Bustamante V.

CA (1991)
FACTS:
April 20, 1983 6:30 am: a collision occurred between a 1947 model gravel and sand truck driven by
Montesiano and owned by Del Pilar and a Mazda passenger bus driven Susulin along the national road at
Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite
front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger
bus, ripping off the wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat
several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained:
1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of Emma Adriano Bustamante and father of Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda,
Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante;
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of spouses Salvador and Patria Jocson;
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of spouses Jose and Enriqueta Ramos;
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of spouses Narciso and Adoracion Himaya; and
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of spouses Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina
The bus was registered in the name of Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly
by Magtibay and Serrado
before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other, coming from the
opposite directions of the highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus
driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that the truck was heading towards
his lane. Not minding this circumstance due to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking,
Susulin shifted from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus, which was
ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by
a person along the shoulder of the highway
RTC: liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary
CA: owner and driver of the sand and gravel truck appealed was granted
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance can apply making the bus negligent in failing to avoid the collision and
his act in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate cause of the collision making him
solely liable

HELD: NO. Petition is granted. CA reversed.

the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a
position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.
a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit
brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles
the court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability

G.R. No. L-1563 August 30, 1949

In the matter of the petition for naturalization of JOSE GO (alias JOSEPH GOTIANUY), petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
ANTI-CHINESE LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINE and FELIPE FERNANDEZ, oppositors-appellees.
M. Jesus Cuenco and Regino Hermosisima for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Guiazon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
From a decision of Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg of the Court of First Instance of Cebu denying his petition
for naturalization, Jose Go has appealed to this court.
Appellant was born of Chinese parents on December 5, 1914, in Cebu City, where he has continously
resided up to the present. He commenced his studies in the Cebu Chinese School, and after finishing the
third grade he had a Mrs. Shelton for tutor. Later he enrolled in the De la Salle College in Manila, where
he finished the intermediate course. Sometime in 1929 he left for Hongkong and enrolled for three years
in the De la Salle College of that city. Thence he proceeded to the United States and continued his studies
in Armstrong College in California, in the University of California, and in New York University. He
returned to the Philippines in August, 1940. He is married to Gim F. Lock, an American-born citizen of
Chinese parents. He has no children. He speaks and writes English and the Visayan-Cebuano dialect.
Since his return to the Philippines appellant has been engaged as insurance agent and inspector of the
Visayan Surety Company, from which occupation he averages an annual income of P2,500. He is also
engaged in the export of copra, with a capital of P120,000. He owns real property in Cebu City with an
assessed value of P7,800. In the words of the trial court: "He is not opposed to organized government nor
is he affiliated with any association or group of persons upholding doctrines opposed or antagonistic to
organized government. He does not believe in the necessity or in the wisdom and propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the success or attainment of his ideas. He is not a polygamist nor a
believer in the practice of polygamy. He has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude
and he is not suffering from any incurable disease nor from mental alienation. He believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution."
The trial court's decision denying the petition was based on the proofs presented by the oppositors-Atty.
Vicente Sotto, in behalf of the so-called Anti—Chinese League of the Philippines, and Mr. Felipe
Fernandez, a Filipino citizen residing in Cebu City—consisting of the testimony of two political detainees
named Pedro Gerona and Pedro Labra. These witnesses testified in substance that in the month of
November, 1943, the appellant sold to the Japanese Navy one Fairbanks-Morse motor and two truck tires.
Pedro Gerona also testified that he saw the appellant on different occasions in the Normal School where
the officers of the Japanese Kempei-tai were located. Pedro Labra also testifies that appellant was a
prominent member of the Chinese Association of Cebu City, which according to him donated to the
Japanese Navy P50,000 in cash and some scrap iron, and that appellant frequently visited the offices of
the Kempei-tai.
In rebuttal appellant vehemently denied the imputations of Gerona and Labra and swore that in August,
1942, he evacuated to the barrio of Tupsan, municipality of Mambajao, Oriental, Misamis, where he
stayed until about September, 1944, when he came back to Cebu and after three days left with his father
for the mountains. He was corroborated by Francisco Vibares, of Tupsan, Mambajao, who testified that
during the period mentioned by appellant, that is to say, from August, 1942, to August or September,
1944, the appellant lived in the barrio of Tupsan, Mambajao, Oriental Misamis, in the house of a cousin
of the witness, and that he came to know the appellant because he (witness) supplied appellant with goat's
milk every day.
Appellant also presented Exhibit J, a clearance issued to him by the CIC on August 14, 1945.
The trial court declared that appellant lacked the qualification required by section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, in that he had not conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with
the community in which he was living. As additional reason for denying the petition the trial court
invoked paragraph (f) of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, which disqualifies "persons who,
during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos."
1. Neither the so-called Anti-Chinese of the Philippines nor Felipe Fernandez, a private individual, is a
proper party-oppositor in this case. These oppositors should have presented their opposition, and any
proof they might have in support thereof, to the Solicitor General, who, either personally or through his
delegate or the provincial fiscal, is the only officer or person authorized by law to appear on behalf of the
Government and oppose an application for naturalization. (Sec. 10, Revised Naturalization Law; Anti-
Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix and Lim, 44 Off. Gaz., 1480.) Nevertheless, inasmuch as an
assistant provincial fiscal appeared at the trial of the case and made the oppositions of said oppositors his
own, and the Solicitor General appears to have approved his actuation, we consider the defect or
irregularity complained of by the appellant in his first assignment of error as having been cured or
corrected.
2. The testimony of the two witnesses for the oppositors is of doubtful credibility. They were both under
prosecution for treason. One of them Pedro Labra, has been found guilty by this court and sentenced to
life imprisonment (see G. R. No. L-857, Oct. 19, 1948). Said testimony was, in our opinion, successfully
rebutted by appellant and his witness Francisco Vibares. Moreover, the trial judge apparently
misconstrued said testimony when he said in his decision that the sale by the appellant of a motor and two
truck tires to the Japanese Navy took place "sometime in the month of November, 1944," whereas
according to said witnesses it took place sometime in November, 1943, when the appellant was in
Mambajao, Oriental Misamis.
But even assuming that the appellant did sell such merchandise to the Japanese Navy and that he was a
member of the Chinese Association of Cebu City, which allegedly donated P50,000 in cash and some
scrap iron to the Japanese Navy, such transaction would not, in our opinion, be a sufficient ground to
reject appellant's petition, specially if we take into consideration the clearance issued to him by the CIC.
The trial court itself said that it was not convinced that the appellant was a spy of the Japanese
notwithstanding the efforts of the oppositors to prove that he was.
3. We find no basis in the record for the finding that appellant had not mingled socially with the Filipinos
or had not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos. There is no opposition to the petition on that score. At the trial the appellant testified without
contradiction: "Since my birth I have been a resident here and I have been with contact with Filipinos and
all my friends are in Cebu and our contact became to be more friendly. . . . I am more familiar with the
customs and laws of the Philippines and the United States. I was brought up here, also my schooling, for
the last fifteen years, he has been with the Philippines and the United States."
4. In reasoning out its decision, the trial court said: "It seems . . . that the law makes it mandatory on the
part of the court to grant Filipino citizenship if and when the applicant succeeds in proving that he has all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law. This court believes that [the] law time
has come when a more rigid policy should be adopted in granting the Filipino citizenship. . . . This court
would even go farther by subscribing to a policy calculated to make it discretionary on the part of [the]
courts to grant or not grant Filipino citizenship even though the applicant shall have satisfactorily proven
that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law. . . . .
We cannot subscribe to that proposition. It is the sworn duty of the judge to apply the law without fear or
favor, to follow its mandate—not to tamper The court cannot adopt a policy different from that of the law.
What the law grants, the court cannot deny..
5. The Solicitor General contends that appellant has not satisfactorily proven that the laws of China grant
to Filipinos the right to become naturalize citizens or subjects thereof. The same contention was urged on
us in Jose Leelin vs. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-1761, Aug. 24, 1949, wherein we said: "It
suffices to say that in previous cases a translation of the Chinese naturalization law, made and certified to
be correct by the Chinese Consulate General in Manila, was admitted and considered sufficient evidence
to establish that the laws of China permit Filipino to become citizens of that country."
The judgment appealed from is reversed and appellant's petition for naturalization is hereby granted. The
corresponding certificate of naturalization will accordingly be issued and registered in the proper civil
registry as required by law. No pronouncement as to costs.

Santiago v. Commission on Elections, et al.

Case No. 90
G.R. No. 127325 (March 19, 1997)
Chapter IV, Page 129, Footnote No.26
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Private Respondents filed with Respondent
Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 2,
Art. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition
based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been
passed. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution,
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2, Article 17 of the
1987 Constitution.
HELD:
NO. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws.
If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefore, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy
of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
GALUBA VS LAURETA
G.R. No. 71091 January 29, 1988
FACTS:
The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to
annul an amicable settlement arrived at by the parties through the mediation of the Lupong Tagapayapa,
in the absence of a repudiation of said amicable settlement within the 10-day period provided for in
Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1508.
RULING:
Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which were
promulgated "for the amicable settlement of disputes at the barangay level, without judicial recourse,"
also provides that "[f]ailure to repudiate the settlement or the arbitration agreement within the time limits
respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said
grounds," i.e., fraud, violence or intimidation.
Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the remedy set forth in Section 13 must face the
consequences of the amicable settlement for he can no longer file an action in court to redress his
grievances arising from said settlement. It should be emphasized that under Section 11 of said law, "[t]he
amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court
upon the expiration of the ten [10] days from the date thereof unless repudiation of the settlement has
been made or a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal
court."
Hence, the lower court correctly held that P.D. 1508 does not provide for a judicial procedure for the
annulment of an amicable settlement because the remedy of repudiation supplants the remedy of a court
annulment. An aggrieved party may only resort to a court action after he has repudiated the settlement in
accordance with Section 13 as Section 6 clearly states that repudiation is a pre-condition to the filing of a
complaint regarding any matter within the authority of the Lupong Tagapayapa. It should be clarified,
however, that the "petition for nullification" mentioned in Section 11 refers to an arbitration award
pursuant to Section 7 of the same law and not to an amicable settlement.

Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals

Case No. 151
G.R. No. L-9274 (February 1, 1957)
Chapter IV, Page 144, Footnote No.76
FACTS:
Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs
Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The duties
were paid and the shipment released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector
reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation and
imposed additional duties.
Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack
of jurisdiction citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. Provision says that “the
Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. However,
under Sec. 11 of same Act, the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector
of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector
of Customs.
HELD:
Yes, there is indeed a disparity between Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The
Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical
error was committed in Sec. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. To
support this, the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under
Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code, ‘the Collectors of Customs are
mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision
and control.
In this ruling, the court did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rectified
an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous
intention of the Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construction, it is not the letter,
but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important.

Case No. 280

G.R. No. 84811 (Aug. 29, 1989)
Chapter IV, Page 169, Footnote No.164
FACTS:
The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to
deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. Petitioner contends that the
case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and
not the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
2. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 1344)
HELD:
The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent’s argument
relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail.

Tañada v. Cuenco, et al
Case No. 286
G.R. No. L-10016 (February 28, 1957)
Chapter XI, Page No. 451, Footnote No.55
FACTS:
The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel,
Lopez, and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). Upon
nomination of the Citizens Party, Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as
member of SET. Then, the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET.
Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel, Lopez,
and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET, the other Senators
must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Respondents alleged, however, that six
members of the Electoral Tribunal “shall be members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives”, is mandatory. The word “shall” is imperative in nature relative to the
number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE:
W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was
valid or lawful.
HELD:
No. “The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is
more restricted … except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the
discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not
necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case.” Hence, “if the
judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not
made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may be
rejected.”

PEOPLE v. LACSON [October 7, 2003]

Facts: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures,and that
these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts thatSec 8 was meant to
reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with theconstitutional guarantee to the right to
speedy trial.Issues:1. WON the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the MFR given
theywere only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners’ contention that while§8
secures the rights of the accused, it doesn’t & shouldn’t preclude the equally important right
of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice,the said
rule may not be given a retroactive application.2. WON the application of the time-bar under §8 RCP 117
be given a retroactive applicationw/o reservations, only & solely on the basis of its being favorable to the
accused.
The Court isn’t mandated to apply rules retroactively just because it’s favorable to the accused.
The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State & the accused. When therule was
approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and not
retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the State’s right to due process.
A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust & oppressive consequences to the State& to the
victims of crimes & their heirs.

KING v. HERNAEZ 4 SCRA 791

Facts: Macario King, a naturalized Filipino, owned the grocery store Import Meat & Produce. He
employed 3 Chinamen, one as purchaser and 2 others as salesmen. He sought the permission of the
President to retain the services of the 3, but was denied based on the Retail Trade Law and the Anti-
Dummy Law, which prohibit aliens from interfering in the management and operation of retail
establishments. King contends that the 3 aliens are employed in non-control positions and do not
participate in the management, thus, they are not covered by the Anti-Dummy Law.
Issue: Whether the employment of the 3 Chinamen is covered under the Anti-Dummy Law.
Held: YES. The prohibition covers the entire range of employment, regardless of whether they are control
or non-control positions. Thus, employment of aliens for evening clerical positions is prohibited. The
reason is obvious: to plug any loopholes that unscrupulous aliens may exploit for the purpose of
circumventing the law.

United States vs Luis Toribio

Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was
denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao
without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in
one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his
carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public
use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the
legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or
injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it
shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests
of the community.”

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 251
G.R. No. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31, 1962)
Chapter 5, Page 201 , Footnote No.100
FACTS:
A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent, in a
confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated him.
Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim. The act
of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. Thus, respondent and filed a criminal
case.
ISSUE:
W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense.
HELD:
The law makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties in any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Matabuena v. Cervantes
Case No. 172
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)
Chapter IV, Page 143, Footnote No.69
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix
Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married.
After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the
donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void.”
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because
the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet
married and were simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within
the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for
the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the
possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on
the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law
relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the
deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have
exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and
Respondent were legitimated by marriage.

Largado v. Masaganda
Facts of the case:
On January 7, 1960, Angelo de los Reyes filed a petition before the Justice of the Peace court of Unisan,
Quezon, praying that he be appointed guardian of the persons and properties of certain minors. The
hearing was set. Aquilina Largado, mother of the minors, because of the failure of her counsel to appear,
was declared in default. Two hours later, the counsel appeared and moved for there consideration of the
order default, but the same was denied. Thereupon, the justice of the peace court issued an order
appointing Angelo de los Reyes guardian as prayed for. A month after, Aquilina Largado filed a petition
to dismiss on the ground that said justice of the peace court has no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian
under Republic Act No. 2613, which was enacted on August 1, 1959. This motion was also denied.
Hence, Aquilina Largado filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of
First Instance of Quezon praying for the nullification of the orders entered by the Justice of the Peace
Court of Unisan on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. And acting on it, the court a quo grant edex parte
the writ prayed for. In the meantime, respondents gave their answer justifying the appointment by the
Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan, and after issues were joined, the court a quo rendered decision
holding that the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan has no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian because the
same is prohibited by Republic Act No. 2613. In due time, petitioner took the present appeal.
Issue:Whether or not, a justice of the peace court has jurisdiction to appoint a guardian at the time the
present petition was filed before the Justice of the Peace Court of Unisan?
Held:No. Justice of the Peace cannot appoint a guardian.
Ratio:Relying on Section 10 of Republic Act No. 2613, the said section amends Section 88 of Republic
Act No. 296, known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, provides that the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peacecourts shall not extend, among others, to the appointment of guardians. SC held that provisions of
saidAct are clear.

Amatan v. Aujero
Facts:
Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended party
and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the approval of the judge, the
information was amended to attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The plea
bargaining agreement was entered into and approved by Judge Aujero pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of
the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - which allows an accused with the consent of the
offended party, to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. Amatan filed an
administrate suit against Judge Aujero for gross ignorance of the law for approving the plea bargaining
agreement and sentencing the accused for the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge explained that what
he did was in accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
Held:
Yes, Judge Aujero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in
criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in
the crime charged." The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally
liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower
offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the
case before us, which could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright
confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he recommended
an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application
of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of
logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code 5 admonishes judges to take
principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat
justice ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to
invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation
of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent
result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts
to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the
performance of his duties.

Pritchard v. Republic
Case No. 245
G.R. No. L-1715 (July 17, 1948)
Chapter 4.16, Footnote No.114, page 156
FACTS:
The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from
filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for
exemption, it is imperative that Petitioner’s children should be enrolled during the
entire period of residence, and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his
children in school, he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to entitle
him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention.
Issue:
W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking
the aforementioned provision.
HELD:
The provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense
that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire
period of the residence of the applicant. The drafters of the law could not have
intended to create an absurd or impossible situation.

Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons

Case No. 122
G.R. No. L-278 (July 18, 1946)
Chapter V, Page 234, Footnote No. 230
FACTS:
Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps
Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. 286 wherein she was specifically
charged with (a) “active collaboration with the Japanese,” and (b) “previous
association with the enemy.” When she, along with her co-detainees and co-
Petitioners in that case, was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth
Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of
December 29, 1944, she was detained by said Government under that charge. And
under the same charge during all the time referred to, she has remained in custody
of the Commonwealth Government.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail.
HELD:
Yes. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall
before conviction be bailable, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong. Since the People’s Court Act and the Constitution and
other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law, and since the language
used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of
bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the
same subject, the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital
offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. To hold that the People’s Court has
uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of
guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all, is to make the Act offensive
not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution, which is contrary to the
most elementary rules of statutory construction.

Demafiles v. Comelec
Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967)
Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159
FACTS:
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to
reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering
that they were reelectionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner.
Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question
were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as
municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision.
ISSUES:
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from
Precinct 7.
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified
from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers.
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return.
HELD:
RA 4970 reads “the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality
of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall
have qualified.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of
meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January
following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created
municipality.
No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause.
However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation
should be annulled. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of
municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent
to act on the said body.” Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and
illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order
canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular.

Munoz & Co. v. Hord

ISSUE: “Consumption” limited or broad meaning
STATUTE: word is used in statute which provides that “except as herein specifically exempted, there
shall be paid by each merchant and manufacturer a tax at the rate of 1/3 of 1% on gross value of money in
all goods, wares and merchandise sold, bartered, or exchanged for domestic consumption.
HELD: Considering the purpose of the law, which is to tax all merchants except those expressly
exempted, it is reasonable and fair to conclude that legislature used in commercial use and not in limited
sense of total destruction of thing sold.

People vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010

Self-defense- the burden of proof is on the accused
Facts:
On August 15, 2003, five (5) separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and three (3) counts of
attempted murder were filed against appellant.
When arraigned, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges. Trial on the merits then ensued.
Not finding credence in appellant's claim of self-defense, the RTC convicted him of murder, frustrated
murder and attempted murder on three (3) counts.
Appellant assails the trial court and the CA for giving credence to the prosecution’s evidence. He admits
having killed Regis and wounding Dalit, but insists that he did so in self-defense.
Issue:
Did the accused act in self-defense?
Ruling:
No. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability for crimes only if
satisfactorily proved. It requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
In People of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Mara, we explained:
One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of
proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming
self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly
and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be
successfully pleaded.
In this case, appellant utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. His version
of the events was uncorroborated, and his testimony was found to be less credible by the trial court. On
the other hand, the surviving victims were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them, without any
provocation on their part. The credibility of the prosecution witnesses had been weighed by the trial court,
and it found their testimonies to be more convincing. As a rule, the appellate court gives full weight and
respect to the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, since the trial judge has the
best opportunity to observe their demeanor. While this rule admits of exceptions, none of such exceptions
obtains in this case.
In Razon v. People, we held:
Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of
evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
The trial court and the CA cannot, therefore, be faulted for rejecting appellant’s plea of self-defense.
This Court also agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk
to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.
The pieces of evidence gleaned by the trial court, the facts, are enough to show that treachery was
employed by appellant. The attack was sudden, as testified to by the witnesses, and unexpected.
Provocation on the part of the victims was not proven, and appellant’s testimony that the victims were
about to attack him cannot be given credence. The victims had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming
and had no opportunity to mount a defense. Thus, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance
to qualify the crime to murder.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty
imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 223 of the RPC. The prison
term imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 03-3639 is correct.
We also affirm the CA ruling that appellant is guilty of attempted murder, not of frustrated murder, in
Criminal Case No. 03-3640 for the injury sustained by Dalit. No convincing proof was offered to show
that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal and would have caused his death had medical help not been
provided. It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that
would have brought about the victim's death.

In the Matter of the Instestate Estate of Pedro Santillon, Claro SANTILLON, petitioner-
appellant,vs.Perfecta MIRANDA, Benito MIRANDA and Rosario CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281, June 30, 1965FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son, Claro.
Four years after Pedro’s death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration which
was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales. The court appointed
commissioners to draft a project of partition and distribution of all properties of Pedro. Claro then filed a
motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties invoking Art.892 of the
New Civil Code insisting that after deducting ½ from the conjugal properties (conjugal share of Perfecta),
the remaining ½ must be divided as follows: ¼ for her and ¾ for him. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed
besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to another ½ of the remaining half.
After due notice and hearing, the court held that Perfecta is entitled to ½ shares and the remaining ½ share
for Claro after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
The manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent when the only survivors are the
spouse and one legitimate child.
RULING:
Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Code’s chapter on legal or intestate
succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference
from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives
with legitimate children(general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only
one child(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the
legislator’s desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations. Surviving spouse
concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-half of the intestate estate. When an intestacy occurs, a
surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the deceased is entitled to one-half of the
estate of the deceased spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.

Chua v. Civil Service Commission

Case No. 60
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146
FACTS:
RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as
well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who
are qualified:
· Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees
of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall
apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless
of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation…”
Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of
the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent
Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to
Respondent Commission yielded the same result.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the
benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).
HELD:
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain
Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.
The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.

Felipe v. Leuterio
Facts: In an oratorical contest held in Naga, Camarines Sur, first honor was given by the board of five
judges to Nestor Nosce, and second honor to Emma Imperial. Six days later, Emma asked the court of
first instance of that province to reverse the award, alleging that one of the judges had fallen error in
grading her performance. After a hearing, the court declared Emma winner of the first place.
Issue: Whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an
oratorical competition.
Held: No party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that
the boards decision is final and unappealable. Also in American jurisprudence, no litigation questioning
the determination of the board of judges. The Judiciary has no power to reverse the award given by the
board of judges. For the court would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar
competitions.

Angara vs Electoral Commission (G.R. No. L-45081)

Separation of Powers
FACTS: In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio
Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of
Tayabas. The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most number
of votes and thereafter took his oath in office. A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election
of the petitioner. The petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by
the Electoral Commission.
ISSUES: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy; and
Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming
cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner.
HELD: The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through
its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the
concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its
power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial
department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments.
The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.” In view of the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua. The petition of writ of prohibition against the
Electoral Commission is hereby denied.