B-3.
Exception not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs
Enrico vs. Heirs
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007
FACTS:
The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad
Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and
petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and
begot seven children, herein respondents. On
May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26,
2004, Eulogio married petitioner before
the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without
the requisite of a marriage license. Eulogio
passed away six months later. They argued that
Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a
man and a woman who have been living
together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to
petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited
that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was
dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1
May 2004, which was barely three months from
the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not
have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years. To further their cause,
respondents raised the additional ground of lack
of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios
serious illness which made its
performance impossible.
In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she
and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife
under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly;
hence, they were exempted from the
requirement of a marriage license. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was
performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo,
Cagayan, and solemnized by
the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense,
she sought the dismissal of the action on the
ground that it is only the contracting parties
while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
ISSUES:
Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the
declaration of nullity of marriage between
Eulogio and Lolita
RULING:
No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, effective March 14,
2003, covers marriages under the Family Code
of the Philippines does not allow it.
The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on August 26, 2004
which falls within the ambit of the order. The
order declares that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. But it does
are already without any recourse under the law.
They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding
for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
FACTS:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On
12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise
Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting
on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live
Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real
properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal
properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late
father’s estate.
ISSUE:
Did the Court err in declaring the marriage of
Amelia to Eliseo void?
HELD:
No. The existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and
signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The
said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from
the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not
diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. in a void marriage, no marriage has
taken place and it cannot be the source of rights,
such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that
Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia,
may impugn the existence of such marriage
even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or
collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a
cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo
and Amelia, and the death of either party to the
said marriage does not extinguish such cause of
action.
Powers of Settlement Court (Rule 73, Sec. 3)
Venue (Rule 73, Sec. 1)
Eusebio vs. Eusebio
Facts:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of
Rizal a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres
Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on
November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City.
Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan,
Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are
illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the
petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled
in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that
the case be dismissed upon the ground that
venue had been improperly laid.
The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and
overruled his siblings’ objection.
Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in
Rizal?
Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October
29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in
San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a
house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension,
Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio,
who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino
St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to
transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered
a stroke and was forced to live in his son’s
residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place
merely for one own’s health” even if coupled
with “knowledge that one will never again be
able, on account of illness, to return home.
Having resided for over seventy years in
Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres
retained such domicile.
Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon
City permanently. There is no direct evidence of
such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire
to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did
not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was
not presented to testify on the matter. Andres
did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children
remained in that municipality. In the deed of
sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres
gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence.
The marriage contract signed by Andres when
he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion
Villanueva two days prior to his death stated
that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.
The requisites for a change of domicile include
(1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2)
physical presence at the place chosen, (3)
intention to stay therein permanently. Although
Andres complied with the first two requisites,
there is no change of domicile because the third
requisite is absent.
Anent the contention that appellants submitted
themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal
because they introduced evidence on the
residence of the decedent, it must be noted that
appellants specifically made of record that they
were NOT submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose
only of assailing the same.
In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the
time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no
authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
venue having been laid improperly.
Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained
until a new domicile is gained. It is not changed
by presence in a place for one’s own health.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA,
PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189 (1976)
FACTS:
Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with
the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of
administration alleging “that on April 26, 1973,
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba,
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the
same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratix over the
estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the
deceased, contending that
1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months
before his death as shown by his death
certificate and therefore have an improper
venue.
2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over
the petition.
CFI denied the motion.
CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the
administratix.
Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on
appeal by certiorari.
ISSUES:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How
can it be determined in the present case?
b.) What does the word “resides” in Revised
Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the
estate?
Held:
No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try,
hear and decide a case base on the merits or the
substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect
of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by
the constitution and cannot be waived or
stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court
define venue as the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein real property
involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue
is the location of the court with jurisdiction. It is
more on convenience purposes. It’s more on
procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it
may be waived or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate.
“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary.
In the present case, SC ruled that the last place
of residence of the deceased should be the venue
of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his
death certificate. A death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that
the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid in
the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a
special administratix.
RODOLFO V. JAO v. CA, GR No. 128314,
2002-05-29
Facts:
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for
issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99,
over the estate of his parents
He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was
gradually dissipating the assets of the estate
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition
on the ground of improper venue.[2] He argued
that the deceased spouses did not reside in
Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the
time of their deaths.
The decedent's actual residence was in
Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother
used to run and operate a bakery
In his opposition,[3] Perico countered that their
deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo's
house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave
the information regarding the decedents'
residence on the death certificates in good faith
and through honest mistake.
The court required the parties to submit their
respective nominees for the position.[6] Both
failed to comply, whereupon the trial court
ordered that the petition be archived.
The court required the parties to submit their
respective nominees for the position.[6] Both
failed to comply, whereupon the trial court
ordered that the petition be archived.[7]
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate
proceedings be revived.[8] After the parties
submitted the names of their respective
nominees, the trial court designated Justice
Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of
the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner Rodolfo was denied. Rodolfo filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals,... he Court of Appeals rendered... the
petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
Rodolfo's motion for reconsideration was
denied Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case
of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,[1
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the
venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,[18]
on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1,
which applies specifically to settlement
proceedings. He argues that while venue in the
former... understandably refers to actual
physical residence for the purpose of serving
summons, it is the permanent residence of the
decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section
1.
Issues:
The main issue before us is: where should the
settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga,
where the decedents had their permanent
residence, or in Quezon City, where they
actually stayed before their demise?
Ruling:
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the
Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court
located in the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those
in the case at bar.
It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his
residence because, strictly speaking, his
physical presence in Quezon City was just
temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that
the decedents have transferred to petitioner's
Quezon City residence
Furthermore, the decedents' respective death
certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their
demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself
who filled up his late mother's death certificate.
To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows... that at
that time, at least, petitioner recognized his
deceased mother's residence to be Quezon
City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the
entry in Ignacio's death certificate,
accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
We agree with the appellate court's observation
that since the death certificates were
accomplished even before... petitioner and
respondent quarreled over their inheritance,
they may be relied upon to reflect the true
situation at the time of their parents' death.
the documents presented by petitioner
pertained not to residence at the time of... death,
as required by the Rules of Court, but to
permanent residence or domicile
Petitioner's argument fails to persuade.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is DENIED
Principles:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death,... In
Raymond v. Court of Appeals[19] and Bejer v.
Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same
meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person's actual residence or place
of abode, provided... he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743,
February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor
of the Province of Laguna. He contracted three
marriages. His first was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, but Virginia died on 1963. On May 1,
1968, He married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son.
But on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
at State of Hawaii which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody of December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, He married Felicidad
Sagalongos. He had no children but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992. Felicidad
sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate, filing a letter of
administration before RTC Makati. Rodolfo
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Further claimed that Felicidad has no
legal personality to file the petition because she
only a mistress of his father because at the time
of death, he was still married to his second wife.
Felicidad presented the evidence that prove the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry lee had already
been dissolved. And she claimed that Felicisimo
had the capacity to marry her by virtue of par. 2
Article 26 of the family code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felicidad my file for letters of
administration over Felicisimo’s state.
HELD:
Yes, Felicidad has the legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status that as a surviving
wife of Felicisimo or his co-owner under the Art.
144 of the Civil code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry the respondent in 1974, the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as he may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
Parties-in-Interest
a. Probate Proceeding
G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN VS. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(THIRD SPECIAL CASES DIVISION),
VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ AND ROSA
DIONGSON
FACTS:
Constantino filed a petition for the
probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will
provided that all his shares from properties he
earned with his wife shall be given to his brother
Segundo (father of Constantino). In case
Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to
Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-deceased
Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted
daughter of the deceased, and the latter's widow
Rosa filed a motion to dismiss on the following
grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and
(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
been preterited.
ISSUE:
Was there preterition?
HELD:
Preterition consists in the omission in
the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone
of them either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she
does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir,
there is no preterition even if she is
omitted from the inheritance, for she is
not in the direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the
other respondent Virginia, whose legal adoption
by the testator has not been questioned by
petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he
were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was
totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an
heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance. The only
provisions which do not result in intestacy are
the legacies and devises made in the will for they
should stand valid and respected, except insofar
as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner
together with his brothers and sisters to the
entire inheritance of the testator results in
totally abrogating the will because the
nullification of such institution of universal
heirs - without any other testamentary
disposition in the will - amounts to a declaration
that nothing at all was written.
In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have
an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not
the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a
legatee there being no mention in the
testamentary disposition of any gift of an
individual item of personal or real property he is
called upon to receive. At the outset, he appears
to have an interest in the will as an
heir. However, intestacy having resulted from
the preterition of respondent adopted child and
the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in
effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal
standing to petition for the probate of the will
left by the deceased.
b. Intestate Proceedings
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743,
February 6, 2007
FACTS:
Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor
of the Province of Laguna. He contracted three
marriages. His first was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, but Virginia died on 1963. On May 1,
1968, He married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son.
But on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce
at State of Hawaii which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
Custody of December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, He married Felicidad
Sagalongos. He had no children but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992. Felicidad
sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate, filing a letter of
administration before RTC Makati. Rodolfo
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Further claimed that Felicidad has no
legal personality to file the petition because she
only a mistress of his father because at the time
of death, he was still married to his second wife.
Felicidad presented the evidence that prove the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry lee had already
been dissolved. And she claimed that Felicisimo
had the capacity to marry her by virtue of par. 2
Article 26 of the family code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felicidad my file for letters of
administration over Felicisimo’s state.
HELD:
Yes, Felicidad has the legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status that as a surviving
wife of Felicisimo or his co-owner under the Art.
144 of the Civil code.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry the respondent in 1974, the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as he may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
ALFREDO HILADO v. CA, GR No. 164108,
2009-05-08
Facts:
Well-known sugar magnate Roberto S.
Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000...
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita
Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto),
and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino... two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners
Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor... value of the assets
of the decedent to be P5 Million, "net of
liabilities."
RTC issued an order appointing private Ruling:
respondent as administrator of the estate of...
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a
administration in her favor
legal interest... in the matter in litigation, or in
In the List of Liabilities attached to the the success of either of the parties, or an interest
inventory, private respondent included as against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two affected by a distribution or other disposition of
pending claims then being litigated before the property in the custody of the court x x x"
Bacolod City courts
While the language of Section 1, Rule
RTC required private respondent to submit a
19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
complete and updated inventory and
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case
appraisal... report pertaining to the estate...
law has consistently held that the legal interest
petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
required of an intervenor "must be actual and
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
material, direct and immediate, and not simply
Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with
contingent and... expectant."[
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to
the intestate proceedings The settlement of estates of deceased persons
fall within the rules of special proceedings under
RTC issued an order denying the
the Rules of
manifestation/motion, on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties within the Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the
in the intestate proceedings. absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[12]
practicable, applicable to special
dismissing the petition and declaring that the
proceedings."... notwithstanding Section 2 of
Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in
Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19
refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the
does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose
intestate proceedings.
credit is based on a contingent claim. The
Hence, the present petition definition of "intervention" under Rule 19
simply does not accommodate... contingent
Issues:
claims.
W/n lower courts erred in denying them the
even if... it were declared that petitioners have
right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19,
the estate of Roberto Benedicto... they prayed
it would not necessarily mean the disallowance
that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all
of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC
processes and orders issued" by the intestate
since the right to intervene is not one of those
court as well as the pleadings filed by
reliefs.
administratrix
Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any
Benedicto with the said court... prayed that the
interested persons" or "any persons interested
intestate court set a deadline for the submission
in the estate" to participate in varying capacities
by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified
in the testate or intestate proceedings... it
and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
appears that the claims against Benedicto were
submission thereof, order the inheritance tax...
based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of
Traders
the same.
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
moved that the intestate court set a deadline for
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed
the submission by the administrator of her
under the notice to creditors required under
verified annual account, and,... upon
Rule 86.
submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, These actions, being as they are civil, survive the
with due notice to them and other parties death of the decedent and may be commenced...
interested in the collation, preservation and against the administrator pursuant to Section 1,
disposition of the estate Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the
intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by
In the event the claims for damages of
its administrator, was successfully impleaded in
petitioners are granted, they would have the
Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil
right to enforce the judgment... against the
case[21] was... already pending review before
estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may
this Court at the time of Benedicto's death.
they be allowed to participate in the intestate
proceedings?
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in
the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to
their desire to protect their interests it
appearing that the property in litigation is
involved in said proceedings and in fact is the
only property of the estate... left subject of
administration and distribution; and the court
is justified... in taking cognizance of said civil
case because of the unavoidable fact that
whatever is determined in said civil case will
necessarily reflect and have a far reaching
consequence in the determination... and
distribution of the estate.
Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court,
expressly provides that "action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to... recover damages
for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against the
executor or administrator."
Anybody with a contingent claim based on a
pending action for quasi-delict against a
decedent may be reasonably concerned that by
the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the
estate of the decedent... would have already
been distributed, or diminished to the extent
that the judgment could no longer be enforced
against it.
while there is no general right to intervene on
the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed
to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the
intestate court not explicitly provided for under
the Rules, if the prayer or relief... sought is
necessary to protect their interest in the estate,
and there is no other modality under the Rules
by which such interests can be protected.
petitioners be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders issued in connection with
the intestate proceedings, as well as the
pleadings filed by the administrator of the
estate... running account would allow them to
pursue the appropriate remedies should their
interests be compromised, such as the right,
under
Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate
court if property of the estate concealed,
embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
The Court ruled that petitioners were
"interested persons" entitled to access the
court... records in the intestate proceedings.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise,
access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable
precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them.
We do not doubt that there are reliefs available
to compel an administrator to perform either
duty, but a person whose claim against the
estate is still contingent is not the party...
entitled to do so.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as
we have explained, petitioners should not be
deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules
on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this
decision.
Principles:
Section1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right
of "any person interested" to oppose the
issuance of letters testamentary and to file a
petition for administration;
Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the
giving of notice of hearing on the petition for
letters of administration to... the known heirs,
creditors, and "to any other persons believed to
have interest in the estate;
Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person
interested in the estate" to petition for the
allowance of a will;
Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an
individual interested in... the estate of the
deceased "to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of
any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the
decedent's title or interest therein;
Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice
of the time and place of the... examination and
allowance of the Administrator's account "to
persons interested;
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the
court to give notice "to the persons interested"
before it may hear and grant a petition seeking
the disposition or encumbrance of the
properties of... the estate
Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person
interested in the estate" to petition for an order
for the distribution of the residue of the estate of
the decedent, after all obligations are either
satisfied or provided for
This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which
declares that questions concerning ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate but
claimed by another person... should be
determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction. These rules would be
rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an
intestate proceedings can be closed by any time
at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x... x... the
Court, citing Dinglasan, stated:
"[t]he rulings of this court have always been to
the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect
their interests are allowed to do so to protect the
same, but not for a decision on... their action."...
the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that
the... assets are being preserved and disposed of
in accordance with the rules will be duly
satisfied.
G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008
TAYAG V. TAYAG-GALLOR
FACTS:
On 15 January 2001, respondent herein,
Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over the
estate of Ismael Tayag. Respondent alleged in
the petition that she is one of the three (3)
illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag
and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was
married to petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag,
but the two allegedly did not have any children
of their own. On 7 September 2000, Ismael
Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real
properties both of which are in the possession of
petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter
sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the
settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner
allegedly promised to give respondent and her
brothers P100,000 each as their share in the
proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only
gave each of them half the amount she
promised. Respondent further averred that
on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused
the annotation of 5 September 1984 affidavit
executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the
properties to be the paraphernal properties of
petitioner. The latter allegedly intends to
dispose of these properties to the respondent’s
and her brothers’ prejudice.
Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that
she purchased the properties subject of the
petition using her own money. She claimed that
she and Ismael Tayag got married in Las
Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October 1973, and
that they have an adopted daughter, Carmela
Tayag, who is presently residing in the USA. It
is allegedly not true that she is planning to sell
the properties. Petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the suit because respondent failed
to state a cause of action. Petitioner reiterated
her sole ownership of the properties and
presented the transfer certificates of title thereof
in her name. She also averred that it is necessary
to allege that respondent was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate
child. There being no such allegation, the action
becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative
father. The motion was denied by the trial
court.
CA affirmed. The CA ruled that the allegation
that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices
for a cause of action, without need to state that
she had been recognized and acknowledged as
such. However, respondent still has to prove
her allegation and, correspondingly, petitioner
has the right to refute the allegation in the
course of the settlement proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N respondent’s petition for the
issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that
respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent, without
stating that she had been acknowledged or
recognized as such by the latter
HELD: Yes, the allegation that respondent is an
illegitimate child of the decedent suffices even
without further stating that she has been so
recognized or acknowledged.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a
petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested
person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag, the Court
defined an interested party as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. This interest,
furthermore, must be material and direct, not
merely indirect or contingent.
Essentially, the petition for the issuance of
letters of administration is a suit for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael
Tayag. The right of respondent to
maintain such a suit is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional
rights as an illegitimate child of the
decedent which, in turn, may be
established through voluntary or
compulsory recognition.
Voluntary recognition must be express such
as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil
register, a final judgment, a public instrument
or private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned. The voluntary recognition of
an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs
no further court action and is, therefore, not
subject to the limitation that the action for
recognition be brought during the lifetime of the
putative parent. Judicial or compulsory
recognition, on the other hand, may be
demanded by the illegitimate child of his
parents and must be brought during the lifetime
of the presumed parents.
Petitioner’s thesis is essentially based on her
contention that by Ismael Tayag’s death,
respondent’s illegitimate filiation and
necessarily, her interest in the decedent’s estate
which the Rules require to be material and
direct, may no longer be
established. Petitioner, however,
overlooks the fact that respondent’s
successional rights may be established
not just by a judicial action to compel
recognition but also by proof that she had
been voluntarily acknowledged and
recognized as an illegitimate child.
Respondent in this case had not been given the
opportunity to present evidence to show
whether she had been voluntarily recognized
and acknowledged by her deceased father
because of petitioner’s opposition to her petition
and motion for hearing on affirmative
defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine
if her petition is actually one to compel
recognition which had already been foreclosed
by the death of her father, or whether indeed she
has a material and direct interest to maintain
the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary
acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.
EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR. vs. JUDGE
RAMON A. CRUZ G.R. No. 167321 July 31,
2006
Facts:
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and
Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the
devisees therein. Upon Loreto‘s death a certain
Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the
probate of the will. While the petition for the
probate of the will was pending, the devisee
Oscar Casa died, intestate. Aquino filed a
pleading entitled ―Appointment of
Administrator‖ signed by Candelaria, Jesus,
Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael
and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, praying that
one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as
administrator of the estate of the deceased and
that he be substituted for the deceased.
Petitioner contested the same.
Issue:
WON a person nominated as ―administrator‖
by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee in a
will under probate may validly substitute for
that devisee or legatee in the probate
proceedings despite the fact that such
administrator is not the court-appointed
administrator of the estate of the devisee or
legatee?
Ruling:
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not
need to first secure the appointment of an
administrator of his estate, because from the
very moment of his death, they stepped into his
shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee
of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior
appointment of an administrator or executor of
the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his
heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted
as representatives of the estate. Said heirs may
designate one or some of them as their
representative before the trial court.
C. Summary Settlement (Rule 74, Sec. 2)
D. Regular Settlement Proceeding
 Testate Proceedings
a. Venue (Rule 71, Sec. 1)
URIARTE vs. CFI Vicente Uriarte vs. CFI
Negros Occidental, CFI Manila, Juan Uriarte
Zamanoca and Higinio Uriarte May 29, 1970
Dizon, J. Short version:
Vicente filed a petition for the settlement of the
estate of his father in Negros. Subsequently, a
petition for probate of the will of his father was
filed in Manila. Court held that the proper court
to try the case was Negros. The deceased was a
non-resident alien and while his properties were
not in just one place, it was Negros who first
took cognizance of the case. However, the will
was already probated in Manila and the Court
blamed Vicente for being negligent in raising the
improper venue issue in time. The probate of the
will was affirmed.
FACTS
November 6, 1961 – Vicente filed with CFI
Negros a petition for the settlement of the estate
of the late Don Juan Uriarte alleging therein
that as a natural son of the latter, he was the sole
heir and that during the lifetime of said
decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in
CFI Negros for his compulsory acknowledgment
as such natural son CFI Negros appointed the
PNB as special administrator and later set the
date for the hearing of the petition and ordered
that the requisite notices be published in
accordance with law. The record discloses,
however, that, for one reason or another, PNB
never actually qualified as special
administrator. December 19, 1961 – Higinio
Uriarte filed an opposition to the petition
alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased
Juan Uriarte who had executed a Last Will and
Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy
whereof has been requested and which shall be
submitted to the court upon receipt and further
questioning Vicente’s capacity and interest to
commence the intestate proceeding. August 28,
1962 – Juan Uriarte Zamacona commenced a
special proceeding in CFI Manila for the probate
of a document alleged to be the last will of the
deceased Juan Uriarte and filed with CFI
Negros a Motion to Dismiss on these grounds:
As a deceased left a last will, there was no basis
to proceed with the intestate proceedings
Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and
interest to initiate the intestate proceedings, he
not being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent. Vicente opposed the MTD contending
that, as CFI Negros was first to take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of Juan Uriarte, it
had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
same. CFI Negros granted Juan Uriarte
Zamacona’s MTD and dismissed the proceeding
before it. MR denied. He filed a notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal. The
administrator appointed by CFI Manila
objected to the approval of the record on appeal.
While this was pending, Vicente Uriarte filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Therefore, CFI Negros disapproved the record
on appeal to give way to the certiorari. Vicente
Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in CFI Manila
asking for leave to intervene therein, for the
dismissal of the petition and for the annulment
of the proceedings had in the special proceeding
therein. Motion was denied. It appears from the
records that Vicente had filed a civil case in CFi
Negros during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte to
obtain judgment for his compulsory
acknowledgement as his natural child. It is
likewise clear that at the time he filed the action,
as well as when he commenced the petition for
settlement of estate, he had not yet been
acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte.
The record further discloses that the special
proceeding before CFI Negros has not gone
further than the appointment of PNB as special
administrator (who failed to qualify). On the
other hand, CFI Manila admitted to probate the
document submitted to it, as thelast will of Juan
Uriarte, the petition for probate appearing not
to have been contested.
ISSUE: Whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona
should have filed the petition for probate of the
last will of Juan Uriarte with CFI Negros or was
entitled to commenced the corresponding
separate proceedings in CFI Manila
Held: Rule 73, Section: the estate of a decedent
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in
the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
court of first instance of any province in which
he had estate. The deceased Juan Uriarte was a
non-resident alien. Therefore, the CFIs in
provinces where he left any property have
concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proper special proceedings for the settlement of
his estate. Vicente argues that when CFI Negros
took cognizance, CFI Manila no longer had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the special
proceeding. It cannot be denied that a special
proceeding intended to effect the distribution of
the estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate succession
or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his
estate. It is equally true, however, that in
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this
jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose. Thus it has been held
repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first
instance it is found that the decedent had left a
last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings even if
at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render
final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently
appointed. These facts support the view that
Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have submitted
the will for probate in CFI Negros either in a
separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion in the already pending special
proceeding:
1. It is not in accord with public policy and the
orderly and inexpensive administration of
justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation,
especially if several courts would be involved.
2. When Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to
Vicente’s petition for the issuance of letters of
sdministration, he had already informed the
Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte
had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been
requested for submission to CFI Negros.
When Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed his MTD in
CFI Negros, he had submitted there a copy of
the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact
it may be inferred that he knew before filing the
petition for probate with the Manila Court that
there was already a special proceeding pending
in CFi negros for the settlement of the estate of
the same deceased person. It is well settled that
wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural
defect, and in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in this case, Vicente has waived the
right to raise such objection or is precluded from
doing so by laches. He knew of the existence of
the will since 1961 when Higinio Urirate
opposed the initial petition in CFI Negros. He
was also served with notice of the alleged will
and of the filing of petition for its probate when
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed an MTD in CFI
Negros on 1962. He only filed the omnibus
motion in the Manila Court on April 1963. By
then, The Manila Court had already appointed
an administrator and had admitted the will to
probate. Toa llow him now to assail the exercise
of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila court and the validity of all the
proceedings therein would put a premium on
his negligence. SC is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even
if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same
proceedings repeated in some other court of
similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the
present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late.
DISPOITIVE petition dismissed
 Probate of Will (Rule 75, Sec. 1)
Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23,
1966; 17 SCRA 449, digested
(Special Proceedings – Difference between
Preterition and Disinheritance)
Facts:
Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and
sisters.
Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario
instituting the former as the sole, universal heir
of all her properties. She prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letter of
administration be issued to her.
Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will
on the ground that by the institution of
Remedios as universal heir of the deceased,
oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the
direct ascending line – were illegally preterited
and that in consequence, the institution is void.
Article 854 provides that preterition of one,
some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir.
Petitioners contention is that the present is a
case of ineffective disinheritance rather than
one of preterition drawing the conclusion that
Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.
Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister
of the deceased as the sole, universal heir
preterited the compulsory heirs.
Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line –
her parents, and her holographic will does not
explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their
names altogether, the case is one of preterition
of the parents, not a case of ineffective
disinheritance.
Preterition “consists in the omission in the
testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a
testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for
a cause authorized by law”.
Where the one sentence will institutes the
petitioner as the sole, universal heir and
preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it
contains no specific legacies or bequests, such
universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is
void. And intestate succession ensues.
IN MATTER OF PETITION TO APPROVE
WILL OF LEODEGARIA JULIAN. FELIX
BALANAY v. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ,
GR No. L-39247, 1975-06-27
Facts:
Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos
Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at
the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her
husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six
legitimate Children named Felix Balanay, Jr.,
Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B.
Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B.
Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a
petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate
of his mother's notarial will dated September 5,
1970 which is written in English. In that will
Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the
owner of the "southern half" of... nine conjugal
lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner
of two parcels of land which she inherited from
her father (par. III) and (c) that it was her desire
that her properties should not be divided among
her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that
their legitimes... should be satisfied out of the
fruits of the propertie
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that
after her husband's death (he was eighty-two
years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all
the conjugal lands (which she described as "my
properties") should be divided and distributed
in the manner set forth in that part of... her
will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal
lands as if they were all owned by her. She
disposed of in the will her husband's one-half
share of the conjual assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio
opposed the probate of the will on the grounds
of lack of testamentary capacity, undue
influence, preterition of the husband and
alleged improper partition of the conjugal
estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix
Balanay, Jr.
should collate certain properties which he had
received from the testatrix.
The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty.
Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice
to creditors was in order since the parties had
agreed on that point. It adopted the view of
Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was
void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974... it
dismissed the petition for the probate,
converted the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a
notice to creditors and set the intestate
proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2,
1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior
orders of
June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to
creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and
published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star
in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974
that its publication be held in abeyance.
Issues:
whether the probate court erred in passing upon
the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on
its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring
it void.
Ruling:
We are of the opinion that in view of certain
unusual provisions of the will, which are of
dubious legality, and because of the motion to
withdraw the petition for probate (which the
lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization), the trial court...
acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
had been established. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the... intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before
it is probated, the court should meet the issue
(Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA
449. Compare with Surnilang vs. Ramagosa, L-
23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369;
Cacho vs. Udan,... L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13
SCRA 693).
The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result
in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless
it is to be presumed that the testator would not
have made such other dispositions if the first
invalid disposition had not... been made" (Art.
792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions
of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid
parts will be upheld if they can be separated
from the invalid without defeating the intention
of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary... scheme, or doing injustice to the
beneficiaries"
The statement of the testatrix that she owned
the "southern half" of the conjugal lands is
contrary to law because, although she was a
coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and
proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrgial and
Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion,... 38 Phil.
414). But that illegal declaration does not
nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the
rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid
and the partition therein may be given effect if it
does not prejudice the creditors and impair the
legitimes. The distribution and partition would
become effective... upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income
should be equitably divided among the children
and the surviving spouse.
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals
No. L-62952, October 9, 1985
Facts
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon,
Rizal. He left a last Will and
Testament where he named
and appointed petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as
his sole and only executor of his estate. It is
clearly stated in the will that the testator
was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez
by whom he had two legitimate children, but
since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with
petitioner as husband and wife.
In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin
Jugoand the petitioner herein, Sofia, were
married on Tarlac before the Justice of the
Peace.
The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely,
his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his
children his entire estate and the free portion
thereof to herein petitioner.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for
the probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased, but the legal wife of the testator
Rufina and her children filed an opposition
alleging inter alia that the execution of the will
was procured by undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at
the time of the execution of the will, the
testator was already very sick and that the
petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting
integrity and thus letters testamentary
should not be issued to her.
The lower court denied the probate of the will on
the ground that as the testator
admitted in his will to cohabiting with the Facts:
petitioner because on the face of the will, the
This case is about the probate before
invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.
Philippine court a will executed by Ruperta C.
The appellate court declared the will to be
Palaganas, a foreigner although it has not been
valid except that the devise in favor of the
probated in its place of execution.
petitioner is null and void.
Respondent filled with the RTC of
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation made by
Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the probate of
the testator in favor of herein petitioner
Ruperta’ s will and for his appointment as the
was valid.
special administrator of her estate. However,
Held: petitioners oppose on the petition arguing that
an unprobated will executed by an American
No. There is no question from the records about citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the
the fact of a prior existing first time in the Philippines.
marriage when Martin Jugo lived together in an
ostensible marital relationship for 22
years until his death. It is also a fact that Martin
ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a
Jugo and Sofia Nepomuceno contracted
foreigner abroad may be probated in the
a marriage before the Justice of the Peace of
Philippines although it has not been previously
Tarlac.
probated and allowed in the country where it
The man was then 51 years old was executed.
while the woman was 48. Nepomuceno
contends that she acted in good faith for 22
years in the belief that she was legally married Held:
to the testator. The records do not
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of
sustain that she acted in good faith for 22 years
wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
in the belief that she was legally
same have not as yet been probated and allowed
married to the testator, since the last will and
in the countries of their execution. A foreign will
testament itself expressly admits indubitably on
can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.
its face the meretricious relationship between
Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will
the testator and petitioner, the devisee.
of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the formalities prescribed by the law of the place
Civil Code is against the making of a donation where he resides, or according to the formalities
between persons who are living in adultery or observed in his country.6
concubinage. It is the donation
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of
which becomes void. The giver cannot give even
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
assuming that the recipient may
if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign
receive. The very wordings of the will invalidate
country, the RTC of the province where he has
the legacy because the testator
an estate may take cognizance of the settlement
admitted he was disposing the properties to a
of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76
person with whom he had been living in
further state that the executor, devisee, or
concubinage.
legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after
the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
Subject to Probate whether the same be in his possession or not, or
is lost or destroyed.

G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011 Our rules require merely that the petition
for the allowance of a will must show, so far as
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional
PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the
RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL decedent; (c) the probable value and character
ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the
PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if
GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners, the will has not been delivered to the court, the
vs.
name of the person having custody of it.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of
the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is
sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the estate he left in such province.7 The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will
has already been allowed and probated in the
country of its execution.
DY YIENG SEANGIO v. AMOR A. REYES, GR
NOS. 140371-72, 2006-11-27
Facts:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents
filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870 of the RTC, and praying
for the appointment of private respondent Elisa
D. Seangio-Santos as special... administrator
and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy
and in full command of her faculties; 2) the
deceased Segundo executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the...
power to manage and exercise control and
supervision over his business in the Philippines;
3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified
to serve as the administrator of the estate of
Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic... will, dated September 20, 1995,
disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the
purported holographic will, petitioners averred
that in the event the decedent is found to have
left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically... suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo,... The document
that petitioners refer to as Segundo's
holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa
naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila
at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at
disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko
ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong
anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging...
lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita
ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na
si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob
ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa
ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako
nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni
Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los
Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad
ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya
sa... mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at
ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at
ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin
si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan
ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si
Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi
siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre
1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong
saksi. [3]
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for
the dismissal of the probate proceedings[5]
primarily on the ground that the document
purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
does not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased and thus... does not meet the
definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code. According to private respondents, the will
only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by
the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and
nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs
were not named nor... instituted as heir, devisee
or legatee, hence, there is preterition which
would result to intestacy. Such being the case,
private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only
on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not
barred from... delving into the intrinsic validity
of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the
petition for probate when on the face of the will
it is clear that it contains no testamentary
disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion
to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to
a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; 2) private respondents question the
intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of... the
will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition
of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundo's
will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs
to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs.
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed
order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,
clearly shows that there is preterition, as the
only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and
Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted,
Article 854 of the New Civil Code... thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng
Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not him in accordance... with law in the form of a
apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the holographic will. Unless the will is probated,[13]
direct line. the disinheritance cannot be given effect
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this With regard to the issue on preterition,[15] the
petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was,
case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last
[155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position expression to bequeath his estate to all his
clear: "for ... respondents to have... tolerated the compulsory heirs, with... the sole exception of
probate of the will and allowed the case to Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir
progress when, on its face, the will appears to be [16] to the exclusion of his other compulsory
intrinsically void ... would have been an exercise heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of
in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial not operate to institute her as the universal...
court could... have denied its probate outright or heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness
could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic Alfredo.
validity of the will was resolved (underscoring
supplied). Considering that the questioned document is
Segundo's holographic will, and that the law
Issues: favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the
will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the
whether the document executed by Segundo can Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either
be considered as a holographic will. real or personal property unless it is... proved
Ruling: and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the
A holographic will, as provided under Article right of a person to dispose of his property may
810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, be rendered nugatory
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may In view of the foregoing, the trial court,
be made in or out of the Philippines, and need therefore, should have allowed the holographic
not be witnessed. will to be probated. It is settled that testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Segundo's document, although it may initially the decedent take precedence over intestate
come across as a mere disinheritance proceedings for the same purpose.[18]
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written,
dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis... causa[9]
can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latter's property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an
act of disposition in itself. In other words, the...
disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo.
t is a fundamental principle that the intent or
the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be
recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain
and give effect to that... intention. It is only
when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually
prepared by one who is not learned in the law,
as illustrated in the present case, should be
construed more liberally than the ones drawn by
an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument...
and the intention of the testator.[12] In this
regard... the Court is convinced that the
document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng
Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to
be his last testamentary act and was executed by