SUPPORT

Lacson v Lacson

Facts:
Sisters Maowee and Moana are legitimate daughters of Edward. Less than a year
after Moana was born, Edward left home. For 18 years, the sisters and their mother Lea
shuttled from one dwelling to another. Lea from time to time requested Edward to
support them pursuant to his promise but Edward did not fully support them and
merely gave them small amounts for school expenses despite being gainfully employed
and owning several pieces of valuable lands. Lea and her 2 daughters were able to
survive and send the daughters to school from borrowing money from Lea’s brother
which amounted to 400-600k.
Issue:
Whether the children are entitled for support only from the time they made a demand
judicially. NO

Ruling:
The law states that Support shall be demandable from the time the person who
has a right to receive needs it and shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand. The demand made in this case is extrajudicial thru Lea, the
mother of Edward’s daughters. Edward could not have expected a demand from his
daughters who he left during tender years. What would pass as a demand was made in
this case in the form of request for financial assistance or to be true to his promise
based on a note to support the children.
The uncle who advanced money to the children is entitled to reimbursement.
The small tokens Edward gave is not sufficient since support includes everything
indispensable for sustenance.

Lim-Lua v Lua

Facts:
Susan filed an action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Danilo and prayed
500k as monthly support pendente lite citing Danilo’s huge earnings. After hearing, she was
granted support pendente lite of 250k per month excluding 135k for immediate medical
expense and 1,750,000 as arrears.
Danilo asserts that the support should be equitably reduced considering the needs of
Susan and that the advances he made be deducted in the support arrears since she continues
to live with their children and that he continues to support/provide for all the needs of the
family.

Issue:
 Whether the expenses already incurred by Danilo may be deducted from the total
support in arrears. Yes but not all.

Held:

The CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited
against the accrued support pendente lite. The monthly support pendente lite granted by the
trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and
house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two
expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel
expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries
and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite. 
The father cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the children.
The deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and
appellate courts.

Del Socorro v Van Wilsem

Facts:
Norma and Ernst was married in Holland with a son. After they were divorced, Norma
and his son came home to the Philippines and never received support. Ernst married again a
Filipina and also resided in Cebu where Norma and his son lives. She filed a complaint for
violation of RA 9262 for unjust refusal to give support which was dismissed because Ernst is an
alien.

Issue:
Whether foreign national have an obligation to support a minor child under Philippine
law.

Held:
Yes. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead
and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
A law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
RA covers him being a resident of PH.
Caram v Atty Segui

Facts:
Cristina had a child with Marcelino outside marriage. Cristina misled Marcelino into
believing that she had an abortion since she intended to have the child adopted. Upon giving
birth, Cristina voluntarily surrendered the baby. The baby was matched with spouses Medina
and trial custody commenced when Cristina (after 3 months of giving birth) changed her mind
and wrote to DSWD asking for suspension of adopting proceedings.
DSWD informed her that the decision making the baby legally available for adoption has
attained finality which terminated her parental authority making the baby a ward of the state.
Cristina filed a writ of amparo to obtain custody of the child.

Held:
Writ of amparo cannot be used to obtain parental authority and regain custody of a
child who has been legally considered a ward of the state. Writ of amparo is for enforced
disappearances. Cristina was informed that the child is in the custody of the spouses Medina.
Cristina therefore has knowledge of the whereabouts of her child and is only clearly seeking
parental authority.

David v CA

Facts:
Daise worked as a secretary of Ramon. Ramon is married. The 2 had an illicit affair which
resulted in having children, one is named Cristopher. The illegitimate children of Daise and
Ramon are accepted by the latter’s legal family. One summer, Cristopher was brought by
Ramon together with his legal family for a vacation but refused to give back the child since
then. Daise filed a petition for Habeas Corpus. It was granted by the RTC but the CA reversed
holding that a separate custody case should be filed to determine who between Daise and
Ramon is entitled and, in the meantime, awarded temporary custody to Ramon as being in the
best interest of the child since Ramon is well off.

Held:
the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to
give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole
parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father
assume custody and authority over the minor. Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off
a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she
has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Daisie and her
children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child
lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to
support her children according to her means.
 Cristopher being then less than 7 cannot be taken away from mother’s custody. Even
now before the SC that the child attained the age of 7 and expressed willingness to live with his
mother.

Libi v IAC

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot
wound from a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi. The respondents,
parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The trial court dismissed
the complaint. On appeal, the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court dismissing the
complaint of Julie Ann’s parents.
Issue: 
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by the respondent
Court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Held: 
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and responsibility in
monitoring and knowing the activities of their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son from committing the crime by
means of the gun which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not regularly
checked whether the gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety
deposit box only after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.

Espiritu v CA

FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of
husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer,
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986
named Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they
also got married. Subsequently, they had a second child named Reginald.
In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but instead of Teresita
granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought
the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister.When Teresita returned in the
Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo
and his sister to gain custody of the children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the two children should be awarded to the mother.

RULING:
No. In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be
the paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be
separated from the mother for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the
best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the
judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to
whom she preferred to stay must be considered.
It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was
found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there
was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best
to give the children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to
extend. On the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit
relationship had already caused emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with
the daughter.
Hence, the custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.

Santos v CA

FACTS:

Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were
married and beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was born,
he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, spouses Bedia who
paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy. Julia Bedia-
Santos, left for the United States to work and although abroad, Julia had been sending
financial support for her son.

Petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-
year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited
him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a “Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr.,” the trial court awarded custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
grandparents.

The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to
his grandparents and not to himself. He contends that since private respondents have
failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental
authority granted to the boy’s grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is
inappropriate.

On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-conditioned
room for the boy and that petitioner would not be in a position to take care of his son
since he has to be assigned to different places. They also allege that the petitioner did
not give a single centavo for the boy’s support and maintenance.

ISSUE: The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded
custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.

HELD:

Considerations are insufficient to defeat petitioner’s parental authority and the

concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since
he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Notwithstanding the love
from the parents, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. 22 The
latter’s wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable
to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he
took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip
him of his permanent right to the child’s custody.

While petitioner’s previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be
regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would
help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance
to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support
which a father can give.

His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many
men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the
nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers
of authority, care and custody over their children merely because of the normal
consequences of their duties and assignments, such as temporary separation from their
families.

Perez v CA

Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse

working in the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one child.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their
son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother,.
Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and awarded
custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody
over the child even under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy’s father
would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.
Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that “No child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons
therefore.
Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given to the father.
Held:  No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.
The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years
old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier
Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the child’s age to 5 years.

Vancil v Belmes

FACTS: Petitioner Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United
States of America who died in the said country and had two (2) children named Valerie and
Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Bonifacia Vancil commenced a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of
minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year
old child. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and
have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits with a
probable value of P100,000.00.

On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the
persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition
to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar
petition for guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pagadian City.

On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion
to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead
ordered petitioner Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian
upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent attempt for a reconsideration was
likewise dismissed in an Order dated November 24, 1988.
ISSUE:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

HELD: the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be
hisguardian.

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case
of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is very much
alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minor‘s guardian, respondent‘s unsuitability.
Petitioner asserts this based on the allegation that Valerie was raped several times by the live in
partner. However this case pertains to Vincent and is thus not directly attestable to that fact.

Moreover the  status as U.S.resident, her old age and her conviction of libel in the country
deem her unlikely to be able to execute the duties of a guardian (has not been in RP since 87‘).
Moreover courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of
our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

Masbate v Relucio

FACTS
Queenie was born to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together
with Renalyn's parents without the benefit of marriage. When the relationship ended, Renalyn
went to Manila leaving Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James. Ricky
James alleged that Renalyn's parents took Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her.
When asked to give Queenie back, Renalyn's parents refused and instead showed a copy of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority,
and custody over Queenie to them. 
Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody. RTC
ruled that the custody of three (3)year-old Queenie rightfully belongs to Renalyn.

ISSUES
 
 WoN the CA erred in granting Ricky James temporary custody for a limited period of twenty-
four (24) consecutive hours once every month, in addition to visitation rights, invoking
"humane and practical considerations," which were based solely on Ricky James' allegations 

Held: 
YES. It should be stressed that Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides
for temporary visitation rights, not temporary custody. 
 By granting temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial, the appellate court
overturned the tender-age presumption with nothing but Ricky James' bare allegations, to
which the Court cannot give its imprimatur. As earlier intimated, the issue surrounding
Renalyn's fitness as a mother must be properly threshed out in the trial court before she can be
denied custody, even for the briefest of periods, over Queenie

St mary’s academy v carpitanos

Facts:

St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive through visitation of other
schools. Among the students of the school who took part in the campaign was Sherwin
Carpitanos and James Daniel. Sherwin and other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva and driven by  by James, then 15 years old. On their way to
Dapitan City, the jeep turned turtle resulting in the death of Sherwin. 

The parents of Sherwin thus sued James and his parents, Villanueva and SMA. At  the trial, the
traffic investigator testified and submitted his report showing that the jeep turned turtle because the
steering wheel guide of the jeep was detached. This report and the testimony of the traffic
investigator was not disputed by any of the parties. 

After trial, the lower court held that the school is primary liable for damages as it had special parental
authority at the time of the accident. The parents of James were found to be only subsidiarily liable
and were ordered to pay only in the event of insolvency of the school. James was absolved for being
only a minor under the special parental authority of the school. Villanueva, the vehicle owner was not
held liable at all. 

Issue:

Was the lower court correct? 

Held:

No. 

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. 

This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the
school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the death or injury sustained. 
In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to show that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the school authorities. They admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was
not the negligence of SMA or the reckless driving of James, but the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Hence reliance on Art. 219, of the Family Code is unfounded. 

Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed the minor James to
drive the jeep at the time of the accident. The school did not allow James to drive the jeep. So
whether the accident was caused by the reckless driving of James or the mechanical detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events which
it had no control. If the school may be considered negligent, it was only the remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. 

At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who should be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not
used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries
caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.