STRATEGIC STUDIES

1. INTRODUCTION IN STRATEGIC STUDIES

The use of the “strategic” adjective or adverb may seem, at first glance, one of the instances
of unchallengeable ubiquity. Public policies need to be framed around strategies and strategic
objectives, companies may develop branding or marketing strategies, and even sport franchises
employ strategies throughout the sporting season (and transfer strategies in the post-season). The
authors acknowledge that this overuse of the term may lead to a high degree of uncertainty as to
its meaning1: in the end, how can we make the difference between the tactics and the strategy a
football team uses?
At the same time, certain characteristics of strategy may pinpoint its distinctive
characteristics: strategy involves planning deliberate actions, using resources which are already
available or may be later gained, in order to advance purposes, in a situation marked by the
actions of multiple agents with competing interests and, indeed, strategies 2. Moreover, especially
in the case of state actors, strategy is on numerous occasions the result of planning and
interaction between different bureaucratic departments, which do not always work as fully
committed partners3. It is also a matter of debate to what extern the organization of modern
societies has created the need or the expectation for strategic planning and action. Strategic
Studies, as a distinct field of study, can be seen as being concerned with the use or the threat of
use or actual use of armed force, between different actors, for political purposes, a perspective
which remains highly influenced by the writings of 18 th century Prussian officer, Carl von
Clausewitz, whose views will be discussed later on. It is nevertheless important to add that, to a

“Thus in the field of abstract thought the inquiring mind can never rest until it reaches the extreme, for
here it is dealing with an extreme: a clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their
own.”

Carl von Clausewitz

1
Lawrence Freedman (2013), Strategy. A History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. X
2
Lawrence Freedman, op.cit., pp. X-XII.
3
Graham T. Allison, Phillip K. Zelikow, Essence of Decision

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consistent degree, Strategic Studies as a distinct field of study has been concerned with issues of
military conflict.
Another equally influent perspective on strategy sees is as the final result of the balanced
interaction between ends (“objectives towards which one strives”), ways (“course of action”) and
means (“instruments by which some ends can be achieved”) 4. Additionally, strategy has been
seen as equally an art and a science 5, operating within a climate of increased uncertainty 6 and
following apparently paradoxical rules7. One more prominent feature, which is also owned to
Clausewitz, is his insistence on the political nature of the confrontation between the sides of a
conflict, hence excluding other forms of violence from systematic consideration.
However, in spite of the width of the definitions or perspectives employed, the relevance
of certain key concepts, central not only to Strategic Studies, but to social sciences in general,
needs to be appraised. Even if states are not the only actors whose strategic actions are
considered, indeed, a wide range of Strategic Studies literature is dedicated to the interaction
with non-state actors, they retain a centrality within the field. In a classical perspective, states are
seen as the legitimate monopoly on violence 8 on a specific territory; states retain a prominent
role due to their significant military capacities and their destructive and potential.
The central position of states is also highlighted by the political nature of strategy. One of
the most compelling arguments of Clausewitz is his dictum that “war is not merely an act of
policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other
means.”9 Hence, regardless of whether we are talking about competing strategies, conflicts or
wars, one of the dominant perspectives on strategic studies is that what sets apart the field is the
political consequences of these events, i.e. their influence on the power of the political actors
themselves.

The State
4
Arthur F. Lykke Jr. (2001), “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy” in Joseph R. Cerami, James F.
Holcomb, Jr. (eds.), US Army College Guide to Strategy, available at
https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/01cerami.pdf, consulted on 4th of October 2020.
5
See, for example, Bernard Brodie (1959), “Strategy as an Art and Science”, in Naval War College Review, Vol. 12,
No.2 (Feb.), pp. 1-20
6
Peter Paret (1986), “Clausewitz”, in Peter Paret (ed), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear
Age, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 199-202
7
Nota Luttwak, Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace
8
Max Weber (1978), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, (edited by Guenther Roth, Claus
Wittich) Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA; London: University of California Press, p. 56.
9
Carl von Clausewitz (2007), On War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 28-29

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 The state plays a foundational role in Western strategic studies, meaning is not only an
important actor, but often the main reference when we use concepts and ideas related to political
violence, military powers, strategy, war or international relations. Most definitions follow
Weber`s notion of a “community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly the legitimate
physical force” in a territory 10. Thus, in the modern era, the state links power relations, with
authority and sovereignty, thus being considered, sometimes, as the main unit in international
relations and security studies11.
As most units, it combines at least, some common interests and identities, like the
national ones, with an institutional structure which allows it to act as a whole, by drawing on
some resources12. Generalizing these considerations, the classical models relied on the concepts
of a unitary and rational actor, power, capabilities and strategy and were criticized by alternative
theories, relying on administrative routines, domestic and bureaucratic politics or ideology and
culture13. What is important in these debates is that one should have a critical attitude to the
image of an unchanging actor, with persistent and always coherent goals14
In the Hobbesian and other modern traditions, states are responsible for keeping internal
peace, suppressing sedition or civil wars. The external side of the aforementioned monopoly is
well illustrated by Charles Tilly`s famous point about “states make war and war makes state”,
which mean, not only that coercion is essential for states, but that waging war consolidated them
as institutions in the modern era, and pressed for internal adjustments 15. Thus, Realists and other
IR scholars argue that the absence of an equivalent for the state on the international level,
enjoying the monopoly of political coercion, is the most important source of conflict, on this
stage16.
States are not responsible only for war, who’s occurrence is a rare phenomenon, but they
also negotiate and build the framework for world`s order, including on the use of force (Bull).
10
Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, in Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures, Hackett Publishing Company Inc.,
1919[2004]; p. 33.
11
Michael G. Roskin, Robert L. Cord, James A. Medeiros, Walter S. Jones, Științapolitică. O introducere, Polirom,
2010[2011], pp. 24-27.
12
Peter Turchin, Historical Dynamics. Why States Rise and Fall, Princeton University Press, 2003, p. 37.
13
Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown and Company,
1971, pp. 2-7.
14
Martin Wight, Politica de putere, Arc, Chișinău, 1946[1998], pp. 36-37.
15
Charles Tilly, ”Reflections on the History of Eurpean State-Making”, in Charles Tilly (ed.), The Formation of
National States in Western Europe, Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 42.
16
Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press, 1954[2001], pp.
224-238.

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Some groupings like alliances are often decisive in strategic interactions, which international
institutions like the United Nations enjoy legitimacy. Thus, states are complex and versatile
actors, for which a contextual understanding is enlightening
The significance of the state was contested, especially after the Cold War was ended
(1989—1991), when economic globalization and information technology were thought to
sideline it and maybe, to lead to a historical decline (Tilly). Alongside these broad trends, the
frequency of classical, interstate war became smaller by comparison with intra-state or
transnational conflicts, involving at least one non-state actor, for example, civil wars and
terrorism. The Covid-19 pandemic, itself a global phenomenon, propelled again the states in full
view, continuing a trend noticeable at least since the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the recurrent
debates on China`s rise17.

Military force
Military force refers to either the aspect of organized violence, taken as an element of a
more general notion of power or as the forces itself and is closely related to the modern notions
of war and battles18 (Rupert Smith). For Realists and traditionalists, is the main capability which
allows a nation-state to survive, due to a combination of anarchy, resources or human nature 19.
This argument is criticized by many, which point to other sources of power or of different type of
interactions, other than classic warfare20.
Robert Art distinguished four meanings or objective for the military power of an
international actor: ”defense” (more treated as a synonym for warfighting), ”deterrence” (a threat
intended to avoid certain actions); ”compellence (pressure for an active goal) and demonstrations
(”swaggering”)21. Out of these, the first two is the most widely studied in the strategic studies
literature, out of a traditional concern for war, but also as a reaction to the development of
nuclear weapons. Sharing the fate of many concepts, they are often blurry and imprecise when
used to understand concrete situations22.

17

18
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Knopf, 2005[2007].
19

20
Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 4th ed., Longman, 1977[2012].
21
Robert Art, “To What Ends Military Power?”, International Security, Spring 1980, 4(4), pp. 3-35.
22
Paul R. Viotti, Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edition, Pearson 2001[2013], pp.
307-314.

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 The scale of military force was considered the main scale to measure power and its
changed are still seen as significant events. For example, the Chinese armed forces
modernization process raised concerns in Western capitals during the last years 23. After the
development of massive nuclear arsenals and a sum of political and economic changes, this
primacy was contested, and deterrence or demonstrative functions grew in importance24.
Looking at forces from a pragmatic/organizational point of view, they are usually
classified in conventional, nuclear and irregular, taking the nation-state requirements as a model.
The conventional refers to the classical use of military power, in battles and maneuvers, for
warfighting and compellence; the nuclear, mostly for deterrence, and the irregular covers a
nebulous of non-state, terrorist or guerilla actors. The last class grew in importance after the end
of Cold War.
The main issues regarding military force are related to its value, taking account that big
general or hegemonic wars are considered outdated; the strengths and weaknesses of deterrence
as a significant
Social Sciences
strategy for major
actors and alliances
or the role of state
and non-state actors.
Political Science
For example, the
wars in Balkans, the
International Relations fight against
terrorism, the Iraq

Security Studies
and Afghanistan
interventions show
that state is not the
Strategic Studies
only one who can
wield force (Rupert
D. Smith). But Russia in Crimea and the debates on the rise of China stimulated a certain return
to more traditional concerns about great power rivalry and the use of force.

23

24
Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence.

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Strategic Studies within Social Science
As a field of study, Strategic Studies has developed after the end of the Second World
War, when, at least on the Western side, the scale and the imperatives of the Cold War allowed
for the bureaucratization and institutionalization of an intellectual enquiry meant to reduce the
risks and the consequences of a direct conflict between the two superpowers25. Throughout most
of the period, at least until the mid ‘80s, Strategic Studies can be seen as a prominent field within
the larger discipline of International Relations, given the importance attributed in the Cold War
political and military context to military conflicts. Strategic Studies can be seen as a subfield of
Security Studies, focusing primarily on issues pertaining to the threat of use or the actual use of
armed force. The shifting debate in Security Studies, especially in regard to the widening and the
deepening of the concept of security and the importance of the non-military dimensions 26 raised a
significant debate as to the relevance of Strategic Studies as a distinct field 27. A significant cause
for concern has been also the overlapping between political and scholarly positions – several
significant Strategic Studies authors have held political (Henry Kissinger is only the most
prominent example) or advisory positions
In spite of these critical assessments, the authors believe that insofar as the use of force is
concerned, Strategic Studies continues to be relevant in explaining and understanding the
dynamics of international conflict. Even though the strategic environment of the 21 st century has
given rise to the prominence of non-state actors (such as al Qaeda or ISIS), international
terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, increased use of UAVs, conventional (Georgia, Ukraine,
Nagorno-Karabakh) and non-conventional (Irak, Afghanistan, Congo, Syria) conflicts, Strategic
Studies still holds the instruments to offer a deeper understanding and a wider explanation of
these events, processes and dynamics.

The Western-centric perspective of Strategic Studies

25
John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, (2002), “Introduction” in John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, Colin S. Gray,
Strategy in the Contemporary World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 2
26
Barry Buzan, Lene Hansen (2009), The Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 187-225
27
Richard K. Betts (1997), “Should Strategic Studies Survive?” in World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, Fiftieth
Anniversary Special Issue (Oct., 1997), pp. 7-33

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 While some authors which originate outside the Western World can be seen as iconic
(Sun-Tzu, Mao, Che Guevarra) for Strategic Studies, the discipline has to a large extent been
driven by Western, especially European debates and practices. Little or no attention has been
given to the developments occurring outside Western Europe, on the background of purported
intellectual, material and technical superiority28.
Inasmuch as strategic debate is concerned, the influence of authors such as Clausewitz
and Joimini, who drew lessons from their personal experience and from the impact of the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, rarely touched the conflicts outside Europe or the conflicts
between European and native peoples. Such conflicts, which actually tended to be more
numerous than the clashes between European powers (between 1837 and 1901, Great Britain
fought over 400 battles in 60 colonial campaigns29), tended to be bloodier, more destructive and
gain a sometimes genocidal character. Against the apparently “civilized” conflicts between
European nations, colonial wars or campaigns eschewed the difference between civilian and
military targets, being specifically excluded from any debate about the relevance of rules of
warfare: the powers which convened at The Hague excluded colonial or imperial matter from the
negotiations. Sometimes, as in the case of the Two Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860),
moral considerations on the Western side were totally lacking: protection of free trade of drugs
was considered more important than matters of public health.

28
Jeremy Black (1999), Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, London: Cassell, pp. 20-58
29
Lawrence Freedman (2017), The Future of War. A History, PublicAffairs, p.

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  “I attach more importance to these deep incisions The separation between
into the enemy's country, because this war differs “civilized” conflict and war against
from European wars in this particular: we are not natives could not be maintained,
only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people,
and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel especially as the industrialization of
the hard hand of war, as well as their organized warfare brought societies in conflict.
armies.” Gen. Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign
General William Tecumseh Sherman (1863-1864), which entailed the
destruction of civilian life and
property, the Great Paraguayan War
William T. Sherman, Letter of William T. Sherman to
Henry Halleck, December 24, 1864, Civil War Era NC, (1864-1870), or the British counter-
accessed October 5, 2020,
insurgency campaign against Boer
commandos during the latter stages of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) showed that neat
borders between different types of conflict were fading and Western powers were no less prone
to regard civilians as targets as war as numerous native peoples had been.

“By what right do they then in return use the poisonous drug to injure the Chinese
people? Even though the barbarians may not necessarily intend to do us harm, yet in
coveting profit to an extreme, they have no regard for injuring others. Let us ask,
where is your conscience? I have heard that the smoking of opium is very strictly
forbidden by your country; that is because the harm caused by opium is clearly
understood. Since it is not permitted to do harm to your own country, then even less
should you let it be passed on to the harm of other countries -- how much less to
China! Of all that China exports to foreign countries, there is not a single thing which
is not beneficial to people: they are of benefit when eaten, or of benefit when used, or
of benefit when resold: all are beneficial. Is there a single article from China which has
done any harm to foreign countries?”

Lin Zexu (1839), Letter of Advice to Queen Victoria, available at

https://cyber.harvard.edu/ChinaDragon/lin_xexu.html, accessed October 5, 2020

The Three levels of War

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 While the most basic concepts employed seldom in Strategic Studies, strategy and tactics
can often have different meanings and be the object of several, sometimes contrasting
definitions, it is important to notice that their interaction describes different levels of action.
Hence, strategy can be seen as the highest level of warfare, “focusing on policy objectives”, “the
art of winning war and securing peace”30. Tactics, on the other hand, represents the lowest level
of interaction, focusing on the “concepts and methods
Strategy
used to accomplish a particular mission”, or, “the art and
Winning wars
science of winning engagements and battles”31. The
operational level serves as a link between the strategic Operations
and tactical level, entailing “the use of tactical results to attain Winning
strategic objectives”32 campaigns

Criticism of Strategic Studies

The field has been at times criticized for several reasons, having
to do with its theoretical underpinnings, the advice or
recommendations given by its scholars, or the statute of
Tactics
the scholars themselves. Summarily, the “charges” Winning battles and
brought concern the discipline’s focus on conflict and
engagements
force, its apparent lack of proper concern for ethical
issues, its very scholarly nature, the prominent position of
the state, as well as the adoption of a dominating, but narrow theoretical perspective33.
The answers to the criticism highlights the transformation the discipline has gone through
after the end of the Cold War: recent events show the continuous relevance of force (especially
military) and conflict, but a significant number of scholars have dedicated themselves to
discussing ethical issues, which are sometimes a major concern for the military themselves (see
the debates in the Israeli or US armies as to the ethical nature of the rules of engagement). From

30
***US Marine Corps (1997), Warfighting, p. 28, available at
https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/LLI/MLD/Toolkits/0001_MCLDW_MCDP1Warfighting.pdf?ver=2018-09-26-
102627-107, consulted on 5th Octeber 2020
31
***US Marine Corps, op.cit., pp. 29-30
32
***US Marine Corps, op.cit., p. 30
33
John Baylis, James J. Wirtz (2019), “Introduction: Strategy in the Contemporary World” in John Baylis, James J.
Wirtz, Colin S. Gray (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies (6th ed.),
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 8-12.

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an ethical point of view, the question of force is an important subject for debate, in both its
aspects, the use and threat. An example: out of the nine declared or suspected nuclear powers,
five are stable democracies, most of them Western; is this a good thing? How can one grapple
with the tension between nuclear deterrence and human rights? Should we use ethical rules to
direct the progress of technology and research? These issues, which have obvious and significant
consequences, are not absent from the debate within Strategic Studies.
Furthermore, methodological debates and the specific meaning of what a scholarly
pursuit actually entails are not a feature intrinsic to Strategic Studies. More problematic,
however, remains the line between academic and political pursuits – while there is a legitimate
interest to bring academics into the consulting process or even in the drafting of particular
policies, advocacy for a particular course of action may highlight the problematic divide between
the public and the academic space.
At the same time, while Realist or traditionalist considerations have been dominant in the
field, it is difficult to argue that they maintain their intellectual hegemony, especially as issues
concerning the conduct of military hostilities, the human costs of warfare, the rise in number of
military operations other than war (MOOTW) or peace-supporting operations (PSO), the gender
problem within armed forces etc. force a wide reconsideration of the theoretical apparatus that
has long underpinned Strategic Studies.

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