Effect of Probate
parcels of land.
1. Galanosa vs. Arcangel (GR No. L-29300,
June 21, 1978)
FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis, a childless widower
executed a will wherein he beaqueathed his one-
half share in the conjugal estate to his second
wife, Tecia Dollentas, and should Tecia
predecease him, as was the case, his one-half
share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro
Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being
that Pedro, Tecia’s son by her first marriage,
grew up under the care of Florentino and had
treated Perdo as his foster child. Florentiono
likewise bequeathed his separate properties to
his protégé, Adolfo Fortajada, a minor. A
petition for the probate of his will was filed in
CFI which was opposed by his legal heir, his
brother Leon Hitosis and his nephews and
nieces. The court admitted the will to probate
and appointed Gallanosa as executor.
Subsequently, the testamentary heirs submitted
a project of partition which was approved by the
court, thus confirming the heirs’ possession of
their respective shares. The testator’s legal heirs
did not appeal from the decree of probate and
from the order of partition and distribution.
Leon instituted an action against Pedro for the
recovery of the sixty-one parcels of land alleging
that the former had been in continuous
possession of said land however, the complaint
was dismissed on the ground of res
judicata. The legal heirs of the testator did not
appeal from the order of dismissal instead, 28
years after the probate of the will, they filed an
action for the annulment of the will of
Florentino and for the recovery of the parcels of
land. Pedro filed for the dismissal of the
complaint but the respondent judge set aside his
order of dismissal and granted trial. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents have a
cause of action for the annulment of the will of
Florention Hitosis and for the recovery of the
RULING:
The lower court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in reconsidering its order of dismissal
and in ignoring the testamentary case. It is
evident from the allegations of the complaint
that the action is barred by res judicata. The
decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution or formal validity of the will. The
decree of adjudication rendered by the trial
court in the testate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Florentino Hitosis
having been rendered in a proceeding in rem, is
binding upon the whole world.
The private respondents did not even bother to
ask for the annulment of the testamentary
proceeding and the proceeding on partition.
Obviously, they realized that the final
adjudications in those cases have the binding
force of res judicata and that there is no ground,
nor it is timely, to ask for the nullification of the
final orders and judgments in those two cases.
2. Mang-oy vs. CA (GR No. L-27421, Sep.
12, 1986)
FACTS:
Old Tumpao begot 3 children (respondents) with his
first wife. Upon her death, he took himself a second
wife but without issues. However she had adopted 2
children according to the practice of Igorots. On
September 4, 1937, Old Tumpao executed what he
called “last will and testament which were read to
and thumb mark affixed by all of the beneficiaries
who at the time were already occupying the portions
respectively allotted to them. After the death of Old
Tumpao, the parties remained to be in possession of
the lots assign to them which was in accordance of
the wishes of old Tumpao which was also agreed
upon by the parties in a public document.
On November 4, 1960, respondents executed an
extra-judicial partition in which they divided the
property of Old Tumpao among the three of them
only. Petitioners sued for reconveyance , sustained
by trial court but reversed by CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “ will and testament” of Old
Tumpao be duly allowed even without being proved
in the court
RULING:
In accordance with the rules of court, no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved or allowed in court.
However the document maybe sustained by art 1056
of the Old Civil Code which was the law in force at
the time the document was made. The law says: “If
the testator should make a partition of his properties
by an act inter vivors, or by will such partition shall
stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the forced heirs.”
Such partition is not governed by the rules of wills or
donation inter vivos, which is a consequence of its
special nature. Thus, the last will and testament of
Old Tumpao is sustained by the provision of Art
1056, Old Civil Code, which became a binding law
when the beneficiaries, parties herein, agreed and
confirmed with the disposition made by Old
Tumpao.
Joint Probate of Will
Perez vs. Tolete (GR. No. 76714, June 2, 1994)
FACTS:
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens,
established a successful medical practice in New
York, USA.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Jose executed a last will
and testament, bequeathing to his wife “all the
remainder” of his real and personal property at
the time of his death “wheresoever situated.” In
the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and
grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of
his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael Jr. as
substitute executor.
In his will, Dr. Jose provided that should he and
his wife die under such circumstances that there
is not sufficient evidence to determine the order
of their deaths, the presumption is that he died
first.
Four days later, Dr. Evelyn executed her own
last will and testament, containing the same
provisions as that of her husband. Likewise, she
provided that should she and her husband died
under such circumstances that there is not
sufficient evidence to determine the order of
their deaths, it should be presumed that he died
first.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Jose and his entire
family perished when they were trapped by fire
that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael
Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two
wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate
thereof in the Surrogate Court of the County of
Onondaga, New York. The wills were admitted
to probate and letters testamentary were issued
in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the
mother of Dr. Evelyn, filed with the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of
the two wills ancillary to the probate
proceedings in New York. She also asked that
she be appointed as special administratrix of the
estate of the deceased couple consisting
primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
She was granted letters of special
administration and posted bond in the amount
of PHP 10,000.00. As special administratrix,
Salud consolidated the assets of the Cunanan
spouses, including the bank deposits of Dr. Jose.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose opposed
and asked to be notified of the proceedings as
heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. But their status as
heirs were disputed by Salud, who said that they
were only collaterals and not heirs as “heirship
is only by institution” under a will or by
operation of the law of New York. Since the will
of Dr. Jose provided a presumption that he
predeceased his wife, his estate passed on to his
wife, Dr. Evelyn. Salud, being the sole heir of Dr.
Evelyn, thus inherited the estate of the Cunanan  WHETHER OR NOT THE TWO
spouses. WILLS PROBATED OUTSIDE THE
PHILIPPINES MAY BE
REPROBATED IN THE PHILIPPINES
The Cunanan heirs soon asked that the RTC
proceedings be nullified and that the
appointment of Salud as special administratrix
be set aside. They also asked that Dr. Rafael Sr., RULING:
brother of Dr. Jose, be appointed the regular
administrator of the estate of the deceased
Requirements for allowance of foreign wills for
spouses. They alleged that the Cunanan heirs
probate in the Philippines
and Salud had entered into an agreement in the
United States “to settle and divide equally the
estates.” The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses,
who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with
RTC issued an order, disallowing the reprobate
the following provisions of the Civil Code of the
of the two wills, recalling the appointment of
Philippines:
petitioner as special administratrix, requiring
the submission of petitioner of an inventory of
the property received by her as special “Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad
administratrix and declaring all pending produces effect in the Philippines if made with
incidents moot and academic. The RTC Judge the formalities prescribed by law of the place in
reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the which he resides, or according to the formalities
law of New York on procedure and allowance of observed in his country, or in conformity with
wills and the court had no way of telling whether those which this Code prescribes.”
the wills were executed in accordance with the
law of New York. In the absence of such
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the
evidence, the presumption is that the law of
formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
succession of the foreign country is the same as
Philippine laws is imperative.
the law of the Philippines.

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or

Salud’s motion for reconsideration was granted.
allowance of wills which have been probated
In another order, the RTC Judge held that the
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the
documents presented did not establish the law
due execution of the will in accordance with the
of New York on the procedure and allowance of
foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in
wills but granted a motion to submit additional
the foreign country and not in the Philippines;
evidence to prove the law of New York.
(3) the will has been admitted to probate in such
However, the RTC Judge ruled that the probate
country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is
of two wills in a single proceeding is not
a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign
procedural.
country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Except for the first and law requirements, the
Hence, this petition. petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

ISSUES: The necessity of presenting evidence on the

foreign laws upon which the probate in the
 WHETHER OR NOT THE foreign country is based is impelled by the fact
REPROBATE OF THE TWO WILLS IN that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
A SINGLE PROCEEDING IS them.
PROCEDURAL
While the probate of a will is a special
proceeding wherein courts should relax the
rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best
evidence of which the matter is susceptible
before a purported will is probated or denied
probate.
The separate wills of the Cunanan
spouses should be probated jointly
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the
separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be
probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that
the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in
singular terms and therefore should be
interpreted to mean that there should be
separate probate proceedings for the wills of the
Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an
approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which advise that the rules shall be “liberally
construed in order to promote their object and
to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.”
A literal application of the Rules should be
avoided if they would only result in the delay in
the administration of justice.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making
of joint wills either for the testator’s reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person. In the
case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed
separate wills. Since the two will contains
essentially the same provisions and pertain to
property which in all probability are conjugal in
nature, practical considerations dictate their
joint probate. As this Court has held a number
of times, it will always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation.
On the requirement of notice
Petitioner has always considered herself the sole
heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because
she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose
F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his
heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over
the reprobate of a will shall “cause notice thereof
to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance” means that with
regards to notices, the will probated abroad
should be treated as if it were an “original will”
or a will that is presented for probate for the first
time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in
the Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not
the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
contrary to petitioner’s claim are entitled to
notices of the time and place for proving the
wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the “court shall also cause copies
of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator, …”
Jurisdiction of Probate Court (Rule 76, Sec.
1)
Rodriguez vs. De Borja (June 21, 1966)
FACTS:
Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court
of Bulacan a purported last will and testament
of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners
filed a petition before the court to examine the
purported will but which was later withdrawn,
and a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in
a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now
sought the dismissal of the special proceeding
on the settlement of the decedent's estate based
on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to
proceed with the testate proceedings?
HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon
the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father
Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance
was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have
taken steps to fix the time and place for proving
the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3,
Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to
the testate, since intestacy only takes place in
the absence of a valid operative will.
Principal Testate Proceeding
 “One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose
Who may file petition? (Rule 76, Sec. 1)
1. Maloles vs. Philipps (GR No. 129505,
Jan. 31, 2000)
FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino
and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for
probate of his will 1 in the Regional Trial Court.
He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs;
that he had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.;
that he disposed by his will his properties with
an approximate value of not less than
P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will
were in the custody of the named executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion
for intervention claiming that, as the only child
of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio
L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He
likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the
testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will
and the issuance of letters of administration in
his name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor
of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to
intervene and oppose the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by the respondent
RULING:
No. The petitioner in this case avers that, as the
nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator,
his interest in the matter is material and direct.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin
of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an
“heir” of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of
testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Thus, Article 842 of the
Civil Code provides:
by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor
of any person having capacity to succeed.”
“One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of
his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitimate of said heirs.”
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s —
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents
and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article
287 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a
compulsory heir who may have been preterited
in the testator’s will. Nor does he have any right
to intervene in the settlement proceedings
based on his allegation that he is a creditor of
the deceased. Since the testator instituted or
named an executor in his will, it
is incumbent upon the Court to respect the
desires of the testator. Only if the appointed
executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or
fails to give bond may the court appoint other
persons to administer the estate. None of these
circumstances is present in this case.
Nittscher vs. Nittscher (GR No. 160530,
Nov. 20, 2007)
FACTS:
On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann
Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a
petition for the probate of his holographic will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.On
September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due
notice to the compulsory heirs,
the probate court issued an order allowing the
said holographic will. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but her motion was denied for
lack of merit. Atty. Nogales was issued letters
testamentary and was sworn in as executor.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
alleging that respondent’s petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary should have
been dismissed outright as the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she
was denied due process.The appellate court
dismissed the appeal. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present
petition on the following grounds:
BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT
THE PETITION FOR LETTERS …
TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES
WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN
VIOLATION OF REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-
91 AND ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II.
THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE PRESENT SUIT.
III.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY ISSUED TO
THE PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS
INTERESTED IN THEPROBATE OF THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF DR. NITTSCHER.
IV.
THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER COURT.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds for the
petition were valid.
RULING:
As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-
91and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the
Court require a certification against forum-
shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in
court. However, in this case, the petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary is not an
initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of
the original petition for the probate of Dr.
Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure to
include a certification against forum-shopping
in his petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary is not a ground for outright
dismissal of the said petition.
Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons
settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien,his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any
province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a
resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time
of his death. Such factual finding, which we find
supported by evidence on record, should no
longer be disturbed.
Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr.
Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati
City, which then covered Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, the petition for the probateof his will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.
Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note
that Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his
own will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76
of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors
to be notified by mail or personally. – …
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own
will, notice shall be sent only to his compulsory
heirs.
In this case, records show that petitioner, with
whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr.
Nittscher’s children from his previous marriage
were all duly notified, by registered mail, of
the probate proceedings. Petitioner even
appeared in court to oppose respondent’s
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said
petition. She likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration of the issuance of the letters
testamentary and of the denial of her motion to
dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was
accorded every opportunity to defend her cause.
Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was
denied due process in the probate proceedings
is without basis.
Delivery of Will (Rule 72, Sec. 2 – 5)
Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee (GR
No.176831, Jan. 125, 2010)
Facts:
Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for
mandamus with damages against his mother Uy
Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of
Manila to compel petitioner to produce the
holographic will of his father so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be
instituted. Respondent had already requested
his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s
estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their
respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to
do so without any justifiable reason. Petitioner
denied that she was in custody of the original
holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts.
The RTC heard the case. After the presentation
and formal offer of respondent’s evidence,
petitioner demurred, contending that her son
failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will. The RTC, at first,
denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it
granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of this latter order was denied.
Hence, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved,
respondent sought review from the appellate
court.
The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of
merit. Respondent moved for reconsideration.
The appellate court granted the motion, set
aside its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and
ordered the production of the will and the
payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time
that respondent was able to show by testimonial
evidence that his mother had in her possession
the holographic will. Dissatisfied with this turn
of events, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court denied this
motion. Left with no other recourse, petitioner
brought the matter before this Court,
contending in the main that the petition for
mandamus is not the proper remedy and that
the testimonial evidence used by the appellate
court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
Issue:
Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy
of the respondent.
Held:
The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of
the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court
of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of
the state or the sovereign, directed to some
inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed
or from operation of law. This definition
recognizes the public character of the remedy,
and clearly excludes the idea that it may be
resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ is a proper recourse for
citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to
compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted
provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue
to compel an official to do anything which is not
his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or
to give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to
enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or
as to which a substantial doubt exists, although
objection raising a mere technical question will
be disregarded if the right is clear and the case
is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie
in the absence of any of the following grounds:
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person
against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court,
officer, board, or person has unlawfully
excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential
to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the
principle that mandamus cannot be used to
enforce contractual obligations. Generally,
mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private
contract rights, and will not lie against an
individual unless some obligation in the nature
of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The
writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right
against an individual.] The writ of mandamus
lies to enforce the execution of an act, when,
otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and,
regularly, issues only in cases relating to the
public and to the government; hence, it is called
a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative
character, mandamus is not used for the redress
of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to
the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in
the issuance of the writ is that there should be
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law other than the remedy of
mandamus being invoked. In other words,
mandamus can be issued only in cases where the
usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy
are powerless to afford relief. Although
classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is
equitable in its nature and its issuance is
generally controlled by equitable principles.
Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies
in the sound discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without
unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here—the production of the
original holographic will—is in the nature of a
public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent
Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy
of the will and that he seeks the production of
the original for purposes of probate. The Rules
of Court, however, does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the
allowance of the will whether the same is in his
possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to
state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action
in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the
demurrer.
Contents of Petition (Rule 76, Sec. 2)
Fran vs. Salas (GR No. 53546, June 25,
1992)
Facts:
Remedios Tiosejo died with neither
descendants nor ascendants. She left real
and personal properties. In her last will and
testament, she bequeathed to her collateral
relatives all her properties.
When the will was presented before the probate
court, private respondents who are sisters of the
deceased filed a manifestation, alleging that
they needed time to study the petition because
some heirs have been intentionally omitted.
However, none file any opposition. The petition
thus became uncontested.
The probate court rendered a decision
admitting the will to probate. Then, a Project
of Partition was submitted by the executor to
the court. The private respondents still did not
make any objections. Thereafter, the probate
court issued its Order approving the partition.
Later, the aforesaid branch which issued the
order was converted to a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
The private respondents filed with the new
branch a Motion for Reconsideration of the
probate judgment and the order of partition.
The Petitions challenged the jurisdiction of the
court because only the English translation of the
will was attached to the petition and the will was
not even submitted to the court for their
examination.
Respondent Judge issued an order declaring the
testamentary disposition as void.
Issue:
Is it necessary that the original of the will be
presented in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction?
Ruling:
No. In several rulings of the Supreme Court, it
ruled that it is not necessary that the original of
the will be attached to the petition
That the annexing of the original will to the
petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is
clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court which allows the filing of a petition for
probate by the person named therein regardless
of whether or not he is in possession of the will,
or the same is lost or destroyed.
In the instant case, a copy of the original will and
its English translation were attached to the
petition and made integral parts of the same. It
is to be presumed that upon the filing of the
petition the Clerk of Court, or his duly
authorized subordinate, examined the petition
and found that the annexes mentioned were in
fact attached thereto. Hence, the order of
partition issued by the old probate court is final
and executor.
Notice of Hearing (Rule 76, Sec. 3 – 4;
Rule 77, Sec. 2; Rule 79, Sec. 3)

Alaban vs. CA (GR No. 156021, Sep 23,
2005)
DOCTRINE:
Extrinsic Fraud. – An action to annul a final
judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the
fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character.
Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents
a party from having a trial or from presenting
his entire case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters pertaining no to the judgment
itself but to the manner in which it is procured.
The overriding consideration when extrinsic
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Francisco Provido
(respondent) filed a petition for the
probate of the Last Will and Testament of
the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado
(decedent), who died on Oct. 26, 2000 in
Janjuay, Iloilo. Respondent that he was
the heir of the decedent and the executor
of her will. The RTC allowed the probate
of the will of the decedent and directed
the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.
2. More than 4 months later or on Oct. 4,
2001, petitioners filed a motion for
reopening of the probate proceedings.
Likewise, they filed an opposition to the
allowance of the will of the decedent. As
well as the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent, claiming
that they are the intestate heirs of the
decedent. On Jan. 11, 2002, RTC issued
an order denying the petitioners’ motion
for being unmeritorious. Moreover, the
RTC’s decision was already final and
executory even before petitioner’s filing
of the motion to reopen.
3. Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with
an application for preliminary injunction
with the CA, seeking the annulment of
the RTC’s Decision and Order. They
argued that the RTC decision should be
annulled and set aside on the ground of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the RTC.
4. CA dismissed the petition. It found that
there was no showing that petitioners
failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies through no fault of
their own. Moreover, the CA declared as
baseless petitioners’ claim that the
proceedings in the RTC was attended by
extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any
showing that they availed of this ground
in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief from judgment in the RTC.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the
same was denied.
5. Petitioner maintains that they were not
made parties to the case in which the
decision sought to be annulled was
rendered and, thus could not have
availed of the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment and other appropriate
remedies, contrary to the ruling of the
CA. They aver that respondent’s offer of a
false compromise and his failure to notify
them of the probate of the will constitute
extrinsic fraud that necessitates the
annulment of the RTC’s judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings in the
RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud that
necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s
judgment.
HELD: Petition is devoid of merit.
An action for annulment of judgment is a
remedy in law independent of the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. The purpose of such action is to have
the final and executory judgment set aside so
that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is
resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based only on two grounds:
extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process. A person need not be a party to
the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is
only essential that he can prove his allegation
that the judgment was obtained by the use of
fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the
ground of fraud only lies if the fraud is extrinsic
or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having
a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic is alleged is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.
In the present case, to sustain their allegation of
extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result
of respondent’s deliberate omission or
concealment of their names, ages and
residences as the other heirs of the decedent in
his petition for allowance of the will, they were
not notified of the proceedings, and thus they
were denied their day in court. In addition, they
claim that respondent’s offer of a false
compromise even before the filing of the
petition prevented them from appearing and
opposing the petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced. According to the
Rules, notice is required to be personally given
to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator. A perusal of the will shows that
respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the
decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of
the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs who are entitled to be notified of the
probate proceedings under the Rules.
Respondent had no legal obligation to mention
petitioners in the petition for probate, or to
personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are
entitled to be so notified, the purported
infirmity is cured by the publication of the
notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs
is a matter of procedural convenience and not a
jurisdictional requisite.
The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the
petition and alleged failure to personally notify
them of the proceedings do not constitute
extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied
their day in court, as they were not prevented
from participating in the proceedings and
presenting their case before the probate court.
Aranz vs. Galing (GR No. 77047, May 28,
1988)
Topic/Doctrine: Civil Law; Wills and
Succession; The requirement of the law for the
allowance of will was not satisfied by mere
publication of notice of hearing; Notice of
hearing to the designated heirs, legatees and
devisees, required.
Facts:
Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a petition for the
probate and allowance of the last will and
testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-
Pola The petition specified the names and ad-
dresses of herein petitioners as legatees and
devisees the probate court issued an order
selling the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was
published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of
the hearing, no oppositor appeared. Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was denied by the
probate court. On appeal, Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. It is the view of
petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that personal notice of probate
proceedings to the known legatees and devisees
is not a jurisdictional requirement in the
probate of a will. Petitioners allege that under
Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, notice on
individual heirs, legatees and devisees is
mandatory and its omission constitutes a
reversible error for being constitutive of grave
abuse of discretion
Issue:
Whether or not personal notice of probate
proceedings to the known legatees and devisees
is a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of
a will
Held:
Yes. Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors
to be notified by mail or personally. — The court
shag also cause copies of the notice of the time
and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines at their places of
residence, and deposited in the post office with
the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20)
days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known. A copy of the notice must
in like manner be mailed to the person named
as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to
any person named as co-executor not
petitioning, if their places of residence be
known. Personal service of copies of the notice
at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing
shall be equivalent to mailing. It is clear from
the aforecited rule that notice of the time and
place of the hearing for the allowance of a will
shall be forwarded to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and [SUCCESSION
CASE devisees residing in the Philippines at
their places of residence, if such places of
residence be known. There is no question that
the residences of herein petitioners legatees and
devisees were known to the probate court. The
petition for the allowance of the will itself
indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees of the testator, But despite
such knowledge, the probate court did not cause
copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The
requirement of the law for the allowance of the
will was not satisfied by mere publication of the
notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
Who may oppose? (Rule 76, Sec. 10)
Acain vs. IAC (GR No. 72706, Oct. 27,
1987)
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial
Court a petition for the probate of the will of his
late Uncle, Nemesio Acain, on the premise that
the latter died leaving a will in which the former
and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in
the lower court, Virginia Fernandez and Rosa
Diongson, a legally adopted daughter and the
widow of the deceased respectively, filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1)
Constantino Acain has no legal capacity to
institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a
universal heir; and (3) the widow and the
adopted daughter have been pretirited. Said
motion was denied as well as the subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Consequently,
Fernandez and Diongson filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction which was
subsequently referred to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez and
Diongson’s petition and ordered the trial court
to dismiss the petition for probate of the will.
Due to the denial of Acain’s motion for
reconsideration, he then filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Virginia Fernandez
and Rosa Diongson have been pretirited.
RULING: Article 854 of the Civil Code: The
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether
living at the time of the execution of the will or
born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devisees and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. If the omitted compulsory heirs
should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prefudice to the right
of representation. Preterition consists in the
omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs
or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned,
Article 854 may not apply as she does not
ascend or descend from the testator, although
she is a compulsory heir. However, the same
thing cannot be said of the legally adopted
daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603,
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
adoption gives to the adopted person the same
rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child
of the adopter and makes the adopted person a
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
that she was totally omitted and preterited in
the will and that both the adopted child and the
widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case
of preterition of the legally adopted child. The
universal institution of Acain together with his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of
the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs without any other testamentary
disposition in the will amounts to a declaration
that nothing at all was written.
Maloles II vs. Philips (GR No. 129505,
Jan. 31, 2000)
Octavio Maloles II vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133359, January 31, 2000
FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino
and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for
probate of his will 1 in the Regional Trial Court.
He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs;
that he had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.;
that he disposed by his will his properties with
an approximate value of not less than
P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will
were in the custody of the named executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion
for intervention claiming that, as the only child
of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio
L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He
likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the
testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the will
and the issuance of letters of administration in
his name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor
of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to
intervene and oppose the petition for issuance
of letters testamentary filed by the respondent
RULING:
No. The petitioner in this case avers that, as the
nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator,
his interest in the matter is material and direct.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin
of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an
“heir” of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of
testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his
entire estate by will. Thus, Article 842 of the
Civil Code provides:
“One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose
by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor
of any person having capacity to succeed.”
“One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of
his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitimate of said heirs.”
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s —
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents
and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article
287 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a
compulsory heir who may have been preterited
in the testator’s will. Nor does he have any right
to intervene in the settlement proceedings
based on his allegation that he is a creditor of
the deceased. Since the testator instituted or
named an executor in his will, it
is incumbent upon the Court to respect the
desires of the testator. Only if the appointed
executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or
fails to give bond may the court appoint other
persons to administer the estate. None of these
circumstances is present in this case
Leviste vs. CA (GR No. 29184, Jan. 30,
1989)
The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of
the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That
legal provision protects the creditor of a
repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of
Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is
contingent and dependent upon the successful
probate of the holographic will. Since the
petition for probate was dismissed by the lower
court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney
Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the
obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal
heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the
dismissal of her petition for probate of the
decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any
part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for
the petitioner to accept in her name.
This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs.
Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for
contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor
purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any
right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her
(Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal
partnership. The amount thereof is simply
a basis for the computation of said fees."
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
the petition for mandamus, for while it is true
that, as contended by the petitioner, public
policy favors the probate of a will, it does not
necessarily follow that every will that is
presented for probate, should be allowed. The
law lays down procedures which should be
observed and requisites that should be satisfied
before a will may be probated. Those procedures
and requirements were not followed in this case
resulting in the disallowance of the will. There
being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the
probate petition was inconsequential.
Petitioner was not a party to the probate
proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct
interest in the probate of the will. His only
interest in the estate is an indirect interest as
former counsel for a prospective heir. In Paras
vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occassion to
rule that one who is only indirectly interested in
a will may not interfere in its probate.
 How to oppose (Rule 76, Sec. 10)
 Proof required
Lost or destroyed will (Rule 76, Sec. 6)
Rodelas vs. Aranza (GR No. L-58509,
Dec. 7, 1982)
FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for
the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B.
Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favor.
Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the
deceased left a will by failing to produce the will
within twenty days of the death of the testator as
required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of
Court;
2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did
not contain a disposition of property after death
and was not intended to take effect after death,
and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an
instruction as to the management and
improvement of the schools and
colleges founded by the decedent;
3.the hollographic will itself, and not
an alleged copy thereof, must be produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect because
lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be
proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary
wills.
4.the deceased did not leave any will,
holographic or otherwise, executed and attested
as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR,
Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the
petition for the probate of the will stating that
“in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522,
the Supreme Court held that ‘in the matter of
holographic wills the law, it is reasonable
to suppose, regards the document itself as the
material proof of authenticity of said wills.”
And that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B.
Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more
than 14 years from the time of the execution of
the will to the death of the decedent and the fact
that the original of the will could not be located
shows to that the decedent had discarded
the alleged holographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas
appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to
forward the case to the SC as it involves a
question of law not of fact.
ISSUE:
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot
be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.
HELD:
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed
and no other copy is available, the will cannot be
probated because the best and only evidence is
the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator
and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made by the probate court
with the standard writings of the testator. The
probate court would be able to determine the
authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the
Court ruled that “the execution and the contents
of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses
who have seen and/or read such will. The will
itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of
authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said
decision, it says that “Perhaps it may be proved
by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity
of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court,”
Uncontested Will (Rule 76, Sec. 5 & 12)
Contested Notarial Will (Rule 76, Sec.
11, 7 & 8)
Contested Holographic Will (Rule 76,
Sec. 11 – 12)
Grounds for disallowance of will (Rule
76, Sec. 9)
1. Ortega vs. Valmonte (GR No. 157451,
Dec. 16, 2005)
Facts:
Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside
the December 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the
March 7, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals
Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
rendered approving and allowing probate to the
said last will and testament of Placido Valmonte
Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the
United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home
to stay in the Philippines,... Two years after his
arrival from the United States and at the age of
80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old,
in a ceremony solemnized by Judge
Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in
a little more than two years of wedded bliss,
Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause
written down as COR PULMONALE.
"Placido executed a notarial last will and
testament written in English and consisting of
two (2) pages
"The allowance to probate of this will was
opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the
testator, especially those found in the USA;
Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and
residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give
them proper notice pursuant to law;
Will was not executed and attested as required
by law and legal solemnities and formalities
were not complied with;
Testator was mentally incapable to make a will
at the time of the alleged execution he being in
an advance sate of senility;
Will was executed under duress, or the influence
of fear or threats;
Will was procured by undue and improper
influence and pressure on the part of the
petitioner and/or her agents and/or assistants;
and/or
Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or
trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto;"
Josefina said she had no... knowledge of the
existence of the last will and testament of her
husband, but just serendipitously found it in his
attache case after his death. It was only then that
she learned that the testator bequeathed to her
his properties and she was named the executrix
in the said will.
"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary
public who notarized the testator's will, testified
that it was in the first week of June 1983 when
the testator together with the three witnesses of
the will went to his house cum law office and
requested him to prepare his last will... and
testament. After the testator instructed him on
the terms and dispositions he wanted on the
will, the notary public told them to come back
He likewise explained that though it appears
that the will was signed by the testator and his
witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it
should have been executed... had he not gone
out of town, the formal execution was actually
on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no
longer changed the typewritten date of June 15,
1983 because he did not like the document to
appear dirty. The notary public also testified
that to his observation the... testator was
physically and mentally capable at the time he
affixed his signature on the will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated
the testimony of the notary public,... "It then
found these grounds extant and proven, and
accordingly disallowed probate."[... appellate
court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to
probate. The CA upheld the credibility of the
notary public and the subscribing witnesses who
had acknowledged the due execution of the will.
Moreover, it held that the testator had...
testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will. It added that his "sexual
exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and
impolite ways"[6] did not make him a person of
unsound mind.
Issues:
Whether or not the signature of Placido
Valmonte in the subject will was procured by
fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte
never intended that the instrument should be
his last will and testament.
In short, petitioner assails the CA's allowance of
the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.
Ruling:
The Petition has no merit.
We stress that the party challenging the will
bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution.[14] The
burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of
credible evidence of fraud.[15] Unfortunately in
this case, other than the self-serving allegations
of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever
presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some
relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will.[16] That the testator was tricked into
signing it was not sufficiently established by the
fact that he had instituted his wife, who was
more than fifty... years his junior, as the sole
beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her
family, who were the ones who had taken "the
cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his
twilight years."[... petitioner failed to
substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in
the commission of a fraud. There was no
showing that the witnesses of the proponent
stood to receive any benefit from the allowance
of the will. The testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses and... the notary are
credible evidence of its due execution.
the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Baltazar vs. Laxa (GR No. 174489, Apr.
11, 2012)
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made
her last will and testament in the Pampango
dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in
the house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to
Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia
expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament. She thereafter affixed her signature
at the end of the said document on page 3 and
then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters,
Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon
Laza and their children Luna and Katherine.
Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she
treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo
came to know and treated Paciencia as his own
mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19,
1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she resided
with Lorenzo and his family until her death on
Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will remained
in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or
on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with
the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate
of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of
Letters of Administration in his favor.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio
Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s
petition. Antonio averred that the properties
subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest;
hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them
to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie
Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of
being “mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit
for executing a will and that the execution of the
will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the
Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor
arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be
appointed as such, he being a citizen and
resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that
Letters of Administration be instead issued in
favor of Antonio.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will
and concluded that when Paciencia signed the
will, she was no longer possessed of the
sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the
testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed
the decision of the RTC and granted the probate
of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a
petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the authenticity and due execution of
the will was sufficiently established to warrant
its allowance for probate.
HELD:
 Yes. A careful examination of the face of the
Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of
the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present
and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement
that the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the
signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question of her state of
mind when she signed the same as well as the
voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of

unsound mind at the time of the execution of the
will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The
SC agree with the position of the CA that the
state of being forgetful does not necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to render
him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides,
Art. 799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound
mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in
full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or
that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired,
or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at
the time of making the Will to know the nature
of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects
of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.”