This strategy of internal demolition becomes apparent if we regard the First

Meditation as in effect a dialogue that Descartes has staged between the empiricist
and the skeptic in order to clear the way for his own philosophy. The two figures
can be regarded as warring voices in the mind of the meditating “I,” who is
inclined toward empiricism, but is also familiar with skeptical worries, precisely
because they arise fromwithin the empiricist perspective. Here, then, is a
reconstruction of the main steps in the central part of the Meditation (AT 7: 18–
21) as a dialogue between the two figures. The empiricist is obliged to amend his
fundamental principle again and again in response to each new charge by the skeptic
that he is caught in an internal contradiction, until at last, reduced to silence,
he must admit complete defeat:

- EMPIRICIST: Knowledge is possible on the basis of sense experience.

- SKEPTIC: But perception of small and distant objects is fallible.
- EMPIRICIST: Nonetheless, perception of close, medium-sized objects is veridical.
- SKEPTIC: What of the possibility that you are mad?
- EMPIRICIST: I would be mad even to consider that possibility.
- SKEPTIC: Still, you must acknowledge that in the past you have mistaken dreams
for veridical perceptions. In fact, there are no sure signs by means of which dream
perceptions can be distinguished from waking ones. How can you rule out the
possibility that any perception of some close, medium-sized object is actually a
dream?
- EMPIRICIST: Even so, the sensible elements of any perception, whether I am awake
or dreaming, resemble things in reality.
- SKEPTIC: For all you know, these sensible elements could be purely imaginary.
- EMPIRICIST: Maybe, but the simplest elements in these perceptions – mathematical
notions of extension, quantity, and magnitude – express truths, even if they do not
refer to anything in nature. Pure mathematics remains certain.
- SKEPTIC: Still, there is the possibility of an omnipotent God, who created you
and could have given you a mind such that even what you think you know most
perfectly is actually false. Or if you believe your origin was some natural and
more imperfect course of events, you have all the more reason to wonder whether
your mind does not mislead you here.
- EMPIRICIST: [silence].

One of the views that is defended prominently in the First Meditation is that there
exists the possibility that we are deceived about matters that are utterly evident
to us. The possibility takes three different forms: (1) that God created us with
minds that are highly defective; (2) that our minds evolved by chance and so are
not dependable devices for tracking truth; and (3) that an evil demon is deceiving
us every time we grasp a result as obvious.

(1) The first argument is that God is omnipotent and hence that, strictly speaking,
He has enough power to have created us so that our minds are mistaken about things
that seem obvious. Descartes writes: "Hace mucho que tengo en mi espíritu cierta
opinión, a saber, que existe un Dios (...)" (cita hasta los otros se engañan, cómo
sé que no me engaño yo en las cosas más sencillas).
If God is omnipotent, the meditator is thinking, there are absolutely no limits on
what He can do. He created us, and He has enough power to have made our minds such
that we are mistaken about matters that are utterly evident to us. Perhaps there
are things that are more important than truth – for example faith – and God would
have us focus our attention on those instead. Or perhaps the acquisition of truth
is important, but there is a larger context to be considered, in which human minds
have a different assignment and role. As Descartes puts it a few lines later, "si
repugnara a su bondad el haberme hecho tal que yo me engañara siempre (...) y sin
embargo, no puedo dudar de que lo permita" (a veces igual me engaño). There is
clearly a reason that God allows us to err sometimes – a reason that is consistent
with His goodness – and perhaps there is a reason for keeping us off the mark in
general.
(2) The second argument for the view that it is possible that our minds are
deceived about matters that are utterly evident to us starts with the assumption
that it is possible that our cognitive mechanisms are the product of a cause that
is less than omnipotent. Descartes writes: "Habrá tal vez aquí personas (...)"
(hasta la parte de mientras más imperfecta mi causa, más me voy a equivocar). If
there is no skillful hand guiding the development of our cognitive processes, there
would be a possibility that at some point our minds would come to have
imperfections and faults. If the process is sufficiently random, it is possible
that we are deceived about matters that are utterly evident to us.

(3) The third argument is that it is possible that there is an evil genius that
takes steps to ensure that we have as many false beliefs as possible. Descartes
anticipates that some of his readers will find it implausible that God would have a
reason for creating us to be deceived all the time. These same readers, if they
believe that we have been created by God, would also find implausible the
suggestion that we evolved by chance: "Supondré que existe, no por cierto un
verdadero Dios (...) pero en la creencia falsa de tener todo esto". Perhaps this
being is the devil, or a spirit that was created by God but that took a bad turn.
Descartes does not explicitly mention the evident truths of mathematics or logic in
the discussion of the demon, but he does mean for them to be included in the domain
of things that are dubitable. He is clear that there is no belief that the demon
scenario leaves untouched.