed. merely a witness for the State on the criminal
thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order aspect of the action. The second is the civil
granting respondent’s Motion for Procedural rules are tools designed to action arising from the delict. The private
Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004 facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is
RTC Order denying petitioner’s Motion for and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of
Reconsideration. The copy of the September strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in the two cases to avoid multiplicity of
11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner some instances, allows a relaxation in the suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)
prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true application of the rules, this we stress, was
copy and is not even legible. Petitioner later never intended to forge a bastion for erring It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted
recompensed though by appending to his litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The respondent.27 As a rule, a judgment of
Motion for Reconsideration a duplicate liberality in the interpretation and application acquittal is immediately final and executory
original copy. of the rules applies only in proper cases and and the prosecution cannot appeal the
under justifiable causes and acquittal because of the constitutional
While petitioner averred before the CA in his circumstances. While it is true that litigation is prohibition against double jeopardy.
Motion for Reconsideration that the February not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
27, 2003 MeTC Order was already attached that every case must be prosecuted in Either the offended party or the accused may,
to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G" bares accordance with the prescribed procedure to however, appeal the civil aspect of the
a replicate copy of a different order, however. insure an orderly and speedy administration judgment despite the acquittal of the accused.
It was to this Court that petitioner belatedly of justice.25 (Emphasis supplied) The public prosecutor has generally no
submitted an uncertified true copy of the said interest in appealing the civil aspect of a
MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to As to the third reason for the appellate court’s decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal
respondent’s Comment. dismissal of his petition – failure to implead ends his work. The case is terminated as far
the People of the Philippines as a party in the as he is concerned. The real parties in
This Court in fact observes that the copy of petition – indeed, as petitioner contends, the interest in the civil aspect of a decision are
the other MeTC Order, that dated May 5, same is of no moment, he having appealed the offended party and the accused.28
2003, which petitioner attached to his petition only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on
before the CA is similarly uncertified as true.
Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of action that the act or omission from which the the case unless the court also declares that
merit. civil liability may arise did not exist.33 the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.36
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with
leave of court, the whole case is submitted for leave of court, the accused may adduce In the instant case, the MeTC granted the
judgment on the basis of the evidence for the countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer and dismissed the case without any
prosecution as the accused is deemed to demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction finding that the act or omission from which the
have waived the right to present as to the two aspects of the case because civil liability may arise did not exist.
evidence.29 At that juncture, the court is called there is a disparity of evidentiary value
upon to decide the case including its civil between the quanta of evidence in such Respondent did not assail the RTC order of
aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil aspects of the case. In other words, a court remand. He thereby recognized that there is
liability by a separate civil action has been may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal basis for a remand.
waived or reserved.30 aspect and at the same time grant the
demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the Indicatively, respondent stands by his
If the filing of a separate civil action has not evidence so far presented is not insufficient to defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000
been reserved or priorly instituted or the prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, with the remainder representing the interest,
enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the then the same evidence is likewise not and that he already made a partial payment
trial court should, in case of conviction, state insufficient to establish civil liability by mere of P1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however,
the civil liability or damages caused by the preponderance of evidence. that the payments made by respondent
wrongful act or omission to be recovered from pertained to other transactions.37 Given these
the accused by the offended party, if there is On the other hand, if the evidence so far conflicting claims which are factual, a remand
any.31 presented is insufficient as proof beyond of the case would afford the fullest
reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still same evidence is insufficient to establish a the trial court to resolve the same.
be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the preponderance of evidence. For if the court
penal action does not carry with it the grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil Petitioner finally posits that respondent
extinction of the civil action where (a) the aspect of the case generally proceeds. The waived his right to present evidence on the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only recognized instance when an acquittal civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of
only preponderance of evidence is required; on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing
(b) the court declares that the liability of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the Section 1 of Rule 33,38 and (2) when
accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability act or omission from which the civil liability respondent orally opposed petitioner’s motion
of the accused does not arise from or is not may arise did not exist. Absent such for reconsideration pleading that proceedings
based upon the crime of which the accused determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the with respect to the civil aspect of the case
was acquitted.32 case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, continue.
in Salazar v. People,35 held:
The civil action based on delict may, Petitioner’s position is tenuous.
however, be deemed extinguished if there is If demurrer is granted and the accused is
a finding on the final judgment in the criminal acquitted by the court, the accused has the Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of incorrect.1awphi1.net Where a court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over Costs against petitioner. The case had its origins in the filing of an
the person of the accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the SO ORDERED. Information[4] on 29 December 2004 by the
court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over Provincial Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros
all issues that the law requires it to resolve. SECOND DIVISION
JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, G.R. No. 177960 Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso
One of the issues in a criminal case being the Petitioner, Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence
civil liability of the accused arising from the Present:
resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical
crime, the governing law is the Rules  
of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil QUISUMBING, J., Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent
Procedure which pertains to a civil action Chairperson, portion of the information reads:
arising from the initiatory pleading that gives - versus - CORONA,*
rise to the suit.39 CARPIO MORALES,   
TINGA, and  That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening
As for petitioner’s attribution of waiver to CHICO-NAZARIO,** JJ. of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan,
respondent, it cannot be determined with PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the
certainty from the records the nature of the GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE Promulgated: jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
alleged oral objections of respondent to SY and DEXIE DURAN, named accused, did then and there, willfully,
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Respondents. January 29, 2009 unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and
grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver x----------------------------------------------------------- imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with
of the right to present evidence must be ----------------x plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded
positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the   with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name
voluntariness of the waiver is frowned D E C I S I O N  of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona,
upon,40 hence, courts must indulge every   Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a
reasonable presumption against it.41 TINGA, J.: Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by
  Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female
This Court therefore upholds respondent’s Before us is a petition for review [1] on certiorari of passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy,
right to present evidence as reserved by his thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou
filing of leave of court to file the demurrer. the Decision[2] dated 17 August 2006 and Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries
on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and
Resolution[3] dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt
foregoing discussions, DENIED. Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina
entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete
The case is REMANDED to the court of Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou
origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended
Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap. parties above-mentioned.
set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further    
proceedings only for the purpose of receiving An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the
evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Revised Penal Code.
 
 
 
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental,
petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty
to the charge.[5]
 
On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P.
Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran
filed a motion for leave of court to file an
amended information.[6] They sought to add the
allegation of abandonment of the victims by
petitioner, thus: The driver of the 10-wheeler
cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a time when
said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside
the car; he was only extracted from the car by the
by-standers.[7]
 
On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial
Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that
the motion to amend the information be
considered withdrawn.[8] On 21 January 2003, the
MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to
amend was considered withdrawn.[9]
 
Pre-trial and trial of the case  
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can
proceeded. Respondents testified for the this Court find that it was the accused who
prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses
have never identified the accused as the one who
case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to has committed the crime. The prosecution never
evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused
who committed the crime or asked questions
Demurrer to Evidence[10] dated 15 April
which would have proved the elements of the
2005 grounded on the prosecutions failure to crime. The prosecution did not even establish if
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is indeed it was the accused who was driving the
truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply
criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to cannot find any evidence which would prove that
which respondents filed a Comment [11] dated 25 a crime has been committed and that the accused
is the person responsible for it. There was no
April 2005.
evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou
  Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate
In the Order  dated 16 May 2005, the that was offered in evidence. The alleged less
[12]
serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie
MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no
petitioner of the crime of reckless medical certificate was presented to state the same
nor was a doctor presented to establish such
imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant
presented by respondents failed to establish the was also not established in any manner as no
allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions witness ever testified on this aspect and no
documentary evidence was also presented to state
of the order state:  the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to
  establish if indeed it was the accused who was
An examination of the allegations in the responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong
information and comparing the same with the and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy,
evidence presented by the prosecution would including the damage to the Colt Galant. The
reveal that the evidence presented has not mother of the victim testified only on the expenses
established said allegations. The facts and she incurred and the shock she and her family
circumstances constituting the allegations charged have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad to
have not been proven. It is elementary in the rules say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the
of evidence that a party must prove his own accused who committed the crime and be held
affirmative allegations. responsible for it. This Court could only say that
xxxx the prosecution has practically bungled this case
from its inception.
 
x x x x  xxxx
 
The defense furthermore argued that on the
contrary, the prosecutions [evidence] conclusively
show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt
Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is
the proximate cause of the accident. The court
again is inclined to agree with this argument of the
defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of
the accident as indicated in the police blotter and
can only conclude that the logical explanation of
the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane
of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latters inner fender
and tires. Exhibit 7 which is a picture of vehicle 2
shows the extent of its damage which was the
effect of vehicle 1s ramming into the rear left
portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide
of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled
out together with their axle. The cutting of the
differential guide cause[d] the entire housing
connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse,
thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and
swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this
accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any
negligent act of the accused.
 
xxxx
Every criminal conviction requires of the
prosecution to prove two things; the fact of the
crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the
crime for which the accused stands charged, and
the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the
crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably
failed to prove these two things. When the
prosecution fails to discharge its burden of
establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused
need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
  ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for
  further proceedings on the civil aspect of the
  case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs recital of
 
  every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved
  the allegation that it failed to consider the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer
evidence presented by the prosecution. The
is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO
DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of records also demonstrated that the MTC
evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary conducted the trial of the case in the manner
liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered
released to the accused or his duly authorized dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of
representative. Court, except that the defense no longer presented
 
its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the
SO ORDERED.[13]
  accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which
 Respondents thereafter filed a petition for is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC
certiorari under Rule 65,[14] alleging that the MTCs however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the
dismissal of the case was done without accuseds civil liability, especially since the
considering the evidence adduced by the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration
prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC that the facts from which the civil liability might
failed to observe the manner the trial of the case arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the
should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and
of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The
the civil liability of the accused in spite of the dispositive portion of the decision states:
evidence presented. The case was raffled to the  
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental,
Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accuseds
Br. 32. acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is
  REMANDED to the court of origin or its
successor for further proceedings on the civil
In the order[15] dated 23 August 2005, the aspect of the case. No costs.
RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but  
SO ORDERED.[16]
   corresponding penalty for the physical injuries RTCs jurisdiction over the case. However, the
  charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
Both parties filed their motions for Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution
reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which dated 25 April 2007.[21] It reiterated that it is the
denied for lack of merit in the order[17] dated 12 govern the summary procedure in first-level courts RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that
September 2005. in offenses involving damage to property through the information alleged a willful, unlawful,
 
  criminal negligence where the imposable fine does felonious killing as well as abandonment of the
Respondents then filed a petition for review with not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of victims.
the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as the total value of the property damaged and  
CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court respondents were claiming the amount In the present petition for review, petitioner argues
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and of P1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal
resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there within the RTCs jurisdiction. The dispositive case for reckless imprudence, owing to the
being no proof of the total value of the properties portion of the Decision dated 17 August enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,
[22]
damaged, the criminal case falls under 2006 reads:  which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts
the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings   on offenses involving damage to property through
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could
before the MTC are  hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a
Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended
  of the merits of the case.
information alleging abandonment. Respondents
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court  
SO ORDERED.[19] are also faulted for challenging the MTCs order
cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case
  acquitting petitioner through a special civil action
is Cuyos v. Garcia)[18] which ruled that in complex
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary
crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in
of Appeals decision,[20] arguing that jurisdiction appeal under Rule 42.
homicide or physical injuries and damage to
over the case is determined by the allegations in  
property, the jurisdiction of the court to take
the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on The petition has merit. It should be granted.
cognizance of the case is determined by the fine
Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary  
imposable for the damage to property resulting
Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the
from the reckless imprudence, not by the
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals any act which, had it been intentional, would deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).[25] Thus, the penalty
erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense constitute a grave felony, with the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found
charged pertained to the RTC. of arresto mayor in its maximum period guilty, is prision correccional in its medium
  to prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years)
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded period. When such reckless imprudence the use of and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day
with the case on the basis of the Information a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person to 6 years).
dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only attended the same article imposes upon the  
with the complex crime of reckless imprudence defendant the penalty of prision correccional in Applicable as well is the familiar rule that
resulting to homicide, less serious physical its medium and maximum periods. the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a
injuries and damage to property. The Court of   case is conferred by the law in force at the time of
Appeals however declared in its decision that The offense with which petitioner was the institution of the action, unless such statute
petitioner should have been charged with the same charged is reckless imprudence resulting in provides for a retroactive application thereof.
[26]
offense but aggravated by the circumstance of homicide, less serious physical injuries and  When this case was filed on 29 December
abandonment of the victims. It appears from the damage to property, a complex crime. Where a 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang
records however that respondents attempt to reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two 129 had already been amended by R.A. No.
amend the information by charging the aggravated or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of
offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had crime is committed.[24] Article 48 of the Revised the first-level courts over criminal cases to include
approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to Penal Code provides that when the single act all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
withdraw their motion to amend the constitutes two or more grave or less grave exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount
information. The information filed before the trial felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of fine, and regardless of other imposable
court had remained unamended.[23] Thus, petitioner for committing the other, the penalty for the most accessory or other penalties including those for
is deemed to have been charged only with the serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be civil liability. It explicitly states
offense alleged in the original Information without applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 that in offenses involving damage to property
any aggravating circumstance. speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through criminal negligence, they shall have exclu
  through negligence in view of the definition of sive original
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes felonies in Article 3 as acts or omissions jurisdiction thereof. It follows that criminal cases f
any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits punishable by law committed either by means of or reckless
imprudence punishable with prision evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still  
correccional  in its medium and maximum periods reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of The second issue is whether the Court of
should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and the Rules of Court.Thus, in such case, the factual Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case
not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the of the matter of civil liability for the reception of
hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse evidence.
the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer  
criminal case.[27] Consequently, the MTC of to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial We disagree with the Court of Appeals on
Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave directing the remand of the case to the RTC for
cognizance of the case and the proceedings before abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as
it were valid and legal. jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the
  rendering the assailed judgment void.[30] MTC.
As the records show, the MTC granted    
petitioners demurrer to evidence and acquitted him Accordingly, respondents filed before the  
of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the  
evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing  
cases, such as the one at bar, is filed after the the case and failing to consider the evidence of the The acquittal of the accused does not
prosecution had rested its case, and when the same prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly automatically preclude a judgment against him on
is granted, it calls for an appreciation of the failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and its by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled penal action does not carry with it the extinction
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance
case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of conclusions were based on facts diligently recited of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that
the accused.[28] Such dismissal of a criminal case in the order thereby disproving that the MTC the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the
by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be failed to consider the evidence presented by the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or
appealed, for to do so would be to place the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC is not based upon the crime of which the accused
accused in double jeopardy.[29] But while the correctly followed the procedure set forth in the is acquitted. [31] However, the civil action based on
dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to Rules of Court. delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal findings that the act or omission from which the WHEREFORE, the petition is
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
civil liability may arise did not exist [32] or where petitioner did not commit the acts or omission dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are
imputed to him.[33] has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16
  be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan,
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the cannot find any evidence which would prove that Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04
accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has a crime had been committed and that accused was granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting
the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the person responsible for it. It added that the petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense
the case unless the court also declares that the act prosecution failed to establish that it was charged therein is REINSTATED and
or omission from which the civil liability may petitioner who committed the crime as charged AFFIRMED.
arise did not exist.[34] This is because when the since its witnesses never identified petitioner as  
accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not the one who was driving the cargo truck at the SO ORDERED.
yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found  
civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on that the proximate cause of the accident is the
 QUASI – DELICT
record is the evidence for the prosecution. What damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by
the trial court should do is issue an order or partial the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left SUPREME COURT
Manila
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless
acquitting the accused, and set the case for driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly EN BANC
continuation of trial for the accused to adduce establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless
G.R. No. L-19495             February 2, 1924
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the imprudence.Consequently, there is no more need
private complainant to adduce evidence by way of to remand the case to the trial court for HONORIO LASAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellants, 
rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since vs.
judgment on the civil aspect of the case.[35] petitioners acquittal has extinguished his civil FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellant.
  liability.
Palma and Leuterio for plaintiffs-appellants.
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports Mariano Alisangco for defendant-appellant.
the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the
  OSTRAND, J.:
The plaintiff are husband and wife and this The defendant, in his testimony, maintains applicable. The court further found that the
action is brought to recover damages in the that there was no defect in the steering gear, breach of the contract was not due to
sum of P20,000 for physical injuries sustained neither before nor after the accident, and fortuitous events and that, therefore, the
by them in an automobile accident. The trial expresses the opinion that the swaying or defendant was liable in damages.
court rendered a judgment in their favor for zigzagging of the car must have been due to
the sum of P1,254.10, with legal interest from its having been driven at an excessive rate of In our opinion, the conclusions of the court
the date of the judgment. Both the plaintiffs speed. This may possibly be true, but it is, below are entirely correct. That upon the facts
and the defendant appeal, the former from our point of view, immaterial whether the stated the defendant's liability, if any, is
maintaining that the damages awarded are accident was caused by negligence on the contractual, is well settled by previous
insufficient while the latter denies all liability
part of the defendant's employees, or whether decisions of the court, beginning with the
for any damages whatever. it was due to defects in the automobile; the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.
result would be practically the same in either (7 Phil., 359), and the distinction between
It appears from the evidence that on February event. extra-contractual liability and contractual
27, 1918, the defendant was the owner of a liability has been so ably and exhaustively
public garage in the town of San Fernando, In going over the bank of the road, the discussed in various other cases, that nothing
La Union, and engaged in the business of automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs further need here be said upon that subject.
carrying passengers for hire from the one pinned down under it. Mr. Lasam escaped (See Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38
point to another in the Province of La Union with a few contusions and a "dislocated" rib , Phil., 768; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compania
and the surrounding provinces. On the date but his wife, Joaquina Sanchez, received Trasatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.,
mentioned, he undertook to convey the serious injuries, among which was a 38 Phil., 875; De Guia vs. Manila Electric
plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, compound fracture of one of the bones in her Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706.) It is
Ilocos Norte, in a Ford automobile. On leaving left wrist. She also appears to have suffered a sufficient to reiterate that the source of the
San Fernando, the automobile was operated nervous breakdown from which she had not defendant's legal liability is the contract of
by a licensed chauffeur, but after having fully recovered at the time of the trial. carriage; that by entering into that contract he
reached the town of San Juan, the chauffeur bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and
allowed his assistant, Remigio Bueno, to The complaint in the case was filed about a securely to their destination; and that having
drive the car. Bueno held no driver's license, year and a half after the occurrence above failed to do so he is liable in damages unless
but had some experience in driving, and with related. It alleges, among other things, that he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation
the exception of some slight engine trouble the accident was due to defects in the was due to causes mentioned in article 1105
while passing through the town of Luna, the automobile as well as to the incompetence of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
car functioned well until after the crossing of and negligence of the chauffeur, and the case
the Abra River in Tagudin, when, according to appears to have been tried largely upon the No one shall be liable for events which could
the testimony of the witnesses for the theory that it sounds in tort and that the not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen,
plaintiffs, defects developed in the steering liability of the defendant is governed by article were inevitable, with the exception of the
gear so as to make accurate steering 1903 of the Civil Code. The trial court held, cases in which the law expressly provides
impossible, and after zigzagging for a however, that the cause of action rests on the otherwise and those in which the obligation
distance of about half a kilometer, the car left defendant's breach of the contract of carriage itself imposes such liability.
the road and went down a steep and that, consequently, articles 1101-1107 of
embankment. the Civil Code, and not article 1903, are
This brings us to the principal question in the characteristics: (1) The cause of the In that case Alba, a passenger on a street
case: unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of car, was standing on the platform of the car
the failure of the debtor to comply with his while it was in motion. The car rounded a
What is meant by "events which cannot be obligation, must be independent of the human curve causing Alba to lose his balance and
foreseen and which, having been foreseen, will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the fall off the platform, sustaining severe injuries.
are inevitable?" The Spanish authorities event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if In an action brought by him to recover
regard the language employed as an effort to it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to damages, the supreme court of Spain held
define the term caso fortuito and hold that the avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to that inasmuch as the car at the time of the
two expressions are synonymous. render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his accident was travelling at a moderate rate of
(Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the speed and there was no infraction of the
Español, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scævola, obligor (debtor) must be free from any regulations, and the plaintiff was exposed to
Codigo Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.) participation in the aggravation of the injury no greater danger than that inherent in that
resulting to the creditor." (5 Enciclopedia particular mode of travel, the plaintiff could
The antecedent to article 1105 is found in Juridica Española, 309.) not recover, especially so since he should
Law 11, Title 33, Partida 7, which have been on his guard against a
defines caso fortuito as "occasion que a case As will be seen, these authorities agree that contingency as natural as that of losing his
por aventura de que non se puede ante ver. some extraordinary circumstance balance to a greater or less extent when the
E son estos, derrivamientos de casas e fuego independent of the will of the obligor, or of his car rounded the curve.
que se enciende a so ora, e quebrantamiento employees, is an essential element of a caso
de navio, fuerca de ladrones. . . . (An event fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at But such is not the present case; here the
that takes place by accident and could not once apparent that this element is lacking. It passengers had no means of avoiding the
have been foreseen. Examples of this are is not suggested that the accident in question danger or escaping the injury.
destruction of houses, unexpected fire, was due to an act of God or to adverse road
shipwreck, violence of robbers. . . .)" conditions which could not have been The plaintiffs maintain that the evidence
foreseen. As far as the records shows, the clearly establishes that they are entitled to
Escriche defines caso fortuito as "an accident was caused either by defects in the damages in the sum of P7,832.80 instead of
unexpected event or act of God which could automobile or else through the negligence of P1,254.10 as found by the trial court, and
either be foreseen nor resisted, such as its driver. That is not a caso fortuito. their assignments of error relate to this point
floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, only.
lightning, compulsion, insurrections, We agree with counsel that neither under the
destructions, destruction of buildings by American nor Spanish law is a carrier of There can be no doubt that the expenses
unforseen accidents and other occurrences of passengers an absolute insurer against the incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the
a similar nature." risks of travel from which the passenger may accident greatly exceeded the amount of the
protect himself by exercising ordinary care damages awarded. But bearing in mind that
In discussing and analyzing the term caso and diligence. The case of Alba vs. Sociedad in determining the extent of the liability for
fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Anonima de Tranvias, Jurisprudencia Civil, losses or damages resulting from negligence
Española says: "In a legal sense and, vol. 102, p. 928, cited by the defendant in in the fulfillment of a contractual obligation,
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a support of his contentions, affords a good the courts have "a discretionary power to
caso fortuito presents the following essential illustration of the application of this principle. moderate the liability according to the
circumstances" (De Guia vs. Manila Electric REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, 3. The complaint had no cause of action
Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706; art. 1103, as father and Natural Guardian of said against defendant Marvin Hill, because he
Civil Code), we do not think that the evidence minor, defendants-appellees. was relieved as guardian of the other
is such as to justify us in interfering with the defendant through emancipation by marriage.
discretion of the court below in this respect. Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
As pointed out by that court in its well- (P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
reasoned and well-considered decision, by far Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
the greater part of the damages claimed by was first denied by the trial court. It was only
the plaintiffs resulted from the fracture of a   upon motion for reconsideration of the
bone in the left wrist of Joaquina Sanchez defendants of such denial, reiterating the
and from her objections to having a decaying BARREDO, J.: above grounds that the following order was
splinter of the bone removed by a surgical issued:
operation. As a consequence of her refusal to Appeal from the order of the Court of First
submit such an operation, a series of Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, Considering the motion for reconsideration
infections ensued and which required 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965
constant and expensive medical treatment for et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon and after thoroughly examining the
several years. We agree with the court below motion to dismiss of defendants, the arguments therein contained, the Court finds
that the defendant should not be charged with complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
these expenses. damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on
For the reasons stated, the judgment and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
appealed from is affirmed, without costs in whom he was living and getting subsistence, ordering the dismissal of the above entitled
this instance. So ordered. for the killing by Reginald of the son of the case.
plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which,
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Johns and when criminally prosecuted, the said accused SO ORDERED.
Romualdez, JJ., concur. was acquitted on the ground that his act was
not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965.
Republic of the Philippines coupled with mistake." (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
SUPREME COURT
Manila Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-
following grounds: appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
SECOND DIVISION presenting for Our resolution the following
1. The present action is not only against but a assignment of errors:
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now
Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court; THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito 2. The action is barred by a prior judgment THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,  which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
vs. I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY acquittal, presumably because appellants do jurisprudence of our own, that the same given
AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF not dispute that such indeed was the basis act can result in civil liability not only under
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF stated in the court's decision. And so, when the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND appellants filed their complaint against Thus, the opinion holds:
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES appellees Reginald and his father, Atty.
OF COURT IS APPLICABLE; Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their The, above case is pertinent because it
son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss shows that the same act machinist. come
II above-referred to. under both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code. In that case, the action of the agent
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR As We view the foregoing background of this killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore
JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR case, the two decisive issues presented for could have been the subject of a criminal
RES-ADJUDICTA; Our resolution are: action. And yet, it was held to be also a
proper subject of a civil action under article
III 1. Is the present civil action for damages 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the that it was the employer and not the
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, criminal case wherein the action for civil employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616,
ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL liability, was not reversed? 73 Phil.). 1
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and 2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) It will be noticed that the defendant in the
of the Civil Code Be applied against Atty. Hill, above case could have been prosecuted in a
IV notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at criminal case because his negligence causing
the time of the occurrence complained of. the death of the child was punishable by the
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO Reginald, though a minor, living with and Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT getting subsistenee from his father, was instance of the same act of negligence being
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS already legally married? a proper subject matter either of a criminal
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER action with its consequent civil liability arising
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION The first issue presents no more problem from a crime or of an entirely separate and
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.) than the need for a reiteration and further independent civil action for fault or negligence
clarification of the dual character, criminal and under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in
It appears that for the killing of the son, civil, of fault or negligence as a source of this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- obligation which was firmly established in this a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the
appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. Civil Code has been fully and clearly
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on recognized, even with regard to a negligent
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice act for which the wrongdoer could have been
due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case
his act was not criminal because of "lack of relation to culpa criminal or delito and and for which, after such a conviction, he
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of could have been sued for this civil liability
Parenthetically, none of the parties has decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
favored Us with a copy of the decision of works of recognized civilians, and earlier
It is most significant that in the case just cited,
this Court specifically applied article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V.
House could have been criminally prosecuted
for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because
of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this
Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases
already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient
to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we
are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles
365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by
law, accordingly to the literal import of article
1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life. Death or injury
to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest
- would have to be Idemnified only through
the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a
situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are
we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a
criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient
to make the defendant pay in damages.
There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise.
there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the
provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given
rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of
the action for culpa aquiliana, there has
grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by,
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual.
In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe
it is high time we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the
Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel,
so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and
for the further reason that an independent
civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one
might get upon a reading of the foregoing
excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the
concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil
Code therein referred to contemplate only
acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it
actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be
seen in the reference made therein to the
Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a
case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act.
Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of
Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are entirely separate and distinct from the civil
derived from acts or omissions in which fault liability arising from negligence under the
or negligence, not punishable by law, Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, damages twice for the same act or omission
Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi- of the defendant.
delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that According to the Code Commission: "The
Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at
ultimo construction or interpretation of the first sight startling, is not so novel or
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the extraordinary when we consider the exact
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
"(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the former is a violation of the criminal law, while
law to smother and render almost lifeless a the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict,
principle of such ancient origin and such full- of ancient origin, having always had its own
grown development as culpa foundation and individuality, separate from
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved criminal negligence. Such distinction between
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of criminal negligence and "culpa
the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code sustained by decision of the Supreme Court
Commission that drafted the original text of of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and
the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
said Code, which was enacted after the Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed
Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
not punishable by law," thereby making it criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
clear that the concept of culpa doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
character or in violation of the penal law, arising from criminal negligence, but for
whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission,
says, "Obligations derived from quasi- p. 162.)
delicto shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem
delicts) and by special laws." More precisely,
to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code
same argument of Justice Bacobo about
provides: construction that upholds "the spirit that
giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
negligence under the preceding article is observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on
human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for
acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to
32) from the civil responsibility arising from
crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with
modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf
and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault
or negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold,
in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa for those of persons for whom one is Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent responsible. The father and, in case of his 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
acts which may be punishable by law.4 death or incapacity, the mother, are emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
responsible. The father and, in case of his However, inasmuch as it is evident that
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of death or incapacity, the mother, are Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not responsible for the damages caused by the the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, minor children who live in their company." In subsidiary to that of his son.
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant the instant case, it is not controverted that
action against him. Reginald, although married, was living with WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is
his father and getting subsistence from him at reversed and the trial court is ordered to
Coming now to the second issue about the the time of the occurrence in question. proceed in accordance with the foregoing
effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage Factually, therefore, Reginald was still opinion. Costs against appellees.
on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his subservient to and dependent on his father, a
father, it is also Our considered opinion that situation which is not unusual. Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin,
the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is JJ., concur.
already free from responsibility cannot be It must be borne in mind that, according to
upheld. Manresa, the reason behind the joint and Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
solidary liability of presuncion with their
While it is true that parental authority is offending child under Article 2180 is that is Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second
terminated upon emancipation of the child the obligation of the parent to supervise their Division.
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article minor children in order to prevent them from
397, emancipation takes place "by the causing damage to third persons. 5 On the  Republic of the Philippines
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, other hand, the clear implication of Article SUPREME COURT
also clear that pursuant to Article 399, 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by Manila
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be
really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation sued without the assistance of the parents, is FIRST DIVISION
by marriage or by voluntary concession shall that such emancipation does not carry with it
terminate parental authority over the child's freedom to enter into transactions or do any G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
person. It shall enable the minor to administer act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See
his property as though he were of age, but he Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA,
cannot borrow money or alienate or surely, killing someone else invites judicial MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA,
encumber real property without the consent of action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA,
his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue minor child does not relieve the parents of the ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA,
and be sued in court only with the assistance duty to see to it that the child, while still a PACITA VIRATA, and EVANGELINA
of his father, mother or guardian." minor, does not give answerable for the VIRATA,petitioners, 
borrowings of money and alienation or vs.
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation encumbering of real property which cannot be VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and
imposed by article 2176 is demandable not done by their minor married child without their THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH
V, stationed at BACOOR, civil action; that thereafter, the private Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the
CAVITE, respondents. prosecutor actively participated in the trial and Philippines is to recover twice for the same
presented evidence on the damages; that on negligent act.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata
again reserved their right to institute a The Supreme Court has held that:
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents. separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the
heirs of Arsenio Virata, petitioners herein, According to the Code Commission: 'The
  commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at
First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, first sight startling, is not so novel or
FERNANDEZ, J.: for damages based on quasi-delict against extraordinary when we consider the exact
the driver Maximo Borilla and the registered nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on former is a violation of the criminal law, while
of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, August 13, 1976 the defendants, private the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict,
Branch V, in Civil Case No. B-134 granting respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the of ancient origin, having always had its own
the motion of the defendants to dismiss the ground that there is another action, Criminal foundation and individuality, separate from
complaint on the ground that there is another Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same criminal negligence. Such distinction between
action pending between the same parties for parties for the same cause; that on criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-
the same cause. 1 September 8, 1976 the Court of First Instance contractual' or quasi-delito has been
of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal sustained by decision of the Supreme Court
The record shows that on September 24, Case No. 3612-P acquitting the accused of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and
1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
having been bumped while walking along Taft an injury by name accident; and that on Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed
Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney January 31, 1977, the Court of First Instance Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2 doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
employer of Ochoa; that for the death of subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide through The principal issue is whether or not the of arising from criminal negligence, but for
reckless imprudence was instituted on the Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla for the damages based on quasi-delict aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, recovery. (Report of the Code Commission, p.
City, docketed as C Case No. 3162-P of said driver and owner, respectively on the 162.)
court; that at the hearing of the said criminal passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio
case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Virata. Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem
Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
reservation to file a separate civil action for It is settled that in negligence cases the same argument of Justice Bocobo about
damages against the driver on his criminal aggrieved parties may choose between an construction that upholds 'the spirit that given
liability; that on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio action under the Revised Penal Code or of life' rather than that which is literal that killeth
Francisco filed a motion in said c case to quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil the intent of the lawmaker should be
withdraw the reservation to file a separate Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on
human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for
acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to
32) from the civil responsibility arising from
crime fixed by Article 100 of the Penal Code,
and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate
also the same separability, it is 'more
congruent' with the spirit of law, equity and
justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress', to borrow the felicitous language in
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil.
to 359, to hod as We do hold, that Article
2176, where it refers to 'fault covers not only
acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal
in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty and acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the, two assuming the awards made
in the two cases vary. In other words the
extinction of civil liability refereed to in Par. (c)
of Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to
civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Brief
stated, We hold, in reitration of Garcia, that
culpa aquilina includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by [G.R. No. 141986. July 11, 2002]
law. 3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover
twice for the same negligent act. Before
Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they
manifested in said criminal case that they
were filing a separate civil action for damages
against the owner and driver of the passenger
jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal
of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime
charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a
bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134
for damages based on quasi-delict The
source of the obligation sought to be enforced
in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an
act or omission punishable by law. Under
Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or
omission punishable by law are two different
sources of obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the
action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134,
they have only to establish their cause of The Case
action by preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal
appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil
Case No. B-134 is reinstated and remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings, with
costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
NEPLUM, INC., petitioner, vs. EVELYN V.
ORBESO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Within what period may private offended
parties appeal the civil aspect of a judgment
acquitting the accused based on reasonable
doubt? Is the 15-day period to be counted
from the promulgation of the decision to the
accused or from the time a copy thereof is
served on the offended party? Our short
answer is: from the time the offended party
had actual or constructive knowledge of the
judgment, whether it be during its
promulgation or as a consequence of the
service of the notice of the decision.
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the February 17,
2000 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City (Branch 133) in Criminal
Case No. 96-246. The Order reads in full as
follows:
Opposition to Notice of Appeal being well-
taken, as prayed for, the Notice of Appeal and
the Amended Notice of Appeal are denied
due course.[3]
 The foregoing Order effectively prevented Reconsideration on 29 November 1999, a The Issue
petitioner from appealing the civil aspect of Monday.
the criminal proceedings in which the
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits
accused was acquitted based on reasonable 2.04 On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner
this lone issue for our consideration:
doubt. received its copy of the 24 January 2000
Order of the Trial Court denying for lack of
merit petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Whether the period within which a private
offended party may appeal from, or move for
The Facts
a reconsideration of, or otherwise challenge,
2.05 On 31 January 2000, a Monday,
the civil aspect of a judgment in a criminal
petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of
The factual antecedents, as narrated by action should be reckoned from the date of
Appeal from the Judgment. On the same day,
petitioner in its Memorandum,[4] are as promulgation or from the date of such partys
petitioner filed by registered mail its 28
follows: actual receipt of a copy of such judgment
January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.
considering that any party appealing or
2.01 On 29 October 1999, the trial court challenging such judgment would necessarily
2.06 On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court
promulgated its judgment (the Judgment) in need a copy thereof, which is in writing and
issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner
Criminal Case No. 96-246 acquitting the which clearly express the factual and legal
received through the private prosecutor on 22
accused of the crime of estafa on the ground bases thereof to be able to file an intelligent
February 2000, denying due course to
that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of appeal or other challenge.[9]
petitioners Notice of Appeal and Amended
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Notice of Appeal x x x.[5]
accused and her counsel as well as the
public and private prosecutors were present The Courts Ruling
during such promulgation.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The Petition is unmeritorious.
2.01.1 The private prosecutor represented the
interests of the petitioner who was the private The RTC refused to give due course to
offended party in Criminal Case No. 96-246. petitioners Notice of Appeal[6] and Amended
Notice of Appeal.[7] It accepted respondents Preliminary Matter:
2.02 On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, arguments that the Judgment from which the Mode of Review
through the private prosecutor, received its appeal was being taken had become final,
copy of the Judgment. because the Notice of Appeal and the Petitioner brought this case to this Court
Amended Notice of Appeal were filed beyond through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
2.03 On 29 November 1999, petitioner filed the reglementary period. The 15-day period under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
its 25 November 1999 Motion for was counted by the trial court from the Petition seeks to set aside the February 17,
Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the promulgation of the Decision sought to be 2000 Order of the RTC which, in effect,
Judgment. reviewed. disallowed petitioners appeal of its Judgment.
Hence, this Petition.[8] An ordinary appeal from the RTC to the
2.03.1 Considering that 27 November 1999
was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Court of Appeals (CA) is taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, compliance may well be fatal to his clients
rendered the judgment or final order appealed nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy cause. [17]
from and serving a copy thereof upon the in the ordinary course of law, a person
adverse party.[10] Consequently, the aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition This Court has often admonished litigants
disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies in the proper court, alleging the facts with for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of
the disallowance of the appeal itself. certainty and praying that judgment be determining under which rule a petition
rendered annulling or modifying the should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to
A petition for review under Rule 45 is a
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, follow scrupulously the requisites for appeal
mode of appeal of a lower courts decision or
and granting such incidental reliefs as law prescribed by law, ever aware that any error
final order direct to the Supreme
and justice may require.[13] (Italics supplied) or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal
Court. However, the questioned Order is not
to the clients cause.[18]
a decision or final order from which an appeal
By availing itself of the wrong or
may be taken. The Rules of Court states On this score alone, the Petition could
inappropriate mode of appeal, the Petition
explicitly: have been given short shrift and outrightly
merits an outright dismissal.[14] Supreme
dismissed. Nevertheless, due to the novelty
Court Circular No. 2-90[15] (hereinafter
No appeal may be taken from: of the issue presented and its far-reaching
Circular) is unequivocal in directing the
effects, the Court will deal with the arguments
dismissal of an inappropriate mode of appeal
x x x x x x x x x raised by petitioner and lay down the rule on
thus: 
this matter. As an exception to Circular 2-90,
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an it will treat the present proceedings as a
4. Erroneous Appeals An appeal taken to
appeal;[11] petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
either the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari
shall be dismissed.[16]
is the suitable remedy that petitioner should Main Issue:
have used, in view of the last paragraph of
The same Circular provides that Timeliness of Appeal
the same provision which states:
petitioners counsel has the duty of using the
proper mode of review. Petitioner contends that an appeal by the
In all the above instances where the judgment
or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved private offended party under the Rules of
e) Duty of counsel It is therefore incumbent Criminal Procedure must be made within 15
party may file an appropriate special civil
upon every attorney who would seek review days from the time the appealing
action under Rule 65.[12]
of a judgment or order promulgated against party receives a copy of the relevant
his client to make sure of the nature of the judgment. It cites Section 6, Rule 122 of the
In turn, Rule 65, Section 1, provides:
errors he proposes to assign, whether these 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
be of fact or of law; then upon such basis to provides:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any ascertain carefully which Court has appellate
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or jurisdiction; and finally, to follow scrupulously
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave ever aware that any error or imprecision in must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from
the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the
order overruling the motion shall have been
served upon the accused or his counsel.
(Italics supplied)
The italicized portion of the provision
uses the conjunctive or in providing for the
reckoning period within which an appeal must
be taken. It shall be counted from the
promulgation or the notice of the judgment or
order.
It is petitioners assertion that the parties
would always need a written reference or a
copy of the judgment x x x to intelligently
examine and consider the judgment from
which an appeal will be taken. [19] Thus, it
concludes that the 15-day period for filing a
notice of appeal must be counted from the
time the losing party actually receives a copy
of the decision or order. Petitioner
ratiocinates that it could not be expected to
capture or memorize all the material details of
the judgment during the promulgation thereof.
[20]
 It likewise poses the question: why require
all proceedings in court to be recorded in
writing if the parties thereto would not be
allowed the benefit of utilizing these written
[documents]?[21]
We clarify. Had it been the accused who
appealed, we could have easily ruled that the
reckoning period for filing an appeal be
counted from the promulgation of the
judgment. In People v. Tamani,[22] the Court
was confronted with the question of when to
count the period within which the accused
must appeal the criminal for appeal, as construed in the cited cases, is
conviction. Answered the Court: the same as that for the private offended
party. We answer in the negative. 
The assumption that the fifteen-day period
should be counted from February 25, 1963,
when a copy of the decision was allegedly No Need to Reserve
served on appellants counsel by registered Independent Civil Action
mail is not well-taken. The word promulgation
in section 6 should be construed as referring
to judgment, while the word notice should be At the outset, we must explain that the
construed as referring to order.[23] 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted
the requirement of reserving independent civil
The interpretation in that case was very actions and allowed these to proceed
clear. The period for appeal was to be separately from criminal ones. Thus, the [27]
civil
actions
counted from the date of promulgation of the [28] [29] referred to in Articles 32,  33,
[30]
 34  and 2176  of the Civil Code shall
decision. Text writers[24] are in agreement with
remain separate, distinct and independent of
this interpretation.
any criminal prosecution based on the same
In an earlier case,[25] this Court explained act. Here are some direct consequences of
the same interpretation in this wise: such revision and omission:
It may, therefore, be stated that one who 1. The right to bring the foregoing actions
desires to appeal in a criminal case must file based on the Civil Code need not be reserved
a notice to that effect within fifteen days from in the criminal prosecution, since they are not
the date the decision is announced or deemed included therein.
promulgated to the defendant. And this can 2. The institution or waiver of the right to
be done by the court either by announcing the file a separate civil action arising from the
judgment in open court as was done in this crime charged does not extinguish the right to
case, or by promulgating the judgment in the bring such action.
manner set forth in [S]ection 6, Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court.[26] 3. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover more than once for the
Clear as those interpretations may have same act or omission.
been, they cannot be applied to the case at Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal
bar, because in those instances it was the prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
accused who appealed, while here we are crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto),
confronted with the offended partys appeal of but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts,
the civil aspect only. Thus, the question contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a
arises whether the accused-appellants period civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution
remains, and the offended party may --
subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still
intervene in the criminal action in order to
protect such remaining civil interest therein.
[31]
 By the same token, the offended party may
appeal a judgment in a criminal case
acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt,
but only in regard to the civil liability ex
delicto.
And this is precisely what herein
petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil
liability arising from the crime -- the civil
liability ex delicto.
Period for Perfecting an Appeal
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure declares:
Section 6. When appeal to be taken. An
appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of the judgment or from
notice of the final order appealed from. This
period for perfecting an appeal shall be
suspended from the time a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of
the order overruling the motions has been
served upon the accused or his counsel at
which time the balance of the period begins to
run.
This provision is similar, though not
identical, to Section 6 of Rule 122 of the 1985
Rules invoked by petitioner. The difference is
that the former makes clear
that promulgation refers to judgment, judgment shall have authority to accept the
and notice refers to final order appealed from. notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond
pending appeal; provided, that if the decision
Taken on its face, the provision seems to
of the trial court convicting the accused
suggest that the period for any appeal,
changed the nature of the offense from non-
whether by the accused or by the private
bailable to bailable, the application for bail
offended party, must be counted from and
can only be filed and resolved by the
understood in conjunction with the provision
appellate court.
on the promulgation of the judgment. This
provision mentions the presence of the
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to
accused, the judge or the clerk of court in
the accused personally or through his
certain instances, and/or the counsel or
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring
representative of the accused. Petitioner is
him to be present at the promulgation of the
correct in observing that the private offended
decision. If the accused was tried in
party is not required to be present during the
absentia because he jumped bail or escaped
promulgation; in fact, the said party is not
from prison, the notice to him shall be served
even mentioned in the provision. 
at his last known address.
For clarity, the 2000 Rule on the
promulgation of judgment is quoted in full In case the accused fails to appear at the
hereunder: scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment The made by recording the judgment in the
judgment is promulgated by reading it in the criminal docket and serving him a copy
presence of the accused and any judge of the thereof at his last known address or thru his
court in which it was rendered. However, if counsel. 
the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence If the judgment is for conviction and the
of his counsel or representative. When the failure of the accused to appear was without
judge is absent or outside the province or city, justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies
the judgment may be promulgated by the available in these rules against the judgment
clerk of court. and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
If the accused is confined or detained in judgment, however, the accused may
another province or city, the judgment may be surrender and file a motion for leave of court
promulgated by the executive judge of the to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over reasons for his absence at the scheduled
the place of confinement or detention upon promulgation and if he proves that his
request of the court which rendered the absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall
judgment. The court promulgating the
be allowed to avail of said remedies within [33] Hence, the presence of either party during suppletory to the latter. As correctly pointed
fifteen (15) days from notice.[32] promulgation is not required. out by petitioner, [t]he appeal from the civil
aspect of a judgment in a criminal action is,
The period to appeal, embodied in
for all intents and purposes, an appeal from a
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Rules on
Appeal of the Accused Different from That Criminal Procedure, cannot be applied judgment in a civil action as such appeal
of the Offended Party cannot affect the criminal aspect thereof.
equally to both accused-appellant and private [35]
 Being akin to a civil action, the present
offended party. Further bolstering this
appeal may be guided by the Rules on Civil
Clearly, the Rule on the promulgation of argument is the second sentence of this Procedure.
judgment refers to the accused, not to the provision which mandates as follows:
private offended party, who is not even In People v. Santiago,[36] the Court has
required to be present during the x x x. This period for perfecting an appeal definitively ruled that in a criminal case in
proceedings. Since the judgment may be shall be suspended from the time a motion for which the offended party is the State, the
promulgated in the absence of the latter, it will new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice interest of the private complainant or the
be inequitable to count from that date the of the order overruling the motions has been private offended party is limited to the civil
period of appeal for the said party. It is but served upon the accused or his counsel at liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is
logical to begin tolling such period only upon which time the balance of the period begins to dismissed by the trial court or if there is an
[34]
service of the notice of judgment upon the run.  (Italics supplied) acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect
offended party, and not from its promulgation may be undertaken, whenever legally
to the accused. It is only through notice to the The above-quoted portion provides for feasible, only by the State through the
former that an appeal can reasonably be the procedure for suspending and resuming solicitor general. As a rule, only the solicitor
made, for it is only from that date that the the reglementary period of appeal specifically general may represent the People of the
complainant will have knowledge of the need mentioned in the preceding Philippines on appeal. The private offended
to elevate the case. Till then, the remedy of sentence. However, it is clear that the party or complainant may not undertake such
appeal would not be an option in the event of procedure operates only in relation to the appeal.
an adverse judgment. accused. This conclusion can be deduced
However, the offended party or
from the fact that after being interrupted, the
We clarify also that the situations covered period to appeal begins to run again only after complainant may appeal the civil aspect
by this Rule (Section 6, Rule 122) are limited the accused or the counsel of the accused is despite the acquittal of the accused. As such,
to appeals of judgments rendered by regional given notice of the order overruling the motion the present appeal undertaken by the private
trial and inferior courts. In higher courts, there for reconsideration or for new trial. Verily, the offended party relating to the civil aspect of
is no promulgation in the concept of Section 6 assumption behind this provision is that the the criminal judgment can no longer be
Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal appeal was taken by the accused, not by the considered a criminal action per se, wherein
Procedure. In the Supreme Court and the private offended party. the State prosecutes a person for an act or
Court of Appeals, a decision is promulgated omission punishable by law.Instead, it
when the signed copy thereof is filed with the Indeed, the rules governing the period of becomes a suit analogous to a civil action.
clerk of court, who then causes copies to be appeal in a purely civil action should be the
Being in the nature of a civil case, the
served upon the parties or their counsels. same as those covering the civil aspects of present intended appeal involves proceedings
criminal judgments. If these rules are not
brought to the Court of Appeals from a
completely identical, the former may be
decision of the RTC in the exercise of the
latters original jurisdiction. Thus, it should be
properly done by filing a notice of appeal.
[37]
 An appeal by virtue of such notice shall be
filed within 15 days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. [38] For
the private offended party, this rule then
forecloses the counting of the period to
appeal from the promulgation of the judgment
to the accused.
In sum, we hold that an offended partys
appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a
judgment of acquittal should be filed within 15
days from notice of the judgment or the final
order appealed from. To implement this
holding, trial courts are hereby directed to
cause, in criminal cases, the service of their
judgments upon the private offended parties
or their duly appointed counsels -- the private
prosecutors. This step will enable them to
appeal the civil aspects under the appropriate
circumstances.
General Rule Not Applicable to the signifies notification of the party he represents
Present Case
Having laid down the general rule on the
appeal of civil liabilities ex delicto, we now
determine its application to the present
controversy. In short, was petitioners appeal
timely filed?
If we were to follow the reasoning of
petitioner, the Notice of Appeal filed on
January 31, 2000 was on time, considering
that (1) the Judgment had been received by
its counsel only on November 12, 1999; and
(2) the Motion for Reconsideration filed on because of their presence? Notice of the
November 29, 2000 interrupted the running of judgment may not be defined in any other
the reglementary period. way x x x.[41]
However, a peculiar circumstance in this
case militates against this conclusion. Here,
the private prosecutor himself was present
during the promulgation of the
Judgment. This fact is undeniable, as
petitioner itself admits his presence in its
Memorandum as follows:
2.01 On 29 October 1999, the Trial Court
promulgated its judgment (the Judgment) in
Criminal Case No. 96-246 acquitting the
accused of the crime of estafa on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
accused and her counsel as well as the
public and private prosecutors were present
during such promulgation.[39] (Italics supplied)
Further, private prosecutor[40] even signed
a copy of the Judgment dated October 29,
1999, a signature which in unequivocal terms
-- herein petitioner.
Having been present during the
promulgation and having been furnished a
copy of the judgment at the time, private
offended party was in effect actually notified
of the Judgment, and from that time already
had knowledge of the need to appeal it. Thus,
the very raison d'tre of this Decision is already
satisfied: the filing of an appeal by the said
party, only after being notified of the
Judgment. As argued by respondent, did not
the public and private prosecutors acquire
notice of Judgment at its promulgation
Petitioner stresses the need for service of
the Judgment on the offended party. It harps
on the fact that -- based on constitutional,
statutory and even jurisprudential edicts --
judgments must be in writing and with the
factual and legal bases thereof clearly
expressed.
Petitioner posits that it can make an
appeal only after receiving a written copy of
the Judgment, for the parties would always
need a written reference or a copy [thereof
which] they can review or refer to from time to
time.[42] To rule otherwise would supposedly
deny them due process.
We clarify. If petitioner or its counsel had
never been notified of the Judgment, then the
period for appeal would never have run. True,
no law requires the offended party to attend
the promulgation, much less to secure a copy
of the decision on that date. But fiction must
yield to reality. By mere presence, the
offended party was already actually notified of
the Decision of acquittal and should have
taken the necessary steps to ensure that a
timely appeal be filed.
Besides, all that petitioner had to do was
to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief
statement of its intention to elevate the trial
courts Decision to the CA. There was no
reason why it could not have done so within
15 days after actually knowing the adverse
Judgment during the promulgation. [43] Parties
and their counsels are presumed to be
vigilant in protecting their interests and must
take the necessary remedies without delay the burden of proving the existence of
and without resort to technicalities. exceptionally
warranting such deviation.[49]
Appeal Not Part of Due Process
It should be stressed that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process. It is merely a procedural remedy
of statutory origin and may be exercised only
in the manner prescribed by the provisions of
law authorizing its exercise.[44] Hence, its
requirements must be strictly complied with.
[45]
 The failure of petitioner to file a timely
notice of appeal from the Judgment, thus
rendering the Judgment final and executory,
is not a denial of due process. It might have
lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied
its day in court.
It would be incorrect to perceive the
procedural requirements of the rules on
appeal as merely harmless and trivial
technicalities that can be discarded.
[46]
 Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot
be tolerated.[47] The rationale for this strict
attitude is not difficult to appreciate. These
rules are designed to facilitate the orderly
disposition of appealed cases. In an age
where courts are bedeviled by clogged
dockets, these rules need to be followed by
appellants with greater fidelity. Their
observance cannot be left to the whims and
caprices of appellants.[48]
Neither has petitioner justified a deviation
from an otherwise stringent rule. Anyone
seeking exemption from the application of the
reglementary period for filing an appeal has
Respondents.
meritorious instances  
x------------------------------------------------------
A fundamental precept is that the
reglementary periods under the Rules are to ------------------------------x
be strictly observed, for they are  
indispensable interdictions against needless  
delay and for an orderly discharge of judicial DECISION
business.[50] After judgment has become final,  
vested rights are acquired by the winning NACHURA, J.:
 
party. Just as the losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, so
does the winning party also have the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the 
resolution of the case.[51] This principle  
becomes even more essential in view of the This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
fact that the criminal aspect has already beenDecision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
adjudicated.
dated May 11, 2005 and the resolution denying the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is motion for reconsideration thereof in CA-G.R. CV
hereby DENIED and the assailed
Order AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. No. 65553.
 
SO ORDERED.
The facts are as follows:
THIRD DIVISION  
  Petitioner spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo
NGO SIN SING and TICIA DY NGO,
owned a lot at 745 Caballero St., Binondo. In
Petitioners,
1978, they decided to construct a 5-storey concrete
  building thereon, the NSSBuilding, and for this
  project, they contracted the services of Contech
- versus -
Construction Technology Development
  Corporation (Contech) as their General
  Contractor. Adjacent to their lot is a semi-concrete
LI SENG GIAP & SONS, INC., and CONTECH
CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGYbuilding known as the Li Seng Giap Building
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, (LSG Building), owned by Li Seng Giap & Sons,
Inc. (respondent). During the construction of
the NSSBuilding, the respondent, through its
general manager, John T. Lee, received
complaints from their tenants about defects in the
building. There were cracks appearing on the
floors, the steel door was bent, and concrete slabs
of the walls were falling apart.[2] An inspection of
the premises revealed that the excavation made by
Contech on petitioners land was close to the
common boundary, exposing the foundation of
the LSG Building. As a gesture of goodwill to
their neighbors, the petitioners assured the
respondent that repairs would be undertaken by
their contractor. In December 1979, Contech
announced that it had completed repairs on
the LSG Building. Notwithstanding this assurance,
more defects in
the LSG Building appeared, i.e., tilted floors,
cracks in the columns and beams, distorted
window frames. Apparently,
the LSG Building was continuously sagging and
the respondent felt that it was no longer safe to
occupy the building.
 
In 1981, the respondent was constrained to
consult engineers, E.S. de Castro Ph.D. and
Associates, through Control Builders Corporation,
to investigate the cause of the damages in
the LSG Building and to determine its present
structural integrity. It was immediately noticed
that the LSG Building underwent differential             P8,021,687.00, representing the actual cost
of demolition and reconstruction of
settlement.[3] Based on their ocular inspection on the LSG Building;
the building measurement of the actual differential  
settlement, structural analysis of the building and             P154,800.00 which plaintiff contracted to
pay the E.S. de Castro, Ph.D. and Associates, and
determination of the sub-surface soil conditions,
Control Builders Corporation to determine the
the consultants concluded that the structural extent of the damages and the structural integrity
failure of the LSG Building resulted from the of the LSG Building;
differential settlement caused by the excavation  
             P543,672.00, representing the income that
during the construction of the NSSBuilding. Since the plaintiff will lose from the rentals during the
the building had undergone large differential reconstruction of the building;
settlements beyond safe tolerable limits, the  
             P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.[5]
consultants recommended the complete demolition  
of the LSGBuilding. The demolition and  
reconstruction of the building was estimated to In their Answer,[6] spouses Ngo Sin Sing
cost the respondents about P8,021,687.00.[4] The and Ticia Dy Ngo moved to dismiss the complaint
respondents demanded that the petitioners rebuild alleging that: (1) the respondents building had
the LSG Building or pay the cost of the same, been structurally unstable and deficient since
which the petitioners refused. incipiency, having been constructed in 1966
  without the appropriate provision to vouchsafe its
Thus, a complaint for sum of money was structural integrity including differential
filed against Ngo Sin Sing, Ticia Dy Ngo and settlements during its economic life; and (2) the
Contech Construction Technology Development structural defects and failure were traceable not
Corporation with the Regional Trial Court of necessarily due to soil erosion but to a number of
Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 83-19367, external forces constantly working upon the
praying that the petitioners and Contech be building including earthquakes and improper
ordered to, jointly and severally, pay the following maintenance. Petitioners filed a cross-claim
sums: against Contech averring that pursuant to their
  construction contract, all claims of third parties
should be answered by said corporation.[7]
  
For its part, Contech alleged that the
excavation did not reach the common boundary
and was eight (8) inches, more or less, away from
the common boundary. Adequate and necessary
precautions were undertaken which included the
putting of wood sheet piles along the boundaries
to prevent soil erosion and all phases of work were
done according to the approved plan. Assuming it
was liable on the cross-claim, such liability was
deemed waived or abandoned for failure of Ngo
Sin Sing to notify Contech of such claim.[8]
 
After due hearing, the trial court ruled that
the defendants were negligent. It found that the
excavation made on defendants lot was near the
common boundary, and that soil erosion would not
have taken place if wood sheet piles were properly
put in place along the common boundary.
However, the trial court also stated that the
plaintiff was likewise not without fault. The trial
court noted that the LSG Building was originally a
2-storey building and the plaintiff added two more
floors without providing the necessary foundation
and reinforcement causing the building to sag. The
trial court held that it was but fair for the plaintiff
to assume its share of the faults and defects of its
property in this case.
 
Thus, the trial court rendered judgment as
follows:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants
Ngo Sin Sing, Ticia Dy Ngo and [Contech]
Construction Technology Development Corp.
jointly and severally, liable to pay plaintiff Li
Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. the sum
of P4,010,843.50. The claim for other damages
cannot be awarded for lack of sufficient
basis. Defendant Contech Technology & the property, it was their right to construct on their
Development Corp. shall reimburse defendants
Spouses Ngo Sin Sing & Ticia Dy Ngo for
whatever amount the latter will pay to
plaintiff. The counterclaims of defendants are
DISMISSED.[9]
Dissatisfied with the trial courts ruling, Li
Seng Giap & Sons, Inc. and the spouses Ngo Sin
Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo filed their respective
appeals. Contech no longer appealed.
 
The respondent disagreed with the trial
courts finding that it was guilty of contributory
negligence and that it must share in the cost of the
reconstruction of the LSGBuilding. It claimed that
the LSG Building never exhibited any sign of
structural distress from the time it was completely
constructed in 1968, despite the fact
that Manila was rocked by several earthquakes,
the most violent of which was in 1969. The
defects were experienced only when excavation
and construction of the NSS Building started.
Respondent reiterated its prayer in the complaint.
 
The petitioners, on the other hand, averred
that there was no basis for holding them jointly
and severally liable with Contech for the payment
of the amount of damages to the respondent. The
trial court correctly pointed out that as owner of
land and have it excavated. More importantly,
they had a contract with Contech wherein it was
provided that all claims of third persons would be
answered by the company. 
On May 11, 2005, the CA affirmed the
trial courts decision with modification. The
appellate court ruled that the respondent had a
proven cause of action against the petitioners; that
respondents right to property was invaded or
disturbed when excavation was done without
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. As such, the
petitioners liability as project owner should be
shared with the contractor, applying the provisions
of Article 2194 of the Civil Code which states that
the responsibility of two or more persons for a
quasi-delict is solidary.[10] The CA refuted the
findings of the trial court imputing contributory
negligence to the respondents Li Seng Giap &
Sons, Inc., and ruled that the spouses Ngo Sin
Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo together with Contech,
were solidarily liable for the whole amount. Thus:
 
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that the
defendants shall jointly and severally pay the
plaintiff the sum of P8,021,687.[00] with interest
at 6 percent per annum from the date of the filing
of the complaint until paid, plus ten percent of the
principal award as attorneys fees and costs. The
rest of the decision is AFFIRMED.    building permit dated June 27, 1956[12] was for the
 
 
Aggrieved, the spouses Ngo Sin Sing and
Ticia Dy Ngo now come to this Court raising the
following assignment of errors:
 
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION WHICH IGNORED AND
DISREGARDED CLEAR EVIDENCE ON
RECORD THAT RESPONDENT LSGS OWN
NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE TO ITS BUILDING,
OR AT LEAST, AMOUNTED TO
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
WARRANTING REDUCTION OF THE
AWARD.
 
II.
 
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION WHEN DESPITE THE
FACT THAT NO ACT OR OMISSION
CONSTITUTING NEGLIGENCE HAD BEEN
SUCCESSFULLY IMPUTED AGAINST
PETITIONERS, IT HELD PETITIONERS
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
RESPONDENT CONTECH FOR
RECONSTRUCTION COSTS.
III.
 
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION WHEN, WITHOUT ANY
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS, IT ORDERED
PETITIONER TO PAY RESPONDENT LSG
ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF TEN
(10%) [PERCENT] OF THE PRINCIPAL
AMOUNT.[11]
 
We resolve to grant the petition.
 
In petitions for review, the Court does not
normally review the factual findings of the courts
below, but when the findings of the CA differ
from those of the trial court, the Court will not
hesitate to scrutinize the evidence on record. As
between these two courts, it cannot be denied that
the trial court is in a better position to ascertain the
facts of the case considering its peculiar
opportunity to be in direct contact with the
witnesses and the evidence presented. As such,
this Court is inclined to uphold the findings of the
trial court in this case which we find to be more
conformable to the evidence on record. 
 
The records reveal that the LSG Building was
constructed as early as 1956. Originally, the
construction of a 3-storey building. Apparently,
this was amended when another building permit
was issued on August 20, 1956,[13] for the
construction of a 2-storey building only. The City
Engineer testified that the Certificate of
Occupancy was issued for the August 20, 1956
permit which was for the 2-storey building. [14] In
1966, the building was burned. Thereafter, it was
rebuilt with two floors added to the original 2-
storey building. The CA stressed that, according
to John T. Lee, Manager of LSG Building, the
present building was an entirely new edifice and
not one built on the ashes of the old.
[15]
 However, on cross-examination, John T. Lee
admitted that:
WITNESS:
May I recall sometime in 1940, the property was
purchased with an existing building apartment
wooden in 1940. Sometime in 1956, the wooden
apartment was destroyed by fire. So in 1956, a
permit was requested and granted to construct a
three storey reinforce concrete building. Now on Whether or not the building is a new building. The possibility of settlement due to weak
the later part of 1956 it was amended. The permit
was amended. It was changed to a two storey edifice or built on the old ashes is really of no foundation cannot, therefore, be discounted. As
moment.
concrete building. It is called semi-concrete. So Verily, the foundation of the trial court correctly ruled: adding more floors
the building was finished in 1957. Then in 1966
the LSG Building which was good to support only without touching or reinforcing the buildings
that semi-concrete building was burned. So we
two floors remained the same and could not bottom line or foundation are already manifestive
requested for a building permit to reconstruct and
include a 3rd and 4th storey building. support the weight of the present 4-storey of some negligence or ignorance on the part of
  building. Edgardo Soriano, Civil Engineer from said building owner. x x x Had plaintiff stuck to
COURT: the Office of the City Engineers Manila, testified his original building 2-storey with its kind of
 
that there was a great possibility that the
Q So the 3rd and 4th storey will be built on the foundation, the excavation by its adjacent
skeleton? settlement may be progressive,[17] and that the neighbor would not matter much or affect the
  damages may be due to the defect in the building in question at the outset.[20]
A According to my brother that is exactly the
  foundation and not due to the excavation. [18] More  
intriguing is the statement in the report of E.S de
Q Skeleton on the ground floor and second floor Contributory negligence is conduct on the
and what was added was the 3rd and 4th floor?Castro which reads: part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
Storey?
  cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
 
In terms of purely engineering below the standard to which he is required to
A Yes, sir.
considerations, it would be best to demolish the
  conform for his own protection.[21] In this case,
existing building and then rebuild using present
Q And it was finished when?
data as design guides. Economic feasibility is, of considering that respondents negligence must have
 
course, beyond the scope of this study. necessarily contributed to the sagging of
A It was finished in 1968.
 
  the LSG Building, a reduction of the award is
If the owners wish to salvage whatever
Q And it was semi-concrete? warranted. We, therefore, agree with the trial court
they can of the present building, it is suggested
 
that the 3rd and 4th floors be removed and retain that respondent should likewise share in the cost
A No reinforce concrete in 1968.
use of the ground and second floors only. To leave
  of the restructuring of its building. This is more in
the building in its present condition would be
unsafe.[19] keeping with justice and equity. As the trial court
Q So the 3rd and 4th storey was added to the   ratiocinated:
shell of the ground and 2nd floor which was    
burned? This only goes to show that the additional After going over the records of the case,
  two floors put up on the LSG Building could have the Court believes and so holds that plaintiff is
A Yes, your honor.[16] equally negligent in not providing the necessary
overburdened the foundations load-bearing foundation and reinforcement to
capacity and contributed to the sagging of the accommodate/support the additional floors and
this finding is supported by plaintiffs evidence
more particularly the declaration of John Lee that
the 3rd and 4th floors were built on the skeleton of
the ground and 2nd floor which was burned (tsn pp.
8-9, July 9, 1985). To be adding additional floors
to the original 2-storey of plaintiffs building and
depending merely on the skeleton of the ground
and second floors for its third and fourth floors
without touching or reinforcing that buildings
bottom line or foundation are already manifestive
of some negligence or ignorance on the part of
said building owner (plaintiff). To put all the
blame and responsibility for the defects, cracks
and tilting or sagging of the building in question
on the shoulders of the defendants is not
proper. Plaintiff must realize his share of the faults
and defects of his property in the situation.[22]
 
xxxx
In view of this and considering that the
plaintiffs building is still occupied by tenants and
has not been condemned nor condemnation
proceedings accordingly instituted, the Court
believes that demands of substantial justice are
satisfied by allocating the damages on 50-50
ratio. Thus, 50% of the damages sustained by the
building is to be borne by the plaintiff and the
other 50% by the defendants jointly and severally
upon reconstruction of the formers building. The
amount of P154,000.00 for the services rendered
by Contech (sic) Builders should be shouldered by
the plaintiff alone. Defendant Contech shall
reimburse defendants Spouses Ngo Sin Sing and
Ticia Dy Ngo for whatever amount the latter will
pay to the plaintiff.[23]
 
The lower courts also found that there was or negligence should be attributed to the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
insufficient lateral or subjacent support provided the impending harm and failed to do so is
on the adjoining lot when excavation was done on chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated
petitioners land. While there were wood sheet differently, the rule would also mean that an
antecedent negligence of a person does not
piles placed along the sides of the excavation, they
preclude the recovery of damages for the
were not properly braced to prevent a failure supervening negligence of or bar a defense against
wedge.[24] Such failure can only be accounted to the liability sought by another, if the latter, who
the contractor, which is no other than Contech. In had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
the Proposal[25] submitted to the petitioners,  
Contech committed to undertake the construction In the case at bench, the negligence of Contech
of the NSS Building, providing labor and caused the damages sustained by the building,
which did not discharge its duty of excavating
equipment for the project. Work included eight (8) inches away from the boundary line from
excavation for foundation, formworks, steel the lot of plaintiff with insufficient lateral and
[27]
works, etc. Construction would be completed after subjacent support.
 
365 days. It was also provided that the petitioners  
were released and relieved of any and all liabilities Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
and responsibilities for any injury to the workers provides:
and laborers employed in the work contracted for,
 
as well as for third-party liabilities. [26] As it turned Whoever by act or omission causes
out in the course of the construction of damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
the NSS Building, Contech failed to observe the
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
proper procedure prior to excavation. We quote contractual relation between the parties, is called a
the trial court: quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
  this Chapter.
Clearly, defendant Contech failed to observe his  
procedure of providing lateral and subjacent  
support prior to excavation. Under the doctrine of The requisites of quasi-delict are the
supervening negligence which states that where following:
both parties are negligent but the negligence of
one is appreciably later in time than of the other,
or when it is impossible to determine whose fault            There must be an act or omission;
               Such act or omission causes damage to
another;
                Such act or omission is caused by fault or
negligence; and
               There is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties.[28]
 
These requisites are attendant in the instant
case. The tortious act was the excavation done
without observing the proper safeguards. Although
the trial court stated that petitioner as land owner
had every right to excavate on his own land, such
right is not absolute as to deprive the adjacent
owner sufficient lateral support pursuant to Article
684, New Civil Code, which states that:
 
No proprietor shall make such excavation
upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
 
 
For the damage caused to the respondent,
petitioners and Contech are jointly liable as they
are joint tort-feasors. Conformably with Article
2194, the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary.
[29]
 In Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v.
Continental Cement Corporation,[30] the Court had
the occasion to explain:
 
[O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature,
always solidary. We have assiduously maintained
this legal principle as early as 1912 in Worcester
v. Ocampo, in which we held:
 
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the
appellants is that they fail to recognize that the
basis of the present action is tort. They fail to
recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort
feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in
which he participates, but is also jointly liable
with his tort feasors. x x x
 
It may be stated as a general rule that joint
tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it
is done, if done for their benefit. They are each
liable as principals, to the same extent and in the
same manner as if they had performed the
wrongful act themselves. x x x
 
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally
liable for the tort which they commit. The persons
injured may sue all of them or any number less
than all. Each is liable for the whole damages
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for
the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued
alone, that the others who participated in the
wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his
participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared to that of the others. x x x
 
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro
rata. The damages can not be apportioned among
them, except among themselves. They cannot
insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of
each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and
severally liable for the whole amount. x x x
 
A payment in full for the damage done, by
one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any
claim which might exist against the others. There
can be but satisfaction.The release of one of the
joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates
to discharge all. x x x
 
Of course, the court during trial may find
that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and
that others are not liable. The courts may release
some for lack of evidence while condemning
others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true
even though they are charged jointly and
severally.[31]
 
 
Prescinding from the above, there is basis
to re-examine the courts disposition in this case as
to the liability of the petitioner in the light of the
judgment rendered (1) holding the petitioner and
Contech jointly and severally liable, and (2) giving
the right to the petitioner to be reimbursed for
whatever amount it shall pay the respondent.[32]
In Citytrust Banking Corporation v. Court
of Appeals,[33] the Court stated that a judgment
may determine the ultimate rights of the parties on
the same side as between themselves, such that
questions of primary and secondary liability
between joint tort-feasors may be determined.
Such judgment does not make the co-defendants
adversaries. It permits only the determination of
questions of primary and secondary liability
between joint tort-feasors.[34]
 
In Weiner v. Mager & Throne, Inc., et al.,
[35]
 it was held that  damage. Construction is a field requiring technical
 
In order to avoid a multiplicity of suits,
and to place it in the power of the defendant to get
a determination of an entire controversy in a single
action, statutory provision is made whereby, if the
rights of the defendants as between themselves are
determinable in an action, the whole matter may
be disposed of in the judgment of such action,
instead of leaving the defendants to litigate
independently after the judgment has been entered
in the main action.
From the foregoing, it is clear that this
Court is not precluded from rendering a judgment
that determines the liabilities of the co-defendants
(petitioners and Contech) in this case. Rather than
invite the definite prospect of the petitioners filing
or instituting an action later on seeking
reimbursement from the party primarily liable,
which in this case is Contech, it would be more in
keeping with the principles of expediency and the
policy against multiplicity of suits to make a direct
adjudication in this regard. Considering that there
was no proffered evidence of negligence on the
part of the petitioners, the inescapable conclusion
is that Contech is ultimately liable and should
answer for the cost of the damage.  Defendant Contech as the contractor should have
 
Indeed, the facts show that Contechs
negligence was the proximate cause of the
expertise. The petitioners, as ordinary laymen,
would understandably have no knowledge at all
about the technical aspect of constructing a
building. This was precisely the reason why they
contracted the services of a reputable construction
firm to undertake the project. Petitioners had every
right to rely on the warranties and representations
of their contractor. 
We note that Contech has remained silent,
as if accepting its fate of liability in this case. The
trial court observed that Contech did not present
evidence to controvert the parties assertions or
prove their allegations in the answer, despite an
order to do so.[36] From the trial courts decision,
both the petitioner and respondent filed their
respective appeals while Contech no longer
challenged said decision. Thus, the decision
holding it liable has become final and executory.
 
Moreover, the trial court pointed out that
Contech fell short of its responsibility as
contractor in this valuable project. It failed to
insure its work against possible risks. We quote:
 
been prudent enough as to have sought and
acquired a Contractor All Risk (CAR) insurance
policy and/or Erection All Risk (EAR) insurance
policy in the course of such a construction that it
had contracted with co-defendant Spouses. Had
CAR & EAR insurance policies been availed of
before any excavation was undertaken the plaintiff
could have run after the insurance companies that
could have covered those risks. Contractors of
building should have taken the roles of the wise
and prudent father to their customers or clients as
they are specialists in themselves as their field of
know-how in technology would always be
demanded and extracted of them by all their
patrons.[37]
 
As to the award for attorneys fees in the
CA decision, the same should be deleted, as the
appellate court did not provide any basis
whatsoever to justify the award. 
 
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with the
modification that Contech Construction
Technology Development Corporation,
alone, is ORDERED to pay respondent Li Seng
Giap & Sons, Inc., the sum of P4,010,843.50. 
 
SO ORDERED. 
Republic of the Philippines On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000,
SUPREME COURT Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a
Manila Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine
City.4 her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she
SECOND DIVISION suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the caused by the compression of the nerve
G.R. No. 182356               December 4, 2013 front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla
was at the backseat.5 required her to undergo physical therapy to
DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner,  alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s
vs. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans condition did not improve despite three
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under Memorial Hospital when the signal light months of extensive physical therapy.9
the name and style of Pongkay turned red. A few seconds after the car
Trading, Respondent. halted, a dump truck containing gravel and She then consulted other doctors, namely,
sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric
DECISION violently pushing the car forward. Due to the Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores, a
impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she
BRION, J.: rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters undergo a cervical spine surgery to release
flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from the compression of her nerve. On October 19,
Very case essentially turns on two basic these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and
questions: questions of fact and questions of appear to have suffered from any other visible neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.10
law. Questions of fact are the parties and physical injuries.6
their counsel to respond to, based on what The operation released the impingement of
supporting facts the legal questions require; The traffic investigation report dated March the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana
the court can only draw conclusion from the 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel from the practice of her profession since June
facts or evidence adduced. When the facts Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly 2000 despite the surgery.11
are lacking because of the deficiency of imprudent in driving the truck.7
presented evidence, then the court can only Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000,
draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail Joel later revealed that his employer was demanded from Rebecca compensation for
for lack of evidentiary support. respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.12
under the name and style of "Pongkay
The present case is one such case as Dra. Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued
Leila A dela Llana’s(petitioner) petition for sand business.8 Rebecca for damages before the Regional
review on certorari1challenging the February Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged
11, 2008 Decision2 and the March 31, 2008 In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana that she lost the mobility of her arm as a
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left result of the vehicular accident and
CA-G.R. CV No. 89163. side of her neck and shoulder. The pain claimed P150,000.00 for her medical
became more intense as days passed by. Her expenses (as of the filing of the complaint)
The Factual Antecedents injury became more severe. Her health and an average monthly income
deteriorated to the extent that she could no of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further
prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary as barangay, police, and NBI clearances prior Joel's selection and supervision of Joel.
damages as well as attorney’s fees.13 to his employment. She also stressed that Rebecca was vicariously liable because she
she only hired Primero after he successfully was the employer and she personally chose
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. passed the driving skills test conducted by him to drive the truck. On the day of the
dela Llana had no cause of action against her Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-mechanic.19 collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel
as no reasonable relation existed between and sand to Muñoz Market, Quezon City. The
the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s Alberto also took the witness stand. He Court concluded that the three elements
injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s testified that he checked the truck in the necessary to establish Rebecca’s liability
illness became manifest one month and one morning of March 30, 2000. He affirmed that were present: (1) that the employee was
week from the date of the vehicular accident. the truck was in good condition prior to the chosen by the employer, personally or
As a counterclaim, she demanded the vehicular accident. He opined that the cause through another; (2) that the services were to
payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the of the vehicular accident was a damaged be rendered in accordance with orders which
suit.14 compressor. According to him, the absence of the employer had the authority to give at all
air inside the tank damaged the compressor. 20 times; and (3) that the illicit act of the
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself employee was on the occasion or by reason
as an ordinary witness15 and Joel as a hostile RTC Ruling of the functions entrusted to him. The RTC
witness.16 thus awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and of P570,000.00 as actual
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela damages, P250,000.00 as moral damages,
mobility of her arm because of the vehicular Llana’s whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless and the cost of the suit.22
accident. To prove her claim, she identified driving.21
and authenticated a medical certificate dated CA Ruling
November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The It found that a whiplash injury is an injury
medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the
suffered from a whiplash injury. It also the neck area. It pointed out that the massive CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra.
chronicled her clinical history and physical damage the car suffered only meant that the dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable
examinations.17 truck was over-speeding. It maintained that connection between the vehicular accident
Joel should have driven at a slower pace and her whiplash injury by preponderance of
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the because road visibility diminishes at night. He evidence. Citing Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v.
car because the truck’s brakes got stuck.18 should have blown his horn and warned the Court of Appeals,23 it declared that courts will
car that his brake was stuck and could have not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela prevented the collision by swerving the truck if there is no evidence or the evidence is too
Llana was physically fit and strong when they off the road. It also concluded that Joel was slight to warrant an inference establishing the
met several days after the vehicular accident. probably sleeping when the collision occurred fact in issue. It noted that the interval between
She also asserted that she observed the as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on the date of the collision and the date when
diligence of a good father of a family in the that fateful day. The RTC further declared Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms
selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed that Joel’s negligence gave rise to the of her illness was lengthy. It concluded that
out that she required Joel to submit a presumption that Rebecca did not exercise this interval raised doubts on whether Joel’s
certification of good moral character as well the diligence of a good father of a family in reckless driving and the resulting collision in
fact caused Dra. dela Llana’s injury. It also
declared that courts cannot take judicial
notice that vehicular accidents cause
whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela
Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to
check if she sustained internal injuries after
the accident. Moreover, her failure to present
expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also
gave no weight to the medical certificate. The
medical certificate did not explain how and
why the vehicular accident caused the
injury.24
The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition
before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable
in the present case. She stresses that
Nutrimix involved the application of Article
1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code, provisions
governing hidden defects. Furthermore, there
was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix that
showed that poisonous animal feeds were
sold to the respondents in that case. As
opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra.
dela Llana asserts that she has established
by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s
egligent act was the proximate cause of her
whiplash injury. First, pictures of her
damaged car show that the collision was
strong. She posits that it can be reasonably
inferred from these pictures that the massive
impact resulted in her whiplash
injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated
in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana
suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her
testimony that the vehicular accident caused
the injury is credible because she was a
surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the the findings of fact by the lower courts are
medical certificate has probative value. Citing conflicting
several cases, she posits that an
uncorroborated medical certificate is credible The issue before us involves a question of
if uncontroverted.25 fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a
general rule, the CA’s findings of fact are final
She points out that expert opinion is and conclusive and this Court will not review
unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to them on appeal. It is not the function of this
matters of common knowledge. She Court to examine, review or evaluate the
maintains that a judge is qualified as an evidence in a petition for review
expert to determine the causation between on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Joel’s reckless driving and her whiplash Court. We can only review the presented
injury. Trial judges are aware of the fact that evidence, by way of exception, when the
whiplash injuries are common in vehicular conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the
collisions. CA.27
The Respondent’s Position We see this exceptional situation here and
thus accordingly examine the relevant
26
In her Comment,  Rebecca points out that evidence presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is
beyond the scope of a petition for review Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of preponderance of evidence
Court. She maintains that the CA’s findings of
fact are final and conclusive. Moreover, she Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
stresses that Dra. dela Llana’s arguments are "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage
not substantial to merit this Court’s to another, there being fault or negligence, is
consideration. obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
The Issue contractual relation between the parties, is a
quasi-delict." Under this provision, the
The sole issue for our consideration in this elements necessary to establish a quasi-
case is whether Joel’s reckless driving is the delict case are:
proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury. (1) damages to the plaintiff;
Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious. (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the
defendant or by some person for whose acts
The Supreme Court may review questions of the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
fact in a petition for review on certiorari when
(3) the connection of cause and effect The rationale for these graduated levels of (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none
between such negligence and the damages.28 analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful of these pieces of evidence show the causal
or negligent act or omission itself which relation between the vehicular accident and
These elements show that the source of creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual the whiplash injury. In other words,
obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach obligations.33
or omission of mutual duties that civilized Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce
society imposes upon its members, or which In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by
arise from non-contractual relations of certain the burden of proving it. which the factum probandum or the ultimate
members of society to others.29 fact can be established, as fully discussed
He who alleges has the burden of proving his below.37
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana allegation by preponderance of evidence or
must first establish by preponderance of greater weight of credible evidence.34 A.
evidence the three elements of quasi-delict
before we determine Rebecca’s liability as The reason for this rule is that bare The pictures of the damaged 
Joel’s employer. allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are car only demonstrate the 
not equivalent to proof. impact of the collision
She should show the chain of causation
between Joel’s reckless driving and her In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35 Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of
whiplash injury. the damaged car show that the massive
In the present case, the burden of proving the impact of the collision caused her whiplash
Only after she has laid this foundation can the proximate causation between Joel’s injury. We are not persuaded by this bare
presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash claim. Her insistence that these pictures show
the diligence of a good father of a family in injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must the causation grossly belies common logic.
the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30 establish by preponderance of evidence that These pictures indeed demonstrate the
Joel’s negligence, in its natural and impact of the collision. However, it is a far-
Once negligence, the damages and the continuous sequence, unbroken by any fetched assumption that the whiplash injury
proximate causation are established, this efficient intervening cause, produced her can also be inferred from these pictures.
Court can then proceed with the application whiplash injury, and without which her
and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of whiplash injury would not have occurred. 36 B.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.31
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim The medical certificate cannot be 
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in mainly on three pieces of evidence: considered because it was 
relation with the fifth paragraph of Article not admitted in evidence
2180, "an action predicated on an employee’s (1) the pictures of her damaged car,
act or omission may be instituted against the Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked
employer who is held liable for the negligent (2) the medical certificate dated November as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be
act or omission committed by his employee."32 20, 2000, and considered in resolving this case for the
reason that it was not admitted in evidence by
the RTC in an order dated September 23, "Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent
2004.38 what was the reason why you were feeling surgery on my neck, on my spine.
that pain in your left arm?
Thus, the CA erred in even considering this Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of
documentary evidence in its resolution of the A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that that surgical operation?
case. It is a basic rule that evidence which certificate, she stated that my condition was
has not been admitted cannot be validly due to a compression of the nerve, which Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve
considered by the courts in arriving at their supplied my left arm and my left hand. the compression on my nerve, which did not
judgments. resolve by the extensive and prolonged
Court: By the way, what is the name of this physical therapy that I underwent for more
However, even if we consider the medical physician, Dra.? than three months."42(emphasis ours)
certificate in the disposition of this case, the
medical certificate has no probative value for Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal
being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. knowledge of the contents of the medical
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its Atty. Yusingco: You mentioned that this Dra. certificate. However, she was not presented
probative value is not based on the personal Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical to testify in court and was not even able to
knowledge of the witness but on the certificate. What relation does this medical identify and affirm the contents of the medical
knowledge of another person who is not on certificate, marked as Exhibit H have to do certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was
the witness stand.39 with that certificate, you said was made by deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
Dra. Milla? Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or findings. We also point out in this respect that
not, cannot be given credence 40 except in Witness: This is the medical certificate that the medical certificate nonetheless did not
very unusual circumstance that is not found in Dra. Milla made out for me. explain the chain of causation in fact between
the present case. Furthermore, admissibility Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela Llana’s
of evidence should not be equated with Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been whiplash injury. It did not categorically state
weight of evidence. The admissibility of marked as Exhibit H. that the whiplash injury was a result of the
evidence depends on its relevance and vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical
competence, while the weight of evidence Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services certificate shows that it only attested to her
pertains to evidence already admitted and its were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a result of that feeling, that pain that you felt in from whiplash injury. However, the medical
particular item of evidence may be your left arm? certificate failed to substantially relate the
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana’s
on judicial evaluation within the guidelines Witness: Well, aside from the medications whiplash injury. Rather, the medical certificate
provided by the Rules of Court.41 and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my only chronicled
condition after three months indicated that I
During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified: needed surgery. her medical history and physical
examinations.
Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?
C.
Dra. dela Llana’s opinion that  experience or training which he shown to Dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s
Joel’s negligence caused her  possess.44 negligence causes her whiplash injury was
whiplash injury has no probative value not established because of the deficiency of
However, courts do not immediately accord the presented evidence during trial. We point
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in probative value to an admitted expert out in this respect that courts cannot take
the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff testimony, much less to an unobjected judicial notice that vehicular ccidents cause
in this quasi-delict case, was the lone ordinary testimony respecting special whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public
physician-witness during trial. Significantly, knowledge. The reason is that the probative knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
she merely testified as an ordinary witness value of an expert testimony does not lie in a demonstration, or ought to be known to
before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana simple exposition of the expert's opinion. judges because of their judicial
46
essentially claimed in her testimony that Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that functions.  We have no expertise in the field
Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash the expert witness may afford the courts by of medicine. Justices and judges are only
injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is demonstrating the facts which serve as a tasked to apply and interpret the law on the
a physician and even assuming that she is an basis for his opinion and the reasons on basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and
expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to which the logic of his conclusions is their corresponding legal arguments.
her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving founded.45
caused her whiplash injury without violating In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to
the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical establish her cause by preponderance of
Court, there is a substantial difference opinion cannot be given probative value for evidence. While we commiserate with her,
between an ordinary witness and an expert the reason that she was not presented as an our solemn duty to independently and
witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she impartially assess the merits of the case binds
may be received in evidence regarding: was not competent to testify on the nature, us to rule against Dra. dela Llana’s favor. Her
and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. claim, unsupported by prepondernace of
(a) the identity of a person about whom he Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has
has adequate knowledge; Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not no leg to stand on.
provide a medical explanation on the nature
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient as well as the cause and effects of whiplash WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the
familiarity; and injury in her testimony. assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008
and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of the
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom The Supreme Court cannot take Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and
he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the judicial notice that vehicular  the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
witness may also testify on his impressions of accidents cause whiplash injuries. merit.
the emotion, behavior, condition or SO ORDERED.
appearance of a person.43 Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence
presented by the parties before the trial court
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert shows that Dra. Dela Llana did not present
witness may be received in evidence on a any testimonial or documentary evidence
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, that directly shows the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and Dra.