FIRST DIVISION
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy
[G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009.]
CAMILO F. BORROMEO, petitioner,vs.ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR,
respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J p:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired
real properties in the country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in
whose sole name the properties were registered under the Torrens
system? CaAIES
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he
was assigned by his employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,an Austrian
company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu
and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation.
There, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother
of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich
befriended respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need
of additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The
tutorials were held in Antonietta's residence at a squatters' area in Gorordo
Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a
rented house in Hernan Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to
their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue
City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 1 and March 10,
1986 2 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to
as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 3 was
likewise issued in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale
was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration
was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not
acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich's
name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his
signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondent's
signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last
page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over
the properties were issued in respondent's name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondent's two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-
MAN, 4 and per Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated
May 5, 1988. 5
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a
new boyfriend while Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao
City. Jambrich supported respondent's sons for only two months after the
break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner
was engaged in the real estate business. He also built and repaired
speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to
the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and
interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for P250,000, as
evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment". 6 On July 26, 1991,
when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered
that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of
respondent, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City.
Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and
March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987
over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as
buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent
did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a
buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his
exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the
properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of
the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich
executed in his favor. IcSEAH
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a
single centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she
"solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for
the purchase price of the subject lots in question",and that Jambrich, being
an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.
the disputed property with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn,
presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial
salaries which Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found —
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the]
properties under litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much.
This fact of Jambrich earning much is not only supported by documentary evidence but
also by the admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrich's
financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties ...is not disputed. 7
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, evidence ...clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich
sometime in the latter part of 1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz
Hotel with an income of P1,000.00 a month and was ...renting and living only in ...[a]
room at ...[a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave.,Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of her and
the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which she readily accepted.
In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers and her two children ...are all stated and
reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts
she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when she was personally
interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm
Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her ...and
if it was also true that during this time she was already earning as much as P8,000.00 to
P9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra business, it would be highly unbelievable
and impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since it is the
observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person
and not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly
shown by her actuation when she was already cohabiting and living with Jambrich that
according to her ...the allowance given ...by him in the amount of $500.00 a month is not
enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her children. 8 IDAESH
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the
properties under litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which
according to her is worth more than P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a]
waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning P1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or less
P2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that it
is safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met and accepted the
offer of Jambrich to come and live with him because that was a big financial opportunity
for her and her children who were already abandoned by her husband. 9
xxx xxx xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the
contracts to sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of
absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court,
she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of
Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good
attitude shown by her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she
needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the
acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time when their relationship
was still going smoothly and harmoniously. 10 [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, ...Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong
materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered
by TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of
defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name
of plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I","K" and "L" as avoided insofar as
they appear to convey rights and interests over the properties in question to the
defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar; ATSIED
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P25,000.00
and litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs. 11
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002, 12 the
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the
respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower court's conclusion. The circumstances involved
in the case cited by the lower court and similar cases decided on by the
Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the subsequent
Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in
said cases, the title to the subject property has been issued in the name of
the alien transferee (Godinez et al. vs. Fong Pak Luen et al.,120 SCRA 223
citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila,79 Phils. 461; United Church
Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian,159 SCRA 446, citing the case of
Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco,113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs.
Zamacoma,138 SCRA 78).In the case at bar, the title of the subject property
is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant.
Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title
thereto. 13
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING RESPONDENT'S JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING JAMBRICH'S PARTICIPATION,
INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND
BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT JAMBRICH HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY
NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING
THE WELL-REASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING
DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).
14 HTScEI
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between
respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in
1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker
A.G.,an Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of
P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year
where his monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to
1985 with a monthly salary of not more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the
parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her
during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra
business were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually
the business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has no
license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the
motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left
standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report 15 submitted
by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the
adoption proceedings of respondent's two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was
accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no
problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are (sic)
foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were
no more foreigners coming because of the situation in the Philippines at
that time. Her financial problem started then. She was even renting a small
room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave.,Cebu City. It was during her time
of great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered
her a decent place for herself and her children. 16
The DSWD Home Study Report 17 further disclosed that:
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw
Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said Restaurants. He
made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the] English
language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of
additional income to support [her] 2 young children who were abandoned
by their father. Their session was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon
at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue,
Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the family
particularly the children who were malnourished. After a few months
sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent place.
He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was
miserable and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the
children. 18 aSTECA
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of
fund used to purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination
and during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the
owner of the properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of
Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the
deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated
checks issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank.
Receipts of the installment payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten
months, where she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the
subject properties to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over
the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on
July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial
court are accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a
number of exceptions. In the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual
findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did not controvert the factual findings
of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple's
cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man
and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. 19 In the
instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties.
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions
of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply. 20 DcaCSE
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of
respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was
the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in
the name of respondent?
It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 21 It is only a means of
confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. 22 Certificates of title
are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true
owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A
certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, 23 and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. 24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a
valuable consideration. 25 This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not
contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her
own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully
supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is
embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, 26 which is basically a
reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, 27 and Section 14, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution. 28 The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the
capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transferred
only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain".
Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now
stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding
title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made
by a former natural-born citizen. 29
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino
citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, 30 the Court reiterated
the consistent ruling in a number of cases 31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the
original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Applying United Church Board for World Ministries,the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary
to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the
acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from
him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the
transferee is valid.

The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and
ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared
petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong
materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of
title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent to pay
petitioner P25,000 as attorney's fees and P10,000 as litigation expenses, as
well as the costs of suit. DScTaC

We affirm the Regional Trial Court.

The rationale behind the Court's ruling in United Church Board for World
Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases, 32 is this — since the ban on
aliens is intended to preserve the nation's land for future generations of
Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real
estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those
transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is
already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be
no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution
dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.

||| (Borromeo v. Descallar, G.R. No. 159310, [February 24, 2009], 599 PHIL
332-346)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 113472-73. December 20, 1994.]
ONG CHING PO, YU SIOK LIAN DAVID ONG and JIMMY ONG, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLEDAD PARIAN, respondents.
DECISION
QUIASON,J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1993, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 28391-92.
I As stated by petitioners themselves, what is in dispute "...is not so much as to which
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of Land located at Fundidor
Street, San Nicolas to private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife of Ong
Yee. The latter, the brother of petitioner Ong Ching Po, died in January
1983; while petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986. The said sale
was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in English.
Subsequently, the document was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Manila, which issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9260 dated
September 2, 1947 in the name of private respondent.
According to private respondent, she entrusted the administration of the
lot and building to petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband
settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be
vacated because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused
to vacate the said premises. LLjur
On March 19, 1984, private respondent filed a case for unlawful detainer
against petitioner Ong Ching Po before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 26. The inferior court dismissed her case. The dismissal was
affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court was, in turn, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed the petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final
and executory.
Petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner
Ong Ching Po bought the said parcel of land from Ong Joi Jong. The sale
was evidenced by a photo copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese with
the letter head "Sincere Trading Co." (Exh. "B").An English translation of
said document (Exh. "C") read as follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic)
manner a lot located on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area
consisting 213 square meters including a one-story house erected thereon
unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for the sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged by me and consequently I have executed and signed
the government registered title (sic) the said lot inclusive of the house
erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr. Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And
the purpose of this document is to precisely serve as proof of the sale.
Addendum: I have acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing
another document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of
Ong Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the
issuance of the new title by the City Register of Deeds and for the reason
that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this fact.
Lot Seller: Ong Joi Jong"
(Exhibits for the plaintiff, p. 4)
On December 6, 1983, petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale conveying to his children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong,
the same property sold by Ong Joi Jong to private respondent in 1947. On
December 12 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy Ong and David Ong
filed an action for reconveyance and damages against private respondent
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Manila, docketed as Case No. 85-
33962.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title
against petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 86-
36818. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with Civil Case No. 85-
33962. On May 30 1990, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
private respondent. On appeal by petitioners to the Court of Appeals, the
said court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. prLL
Hence, this petition.
II
According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred:
(1) When it gave full faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") in favor of private
respondent, instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh. "B" and its translation, Exh. "C") in favor of
petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and
private respondent (Rollo, pp. 17-18).
between Exhibit "A" and "Exhibit "B" is more weighty, but whether this document is what
it purports to be (i.e.,a deed of conveyance in favor of Soledad Parian [private
respondent] or it was only resorted to or executed as a subterfuge because the real buyer
(Ong Ching Po) was an alien and it was agreed upon between Ong Ching Po and his
brother (Ong Yee, Soledad Parian's husband) that the land be registered in the name of
Soledad Parian in order to avoid legal complications and to facilitate registration and
transfer and that the said title would be transferred by Soledad to Ong Ching Po or his
successors-in-interest and that she would be holding the title in trust for him" (Rollo, pp.
19-20)
We cannot go along with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private
respondent as a dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name
because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To
sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a high premium to a violation of
our nationalization laws.
Assuming that Exhibit "B" is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners
cannot claim ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:
"Save in cases of heredity succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines."
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
"Save in cases of heredity succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in
the public domain."
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Save in cases of heredity succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in
the public domain."
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to
individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas, The
Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other natural
resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of
the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens , whether individuals or corporations,
have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from
acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of
Exhibit "B" has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to law.
On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong in favor
of private respondent (Exh. "A") is notarized document.
To remove the mantle of validity bestowed by law on said document, petitioners claim
that private respondent admitted that she did not pay anything as consideration for the
purported sale in her favor. In the same breath, petitioners said that private respondent
implied in her deposition that it was her husband who paid for the property. It appears,
therefore, that the sale was financed out of conjugal funds and that it was her husband
who handled the transaction for the purchase of the property. Such transaction is a
common practice in Filipino-family affairs.
It is not correct to say the private respondent never took possession of the property.
Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "when the sale is
made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be respondent and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.
equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed prcd
the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred." If what
petitioners meant was that private respondent never lived in the building WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
constructed on said land, it was because her family had settled in Iloilo.
LLphil SO ORDERED.

There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by ||| (Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 113472-73, [December 20, 1994], 309
petitioner Ong Ching Po as trustor and private respondent as trustee. Not PHIL 313-321)
even Exhibit "B" can be considered as such a document because private
respondent, the registered owner of the property subject of said "deed of
sale," was not a party thereto. The oral testimony to prove the existence of
the express trust will not suffice. Under Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "No express trust concerning an immovable or any interest
therein may be proved by parole evidence."

Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in

writing, they can prove an implied trust orally. While an implied trust may
be proved orally (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1457),the evidence must
be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, because
such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated (Salao v. Salao,70 SCRA 65
[1976]).It cannot be made to rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on
loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (Cf. De Leon v. Molo-Peckson, et
al.,116 Phil. 1267 [1962]).Petitioners do not claim that Ong Yee was not in a
financial position to acquire the land and to introduce the improvements
thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner Ong Ching
Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of
Lam Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.

The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit "B" and its
translation, Exhibit "C",because these documents had not been properly
authenticated.

Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:

"Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original

writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon
proof of its execution and lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the recollection of the witnesses."

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were

actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution;
loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of
the court (De Vera v. Aguilar,218 SCRA 602 [1993]).

Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due

execution of the deed of sale, "Exhibit "B".

The due execution of the document may be established by the person or

persons who executed it; by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged; or by any person who was present and saw it executed or
who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or by a
person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed
the execution thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar,supra).

Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document
was executed, but the trial court rejected her claim and held:

"If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said document, even
merely as a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate.
Furthermore, she was married only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff,
Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City where she apparently resided, or after the
deed of sale was executed. The Court does not believe that she was
present during the execution and signing of the deed of sale involved
therein, notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary" (Decision p. 6
Records p. 414).

As to the contention of petitioner that all the tax receipts, tax declaration,
rental receipts, deed of sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were
in their possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband
entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.

As observed by the Court of Appeals:

"We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily
reflective of dominion, as even a mere administrator or manager may
lawfully perform them pursuant to his appointment or employment" (Rollo,
p. 10).

It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164584. June 22, 2009.]
PHILIP MATTHEWS, petitioner,vs.BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C.
TAYLOR, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals
(CA) December 19, 2003 Decision 1 and July 14, 2004 Resolution 2 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed and upheld the June 30,
1997 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan in
Civil Case No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British
subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year-old Filipina. 4 On
June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at
Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of
P129,000.00. 5 The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. 6 Joselyn and
Benjamin, also using the latter's funds, constructed improvements thereon
and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort
known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. 7 All required permits and licenses for
the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino,
Joselyn's sister. 8
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away
with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell,
lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties
with respect to their Boracay property. 9
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease 10 (Agreement) involving the Boracay
property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the
resort as Music Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
Joselyn without his (Benjamin's) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages 11 against
Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in
the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled
with the fact that he was Joselyn's husband, any transaction involving said
property required his consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in
defeault. On March 14, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment by default
declaring the Agreement null and void. 12 The decision was, however, set
aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054. 13 The CA also ordered the RTC to
allow the petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings.
HTDAac
In his Answer, 14 petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn.
Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the Boracay property, he found
it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing
in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating
his knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the
agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped
from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the merits
ensued.
On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight (8) pages
(Exhibits "T","T-1","T-2","T-3","T-4","T-5","T-6" and "T-7") entered into by
and between Joselyn C. Taylor and Philip Matthews before Notary Public
Lenito T. Serrano under Doc. No. 390, Page 79, Book I, Series of 1992 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID;
2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND (P16,000.00) PESOS as damages representing
unrealized income for the residential building and cottages computed
monthly from July 1992 up to the time the property in question is restored to plaintiff;
and
3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, for attorney's fees and
other incidental expenses.
SO ORDERED. 15
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of Benjamin and
Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to validate any contract involving
the property. Benjamin's right over the Boracay property was bolstered by the court's
findings that the property was purchased and improved through funds provided by
Benjamin. Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial court
refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the questioned transaction
primarily because his signature appeared only on the last page of the document and not
on every page thereof.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision. In its December
19, 2003 Decision, 16 the CA affirmed the conclusions made by the RTC. The appellate
court was of the view that if, indeed, Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned
transaction, the parties to the Agreement should have used the phrase "with my consent"
instead of "signed in the presence of." The CA noted that Joselyn already prepared an SPA
in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it was therefore unnecessary for
Joselyn to participate in the execution of the Agreement. Taken together, these
circumstances yielded the inevitable conclusion that the contract was null and void
having been entered into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari
based on the following grounds:
4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN
THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT HIS
CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT
WHEN HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS WITNESS IN THE
LIGHT OF THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SPOUSES PELAYO VS.
MELKI PEREZ,G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE 8, 2005.
4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS.
IAC,G.R. NO. 74833, JANUARY 21, 1991. CEASaT
4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES WHICH IS A PROVISION REFERRING TO THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF
PROPERTY. THE PROPERTY REGIME GOVERNING THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF BENJAMIN
TAYLOR AND JOSELYN TAYLOR IS THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS BECAUSE THEY
WERE MARRIED ON 30 JUNE 1988 WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY
CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES FINDS NO APPLICATION IN
THIS CASE.
4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
IN THE EXECUTION OF NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.
4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED AND DESPITE THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM. 17
The petition is impressed with merit.
In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of Lease of a parcel
of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband. In
addressing the matter before us, we are confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of
law issues, but more importantly, with a constitutional question.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said acquisition was
evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee. The property was also declared
for taxation purposes under her name. When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner,
Benjamin sought the nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he was the
actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the same;
and second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract involving the subject
property without his consent.
The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of petitioner and
respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code provisions. They, however, failed to
observe the applicable constitutional principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: 18
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands
of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional
provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 19 The
primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony. 20 Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The
right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino
citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos. 21 IcAaSD
In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 22 cited in Muller v. Muller, 23 we had the
occasion to explain the constitutional prohibition:
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in
the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is
partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it
reads as follows:
"Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through
which agricultural resources may leak into alien's hands. It would certainly
be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if,
after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. ...
xxx xxx xxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that
"aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses
for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and
that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for
building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields,
and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6) That this is obnoxious to
the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. 24
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire
public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally
recognized exceptions. 25 There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent
the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of
cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above
constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted that a
particular property be declared as part of their father's estate; 26 that they
be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name
of another; 27 that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens') favor; 28
and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent. 29
In Frenzel v. Catito, 32 petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to Teresita Santos;
while respondent, a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller. Petitioner and respondent met
and later cohabited in a common-law relationship, during which petitioner acquired real
properties; and since he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines,
respondent's name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship
turned sour, petitioner filed an action for the recovery of the real properties registered in
the name of respondent, claiming that he was the real owner. Again, as in the other
cases, the Court refused to declare petitioner as the owner mainly because of the
constitutional prohibition. The Court added that being a party to an illegal contract, he
could not come to court and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses
his money or property by knowingly engaging in an illegal contract may not maintain an
action for his losses.
Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 33 petitioner (an American citizen)
and Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latter's
name. Criselda subsequently sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the
petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not give his
consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his (petitioner's) intention that
the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over
the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in
land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale
as to him was null and void. TaEIcS
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to
nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien,
is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines.
Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of
said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain
Benjamin's claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such
contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no
reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any
event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the
Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would
countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were
to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and
right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. 34
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be
nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity.
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised
by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003 Decision and July 14, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner Philip Matthews.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.

In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, 30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a ||| (Matthews v. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584, [June 22, 2009], 608 PHIL 193-205)
parcel of land, together with the improvements thereon. Upon his death,
his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part of the
estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties
among themselves. We, however, excluded the land and improvements
thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because he never
became the owner thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional
prohibition.

In Muller v. Muller, 31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and

respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany. During the
subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land in
Antipolo City and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of the petitioner. They eventually separated,
prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of property.
Specifically, respondent prayed for reimbursement of the funds he paid for
the acquisition of said property. In deciding the case in favor of the
petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware that as an alien, he
was prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines. He
had, in fact, declared that when the spouses acquired the Antipolo
property, he had it titled in the name of the petitioner because of said
prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently asserting a right
to the said property in the form of a claim for reimbursement. Neither did
the Court declare that an implied trust was created by operation of law in
view of petitioner's marriage to respondent. We said that to rule otherwise
would permit circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 175746. March 12, 2008.]
CHARLES L. ONG, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which reversed and set aside
the January 16, 2002 Decision 2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan,
Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November 20,
2006 Resolution 3 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as
duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto
and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title 4 over Lot 15911
(subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an
area of five hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less. They
alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is
their exclusive property having acquired the same by purchase from
spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the
subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the
subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of the
Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent asserted that
neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1073; that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of title to prove their
claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not
appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage;
that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No.
892; and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be
the subject of private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of
petitioner and his brothers, viz:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant indubitably established
sufficient basis to grant the applicant (sic) for registration. Originally, the
whole parcel of land was owned by spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella
Charmine who acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia
Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro Cacho.
Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony C. Villamil and
Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to herein applicants.
The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of the applicant
and her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes has (sic) been religiously
paid.
The said circumstances further show that the possession and ownership of
the applicant and her (sic) predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of
land has (sic) been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of
ownership before the filing of the instant application for registration on
[July 1, 1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General Default, the Court
hereby orders and decrees the registration of a parcel of land as shown on
plan ap-01-004897 approved by the Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay
Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred
Seventy Four (574) square meters, subject of the application for
registration of title, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, in
favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf and as representative of his brothers
namely, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, Makati
City, Metro Manila, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City,
Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land Registration Authority,
Quezon City, as well as the applicant.
SO ORDERED. 5
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered
the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the court a quo
granting the application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that the subject lot
is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the
duration required by law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-
in-interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner
since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529. It noted that
the earliest tax declaration which petitioner presented is dated 1971. Consequently,
petitioner could not fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither was
petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the
subject lot prior to the filing of the application. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L.
ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE
REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH
DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC
LAND IS CORRECT. 7
The petition lacks merit.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended, provides —
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title
must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 8 These requisites involve questions of fact which are not
proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are
generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized exceptions, as is the case
here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings. 9 After
a careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. The Report 10 dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated that
the subject lot is "within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project 50
L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such on November 21, 1927." 11 This
finding is, likewise, embodied in the Report 12 dated January 7, 1999 of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy 13 of the plan covering the subject lot.
However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses
Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998, 14 who in turn purchased the same
from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997. 15 The latter
bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed
Cacho, on July 10, 1979. 16 The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence
was Tax Declaration No. 25606 17 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho
and Eufrosinia Bautista. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership,
they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title
over the subject property. 18 Even if we were to tack petitioner's claim of ownership over
the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses Agustin Cacho
and Eufrosinia Bautista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required possession from
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to
acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession
and occupation. As held in Republic v. Alconaba: 19
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property. 20

Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his
brothers actually occupied the subject lot. 21 No improvements were made
thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several
occasions. 22 Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified
that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time
they bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in
1997. 23 Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence was
presented to establish the character of the possession of the subject lot by
petitioner's other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioner's
evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the
subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who
must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged
possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration
required by law. 24 Unfortunately, petitioner's evidence do not constitute
the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this nature.
25 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of
the trial court and in denying his application for registration of title over
the subject lot.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The April 25,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which
reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and
the November 20, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, [March 12, 2008], 571 PHIL 588-596)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 177790. January 17, 2011.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R.
VEGA, ROGELIO R. VEGA, LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R. VEGA,
NAMELY: FRACISCO L. YAP, MA. WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ, MA. WENDELYN
V. YAP and FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR., respondents,
ROMEA G. BUHAY-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO G. BUHAY, ARCELI G. BUHAY-
RODRIGUEZ, ORLANDO G. BUHAY, SOLEDAD G. BUHAY-VASQUEZ, LOIDA G.
BUHAY-SENADOSA, FLORENDO G. BUHAY, OSCAR G. BUHAY, ERLYN
BUHAY-GINORGA, EVELYN BUHAY-GRANETA, and EMILIE BUHAY-DALLAS,
respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
SERENO, J p:
This is a Rule 45 Petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner
Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), questioning
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 which affirmed a lower court's grant
of an application for original registration of title covering a parcel of land
located in Los Baños, Laguna.
The facts of the case as culled from the records of the trial court and the
appellate court are straightforward and without much contention from the
parties.
On 26 May 1995, respondents Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R.
Vega, Lubin R. Vega and Heirs of Gloria R. Vega — namely, Francisco L. Yap,
Ma. Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap and Francisco V. Yap, Jr.
(respondents Vegas) — filed an application for registration of title. The
application covered a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 6191, Cadastre
450 of Los Baños, Laguna, with a total area of six thousand nine hundred
two (6,902) square meters (the subject land). The case was docketed as
Land Registration Case No. 103-95-C and raffled to the Regional Trial Court
of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 92.
Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land from their
mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn inherited it from her
father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mother's siblings (two brothers and a sister)
died intestate, all without leaving any offspring.
On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to respondents
Vegas' application for registration on the ground, inter alia, that the subject
land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, as such, not
subject to private appropriation. SECcIH
During the trial court hearing on the application for registration,
respondents Vegas presented several exhibits in compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove respondents
Vegas' ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of the
registration. Significant was the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a
Special Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna, under the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He attested to having
conducted an inspection of the subject land 2 and identified the
corresponding Report dated 13 January 1997, which he had submitted to
the Regional Executive Director, Region IV. The report stated that the area
subject of the investigation was entirely within the alienable and disposable
zone, and that there was no public land application filed for the same land
by the applicant or by any other person. 3
During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea G. Buhay-Ocampo,
Francisco G. Buhay, Arceli G. Buhay-Rodriguez, Orlando G. Buhay, Soledad
G. Buhay-Vasquez, Loida G. Buhay-Senadosa, Florendo G. Buhay, Oscar G.
Buhay, Erlyn Buhay-Ginorga, Evelyn Buhay-Grantea and Emilie Buhay-Dallas
(respondents-intervenors Buhays) entered their appearance and moved to
intervene in respondents Vegas' application for registration. 4
Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the subject land
consisting of eight hundred twenty-six (826) square meters, purportedly
sold by respondents Vegas' mother (Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega) to the
former's predecessors-in-interest — the sisters Gabriela Gilvero and Isabel
Gilverio — by virtue of a "Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan" dated
14 January 1951. 5 They likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision
Plan Csd-04-024336-D, which indicated the portion of the subject land,
which they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-interest. 6 HESIcT
In a Decision dated 18 November 2003, the trial court granted respondents
Vegas' application and directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to
issue the corresponding decree of registration in the name of respondents
Vegas and respondents-intervenors Buhays' predecessors, in proportion to
their claims over the subject land.
Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, arguing that respondents
Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable, since the
testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not contain the date when the land was declared as such.
Unpersuaded by petitioner Republic's arguments, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the earlier Decision of the trial court. Aggrieved by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant
Rule 45 Petition with this Court.
Respondents Vegas, who are joined by respondents-intervenors Buhays (collectively,
respondents), raise procedural issues concerning the filing of the instant Petition, which
the Court shall resolve first. Briefly, respondents found, in the instant Petition, procedural
deficiencies that ought to warrant its outright dismissal. These deficiencies are as follows:
(a) petitioner Republic failed to include the pertinent portions of the record that would
support its arguments under Rule 45, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Court, specifically the
Appellee's Brief of respondents Vegas in the appellate proceedings; and (b) it raised
questions of fact, which are beyond the purview of a Rule 45 Petition. 7
The Court is not persuaded by respondents' arguments concerning the purported defects
of the Petition.
First, petitioner Republic's failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas' Appellee's Brief
to the instant Petition is not a fatal mistake, which merits the immediate dismissal of a
Rule 45 Petition. The requirement that a petition for review on certiorari should be
accompanied by "such material portions of the record as would support the petition" is
left to the discretion of the party filing the petition. 8 Except for the duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment sought to be appealed from, 9 there are no other
records from the court a quo that must perforce be attached before the Court can take
cognizance of a Rule 45 petition.
Respondents cannot fault petitioner Republic for excluding pleadings, documents or
records in the lower court, which to their mind would assist this Court in deciding
whether the Decision appealed from is sound. Petitioner Republic is left to its own
estimation of the case in deciding which records would support its Petition and should
thus be attached thereto. In any event, respondents are not prevented from attaching to
their pleadings pertinent portions of the records that they deem necessary for the Court's
evaluation of the case, as was done by respondents Vegas in this case when they attached
their Appellee's Brief to their Comment. In the end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the
merits of the suit that will ultimately decide whether the material portions of the records
attached are sufficient to support the Petition. HIaSDc
Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner
Republic simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate
courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of land, based on the
evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the decisions made by a lower
court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but
simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law
is raised.
In New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan, 10 the Court
reiterated the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact in this wise:
We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question
of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and
the probability of the situation. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness
of the evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr. Gonzales. It, however,
questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court's
conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Otherwise stated,
considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in the proceedings below,
were the trial and the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in their
findings on the nature and character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure
question of law, which calls for a resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a
given set of facts.
Going now to the substantial merits, petitioner Republic places before the Court the
question of whether, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have
sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Was it erroneous
for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the trial court's grant of registration applied for
by respondents Vegas over the subject land? We find no reversible error on the part of
either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides for the instances when a person may file for an application for registration of
title over a parcel of land:
Section 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
SEHTIc
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. . . . .
Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted provision of law, applicants for
registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and
(2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. 11 Section 14 (1) of the law
requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration is filed. 12
Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas' open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the present
Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first requisite: specifically,
whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is
alienable and disposable.
Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable,
occupation of the same in the concept of an owner — no matter how long
— cannot ripen into ownership and result in a title; public lands not shown
to have been classified as alienable and disposable lands remain part of the
inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. 13
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they
call for proof. 14 To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the following:
a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative
actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a
legislative act or statute. 15 The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable. 16
Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and
disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the
property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence. 17
However, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 18 the Supreme Court
overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original application for
registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO
certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent
failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not,
by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis
supplied) aDcHIC
Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for
original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order
to establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable. 19
To comply with the first requisite for an application for original registration
of title under the Property Registration Decree, respondents Vegas should
have submitted a CENRO certification and a certified true copy of the
original classification by the DENR Secretary that the land is alienable and
disposable, together with their application. However, as pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, respondents Vegas failed to submit a CENRO certification
— much less an original classification by the DENR Secretary — to prove
that the land is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. 20 If the stringent rule imposed in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc., is to be followed, the absence of these twin certifications justifies a
denial of an application for registration. Significantly, however, the Court's
pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., was issued after the
decisions of the trial court 21 and the appellate court 22 in this case.
Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano, 23 the Court affirmed the findings of the trial
and the appellate courts that the parcel of land subject of registration was alienable and
disposable. The Court held that a DENR Regional Technical Director's certification, which
is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial
compliance with the legal requirement:
While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the
alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR
Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan
submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal
requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the
alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925.
The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the
contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land
Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents' applications on the ground
that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights
which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably
extended in favor of respondents. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable
are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENR's original classification of the land.
The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land
registration on other substantial and convincing evidence duly presented without any
opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground of substantial compliance.
Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by
the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary,
there has been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject
land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record.
First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who testified
that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his written report on
his inspection of the subject land.
In the Report, 24 Mr. Gonzales attested under oath that (1) the "area is entirely within the
alienable and disposable zone" as classified under Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582,
certified on 31 December 1925; 25 (2) the land has never been forfeited in favor of the
government for non-payment of taxes; (3) the land is not within a previously
patented/decreed/titled property; 26 (4) there are no public land application/s filed by
the applicant for the same land; 27 and (5) the land is residential/commercial. 28 That
Mr. Gonzales appeared and testified before an open court only added to the reliability of
the Report, which classified the subject land as alienable and disposable public land. The
Court affirms the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Mr. Gonzales' testimony and written
report under oath constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature
of the subject land. DcCIAa
Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respondents-
intervenors Buhays, 29 expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable.
Similar to Republic v. Serrano, Mr. Samson G. de Leon, the officer-in-charge of the Office
of the Assistant Regional Executive Director for Operations of the DENR, approved the
said subdivision plan, which was annotated with the following proviso: "[T]his survey is
inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on
Dec. 31, 1925." Notably, Mr. De Leon's annotation pertaining to the identification of the
land as alienable and disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales.
Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas' application for original registration,
the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was not alienable and
disposable. In the Supplementary Report submitted during the trial court proceedings, 30
the LRA did not interpose any objection to the application on the basis of the nature of
the land. It simply noted that the subject subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been
applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505, but that there was no decree of
registration issued therefor. Thus, the LRA recommended that "should the instant case be
given due course, the application in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505 with respect
to plan Psu-51460 be dismissed." In addition, not only did the government fail to cross-
examine Mr. Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing evidence to
support its opposition. In contrast to the other cases brought before this Court, 31 no
opposition was raised by any interested government body, aside from the pro forma
opposition filed by the OSG.
The onus in proving that the land is alienable and disposable still remains with the
applicant in an original registration proceeding; and the government, in opposing the
purported nature of the land, need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise. 32 In this
case though, there was no effective opposition, except the pro forma opposition of the
OSG, to contradict the applicant's claim as to the character of the public land as alienable
and disposable. The absence of any effective opposition from the government, when
coupled with respondents' other pieces of evidence on record persuades this Court to
rule in favor of respondents.
In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gonzales to
testify as to when the land was declared as alienable and disposable.
Indeed, his testimony in open court is bereft of any detail as to when the
land was classified as alienable and disposable public land, as well as the
date when he conducted the investigation. However, these matters could
have been dealt with extensively during cross-examination, which
petitioner Republic waived because of its repeated absences and failure to
present counter evidence. 33 In any event, the Report, as well as the
Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subject land was certified as
alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was even
classified as residential and commercial in nature. TCcDaE

Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents Vegas,
coupled with the absence of any countervailing evidence by petitioner
Republic, substantially establishes that the land applied for is alienable and
disposable and is the subject of original registration proceedings under the
Property Registration Decree. There was no reversible error on the part of
either the trial court or the appellate court in granting the registration.

Respondents-intervenors Buhays' title to that portion of the subject land is

likewise affirmed, considering that the joint claim of respondents-
intervenors Buhays over the land draws its life from the same title of
respondents Vegas, who in turn failed to effectively oppose the claimed
sale of that portion of the land to the former's predecessors-in-interest.

It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance

applies pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict
requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable,
especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court
of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings. 34 To establish that the
land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the
general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the
Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO
certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made
by the DENR Secretary.

As an exception, however, the courts — in their sound discretion and based

solely on the evidence presented on record — may approve the
application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing
that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and
character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the
government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration
currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be
inapplicable to all future applications.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The

Court of Appeals' Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial court's Decision
dated 18 November 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio Morales, Brion, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Vega, G.R. No. 177790, [January 17, 2011], 654 PHIL 511-
528)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences. STHDAc
xxx xxx xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have
not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru,
the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other
which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their
own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field — in each field a different dog is going to bark at
you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who
does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a
"common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal
system does not know how to recognize.
Hernando De Soto 1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of
persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition,
while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in
order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original
registration proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant
provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on
the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the
problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been
treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their
own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our
part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution
and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though
our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic
problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
Silang Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting
of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. HaSEcA
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-
Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr.,
to appear on behalf of the State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified
at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged *
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons — Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban
— the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold
by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property
and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The
Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the
application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the
subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration
shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification
of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since
the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not
be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the
Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was
his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court,
rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit, 11 which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had
directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the
requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun.
Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property
in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any
possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11 November 2008, the case
was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral
arguments, to wit: HICEca
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of
the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible
to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in
Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein
was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated in
June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation
that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14 (1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14 (1) to
apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as
of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent
rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic, 15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation, 17 as well as the
earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals. 18 ACTEHI
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private
property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14 (2). According to
them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at
the time of the application, the property had already been "converted" into
private property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2) are
more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code,
the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property", while Section 14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It observes that
the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14 (2) as a ground
for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period
refers to the period of possession under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run
against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the
public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership
thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a
full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public
Land Act. HSEIAT
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since
its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or
mineral lands. 20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the
Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles" through "judicial legalization". 22 Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably
grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. DEHcTI
Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain". The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the
lands that may be registered. 23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the
Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June
12, 1945 or earlier". The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.
1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended,
this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same
as Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various
laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14 (1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The
provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. SDTIaE
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of
Section 14 (1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly
refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy,
or that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That
is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. — The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which
seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself
for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D.
No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino
citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by
applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title. DCSETa
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public
Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that
both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the
substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since
12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48 (b).
Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may
exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has
been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002.
It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to
avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply
only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares:
Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also
to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section
shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under
this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. 24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right
granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until 31 December
2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has
adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration
of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough
that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and
disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12
June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable
and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was
discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 25
Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were
not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines
was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that
the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property. EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the
point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current
possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona
fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect
titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is
significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto
are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first
place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no
need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's acknowledgment that
the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14 (1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the Court, citing
Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. . ." That
statement, in the context of Section 14 (1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the
passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application
therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14 (2). The evidence submitted by
petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948,
thereby precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not even apparent from the
decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration
following Section 14 (1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June
1945. aCHDST
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14 (1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant
had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June
1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein was decisive to the resolution of
the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of
the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27
since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was
declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better
rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which involved a
claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was
declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration
in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994,
issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980". This is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents'
application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation
of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application
of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is
there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land. . . . IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for
the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title,
it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the
year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48 (b) of public domain lands declared
alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling
difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years
after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the
application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable.
That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell,
a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14 (2). The
provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14
(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum,
but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application
of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws." DEcSaI
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. [ 30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty
(30) years. [ 31 ] With such conversion, such property may now fall within
the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being
been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the
right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this case
where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that
provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of
possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly
appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14 (2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible
to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
caTESD
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real
property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or
through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith, 34 as well as just
title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides
that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to
the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is
the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription
of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State.
Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14 (2)
does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial
property of the State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the source of
the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14 (2) and to how
exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty
(30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public
lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the
date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for
registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act
No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies
the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Code —
ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith".
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is
the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14 (2). However,
there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep.
Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or
call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for
confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty
(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942
had mandated such a requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding with respect to the
present language of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for
original registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year
period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the
Civil Code.At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section
14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription
under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of
prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14 (2). There is
no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14 (1). DSHTaC
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription". The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by
Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes
property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the public domain,
whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public
dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property
of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision
further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription. IEcDCa
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision
that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when * it is "intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of
the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the
lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although
declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only
by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is
to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language
and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section
14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles. aATEDS
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an
actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The
Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is
more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes
the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in
Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes
of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President
to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) 40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or
administer them. 41 The President is authorized to sell portions of the
military camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself
declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands
have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not
become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic. 44 Such
purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of
national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2), notwithstanding their
status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law
to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a
duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned
in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property
before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to
meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) and Section 14
(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.
Registration under Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14 (2) is made available
both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period
available through Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article
1137 of the Civil Code.The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of
extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without
regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply
as well to Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes
such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to
the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section
14 (2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision
with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our
land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil
Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states
that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription",
and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under
the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed
through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person
from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time,
there are indispensable requisites — good faith and just title. The ascertainment of good
faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the
Civil Code, 45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article
1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains: ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which
would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or
defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dation in payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability
of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the
argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to
the possessor before the completion of the required period of possession".
47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom
the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title,
whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights. SIEHcA
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for
the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land;
and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil
Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of
the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration
of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that
registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but
merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. 48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration
system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of
patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by
the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land
Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945
following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the
Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration. 50 Still,
the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself,
establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have
completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally
closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with
Section 14 (2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of
persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
AcDaEH
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act. 51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code.And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidence — the Tax Declarations they presented in particular — is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. EaCDAT
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code.Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of today's
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country
will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the
Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply
levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands,
such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to limitations
imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties. 52 Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled
and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded
for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is
much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues
are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands
as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new
phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands
which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes
insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of
that individual, but also to the person's family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life
and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to
the long pestering problem. caHIAS
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta
and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents — see Opinion.
Separate Opinions
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for
registration of a piece of land originally filed by the late Mario Malabanan
(Malabanan), petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the
instant Petition, being alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
may not be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code,
nor registered pursuant to Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree. CTIEac
At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration Decree
governs registration of land under the Torrens system. It can only identify
which titles, already existing or vested, may be registered under the
Torrens system; but it cannot be the source of any title to land. It merely
confirms, but does not confer ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws", to apply for registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into account that the
land they are seeking to register is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, a fact which would have several substantial implications.
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and
explicitly refers to "private lands", without mention at all of public lands.
There is no other way to understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree except that the land was already private
when the applicant for registration acquired ownership thereof by
prescription. The prescription therein was not the means by which the
public land was converted to private land; rather, it was the way the
applicant acquired title to what is already private land, from another
person previously holding title to the same. 2 The provision in question is
very clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree applies only to what are already private lands, then, there is no
question that the same can be acquired by prescription under the
provisions of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which
governs rights to private lands. ECcTaS
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, as amended, reads:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed
of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be
disposed of by the State, and at the same time, mandates that the latter
can only do so by the modes identified in the same provision. Thus, the
intent of the legislature to make exclusive the enumeration of the modes
by which agricultural public land may be disposed of by the State in Section
11 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is not only readily apparent, but
explicit. And, undeniably, the enumeration of the modes for acquiring
agricultural public land in the said provision does not include prescription,
in the concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome
the express restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the
modes by which the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law specifically applying to
lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as
amended, being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil Code, a general law. Basic
is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail."
Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same cannot confer
title to land and can only confirm title that already exists or has vested. As has already
been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural public land vests or is acquired only
by any of the modes enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended.
TcADCI
And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended several times, changing the
period of possession required for acquiring an imperfect title to agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en
concepto de dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141,
this requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was
enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a
period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No.
1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this
decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945." 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of the public
domain could be acquired by adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential Decree No.
1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by
requiring possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period of possession for acquiring imperfect
title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain is no longer determined
according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date
(i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the possession should have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public domain
by prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of title to land thus acquired under
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, it would be sanctioning what is
effectively a circumvention of the amendment introduced by Presidential Decree No.
1073 to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable land
of the public domain by possession would again be made to depend on a fixed term
(i.e.,10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years for extraordinary prescription), rather
than being reckoned from the fixed date presently stipulated by Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended. DCcIaE
There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the public agricultural
land in question, accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority opinion concerning
the contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals 6 and
Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, acquired in accordance with Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
and registered pursuant to Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, need only prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since
12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the time
of filing of the application for judicial confirmation and/or registration of title. On the
other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a person must establish that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since
12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land was likewise already declared alienable
and disposable since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling in
Naguit, and declares the pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as mere obiter
dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of my
elucidation in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark
made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way", that
is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a
point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the registration of certain
parcels of land of the public domain in the names of Jeremias and David Herbieto, based
on two grounds, one substantive and the other procedural, i.e., (1) the
applicants for registration failed to prove that they possessed the subject
parcels of land for the period required by law; and (2) the application for
registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first, and held that
the alleged infirmity in the application constituted a misjoinder of causes of
action which did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of
the misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by the court
separately. The Court though took note of the belated publication of the
notice of hearing on the application for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the notice of the same was
published. Such error was not only procedural, but jurisdictional, and was
fatal to the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the substantive issue in
Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias and David Herbieto possessed the
parcels of land they wish to register in their names for the period required
by law. The Court ruled in the negative. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, on judicial confirmation of imperfect title, requires
possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain since 12
June 1945 or earlier. Given that the land sought to be registered was
declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the period of
possession prior to such declaration should not be counted in favor of the
applicants for registration, then Jeremias and David Herbieto could not be
deemed to have possessed the parcels of land in question for the requisite
period as to acquire imperfect title to the same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect title to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, which could be the
subject of judicial confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said
case. It was not a mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause,
"by the way", or only incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon a
question before the Court; or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause; or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy
or argument, as to constitute obiter dictum. ECaHSI
It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition in
Herbieto and discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That
the application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already be dismissed
on the ground of lack of proper publication of the notice of hearing
thereof, did not necessarily preclude the Court from resolving the other
issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed
the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on two
grounds: (1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court over the
application, in light of the absence of proper publication of the notice of
hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of the application given that the
applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial confirmation
of an imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court to expeditiously
and completely resolve the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the
dispute and issues between the parties. Without expressly discussing and
categorically ruling on the second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto
could have easily believed that they could re-file their respective
applications for registration, just taking care to comply with the
publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals 9 on what constitutes, or more appropriately, what does
not constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues
presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule
applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved,
which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration
of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to
matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of
the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground, or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point,
otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have turned on is not
regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an
additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been
disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case
presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine
the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as
an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such
points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be
denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued
and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court
regarding other propositions dicta. IcHTCS
An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the
opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is or
might have been made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points
in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the
particular point, otherwise than it did. 10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law and established
jurisprudence on the matter, and is binding as a precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for the acquisition of
an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain, possession by a
Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis ours.) SCIcTD
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially reiterating Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, recognizes the imperfect title thus acquired and
allows the registration of the same, viz.:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. (Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the applicant for
registration prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable cannot be
credited to the applicant's favor. 11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title, under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the
land in question, necessarily, was already declared alienable and disposable also by 12
June 1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, which would not run afoul of
either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws or binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the interpretation of
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in
absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person from acquiring an imperfect
title to a parcel of land declared alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, which
could be judicially confirmed. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the intention of
the law is to dispose of agricultural public land to qualified individuals and not simply to
dispose of the same. It may be deemed a strict interpretation and application of both law
and jurisprudence on the matter, but it certainly is not an absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, is well justified by the significant consequences arising from a finding
that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural land of the public domain. Not just any
lengthy occupation of an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect title. An
imperfect title can only be acquired by occupation and possession of the land by a person
and his predecessors-in-interest for the period required and considered by
law sufficient as to have segregated the land from the mass of public land.
When a person is said to have acquired an imperfect title, by operation of
law, he acquires a right to a grant, a government grant to the land, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such, the land ceased
to be part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the State
to dispose of. An application for confirmation of title, therefore, is but a
mere formality. 12 EIAHcC
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, as amended, has identified several ways by which agricultural lands of
the public domain may be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of
agricultural public land has its own specific requirements which must be
complied with. If a person is not qualified for a judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title, because the land in question was declared alienable and
disposable only after 12 June 1945, he is not totally without recourse for he
could still acquire the same by any of the other modes enumerated in the
afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the majority of the ruling in
Naguit on Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the majority, to
DENY the Petition at bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 February 2007
and Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals dismissing,
for absolute lack of basis, petitioners' application for registration of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia's modified positions on the application of
prescription under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
(PRD), and on the denial of the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable can be made after June 12, 1945, in
accordance with this Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit (Naguit). 1 Effectively, what results from this decision is a new law,
crafted by this Court, going beyond what the Constitution ordains and
beyond the law that the Legislature passed. Because the majority has not
used the standards set by the Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA), 2
its conclusions are based on a determination on what the law ought to be
— an exercise in policy formulation that is beyond the Court's authority to
make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not necessarily in the
order these grounds are posed above. HDTCSI
Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the hierarchy
of laws that govern public lands to fully understand and appreciate the
grounds for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is the Philippine
Constitution, whose Article XII (entitled National Economy and Patrimony)
establishes and fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and
overriding principle. 3 This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to the
State, 4 and that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the State. 5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classification, grant, and
disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and,
other than the Constitution, is the country's primary law on the matter.
Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the authority to administer
and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands
open to disposition or concession, and the requirement that they should be
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section
11, a very significant section, states that —
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and embodies a grant of title to the
qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land. This section provides: cHAIES
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have
applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and
prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or
grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as
against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has been
amended by PD 1073 as follows:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was enacted to codify the various laws relating to
property registration. It governs the registration of lands under the Torrens System, as
well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. Section 14 of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right
of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
SEDIaH
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted from, Section 48
(b) of the PLA. The two provisions, however, differ in intent and legal effect based on the
purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a substantive law that classifies and
provides for the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the
other hand, specifically refers to the manner of bringing registerable lands, among them
alienable public lands, within the coverage of the Torrens system. Thus, the first is a
substantive law, while the other is essentially procedural, so that in terms of substantive
content, the PLA should prevail. 7
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the Civil Code and its provisions
on Property 8 and Prescription. 9 The law on property assumes importance because land,
whether public or private, is property. Prescription, on the other hand, is a mode of
acquiring ownership of land, although it is not one of the modes of disposition mentioned
in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled "Property in Relation to the Person
to Whom it Belongs". On this basis, Article 419 classifies property to be property of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 proceeds to further classify property of
public dominion into those intended for public use, for public service, and for the
development of the national wealth. Article 421 states that all other properties of the
State not falling under Article 420 are patrimonial property of the State, and Article 422
adds that property of public dominion, no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425,
property of private ownership, besides patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities
and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as one of
the modes of acquiring alienable public land under the PLA, (Significantly,
the PLA — under its Section 48 — provides for its system of how possession
can ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as acquisitive
prescription but as basis for confirmation of title.) Section 14 (2) of the
PRD, however, specifies that "[t]hose who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" as
among those who may apply for land registration. Thus, prescription was
introduced into the land registration scheme (the PRD), but not into the
special law governing lands of the public domain (the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation with public lands is
Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which states that prescription does not run
against the State and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113
provides that "all things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided; property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription." The provisions of Articles 1128 to 1131 may also
come into play in the application of prescription to real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the supremacy of
the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of lands of the public domain
should start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all lands belong
to the State, and he who claims ownership carries the burden of proving his
claim. 10 Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the
grant, alienation and disposition of the lands of the public domain, and the
PRD for the registration of lands. The PLA and the PRD are special laws
supreme in their respective spheres, subject only to the Constitution. The
Civil Code, for its part, is the general law on property and prescription and
should be accorded respect as such. In more concrete terms, where
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are involved, the PLA is
the primary law that should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on
property and prescription must yield in case of conflict. 11
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the PLA with a reiteration
of the first principle that under the regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 12
Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain. 13 We should never lose sight of the impact of this first principle
where a private ownership claim is being asserted against the State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over time, starting
from the first PLA, Act No. 926; the second public land law that followed,
Act No. 2874; and the present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926
was described in the following terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed
the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public
lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands", for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title
to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris
and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands. 14
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried over to
the present PLA and its amendments. Another basic feature, the
requirement for open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable public land under a bona fide
claim of ownership also never changed. Still another consistent public land
feature is the concept that once a person has complied with the requisite
possession and occupation in the manner provided by law, he is
automatically given a State grant that may be asserted against State
ownership; the land, in other words, ipso jure becomes private land. 15 The
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow,
based on the procedure for land registration. 16 It is in this manner that
the PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for reckoning the required
occupation or possession. In the first PLA, the required occupation/possession to qualify
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was 10 years preceding the effectivity of Act
No. 926 — July 26, 1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or earlier). This was retained up to CA 141,
until this law was amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22, 1957), 17
which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. This period did not last; on January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073
(PD 1073) 18 changed the required 30-year possession and occupation period provision,
to possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. PD
1073 likewise changed the lands subject of imperfect title, from agricultural lands of the
public domain to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. PD 1073 also
extended the period for applications for free patents and judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.
The significance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to have been lost to history. A major
concern raised against this date is that the country was at this time under Japanese
occupation, and for some years after, was suffering from the uncertainties and
instabilities that World War II brought. Questions were raised on how one could possibly
comply with the June 12, 1945 or earlier occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073
when the then prevailing situation did not legally or physically permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as the enactment of the law (a Presidential
Decree) was solely through the President's lawmaking powers under a regime that
permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for the date is the possible impact of
the interplay between the old law and the amendatory law. When PD 1073 was enacted,
the utmost concern, in all probability, was how the law would affect the application of the
old law which provided for a thirty-year possession period. Counting 30 years backwards
from the enactment of PD 1073 on January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a
January 24, 1947 cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for unknown reasons,
the date June 12, 1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested rights acquired under the old
law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year possession period could not
be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We recognized this legal dilemma in Abejaron v.
Nabasa, 19 when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required
by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and
possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the
Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation
of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have
already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair
vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may
apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of
the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24, 1947 and not June
12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date is the express legal reality. The
reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that where an applicant has
satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to
the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his or her title, even if
possession and occupation does not date back to June 12, 1945. For purposes of the
present case, a discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to highlight that it is a
date whose significance and import cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns; the full legislative intent must
be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were not confined to RA
1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were complemented by Presidential Decree No. 892
(PD 892) 20 — issued on February 16, 1976 — which limited to six months the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. 21 Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073 totally disallowed the judicial
confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 22 extended the period for filing applications for free patent and
judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The law now also allows the
issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12 hectares to any natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30
years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of
agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to December 31, 2020. 23

Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which defines the administrative
grant of title to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
through homestead settlement and sale, among others), RA 6940 and RA
9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 that the
Legislature has provided, ample opportunities exist under the law for the
grant of alienable lands of the public domain to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on June 11, 1978
to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. Its Section 14
describes the applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree,
among them —
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately
discussed below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off date of June
12, 1945 and which, under the conditions discussed above, may be read to
be January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation with Section 14
(1) of the PRD and, noted among others, that "under the current state of
the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed
of only until December 31, 2020". This is in light of RA 9176, passed in
2002, 24 limiting the filing of an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title to December 31, 2020. The amendatory law apparently
refers only to the use of Section 14 (1) of the PRD as a mode of registration.
Where ownership right or title has already vested in the possessor-
occupant of the land that Section 48 (b) of the PLA grants by operation of
law, Section 14 (2) of the PRD continuous to be open for purposes of
registration of a "private land" since compliance with Section 48 (b) of the
PLA vests title to the occupant/possessor and renders the land private in
character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General that the public land to be registered must have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of the cut-off date for possession
stated in Section 48 (b) — June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and
reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Naguit that held: 25
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.
Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were
not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines
was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper
to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even
if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
xxx xxx xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court noted
that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the
lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration
therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or
nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this
case, where the application was made years after the property had been certified as
alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well discredits Bracewell. It does the same
with Republic v. Herbieto 26 that came after Naguit and should have therefore overtaken
the Naguit ruling. In the process, the ponencia cites with approval the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza, 27 penned by the same ponente who wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it however completely misses the
point from the perspective of whether possession of public lands classified as alienable
and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be credited for purposes of a grant under
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, and of registration under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. These cases,
as analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted or denied registration on the basis of
whether the public land has been classified as alienable and disposable at the time the
petition for registration was filed. Thus, except for Naguit, these cases can be cited only
as instances when registration was denied or granted despite the classification of the land
as alienable after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the quotation above, this is one
case that explained why possession prior to the classification of public land as alienable
should be credited in favor of the possessor who filed his or her application for
registration after the classification of the land as alienable and disposable, but where such
classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the ponencia relied upon are its statutory
construction interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the PLA and the observed ABSURDITY of
using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree with Naguit and its reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution classifies public lands into
agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of these, only agricultural lands can be alienated. 28
Without the requisite classification, there can be no basis to determine which lands of the
public domain are alienable and which are not; hence, classification is a constitutionally-
required step whose importance should be given full legal recognition and effect.
Otherwise stated, without classification into disposable agricultural land, the land forms
part of the mass of the public domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral or
timber land that are completely inalienable and as such cannot be possessed with legal
effects. To allow effective possession is to do violence to the regalian doctrine; the
ownership and control that the doctrine denotes will be less than full if the possession
that should be with the State as owner, but is elsewhere without any authority, can
anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can be claimed under its Section 48
(b), it is very important to note that this law does not apply until a classification into
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is made. If the PLA does not apply
prior to a public land's classification as alienable and disposable, how can possession
under its Section 48 (b) be claimed prior such classification? There can simply be no
imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable
because, in the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land
that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA
141. 29 If the land is either mineral or timber and can never be the subject of
administration and disposition, it defies legal logic to allow the possession of these
unclassified lands to produce legal effect. Thus, the classification of public land as
alienable and disposable is inextricably linked to effective possession that can ripen into a
claim under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil law term that can best be
understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any specific definition in the PLA
other than in terms of time of possession. 30 Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that
"[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal effects. This perspective
fully complements what has been said above under the constitutional and PLA reasons. It
confirms, too, that the critical difference the ponencia saw in the Bracewell and Naguit
situations does not really exist. Whether an application for registration is filed before or
after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the other, no
effective possession can be recognized prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date — June 12, 1945. The ponencia
assumes, based on its statutory construction reasoning and its reading of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession from
June 12, 1945 and that it suffices if the land has been classified as alienable
at the time of application for registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-
off date was painstakingly set by law and should be given full significance.
Its full import appears from PD 1073 that amended Section 48 (b), whose
exact wordings state:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not expressly
state what Section 48 (b) should provide under the amendment PD 1073
introduced in terms of the exact wording of the amended Section 48 (b).
But under the PD 1073 formulation, the intent to count the alienability to
June 12, 1945 appears very clear. The provision applies only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain that is described in terms of the
character of the possession required since June 12, 1945. This intent —
seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945 under the wording
of the Decree — is clear and should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under the PLA. Naguit's
absurdity argument that the ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent
than real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration
of alienability will not render the grant of alienable public lands out of
reach. The acquisition of ownership and title may still be obtained by other
modes under the PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned above, now
allows the use of free patents. 31 It was approved on March 28, 1990;
hence, counting 30 years backwards, possession since April 1960 or
thereabouts may qualify a possessor to apply for a free patent. The
administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA are also open,
particularly, homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom — the absurdity — of the law. This Court acts
beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in
giving Section 48 (b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its
plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not
there even your purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a
law already has absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role
under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity.
We thereby dip into the realm of policy — a role delegated by the
Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason, we should avoid
expanding — through Naguit and the present ponencia — the plain
meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits the ruling in
Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or an obiter dictum. As
to legal correctness, Herbieto is in full accord with what we have stated
above; hence, it cannot be dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling.
Likewise, its ruling on the lack of effective legal possession prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable cannot strictly be
obiter because it responded to an issue directly raised by the parties.
Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved the
case, but it cannot be faulted if it went beyond this threshold issue into the
merits of the claim of effective possession prior to the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling that the
ponencia passes off as the established and definitive rule on possession
under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that
no definitive ruling touching on Section 14 (1) can be deemed to have been
established in the present case since the applicant Heirs could only prove
possession up to 1948. For this reason, the ponencia falls back on and
examines Section 14 (2) of the PRD. In short, if there is a perfect example of
a ruling that is not necessary for the resolution of a case, that unnecessary
ruling is the ponencia's ruling that Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only to private lands. Thus, on
plain reading, it does not apply to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain that Section 14 (1) covers. This is the difference between
Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the
coverage of Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code by directly applying civil law
provisions on prescription on alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. To quote the obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes to enshrine as the
definitive rule and leading case on Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2): 32
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration
by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of
the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right
to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be considered in the
interpretation of Section 14 (2). Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code fully applies to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (2) assuming that the Civil Code fully
applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore "private property"; and (3)
assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, that these properties are within the commerce
of men and can be acquired through prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the above assumptions and its
direct application of prescription under Section 14 (2) to alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain. This Section becomes relevant only once the ownership of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain vests in the occupant or possessor
pursuant to the terms of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, with or without judicial confirmation
of title, so that the land has become a private land. At that point, Section 14 (2) becomes
fully operational on what had once been an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is clear from Article XII,
Section 3 of the Constitution. There are matters that the Constitution itself provides for,
and some that are left for Congress to deal with. Thus, under Section 3, the Constitution
took it upon itself to classify lands of the public domain, and to state that only agricultural
lands may be alienable lands of the public domain. It also laid down the terms under
which lands of the public domain may be leased by corporations and individuals. At the
same time, it delegated to Congress the authority to classify agricultural lands of the
public domain according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Congress likewise
determines, by law, the size of the lands of the public domain that may be acquired,
developed, held or leased, and the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it will act, specifically,
whether it will pass a general or a special law. On alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, Congress has, from the very beginning, acted through the medium of a
special law, specifically, through the Public Land Act that by its terms "shall apply to the
lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special
laws." Notably, the Act goes on to provide that nothing in it "shall be understood or
construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands commonly
called 'friar lands' and those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become
property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition
shall be governed by laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted." 33
Under these terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very specific act whose coverage extends
only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it is a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules on the effect and
application of laws and human relations; persons and family relations; property and
property relations; the different modes of acquiring ownership; and obligations and
contracts. 34 Its general nature is best appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides that:
"In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code."
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect to the latter's special
focus — land registration — and fully applies civil law provisions in so far only as they are
allowed by the PRD. One such case where the Civil Code is expressly allowed to apply is in
the case of Section 14 (2) of the PRD which calls for the application of prescription under
existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own specific purposes and
are supreme within their own spheres, subject only to what the higher Constitution
provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA provides when the matter to be
registered is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property, including State property. It
classifies property as either of public dominion or of private ownership, 35
and property for public use, public service and those for the development
of the national wealth as property of the public dominion. 36 All property
not so characterized are patrimonial property of the State 37 which are
susceptible to private ownership, 38 against which prescription will run. 39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they refer
to the properties of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and
immovable properties. 40 Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do
not refer to land alone, much less do they refer solely to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the
special governing law and, under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code
provisions shall apply only in case of deficiency. 41
begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has become
private by the government's own declaration so that prescription under the Civil Code can
run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency between this conclusion and the
hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA
applies as a special and primary law when a public land is classified as alienable and
disposable, and remains fully and exclusively applicable until the State itself expressly
declares that the land now qualifies as a patrimonial property. At that point, the
application of the Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered. The application of
Section 14 (2) of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that:

This conclusion gives rise to the question — can alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain at the same time be patrimonial property of the
State because they are not for public use, public purpose, and for the
development of national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the interaction
discussed above between the PLA and PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil
Code, on the other, and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is
necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a grant or
disposition of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain has
been made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is
based on its Section 48 (b) and, until the requirements of this Section are
satisfied, the alienable and disposable land of the public domain remains a
State property that can be disposed only under the terms of Section 11 of
the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the question of whether — for
purposes of prescription — an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain is patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if
alienable and disposable, is State property and prescription does not run
against the State. 42 In other words, there is no room for any hairsplitting
that would allow the inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil
Code to be directly applied to an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain before this land satisfies the terms of a grant under Section
48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial character of
alienable and disposable public lands under the norms of the Civil Code is
rendered moot and academic.
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full application in considering
lands of the public domain. Top consideration should be accorded to the Philippine
Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed by the consideration of applicable special
laws — the PLA and the PRD, insofar as this Decree applies to lands of the public domain.
The Civil Code and other general laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the
primary laws or to supply any of the latter's deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the classification of public lands as
alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 at the latest, is
wrong because:
a. Under the Constitution's regalian doctrine, classification is a required step whose full
import should be given full effect and recognition; giving legal effect to possession prior
to classification runs counter to the regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public land is classified as alienable
and disposable; thus, Section 48 (b) of this law and the possession it requires cannot be
recognized prior to any classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the classification of a public land
as alienable and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence,
any claimed possession cannot have legal effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under the Public Land Act; this legal reality renders the ponencia's absurdity
argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law and is a matter for
the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.

From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain are owned by the State, an applicant for land registration
invoking Section 14 (2) of the PRD to support his claim must first clearly
show that the land has been withdrawn from the public domain through an
express and positive act of the government. 43
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-flawed
premises and for being an aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the very least,
the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an authority on the effective possession prior
to classification since this ruling, by the ponencia's own admission, is not necessary for
the resolution of the present case.

A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular land ||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 244-326)
from the mass of the public domain is provided both in the old and the
prevailing Public Land Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance
with the required possession of agricultural public land (under the first and
second PLAs) or alienable and disposable land of the public domain (under
the prevailing PLA) in the manner and duration provided by law is
equivalent to a government grant. Thus, the land ipso jure becomes private
land. It is only at that point that the "private land" requirement of Section
14 (2) materializes. 44

Prescription

In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia), I discussed

ordinary acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise to leave no stone
unturned in rejecting the ponencia's original conclusion that prescription
directly applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under Section 14 (2) of the PRD. I am happy to note that the present
ponencia has adopted, albeit without any attribution, part of my original
academic discussion on the application of the Civil Code, particularly on the
subjects of patrimonial property of the State and prescription.

Specifically, I posited — assuming arguendo that the Civil Code applies —

that the classification of a public land as alienable and disposable does not
per se signify that the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since
property, to be patrimonial, must not be for public use, for public purpose
or for the development of national wealth. Something more must be done
or shown beyond the fact of classification. The ponencia now concedes
that "[T]here must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use or the
development of the national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code.And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198585. July 2, 2012.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. METRO INDEX REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated
September 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94616.
The Facts
Sometime in June 2006, Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation
(respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naic, Cavite an
application for judicial confirmation of title over three (3) parcels of land
located at Barangay Alulod/Mataas na Lupa, Indang, Cavite. These
properties have a consolidated area of 39,490 square meters and more
particularly described as Lot No. 16742 Csd-04-014277-D, Lot No. 17154
and Lot No. 17155 Cad-459-D of the Indang Cadastre.
During the hearings on the application, which was docketed as LRC Case
No. NC-2005-0006, the respondent presented two (2) witnesses, Enrico
Dimayuga (Enrico) and Herminia Sicap-Fojas (Herminia). Enrico, who was
the respondent's Project Documentation Officer, testified that: (a) the
respondent bought the subject properties from Herminia, Melinda Sicap
(Melinda), and Hernando Sicap (Hernando); (b) the subject properties had
been declared for tax purposes in the respondent's name since 2006; (c)
the subject properties are alienable and disposable as evidenced by the
certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR); (d) as shown by their respective affidavits, the adjoining
lot owners had no adverse claim and objections to the respondent's
application; and (e) the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject properties for more than fifty (50) years.
Herminia, on the other hand, testified that: (a) she and her siblings,
Melinda and Hernando, inherited the subject properties from their parents,
Brigido Sicap and Juana Espineli; (b) their parents had been in possession of
the subject properties since 1956 as shown by the tax declarations in their
name; (c) from the time they inherited the subject properties, they had
actively cultivated them and religiously paid the taxes due; 2 and (d) the
subject properties are planted with coconut, banana, santol, palay and
corn. 3 IaDSEA
On August 7, 2009, the RTC issued a Decision 4 granting the respondent's
application, ratiocinating that:
From the evidence presented by the applicant thru counsel, this Court finds
that the land being applied for registration is alienable and disposable land;
that it is not within any military or naval reservation; that the possession of
herein applicant as well as that of its predecessor(s)-in-interest has (sic)
been open, public[,] continuous, notorious and adverse to the whole world
and therefore, the applicant is entitled to the relief prayed for. 5
On appeal to the CA, the same was denied. In its assailed decision, the CA
ruled that while only a few trees are found on the subject properties, this
fact coupled with the diligent payment of taxes since 1956 sufficed to
substantiate the claim that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession in the manner and for the length of time required
by law.
Although as a rule, tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property and serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.
It may be true that only few trees are planted and grown on the lots, but
this does not mean that appellee and their predecessors-in-interest do now
own them. Surely, ownership is not measured alone by the number or kind
of crops planted on the land. Possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession. Actual possession consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property. The general rule is that the
possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract under claim of ownership
of its entirely (sic) is a constructive possession of the entire tract, so long as
no portion thereof is in the adverse possession of another. At any rate,
some owners may be hardworking enough to fully utilize their lands, some
may not be as hardworking. But both do not retain or lose their ownership
on the basis alone of the degree of hard work they put into their respective
lands.
This Court finds that while appellee's predecessors-in-interest may not have fully tilled
the lots, this does not destroy their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
thereof, in the concept of owner. They have proven their particular acts of ownership by
planting crops on the lots, declaring them for tax purposes in their names, religiously
paying taxes thereon since 1956 onward, and retaining peaceful, open, uninterrupted,
exclusive and notorious possession of it for over 50 years. . . .: 6 (Citation omitted) IaESCH
In the instant petition, this Court is urged to reverse the CA as the respondent allegedly
failed to prove its compliance with the requirements of either Section 14 (1) or Section 14
(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Assuming that the respondent's application
was anchored on Section 14 (1), there is no evidence that possession and occupation of
its predecessors-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. In fact, the earliest
tax declaration presented by the respondent was for the year 1956. On the other hand,
assuming that the respondent's claim of imperfect title is based on Section 14 (2), the
subject properties cannot be acquired by prescription as there is no showing that they
had been classified as patrimonial at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application. The respondent failed to show proof of an official declaration that the subject
properties are no longer intended for public service or for the development of national
wealth; hence, the subject properties cannot be acquired by prescription.
In any case, the petitioner posited, the CA erred in finding that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the property openly, continuously,
notoriously and exclusively for more than fifty (50) years. Tax declarations, per se, are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. Alternatively, while the tax declarations are
accompanied by the claim that the subject properties are planted with coconut and fruit-
bearing trees, their numbers are insignificant to suggest actual cultivation. Moreover,
only the tax declarations in the name of the respondent show the existence of these fruit-
bearing trees.
Our Ruling
Finding merit in the foregoing submissions, this Court resolves to GRANT this petition. The
issue of whether the respondent had proven that it is entitled to the benefits of P.D. No.
1529 on confirmation of imperfect titles should be resolved against it.
It is not clear from the assailed decision of the CA as well as that of the RTC whether the
grant of the respondent's application is based on Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D.
No. 1529. Nonetheless, considering the respondent's evidence purportedly
demonstrating that its predecessors-in-interest started to possess and occupy the subject
properties sometime in 1956 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier, the reasonable
conclusion is that its claim of having acquired an imperfect title over the subject
properties is premised on its supposed compliance with the requirements of Section 14
(2), which states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives: HDIaST
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
That properties of the public dominion are not susceptible to prescription and that only
properties of the State that are no longer earmarked for public use, otherwise known as
patrimonial, may be acquired by prescription are fundamental, even elementary,
principles in this jurisdiction. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 7 this Court, in
observance of the foregoing, clarified the import of Section 14 (2) and made the following
declarations: (a) the prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring an imperfect title over a
property of the State shall commence to run from the date an official declaration is issued
that such property is no longer intended for public service or the development of national
wealth; and (b) prescription will not run as against the State even if the property has been
previously classified as alienable and disposable as it is that official declaration that
converts the property to patrimonial. Particularly:
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable and disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. 8
The Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the foregoing principles in Republic v.
Rizalvo, Jr. 9 as follows:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration
because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds
thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of
prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State expressly declares
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. . . . 10
Simply put, it is not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession
and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the
mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial. The indispensability of an
official declaration that the property is now held by the State in its private
capacity or placed within the commerce of man for prescription to have
any effect against the State cannot be overemphasized. This Court finds no
evidence of such official declaration and for this reason alone, the
respondent's application should have been dismissed outright.
It is rather unfortunate that the lower courts operated on the erroneous
premise that a public land, once declared alienable and disposable, can be
acquired by prescription. Indeed, familiarity with the principles cited above
would have instantly alerted them to the inherent incongruity of such
proposition. First, an alienable and disposable land of the public domain is
not necessarily patrimonial. For while the property is no longer for public
use, the intent to use it for public service or for the development of
national wealth is presumed unless the contrary is expressly manifested by
competent authority. Second, while the State had already deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation and disposition, the only
mode which the law provides for its acquisition is that provided under
Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
It was therefore of no moment if the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest had allegedly been in possession and occupation of the subject
properties for more than fifty (50) years for the subject properties cannot
be acquired by prescription for as long as they remain reserved for public
service or the development of national wealth. That there was much ado
on whether the evidence on the character and nature of the respondent's
possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest measured up to the
standards imposed by law and jurisprudence is definitely futile and otiose;
the primary question of whether the subject properties are patrimonial,
hence, may be acquired by prescription should have been addressed first
hand but regrettably neglected.
Worse than its failure to see that the subject properties cannot be acquired
by prescription, the CA erred in concluding that the possession and
occupation of the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest was in the
manner contemplated by law. The CA is definitely mistaken in downplaying
the importance and indispensability of demonstrating actual cultivation
and development in substantiating a claim of imperfect title and in putting
much premium on the religious payment of realty taxes effected by the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest. It is well-settled that tax
declarations are mere bases for inferring possession. They must be coupled
with proof of actual possession for them to constitute "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence of a claim of ownership. 11
Moreover, it is undisputed that the number of coconut trees is unspecified
while the number of fruit-bearing trees is too few (three santol, one
avocado and one star apple). However, the CA haphazardly ruled that this
warranted the application of the doctrine of constructive possession
without considering the size of the subject properties contrary to this
Court's pronouncements in Spouses Rumarate v. Hernandez: 12
However, the records do not support the argument of respondents that
Santiago's alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 is in the nature
contemplated by the Public Land Act which requires more than
constructive possession and casual cultivation. As explained by the Court in
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and
occupation." Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under
paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not
be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P.
Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
". . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in
Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also Rosales vs.
Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be observed that the
application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject
to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among
these qualifications is 'one particularly relating to the size of the tract in
controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant.' While, therefore, 'possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession,' possession under paragraph 6 of section 54
of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained
by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify
a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a
means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction . . . ."
EATCcI
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:
". . . The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and visiting it
every once in a while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts of possession." 13
(Citation omitted)
Rather than proof of constructive possession, the presence of a meager number of
plantings on the subject properties shows that the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest engaged in mere casual cultivation, which does not constitute possession under
claim of ownership. As ruled in Republic of the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Vera etc., et al.:
14
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. 15
Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 16 which is an illustration of
what is considered casual cultivation, states:
But even granting that the witnesses presented by herein respondent applicants were
indeed bona fide overseers and tenants or workers of the land in question, it appears
rather strange why only about 3,000 coconut trees and some fruit trees were planted
(2,000 coconut trees on Lot 1 which is 119 hectares, and 1,000 coconut trees on Lot 2
which is 19 hectares) on the vast tract of land subject of the instant petition. In a practical
and scientific way of planting, a one-hectare land can be planted to about 114 coconut
trees. In the instant case, if the hired tenants and workers of respondent applicants
managed to plant only 3,000 coconut trees, it could only mean that about only 25
hectares out of the 138 hectares claimed by herein respondent applicants were cleared,
cultivated, and planted to coconut trees and fruit trees. Once planted, a coconut is left to
grow and need not be tended or watched. This is not what the law considers as
possession under claim of ownership. On the contrary, it merely showed casual or
occasional cultivation of portions of the land in question. In short, possession is not
exclusive nor notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to a presumptive grant
from the government. 17
Furthermore, in Wee v. Republic, 18 this Court held it is not enough that improvements
or signs of use and cultivation can be found on the property; there must be proof that the
use or development of the property is attributable to the applicant and his predecessors-
in-interest: EHCaDS
We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an unspecified
number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them, when they were
planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation
and ownership were undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's right to
the registration of title in her favor. 19
This Court does not see why this case should be decided otherwise given that the
evidence of the alleged overt acts of possession in the two cases cited above and in this
case are unsatisfactory and cannot be considered as "well-nigh incontrovertible" that the
law and jurisprudence requires.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
September 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94616 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The respondent's application for original registration of Lot No. 16742
Csd-04-014277-D, Lot No. 17154 and Lot No. 17155 Cad-459-D of the Indang Cadastre is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Perez and Sereno, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Metro Index Realty and Development Corp., G.R. No. 198585, [July 2,
2012], 690 PHIL 31-43)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172011. March 7, 2011.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR.,
respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
On appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73647
which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bauang,
La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU, approving respondent's application
for registration of an 8,957-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy.
Taberna, Bauang, La Union. aIcCTA
The facts are undisputed.
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the
MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application
for the registration 3 of a parcel of land referred to in Survey Plan Psu-
200706, 4 located in Bauang, La Union and containing an area of 8,957
square meters.
Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel
of land, that he obtained title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer
5 dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently in possession of the
land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration
No. 22206 6 for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment 7 of real
property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an
Opposition alleging that neither respondent nor his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and
that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of ownership. The OSG also asserted
that the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private acquisition.
At the hearing of the application, no private oppositor came forth.
Consequently, the trial court issued an Order of Special Default against the
whole world except the Republic of the Philippines and entered the same
in the records of the case.
At the trial, respondent testified that he acquired the subject property by
purchase from his mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, as evidenced by a Deed of
Transfer dated December 31, 1962. 8 He also testified that he was in
adverse, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property;
that no one was questioning his ownership over the land; and that he was
the one paying the real property tax thereon, as evidenced by the bundle
of official receipts covering the period of 1953 to 2000. He also stated that
he was the one who had the property surveyed; that no one opposed the
survey; and that during said survey, they placed concrete markers on the
boundaries of the property. Further, he stated that he was not aware of
any person or entity which questioned his mother's ownership and
possession of the subject property.
Respondent's mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, was also presented during the
trial. She stated that she purchased the lot from Eufrecina Navarro, as
evidenced by the Absolute Deed of Sale 9 dated July 8, 1952. She
confirmed that before she sold the property to her son, she was the
absolute owner of the subject property and was in possession thereof,
without anyone questioning her status as owner. She further stated that
she was the one paying for the real property taxes at that time and that she
even installed improvements on the subject property. SIcEHD
After conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving
the subject land, Land Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San
Fernando, La Union submitted a report 10 on July 17, 2001. Aside from the
technical description of the land, the report certified that indeed the
subject parcel of land was within the alienable and disposable zone and
that the applicant was indeed in actual occupation and possession of the
land.
On the part of the Republic, the OSG did not present any evidence.
As stated above, the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration
court, rendered its Decision 11 on November 29, 2001, approving
respondent's application. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads —
WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming the Order of Special Default, hereby approves the
application and orders the adjudication and registration of the land described in Survey
Plan No. PSU-200706 (Exh. "A") and the Technical Description of the land (Exh. "B")
situated at Brgy. Taberna, Bauang, La Union containing an area of Eight Thousand Nine
Hundred Fifty Seven (. . .8,957) square meters.
Once this decision becomes final and executory let the corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED. 12
On December 21, 2001 the Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of
Appeal. In its Brief, 13 the OSG argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the
applicant proved a registrable title to the property. However, the CA found no merit in
the appeal and promulgated the assailed Decision 14 on March 14, 2006, affirming the
trial court's decision.
The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG now comes to this Court by way of
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, to seek relief.
In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion over all
lands of public domain and that the grant to private individuals of imperfect title by the
Republic over its alienable and disposable lands is a mere privilege. Hence, judicial
confirmation proceeding is strictly construed against the grantee/applicant. 15 TSaEcH
The OSG further contends that respondent failed to show indubitably that he has
complied with all the requirements showing that the property, previously part of the
public domain, has become private property by virtue of his acts of possession in the
manner and length of time required by law. The OSG maintains that respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest failed to show convincingly that he or they were in open,
continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land of the public domain as required
by law. The OSG points out that there is no evidence showing that the property has been
fenced, walled, cultivated or otherwise improved. The OSG argues that without these
indicators which demonstrate clear acts of possession and occupation, the application for
registration cannot be allowed. 16
On the other hand, respondent counters that he has presented sufficient proof that the
subject property was indeed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. He also asserts that his title over the land can be traced by documentary
evidence wayback to 1948 and hence, the length of time required by law for acquisition
of an imperfect title over alienable public land has been satisfied. 17
Further, he argues that although not conclusive proof of ownership, tax declarations and
official receipts of payment of real property taxes are at least proof of possession of real
property. In addition, he highlights the fact that since the occupancy and possession of his
predecessors-in-interest, there has been no question about their status as owners and
possessors of the property from adjoining lot owners, neighbors, the community, or any
other person. Because of this, he claims that his possession of the land is open,
continuous, adverse, and public — sufficient for allowing registration.
Verily, the main issue in this case is whether respondent and his predecessors-in-interest
were in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land in question in the
manner and length of time required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
We answer in the negative.
Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title must prove compliance with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The pertinent portions of Section 14 provide:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first,
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third,
that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report
19 dated July 17, 2001 submitted by Special Investigator I Dionisio L. Picar
of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire land
area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as
such since January 21, 1987.
In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic, 20 we have ruled that a
certification and report from the DENR-CENRO enjoys the presumption of
regularity and is sufficient proof to show the classification of he land
described therein. We held:
In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic, 21 we ruled that said
Certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the
subject property as public and alienable land. We similarly ruled in Republic
v. Court of Appeals 22 and intoned therein that the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. aHTEIA
Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a positive
government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in
question. As adverted to by the petitioner, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government. Clearly, the petitioner has overcome the burden of proving
the alienability of the subject lot.
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. 31 In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court
ruled,
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), 32 and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by
the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. 33
In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and report from the DENR-
CENRO dated July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in question entirely falls within the
alienable and disposable zone since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for
public use; and that it does not encroach any area devoted to general public use. 34
Unfortunately, such certification and report is not enough in order to commence the
thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). There is no evidence in this case
indicating any express declaration by the state that the subject land is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, there appears no basis
for the application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period in this case.

Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and
possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has
presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that
he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings
are binding upon this Court absent any showing that the lower courts
committed glaring mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. In Buenaventura v. Pascual, 23 we reiterated.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the findings of fact
complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the
assailed judgment is based on the misapprehension of facts. The trial court,
having heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of
testifying, is in a better position to decide the question of their credibility.
Hence, the findings of the trial court must be accorded the highest respect,
even finality, by this Court. . . . .
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough
to signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration because the land was
certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the application for registration was
filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after and far short of the required
thirty (30) years under existing laws on prescription. EcHaAC
Although we would want to adhere to the State's policy of encouraging and promoting
the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the
ideal of social justice 35 we are constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law
to disallow respondent's application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 14, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 73647 affirming the Decision dated November 29, 2001 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent's application for registration is DENIED.
No costs.

However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in- SO ORDERED.
interest be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Abad * and Sereno, JJ., concur.
been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary
evidence of his and his mother's ownership and possession of the land ||| (Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, [March 7, 2011], 659 PHIL 578-591)
since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale 24 dated July
8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He presented
Tax Declaration No. 11078 25 for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina
Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952. 26 In Llanes v.
Republic, 27 the Court held that tax declarations are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. 28 However, even assuming that the 1948 Tax Declaration in
the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be
taken in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks
proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier.
What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 29 aAHISE

But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject land since 1948, is respondent
nonetheless entitled to registration of title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No.
1529? To this question we likewise answer in the negative.

An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription

under existing laws. The laws on prescription are found in the Civil Code
and jurisprudence. It is well settled that prescription is one of the modes of
acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable public land
may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty years. 30

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for
registration because his claim of ownership and possession over the
subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for
purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under
Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment the State
expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-39248. May 7, 1976.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant,
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
DAVAO CITY, defendants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General
Octavio R. Ramirez and Baltazar Llamas for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.
SYNOPSIS
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Certificate of Title alleging that: the subdivision of a parcel of
land owned by defendant into two lots included an excess area of 82,127
square meters; the Land Registration Commissioner approved said petition
for subdivision and; in view of which transfer certificate of title, which
included the excess area, were issued by the Register of Deeds. The lower
court rendered judgment cancelling the new certificates of title (one of the
subdivided lots having been further subdivided and new certificates of title
issued therefor) containing the increased area and ordered the Register of
Deeds to issue new ones in lieu thereof after the increased portion had
been deducted. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the latter certified the
case to the Supreme Court since it involved purely a question of law.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment holding that to bring the
increased area under the operation and coverage of the Land Registration
Act proceedings for registration of the land should be filed.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION ACT; PETITION FOR SUBDIVISION INCLUDES ONLY
PREVIOUSLY REGISTERED LANDS. — Recourse under Section 44 of Act 496
is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands.
2. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where parts of the tracts of land has not yet
been brought under the operation of the Torrens System, approval of
subdivision plans cannot bring said tracts of land under the operation and
coverage of the Torrens Systems. More so where the approval of the
subdivision plans was without notice to all parties in interest, more
particularly the Director of Lands.
3. ID.; REQUISITES FOR REGISTRATION UNDER LAND REGISTRATION ACT. —
For an applicant to have this imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land
to be originally registered under Act 496, the several requisites should all
be satisfied; (1) Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed
private surveyor; (2) Filing an application for registration by the applicant;
(3) Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
(4) Transmittal of the application and the date of the initial hearing
together with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by
the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration Commission; (5) Publication of a
notice of the filing of the application and the date and place of the hearing
in the Official Gazette; (6) Service of notice upon contiguous owners,
occupants and those known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
(7) Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the
notice or not; (8) Hearing of the case by the Court; (9) Promulgation of
judgment by the Court; (10) Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring
the decision final and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue
a decree of confirmation and registration; (11) Entry of the decree of
registration in the Land Registration Commission; (12) Sending of copy of
the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and (13)
Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the
issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant
by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
DECISION
ESGUERRA, J p:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this
Court for final consideration and resolution of the pure question of law
involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed
by the Republic of the Philippines. (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court
of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, alleging, among others, the following:
"3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant Register of Deeds
of Davao City whose Offices are at España Extension, Quezon City and Davao City,
respectively, are included in this complaint, the first being the public Official charged
under the law with the approval of subdivision surveys of private lands while the second
is the Official vested with the authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant to the
provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
"4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille) is the
owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO SQUARE METERS (525,652), more or
less, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City,
issued in her name;
"5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the subdivision of the
aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2
under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-9322 which was approved by the Land Registration
Commissioner on March 17, 1967;
"6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 contains an area of
30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 contains an area of 577,679 Square
Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more
than the original area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of
said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
"7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land Registration
Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of First
Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the
City of Davao and Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439
and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-
18887;
"8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered Lot 379-B-2-B-1
and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa-Abrille and on the same
date registered Lot No. 3 79-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa Villa-
Abrille;
"9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the aforementioned
excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the
required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known
as the Land Registration Law;
"10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the approval
of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the Davao River
which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao River; hence a land
belonging to the public domain; and
"11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887 which covers
Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the excess. area of
land belong to the public domain (not private land) is null and void ab initio."
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City filed her answer averring
that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected
the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and the
issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in
view of the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-
69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area
in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos.
T-18886 and T-18887". LibLex
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4,5 and 7 of the complaint. That they admit the increase in
area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was
acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and the
same was duly noted and approved by the Court of First Instance of Davao; that they
admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T-1439
in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No. T-18886
had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio
Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several Transfer
Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area was made in
accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa Abrille, predecessor-
in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was entitled under the law to
claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of her original land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a judgment
on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the subject matter
of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein was approved by the then
Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that on February 19, 1968, the
then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No. 167
directing the Register of Deeds throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny the
registration of subdivision plans with increased or expanded areas and to withhold the
issuance of the corresponding titles, or if the plans have already been
registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate
steps for their cancellation.
Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to
intervene in the case as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing
in court by the trial court in its order of August 16, 1969.
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed
Stipulation of Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court
on their case based on their stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of
Facts" of the parties reads as follows: Cdpr
"COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto
the Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of
facts and allege:
"1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the
Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A-27, Page 40
under Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No.
317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa
Abrille;
"2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was
inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;
"3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-69322
by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T- 18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant, Register of
Deeds of Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto attached as Annex
"A", and made integral part hereof;
"4. That Transfer Certificate of Title. No. T-18886 was subsequently concern
by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was
issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji, a purchaser in good faith and
for value;
"5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated March
27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made
part hereof;
"6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto attached as
Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;
"7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was, by
virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, in Special
Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa
Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
the following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the following
named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-20715 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan LRC
Psd-71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto
attached as Annex "D" and made integral part hereof;
"8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-
B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner and the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;
"9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or prejudiced in the
increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property adjacent
to the parcel of land in question;
"10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B and abuts the
Davao River;
"11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with coconuts, bananas
and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through their predecessor-in-interest;
"12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago as the coconuts
planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;
"13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any portion of the
increase in area;
"14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236,
only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-20690 contain
the increase in area; while all the other certificates of title issued under subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236 do not contain any increase in area;
"15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was without notice
to the Director of Lands."
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970, which reads as
follows:
"This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted by the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, against the Estate of
Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land Registration
Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue of the
intestate estate of Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino
Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were directed to
appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did. LLphil
"The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
"The increase area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5609 of the
Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and
subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille
and finally, based on subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang, T-20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-
20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang Siu Sin, is from
525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or 82,127 square meters.
"The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to include the
increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322
recommended by the Commissioner of Land Registration in his Report, and for issuance
of new titles under Section 44, Act 496, as amended, filed with this Court, which was
assigned to Branch IV.
"Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy was sought,
notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that there was no notice to the
persons interested, including the Director of Lands, before the petition was heard.
"Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even assuming arguendo that the same
belonged to the owner of the land to which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a
petition for approval of subdivision plan and issuance of new titles, because a subdivision
of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the inclusion of land
or area not embraced in the titled or in excess of what is stated in the title. And the
approval of the Court of such subdivision plan does not lend validity to it. The subdivision
must be limited to the area stated in the title. Neither amendment of the title under
Section 112 of Act 496 would be a valid remedy.
"The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille, owners of the adjacent estate, might have acquired a
registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the operation of the Land
Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act 496 should have been filed. More so
when the title acquired is by continuous possession for at least 30 years under a claim of
ownership. And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian
estate is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the
operation of the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration of the land based upon
final judgment promulgated by a court of competent jurisdiction after due publication,
notice and hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and
transcribed by the Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial
or original registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner. And the only way
by which a title to the land in question can be issued for the first time is for the Land
Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based upon final judgment
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction after trial.
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and directing the 4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together with all the
Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
after the portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land involved, Registration Commission;
shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance with law."
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place of the hearing
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa in the Official Gazette;
Villa Abrille brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals, however, in its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the 6. Service of notice upon continuous owners, occupants and those known to have
case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final interests in the property by the sheriff;
disposition. cdrep
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice or not;
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the
approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on 8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
ground of lack of notice to interested persons, and in ordering the
cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713, and T- 9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
20690. It is the contention of the defendant-appellant that since the
government agencies having to do with lands know all the time the 10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the
increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration;
agencies concerned tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of the
involved increase in area, defendant-appellant should not be made to 11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission;
suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the
approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides, defendant- 12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds;
appellant claims that it is their honest belief that the legal remedy taken by and
them in seeking the approval of their subdivision plan concern was well
within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as 13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and the issuance of
amended. the owners duplicate original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds,
upon payment of the prescribed fees.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the
subdivision plan, with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court
Land Registration Commission does not lend validity to the said subdivision committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
plan; and that the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-
20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the increased area in question WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
is improper and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the Land
Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First No special pronouncement as to costs.
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as
the required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant- SO ORDERED.
appellant's petition for approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed.
||| (Republic v. Heirs of Abrille, G.R. No. L-39248, [May 7, 1976], 162 PHIL 913-929)
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to
arrive at judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the
lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the
increased area in question totalling 82,127 square meters.

After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We

are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in
ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-
20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which admittedly covered the increased area
of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-71236 (and
formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.

Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for

the approval of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236
to include the questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say
the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so for the increased area in
question, which is not a registered land but formerly a river bed, is so big as
to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of the original registration of
the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and
registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna.
In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have
been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and
coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in
registrations of land title should have been filed instead of an ordinary
approval of subdivision plan.

It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which

the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-
appellant took, is good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands.
In the instant case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127
square meter, has not yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens
System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-09322 and
Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly
the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete
title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the
following requisites should all be satisfied: LLpr

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private

surveyor;

2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 178411. June 23, 2010.]
OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY
ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF
PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG
PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAÑAQUE CITY, TERESITA A.
GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M.
ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L.
GONZALES, ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P.
ROSALES, petitioners, vs. MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely,
ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E.
MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO, respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007
Decision 1 and June 8, 2007 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
The CA had reversed the Order 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-
0155.
Below are the facts.
Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land
consisting of 406 square meters, more or less, located at 9781 Vitalez
Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Parañaque City and covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 01027 and 01472 in the name of respondent Mario D.
Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that
the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their
great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930, Jose gave the land to his
son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively
occupied and possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit
declaring possession and occupancy, 4 Pedro was able to obtain a tax
declaration over the said property in his name. 5 Since then, respondents
have been religiously paying real property taxes for the said property. 6
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro's daughter,
Zenaida. Upon Pedro's advice, the couple established their home on the
said lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building
permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their
house within the said compound. 7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro executed a
notarized Transfer of Rights 8 ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land
in favor of Mario Ebio. Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro's
name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio's name. 9
On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez
passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1999 10 seeking assistance from the
City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along
Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected
to be eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters long, will run from Urma
Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound 11 traversing the lot occupied
by the respondents. When the city government advised all the affected
residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their
opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily
suspended. 12 aTAEHc
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several
officials from the barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cut
eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-
complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the
Department of Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice
Mayor. 13 On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a
meeting to discuss the construction of the proposed road. In the said
meeting, respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed project
and their claim of ownership over the affected property. 14 On November
14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with officials from the
city government, but no definite agreement was reached by and among the
parties. 15
On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the
respondents ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30)
days, or be physically evicted from the said property. 16 Respondents sent
a letter to the Office of the City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim
over the subject property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. 17
The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21,
2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. 18 In the course
of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending
application for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). 19
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 20 denying the petition for lack of merit. The
trial court reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have
an established right to the property since they have not instituted an action for
confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted.
Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an
indispensable party.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. 21
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31,
2007, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents. According to
the Court of Appeals —
The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands adjoining
Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion
beside RL 8.
The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of 291
square meters is owned by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-62176. The
same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed Homes to the City
Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966 and which was accepted by the then Mayor
FLORENCIO BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence however, when RL 8 has been
intended as a road lot.
On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the
accreted property since 1930 per his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of
declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The property then became the subject
of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967 and the real property taxes
therefor had been paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974,
1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime
in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO EBIO for
the subject property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the
accreted property to MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.
Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary evidence,
it could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the accreted property
considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached. However,
this is without the application of the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription which is likewise applicable in the instant case. DAEaTS
xxx xxx xxx
The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which
[was] duly proven by the Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants together with
their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have been in exclusive possession of the
subject property and starting 1964 had introduced improvements thereon as evidenced
by their construction permits. Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,]
Appellants have acquired ownership of the property in question since 1930 even if the
adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed Homes. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8 registered in
its name, which is almost fifty years from the time PEDRO VITALEZ occupied the adjoining
accreted property in 1930. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants which
bolster their right over the subject property. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply proven their
right over the property in question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
challenged Order of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED. 22
On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;]

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE FOR
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE
COMPLAINT . . . FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT. 23
The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the
State is an indispensable party to respondents' action for prohibitory
injunction; and substantively, whether the character of respondents'
possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to avail of
the relief of prohibitory injunction.
The petition is without merit. EACTSH
An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the
performance of an act. 24 It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as an
incident to an independent action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action
for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or
mandatory injunction may issue. 25
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the
local government of Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction
of an access road that will traverse through a parcel of land which they
claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the
river, is classified as part of the public domain, any land that may have
formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of
the public domain. And respondents should have included the State as it is
an indispensable party to the action.
We do not agree.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial
deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This
being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, 26
in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers
ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads:
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks,
streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters
thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. 27
Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits
along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the
alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which
it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the
owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons. 28
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by
prescription. No matter how long the possession of the properties has
been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of
public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire them by
prescription as against the State. 30
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the
land which is formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of
sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear
provision of law.
Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy
is such that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the
court cannot proceed without their presence. 32 In contrast, a necessary
party is one whose presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate
the whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a final
decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. 33 aTcIEH
In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city
government of Parañaque from proceeding with its implementation of the road
construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an
action where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be
imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be an indispensable party if
none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.
We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the
contested land entitles them to the avails of the action.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. 34 A party seeking to avail of an
injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or
existing. 35 It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never
arise. 36
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez,
had occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario
Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of
their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession
and occupancy allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes.
Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of
Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8
to the local government of Parañaque.
From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one
conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes,
Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to
register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired
ownership over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such
right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be
remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only
the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration
was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. 37 A decree of registration
merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership. 38
Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending
before the DENR, estop them from filing an injunction suit?
We answer in the negative.
Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through
judicial proceedings or through administrative process. In the instant case, respondents
admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the property administratively by filing
an application for sales patent.
Respondents' application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or
derogate what may be deemed as their vested right over the subject property. The sales
patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity particularly since
ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon
them by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any
authority to convey a property through the issuance of a grant or a patent if the land is no
longer a public land. 39 cHDaEI
Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is
equally applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007 Decision, as
well as the July 8, 2007 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City v. Ebio, G.R. No. 178411, [June 23, 2010],
635 PHIL 528-540)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III,
and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
By law, accretion — the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through
the effects of the current of the water — belongs to the owner of the land
adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is
not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as
property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests
the ownership in some other person.
Antecedents
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years,
respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7,
1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Parañaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio,
Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging
to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the
Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the
Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. 1
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land
registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter's
co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been
formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious,
public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. 2
aICHEc
The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land
registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters
from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered
by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor
of the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had
dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3
Ruling of the RTC
On May 10, 2000, 4 the RTC granted the application for land registration,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A.
SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as
the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for which is
situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of
one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered by
Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299,
Case 4, Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot
4998-B in their names with the following technical description, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding
Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
THIAaD
Ruling of the CA
In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5 to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE
REGISTERED IS AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY
APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR.
THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE
GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION
DESPITE APPELLEE'S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED
THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC. 6
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October
20, 2003. 7 HAICET
Issues
Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that: 8
I
RESPONDENTS' CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR
ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.
II
ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF
THE PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE
REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO
THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.
IV
THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY,
OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN
THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.
HSDIaC
To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and
whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription
pursuant to Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
I.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457
of the Civil Code to respondents' benefit
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents
of the waters."
In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:
On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this
application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard
after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is
owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through
inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.
Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:
"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." 9 AaSTIH
The CA upheld the RTC's pronouncement, holding:
It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio
Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River
which became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which
adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was obtained
by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo). 10
The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts
of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that
respondents' evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying
up of the Parañaque River.
The Republic's submission is correct.
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of
proof to establish the merits of their application by a preponderance of
evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or
more convincing than that offered in opposition to it. 11 They would be
held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its
registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed,
the property was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers. 12 The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a)
gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of
the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. 13
Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements
of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land registration.
DAcaIE
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did
not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the
effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their
evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that
Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque
River . . . (and) became an orchard after it dried up."
Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist
when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in their mother's name in 1920,
and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed
between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should
then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4
by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot
4998-B.
The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents
thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the river are not the only
cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other
causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river
bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In
other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land
had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit of soil by the
effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large
volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045
square meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner
by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years — the span
of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name
of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in
existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents' witness Rufino
Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied Lot
4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was
that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming
this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.'s own testimony to the effect that the
property was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up
and become an orchard. AaITCH
We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.'s own Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC
and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the
Parañaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of
the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described,
was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed." 14 That
boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot
4998-B, which was described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1,
Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-
13-002563) in the Northeast." 15
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an
accretion that became respondents' property pursuant to Article 457 of the
Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying
up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level from
the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which
was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks
through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the
riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the
clear and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision
only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells
us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical,
there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. 16 The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law. 17
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership.
Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are
public dominion of the State. 18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B,
continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an
express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other
person. 19 aSAHCE
II
Acquisitive prescription was
not applicable in favor of respondents
The RTC favored respondents' application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also
because they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than 30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the
adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following
ratiocination, viz.: 20
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners
thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the
adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact
that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343
(Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact that
Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC-Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration Authority, made a
Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does
not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.
Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of
the foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds
that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a
government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their
favor. So also, oppositor failed to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not
having presented any witness. TEcCHD
In fine, the application is GRANTED.
As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.
Both lower courts erred.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional
Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 14 (1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the
following, namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. 21
The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of
the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30)
years." 22 ICTacD
Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be
disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court, 23 the
Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit:
(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent;
and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 24
Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference made by the RTC and the
CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court
should now review the findings.
In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and
adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:
In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the
owners thereof, they took possession of the same property continuously,
openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their
predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of
land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its
realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L")
which was duly approved by the Land Management Services and the fact
that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC — Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration
Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the
Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus,
the Court opts to grant the application.
The RTC apparently reckoned respondents' period of supposed possession
to be "more than thirty years" from the fact that "their predecessors in
interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its
decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing
their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and
adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they
had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to be
made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings,
because, firstly, the payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the
payor's ownership of the land the taxes were paid for, 25 the tax
declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership; 26
and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the property involved was not
itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual
deposits of soil does not need to make an express act of possession, and
that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the
law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner
from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water
becomes manifest 27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot
4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the
land adjacent to the river bank by respondents' predecessor-in-interest did
not translate to possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive
prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and
adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not even validated or
preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that
they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid
realty taxes only from 1999 28 signified that their alleged possession would
at most be for only nine years as of the filing of their application for land
registration on March 7, 1997. SIaHTD
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed
Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they
did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without
any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and
disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still
belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the
properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those
intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of
the Civil Code declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public
dominion.
Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive
prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved in favor of the
State in Celestial v. Cachopero, 29 a case involving the registration of land
found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There
the Court held:
As for petitioner's claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of
the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of
her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she
purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art.
370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must
fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable
or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has declared
the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation
and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of
the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public
domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
And, absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up
does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character. IcAaEH
xxx xxx xxx
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code
took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-
interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to
the owners of the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots
have the right to acquire them only after paying their value.
And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are
applicable only when "[r]iver beds are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of
Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result
of the construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in
Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies
only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not
apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or
esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up
portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it
follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios
cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the
land of the public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private
ownership. . . . (Emphasis supplied) SEAHcT
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the
course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even
alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators
are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold
emphases supplied)
Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 30 No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the Government.
It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State. 31
Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. 32
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river
beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso
facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to
the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not
ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of
the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public
dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared
by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not
shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be
deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.
Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and
disposable by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and
disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to wit: 33 aSIHcT
NOTE
ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM
All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm
Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the
Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2,
1996.
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev't. on Jan. 3, 1968.
Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299
Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Parañaque Cadastre.
Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was
"inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property's nature as
alienable and disposable public land?
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of
the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and
disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap 34 that: cCaATD
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or
claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have
been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-
nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission
that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition
before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)
In Menguito v. Republic, 35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,
36 we specifically resolved the issue of whether the notation on the survey
plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of
public land, to wit:
To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed
words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land
Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No.
Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. . . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case)
must overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable. HISAET
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside alienable and
disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification
by the Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer
(CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the
following manner, viz.:
. . . it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within
the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by
respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented
before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted
the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no
probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.
xxx xxx xxx
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that
Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications
are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied) ECSaAc
These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B,
Cad-00-000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev't" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was
already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly
assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045
square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro
Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of
the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River.
Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Santos III, G.R. No. 160453, [November 12, 2012], 698 PHIL 275-297)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 182908. August 6, 2014.]
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and
PEDRO FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B.
NARVASA-REGACHO, petitioners, vs. EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE,
MATEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, and EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL,
respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated
November 28, 2006 and the Resolution 3 dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 which reversed and set aside the
Decision 4 dated August 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Civil Case No. D-6978, declared (a) the descendants
of Ciriaco Abrio 5 as the exclusive owners of the Motherland covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1462, 6 (b) the descendants of
respondent Victoriano Imbornal (respondent Victoriano) as the exclusive
owners of the first accretion (First Accretion) covered by OCT No. P-318, 7
and (c) the descendants of Pablo Imbornal (Pablo) as the exclusive owners
of the second accretion (Second Accretion) covered by OCT No. 21481, 8
and dismissed the complaint and counterclaim in all other respects for lack
of merit.
The Facts
Basilia Imbornal of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal (Petra) was
the daughter of Balbina. Petitioners are the heirs and successors-in-interest
of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.). On the other hand,
respondents Emiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and
Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo.
During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan,
Barangay Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan with an area of 4,144
square meters (sq.m.), more or less (Sabangan property), which she
conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina
(Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920.
Meanwhile, Catalina's husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was
granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq.m. riparian land
(Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan. 14
He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No. 24991 15 therefor, and,
on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in his name. Later, or on
May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 101495 16 was issued in the name of Ciriaco's heirs, namely:
Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio, married to Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio,
married to Crisenta Corpuz; Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz;
Pepito Abrio; Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla
Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).
Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the
Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion. 17
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq.m. in area,
adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT
No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano, married to
Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion.
Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of
32,307 sq.m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern
portion. 19 On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the
names of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion. TaDSCA
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children
of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27, 1984 an Amended
Complaint 20 for reconveyance, partition, and/or damages against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They anchored their claim
on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged
Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used
the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead patent
application over the Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his
homestead patent is approved, he will be deemed to be holding the
Motherland — which now included both accretions — in trust for the
Imbornal sisters. 21
Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and
misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First
Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second
Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions in their names,
notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners (as they did not own the
Motherland to which the accretions merely formed adjacent to). In this relation,
Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance claims over the
Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they respected respondents' rights, until
they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their (Francisco, et al.'s) shares
thereon. 22 Thus, bewailing that respondents have refused them their rights not only
with respect to the Motherland, but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al.
prayed for the reconveyance of said properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of
their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP100,000.00,
actual damages in the amount of PhP150,000.00, including attorney's fees and other
costs.
In their Amended Answer dated March 5, 1984, 24 respondents contended that: (a) the
Amended Complaint stated no cause of action against them, having failed to clearly and
precisely describe the disputed properties and specify the transgressions they have
allegedly committed; (b) the action was barred by prescription; and (c) that the properties
sought to be reconveyed and partitioned are not the properties of their predecessors-in-
interest but, instead, are covered by Torrens certificates of titles, free from any
encumbrance, and declared for taxation purposes in their names. In this regard,
respondents prayed that the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that Francisco, et al.
be held liable for the payment of moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit in their
favor.
During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties that the Motherland
was eventually sold by the Heirs of Ciriaco to a certain Gregorio de Vera (de Vera), and
that said heirs and de Vera were not impleaded as parties in this case. 25
The RTC Ruling
On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision 26 in favor of Francisco, et al. and
thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions
in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b)
pay actual damages in the amount of PhP100,000.00, moral damages in the amount of
PhP100,000.00, and attorney's fees in the sum of PhP10,000.00, as well as costs of suit.
DETcAH
The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed that
an implied trust existed between Ciriaco and the Imbornal sisters with respect to the
Motherland. 27 It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.'s allegation that the Sabangan
property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother, Basilia, was sold in order to
help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending homestead patent application. In exchange
therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in trust for them once his
homestead patent application had been approved. As Ciriaco was only able to acquire the
Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the proceeds realized from the sale
of the Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al. (as the
children of Alejandra and Balbina) are entitled to their proportionate shares over the
Motherland, notwithstanding the undisputed possession of respondents over its southern
portion since 1926. 28
With respect to the accretions that formed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled
that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the owner of the said accretions.
Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the
Motherland by virtue of the implied trust created between them and Ciriaco, they
(Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also entitled to the ownership of said accretions
despite the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.
Dissatisfied with the RTC's ruling, respondents elevated the matter on appeal to the CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision 29 reversing and setting aside the
RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as the
exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano as the
exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e.,
respondents collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.
With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a
homestead patent, which later became the basis for the issuance of a Torrens certificate
of title in his name; as such, said certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally through
an action for reconveyance filed by his wife's (Catalina's) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al.
being the children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are the sisters of Catalina). The
CA further observed that the homestead patent was not an inheritance of Catalina;
instead, it was awarded by the government to Ciriaco after having fully satisfied the
stringent requirements set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, 30 as amended, 31
and his title thereto had already become indefeasible. 32 Consequently, since the entire
Motherland was titled in Ciriaco's name, his descendants should be regarded as the
absolute owners thereof. acAIES
On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that respondents
— i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the First Accretion, and all the respondents
with respect to the Second Accretion — need not be the owners of the Motherland in
order to acquire them by acquisitive prescription. Considering that accretions are not
automatically registered in the name of the riparian owner and are, therefore, subject to
acquisitive prescription by third persons, any occupant may apply for their
registration. In this case, the CA found that respondents have acquired title
to the subject accretions by prescription, 33 considering that they have
been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the
concept of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was formed),
which resulted in the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of
respondent Victoriano covering the same. Accordingly, they have also
become the riparian owners of the Second Accretion, and given that they
have caused the issuance of OCT No. 21481 in their names over the said
Accretion, they have also become the absolute owners thereof. Since
Francisco, et al. took no action to protect their purported interests over the
disputed accretions, the respondents' titles over the same had already
become indefeasible, to the exclusion of Francisco, et al. 34
At odds with the CA's disposition, Francisco, et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution 35
dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by the latter's heirs as their
successors-in-interest. SCHcaT
The Issue Before the Court
The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in
declaring that: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of
the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the
exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo
(respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion
on the basis of the following grounds: (a) prescription of the reconveyance
action, which was duly raised as an affirmative defense in the Amended
Answer, and (b) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal
sisters and Ciriaco.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.
At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the
Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property,
wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. 36 Thus,
reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property
alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. 37
As the records would show, the Amended Complaint filed by petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest, Francisco, et al. is for the reconveyance of their
purported shares or portions in the following properties: (a) the
Motherland, originally covered by OCT No. 1462 in the name of Ciriaco; (b)
the First Accretion, originally covered by OCT No. P-318 in the name of
respondent Victoriano; and (c) the Second Accretion, covered by OCT No.
21481 in the name of all respondents. To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted
co-ownership over the Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the
same in trust for their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon
issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents
acquired the First and Second Accretions by means of fraud and deceit.
When property is registered in another's name, an implied or constructive
trust is created by law in favor of the true owner. 38 Article 1456 of the
Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud
becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of
registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title
over the property, 39 if the plaintiff is not in possession. However, if the
plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible. As
held in the case of Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.: 40 TCADEc
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10
years. The reference point of the 10-year prescriptive period is the date of
registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period
applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the
real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the
prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not
run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless
filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible. 41 (Emphases supplied)
Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years
from the registration of the respective titles covering the disputed
properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into
account the fact that they were never in possession of the said properties.
Hence, with respect to the Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5,
1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for reconveyance therefor should have been filed
until December 5, 1943; with respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-318
issued on August 15, 1952 in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same
nature should have been filed until August 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the
Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978 in the name of
the respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November
10, 1988.
A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint 42
covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed only on February 27, 1984. As such, it
was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to seek the
reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First
Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the Second Accretion having
been seasonably filed. Thus, considering that respondents raised prescription as a
defense in their Amended Answer, 43 the Amended Complaint with respect to the
Motherland and the First Accretion ought to have been dismissed based on the said
ground, with only the cause of action pertaining to the Second Accretion surviving. As will
be, however, discussed below, the entirety of the Amended Complaint, including the
aforesaid surviving cause of action, would falter on its substantive merits since the
existence of the implied trust asserted in this case had not been established. In effect, the
said complaint is completely dismissible. DACcIH
B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.'s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had
arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with
respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the
proceeds from the sale of the Sabangan property — an inheritance of their predecessors,
the Imbornal sisters — were used for the then-pending homestead application filed by
Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively, co-
owners of the Motherland together with Ciriaco's heirs.
An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation
of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair
dealing or downright fraud. 44 To reiterate, Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that "[i]f
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes".
The burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and
such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its
elements. 45 While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence must be
trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to
rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required
because oral evidence can easily be fabricated. 46 aCTHEA
In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by
Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been either mistakenly or fraudulently
registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely a
trustee of an implied trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters
or their heirs.
As the CA had aptly pointed out, 47 a homestead patent award requires proof that the
applicant meets the stringent conditions 48 set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the
homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and
duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent
application. As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired and
registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied trust between the
Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence showing that
the Imbornal sisters entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion thereof,
or asserted any right over the same at any point during their lifetime. Hence, when OCT
No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent
No. 24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriaco's title to the Motherland had become
indefeasible. It bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that led to the
issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriaco's name
are presumptively regular and proper, 49 which presumption has not been overcome by
the evidence presented by Francisco, et al.
In this light, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the oral
testimony offered by Francisco, et al. on the alleged verbal agreement between their
predecessors, the Imbornal sisters, and Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland. Weighed
against the presumed regularity of the award of the homestead patent to Ciriaco and the
lack of evidence showing that the same was acquired and registered by mistake or
through fraud, the oral evidence of Francisco, et al. would not effectively establish their
claims of ownership. It has been held that oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending
as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence, 50 especially since the purported agreement transpired decades ago, or in the
1920s. Hence, with respect to the Motherland, the CA did not err in holding that Ciriaco
and his heirs are the owners thereof, without prejudice to the rights of any subsequent
purchasers for value of the said property.
Consequently, as Francisco, et al. failed to prove their ownership rights G.R. CV No. 57618 are hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the
over the Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First Amended Complaint dated February 27, 1984 filed in said case.
Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A
further exposition is apropos. SO ORDERED. cIaHDA

Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters". ||| (Heirs of Narvasa, Sr. v. Imbornal, G.R. No. 182908, [August 6, 2014], 740 PHIL 541-
Relative thereto, in Cantoja v. Lim, 51 the Court, citing paragraph 32 of the 560)
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, in relation to
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, as well as related
jurisprudence on the matter, elucidated on the preferential right of the
riparian owner over the land formed by accretions, viz.: IaEScC

Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the
riparian or littoral owner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore
area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No.
7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner. — The owner of the property adjoining

foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the
public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this
nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the
date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him
of his preferential right. cADEIa

The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary [170 Phil. 567;
80 SCRA 548 (1977)] the reason for such grant of preferential right to the
riparian or littoral owner, thus:

Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the
preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law

of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shore by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of
the public domain, such lands, when they are no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for
the established [sic] of special industries, or for the coast guard service,
"shall be declared by the Government to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof".

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral

owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed
by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for
giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion
compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers
by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral
lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its
recession. 52 AIDSTE

Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a

river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have
been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of
the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons. 53

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners,
are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion
had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the First
Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to
the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion.
Neither were they able to show that they acquired these properties
through prescription as it was not established that they were in possession
of any of them. Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently,
through prescription, the discernible conclusion is that Francisco, et al.
and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had
not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be
reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since on the other end of the
fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering
the First and Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both
of which give rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence,
petitioners' action for reconveyance with respect to both accretions must
altogether fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28,

2006 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 24066. December 9, 1925.]
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PUBLIC LANDS; ACQUISITION BY OCCUPANCY. — An open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain from time
immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be
public, to become private, property.
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — To acquire a right to a certificate of title over a
land of the public domain, under the provisions of Chapter VI of Act No.
926, as amended by Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, an open, adverse, public
and continuous possession from July 26,1894, is sufficient, provided the
possessor makes application therefor under the provisions of section 47 of
Act No. 2874. The possessor under such circumstances acquires by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the government,
and the actual issuance of a title is not necessary in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY. — As the possessor of a public
land under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraphs
acquires the land by operation of law as a grant from the State, the land
ceasing to be of public domain, to become private property, at least by
presumption, it follows that it can no longer be sold by the Director of
Lands to another person, and if he does, the sale is void, and the said
possessor may recover the land from any person holding it against his will.
DECISION
VILLA-REAL, J p:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a
complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of
Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute
owner of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of the
complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c)
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela
Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and
every allegation contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the
land in question was a property of the Government of the United States
under the administration and control of that of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff
entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the
Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of
the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon.
From this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning
thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment
rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon
on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding
that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the
annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and
the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of
the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be
cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the
Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the
land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza
for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B).
After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish
pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on
September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving
the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of
sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said
land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds
of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession
and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and
then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on
September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to
recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence
introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against
Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain
possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the
Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned
of said application, Valentin Susi filed an opposition thereto on December 6, 1915,
asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the
proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of
Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon (Exhibit S). By virtue of said grant the
register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title
to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to
vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought an action for forcible
entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibits F
and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the
appellant in his assignments of error.
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land
in question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his
predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case
does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts
her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela
Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession
thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken
into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it
on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy
it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the
facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Cariilo vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1 ), is applicable here. In
favor of Valentin Susi, there is, more over, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since
July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin
Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be
of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he
had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the
plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become,
by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial
sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the
possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from the
same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., did not take part.
||| (Susi v. Razon, G.R. No. 24066, [December 9, 1925], 48 PHIL 424-429)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170316. September 18, 2017.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES JOEL AND ANDREA
NOVAL, ELLEN N. DELOS REYES, DALE Y. NOVAL, WINNIE T. REFI, ZENAIDA
LAO, and DAISY N. MORALES, respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
When an applicant in the registration of property proves his or her open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of a land for the period
required by law, he or she has acquired an imperfect title that may be
confirmed by the State. The State may not, in the absence of controverting
evidence and in a pro forma opposition, indiscriminately take a property
without violating due process. HTcADC
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to reverse and set aside the
August 5, 2005 Decision 2 and the October 28, 2005 Resolution 3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76912. The Court of Appeals sustained
the Municipal Trial Court April 19, 2002 Judgment in a land registration
case granting the application for registration of title filed by Spouses Joel
and Andrea Noval (the Spouses Noval), Ellen N. delos Reyes (delos Reyes),
Zenaida Lao (Lao), Winnie T. Refi (Refi), Dale Y. Noval (Dale), and Daisy N.
Morales (Morales) (collectively, applicants).
On September 8, 1999, the applicants sought the registration of their titles
over the subdivided portions of a land in Barangay Casili, Consolacion,
Cebu, designated as Lot 4287 of Consolacion Cadastre. They alleged to
have acquired their respective portions of this land by "purchase, coupled
with continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years including [the possession] of
their predecessors-in-interest." They also alleged that they were in actual
possession of their respective portions of the property. 4
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Opposition on the ground that the applicants failed to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property since June
12, 1945. 5 It also argued that the property sought to be registered was
part of the public domain. 6 It alleged that the tax declarations and tax
payment receipts attached to the application were not competent to show
bona fide acquisition or open and continuous possession of the land. 7
The applicants' immediate predecessor-in-interest was Cecilia Alilin
Quindao (Cecilia), who was already 73 years old when she testified before
the trial court. She said that she was familiar with Lot 4287 since she was
15 years old. Her grandmother, Flaviana Seno Alilin (Flaviana), had already
possessed and owned this property and enjoyed the fruits of 15 coconut
trees already growing there. Her grandmother's possession was "peaceful,
exclusive, adverse, public and in the concept of [an] owner." 8
Cecilia's father, Miguel Alilin (Miguel), inherited the property when Flaviana
died. 9 Cecilia was then 20 years old. 10 Miguel tilled and cultivated the
land and planted root crops, corn, and other plants. 11 Their family
enjoyed the fruits of his cultivation of the land. 12 When he died, Cecilia
inherited the property. 13 She also tilled the land and declared it in her
name for taxation. 14 She even shared the produce of the land with her
tenant. 15 Later, she sold the property to Joel Noval (Joel) and Elizabeth
Messerli (Messerli). 16 Messerli sold her property to the Spouses Noval and
Refi. 17 Soon the property was partitioned as follows: Lot 1 to the Spouses
Noval; Lot 2 to Gertrudes Noval, who later donated his share to delos
Reyes; Lot 3 to Lao; Lot 4 to Refi; Lot 5 to Dale; and Lot 7 to Dale and
Morales. 18 All of them later on took possession of their respective
portions and declared them in their respective names. 19
The Municipal Trial Court granted their application for registration of title.
It declared the applicants to be the absolute owners and possessors of
their respective lots, having established conclusively that they are the
exclusive owners and peaceful possessors of the properties. The trial court
ordered the issuance of decrees of registration upon finality of its
judgment. 20
The Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court, 21 arguing that the
applicants failed to show open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of alienable and disposable lands for 30 years. 22 It reiterated
that tax declarations may not be used as bases for the grant of the
application. 23 It added that there was no Department of Environment and
Natural Resources report submitted to show when the properties were
declared alienable and disposable, for the purpose of computing the 30-
year period of possession required by law. 24
The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed 25 the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court. 26
The Court of Appeals found that the required period of possession in land registration
cases was satisfied. It noted that Cecilia was already 73 years old when she testified in
2000 and that the property had already been owned and possessed by Cecilia's
grandmother since Cecilia was 15 years old. It held that at 15 years of age, she was
already competent to perceive that her grandmother's possession was in the concept of
an owner. 27 aScITE
The Court of Appeals also found that while the applicants did not submit a Department of
Environment and Natural Resources report showing that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable, the Republic was not relieved of the duty to present evidence
that the land belongs to the public domain. It ruled that the burden is upon the State to
prove that land is public domain when it has been possessed and cultivated by an
applicant and his or her predecessors-in-interest for a considerable number of years
without action from the State. The Court of Appeals added that the open, continuous,
adverse, and public possession of land from time immemorial confers an effective title to
the possessor. 28
The Court of Appeals likewise recognized that while tax declarations are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, they may give weight to a claim of ownership when coupled with
open, adverse, and, continuous possession. 29
The Republic sought the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision, but this was
denied in a Resolution 30 dated October 28, 2005. 31
Hence, this Petition 32 was filed.
Petitioner argues that respondents failed to show that they or their predecessor-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land for the period required by law. 33 It also contends that the tax
declarations presented by respondents are not conclusive evidence of ownership and
possession for at least 30 years. 34 It likewise asserts that the property may not be
registered without a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources that it has been declared alienable and disposable. 35 Failure to show such
certification means that the land belongs to the State. 36 It submits that the burden of
proof is upon respondents to show that Lot 4287 had already been declared alienable and
disposable at the time of their application. 37
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that Cecilia's testimony was sufficient to
establish the nature of her possession and that of her predecessors-in-interest. 38 They
submit that the property has been declared for tax purposes since 1945 39 and that while
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources did not issue a certification, it did
approve their survey plan when the property was partitioned. 40
For this Court's resolution is the sole issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the trial court decision to allow the Spouses Joel and Andrea Noval, Ellen N.
delos Reyes, Dale Y. Noval, Winnie T. Refi, Zenaida Lao, and Daisy N. Morales to register
their respective portions of Lot 4287.
I
Any person seeking relief under Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act,
admits that the property being applied for is public land.
Under the Public Land Act, public lands may be disposed of through confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles. 41 Confirmation of title may be done judicially or through
the issuance of a free patent. 42 The process for judicial confirmation of title is outlined in
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073: 43
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as
against the government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When a person applies for judicial confirmation of title, he or she already holds an
incomplete or imperfect title over the property being applied for, after having been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation from June 12, 1945
or earlier. The date "June 12, 1945" is the reckoning date of the applicant's possession
and occupation, and not the reckoning date of when the property was classified as
alienable and disposable. 44 In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic: 45 HEITAD
[T]he choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the
lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the
fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret
only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act indicates
that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. As such, the applicant's imperfect or incomplete title is derived
only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the application as
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines
its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it. 46
Thus, a property applied for judicial confirmation of title may be classified
as alienable and disposable at any time. For the purposes of judicial
confirmation of title, only possession and occupation must be reckoned
from June 12, 1945.
II
The Public Land Act is a special law that applies only to alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain, and not to forests, mineral lands,
and national parks. 47 Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic 48 categorized
alienable and disposable lands into: "(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or
those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public
lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural." 49 Thus, for Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
to apply, the property first, must be agricultural land of the public domain,
and second, must have been declared as alienable and disposable. 50
Parenthetically, not all lands and natural resources, by default, belong to
the State.
The theory that all lands belong to the State was introduced in this
jurisdiction during the Spanish colonization. When Spain transferred
sovereignty of the Philippines to the United States in 1898 through the
Treaty of Paris, the United States opted not to adopt this concept. Instead,
it created new presumptions with respect to land ownership. This was
thoroughly explained in Carino v. Insular Government: 51
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown, . . . It is true also that, in
legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations,
the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it
does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the
United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on
one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree.
How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the
subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual facts,
are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General,
in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought
under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems
probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted
to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff
was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have made his title
beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of
Spain, it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost
all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized
his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native
titles throughout an important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the
want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and
had not the power to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white
race in the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to
the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in
America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that, however stated, the
reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we
suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities,
our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice
to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic
Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the property and rights
acquired there by the United States are to be administered "for the benefit
of the inhabitants thereof." It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude
thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably
its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The
same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like
the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that "no law shall be enacted
in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." § 5. In the
light of the declaration that we have quoted from § 12, it is hard to believe that the
United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace
the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become
such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard,
and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long
association — one of the profoundest factors in human thought — regarded as their own.
52 (Emphasis supplied) ATICcS
The United States chose to limit its sovereign exercise to the fiduciary administration of
the Philippines. Instead of exercising absolute power with respect to property rights, it
chose to adopt due process as embodied in the Bill of Rights. This due process clause is
already found in our present Constitution. Thus, Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
states:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Most notably, however, Carino created a presumption against State ownership and
recognized private property rights independent of State grant. Thus:
[E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present.
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it
will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land. 53
Carino did not qualify that the existence of property rights independent of State grant
and the presumptions on land registration apply only to the indigenous cultural
communities. These principles can be seen in the present land registration laws.
Under the Public Land Act, ownership is recognized if possession dates back since June
12, 1945 or earlier. 54 The law refers to this as "judicial legalization," which allows for
agricultural public lands to be disposed of by the State and acquired by Filipino citizens.
55
Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, has a similar provision,
but also recognizes ownership through prescription. 56 Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Section 14 (1) does not vest or create a title to public land. 57 The procedure of
registering one's title "simply recognizes and documents ownership and provides for the
consequences of issuing paper titles." 58
These provisions are the latest versions of a catena of provisions on judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles. 59 All these laws recognize ownership acquired through
possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.
That the law provides for confirmation of titles based on possession and occupation is an
acknowledgment of the existence of property rights independent of State grants. It is an
acknowledgment that registration is a means only to document ownership already
acquired.
Be that as it may, applicants for judicial confirmation of title must still comply with the
requisites stated in Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain. 60
III
Petitioner argues that respondents were unable to prove that they and
their predecessor-in-interest were able to prove their open and continuous
possession and occupation of the property for the period required by law.
It describes respondents' and their predecessor-in-interest's possession as
mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession contemplated by land
registration laws. TIADCc
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Court of Appeals established that
respondents and their predecessor-in-interest were the exclusive owners
and possessors of the land. Both courts affirmed that respondents have
met the required period of possession for land registration cases. 61 They
acknowledged the credibility of the testimony of respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, which established possession of Lot 4287 in the
concept of an owner since 1942 or earlier. 62 This means that respondents
and their predecessor-in-interest have already been in occupation and
possession of the land for more than 50 years at the time of their
application for registration.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
63 This Court has repeatedly said that findings of facts of the lower courts
deserve high respect since they are in the best position to pass judgment
on the credibility of the witnesses and their statements. This Court rarely
questions facts as determined by the lower courts, especially when they
are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The findings of facts are often
conclusive upon this Court, subject only to a few exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures . . .; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible . . .; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion . . .; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts . . .; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting . . .; (6) When the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee .
. .; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court . . .; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record . . . 64
This case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Since the Court of
Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court, and there is no showing
that the conclusions made by both courts are either made with grave abuse
of discretion or contrary to the evidence presented and the law, this Court
will not disturb these findings.
Respondents' predecessor-in-interest recalled her grandmother to have
already cultivated fruit-bearing trees on Lot 4287 when she was 15 years
old. Possession prior to that "can hardly be estimated . . . the period of
time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory." 65
Hence, respondents' and their predecessor-in-interest's possession is, with
little doubt, more than 50 years at the time of respondents' application for
registration in 1999. This is more than enough to satisfy the period of
possession required by law for acquisition of ownership.
IV
The burden of proving that the property is an alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain falls on the applicant, not the State.
66 The Office of the Solicitor General, however, has the correlative burden
to present effective evidence of the public character of the land. 67
In order to establish that an agricultural land of the public domain has
become alienable and disposable, "an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute."
68 It is settled that the declaration of alienability must be through
executive fiat, as exercised by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. 69 Republic v. T.A.N. Properties 70
provided further:
The applicant for land registration must prove that the [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources] Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the [Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Officer] or [City Environment and
Natural Resources Officer]. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources] Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. 71
Admittedly, respondents have failed to present any document from the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources certifying that the property is part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals observed, as this Court has, that the Office of the Solicitor General has failed to
"present any evidence, testimonial or documentary evidence to support its opposition."
72
When the State has no effective opposition, except for a pro forma opposition, to
controvert an applicant's convincing evidence of possession and occupation,
presumptions are tilted to this applicant's favor. 73 In Republic v. Barandiaran: 74 AIDSTE
"[W]here it appears that the evidence of ownership and possession are so significant and
convincing, the government is not necessarily relieved of its duty from presenting proofs
to show that the parcel of land sought to be registered is part of the public domain to
enable [the courts] to evaluate the evidence of both sides." . . . [W]hen the records shows
that a certain property, the registration of title to which is applied for has been possessed
and cultivated by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest for a long number of
years without the government taking any action to dislodge the occupants from their
holdings, and when the land has passed from one hand to another by inheritance or by
purchase, the government is duty bound to prove that the land which it avers to be of
public domain is really of such nature. 75 (Citations omitted)
Indeed, the Public Land Act itself establishes a conclusive presumption in favor of the
possessor that all conditions essential to a State grant, including the conversion of a land
in the public domain to a private property, have been performed, entitling him or her to a
certificate of title. 76
Therefore, when an applicant is shown to have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of a land for the period required by law, he or she has acquired an
imperfect title that may be confirmed by the State. The State may not, for the simple
reason that an applicant failed to show documents which the State is in the best position
to acquire, indiscriminately take an occupied property and unjustly and self-servingly
refuse to acknowledge legally recognized rights evidenced by possession, without
violating due process. 77
The burden of evidence lies on the party who asserts an affirmative allegation. 78
Therefore, if the State alleges that lands belong to it, it is not excused from providing
evidence to support this allegation. 79 This specially applies when the land in question
has no indication of being incapable of registration 80 and has been exclusively occupied
by an applicant or his or her predecessor-in-interest without opposition — not even from
the State.
Hence, when a land has been in the possession of the applicants and their predecessor-in-
interest since time immemorial and there is no manifest indication that it is unregistrable,
it is upon the State to demonstrate that the land is not alienable and disposable. "[A]
mere formal opposition on the part of the [Solicitor General] . . . , unsupported by
satisfactory evidence, will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant." 81
This Court's previous rulings imposing the burden of overcoming the presumption that a
land is public should only be strictly applied when a manifestly unregistrable land is in
danger of fraudulent titling — not when it will promote unfairness and violation of due
process rights.
Respondents' and their predecessor-in-interest's possession was never opposed, even at
the time of application, by the government agencies tasked to ensure that public lands
remain public. There was neither indication nor mention that Lot 4287 was forest, timber
land, or belonging to a reservation.
The State also kept silent on respondents' and their predecessor-in-interest's
continuously paid taxes. The burden to prove the public character of Lot 4287 becomes
more pronounced when the State continuously accepts payment of real property taxes.
This Court acknowledges its previous rulings that payment of taxes is not conclusive
evidence of ownership. 82 However, it is good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner, and when coupled with continuous possession, it constitutes strong evidence of
title.
No person in the right mind would pay taxes on real property over which he or she does
not claim any title. 83 Its declaration not only manifests a sincere desire to obtain title to
a property; it may be considered as an announcement of an adverse claim against State
ownership. 84 It would be unjust for the State to take properties which have been
continuously and exclusively held since time immemorial without showing any basis for
the taking, especially when it has accepted tax payments without question.
However, despite these circumstances, petitioner failed to show any evidence that Lot
4287 remained public land. Instead, it conveniently relied on the absence of a
Department of Environment and Natural Resources certification.
Therefore, this Court is constrained to hold that respondents' evidence, coupled with the
absence of contradictory evidence from petitioner, substantially establishes that
respondents have complied with the requisites of Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. The
Municipal Trial Court and the Court of Appeals did not err in approving the
registration of the property.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 5, 2005 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76912 is AFFIRMED. AaCTcI

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Martires and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Spouses Noval, G.R. No. 170316, [September 18, 2017],
818 PHIL 298-320)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73002. December 29, 1986.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, J p:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment
of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended; and
the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
"1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary
purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-1');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as
such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is
applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into
the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant
bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already
considered from time immemorial;
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or
within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more
than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements,
said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation
of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered
by the applicant was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the
donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and the
negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the
Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N')
on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal
Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-1'), during their special session
on November 22, 1979."
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to
the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning
this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced
only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into
effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its
Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding
alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a
prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme.
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of the chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof."
The Petition for Review does not dispute — indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the
trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no
longer controvert before this Court — the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and
occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year
period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of
the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension
that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register
ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section
11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the
Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric
Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-
owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots
had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest,
Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1,
1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows
only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal.
It was held that:
". . ., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply
for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course
or has to be dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx
"Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant
has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to
which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title
may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) `presupposes
that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644)."
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of
cases beginning with Cariño in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in
1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the
correct, view — becomes evident from a consideration of some of the
principal rulings cited therein.
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Cariño, involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was
ruled that:
"It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those
`who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook
the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It
may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words
'may prove' (acrediten), as well or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The
effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. . . ."
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more
categorical language, in Susi:
". . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et
de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since
July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied
for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired by operation
of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient,
under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it
had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had
no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no
effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, like Lacaste vs.
Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan,
9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and
affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
". . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the
latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since
1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by
free patent. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of
the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent." 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession
of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that
the possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . ." No proof
being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining
whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but
only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment
the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, ". . .
(T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted — as it must be — that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to
make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for
that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no
serious question of Acme's right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant
was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess
of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper, This Court has
already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested
rights.
"We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the
sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase
public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares.
Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional
law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. `A state may not impair
vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power' (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and
established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent
had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's
right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that
right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919)." 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect
hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right
of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts,
the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in
themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law
would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance
which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority
ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent.
The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under
The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and
on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was
already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by
Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The
objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent
in Meralco:
"6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines
who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions.
Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition
against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there
any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect
in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons)
with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets
when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See
Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e.
as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are
duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act
and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged."
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the
Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and,
after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands
back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with
no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on amendment
to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively
recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms
and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed
the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it
is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring
opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco
rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect
title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to
the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential,
limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context,
be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without
costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J ., I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-
Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion
in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein
upheld, "expressed what is the better . . . and indeed the correct view." My
dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Cariño 2 through the
1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest
1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine . . . that an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain
for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26,
1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive
prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers
an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public
domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for
brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and
precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed
therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification
of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the
Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient . . . If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain, and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond
his authority to sell to any other person]." 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Cariño (the Igorot chief who would
have been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for
registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of
June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco
decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive
prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without
the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of
the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico,
supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly
stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations
may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the
public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public
lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on
October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no
prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares)
unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition, Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open
possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P45 million investments redounding
presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality
of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a
vested right which could not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later.
But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted into
private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title)
which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State
to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands,"
i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private
property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact.
Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally expired
first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then
extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to
December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder
for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to
the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the
Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations
(both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from
the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the
Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was
Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors,
under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable
obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts
could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of
Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and
possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would
be to decide the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed
by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9
Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the
procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority
ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots
which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public
domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They
are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of
the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is
inapplicable." 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to
natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of
public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the
exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically
and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But
when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of
possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully
transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and
should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited
opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the
natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm
their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons — (as I
understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the
technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation
of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or in interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) . . .
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) . . .
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
"SEC. 11. . . . No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen
hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares . . ."
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of
Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114
SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA
449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the
literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly
apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal"
requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards
transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982].
"To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application
for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco.
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive
effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the
end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their
favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only
citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which
prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That
interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of
the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688,
93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers, 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am.
Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
"In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the
courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act,
while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred, One part of a statute
may not be construed so as to render another part nugatory, or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute by
construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used
in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to
prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general,
everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by
implication." (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE 2d 47; cited in
73 Am. Jur. 2d pp. 422-423).
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public
policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest
manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would
alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.

Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

||| (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73002,

[December 29, 1986], 230 PHIL 590-615)
THIRD DIVISION
7-8 S.
[G.R. No. 190817. January 10, 2018.]
24 deg.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ROVENCY REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent. 28'E.

DECISION 152.88 m.

MARTIRES, J p: 8-9 S.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside 34 deg.
the 10 March 2009 Decision 1 and the 3 December 2009 Resolution 2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00651, which affirmed the 7 00'W.
November 2003 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41,
Cagayan de Oro City, in LRA Case No. N-2000-084, which granted the 448.33 m.
application for original registration of title to land by respondent Rovency
Realty and Development Corporation (RRDC). 9-1 S.

THE FACTS 33 deg.

On 22 March 2001, RRDC filed before the RTC an Amended Application for
Registration 4 covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3009 (subject
land) situated in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 3009, Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre) situated in the
Barrio of Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro, Island of Mindanao. Bounded on
the S., along line 1-2 by Lot 6648; on the NW., along line 2-3 by Lot 30011;
along line 3-4 by Lot 3010; along line 4-5 by Lot 3047; along line 5-6 by Lot
3020; on the N., along line 6-7 by Lot 3007; on the SE., along line 8-9 by Lot
6645; along line 9-1 by Lot 3008; all of Cad-237, Cagayan Cadastre. EcTCAD
Beginning at the point marked "1" on the plan being N. 51 deg. 24'W.,
1091.05 m. from PBM No. 24, Cad-237, Thence;
1-2 S.
79 deg.
15'W.
260.92 m.
2-3 N.
19 deg.
02'E.
231.49 m.
26'W.
445.73 m.
beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (318,345) square meters more or less. All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and marked on the ground by Old BL., cyl. conc. mons. 15 x 60 cm.
Bearing true, date of Original Survey August 9 & 13, 1929, and that of the preparation
June 29, 2000, executed by Crisanto M. Bagares, Geodetic Engineer and approved on
August 1, 2000. 5
RRDC alleged, among others, that it is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines; that it is the absolute
owner in fee simple of the subject land having acquired the same from its previous
owner, P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc., by virtue of a notarized deed of absolute sale executed
on 05 March 1997; that the subject land was assessed at P2,228,000.00 as shown in the
Tax Declaration (TD) No. 141011; that it has registered the subject land for taxation
purposes and paid the realty taxes due therein from its acquisition, to the filing of the
application; that immediately after acquiring the subject land, it took actual physical
possession of the same and has been continuously occupying the subject land; and that it
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, adverse, and peaceful
possession in concept of owner of the subject land since time immemorial, or for more
than thirty (30) years.
Attached to the application are: original copy of the technical description of the subject
land; 6 the Tracing Cloth Plan of the survey plan; 7 Certification in Lieu of
Surveyor's/Geodetic Engineer's Certificate 8 issued by the Chief of the Land Surveys
Assistance Section, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region X; T.D. No.
141011 in the name of RRDC; 9 and the Deed of Absolute Sale between RRDC and P.N.
Roa Enterprises, Inc., dated 5 March 1997. 10

3-4 N. On 16 July 2001, an opposition to the application was filed by the Heirs of Paulino
Avanceña. They alleged, that the subject land was already claimed and owned by the late
13 deg. Atty. Paulino Avanceña (Paulino), their father and predecessor-in-interest, as early as
1926; that Paulino had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse, and exclusive
32'E. possession and occupation of the subject land; that Paulino registered the subject land
for taxation purposes and has paid the taxes due thereon in 1948; that their parents,
489.77 m. Paulino and Rizalina Neri (Rizalina) merely allowed and tolerated Pedro N. Roa's (Pedro)
possession of the subject land after the latter approached them and requested that he be
4-5 N. allowed to use the subject land for his businesses; that Pedro is one of RRDC's
predecessors-in-interest; that sometime in 1994, Rizalina demanded the return of the
61 deg. subject land from the heirs of Pedro, but to no avail; that in 1996, Rizalina died leaving
the private oppositors as the rightful heirs of the subject land; that their parents never
39'E. sold the subject land to Pedro nor to RRDC, and as such, no right or title over the subject
land was passed on to RRDC. Thus, they prayed that RRDC's application be dismissed, and
302.54 m. that their opposition be treated as their own application for registration. 11

5-6 N. On 3 August 2001, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its opposition to the application on the
40 deg. following grounds: that neither RRDC nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
09'E. since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the subject land exceeds the twelve (12)-hectare
limit for confirmation of imperfect title set by Section 47 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
146.06 m. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6940; and that the subject land forms part of
the public domain belonging to the Republic and, thus, not subject to private
6-7 S. appropriation. 12

82 deg. During trial, RRDC presented the following documents in support of its application: (i)
Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Paulino Avanceña showing that the
14'E. subject land was sold by Catalino Ebalo to Nicolas Beja and Maximo Amper on 21 June
1937; 13 (ii) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Paulino Avanceña showing
140.06 m. that a portion of the subject land consisting of 159,178.5 square meters (first portion) was
sold by Maximo Amper to Perfecto Virtudazo on 07 October 1940; 14 (iii)
Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary public Troadio C. Ubay-ubay
showing that the first portion consisting of 15 hectares, 91 ares and 72
centares (159,172 square meters) was sold by Trinidad Virtudazo, Israel
Virtudazo, and Adelina Virtudazo to Victor D. Beja on 22 April 1961; 15 (iv)
Deed of Absolute Sale showing that the first portion of the subject land
consisting of 159,172 square meters was sold by Victor D. Beja to Pedro N.
Roa on 01 February 1967; 16 (v) Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by notary
public Troadio C. Ubay-ubay showing that the other portion (second
portion) of the subject land was sold by Nicolas Beja to Victor Beja on 22
April 1961; 17 (vi) Deed of Sale showing that the second portion was sold
by Victor Beja to Pedro N. Roa on 01 February 1967; 18 (vii) Deed of
Exchange notarized by notary public Jose L. Sabio, Jr. showing that the two
portions of the subject land were conveyed by Pedro N. Roa in favor of P.N.
Roa Enterprises, Inc. on 23 September 1987; 19 and (viii) Deed of Sale
notarized by Rene C. Barbaso showing that the two (2) portions of the
subject land were sold by P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc. to RRDC on 25 July
1996. 20 HSAcaE
RRDC also presented a certification 21 from the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cagayan de Oro City, certifying that
the subject land is alienable and disposable and not covered by any public
land application patent and hence, no patent has been issued thereon.
Lastly, RRDC presented several tax declarations in the name of its
predecessors-in-interest, the earliest of which is T.D. No. 91264, which
showed that realty taxes on the subject land have been paid in 1947. 22
On the other hand, to support their claim that a patent over the subject
land had been issued in the name of their father, the private oppositors
presented a certification 23 issued by the Records Management Division of
the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources which merely states that ". . . according to the
verification made by the Geodetic Surveys Division, survey plan no. Psu-
45882 with an accession no. 284578 is located at Cagayan, Misamis, as per
their EDP listing. It is unfortunate however that as of this moment, this
office (Records Management Division) cannot locate said records despite
diligent search made thereon."
The RTC Ruling
In its decision, dated 7 November 2003, the RTC granted RRDC's application
for registration of the subject land. It opined that the CENRO certification,
stating that the subject land is alienable and disposable and not covered by
any public land application, is sufficient to show the character of the land. It
further ruled, that RRDC and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open
and continuous possession under a bona fide claim of ownership over the
subject land based on the documentary and testimonial evidence offered
by RRDC, without discussing how these pieces of evidence established the
required possession.
The trial court further brushed aside the opposition interposed by the heirs
of Paulino Avanceña. It was not convinced that the evidence they
presented were sufficient to grant the application in their favor. It noted
that the oppositors' claim that they were the rightful owners of the subject
land does not hold water considering that the deeds of sale presented by
RRDC in support of their claim were notarized by Paulino himself.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court considering the evidence of the applicant, the
reports of the Land Registration Authority, Director of Lands and the
Certification of the CENRO, DENR, Cagayan de Oro City, hereby declares
that the applicant, Rovency Realty & Development Corporation, have
sufficient title proper for registration over the parcel of land subject of this
application. The opposition of the Heirs of Paulino Avanceña, is hereby
ordered dismissed, being lack of merit.
Accordingly, in accordance with the prayer of the applicant herein, the
Commissioner, or anyone acting on his behalf is hereby directed to ISSUE A
DECREE OF REGISTRATION and the CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
FOR THE PARCEL OF LAND described in the instant application in favor of
ROVENCY REALTY and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. SO ORDERED. 24
Unconvinced, the Republic, through the OSG, and private oppositors heirs
of Paulino Avanceña, elevated their respective appeals to the CA. 25
The Republic contended that the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration, considering that the land applied for is in
excess of what is allowed by the Constitution; and that the Corporation
Code further prohibits RRDC to acquire the subject land unless the
acquisition thereof is reasonably necessary for its business. On the other
hand, the Avanceña heirs insisted that they are the rightful owners of the
subject land, by virtue of the homestead patent granted to their
predecessor-in-interest.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated 10 March 2009, the CA affirmed the 7 November 2003 RTC
decision. The appellate court concurred with the trial court's findings that the subject
land is alienable and disposable, and that RRDC has sufficiently established the required
period and character of possession. Likewise, the appellate court was not persuaded by
the claims of the heirs. It noted that the private oppositors anchored their claim on the
alleged homestead grant to Paulino, their predecessor-in-interest, which claim was
unsupported by sufficient documentary evidence. HESIcT
The appellate court also ruled that the 12-hectare limit under the Constitution was not
violated. It explained that Section 3 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the
constitutional provision which provided for the 12-hectare limit in the acquisition of land,
covers only agricultural lands of the public domain. It ratiocinated that when the subject
land was acquired through acquisitive prescription by RRDC's predecessors-in-interest, it
was converted into a private property and, as such, it ceased to be part of the public
domain. Thus, when RRDC acquired the subject land by purchase, it was no longer within
the ambit of the constitutional limitation.
As to the contention that the Corporation Code bars RRDC to acquire the subject land, the
appellate court simply stated that while the said code imposes certain limitations on the
acquisition of real property, there is no such prohibition. It stressed that RRDC is an
artificial being imbued with the power to purchase, hold, and convey real and personal
property for such purposes that are within the objects of its creation. Considering that
RRDC is a corporation engaged in realty business, it has the power to purchase real
properties. The dispositive portion of said decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed November 7, 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 26
The Republic moved for reconsideration; while the Heirs of Paulino Avanceña adopted
the Republic's motion for reconsideration as their own. In its resolution, dated 3
December 2009, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
THE ISSUES
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE AMENDED APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
AND ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION AND THE
CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATE OF TITLE FOR A PARCEL OF LAND CONTAINING AN AREA
OF THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (318,345)
SQUARE METERS IN FAVOR OF ROVENCY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
DESPITE THE FACTS THAT —
(i) THE LAND APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE IS IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS ALLOWED BY
LAW; AND,
(ii) RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO ACQUIRE THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS FURTHER
LIMITED BY THE CORPORATION CODE.
II.
RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT IT OR ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-
INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION
UNDER A BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER AND THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NO LONGER INTENDED FOR PUBLIC USE OR FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH. 27
THE COURT'S RULING
The petition is meritorious.
12-hectare limit under Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987
Constitution
The Republic argues that the trial and appellate courts erred in granting RRDC's
application for the registration of the subject land, as the same has a total land area of
31.8 hectares, which is way beyond the 12-hectare limit under Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease
not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. [emphasis supplied]
As can be clearly gleaned from its language, Section 3, Article XII applies
only to lands of the public domain. Private lands are, therefore, outside of
the prohibitions and limitations stated therein. Thus, the appellate court
correctly declared that the 12-hectare limitation on the acquisition of lands
under Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution has no application to
private lands.
A case in point is the absolute prohibition on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This prohibition
could be traced to the 1973 Constitution which limited the alienation of
lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the
Philippines. This constitutional prohibition, however, does not necessarily
mean that corporations may not apply for original registration of title to
lands. In fact, the Court, in several instances, affirmed the grant of
applications for original registration filed by corporations, 28 for as long as
the lands were already converted to private ownership by operation of law
as a result of satisfying the requisite possession required by the Public Land
Act. 29
In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court 30 (Director of Lands),
the Court granted the application for original registration of parcels of land
filed by a corporation which acquired the lands by purchase from members
of the Dumagat tribe. The Court ratiocinated that the lands applied for
registration were already private lands even before the corporation
acquired them. The Court observed that the sellers, being members of the
national cultural minorities, had by themselves and through their
predecessors, possessed and occupied the lands since time immemorial. As
a consequence of their open, exclusive, and undisputed possession over
the said lands for the period required by law for the acquisition of alienable
lands of the public domain, said lands ceased to become part of the public
land and were converted, by operation of law, into private ownership. As
such, the sellers, if not for their conveyance of the lands in question to the
corporation, were entitled to exercise the right granted to them by the
Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Considering further
that the lands in question were already private in character at the time the
corporation acquired them, the constitutional prohibition does not apply to
the corporation. caITAC
In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties 31 (T.A.N. Properties), the Court stressed
that what is determinative for the application of the doctrine in Director of
Lands is for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that
when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation
of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had
already lapsed.
The pronouncements in Director of Lands and T.A.N. Properties apply with
equal force to the 12-hectare limitation, considering that both the
limitation and the prohibition on corporations to acquire lands, do not
cover ownership of private lands. Stated differently, whether RRDC can
acquire the subject land and to what extent, depends on whether the
pieces of evidence it presented before the trial court sufficiently
established that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and that the nature and duration of the possession of its
individual predecessors-in-interest converted the subject land to private
land by operation of law.
Requirements for original
registration of title to land
In Republic of the Philippines vs. Cortez, 32 the Court explained that
applicants for original registration of title to land must first establish
compliance with the provisions of either Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of
P.D. No. 1529, which state:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
It must be emphasized that the requirements and bases for registration
under these two provisions of law differ from one another. Section 14 (1)
mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14 (2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. 33 Thus, it is important to ascertain
under what provision of Section 14 the registration is sought.
A reading of the application, however, is unavailing. In its application, RRDC alleged that it
and its predecessors-in-interest "had been in open, continuous, adverse, and peaceful
possession in concept of owner of the subject property since time immemorial or for
more than thirty years." This allegation made it unclear whether registration is sought
under Section 14 (1) — possession since 12 June 1945 or earlier; or under Section 14 (2)
— possession for more than thirty years.
An examination of the 7 November 2003 RTC decision also proved futile considering that,
and as previously pointed out, aside from enumerating the exhibits offered by the
applicant, the trial court did not discuss how these pieces of evidence established the
requisites for registration. Thus, for the proper resolution of the issues and arguments
raised herein, it becomes necessary for the present application to be scrutinized based on
the requirements of the provisions of Sections 14 (1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Registration under Section 14 (1)
of P.D. No. 1529
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish the
following requisites: first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and third, that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945, or earlier. 34
The first requisite of Section 14 (1) entails only that the property sought to be registered
be alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for registration. 35
To prove that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable, the present
rule is that the application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO
or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary, and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 36 This
strict requirement for the registration of lands enunciated in T.A.N. Properties had been
consistently applied and affirmed by the Court in a plethora of cases. 37 ICHDca
In the present case, to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable, RRDC
presented a CENRO certification stating that the subject land is "alienable and disposable
and not covered by any public land application." RRDC, however, failed to present a
certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary declaring
the subject land alienable and disposable. Clearly, the evidence presented by RRDC falls
short of the requirements in T.A.N. Properties. Thus, the trial and appellate courts erred
when they ruled that the subject land is alienable and disposable part of the public
domain and susceptible to original registration.
Furthermore, RRDC also failed to prove that it and its individual predecessors-in-interest
sufficiently complied with the required period and nature of possession.
An applicant for land registration must exhibit that it and its predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. It has been held that
possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; it
is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or occasional; it is
exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous,
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
38
In Republic vs. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 39 the Court held that for purposes of land
registration under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for
land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law
rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession is in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would actually exercise over his own
property.
In Republic v. Gielczyk, the Court explained that "possession" and "occupation" are not
synonymous to each other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession; whereas occupation delimits the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Thus, taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation means that for one's title to land to be
judicially recognized, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. 40
In this case, aside from the deeds of absolute sale covering the subject land which were
executed prior to 12 June 1945, RRDC did not present any evidence which would show
that its predecessors-in-interest actually exercised acts of dominion over the subject land
even before the cut-off period. As such, RRDC failed to prove that its possession of the
land, or at the very least, its individual predecessors-in-interest's possession over the
same was not mere fiction.
Neither would the tax declarations presented by RRDC suffice to prove the required
possession. To recall, the earliest of these tax declarations dates back only to 1948.
Clearly, the required possession and occupation since 12 June 1945 or Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Leonen and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
earlier, was not demonstrated.
||| (Republic v. Rovency Realty and Development Corp., G.R. No. 190817, [January 10,
From the foregoing, it is clear that RRDC failed to prove that its individual 2018])
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide
claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and that said possession
and occupation converted the subject land into a private property by
operation of law. Consequently, the subject land cannot be registered in
the name of RRDC under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.

Requirements under Section 14 (2)

of P.D. No. 1529

RRDC also failed to establish compliance with the requirements for

registration under Section 14 (2).

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic (Malabanan), 41 the Court

explained that when Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that persons
"who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a
valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing
law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands,
including patrimonial property belonging to the State.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought about by
Article 1113, which states that all things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription, and that property of the State or any
of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription. 42 TCAScE

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that when a piece of land is
declared alienable and disposable part of the public domain, it can already
be acquired by prescription. In Malabanan, this Court ruled that declaration
of alienability and disposability is not enough — there must be an express
declaration that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial, thus:

"(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,

consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run." 43 [emphasis supplied]

The classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. As such, said land, although
classified as alienable and disposable, is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription. 44

In this case, RRDC did not present any evidence which would show that the
subject land was expressly declared as no longer intended for public service
or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Hence, it failed to prove that acquisitive
prescription has begun to run against the State, and that it has acquired
title to the subject land by virtue thereof.

In fine, RRDC failed to satisfy all the requisites for registration of title to
land under either Sections 14 (1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. RRDC also failed to
establish that when it or P.N. Roa Enterprises, Inc., also a corporation and
its direct predecessor-in-interest, acquired the subject land, it had already
been converted to private property, thus, the prohibition on the
corporation's acquisition of agricultural lands of the public domain under
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution applies. RRDC's application
for original registration of imperfect title over Lot No. 3009 must perforce
be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 10 March 2009 Decision

and 3 December 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
00651, which affirmed the 7 November 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 41, Cagayan de Oro City, in LRA Case No. N-2000-084, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Lot
No. 3009 filed by Rovency Realty and Development Corporation is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision 1 of the Sixth Division of
the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The
appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), 2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) 3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated
February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a
parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to
Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition
for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas,
Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas
Cadastre, AP-060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square
meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent's
imperfect title over the aforesaid land. aTEACS
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The
public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles,
representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later
date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to the
petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general
default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles
and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano
(Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. 4 On July 9,
1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the
subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956. 5 Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started
occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-
fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements,
planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition
to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the
corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels
of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue
of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied
the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from
any private person or even the government until she filed her application
for registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor
manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence
while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico
Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,
1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be
brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered
and confirmed in the name of Naguit. 6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that
the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October
15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T.
Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Region VI. 7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in
an order dated February 18, 1998. 8
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC
to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC
rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. 9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule
42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate
court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and
affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the
Republic on September 4, 2000. 10
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court
gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the government's prior release of the
subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable
within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No.
10049 in the concept of owner for the required period. 11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether it is necessary under Section 14(1)
of the Property. Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable
and disposable before the applicant's possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court 12 in
arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first
be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as
required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land
was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration
proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws. ASEcHI
xxx xxx xxx
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title
under Section 14(1) — that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the
land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne
out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision,
qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 13 Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering
that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals. 14
Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute." 15 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and
disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of the land,
compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land
even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said property. In
the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was
released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by
the DENR. 16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 17 wherein
the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908,
it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable
and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed. In
Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years
before the property was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this
case, where the application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands, 18 such as those which form part
of a reservation for provincial park purposes 19 the possession of which
cannot ripen into ownership. 20 It is elementary in the law governing
natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As
held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals, 21 forestland is not registrable and
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable. 22 In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly
classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is
inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. 23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on
the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which
pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings.
The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona fide
claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the
claimant's open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of
possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894.
However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at
June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the
public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted
though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." 24 Clearly, the subject lands
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application
of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. 25 There is
a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of at least thirty (30) years. 26 With such conversion, such property may now fall within
the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945,
and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may
have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.
The land in question was found to be local in nature, it having been planted with coconut
trees now over fifty years old. 27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in
possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertion shown earlier to be unfounded-that there
could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land
was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by
her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion
is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower
courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of
50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax
declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership. 28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be
traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for
almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title
thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That
she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous,
peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057, [January 17, 2005], 489 PHIL 405-420)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID
HERBIETO, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, 1
which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, 2 granting the application for
land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias
and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single
application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to
be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June
1976. 3 Together with their application for registration, respondents
submitted the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent
Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of
respondent David; 4
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots; 5
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject
Lots; 6
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of
certificates of title covering the Subject Lots; 7
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are
alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
1063, dated 25 June 1963; 8
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in
1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No.
8423, also issued in 1994; 9 and TEHDIA
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements
thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for
P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to
David. 10
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the
Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period
of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents'
muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The
Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and
were not subject to private appropriation. 11
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. 12 All
owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the
Notice of Initial Hearing. 13 A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July
1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin
board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject
Lots were located. 14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the Official
Gazette on 02 August 1999 15 and The Freeman Banat News on 19
December 1999. 16
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order
of Special Default, 17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the
application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through
their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove
jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive
further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC
after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of
respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February
2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of
registration for the Subject Lots. 18
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court
of Appeals. 19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed
the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has
been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things
which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall
not be the object of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over
immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith."2005cdtai
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the
subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they
cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees
(Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees
or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming
arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the
time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still
the argument of the appellant does not hold water. CTacSE
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO
Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of
private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater
right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which
allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering
that possession of appellees should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO
declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject
parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already
when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As
such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo. 20
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of
the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance
with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges
that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had
overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol, 21 where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as
it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be
from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the
application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that
the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple
applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While an
application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels of
land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-
owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to
proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since
the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the
Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter
did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction
to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for
reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the
MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though
they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually
seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423,
respectively. CSEHcT
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by
the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots,
based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals, 22 to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance
with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not
invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the
case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by
the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby
rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This
procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree 23 recognizes and expressly allows the
following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several
applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to
be registered; 24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of
several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same
province. 25 The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the
present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two
parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of
the parcels of land in their respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a
situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the
proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree
itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient."
Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance
with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the
defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with
the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties. Instead of
a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and
David, more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of
jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. 26 They are not
even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. 27 Instead, under the Rules of
Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the
court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative,
to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded
with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined
party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may
have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the
petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect
the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending
before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the
attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the
causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this
Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the
MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration
proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from
assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for
registration. ASDTEa
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, 28 and jurisdiction in rem cannot be
acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service
of notice. 29
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of
the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the
following manner:
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published
once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners
so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted. CEDHTa
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals 30 that publication in a newspaper of
general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and
register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication,
mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including
publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and
imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded
on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus —
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as
well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at
hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely
read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that
the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact
not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. 31
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03
September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the
Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and
circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only
on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing,
would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published
in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due
process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the
initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present his
claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the
claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would
be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for
registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact,
the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing
to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration
thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring
its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA
Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void
for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
II
Period of Possession
Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots
for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction
to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration, this
Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the
required period of possession for acquiring title to public land. TAEDcS
Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory
basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they
obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses
Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent
Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession
of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950. 32
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents
themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I,
Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it
is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992." 33 The Subject
Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government; 34 and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to
public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 35
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain,
except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands
which reverted to the State. 36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which
public lands may be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). 37
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of
the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and
application procedure for every mode. 38 Since respondents herein filed
their application before the MTC, 39 then it can be reasonably inferred that
they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect
or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land,
not exceeding 144 hectares, 40 may be availed of by persons identified
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1073, which reads —
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. TIAEac
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled
to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires
adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the
Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period
of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had
been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
shall not apply thereto. 41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be
judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the
erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the
Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to
own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having
possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest,
since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application, have
acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in
relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already
exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the
occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. 43 As established by this Court in the
preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired
title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect
or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for
judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property
Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads —
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right,
claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every
case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity
of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to
them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. 44
Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied
with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the
procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights
apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of
the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a
special law 45 that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an
established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law,
the special law prevails — Generalia specialibus non derogant. 46
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED.
The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December
1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents'
application for registration is DISMISSED. EAIcCS
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., is out of the country.
||| (Republic v. Herbieto, G.R. No. 156117, [May 26, 2005], 498 PHIL 227-247)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.]
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and
registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World.
And it has many consequences. STHDAc
xxx xxx xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in
Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have
not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state
systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru,
the informals have means of proving property ownership to each other
which are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The
informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their
own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps
which they use for their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you
walk by field after field — in each field a different dog is going to bark at
you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The only one who
does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a
"common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal
system does not know how to recognize.
Hernando De Soto 1
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of
persons and entities other than the Philippine government. The petition,
while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in
order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original
registration proceedings under Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant
provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on
the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the
problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been
treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their
own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our
part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution
and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though
our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic
problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
Silang Cadastre, 2 situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting
of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, 3 and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. HaSEcA
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-
Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr.,
to appear on behalf of the State. 4 Apart from presenting documentary
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified
at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged *
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons — Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban
— the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold
by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. 5
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he "also [knew] the property
and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." 6 The
Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the
application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the
subject property was "verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982." 7
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this
case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of
legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite. HcDaAI
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration
shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of
the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 8 reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification
of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since
the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alienable and
disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not
be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the
Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto. 9
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; 10 hence, it was
his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court,
rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit, 11 which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had
directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the
requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun.
Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property
in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any
possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be
counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc, 12 and on 11 November 2008, the case
was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral
arguments, to wit: HICEca
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of
the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible
to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or
because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both? 13
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14 (1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in
Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly
contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be
considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein
was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia, 14 promulgated in
June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation
that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14 (1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14 (1) to
apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable as
of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent
rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic, 15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic 16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation, 17 as well as the
earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals. 18 ACTEHI
With respect to Section 14 (2), petitioners submit that open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the public
domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into private
property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14 (2). According to
them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at
the time of the application, the property had already been "converted" into
private property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties. 19
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14 (2) are
more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code,
the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property", while Section 14 (2) speaks of "private lands". It observes that
the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14 (2) as a ground
for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period
refers to the period of possession under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run
against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the time the
public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular
factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership
thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a
full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public
Land Act. HSEIAT
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since
its enactment, governed the classification and disposition of lands of the
public domain. The President is authorized, from time to time, to classify
the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or
mineral lands. 20 Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public uses. 21
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the
Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles" through "judicial legalization". 22 Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably
grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. DEHcTI
Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain". The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the
lands that may be registered. 23 This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the
Public Land Act, "agricultural lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are a larger class than only "agricultural lands".
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for "thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to possession "since June
12, 1945 or earlier". The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.
1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended,
this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. . . .
It bears further observation that Section 48 (b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same
as Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various
laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is
Section 14 (1) that operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The
provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. SDTIaE
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of
Section 14 (1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly
refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy,
or that Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That
is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. — The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which
seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself
for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D.
No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino
citizen who has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or complete his title by
applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title. DCSETa
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public
Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that
both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the
substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since
12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48 (b).
Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may
exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has
been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002.
It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to
avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply
only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares:
Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also
to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section
shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under
this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. 24
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right
granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed of only until 31 December
2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
and Section 14 (a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has
adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration
of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough
that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and
disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12
June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands certified as alienable
and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be registered either under
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was
discussed in Naguit. EcTDCI
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 25
Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were
not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines
was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that
the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the
need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then
there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property. EIcSTD
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that
which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as
pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the
point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared
alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current
possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona
fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect
titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is
significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto
are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first
place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no
need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's acknowledgment that
the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section 14 (1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura, 26 the Court, citing
Herbieto, again stated that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. . ." That
statement, in the context of Section 14 (1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the
passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application
therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14 (2). The evidence submitted by
petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948,
thereby precluding the application of Section 14 (1). It is not even apparent from the
decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to original registration
following Section 14 (1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June
1945. aCHDST
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14 (1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14 (1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant
had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June
1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14 (1) therein was decisive to the resolution of
the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of
the Court on Section 14 (1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 27
since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was
declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better
rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza, 28 which involved a
claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was
declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration
in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994,
issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980". This is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents'
application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation
of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application
of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is
there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land. . . . IDASHa
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for
the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title,
it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the
burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the
year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of them. 29
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored
Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48 (b) of public domain lands declared
alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling
difference is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years
after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the
application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable.
That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell,
a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14 (2). The
provision reads:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14
(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum,
but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of
alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application
of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws." DEcSaI
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. [ 30 ] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty
(30) years. [ 31 ] With such conversion, such property may now fall within
the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being
been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the
right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14 (2), unlike in this case
where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that
provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of
possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly
appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14 (2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible
to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
caTESD
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the
acquisition of real property through prescription. Ownership of real
property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, 32 or
through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. 33 Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith, 34 as well as just
title. 35
When Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides
that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws", it unmistakably refers to
the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is
the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription
of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State.
Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14 (2)
does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial
property of the State, which a private person has acquired through
prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence
holding that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least thirty (30) years. 36 Yet if we ascertain the source of
the "thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to Section 14 (2) and to how
exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty
(30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48 (b) of
the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public
lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 37
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the
date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for
registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act
No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies
the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Code —
ordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession. . . for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith".
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is
the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14 (2). However,
there is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep.
Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or
call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for
confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be
declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty
(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942
had mandated such a requirement, 38 similar to our earlier finding with respect to the
present language of Section 48 (b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for
original registration became Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws" to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year
period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the
Civil Code.At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section
14 (1).
B.
Unlike Section 14 (1), Section 14 (2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription
under existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of
prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14 (2). There is
no similar demand on our part in the case of Section 14 (1). DSHTaC
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: "[p]roperty of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription". The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by
Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes
property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. 39 Lands of the public domain,
whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public
dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property
of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision
further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription. IEcDCa
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State". It is this provision
that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when * it is "intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of
the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420 (2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the
registrability even of lands already declared alienable and disposable to the
detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the
lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although
declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used only
by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is
to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language
and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section
14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles. aATEDS
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an
actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating The
Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.", is
more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes
the sale of certain military reservations and portions of military camps in
Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes
of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President
to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA) 40 which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or
administer them. 41 The President is authorized to sell portions of the
military camps, in whole or in part. 42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself
declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties." 43
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands
have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not
become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic. 44 Such
purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of
national wealth" under Article 420 (2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2), notwithstanding their
status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law
to a private person or entity that such lands become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a
duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned
in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property
before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section 14 (2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to
meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. EHTSCD
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14 (1) and Section 14
(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14 (1) mandates registration on the basis of
possession, while Section 14 (2) entitles registration on the basis of prescription.
Registration under Section 14 (1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14 (2) is made available
both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period
available through Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article
1137 of the Civil Code.The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of
extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without
regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14 (2) of the Property
Registration Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply
as well to Section 14 (1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes
such as the Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to
the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section
14 (2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision
with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14 (1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our
land registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil
Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states
that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription",
and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription".
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under
the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed
through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person
from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive
prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time,
there are indispensable requisites — good faith and just title. The ascertainment of good
faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the
Civil Code, 45 provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article
1129, there is just title for the purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could
not transmit any right". Dr. Tolentino explains: ITCcAD
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which
would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or
defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dation in payment. 46
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability
of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the
argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to
the possessor before the completion of the required period of possession".
47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom
the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title,
whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the
acquisition of ownership or other real rights. SIEHcA
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or
extraordinary prescription, the period of possession preceding the
classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for
the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the
possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land;
and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil
Code acquires ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of
the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration
of the property under the Torrens system. It should be remembered that
registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but
merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. 48
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the
Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration
system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of ownership of
patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by
the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land
Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945
following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act 49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for
alienable public lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the
Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such registration. 50 Still,
the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself,
establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have
completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally
closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with
Section 14 (2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of
persons who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
AcDaEH
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act. 51
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act
is further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code.And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of
the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidence — the Tax Declarations they presented in particular — is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree. EaCDAT
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code.Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of today's
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country
will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the
Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply
levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these public domain lands,
such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to limitations
imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties. 52 Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled
and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded
for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is
much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues
are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands
as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new
phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands
which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes
insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of
that individual, but also to the person's family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life
and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to
the long pestering problem. caHIAS
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta
and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., joins J. Nazario.
Quisumbing, J., is on official business.
Corona, J., joins the dissent of Mr. Justice Brion.
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see Concurring & Dissenting Opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., joins the concurring and dissenting opinion of
Justice Nazario.
Brion, J., dissents — see Opinion.
Separate Opinions
CHICO-NAZARIO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for
registration of a piece of land originally filed by the late Mario Malabanan
(Malabanan), petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the
instant Petition, being alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
may not be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code,
nor registered pursuant to Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree. CTIEac
At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property Registration Decree
governs registration of land under the Torrens system. It can only identify
which titles, already existing or vested, may be registered under the
Torrens system; but it cannot be the source of any title to land. It merely
confirms, but does not confer ownership. 1
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree allows "those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws", to apply for registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into account that the
land they are seeking to register is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, a fact which would have several substantial implications.
First, Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and
explicitly refers to "private lands", without mention at all of public lands.
There is no other way to understand the plain language of Section 14 (2) of
the Property Registration Decree except that the land was already private
when the applicant for registration acquired ownership thereof by
prescription. The prescription therein was not the means by which the
public land was converted to private land; rather, it was the way the
applicant acquired title to what is already private land, from another
person previously holding title to the same. 2 The provision in question is
very clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule that when the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for
interpretation or construction, but only for application. 3
With the understanding that Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree applies only to what are already private lands, then, there is no
question that the same can be acquired by prescription under the
provisions of the Civil Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which
governs rights to private lands. ECcTaS
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, as amended, reads:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed
of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis ours.)
The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be
disposed of by the State, and at the same time, mandates that the latter
can only do so by the modes identified in the same provision. Thus, the
intent of the legislature to make exclusive the enumeration of the modes
by which agricultural public land may be disposed of by the State in Section
11 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is not only readily apparent, but
explicit. And, undeniably, the enumeration of the modes for acquiring
agricultural public land in the said provision does not include prescription,
in the concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil Code.
Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome
the express restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the
modes by which the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law specifically applying to
lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as
amended, being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil Code, a general law. Basic
is the rule in statutory construction that "where two statutes are of equal theoretical
application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail."
Generalia specialibus non derogant. 4
As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same cannot confer
title to land and can only confirm title that already exists or has vested. As has already
been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural public land vests or is acquired only
by any of the modes enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended.
TcADCI
And, third, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act was amended several times, changing the
period of possession required for acquiring an imperfect title to agricultural public land:
Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required possession en
concepto de dueño since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141,
this requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act No. 1942 was
enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment required adverse possession for a
period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No.
1073, further amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to December 31, 1987. Under this
decree, "the provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945." 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of the public
domain could be acquired by adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential Decree No.
1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act by
requiring possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period of possession for acquiring imperfect
title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain is no longer determined
according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date
(i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the possession should have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public domain
by prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of title to land thus acquired under
Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, it would be sanctioning what is
effectively a circumvention of the amendment introduced by Presidential Decree No.
1073 to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable land
of the public domain by possession would again be made to depend on a fixed term
(i.e.,10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years for extraordinary prescription), rather
than being reckoned from the fixed date presently stipulated by Section 48 (b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended. DCcIaE
There being no basis for petitioners' application for registration of the public agricultural
land in question, accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority opinion concerning
the contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals 6 and
Republic v. Herbieto, 7 on imperfect titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, acquired in accordance with Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
and registered pursuant to Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
According to Naguit,a person seeking judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, need only prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since
12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the time
of filing of the application for judicial confirmation and/or registration of title. On the
other hand, it was held in Herbieto that such a person must establish that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since
12 June 1945 or earlier, and that the subject land was likewise already declared alienable
and disposable since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling in
Naguit, and declares the pronouncements on the matter in Herbieto as mere obiter
dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of my
elucidation in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some
question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark
made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way", that
is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a
point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. 8
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the registration of certain
parcels of land of the public domain in the names of Jeremias and David Herbieto, based
on two grounds, one substantive and the other procedural, i.e., (1) the
applicants for registration failed to prove that they possessed the subject
parcels of land for the period required by law; and (2) the application for
registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first, and held that
the alleged infirmity in the application constituted a misjoinder of causes of
action which did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of
the misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by the court
separately. The Court though took note of the belated publication of the
notice of hearing on the application for registration of Jeremias and David
Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the notice of the same was
published. Such error was not only procedural, but jurisdictional, and was
fatal to the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the substantive issue in
Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias and David Herbieto possessed the
parcels of land they wish to register in their names for the period required
by law. The Court ruled in the negative. Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, on judicial confirmation of imperfect title, requires
possession of alienable and disposable land of the public domain since 12
June 1945 or earlier. Given that the land sought to be registered was
declared alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the period of
possession prior to such declaration should not be counted in favor of the
applicants for registration, then Jeremias and David Herbieto could not be
deemed to have possessed the parcels of land in question for the requisite
period as to acquire imperfect title to the same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect title to
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, which could be the
subject of judicial confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said
case. It was not a mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause,
"by the way", or only incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon a
question before the Court; or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause; or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy
or argument, as to constitute obiter dictum. ECaHSI
It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain under Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended, was directly raised as an issue in the Petition in
Herbieto and discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That
the application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already be dismissed
on the ground of lack of proper publication of the notice of hearing
thereof, did not necessarily preclude the Court from resolving the other
issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed
the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on two
grounds: (1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land registration court over the
application, in light of the absence of proper publication of the notice of
hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of the application given that the
applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial confirmation
of an imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court to expeditiously
and completely resolve the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the
dispute and issues between the parties. Without expressly discussing and
categorically ruling on the second ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto
could have easily believed that they could re-file their respective
applications for registration, just taking care to comply with the
publication-of-notice requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals 9 on what constitutes, or more appropriately, what does
not constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues
presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule
applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved,
which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration
of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to
matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of
the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground, or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point,
otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have turned on is not
regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an
additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been
disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case
presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine
the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as
an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such
points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be
denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued
and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court
regarding other propositions dicta. IcHTCS
An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be
considered a dictum; and this rule applies as to all pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case, and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the
opinion as to a matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is or
might have been made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points
in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the
particular point, otherwise than it did. 10
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the law and established
jurisprudence on the matter, and is binding as a precedent.
Section 14 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for the acquisition of
an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain, possession by a
Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since 12 June 1945 or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter. (Emphasis ours.) SCIcTD
Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially reiterating Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, recognizes the imperfect title thus acquired and
allows the registration of the same, viz.:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. (Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the applicant for
registration prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable cannot be
credited to the applicant's favor. 11
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title, under
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a Filipino citizen, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the
land in question, necessarily, was already declared alienable and disposable also by 12
June 1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, which would not run afoul of
either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws or binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the interpretation of
Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in
absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person from acquiring an imperfect
title to a parcel of land declared alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, which
could be judicially confirmed. Nonetheless, it must be borne in mind that the intention of
the law is to dispose of agricultural public land to qualified individuals and not simply to
dispose of the same. It may be deemed a strict interpretation and application of both law
and jurisprudence on the matter, but it certainly is not an absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, is well justified by the significant consequences arising from a finding
that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural land of the public domain. Not just any
lengthy occupation of an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect title. An
imperfect title can only be acquired by occupation and possession of the land by a person
and his predecessors-in-interest for the period required and considered by
law sufficient as to have segregated the land from the mass of public land.
When a person is said to have acquired an imperfect title, by operation of
law, he acquires a right to a grant, a government grant to the land, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. As such, the land ceased
to be part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the State
to dispose of. An application for confirmation of title, therefore, is but a
mere formality. 12 EIAHcC
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, as amended, has identified several ways by which agricultural lands of
the public domain may be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of
agricultural public land has its own specific requirements which must be
complied with. If a person is not qualified for a judicial confirmation of an
imperfect title, because the land in question was declared alienable and
disposable only after 12 June 1945, he is not totally without recourse for he
could still acquire the same by any of the other modes enumerated in the
afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the majority of the ruling in
Naguit on Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14
(1) of the Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the majority, to
DENY the Petition at bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 February 2007
and Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals dismissing,
for absolute lack of basis, petitioners' application for registration of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
BRION, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia's modified positions on the application of
prescription under Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree
(PRD), and on the denial of the petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the classification of a
public land as alienable and disposable can be made after June 12, 1945, in
accordance with this Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit (Naguit). 1 Effectively, what results from this decision is a new law,
crafted by this Court, going beyond what the Constitution ordains and
beyond the law that the Legislature passed. Because the majority has not
used the standards set by the Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA), 2
its conclusions are based on a determination on what the law ought to be
— an exercise in policy formulation that is beyond the Court's authority to
make.
The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not necessarily in the
order these grounds are posed above. HDTCSI
Prefatory Statement
Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of the hierarchy
of laws that govern public lands to fully understand and appreciate the
grounds for dissent.
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is the Philippine
Constitution, whose Article XII (entitled National Economy and Patrimony)
establishes and fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and
overriding principle. 3 This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to the
State, 4 and that no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the State. 5
In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classification, grant, and
disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and,
other than the Constitution, is the country's primary law on the matter.
Section 7 of the PLA delegates to the President the authority to administer
and dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the public lands
open to disposition or concession, and the requirement that they should be
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section
11, a very significant section, states that —
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title;
(5) By judicial legalization;
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent).
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and embodies a grant of title to the
qualified occupant or possessor of an alienable public land. This section provides: cHAIES
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have
applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and
prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have, with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or
grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as
against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while subsection (b) has been
amended by PD 1073 as follows:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
Complementing the PLA is the PRD. 6 It was enacted to codify the various laws relating to
property registration. It governs the registration of lands under the Torrens System, as
well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. Section 14 of the PRD provides:
SEC. 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right
of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
SEDIaH
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to have been lifted from, Section 48
(b) of the PLA. The two provisions, however, differ in intent and legal effect based on the
purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a substantive law that classifies and
provides for the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. The PRD, on the
other hand, specifically refers to the manner of bringing registerable lands, among them
alienable public lands, within the coverage of the Torrens system. Thus, the first is a
substantive law, while the other is essentially procedural, so that in terms of substantive
content, the PLA should prevail. 7
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the Civil Code and its provisions
on Property 8 and Prescription. 9 The law on property assumes importance because land,
whether public or private, is property. Prescription, on the other hand, is a mode of
acquiring ownership of land, although it is not one of the modes of disposition mentioned
in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is entitled "Property in Relation to the Person
to Whom it Belongs". On this basis, Article 419 classifies property to be property of public
dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 proceeds to further classify property of
public dominion into those intended for public use, for public service, and for the
development of the national wealth. Article 421 states that all other properties of the
State not falling under Article 420 are patrimonial property of the State, and Article 422
adds that property of public dominion, no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425,
property of private ownership, besides patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities
and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
individually or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not mentioned as one of
the modes of acquiring alienable public land under the PLA, (Significantly,
the PLA — under its Section 48 — provides for its system of how possession
can ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as acquisitive
prescription but as basis for confirmation of title.) Section 14 (2) of the
PRD, however, specifies that "[t]hose who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" as
among those who may apply for land registration. Thus, prescription was
introduced into the land registration scheme (the PRD), but not into the
special law governing lands of the public domain (the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation with public lands is
Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which states that prescription does not run
against the State and its subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113
provides that "all things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided; property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription." The provisions of Articles 1128 to 1131 may also
come into play in the application of prescription to real properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly the supremacy of
the Philippine Constitution, any consideration of lands of the public domain
should start with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all lands belong
to the State, and he who claims ownership carries the burden of proving his
claim. 10 Next in the hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the
grant, alienation and disposition of the lands of the public domain, and the
PRD for the registration of lands. The PLA and the PRD are special laws
supreme in their respective spheres, subject only to the Constitution. The
Civil Code, for its part, is the general law on property and prescription and
should be accorded respect as such. In more concrete terms, where
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are involved, the PLA is
the primary law that should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on
property and prescription must yield in case of conflict. 11
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the PLA with a reiteration
of the first principle that under the regalian doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 12
Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain. 13 We should never lose sight of the impact of this first principle
where a private ownership claim is being asserted against the State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over time, starting
from the first PLA, Act No. 926; the second public land law that followed,
Act No. 2874; and the present CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926
was described in the following terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed
the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public
lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands", for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title
to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris
and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands. 14
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has been carried over to
the present PLA and its amendments. Another basic feature, the
requirement for open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable public land under a bona fide
claim of ownership also never changed. Still another consistent public land
feature is the concept that once a person has complied with the requisite
possession and occupation in the manner provided by law, he is
automatically given a State grant that may be asserted against State
ownership; the land, in other words, ipso jure becomes private land. 15 The
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title shall then follow,
based on the procedure for land registration. 16 It is in this manner that
the PLA ties up with the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for reckoning the required
occupation or possession. In the first PLA, the required occupation/possession to qualify
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title was 10 years preceding the effectivity of Act
No. 926 — July 26, 1904 (or since July 26, 1894 or earlier). This was retained up to CA 141,
until this law was amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 (enacted on June 22, 1957), 17
which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. This period did not last; on January 25, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1073
(PD 1073) 18 changed the required 30-year possession and occupation period provision,
to possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. PD
1073 likewise changed the lands subject of imperfect title, from agricultural lands of the
public domain to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. PD 1073 also
extended the period for applications for free patents and judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.
The significance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to have been lost to history. A major
concern raised against this date is that the country was at this time under Japanese
occupation, and for some years after, was suffering from the uncertainties and
instabilities that World War II brought. Questions were raised on how one could possibly
comply with the June 12, 1945 or earlier occupation/possession requirement of PD 1073
when the then prevailing situation did not legally or physically permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as the enactment of the law (a Presidential
Decree) was solely through the President's lawmaking powers under a regime that
permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for the date is the possible impact of
the interplay between the old law and the amendatory law. When PD 1073 was enacted,
the utmost concern, in all probability, was how the law would affect the application of the
old law which provided for a thirty-year possession period. Counting 30 years backwards
from the enactment of PD 1073 on January 25, 1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a
January 24, 1947 cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for unknown reasons,
the date June 12, 1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested rights acquired under the old
law (CA 141, as amended by RA 1942) providing for a 30-year possession period could not
be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We recognized this legal dilemma in Abejaron v.
Nabasa, 19 when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required
by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and
possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the
Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation
of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have
already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair
vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may
apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of
the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided January 24, 1947 and not June
12, 1945 as its cut-off date, yet the latter date is the express legal reality. The
reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that where an applicant has
satisfied the requirements of Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to
the effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his or her title, even if
possession and occupation does not date back to June 12, 1945. For purposes of the
present case, a discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to highlight that it is a
date whose significance and import cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns; the full legislative intent must
be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its amendments were not confined to RA
1942 and PD 1073. These decrees were complemented by Presidential Decree No. 892
(PD 892) 20 — issued on February 16, 1976 — which limited to six months the use of
Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. 21 Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073 totally disallowed the judicial
confirmation of incomplete titles to public land based on unperfected Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940 22 extended the period for filing applications for free patent and
judicial confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The law now also allows the
issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of 12 hectares to any natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30
years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory Act, has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of
agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to December 31, 2020. 23

Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which defines the administrative
grant of title to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
through homestead settlement and sale, among others), RA 6940 and RA
9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 that the
Legislature has provided, ample opportunities exist under the law for the
grant of alienable lands of the public domain to deserving beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on June 11, 1978
to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. Its Section 14
describes the applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree,
among them —
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
These subsections and their impact on the present case are separately
discussed below.
Section 14 (1)
Section 14 (1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off date of June
12, 1945 and which, under the conditions discussed above, may be read to
be January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation with Section 14
(1) of the PRD and, noted among others, that "under the current state of
the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48 (b) may be availed
of only until December 31, 2020". This is in light of RA 9176, passed in
2002, 24 limiting the filing of an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title to December 31, 2020. The amendatory law apparently
refers only to the use of Section 14 (1) of the PRD as a mode of registration.
Where ownership right or title has already vested in the possessor-
occupant of the land that Section 48 (b) of the PLA grants by operation of
law, Section 14 (2) of the PRD continuous to be open for purposes of
registration of a "private land" since compliance with Section 48 (b) of the
PLA vests title to the occupant/possessor and renders the land private in
character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General that the public land to be registered must have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of the cut-off date for possession
stated in Section 48 (b) — June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and
reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Naguit that held: 25
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945", as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership". Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.
Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were
not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines
was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper
to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even
if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
xxx xxx xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court noted
that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the
lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration
therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or
nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this
case, where the application was made years after the property had been certified as
alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well discredits Bracewell. It does the same
with Republic v. Herbieto 26 that came after Naguit and should have therefore overtaken
the Naguit ruling. In the process, the ponencia cites with approval the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza, 27 penned by the same ponente who wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it however completely misses the
point from the perspective of whether possession of public lands classified as alienable
and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be credited for purposes of a grant under
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, and of registration under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. These cases,
as analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted or denied registration on the basis of
whether the public land has been classified as alienable and disposable at the time the
petition for registration was filed. Thus, except for Naguit, these cases can be cited only
as instances when registration was denied or granted despite the classification of the land
as alienable after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the quotation above, this is one
case that explained why possession prior to the classification of public land as alienable
should be credited in favor of the possessor who filed his or her application for
registration after the classification of the land as alienable and disposable, but where such
classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that the ponencia relied upon are its statutory
construction interpretation of Section 48 (b) of the PLA and the observed ABSURDITY of
using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree with Naguit and its reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The Constitution classifies public lands into
agricultural, mineral, and timber. Of these, only agricultural lands can be alienated. 28
Without the requisite classification, there can be no basis to determine which lands of the
public domain are alienable and which are not; hence, classification is a constitutionally-
required step whose importance should be given full legal recognition and effect.
Otherwise stated, without classification into disposable agricultural land, the land forms
part of the mass of the public domain that, not being agricultural, must be mineral or
timber land that are completely inalienable and as such cannot be possessed with legal
effects. To allow effective possession is to do violence to the regalian doctrine; the
ownership and control that the doctrine denotes will be less than full if the possession
that should be with the State as owner, but is elsewhere without any authority, can
anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can be claimed under its Section 48
(b), it is very important to note that this law does not apply until a classification into
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is made. If the PLA does not apply
prior to a public land's classification as alienable and disposable, how can possession
under its Section 48 (b) be claimed prior such classification? There can simply be no
imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable
because, in the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land
that fully belongs to the State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of CA
141. 29 If the land is either mineral or timber and can never be the subject of
administration and disposition, it defies legal logic to allow the possession of these
unclassified lands to produce legal effect. Thus, the classification of public land as
alienable and disposable is inextricably linked to effective possession that can ripen into a
claim under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially a civil law term that can best be
understood in terms of the Civil Code in the absence of any specific definition in the PLA
other than in terms of time of possession. 30 Article 530 of the Civil Code provides that
"[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the declaration of alienability, a land of the public domain cannot be
appropriated; hence, any claimed possession cannot have legal effects. This perspective
fully complements what has been said above under the constitutional and PLA reasons. It
confirms, too, that the critical difference the ponencia saw in the Bracewell and Naguit
situations does not really exist. Whether an application for registration is filed before or
after the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one as in the other, no
effective possession can be recognized prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date — June 12, 1945. The ponencia
assumes, based on its statutory construction reasoning and its reading of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession from
June 12, 1945 and that it suffices if the land has been classified as alienable
at the time of application for registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-
off date was painstakingly set by law and should be given full significance.
Its full import appears from PD 1073 that amended Section 48 (b), whose
exact wordings state:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not expressly
state what Section 48 (b) should provide under the amendment PD 1073
introduced in terms of the exact wording of the amended Section 48 (b).
But under the PD 1073 formulation, the intent to count the alienability to
June 12, 1945 appears very clear. The provision applies only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain that is described in terms of the
character of the possession required since June 12, 1945. This intent —
seen in the direct, continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945 under the wording
of the Decree — is clear and should be respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under the PLA. Naguit's
absurdity argument that the ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent
than real, since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the declaration
of alienability will not render the grant of alienable public lands out of
reach. The acquisition of ownership and title may still be obtained by other
modes under the PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned above, now
allows the use of free patents. 31 It was approved on March 28, 1990;
hence, counting 30 years backwards, possession since April 1960 or
thereabouts may qualify a possessor to apply for a free patent. The
administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA are also open,
particularly, homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom — the absurdity — of the law. This Court acts
beyond the limits of the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in
giving Section 48 (b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation beyond its
plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into the law an intent that is not
there even your purpose is to avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a
law already has absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role
under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the law an
interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the perceived absurdity.
We thereby dip into the realm of policy — a role delegated by the
Constitution to the Legislature. If only for this reason, we should avoid
expanding — through Naguit and the present ponencia — the plain
meaning of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits the ruling in
Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or an obiter dictum. As
to legal correctness, Herbieto is in full accord with what we have stated
above; hence, it cannot be dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling.
Likewise, its ruling on the lack of effective legal possession prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable cannot strictly be
obiter because it responded to an issue directly raised by the parties.
Admittedly, its ruling on jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved the
case, but it cannot be faulted if it went beyond this threshold issue into the
merits of the claim of effective possession prior to the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling that the
ponencia passes off as the established and definitive rule on possession
under Section 14 (1) of the PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that
no definitive ruling touching on Section 14 (1) can be deemed to have been
established in the present case since the applicant Heirs could only prove
possession up to 1948. For this reason, the ponencia falls back on and
examines Section 14 (2) of the PRD. In short, if there is a perfect example of
a ruling that is not necessary for the resolution of a case, that unnecessary
ruling is the ponencia's ruling that Naguit is now the established rule.
Section 14 (2)
Section 14 (2), by its express terms, applies only to private lands. Thus, on
plain reading, it does not apply to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain that Section 14 (1) covers. This is the difference between
Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of expanding the
coverage of Section 14 (2) via the Civil Code by directly applying civil law
provisions on prescription on alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. To quote the obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes to enshrine as the
definitive rule and leading case on Sections 14 (1) and 14 (2): 32
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration
by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of
the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right
to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code should be considered in the
interpretation of Section 14 (2). Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless
otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1) the Civil Code fully applies to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; (2) assuming that the Civil Code fully
applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore "private property"; and (3)
assuming that the Civil Code fully applies, that these properties are within the commerce
of men and can be acquired through prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the above assumptions and its
direct application of prescription under Section 14 (2) to alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain. This Section becomes relevant only once the ownership of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain vests in the occupant or possessor
pursuant to the terms of Section 48 (b) of the PLA, with or without judicial confirmation
of title, so that the land has become a private land. At that point, Section 14 (2) becomes
fully operational on what had once been an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14 (2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public domain is clear from Article XII,
Section 3 of the Constitution. There are matters that the Constitution itself provides for,
and some that are left for Congress to deal with. Thus, under Section 3, the Constitution
took it upon itself to classify lands of the public domain, and to state that only agricultural
lands may be alienable lands of the public domain. It also laid down the terms under
which lands of the public domain may be leased by corporations and individuals. At the
same time, it delegated to Congress the authority to classify agricultural lands of the
public domain according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Congress likewise
determines, by law, the size of the lands of the public domain that may be acquired,
developed, held or leased, and the conditions therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on how it will act, specifically,
whether it will pass a general or a special law. On alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, Congress has, from the very beginning, acted through the medium of a
special law, specifically, through the Public Land Act that by its terms "shall apply to the
lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special
laws." Notably, the Act goes on to provide that nothing in it "shall be understood or
construed to change or modify the administration and disposition of the lands commonly
called 'friar lands' and those which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become
property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and disposition
shall be governed by laws at present in force or which may hereafter be enacted." 33
Under these terms, the PLA can be seen to be a very specific act whose coverage extends
only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it is a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers general rules on the effect and
application of laws and human relations; persons and family relations; property and
property relations; the different modes of acquiring ownership; and obligations and
contracts. 34 Its general nature is best appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides that:
"In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code."
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with respect to the latter's special
focus — land registration — and fully applies civil law provisions in so far only as they are
allowed by the PRD. One such case where the Civil Code is expressly allowed to apply is in
the case of Section 14 (2) of the PRD which calls for the application of prescription under
existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have their own specific purposes and
are supreme within their own spheres, subject only to what the higher Constitution
provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA provides when the matter to be
registered is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property, including State property. It
classifies property as either of public dominion or of private ownership, 35
and property for public use, public service and those for the development
of the national wealth as property of the public dominion. 36 All property
not so characterized are patrimonial property of the State 37 which are
susceptible to private ownership, 38 against which prescription will run. 39
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked that they refer
to the properties of the State in general, i.e., to both movable and
immovable properties. 40 Thus, the Civil Code provisions on property do
not refer to land alone, much less do they refer solely to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the
special governing law and, under the Civil Code itself, the Civil Code
provisions shall apply only in case of deficiency. 41
begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when the property has become
private by the government's own declaration so that prescription under the Civil Code can
run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency between this conclusion and the
hierarchy of laws on lands of the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate, the PLA
applies as a special and primary law when a public land is classified as alienable and
disposable, and remains fully and exclusively applicable until the State itself expressly
declares that the land now qualifies as a patrimonial property. At that point, the
application of the Civil Code and its law on prescription are triggered. The application of
Section 14 (2) of the PRD follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion that:

This conclusion gives rise to the question — can alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain at the same time be patrimonial property of the
State because they are not for public use, public purpose, and for the
development of national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in the interaction
discussed above between the PLA and PRD, on the one hand, and the Civil
Code, on the other, and will depend on the purpose for which an answer is
necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine whether a grant or
disposition of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain has
been made, then the PLA primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA recognizes is
based on its Section 48 (b) and, until the requirements of this Section are
satisfied, the alienable and disposable land of the public domain remains a
State property that can be disposed only under the terms of Section 11 of
the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the question of whether — for
purposes of prescription — an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain is patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if
alienable and disposable, is State property and prescription does not run
against the State. 42 In other words, there is no room for any hairsplitting
that would allow the inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil
Code to be directly applied to an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain before this land satisfies the terms of a grant under Section
48 (b) of the PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the patrimonial character of
alienable and disposable public lands under the norms of the Civil Code is
rendered moot and academic.
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be given full application in considering
lands of the public domain. Top consideration should be accorded to the Philippine
Constitution, particularly its Article XII, followed by the consideration of applicable special
laws — the PLA and the PRD, insofar as this Decree applies to lands of the public domain.
The Civil Code and other general laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the
primary laws or to supply any of the latter's deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the classification of public lands as
alienable and disposable does not need to date back to June 12, 1945 at the latest, is
wrong because:
a. Under the Constitution's regalian doctrine, classification is a required step whose full
import should be given full effect and recognition; giving legal effect to possession prior
to classification runs counter to the regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from the time a public land is classified as alienable
and disposable; thus, Section 48 (b) of this law and the possession it requires cannot be
recognized prior to any classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession." Prior to the classification of a public land
as alienable and disposable, a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence,
any claimed possession cannot have legal effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under the Public Land Act; this legal reality renders the ponencia's absurdity
argument misplaced.
e. The alleged absurdity of the law addresses the wisdom of the law and is a matter for
the Legislature, not for this Court, to address.

From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all lands of the
public domain are owned by the State, an applicant for land registration
invoking Section 14 (2) of the PRD to support his claim must first clearly
show that the land has been withdrawn from the public domain through an
express and positive act of the government. 43
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for being based on legally-flawed
premises and for being an aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the very least,
the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an authority on the effective possession prior
to classification since this ruling, by the ponencia's own admission, is not necessary for
the resolution of the present case.

A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a particular land

from the mass of the public domain is provided both in the old and the
prevailing Public Land Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance ||| (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 244-326)
with the required possession of agricultural public land (under the first and
second PLAs) or alienable and disposable land of the public domain (under
the prevailing PLA) in the manner and duration provided by law is
equivalent to a government grant. Thus, the land ipso jure becomes private
land. It is only at that point that the "private land" requirement of Section
14 (2) materializes. 44

Prescription

In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia), I discussed

ordinary acquisitive prescription as an academic exercise to leave no stone
unturned in rejecting the ponencia's original conclusion that prescription
directly applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under Section 14 (2) of the PRD. I am happy to note that the present
ponencia has adopted, albeit without any attribution, part of my original
academic discussion on the application of the Civil Code, particularly on the
subjects of patrimonial property of the State and prescription.

Specifically, I posited — assuming arguendo that the Civil Code applies —

that the classification of a public land as alienable and disposable does not
per se signify that the land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since
property, to be patrimonial, must not be for public use, for public purpose
or for the development of national wealth. Something more must be done
or shown beyond the fact of classification. The ponencia now concedes
that "[T]here must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use or the
development of the national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code.And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public domain
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 182913. November 20, 2013.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO, FELIZA, NEMESIO,
ALBERTO, FELICIDAD, RICARDO, MILAGROS AND CIPRIANO, ALL SURNAMED
BACAS; EMILIANA CHABON, SATURNINO ABDON, ESTELA CHABON,
LACSASA DEMON, PEDRITA CHABON, FORTUNATA EMBALSADO, MINDA J.
CASTILLO, PABLO CASTILLO, ARTURO P. LEGASPI, and JESSIE I. LEGASPI,
respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks to review, reverse and set aside the November 12, 2007 Decision 1
and the May 15, 2008 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64142, upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
17, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC), which dismissed the consolidated cases of
Civil Case No. 3494, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Antonio, et al.
and Civil Case No. 5918, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Emiliana
Chabon, et al. Said civil cases were filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) for the cancellation and annulment of Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-358 and OCT No. O-669, covering certain parcels of land
occupied and utilized as part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation,
Misamis Oriental, presently the home of the 4th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army.
The Antecedents:
In 1938, Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon (Pres. Quezon)
issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31,
1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army three (3) parcels of the
public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then
Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The parcels of land were
withdrawn from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes,
"subject to private rights, if any there be."
Land Registration Case No. N-275
[Antonio, Feliza, Nemesio, Roberto,
and Felicidad, all surnamed Bacas,
and the Heirs of Jesus Bacas,
Applicants (The Bacases)]
The Bacases filed their Application for Registration 3 on November 12, 1964
covering a parcel of land, together with all the improvements found
thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, more particularly described
and bounded as follows: ICHDca
A parcel of land, Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C.
Record No. 1612, situated at Barrio Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan,
Province of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on the SE., along lines 1-2-3-4, by
Lot 4357 and along line 4-5, by Lot 3862; on the S., along line 5-6, by Lot
3892; on the W. and NW., along lines 6-7-8, by Lot 4318; on the NE., along
line 8-9, by Lot 4319, along line 9-10, by Lot 4353 and long line 10-11, by
Lot 4359; and on the SE., along line 11-1, by Lot 4356, all of Cagayan
Cadastre; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN (354,377) square meters, more or less,
under Tax Declaration No. 35436 and assessed at P3,540.00. 4
They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in their
application the names and addresses of the adjoining owners, as well as a
statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area) recently
occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance. 5
The Director of the Bureau of Lands, thru its Special Counsel, Benito S.
Urcia (Urcia), registered its written Opposition 6 against the application.
Later, Urcia, assisted by the District Land Officer of Cagayan de Oro City,
thru the Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, Pedro R.
Luspo (Luspo), filed an Amended Opposition. 7
On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the Bacases, the
Land Registration Court (LRC) rendered a decision 8 holding that the
applicants had conclusively established their ownership in fee simple over
the subject land and that their possession, including that of their
predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse, peaceful, uninterrupted,
and in concept of owners for more than forty (40) years.
No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC.
Thus, the decision became final and executory, resulting in the issuance of
a decree and the corresponding certificate of title over the subject
property.
Land Registration Case No.
N-521 [Emiliana Chabon,
Estela Chabon and Pedrita
Chabon, Applicants (The
Chabons)]
The Chabons filed their Application for Registration 9 on May 8, 1974 covering a parcel of
land located in Carmen-District, Cagayan de Oro City, known as Lot 4357, Cagayan
Cadastre, bounded and described as:
A parcel of land (Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, plan Ap-12445), situated in the District of
Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro. Bounded on the NE. by property of Potenciano Abrogan
vs. Republic of the Philippines (Public Land); on the SE. by properties of Geronimo Wabe
and Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; on the SW. by property of Teofilo Batifona or Batipura;
and on the NW. by property of Felipe Bacao or Bacas vs. Republic of the Philippines
(Public Land). Point "1" is N. 10 deg. 39'W., 379.88 M. from B.L.L.M. 14, Cagayan
Cadastre. Area SIXTY NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (69,632) SQUARE
METERS, more or less. 10
They alleged ownership in fee simple over the property and indicated therein the names
and addresses of the adjoining owners, but no mention was made with respect to the
occupation, if any, by the Philippine Army. The Chabons likewise alleged that, to the best
of their knowledge, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting said land with the
exception of 18,957 square meters sold to Minda J. Castillo and 1,000 square meters sold
and conveyed to Atty. Arturo R. Legaspi. 11
On February 18, 1976, there being no opposition made, even from the government,
hearing on the application ensued. The LRC then rendered a decision 12 holding that
Chabons' evidence established their ownership in fee simple over the subject property
and that their possession, including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been actual,
open, public, peaceful, adverse, continuous, and in concept of owners for more than
thirty (30) years. SHAcID
The decision then became final and executory. Thus, an order 13 for the issuance of a
decree and the corresponding certificate of title was issued.
The present cases
As a consequence of the LRC decisions in both applications for registration, the Republic
filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the Chabons before the
RTC. More specifically, on September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months from
the issuance of OCT No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of original
certificate of title, reconveyance of lot or damages was filed by the Republic against the
Bacases, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 3494. On the other hand, on April 21, 1978
or two (2) years and seven (7) months after issuance of OCT No. 0-669, the Republic filed
a civil case for annulment of title and reversion against the Chabons, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5918.
Civil Case No. 3494 against the Bacases
The Republic claimed in its petition for annulment before the RTC 14 that the certificate
of title issued in favor of the Bacases was null and void because they fraudulently omitted
to name the military camp as the actual occupant in their application for registration.
Specifically, the Republic, through the Fourth Military Area, was the actual occupant of
Lot No. 4354 and also the owner and possessor of the adjoining Lots Nos. 4318 15 and
4357. Further, the Bacases failed to likewise state that Lot No. 4354 was part of Camp
Evangelista. These omissions constituted fraud which vitiated the decree and certificate
of title issued.
Also, the Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in 1938 for
military purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it was no longer disposable and
subject to registration. 16
Civil Case No. 5918 against the Chabons
In this case, the Republic claimed that it was the absolute owner and possessor of Lot No.
4357. The said lot, together with Lots 4318 17 and 4354, formed part of the military
reservation known as Camp Evangelista in Cagayan de Oro City, which was set aside and
reserved under Presidential Proclamation No. 265 issued by President Quezon on March
31, 1938. 18
In its petition for annulment before the RTC, 19 the Republic alleged that OCT No. 0-669
issued in favor of the Chabons and all transfer certificates of titles, if any, proceeding
therefrom, were null and void for having been vitiated by fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction.
20 The Chabons concealed that the fact that Lot 4357 was part of Camp Evangelista and
that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was its actual occupant
and possessor. 21 Further, Lot 4357 was a military reservation, established as such as
early as March 31, 1938 and, thus, could not be the subject of registration or private
appropriation. 22 As a military reservation, it was beyond the commerce of man and the
registration court did not have any jurisdiction to adjudicate the same as private
property. 23
Decision of the Regional Trial Court
As the facts and issues in both cases were substantially the same and
identical, and the pieces of evidence adduced were applicable to both, the
cases were consolidated and jointly tried. Thereafter, a joint decision
dismissing the two complaints of the Republic was rendered. aHCSTD
In dismissing the complaints, the RTC explained that the stated fact of
occupancy by Camp Evangelista over certain portions of the subject lands
in the applications for registration by the respondents was a substantial
compliance with the requirements of the law. 24 It would have been
absurd to state Camp Evangelista as an adjoining owner when it was
alleged that it was an occupant of the land. 25 Thus, the RTC ruled that the
respondents did not commit fraud in filing their applications for
registration.
Moreover, the RTC was of the view that the Republic was then given all the
opportunity to be heard as it filed its opposition to the applications,
appeared and participated in the proceedings. It was, thus, estopped from
contesting the proceedings.
The RTC further reasoned out that assuming arguendo that respondents
were guilty of fraud, the Republic lost its right to a relief for its failure to file
a petition for review on the ground of fraud within one (1) year after the
date of entry of the decree of registration. 26 Consequently, it would now
be barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC. 27
Finally, the RTC agreed with the respondents that the subject parcels of
land were exempted from the operation and effect of the Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 pursuant to a proviso therein that the same would
not apply to lands with existing "private rights." The presidential
proclamation did not, and should not, apply to the respondents because
they did not apply to acquire the parcels of land in question from the
government, but simply for confirmation and affirmation of their rights to
the properties so that the titles over them could be issued in their favor. 28
What the proclamation prohibited was the sale or disposal of the parcels of
land involved to private persons as a means of acquiring ownership of the
same, through the modes provided by law for the acquisition of disposable
public lands. 29
The Republic filed its Notice of Appeal before the RTC on July 5, 1991. On
the other hand, the Bacases and the Chabons filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
the Issuance of the Writ of Execution and Possession on July 16, 1991. An
amended motion was filed on July 31, 1991. The RTC then issued the Order,
30 dated February 24, 1992, disapproving the Republic's appeal for failure
to perfect it as it failed to notify the Bacases and granting the writ of
execution. HESAIT
Action of the Court of
Appeals and the Court
regarding the Republic's
Appeal
The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal on April 1, 1992 from the February 24,
1992 of the RTC. The same was denied in the RTC Order, 31 dated April 23,
1992. The Republic moved for its reconsideration but the RTC was still
denied it on July 8, 1992. 32
Not satisfied, the Republic filed a petition before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 28647, entitled Republic vs. Hon. Cesar M. Ybañez, 33
questioning the February 24, 1992 Order of the RTC denying its appeal in
Civil Case No. 3494. The CA sustained the government and, accordingly,
annulled the said RTC order.
The respondents appealed to the Court, which later found no commission
of a reversible error on the part of the CA. Accordingly, the Court dismissed
the appeal as well as the subsequent motions for reconsideration. An entry
of judgment was then issued on February 16, 1995. 34
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appeal allowed, the CA docketed the case as CA G.R. CV No. 64142.
On November 12, 2007, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It explained
that once a decree of registration was issued under the Torrens system and
the reglementary period had passed within which the decree may be
questioned, the title was perfected and could not be collaterally
questioned later on. 35 Even assuming that an action for the nullification of
the original certificate of title may still be instituted, the review of a decree
of registration under Section 38 of Act No. 496 [Section 32 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529] would only prosper upon proof that the
registration was procured through actual fraud, 36 which proceeded from
an intentional deception perpetrated through the misrepresentation or the
concealment of a material fact. 37 The CA stressed that "[t]he fraud must be actual and
extrinsic, not merely constructive or intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant, because the proceedings which are
assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings which by law, are presumed to
have been fair and regular." 38
Citing the rule that "[t]he fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day
in court and, thus, prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in
the name of the applicant," 39 the CA found that there was none. The CA agreed with the
RTC that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. The
allegation of the respondent that Camp Evangelista occupied portions of their property
negated the complaint that they committed misrepresentation or concealment
amounting to fraud. 40 STcHEI
As regards the issue of exemption from the proclamation, the CA deemed that a
discussion was unnecessary because the LRC already resolved it. The CA stressed that the
proceeding was one in rem, thereby binding everyone to the legal effects of the same and
that a decree of registration that had become final should be deemed conclusive not only
on the questions actually contested and determined, but also upon all matters that might
be litigated or decided in the land registration proceeding. 41
Not in conformity, the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on
May 15, 2008 for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
GROUNDS RELIED UPON
WARRANTING REVIEW OF THE
PETITION
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
FILED BY RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF INDICATING ALL THE ADJOINING OWNERS OF THE
PARCELS OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE A REGISTRABLE RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND WHICH
ARE WITHIN THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION.
3. IN G.R. NO. 157306 ENTITLED "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANATALIA ACTUB TIU
ESTONILO, ET AL.," WHICH INVOLVES PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING RIGHTS OVER
PORTIONS OF THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION, THIS HONORABLE
COURT HELD THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS COULD NOT HAVE VALIDLY OCCUPIED THEIR
CLAIMED LOTS BECAUSE THE SAME WERE CONSIDERED INALIENABLE FROM THE TIME OF
THEIR RESERVATION IN 1938. HERE, THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE BEING SUSTAINED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT IN APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION FILED IN 1964 AND 1974.
VERILY, THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE HEREIN ASSAILED DECISION DATED
NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED MAY 15, 2008, HAS DECIDED THAT
INSTANT CONTROVERSY IN A MANNER THAT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
42
Position of the Republic
In advocacy of its position, the Republic principally argues that (1) the CA erred in holding
that the LRC acquired jurisdiction over the applications for registration of the reserved
public lands filed by the respondents; and (2) the respondents do not have a registrable
right over the subject parcels of land which are within the Camp Evangelista Military
Reservation.
With respect to the first argument, the Republic cites Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529, which
requires that applicants for land registration must disclose the names of the occupants of
the land and the names and addresses of the owners of the adjoining properties. The
respondents did not comply with that requirement which was mandatory and
jurisdictional. Citing Pinza v. Aldovino, 43 it asserts that the LRC had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case. Moreover, such omission constituted fraud or willful
misrepresentation. The respondents cannot invoke the indefeasibility of the titles issued
since a "grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation is null and void
and of no effect whatsoever." 44 DTIaCS
On the second argument, the Republic points out that Presidential Proclamation No. 265
reserved for the use of the Philippine Army certain parcels of land which included Lot No.
4354 and Lot No. 4357. Both lots were, however, allowed to be registered. Lot No. 4354
was registered as OCT No. 0-0358 and Lot No. 4357 as OCT No. O-669.
The Republic asserts that being part of the military reservation, these lots are inalienable
and cannot be the subject of private ownership. Being so, the respondents do not have
registrable rights over them. Their possession of the land, however long, could not ripen
into ownership, and they have not shown proof that they were entitled to the land before
the proclamation or that the said lots were segregated and withdrawn as part thereof.
Position of the Respondents

The Bacases
The Bacases anchor their opposition to the postures of the Republic on
three principal arguments:
First, there was no extrinsic fraud committed by the Bacases in their failure
to indicate Camp Evangelista as an adjoining lot owner as their application
for registration substantially complied with the legal requirements. More
importantly, the Republic was not prejudiced and deprived of its day in
court.
Second, the LRC had jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the Bacases had
"private rights" over Lot No. 4354 in accordance with, and therefore
exempt from the coverage of, Presidential Proclamation No. 265, as well as
to determine whether such private rights constituted registrable title under
the land registration law.
Third, the issue of the registrability of the title of the Bacases over Lot No.
4354 is res judicata and cannot now be subject to a re-litigation or
reopening in the annulment proceedings. 45
Regarding the first ground, the Bacases stress that there was no extrinsic
fraud because their application substantially complied with the
requirements when they indicated that Camp Evangelista was an occupant
by mere tolerance of Lot No. 4354. Also, the Republic filed its opposition to
the respondents' application and actively participated in the land
registration proceedings by presenting evidence, through the Director of
Lands, who was represented by the Solicitor General. The Republic,
therefore, was not deprived of its day in court or prevented from
presenting its case. Its insistence that the non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529 is an argument that is at once
both empty and dangerous. 46
On jurisdiction, the Bacases assert that even in the case of Republic v.
Estonilo, 47 it was recognized in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 that the
reservation was subject to private rights. In other words, the LRC had
authority to hear and adjudicate their application for registration of title
over Lot No. 4354 if they would be able to prove that their private rights
under the presidential proclamation constituted registrable title over the
said lot. They claim that there is completely no basis for the Republic to
argue that the LRC had no jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate their
application for registration of their title to Lot No. 4354 just because the
proclamation withdrew the subject land from sale and settlement and
reserved the same for military purposes. They cited the RTC statement that
"the parcels of land they applied for in those registration proceedings and
for which certificates of title were issued in their favor are precisely
exempted from the operation and effect of said presidential proclamation
when the very same proclamation in itself made a proviso that the same
will not apply to lands with existing 'private rights' therein." 48
The Bacases claim that the issue of registrability is no longer an issue as
what is only to be resolved is the question on whether there was extrinsic
or collateral fraud during the land registration proceedings. There would be
no end to litigation on the registrability of their title if questions of facts or
law, such as, whether or not Lot No. 4354 was alienable and disposable
land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement
and reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No.
265; whether or not their predecessors-in-interest had prior possession of
the lot long before the issuance of the proclamation or the establishment
of Camp Evangelista in the late 1930's; whether or not such possession was
held in the concept of an owner to constitute recognizable "private rights"
under the presidential proclamation; and whether or not such private
rights constitute registrable title to the lot in accordance with the land
registration law, which had all been settled and duly adjudicated by the LRC
in favor of the Bacases, would be re-examined under this annulment case.
49
The issue of registrability of the Bacases' title had long been settled by the
LRC and is res judicata between the Republic and the respondents. The
findings of the LRC became final when the Republic did not appeal its
decision within the period to appeal or file a petition to reopen or review
the decree of registration within one year from entry thereof. 50
To question the findings of the court regarding the registrability of then
title over the land would be an attempt to reopen issues already barred by
res judicata. As correctly held by the RTC, it is estopped and barred by prior
judgment to contest the findings of the LRC. 51
The Chabons
In traversing the position of the Republic, the Chabons insist that the CA
was correct when it stated that there was substantial compliance 52 with
the requirements of the P.D. No. 1529 because they expressly stated in their application
that Camp Evangelista was occupying a portion of it. It is contrary to reason or common
sense to state that Camp Evangelista is an adjoining owner when it is occupying a portion
thereof.
And as to the decision, it was a consequence of a proceeding in rem and, therefore, the
decree of registration is binding and conclusive against all persons including the Republic
who did not appeal the same. It is now barred forever to question the validity of the title
issued. Besides, res judicata has set in because there is identity of parties, subject matter
and cause of action. 53
The Chabons also assailed the proclamation because when it was issued, they were
already the private owners of the subject parcels of land and entitled to protection under
the Constitution. The taking of their property in the guise of a presidential proclamation is
not only oppressive and arbitrary but downright confiscatory. 54
The Issues
The ultimate issues to be resolved are: 1) whether or not the decisions of the LRC over
the subject lands can still be questioned; and 2) whether or not the applications for
registration of the subject parcels of land should be allowed. cDEHIC
The Court's Ruling
The Republic can question even
final and executory judgment
when there was fraud.
The governing rule in the application for registration of lands at that time was Section 21
of Act 496 55 which provided for the form and content of an application for registration,
and it reads:
Section 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by applicant, or by
some person duly authorized in his behalf. . . . It shall also state the name in full and the
address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all adjoining owners and
occupants, if known; and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find
them. . . .
The reason behind the law was explained in the case of Fewkes vs. Vasquez, 56 where it
was written:
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is
required to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding,
the name, status and address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps
taken to locate them. When the application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then
that notice (of the hearing), addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the
lot being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the location, boundaries and
technical description of the land being registered, shall be published in the Official
Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing that is
considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration
cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the
land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the
court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all
persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come
forward and show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be
granted.
Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the
Philippine Army. They also did not indicate any efforts or searches they had exerted in
determining other occupants of the land. Such omission constituted fraud and deprived
the Republic of its day in court. Not being notified, the Republic was not able to file its
opposition to the application and, naturally, it was not able to file an appeal either.
The Republic can also question
a final and executory judgment
when the LRC had no
jurisdiction over the land in
question
With respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged
that Camp Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from
questioning the validity of the title.
The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual
and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing registration is null and
void. In Collado v. Court of Appeals and the Republic, 57 the Court declared that any title
to an inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities attending the
filing of the petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the LRC never
acquired jurisdiction over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the property
are null and void and, hence, did not create any legal effect. A judgment by a court
without jurisdiction can never attain finality. 58 In Collado, the Court made the following
citation: IAEcCT
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public
domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in favor of
private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the
name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period
provided for by the Statute of Limitations. 59
Prescription or estoppel cannot
lie against the government
In denying the petition of the Republic, the CA reasoned out that 1) once a
decree of registration is issued under the Torrens system and the
reglementary period has passed within which the decree may be
questioned, the title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned
later on; 60 2) there was no commission of extrinsic fraud because the
Bacases' allegation of Camp Evangelista's occupancy of their property
negated the argument that they committed misrepresentation or
concealment amounting to fraud; 61 and 3) the Republic did not appeal the
decision and because the proceeding was one in rem, it was bound to the
legal effects of the decision.
Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the
doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-
settled rule that the Republic or its government is not estopped by mistake
or error on the part of its officials or agents. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
62 it was written:
In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine
of estoppel cannot operate against the State. "It is a well-settled rule in our
jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually not estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents (Manila Lodge No. 761
vs. CA, 73 SCRA 166, 186; Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, 244; Luciano
vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769).
Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to
Perpetuo Alpuerto and his successors-interest pursuant to Section 101 of
the Public Land Act. Such title has not become indefeasible, for prescription
cannot be invoked against the State (Republic vs. Animas, supra).
The subject lands, being part of
a military reservation, are
inalienable and cannot be the
subjects of land registration
proceedings
The application of the Bacases and the Chabons were filed on November
12, 1964 and May 8, 1974, respectively. Accordingly, the law governing the
applications was Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, 63 as amended by RA
1942, 64 particularly Sec. 48 (b) which provided that: cDACST
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
As can be gleaned therefrom, the necessary requirements for the grant of
an application for land registration are the following:
1. The applicant must, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
have been in possession and occupation of the subject land;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application; and
4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, in 1938, President Quezon issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, reserving for
the use of the Philippine Army parcels of the public domain situated in the
barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis
Oriental. The subject parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or
settlement or reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."
65
Such power of the President to segregate lands was provided for in Section 64 (e) of the
old Revised Administrative Code and C.A. No. 141 or the Public Land Act. Later, the power
of the President was restated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative
Code. When a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes inalienable
and outside the commerce of man. 66 It may not be the subject of a contract or of a
compromise agreement. 67 A property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the
part of the government to withdraw it from being such. 68 In the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals and De Jesus, 69 it was even stated that:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them
can be acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a
parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of
protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law,
issues a proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart
therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by a person who
was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for
lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void.
Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting "private rights." In Republic
v. Estonilo, 70 where the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4318 was part of the Camp
Evangelista Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso in
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights
as meaning that persons claiming rights over the reserved land were not precluded from
proving their claims. Stated differently, the said proviso did not preclude the LRC from
determining whether or not the respondents indeed had registrable rights over the
property.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from
the military reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were
alienable and disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and
settlement and reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No.
265. The question is of primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can
in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens
system. Without first determining the nature and character of the land, all the other
requirements such as the length and nature of possession and occupation over such land
do not come into play. The required length of possession does not operate when the land
is part of the public domain. TECIaH
In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the
proclamation, the subject lands were already private lands. They merely relied on such
"recognition" of possible private rights. In their application, they alleged that at the time
of their application, 71 they had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject parcels of land for at least thirty (30) years and became its
owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation or showing that the
government had earlier declared it open for sale or settlement, or that it was already
pronounced as inalienable and disposable.
It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto converted into a
patrimonial or private property by the mere possession and occupation by an individual
over a long period of time. In the case of Diaz v. Republic, 72 it was written:
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established
as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to
its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon
of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession
is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While
grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to
show possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without
substantial enclosures, or other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a
claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long
the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because
the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
[Emphases supplied]
In the recent case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 73 the
Court emphasized that fundamental is the rule that lands of the public domain, unless
declared otherwise by virtue of a statute or law, are inalienable and can never be
acquired by prescription. No amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen into
ownership over lands of the public domain. All lands of the public domain presumably
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated
or disposed. 74
Another recent case, Diaz v. Republic, 75 also held that possession even for
more than 30 years cannot ripen into ownership. 76 Possession is of no
moment if applicants fail to sufficiently and satisfactorily show that the
subject lands over which an application was applied for was indeed an
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. It would
not matter even if they declared it for tax purposes. In Republic v. Heirs of
Juan Fabio, 77 the rule was reiterated. Thus:
Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared
alienable and disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the concept
of an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the
Lot for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents' predecessors-
in-interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable
from the time of its declaration as a military reservation in 1904. Therefore,
respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot
is alienable and disposable.
Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable
land remain part of the inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of
sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable
and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the
public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529
and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no
need to discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents' occupation
and possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner.
While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution
of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and in line with the ideal
of social justice, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the grant of
such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the prejudice of the
national patrimony. We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards
relative to the registration of imperfect titles. [Emphases Supplied]
important that applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must present
specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general
statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.
It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving that they
have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of opposition from the government
does not relieve them of this burden. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the
appellate courts to hold that the failure of the government to dislodge respondents,
judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject land since 1954 already amounted to a title.
[Emphases supplied]
The ruling reiterated the long standing rule in the case of Director, Lands Management
Bureau v. Court of Appeals, 79
. . . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the
Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the
satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no
opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts
presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which
he is attempting to have registered. IEDaAc
The Court is not unmindful of the principle of immutability of judgments, that nothing is
more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. 80 Such principle, however, must yield to the basic rule that a
decision which is null and void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not a decision in
contemplation of law and can never become final and executory. 81
Had the LRC given primary importance on the status of the land and not merely relied on
the testimonial evidence of the respondents without other proof of the alienability of the
land, the litigation would have already been ended and finally settled in accordance with
law and jurisprudence a long time ago.

In Estonilo, 78 where the Court ruled that persons claiming the protection
of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military reservations
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the properties in question
had been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands, the
respondents therein failed to clearly prove that the lands over which they
lay a claim were alienable and disposable so that the same belonged and
continued to belong to the State and could not be subject to the commerce
of man or registration. Specifically, the Court wrote:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 12, 2007 Decision and the May 15,
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64142 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Judgement is rendered declaring the proceedings in the Land Registration
Court as NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Original Certificate of Title
Nos. 0-358 and 0-669 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City are
CANCELLED. Lot No. 4354 and Lot No. 4357 are ordered reverted to the public domain.
SO ORDERED.

Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Abad and Leonen, JJ., concur.
or by grant, belongs to the State as part of the public domain. For this
reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous ||| (Republic v. Bacas, G.R. No. 182913, [November 20, 2013], 721 PHIL 808-838)
scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted. In the same manner,
persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their
lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the pieces of property in question have been acquired by a
legal method of acquiring public lands.

In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the

trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations
presented by the former. However, while the tax declarations were issued
under the names of respondents' predecessors-in-interest, the earliest one
presented was issued only in 1954. 19 The Director, Lands Management
Bureau v. CA 20 held thus:

". . . . Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership. They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of
Lands vs. Santiago:

'. . . [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago,
had been in possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for
taxation purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of
Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership
for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the
property.'"

In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by

Calixto and Rosendo Bacas, from whom respondents' predecessors had
purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior possession, though,
was totally devoid of any supporting evidence on record. Respondents'
evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since "time immemorial."

Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the

evidence on record merely established the transfer of the property from
Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo. The evidence did not show the nature
and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas. It is
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 173423. March 5, 2014.]
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by the
petitioners, spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision
dated May 16, 2005 2 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and set
aside the decision dated May 7, 2001 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No.
2372.
THE BACKGROUND FACTS
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration
of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo.
Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was filed with the RTC
and docketed as LRC No. 2372.
The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by
Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children,
Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated
August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor
of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May
23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed
of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.
The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and
submitted as evidence the lot's survey plan, technical description, and
certificate of assessment. cSEAHa
Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed
the application, 5 it did not present any evidence in support of its
opposition. Since no private opposition to the registration was filed, the
RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the
whole world, except the Republic. 6
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, 7 the RTC granted the application for
registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the
spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession, including that of their
predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has been
open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the
concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50) years." 8
The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the
spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the
government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortuna's evidence — Tax
Declaration No. 8366 — showed that possession over the lot dates back
only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period
provided under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree (PRD).
In its decision dated May 16, 2005, 9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish
the alienable and disposable nature of the land, 10 they failed to show that
they complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e.,
since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic's argument that Tax
Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortuna's predecessor-
in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of the land
only since 1948.
The CA denied the spouses Fortuna's motion for reconsideration of its
decision in its resolution dated June 27, 2006. 11
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA
rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title
over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was
removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession should be since June
12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14 (1) of the
PRD. 12
The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and
published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on
January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Court's ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et
al., 13 they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May
24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already
satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora's
possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.
They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not
contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to
present documentary evidence proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by
Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the Provincial Assessor's Office, who testified that the
records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War II. IcESaA
Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses
Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even
before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new
tax declaration. Second, the annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366
states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]" 14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366
was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in
1947, indicating that there was already an owner and possessor of the lot before 1948.
Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373
was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098, 15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject
Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a place a few
meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her way
to school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because the latter's
family had constructed a house and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned
the area. On the basis of Macaria's testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC
No. 2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortuna's application for registration of Lot Nos.
4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of January 3, 2005. 16 The RTC's decision has
lapsed into finality unappealed.
The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria's testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be
considered to prove Pastora's possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373 is a
separate registration proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot
No. 4457, and belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure to
present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC No. 2372, the spouses Fortuna
said "it was only after the reception of evidence . . . that [they] were able to trace and
establish the identity and competency of Macaria[.]" 17
Commenting on the spouses Fortuna's petition, the Republic relied mostly on the CA's
ruling which denied the registration of title and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.
DEScaT
THE COURT'S RULING
We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their
compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public
domain.
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and
disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State. 18
Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands, mineral
lands, and national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated. 19 Public land that has
not been classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived
through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the
land. The PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable public lands,
specifically, Sections 11 and 48 (b), will find application only from the time that a public
land has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable.
Under Section 6 of the PLA, 20 the classification and the reclassification of public lands
are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential
proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or
excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and
declare such land as alienable and disposable. 21 Accordingly, jurisprudence has required
that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a public land grant must
present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the
notation in the survey plan, 22 which states:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C.
Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military
reservation. 23
It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there
is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title previously
issued for the subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find that neither of the
above documents is evidence of a positive act from the government
reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the
covered properties' alienable and disposable character. 25 These notations,
at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area per
verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant,
however, must also present a copy of the original classification of the land
into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as
proclaimed by the President. 26 In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, 27 the
Court ruled that
[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO 28 or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and
disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the
President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the
President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public
land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these
documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land
as alienable and disposable. 29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been
reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a
positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortuna's claim of
title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the
alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient
ground to deny the petition and terminate the case, we deem it proper to
continue to address the other important legal issues raised in the petition.
caIEAD
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of
alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of
the public domain may be disposed of, among others, by judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition of
title is governed by Section 48 (b) of the PLA, the original version of which
states:
Sec. 48.  The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b)  Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since
July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[emphasis supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-
year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as amended by
RA No. 1942, read:
(b)  Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least
thirty years, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by requiring
possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4.  The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years — from 1945 up to its
enactment in 1977 — is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of applicants
who had complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942
amendment, but whose possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12,
1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in
Abejaron v. Nabasa 30 that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-
interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of their
imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48 (b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was
considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from
January 25, 1977 — the effectivity date of PD No. 1073. cdll
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted; based
on the certification from the National Printing Office, 31 PD No. 1073 was published in
Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977.
This uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications for judicial
confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. 32 that
the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature." 33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073
should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on
May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA to May 8,
1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at
least since May 8, 1947.
The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove
that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May
8, 1947
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain, the spouses Fortuna's application for registration of title would
still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8,
1947.
The spouses Fortuna's allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax Declaration
No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax Declaration No.
8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed
the land prior to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration
No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner that was subscribed on October 23,
1947. 34 While these circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none
proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the tax
declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the nature of Pastora's
possession. Notably, Section 48 (b) of the PLA speaks of possession and occupation.
"Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is
not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession.
Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession
must not be a mere fiction." 35 Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora
exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land.
Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal." 36
The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366 by relying
on Macaria's testimony in a separate land registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria
alleged that she passed by Pastora's lots on her way to school, and she saw
Pastora's family construct a house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the
area. However, the Court is not convinced that Macaria's testimony
constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases
of this nature.

The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of
land, all of which are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora.
These parcels of land were covered by three separate applications for
registration, to wit: ScAIaT

a.  LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961
sq.m., commenced by Emeteria;

b.  LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total
area of 4,006 sq.m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and

c.  LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total
area of 2,597 sq.m.

As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the
same predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final
rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, 37 upholding Pastora's ownership, be
taken into account in resolving the present case.

Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have
previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq.m. This is too big an area for the
Court to consider that Pastora's claimed acts of possession and occupation
(as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the lots. Given the
size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could
competently assess and declare that its entirety belonged to Pastora
because she saw acts of possession and occupation in what must have
been but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described
Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring
to Lot No. 4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on
her properties.

The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding
Pastora's possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the
spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and
2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially reclassified as
alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature and duration of
Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to
convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or consider their
merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De los
Santos: 38

Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no
less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would
be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize
with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted,
they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in
this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for
viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that
lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as dominus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and
the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio
and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of title on the basis of the
grounds discussed above. Costs against the spouses Fortuna. LLpr

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

||| (Spouses Fortuna v. Republic, G.R. No. 173423, [March 5, 2014])

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133168. March 28, 2006.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 1 vs. BENJAMIN GUERRERO,
respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is the decision 2 dated February 12, 1998 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50298 affirming an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-3899, entitled
"Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero, Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City."
The assailed decision of the CA recites the facts as follows:
Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the
Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales
Application No. V-83191 covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin,
Quezon City, consisting of 256 square meters. Upon favorable report and
recommendation of the District Land Officer, Guerrero's application was
approved per Order of Award (Exhibit "B"), with the boundaries of the land
awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-Culiat Creek; E-
Road; and W-Public Land. A sketch of the land awarded is contained at the
back of the Order of Award.
Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982
was issued in favor of respondent. Pursuant thereto the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982.
On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau
of Lands claiming that respondent obtained the sales patent through fraud,
false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering that
174 square meters awarded to respondent covered the land where her
house is situated and where she has been residing since 1961.
A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which
the Director of Lands issued an order dismissing the protest of Angelina Z.
Bustamante. The dismissal of the protest was affirmed by the then Minister
of Natural Resources and by the Office of the President in a Decision dated
July 22, 1985.
Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated July
22, 1985. Acting on the motion for reconsideration, the President, . . .,
ordered that the case be remanded to the DENR [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources] for the latter's office to conduct an
ocular investigation and resurvey of the disputed area. The said directive is
contained in the Order dated October 30, 1987 (Exhibit "J").
Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation
and relocation survey was conducted by the DENR. A report (Exhibit "K")
was thereafter submitted with a finding that 83 square meters of the titled
property of Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under ACTUAL
PHYSICAL POSSESSION of Marcelo Bustamante (husband of Angelina
Bustamante) with only 91 square meters under the physical possession of
Guerrero. It was also found out that OCT No. 0-28 is supposed to be
traversed by a road 3 meters wide, as even the Order of Award in favor of
Guerrero, shows by the boundaries of the land indicated therein, viz:
bounded on the N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801, S-Culiat Creek, E-Road and W-
Public Land.
On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the
[DENR] Ocular Investigation and Relocation Survey Report (Exhibit "K") . . .,
issued an order directing the DENR to implement the . . . Report for the
'proper correction' of the technical description of the land covered by OCT
No. 0-28 issued to respondent.
Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of
Lands [on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines] instituted the instant
action [Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT
No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero] on November 7, 1989.
On April 6, 1990, the [respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to
dismiss the petition . . ., alleging among other things, that the RTC of
Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the Director of Lands' petition
and that the said petition was defective in form and substance, inasmuch
as it failed to name [Guerrero] who holds a certificate of title (OCT No. 0-
28) over the properties subject of the petition, as respondent in the action,
and that the title sought to be amended was irrevocable and can no longer be
questioned.
In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss for lack
of merit. Trial of the petition followed with the Director of Lands, on one hand, and
[Guerrero], on the other, presenting their respective evidence and witnesses. 3 [Words in
bracket added.] AcEIHC
On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to prove its
allegation that respondent obtained the sales patent and the certificate of title through
fraud and misrepresentation, rendered judgment finding for the latter. The trial court
likewise ruled that the original certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) in the name of
respondent acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of one (1)
year from the entry of the decree of registration.
Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a decision dated
February 12, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, rationalizing as follows:
It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving
public lands is as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued upon
private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The effect of registration
of a homestead or any other similar patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the
patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if
ownership had been determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is
absolutely conclusive and indisputable.
In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be reviewed or reopened
within one year after the entry thereof, upon a charge of actual fraud, a patent awarded
in accordance with the Public Land Law may be reviewed within one year from the date
of the order for the issuance of the patent also on the ground of actual fraud.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . there is no showing . . . that at the time the [respondent] applied for his miscellaneous
sales patent, there were third persons who had been in occupation of the land applied
for. While subsequent survey documents, prepared as a consequence of the protest filed
by the Bustamentes, report the possession of the Bustamantes of a portion of the land,
and the erection of their house thereon, these reports do not indicate if such structures
were existing at the time the application of the [respondent] was filed in 1964.
There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent] was guilty of
actual fraud in the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent, and subsequently, OCT
No. 0-28. 4 (Words in bracket added)
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied by the appellate court in its resolution of March 23, 1998. 5
Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the appellate court erred in
holding —
I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is
conclusive and indefeasible despite the fact that respondent's title was procured through
fraud and misrepresentation.
II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent was guilty of actual fraud in
the acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent despite the final ruling of the Office of
the President from which ruling respondent did not appeal.
III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of possession of a third person of the
land, or a portion thereof, after the award and issuance of the patent to the applicant
despite the obvious fact that the protest was filed within one year from the issuance of
patent. 6
Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and certificate of title
through fraud and misrepresentation. To support its basic posture, petitioner points to
the verification survey conducted by Engr. Ernesto Erive of the DENR, which, to petitioner,
argues for the proposition that respondent's entitlement to a public land award should
have been limited to a 91-square meter area instead of the 174 square meters eventually
granted.
On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he secured
pursuant to a sales patent is conclusive and indefeasible under the Torrens system of
registration. As such, his title can no longer be altered, impugned or cancelled.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this Petition — the
presence of fraud — is factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual
matters, as only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court. And as the Court has consistently held, factual findings of trial courts,
when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this Court, 7 save
when the judgment of the appellate court is based on a misapprehension of facts or
factual inferences manifestly incorrect or when that court overlooked certain relevant
facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 8 Obviously,
petitioner is invoking these exceptions toward having the Court review the factual
determinations of the CA.
The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has proven
by clear and convincing evidence that respondent procured Miscellaneous
Sales Patent (MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 through fraud and
misrepresentation. ISEHTa
It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands
of the public domain and disposed of via a miscellaneous sales
arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land
were brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or
the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the Torrens system of
registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of
title to attest to the fact that the person named is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. 9 As it were, the
Torrens system aims to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the
public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to
dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of
the registered owner, the system gives him complete peace of mind that
he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily
disposed of any right over the covered land. 10
Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands . . . belonging to the Government of the
[Republic of the Philippines] are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons
or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall
be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or
conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument before
its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the
province where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds
and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other
cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate certificate issued to the
grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the
Government shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but
shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee
and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make
registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and
affect the land, and in all cases under this Act registration shall be made in
the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. . . . .
(Words in bracket added)
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and
becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens
certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the
person whose name appears thereon. 11
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person
deprived of land to institute an action to reopen or revise a decree of
registration obtained by actual fraud. Section 38 of Act No. 496 says so:
SEC. 38. . . . . Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the [Republic of
the Philippines] and all the branches thereof, . . . . Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, minority, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees, subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of the land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a petition for review of the decree of
registration within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said
term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance
with this section shall be incontrovertible. . . . . (Emphasis and words in
bracket supplied)
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud
proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is
construed as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests
and public or private confidence, even though the act is not done with an
actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons. 12
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic
where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original
action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of
their day in court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property
registered in the name of the applicant. 13
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had been
accepted and is contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of
registration. Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the
fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in
fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in
deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose
an application; or in misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by
the applicant causing the former to withdraw his application. In all these examples, the
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented
a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is
one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. 14
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the
alleged fraud goes into the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and has been
controverted and decided. Thus, we have underscored the denial of relief where it
appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation at the trial of a supposed forged
document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent
compromise agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel
which prevented the petitioner from properly presenting the case. 15
Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of
the decree constitute actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced adequate evidence
that would show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the
patent and the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that
it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly
presenting its case by reason of such fraud. In fact, other than its peremptory statement
in its petition filed before the trial court that "the patentee, Benjamin Guerrero, obtained
the above indicated sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission
of material facts," 16 petitioner did not specifically allege how fraud was perpetrated by
respondent in procuring the sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor was any evidence
proffered to substantiate the allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of
petitioner to prove it defeats it own cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the
burden of proof. 17 The circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who
perpetrate it in each case. It may assume different shapes and forms; it may be
committed in as many different ways. 18 Thus, the law requires that fraud be established,
not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence. 19
Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report 20 which stated that respondent
Guerrero was entitled to only 91 square meters of the subject lot instead of 174 square
meters which was awarded to him. There is, however, no proof that the area eventually
awarded to respondent was intentionally and fraudulently increased. It was never proven
that respondent was a party to any fraud that led to the award of a bigger area of 174
square meters instead of 91 square meters. Petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof
of any error which may have been committed by its agents who had surveyed the subject
property nor had petitioner offered a sensible explanation as to the reason for such
discrepancy. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
must be respected.
This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the subject lot
was made in accordance with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. 21 Under Section 91 thereof, an
investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the veracity of the
material facts set out in the application. 22 The law also requires sufficient notice to the
municipality and barrio where the land is located in order to give adverse claimants the
opportunity to present their claims. 23
In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day after respondent
filed his miscellaneous sales application, an actual investigation and site verification of the
parcel of land was conducted by Land Investigator Alfonso Tumbocon who reported that
the land was free from claims and conflicts. 24 Likewise, the notice of sale of the lot in
question was posted at the District Land Office in San Miguel, Manila, at the Quezon City
Hall, and at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City for 30 consecutive days from February 17, 1965 to
March 17, 1965 which was the date scheduled for the sale of the lot. The said notice was
worded as follows:
If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at the Bureau of Lands,
Manila on or before the date of the sale; otherwise such claim shall forever be barred. 25
Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the "Issuance of Patent"
27 dated June 28, 1982 were both duly signed by the Director of Lands. The "Order of
Award" even declared that Guerrero has in good faith established his residence on the
land in question. On the other hand, the "Issuance of Patent" stated that the land
consisting of 174 square meters is free from any adverse claim and that Guerrero has fully
paid the purchase price of the lot. Having complied with all the requirements of the law
preliminary to the issuance of the patent, respondent was thus issued MSP No. 8991
dated August 16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding OCT No. 0-28 was issued on August
27, 1982 in the name of respondent Guerrero.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have
regularly performed their official duties. Thus, the proceedings for land
registration that led to the issuance of MSP No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 in
respondent's name are presumptively regular and proper. To overturn this
legal presumption will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate
the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would
reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless
verbiage. 28 Besides, this presumption of regularity has not been overcome
by the evidence presented by petitioner. We, therefore, cannot sustain
petitioner's contention that fraud tainted the sales patent granted to
respondent Guerrero, as well as the certificate of title issued in
consequence thereof.
Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner
failed to avail itself of the remedy within the prescribed period. Under
Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration must be filed within one year from the date of entry
of said decree.
In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period
commences from the issuance of the patent by the government. 29
In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August
16, 1982, while petitioner instituted an action to amend respondent's
certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or after the lapse of more than
seven (7) years from the issuance of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to
timely avail of the remedy to contest Guerrero's title.
Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully
acquired property is not barred by prescription. Thus, it can still recover the
land granted to respondent.
True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter
may still bring an action, even after the lapse of one year, for the reversion
to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to
private individuals. 30 However, this remedy of reversion can only be
availed of in cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents
or certificates of title. In the present case, petitioner cannot successfully
invoke this defense for, as discussed earlier, it was never proven that
respondent's patent and title were obtained through actual fraud or other
illegal means.
with the RTC and obviously, it was way beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.
It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If
a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid,
he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be
attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more
abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the
Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once
the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. 34
Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the amendment of
OCT No. 0-28, derogates the very integrity of the system as it gives the impression to
Torrens title holders, like herein respondent, that their titles can be questioned by the
same authority who had approved their titles. In that case, no Torrens title holder shall be
at peace with the ownership and possession of his land, for land registration officers can
question his title any time they make a finding unfavorable to said title holder. This is all
the more frustrating for respondent Guerrero considering that he had bought the subject
lot from the government itself, the very same party who is now impugning his title.
DISEaC
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of
registration of titles to lands, 35 justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not
be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents,
in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third
persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop
forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the
certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. 36
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude
and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties. 37
Respondent's certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was
thus vested with the garment of indefeasibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is
AFFIRMED.

Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent and SO ORDERED.

the corresponding certificate of title ceases to be part of the public domain.
As such, it is considered a private property over which the Director of Lands Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
has neither control nor jurisdiction. 31

Petitioner likewise insists that respondent's title had yet to attain the status
of indefeasibility. As argued, Angelina Bustamante was able to timely file a ||| (Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, [March 28, 2006], 520 PHIL 296-317)
protest on July 29, 1983, which was well within the one-year prescriptive
period.

We do not agree.

While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in

favor of respondent, the protest was, however, filed with the Bureau of
Lands instead of with the regional trial court as mandated by the
aforequoted provision of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said provision
expressly states that a petition for review of a decree of registration shall
be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance" (now Regional Trial Court).
The law did not say that such petition may be filed with an administrative
agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what the law contemplates in
allowing a review of the decree of registration is a full-blown trial before a
regular court where each party could be afforded full opportunity to
present his/its case and where each of them must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence and not by mere substantial evidence, the
usual quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings. The
concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of
greater weight, or more convincing, than that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. 32 On the other
hand, substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 33

As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very

integrity of land titles and the Torrens system, a full-blown trial on the
merits before a regular court is necessary for the purpose of achieving a
more in-depth and thorough determination of all issues involved.

Hence, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante

with the Bureau of Lands cannot be considered in the context of a petition
to review the decree of registration issued to respondent. It was only on
November 7, 1989 that such petition was filed by the Director of Lands
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 192896. July 24, 2013.]
DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
Incumbent President, GREG SERIEGO, petitioner, vs. BASES CONVERSION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
Before us on Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision 2 dated September 10, 2009 and Resolution 3 dated July 13,
2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85228 nullifying and
setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the Resolution 4 dated April 28, 2004 of
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP
Case No. 99-500. The fallo of the assailed COSLAP Resolution reads, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the subject property, covering an area of 78,466 square
meters, now being occupied by the members of the Dream Village
Neighborhood Association, Inc. to be outside of Swo-00-0001302 BCDA
property.
2. In accordance with the tenets of social justice, members of said
association are advised to apply for sales patent on their respective
occupied lots with the Land Management Bureau, DENR-NCR, pursuant to
R.A. Nos. 274 and 730.
3. Directing the Land Management Bureau-DENR-NCR to process the sales
patent application of complainants pursuant to existing laws and
regulation. EDIHSC
4. The peaceful possession of actual occupants be respected by the
respondents.
SO ORDERED. 5
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village)
claims to represent more than 2,000 families who have been occupying a
78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the
concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously." 6 The lot
used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban (Maricaban), owned by
Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered under a Torrens title, 7 Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291, issued on October 17, 1906 by the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal. 8 Maricaban covered several parcels of land with
a total area of over 2,544 hectares spread out over Makati, Pasig, Taguig,
Pasay, and Parañaque. 9
Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United
States of America (USA) early in the American colonial period, to be
converted into the military reservation known as Fort William Mckinley,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in the name of the
USA to cancel OCT No. 291. 10 The US government later transferred 30 has.
of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad Company, for which TCT No. 192 was
cancelled by TCT Nos. 1218 and 1219, the first in the name of the Manila
Railroad Company for 30 has., and the second in the name of the USA for
the rest of the Maricaban property. 11
On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
1688, and later that year, on September 15, 1914, TCT No. 1688 was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 2288, both times in the name of the
USA. 12 On December 6, 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William
Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and on September
11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 61524, this
time in the name of the Republic. 13 On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P.
Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or settlement
the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort
Bonifacio, and reserving them for military purposes. 14 aAEIHC
On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and
disposable 15 in the manner provided under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 274
and 730, in relation to the Public Land Act, 16 thus allowing the sale to the
settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and
Western Bicutan. 17
On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172
amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298
the areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition. 18
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed 19 creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and
Subic military reservations and their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air
Station, O'Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and
Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses. Section 8 20 of the said law provides that
the capital of the BCDA will be provided from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in nine (9)
military camps in Metro Manila, including 723 has. of Fort Bonifacio. The law, thus,
expressly authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell the above lands, in whole or
in part, which are hereby declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of
existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties," 21 specifically to
raise capital for the BCDA. Titles to the camps were transferred to the BCDA for this
purpose, 22 and TCT No. 61524 was cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888,
23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, now in the name of the BCDA. 23 DCIEac
Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a) approximately 148.80 has. reserved for the
National Capital Region (NCR) Security Brigade, Philippine Army officers' housing area,
and Philippine National Police jails and support services (presently known as Camp
Bagong Diwa); b) approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base for the Presidential Airlift
Wing, one squadron of helicopters for the NCR and respective security units; c) twenty
one (21) areas segregated by various presidential proclamations; and d) a proposed 30.15
has. as relocation site for families to be affected by the construction of Circumferential
Road 5 and Radial Road 4, provided that the boundaries and technical description of
these exempt areas shall be determined by an actual ground survey. 24
Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully
subjecting its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among
the residents, 25 on November 22, 1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with the
COSLAP to seek its assistance in the verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m
property, which they claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and thus is covered by
Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been occupying the area for thirty (30)
years "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously for several
years," and have built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved
roads, drainage and recreational and religious facilities. Dream Village, thus, asserts that
the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore
patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the Land Management
Bureau (LMB).
On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing an Amended Petition
26 in the COSLAP. Among the reliefs it sought were:
d. DECLARING the subject property as alienable and disposable by virtue of applicable
laws; aDHScI
e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298, situated in the
barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, which is presently being occupied by
herein petitioner as within the coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside
the claim of AFP-RSBS INDUSTRIAL PARK COMPLEX and/or BASES CONVERSION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.
f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau to process the application of the
ASSOCIATION members for the purchase of their respective lots under the provisions of
Acts Nos. 274 and 730. 27 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent BCDA in its Answer 28 dated November 23, 2000 questioned the jurisdiction
of the COSLAP to hear Dream Village's complaint, while asserting its title to the subject
property pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. It argued that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561
which created the COSLAP, its task is merely to coordinate the various government offices
and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, adding that BCDA
does not fall in the enumeration in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it being neither a
pastureland-lease holder, a timber concessionaire, or a government reservation grantee,
but the holder of patrimonial government property which cannot be the subject of a
petition for classification, release or subdivision by the occupants of Dream Village.
In its Resolution 29 dated April 28, 2004, the COSLAP narrated that it called a mediation
conference on March 22, 2001, during which the parties agreed to have a
relocation/verification survey conducted of the subject lot. On April 4, 2001, the COSLAP
wrote to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office-NCR requesting the survey, which would also
include Swo-00-0001302, covering the adjacent AFP-RSBS Industrial Park established by
Proclamation No. 1218 on May 8, 1998 as well as the abandoned Circumferential Road 5
(C-5 Road). 30
On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a
blueprint copy of the survey plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director
for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report states: TcEaAS
3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood
Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1, Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot
13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area
actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA. 31 (Emphasis ours and
underscoring supplied)
COSLAP Ruling
On the basis of the DENR's verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved
that Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-
00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process the
applications of Dream Village's members for sales patent, noting that in
view of the length of time that they "have been openly, continuously and
notoriously occupying the subject property in the concept of an owner, . . .
they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their respective occupied lots
pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public
Land Act." 32 DHSCEc
On the question of its jurisdiction over the complaint, the COSLAP cited the
likelihood that the summary eviction by the BCDA of more than 2,000
families in Dream Village could stir up serious social unrest, and maintained
that Section 3 (2) of E.O. No. 561 authorizes it to "assume jurisdiction and
resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature
considering, for instance, the large number of parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical
situations requiring immediate action," even as Section 3 (2) (d) of E.O. No.
561 also allows it to take cognizance of "petitions for classification, release
and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain," exactly the ultimate
relief sought by Dream Village. Rationalizing that it was created precisely to
provide a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land
problems "in general," the COSLAP invoked as its authority the 1990 case of
Bañaga v. COSLAP, 33 where this Court said:
It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take
cognizance of cases which are "critical and explosive in nature considering,
for instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or
emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action." However, the use of the word "may" does not
mean that the COSLAP's jurisdiction is merely confined to the above
mentioned cases. The provisions of the said Executive Order are clear that
the COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more effective
mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general,
which are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners
and cultural minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from the
abolished PACLAP whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power and
authority to act on, decide and resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832)
were all assumed by it. The said Executive Order No. 561 containing said
provision, being enacted only on September 21, 1979, cannot affect the
exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial Committee of Koronadal
on September 20, 1978. Neither can it affect the decision of the COSLAP
which merely affirmed said exercise of jurisdiction. 34 SDcITH
In its Motion for Reconsideration 35 filed on May 20, 2004, the BCDA
questioned the validity of the survey results since it was conducted without
its representatives present, at the same time denying that it received a
notification of the DENR verification survey. 36 It maintained that there is
no basis for the COSLAP's finding that the members of Dream Village were
in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner,
because not only is the property not among those declared alienable and
disposable, but it is a titled patrimonial property of the State. 37
In the Order 38 dated June 17, 2004, the COSLAP denied BCDA's Motion for
Reconsideration, insisting that it had due notice of the verification survey,
while also noting that although the BCDA wanted to postpone the
verification survey due to its tight schedule, it actually stalled the survey
when it failed to suggest an alternative survey date to ensure its presence.
CA Ruling
On Petition for Review 39 to the CA, the BCDA argued that the dispute is
outside the jurisdiction of the COSLAP because of the land's history of
private ownership and because it is registered under an indefeasible
Torrens title; 40 that Proclamation No. 172 covers only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-
13-000298 in Western Bicutan, whereas Dream Village occupies Lots 10, 11
and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302, which also belongs to the BCDA; 41 that
the COSLAP resolution is based on an erroneous DENR report stating that
Dream Village is outside of BCDA, because Lots 10, 11, and portion of Lot
13 of Swo-00-0001302 are within the BCDA; 42 that the COSLAP was not
justified in ignoring BCDA's request to postpone the survey to the
succeeding year because the presence of its representatives in such an
important verification survey was indispensable for the impartiality of the
survey aimed at resolving a highly volatile situation; 43 that the COSLAP is a
mere coordinating administrative agency with limited jurisdiction; 44 and,
that the present case is not among those enumerated in Section 3 of E.O.
No. 561. 45 caTIDE
The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3 (2) (e) of E.O. No. 561 provides
that it may assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes in "other similar
land problems of grave urgency and magnitude," 46 and the present case is one such
problem.
The CA in its Decision 47 dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the complaint because the question of whether Dream Village is within
the areas declared as available for disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its
competence to determine, even as the land in dispute has been under a private title since
1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency, the BCDA, in contrast to the
case of Bañaga relied upon by Dream Village, where the disputed land was part of the
public domain and the disputants were applicants for sales patent thereto.
Dream Village's motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate court's Order 48
of July 13, 2010.
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, Dream Village interposes the following
issues:
A
IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP IN COSLAP CASE NO. 99-500, THE
HONORABLE [CA] DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT; cIDHSC
B
THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN RULING THAT COSLAP HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES HEREIN[.]49
The Court's Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
The BCDA holds title to Fort
Bonifacio.
That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with finality. In Samahan
ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA, 50 it was categorically ruled as follows:
First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and
ownership over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of
Pasay City, Pasig and Makati is final and conclusive on the ownership of the then
Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the
ownership of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to rest. Other than their view that
the USA is still the owner of the subject lots, petitioner has not put forward any claim of
ownership or interest in them. 51
The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are essentially not much different
from the controversy below. There, 20,000 families were long-time residents occupying
98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City, who vainly sought to avert their eviction and the
demolition of their houses by the BCDA upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA
under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme Court found that TCT No. 2288 had in fact been
cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in the name of the Republic, which title was in turn cancelled
on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891,
all in the name of the BCDA. The Court ruled that the BCDA's aforesaid titles over Fort
Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond question, since TCT No. 61524 was cancelled
in favor of BCDA pursuant to an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227, the legal basis for
BCDA's takeover and management of the subject lots. 52 HIaSDc
Dream Village sits on the
abandoned C-5 Road, which lies
outside the area declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as
alienable and disposable.
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys were conducted by the Bureau
of Lands to delimit the boundaries of the areas excluded from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 423: AEScHa
Barangay
Survey Plan
Date Approved
1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October 21, 1986
2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986
3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986
4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January 15, 1987 53
However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows that Lots 3, 4, 5
and 6 thereof are inside the area segregated for the Libingan ng mga
Bayani under Proclamation No. 208, which then leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of
Swo-13-000298 as available for disposition. For this reason, it was
necessary to amend Proclamation No. 2476. Thus, in Proclamation No. 172
only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 are declared alienable and disposable.
54 DCcHAa
The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not
situated in Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 but actually occupies Lots 10, 11 and
part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302: ". . . [Dream Village] is outside Lot 1, SWO-
[13]-000298 and inside Lots 10, 11 & portion of Lot 13, SWO-[00]-0001302
with an actual area of 78466 square meters. The area is actually is [sic]
outside SWO-00-0001302 of BCDA." 55 Inexplicably and gratuitously, the
DENR also states that the area is outside of BCDA, completely oblivious that
the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio, even as the BCDA
asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the
abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road. This area is described as lying north of
Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-13-000298
(Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan ng mga Bayani, and the boundary
line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really the proposed alignment of C-5
Road, which was abandoned when, as constructed, it was made to traverse
northward into the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream Village has not disputed
this assertion.
The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302
was abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of
Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify abandonment by the government
of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become alienable and
disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant
that under Section 8 (d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was
to be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is
nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of
the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south, 56 making
them commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim
that the government has abandoned them to Dream Village.
While property of the State or any
of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of
prescription, those "intended for
some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth" are considered property of
public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription." Articles 420 and 421 identify what is property of public
dominion and what is patrimonial property: EScHDA
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and
others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property. aITECD
One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village
is susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic, 57 it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was
enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and
disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not
thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express
reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court
noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or
"the development of national wealth" under Article 420 (2) of the Civil
Code, such that the lands remain property of the public dominion, albeit
their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that
it is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the
BCDA law that they become private property and cease to be property of
the public dominion: 58
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth." 59
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial
property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together
with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14 (2) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can commence,
the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land
remains to be property of public dominion. 60 cIHSTC
Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the former
Maricaban have been legally disposed to settlers, besides those segregated for public or
government use. Proclamation No. 1217 (1973) established the Maharlika Village in
Bicutan, Taguig to serve the needs of resident Muslims of Metro Manila; Proclamation
No. 2476 (1986), as amended by Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared more than 400
has. of Maricaban in Upper and Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan as
alienable and disposable; Proclamation No. 518 (1990) formally exempted from
Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of Cembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo,
Comembo, Pembo and Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared them open for
disposition. aECTcA
The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public
dominion of the State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the
conversion of military reservations in the country to productive civilian uses. 61 Needless
to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run.
Ownership of a land registered
under a Torrens title cannot be lost
by prescription or adverse
possession.
Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDA's claim that Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of
Swo-00-0001302 are the abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road, which is within the vast
titled territory of Fort Bonifacio. We have already established that these lots have not
been declared alienable and disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. 62 Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property
Registration Decree, expressly provides that no title to registered land in derogation of
the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
And, although the registered landowner may still lose his right to recover the possession
of his registered property by reason of laches, 63 nowhere has Dream Village alleged or
proved laches, which has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken
in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse
party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the assertion of a right
which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in
the condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which, for
the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise
could be a valid claim. 64 TSacCH
The subject property having been
expressly reserved for a specific
public purpose, the COSLAP
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village
settlers.
BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction to hear Dream Village's
complaint. Concurring, the CA has ruled that questions as to the physical identity of
Dream Village and whether it lies in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302, or whether
Proclamation No. 172 has released the disputed area for disposition are issues which are
"manifestly beyond the scope of the COSLAP's jurisdiction vis-Ã -vis Paragraph 2, Section
3 of E.O. No. 561," 65 rendering its Resolution a patent nullity and its pronouncements
void. Thus, the CA said, under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP's duty would have
been to refer the conflict to another tribunal or agency of government in view of the
serious ramifications of the disputed claims: STIcaE
In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the case. It would have been more prudent if the COSLAP has [sic] just referred the
controversy to the proper forum in order to fully thresh out the ramifications of the
dispute at bar. As it is, the impugned Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal
which rendered it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the pronouncements contained therein are
void. "We have consistently ruled that a judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment
at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect." 66
(Citation omitted)
We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific public
purpose under R.A. No. 7227, which unfortunately for Dream Village does
not encompass the present demands of its members. Indeed, this purpose
was the very reason why title to Fort Bonifacio has been transferred to the
BCDA, and it is this very purpose which takes the dispute out of the direct
jurisdiction of the COSLAP. A review of the history of the COSLAP will
readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes over public lands not
reserved or declared for a public use or purpose. cAaDHT
On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the
Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and
coordinate the investigation and resolution of all kinds of land disputes
between settlers, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt
bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, or recommend other
solutions. 67 E.O. No. 305, issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the
PACLAP and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public
lands and other lands of the public domain, 68 as well as adjudicatory
powers phrased in broad terms: "To investigate, coordinate, and resolve
expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in
general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving
public lands and lands of the public domain." 69
On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the PACLAP and enlarged
its functions and duties. Section 2 thereof even granted it quasi judicial
functions, to wit:
Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. — The PACLAP shall have the
following functions and duties:
1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work,
of the various government agencies and agencies involved in land problems
or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small
settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense
and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or
disputes;
2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the
attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof:
Provided, That when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its
resolution, order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding
upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having
jurisdiction thereof;
xxx xxx xxx
4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy
investigation and resolution of land disputes or problems at provincial
level, if possible. (Underscoring supplied)
On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the PACLAP and created
the COSLAP to be a more effective administrative body to provide a
mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small
settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social
unrest. 70 Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O No. 561 now specifically
enumerates the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory
functions:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions: SAHIDc
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the
various government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land
problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve
small settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the
expense and time consuming delay attendant to the solution of such
problems or disputes;
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the
Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases,
assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical
and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the
parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or
timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government
reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain;
and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude. cEaCTS
xxx xxx xxx
Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and demolition by the BCDA and the
seriousness and urgency of the reliefs sought in its Amended Petition, Dream Village
insists that the COSLAP was justified in assuming jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. 99-500.
But in Longino v. Atty. General, 71 it was held that as an administrative agency, COSLAP's
jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically mentioned in its enabling statute, E.O. No. 561.
The Supreme Court said:
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such,
could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. . . . .
LLphil
xxx xxx xxx
Under the law, [E.O. No. 561], the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or
problem lodged before it, namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of
those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive
in nature, taking into account the large number of the parties involved, the presence or
emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the
same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions
raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to
persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the
COSLAP over any land dispute or problem. 72 (Citation omitted) ITScHa
The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent COSLAP cases, among them
Davao New Town Development Corp. v. COSLAP, 73 Barranco v. COSLAP, 74 NHA v.
COSLAP, 75 Cayabyab v. de Aquino, 76 Ga, Jr. v. Tubungan, 77 Machado v. Gatdula, 78
and Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo. 79
Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot invoke Section 3 (2) (e) of E.O. No.
561 to assume jurisdiction over "other similar land problems of grave urgency," since the
statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis prescribes that where general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind as those specifically
mentioned. 80 Following this rule, COSLAP's jurisdiction is limited to disputes involving
lands in which the government has a proprietary or regulatory interest, 81 or public lands
covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture lease agreements,
a timber concessions, or a reservation grants, 82 and where moreover, the dispute is
between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber
concessionaires; between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
and between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants.
In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the Philippine National Railways.
The high court rejected COSLAP's jurisdiction, noting that the disputed lot is not public
land, and neither party was a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government
reservation grantee, public land claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural
minority, nor was the dispute critical and explosive in nature so as to generate social
tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate action. 83
In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the COSLAP has no concurrent
jurisdiction with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in respect of disputes
concerning the implementation of agrarian reform laws, since "[t]he grant of exclusive
and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters on the DAR implies that no other
court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes properly cognizable by the
DAR." 84 Thus, instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should have simply
referred private respondents' complaint to the DAR or DARAB. According to the Court:
cDCSET
The abovementioned proviso [Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561], which vests COSLAP the
power to resolve land disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to
assume every matter referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands
in which the government has proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land
dispute in Bañaga involved parties with conflicting free patent applications which was
within the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike that of the instant case which is
exclusively cognizable by the DAR. 85
In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures encroaching into private
property. The Supreme Court ruled that COSLAP may resolve only land disputes "involving
public lands or lands of the public domain or those covered with a specific license from
the government such as a pasture lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation
grant." 86 TcSCEa
||| (Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development
In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a boundary Authority, G.R. No. 192896, [July 24, 2013], 715 PHIL 211-244)
dispute between two local government units, that its decision is an utter
nullity correctible by certiorari, that it can never become final and any writ
of execution based on it is void, and all acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. 87

In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not extend
to disputes involving the ownership of private lands, or those already
covered by a certificate of title, as these fall exactly within the jurisdiction
of the courts and other administrative agencies." 88

In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over
controversies relating to ownership and possession of private lands, and
thus, the failure of respondents to properly appeal from the COSLAP
decision before the appropriate court was held not fatal to the petition for
certiorari that they eventually filed with the CA. The latter remedy
remained available despite the lapse of the period to appeal from the void
COSLAP decision. 89

In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction in

disputes over private lands between private parties, reiterating the
essential rules contained in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 governing the exercise
by COSLAP of its jurisdiction, to wit:

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land
dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction
only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of
the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving whether
to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the
land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions
raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to
prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property. The
terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to
assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO 561,
the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only
to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from
the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or
reservation grants. 90 (Citations omitted) aSIDCT

In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a complaint for

"interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing"
over a private parcel of land. The CA ruled that the parties were estopped
to question COSLAP's jurisdiction since they participated actively in the
proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting from the complaint that the case
actually involved a claim of title and possession of private land, ruled that
the RTC or the MTC has jurisdiction since the dispute did not fall under
Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, was not critical and
explosive in nature, did not involve a large number of parties, nor was
there social tension or unrest present or emergent. 91

In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Bañaga to assert its jurisdiction.
There, Guillermo Bañaga had filed a free patent application with the
Bureau of Lands over a public land with an area of 30 has. Gregorio
Daproza (Daproza) also filed a patent application for the same property.
The opposing claims and protests of the claimants remained unresolved by
the Bureau of Lands, and neither did it conduct an investigation. Daproza
wrote to the COSLAP, which then opted to exercise jurisdiction over the
controversy. The high court sustained COSLAP, declaring that its jurisdiction
is not confined to the cases mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No.
561, but includes land problems in general, which are frequently the source
of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.

But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the other cases
aforecited, the land dispute in Bañaga was between private individuals who
were free patent applicants over unregistered public lands. In contrast, the
present petition involves land titled to and managed by a government
agency which has been expressly reserved by law for a specific public
purpose other than for settlement. Thus, as we have advised in Longino,
the law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or
problem, but it has to consider the nature or classification of the land
involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and
the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to
persons and damage or destruction to property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. IaDSEA

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 181435. October 2, 2017.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO L. NICOLAS,
respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by the Republic of the
Philippines to assail the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 2 and Resolution 3
in CA-G.R. CV No. 81678. The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Decision, 4 which granted the Petition 5 filed by respondent Rosario L.
Nicolas for the registration of title to a parcel of land located in Barangay
(Brgy.) San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. 6 The appellate court agreed with the
conclusion of the RTC that respondent had convincingly established her
ownership of the land and was therefore entitled to judicial confirmation
and registration of title. 7 HTcADC
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 22 March 1996, respondent filed a Petition before the RTC of San
Mateo, Rizal, 8 seeking to register her title over Lot 2 of Survey Plan Psu-
213331, a parcel of land located in Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, with
an area of 118,448 square meters. 9 She asserted that she was entitled to
confirmation and registration of title, as she had been in "natural, open,
public, adverse, continuous, uninterrupted" possession of the land in the
concept of an owner since October 1964. 10
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an Opposition 11 to the Petition.
It contended that (a) neither respondent nor her predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land since 12 June 1945; 12 (b) the Tax Declarations attached to the
Petition did not constitute sufficient evidence of the acquisition or
possession of the property; 13 (c) respondent failed to apply for
registration of title within six months from 16 February 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 892; 14 and (d) the land in question was part
of the public domain and not subject to private appropriation. 15
After the conduct of proceedings to confirm compliance with jurisdictional
requisites, 16 the RTC directed respondent to submit documents to
establish that (a) the property that was the subject of the application for
registration of title was not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program of the Government; (b) there were no tenants on the
property; and (c) the land was not subject to any homestead, free patent,
or grant of title from the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the Bureau of
Lands, or the Department of Agrarian Reform. 17 Respondent was also
directed to begin the presentation of her evidence. 18
In line with this directive, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) submitted a Report 19 on the results of its
verification of the existing records on the subject property. The Report
stated that the land "appears to be [n]ot covered by any public land
application nor embraced by any administrative title." 20 However, the
entry with respect to whether the land was within the alienable and
disposable zone was left blank with a notation that the area was "not
projected due to [u]navailability of coordinates re[:] Tala Estate Tie-Line."
21
The LRA likewise submitted a Report 22 stating that it "was not in a position
to verify whether or not the parcel of land subject of registration is already
covered by land patent and is within the area classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain." 23 Hence, the LRA recommended
that the CENRO of Antipolo, Rizal, be ordered to submit a report on the
status of the land. 24 This proposal was adopted by the RTC in an Order 25
dated 28 December 1998.
During trial, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her right to
register the property: Leonila Alfaro, her daughter and attorney-in-fact,
who testified that respondent had occupied the land since 1940 and had
paid the real estate taxes therefor since 1969; 26 Santiago Eulin, who was
allegedly hired by respondent to plant vegetables and fruit trees on the
land and who acted as its caretaker since 1942; 27 and Roberto M. Valdez
of the LRA, who identified the original tracing cloth plan for the property.
28
The following documents were likewise submitted to the trial court: Survey
Plan PSU-213331, 29 a Surveyor's Certificate 30 and technical descriptions
of the property, 31 which purportedly proved that the land had been duly
surveyed by the Land Management Sector; various Tax Declarations and
receipts; 32 and a Certification issued by the CENRO that the land applied
for was not covered by any public land application. 33
Petitioner, on the other hand, decided to have the case submitted for resolution without
any further submission. 34
THE RULING OF THE RTC
In a Decision dated 31 July 2002, the RTC granted the Petition and ordered the issuance of
a Decree of Registration in favor of respondent. 35 It declared that she had acquired
ownership of the land by way of open, continuous, public, adverse, actual and bona fide
possession in the concept of an owner since 1940. 36
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. In the Appellant's Brief, 37 the Republic
argued that respondent had failed to clearly and convincingly establish that she had
actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or earlier as required by Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.
38 Petitioner further asserted that there was no basis for the finding of the RTC that she
had occupied the land since 1940. 39
Respondent failed to file an appellee's brief. 40 Consequently, the CA considered the case
submitted for resolution. 41
THE RULING OF THE CA
On 23 August 2007, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal. 42 According to the appellate
court, the evidence presented proved that respondent had occupied the land since 1940.
Even assuming that her possession of the property started only when she had it privately
surveyed in 1964, she had been its occupant for more than 30 years. 43 As such, she was
still entitled to registration of title under Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529. DETACa
The CA further characterized the land as private property:
The fact that the subject land is covered by a private survey (PSU) (EXH. "J") way back in
1964, which survey was approved on April 1965 by Director Nicanor Jorge of the then
Bureau of Lands, is a clear indication that it is already private in nature. Moreover,
applicant's evidence consisting of the DENR-CENRO Certifications (Exhs. "O" and "P") that
Lot 2 of PSY 213331 is not covered by any public land application and that its equivalent is
Lot No. 10549 of the Montalban Cadastre have substantial probative value which
established (sic) that the land is alienable and disposable and not covered by any land
grant from the government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision. 44 The CA, however, denied the
motion in a Resolution 45 dated 22 January 2008, prompting petitioner to elevate the
case to this Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
In its Petition for Review, the Republic argues that (a) the decision of the CA and the RTC
to confirm the title of respondent to the land based on her possession and occupation
thereof was not supported by evidence; and (b) the testimonial and documentary
evidence she presented did not establish possession of the property in the manner and
period required by law, that is, her possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. Petitioner also emphasizes that the lower courts gave undue importance to the
Tax Declarations and receipts presented, 46 as well as to the testimonies of respondent's
witnesses, notwithstanding the inconsistencies in their statements.
On 26 September 2008, respondent filed a Manifestation and Comment 47 in which she
pointed out that the grounds relied upon by petitioner all pertain to allegedly erroneous
findings of fact. She argued that these grounds could not be raised in a Rule 45
proceeding; hence, the dismissal of the petition was warranted. 48
Petitioner reiterated its arguments in its Reply 49 and Memorandum 50 filed on 17 March
2009 and 19 February 2010, respectively.
ISSUES
Based on the submissions of the parties and the Decisions of the CA and the RTC, two
issues are presented for resolution by this Court:
(1) Whether the CA erroneously allowed the judicial confirmation of respondent's title to
the property under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529; and
(2) Whether the CA erred in declaring that respondent is likewise entitled to registration
of title based on ownership by acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
OUR RULING
We GRANT the Petition.
Applications for registration of title to land, both public and private, are governed by
Section 14 of P.D. 1529:
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may
file an application for the original registration of the land, provided,
however, that should the period for redemption expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the
applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any
land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the
trust.
Each paragraph of Section 14 refers to a distinct type of application
depending on the applicable legal ground. Since each type is governed by
its own set of legal principles, the framework for analysis to be used in
resolving an application would vary depending on the paragraph invoked.
51 Hence, it is important for the Court to first determine the exact legal
ground used by an applicant for registration. 52
In this case, we note that the application filed by respondent before the
RTC did not state the exact legal basis of her request. At best, the pleading
implied that her claim was one for registration and confirmation of title
based on her possession and occupation of the property:
COMES NOW Petitioner Rosario L. Nicolas, of legal age, widow, Pilipino [sic]
with address at Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal
Province, Philippines, by her undersigned counsel and to this Honorable
Court respectfully petitions to have the land hereinafter described below
brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act and to have said
land titled, registered and confirmed in her name and further declares that:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Petitioner acquired the subject parcel of land by way of occupation and
has been in natural, open, public, adverse, contin[u]ous, uninterrupted and
in the concept of an owner/possessor thereof since October 1964 up to the
present. 53 (Emphases supplied) aDSIHc
From the foregoing allegations, it appears that the claim of respondent is
anchored on either of the first two paragraphs of Section 14. However, it is
unclear whether she sought judicial confirmation and registration of her
title pursuant to Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529, or of the registration of her
title on the ground of acquisitive prescription under Section 14 (2) of the
same law.
Similarly, no specific provision in P.D. 1529 was identified by the RTC when
it granted the Petition. 54 Its mention of the Civil Code, however, seems to
indicate an application of the principle of acquisitive prescription. The CA,
for its part, delineated the differences between the first two paragraphs of
Section 14, but decided to apply both clauses. In its Decision, it ruled that
respondent is entitled to register her title under either paragraph:
From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has convincingly
established her registrable title to the subject land, which is entitled to
confirmation and registration by the trial court. As testified by the daughter
of applicant, her mother commenced occupying the subject land since
1940 and up to the present which (sic) has been planted with fruit-bearing
trees and vegetables by their caretaker. Her testimony was corroborated
by Santiago Eulin, their caretaker since 1942 who took over after his father,
the original caretaker. These witnesses declared that they even stayed on
the land in question where the applicant has a hut. It was also established
that the applicant had the property surveyed in 1964 resulting in the
approval of Plan PSU 21331 by the Bureau of Lands. This qualifies applicant
under Section 14, par. 1 of the Property Registration Decree.
Even assuming that applicant's occupation and possession of the subject land did not
start on July 12, 1945 or earlier but only in 1964 when she had it surveyed, still she can
apply for registration of title under Sec. 14, par. 2 of the Property Registration Decree as
she has been occupying the land continuously for more than thirty (30) years from the
time the application was filed in 1996. 55 (Emphases supplied)
Given these findings, the Court has examined the application for registration in this case
under the legal framework of both Section 14 (1) and (2) of P.D. 1529. We find that
respondent has failed to sufficiently establish the requisites of both paragraphs; in
particular, with respect to the classification and the character of the land in question.
Hence, we are constrained to reverse the CA and the RTC Decisions allowing the
registration of her title to the property.
Respondent has failed to prove that the
property is alienable and disposable
agricultural land that may be registered
under Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529.
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529 governs applications for registration of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. This paragraph operationalizes Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended. 56 This provision grants occupants of public
land the right to judicial confirmation of their title. Based on these two provisions and
other related sections of C.A. 141, registration is allowed provided the following
requisites have been complied with:
1. The applicant is a Filipino citizen. 57
2. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since 12
June 1945. 58
3. The property has been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing of the
application. 59
4. If the area applied for does not exceed 12 hectares, the application should be filed by
31 December 2020. 60
As earlier stated, respondent failed to establish the third requisite, i.e., that the property
subject of the application is alienable and disposable agricultural land.
The Court has emphasized in a long line of cases 61 that an applicant for registration
under Section 14 (1) must prove that the subject property has been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land by virtue of a positive act of the Executive Department. In
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 62 we declared:
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial
lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands
as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks
are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts. x x x Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that
the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development
of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
In this case, we note that both the RTC and the CA glossed over this requirement. The
RTC, for instance, only made a general conclusion as to the classification and alienability
of the property, but without any discussion of the evidence presented:
From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has convincingly established her
registrable title to the subject land which is entitled to confirmation and registration by
the trial court. x x x It was also established that the applicant had the property surveyed
in 1964 resulting in the approval of Plan PSU-213331 by the Bureau of Lands. This
qualifies applicant under Sec. 14, par. 1 of the Property Registration Decree. 63
The CA, on the other hand, simply relied on the fact that the property had been the
subject of a private survey in 1964: ETHIDa
From the evidence adduced, the following facts have been duly proved:
xxx xxx xxx
That the land applied for is neither subject to any water, oil/nor (sic) mineral rights, not
within any government reservation, naval or military, or mineral rights, within the forest
zone, and neither is it part of the inalienable or undisposable land of the public domain
nor covered by the Code on Comprehensive Agrarian Reform or subject to any subsisting
Public Patent application;
xxx xxx xxx

That the said parcel of land applied for is duly surveyed for registration
(Exh. "J"), classified as agricultural; that they planted mangoes, buko,
sometimes corn in the area through their caretaker x x x. 64
While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is generally limited
to a review of errors of law, the Court may conduct its own review of the
evidence if the findings of the lower courts are bereft of legal and factual
bases. 65 In this case, the conclusions of the RTC and the CA are not only
contradicted by the evidence on record; they are likewise contrary to law
and jurisprudence. As a result, the Court is constrained to set aside these
pronouncements.
To prove that the property subject of an application for original registration
is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
applicants must "identify a positive act of the government, such as an
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes." 66 To sufficiently establish this
positive act, they must submit (1) a certification from the CENRO or the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO); and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 67
Here, respondent presented the following pieces of evidence to establish
her claim that the land had been classified as agricultural and considered
alienable and disposable:
(1) A CENRO Report 68 stating that the land was not covered by any public
land application or embraced by any administrative title, but with a
notation that that the alienability of the land was "[n]ot projected due to
[u]navailability of coordinates re: Tala Estate Tie-line";
(2) A CENRO Certification 69 that the lot "is not covered by any kind of
public land application";
(3) A Report 70 from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) declaring that it
was "not in a position to verify whether or not the parcel of land subject of
registration is already covered by land patent and is within the area
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain"; and
(4) The testimonies of Leonila Alfaro, 71 her daughter, and Santiago Eulin
72 (the caretaker of the land) confirming that the property is agricultural in
nature.
It is evident from the foregoing enumeration that respondent not only
neglected to submit the required CENRO/PENRO certification and DENR
classification, but also presented evidence that completely failed to prove
her assertion.
First, the testimonies of Leonila and Santiago on the classification of the
land have very little evidentiary value. That they consider the property
agricultural in nature is irrelevant, as their statements are mere opinions
bereft of any legal significance.
Second, none of the documents submitted by respondent to the trial court
indicated that the subject property was agricultural or part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. At most, the CENRO Report and
Certification stated that the land was not covered by any kind of public land
application. This was far from an adequate proof of the classification of the
land. In fact, in Republic v. Lualhati, 73 the Court rejected an attempt to
prove the alienability of public land using similar evidence:
Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence, that the
land sought to be registered has been classified as alienable or disposable
land of the public domain. The records of this case merely bear
certifications from the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that
no public land application or land patent covering the subject lots is
pending nor are the lots embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO
certifications, however, do not even make any pronouncement as to the
alienable character of the lands in question for they merely recognize the
absence of any pending land patent application, administrative title, or
government project being conducted thereon. But even granting that they
expressly declare that the subject lands form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, these certifications remain
insufficient for purposes of granting respondent's application for
registration. As constantly held by this Court, it is not enough for the
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for
land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. Unfortunately for respondent, the evidence submitted
clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration in order to
show the alienable character of the lands subject herein.
Applying these standards to the instant case, we declare that the RTC did not have
sufficient basis for its finding that the property in question was alienable and disposable.
The Court also finds that the ruling of the CA on the evidentiary value of the private
survey is untenable. The fact that the land has been privately surveyed is not sufficient to
prove its classification or alienable character. While the conduct of a survey and the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan are mandatory requirements for applications
for original registration of land under P.D. 1529, they only serve to establish the true
identity of the land and to ensure that the property does not overlap with another one
covered by a previous registration. 74 These documents do not, by themselves, prove
alienability and disposability of the property. In fact, in several cases, 75 the Court has
declared that even a survey plan with a notation that the property is alienable cannot be
considered as sufficient evidence of alienability. Here, the survey plan and original tracing
cloth plan submitted by respondent does not even bear that notation. Consequently, it
was grave error for the CA to consider the mere conduct of a private survey as proof of
the classification and the alienability of the land. cSEDTC
Respondent has failed to prove that the
land subject of the application is part of
the patrimonial property of the State
that may be acquired by prescription
under Section 14 (2) of P.D. 1529.
As previously noted, the CA also allowed the registration of the property under Section 14
(2) of P.D. 1529 based on the following findings: (1) the property is "private in nature" as
shown by the fact that it is "covered by a private survey"; 76 (2) respondent had occupied
the land continuously for more than 30 years from the time of the filing of the application
in 1996; 77 and (3) the land is not covered by any public land application based on the
DENR-CENRO Certifications submitted by respondent. 78
We do not agree. The Court finds no sufficient basis to allow the registration of the
property under Section 14 (2).
By express provision of the law, only private lands that have been acquired by
prescription under existing laws may be the subject of applications for registration under
Section 14 (2). The starting point of the Court's evaluation must, therefore, be whether
the property involved falls within the scope of the paragraph.
Under the Civil Code, all things within human commerce are generally susceptible of
prescription. 79 Properties of the public dominion, or those owned by the State, are
expressly excluded by law from this general rule, 80 unless they are proven to be
patrimonial in character. As the Court explained in Republic of the Philippines v. Tan:
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is
outside the commerce of man. It cannot be the object of prescription because
prescription does not run against the State in its sovereign capacity. However, when
property of public dominion is no longer intended for public use or for public service, it
becomes part of the patrimonial property of the State. When this happens, the property
is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of private ownership, albeit
still owned by the State. The property is now brought within the commerce of man and
becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and prescription. 81 (Emphasis
supplied)
To establish that the land subject of the application has been converted into patrimonial
property of the State, an applicant must prove the following:
1. The subject property has been classified as agricultural land. 82
2. The property has been declared alienable and disposable. 83
3. There is an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial,
or is no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. 84
It must be emphasized that without the concurrence of these three conditions, the land
remains part of public dominion and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. 85
Here, the records show that respondent has failed to allege or prove that the subject land
belongs to the patrimonial property of the State. As earlier discussed, the evidence she
has presented does not even show that the property is alienable and disposable
agricultural land. She has also failed to cite any government act or declaration converting
the land into patrimonial property of the State.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the DENR-CENRO Certifications submitted by respondent
are not enough; they cannot substitute for the three conditions required by law as proof
that the land may be the subject of prescription under the Civil Code. For the same
reason, the mere conduct of a private survey of a property — even with the approval of
the Bureau of Lands — does not convert the lot into private land or patrimonial property
of the State. Clearly, the appellate court erred when it relied on the survey to justify its
conclusion that the land is private in nature.
Considering the absence of sufficient evidence that the subject land is a patrimonial
property of the State, we must consider it part of public dominion and thus
immune from acquisitive prescription.

As a final note, the Court must point out that proof of the classification,
alienability and disposability of the subject property is of particular
significance in applications for the registration of land. Given the general
rule that public lands may not be alienated, 86 it is the burden of applicants
to prove that the land they seek to register falls within the classifications
enumerated in Section 14 of P.D. 1529; in particular, the specific paragraph
they invoke as basis for registration. 87 Absent that proof, no length of
possession or occupation would vest any right of ownership over the
property, 88 and registration under P.D. 1529 cannot be sanctioned by this
Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decision dated 23 August 2007 and Resolution dated 22 January 2008 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's application for land registration is
DENIED for lack of merit. SDAaTC

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-de Castro, Del Castillo, Jardeleza and Tijam, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 181435, [October 2, 2017], 819 PHIL 31-
52)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166577. February 3, 2010.]
SPOUSES MORRIS CARPO and SOCORRO CARPO, petitioners, vs. AYALA
LAND, INCORPORATED, respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
In the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners seek to set aside and annul the Decision 1 dated
December 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61784,
which reversed and set aside the Summary Judgment 2 dated December
22, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 255.
Also subject of the present petition is the CA Resolution 3 dated December
16, 2004 which denied the motion for reconsideration of the earlier
decision.
A summary of the facts, as culled from the records of the case, follows:
On February 16, 1995, petitioner spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo
(Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title 4 with the RTC of Makati City
against Ayala Corporation, Ayala Property Ventures Corporation (APVC),
and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-292.
In their Complaint, the Carpos claimed to be the owners of a 171,209-
square meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 296463 issued in their names. 5 They further alleged that Ayala
Corporation was claiming to have titles (specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-
4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property covered by the Carpos' TCT
No. 296463 and that Ayala Corporation had made such property its equity
contribution in APVC to be developed into a residential subdivision.
Attached as annexes to the complaint were photocopies of:
(a) TCT No. 296463 issued on August 13, 1970 in the name of the Carpos,
covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-56007) located in the Barrio of
Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 171,309 square meters;
(b) TCT No. 125945 issued on April 6, 1988 in the name of Ayala
Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-80886) located in Bo.
Tindig na Manga, Las Piñas with an area of 171,309 square meters; EcTCAD
(c) TCT No. T-4367 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala
Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 2, plan Psu-47035) located in the
Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 218,523
square meters; and
(d) TCT No. T-4368 issued on May 18, 1988 in the name of Ayala
Corporation, covering a parcel of land (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035) located in the
Sitio of May Kokak, Bo. of Almanza, Las Piñas with an area of 155,345
square meters.
No copy of TCT No. T-4366 was attached to the complaint.
According to the complaint, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368
and their derivatives "appear to have been issued in the name of Ayala and
purport to cover and embrace the Carpo's property or portion thereof duly
covered registered under the already indefeasible and incontrovertible TCT
[No.] 296463 are inherently invalid and enforceable (sic) for not being the
duly issued derivatives of the Carpos' title." 6 The Carpos additionally
applied for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
Ayala Corporation and APVC from doing construction and development
works on the properties in purported violation of the Carpos' rights.
The complaint prayed that the trial court render judgment:
(1) canceling and declaring void TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367, T-4368
and all alleged derivatives thereof, issued in the name of Ayala Corporation
and/or APVC over the properties or portion thereof embraced in the
Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and issuing a writ of possession in favor of the
Carpos and/or ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to surrender to the
Carpos the properties or portion thereof being occupied by the said
corporations under inherently invalid or void titles; (2) declaring TCT No.
296463 issued in their names as valid and the Carpos as the owners of the
property described therein "including the parcels of land being claimed and
occupied by Ayala [Corporation] and APVC withou[t] valid and enforceable
titles"; and (3) ordering Ayala Corporation and APVC to pay jointly and
severally the amount of P100,000 as attorney's fees plus costs of suit and
litigation expenses. 7
On March 10, 1995, before defendants could file an answer, petitioners
filed an Amended Complaint, impleading respondent Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) in
lieu of Ayala Corporation after purportedly verifying with the Register of Deeds of Las
Piñas that the title to the subject property was registered in the name of ALI and not
Ayala Corporation. 8
On October 12, 1995 and January 12, 1996, ALI filed its Answer with Counterclaims and
Opposition to Application for Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction 9 and
Pre-trial Brief with Motion to Admit Amended Answer, 10 respectively. EAHcCT
In its Amended Answer, ALI alleged that APVC no longer exists having been merged with
ALI in 1991. ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367, and T-
4368 do not overlap with the Carpos' claimed property and the dispute pertained only to
the land covered by the Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las
Piñas Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala
Corporation. It appeared that Ayala Corporation contributed the property to LPVI and
LPVI had, in turn, also merged with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of
the property covered by TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back its title to Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 242 issued in 1950 while the Carpos' title was derived from OCT No. 8575
issued only in 1970. ALI also claimed the Carpos' complaint was barred by res judicata in
view of the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro 11 which upheld the
ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property as Lot 3, of Psu-80886
over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting ownership of the same
under his plan, Psu-56007.
During the pendency of the case, ALI secured a title in its own name, TCT No. T-41262,
over the property previously covered by TCT No. T-5333. 12
In the Order 13 dated March 6, 1996, the Makati RTC ruled that the present case was an
action in rem and directed the transfer of the case to the RTC of Las Piñas where the
disputed property is located. The case was thereafter assigned to Branch 255 of the Las
Piñas RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-0082.
On December 17, 1996, ALI filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that
there was allegedly no genuine issue as to any material fact and the only issue for the
court to resolve was a purely legal one — which of the two (2) titles should be accorded
priority. According to ALI, the parties were relying on their respective TCTs, and since ALI
admittedly traces its title to OCT No. 242 which was issued more than twenty (20) years
earlier than the Carpos' predecessor's title (OCT No. 8575), its title is, thus, superior.
Expectedly, the Carpos filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, arguing
that there were "genuine issues and controversies to be litigated."
In an Order dated April 7, 1997, the RTC denied ALI's motion for summary judgment. This
denial was challenged in a petition for certiorari with the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243.
In a decision 14 dated September 25, 1997, the CA granted ALI's petition and ordered the
RTC to render a summary judgment. Both parties moved for reconsideration of the CA
Decision. ALI filed a motion for partial reconsideration, entreating the CA itself to render
the summary judgment in the interest of judicial economy and on a claim that the sole
issue was legal. The Carpos, in their motion, insisted that there were genuine issues in
this case that must be threshed out in a trial. Both motions were denied in the CA
Resolution dated January 12, 1998. 15 ECISAD
Both parties elevated the matter to this Court in separate petitions for review on
certiorari. In G.R. No. 132259, ALI assailed the CA's refusal to render a summary
judgment, while in G.R. No. 132440, the Carpos assailed the CA's ruling that trial was
unnecessary.
In separate minute Resolutions, 16 the Court denied both petitions. Both parties' motions
for reconsideration were likewise denied.
Accordingly, the RTC rendered a Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998, finding
the Carpos' title superior to that of ALI and ruling, thus:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity
of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by
the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant's answer reveals that OCT No.
242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that
the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this
court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land
registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey
plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has
the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted
as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under
OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of
the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan
without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity
and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly
approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as
evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not
entitled to credit and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
character and unless the plan and its technical description are duly
approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value
(Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was ruled that the
Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey
plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes, et al., 68 SCRA
177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to
have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and
approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law,
the same is void.
It will also be noted that aside from the admissions made by defendant ALI
in its answer, it clearly appears in its title TCT No. T-5333 that the date of
survey was on July 28, 1930. Plaintiffs' property covered by TCT No. 296463
was surveyed on January 4-6, 1927. This means that plaintiffs' predecessor-
in-interest had claimed ownership of the property ahead of that of
defendant ALI's predecessor-in-interest. The principle of prior registration
cannot be applied in this case because the land previously surveyed cannot
anymore be the subject of another survey, and there is already a record of
a prior survey in the Bureau of Lands. This is precisely the reason why the
survey plan has to be approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. This
must be the reason why the later survey in favor of Ayala's predecessor-in-
interest did not anymore bear the approval of the Director of Lands
because had it been submitted for approval, the records of the Bureau of
Lands will show that an earlier survey of the same land had already been
made and approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. HTaSEA
Evidently, Ayala's claim of superiority of its title over that of the plaintiffs'
cannot therefore be sustained. Be that as it may, the fact that cannot be
disputed on the basis of Ayala's answer is its admission that SWO survey
without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands was submitted
in the alleged registration proceedings, rendering the decree and the title
issued thereunder to be tainted with irregularity and therefore void.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and the prevailing jurisprudence
on the matter, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring TCT No. 296463 in the name of the plaintiffs Spouses Morris
G. Carpo and Socorro R. Carpo as valid and legal, and superior to that of
defendant Ayala's TCT No. T-5333;
(b) Declaring TCT No. T-5333, TCT No. 125945, TCT No. T-6055, TCT No.
4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368 and their derivatives as null and void;
(c) Ordering the defendant Ayala Land, Inc. to pay the sum of P100,000.00
as attorney's fees; and
(d) To pay the costs. 17
On January 5, 1999, ALI filed a notice of appeal but the same was dismissed
by the CA in a Resolution 18 dated May 14, 1999 for failure to pay the full
amount of docket fees. In its motion for reconsideration, ALI pointed out
that it paid the full amount assessed by the cash clerk on duty at the RTC
Las Piñas. The motion was also denied, prompting ALI to file with this Court
a petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 140162. Finding ALI's petition
meritorious, the Court, in a Decision 19 dated November 22, 2000,
reversed the CA's dismissal of ALI's appeal and remanded the same to the
CA for further proceedings.
On December 22, 2003, the CA rendered the herein challenged decision in
favor of ALI, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the instant appeal is GRANTED, the
assailed Summary Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas, Branch
255, dated December 22, 1998, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a
new one is rendered as follows:
(1) TCT No. 41262, formerly TCT No. T-5333, in the name of defendant-
appellant Ayala Land, Incorporated is hereby declared to be the VALID title
to the subject property;
(2) TCT No. 296463 issued in the name of plaintiffs-appellees is declared to
be NULL and VOID;
(3) The concerned Register of Deeds is hereby ORDERED to cancel
plaintiffs-appellees' TCT No. 296463, and any and all titles issued covering
the subject property, for being spurious and void, and of no force and
effect. 20
The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the same was denied
by the CA in its Resolution dated December 16, 2004. Hence, the instant petition for
review filed by Socorro Carpo and the heirs of Morris Carpo. 21 The Petition contained
the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT IS
VALID EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SURVEY PLAN APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PETITIONERS GUILTY OF LACHES AND
PRESCRIPTION.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE RTC "RELIED HEAVILY" ON AN
ALLEGED "ADMISSION" BY RESPONDENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS
OVER THE DISPUTED PARCEL OF LAND.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS RES JUDICATA AGAINST
PETITIONERS BASED ON THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO, ET AL., 72 PHIL 415,
WITHOUT PROPER DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE FACTS IN SAID CASE ARE DIRECTLY
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF RES JUDICATA ARE
PRESENT. 22
Petitioners prayed that this Court render a decision: (a) reversing and setting aside the CA
Decision dated December 22, 2003 and Resolution dated December 16, 2004; (b)
reinstating and affirming in toto the RTC's Summary Judgment dated December 22, 1998;
or in the alternative (c) remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings. aDSIHc
After a thorough review of the records, we deny the petition and concur with the CA that
the Summary Judgment rendered by the trial court should be reversed and set aside.
Preliminary discussion regarding subject matter of the controversy
At the outset, it should be noted that the trial court in its Summary Judgment declared
null and void (a) TCT No. T-5333 (and its antecedent, TCT No. [125945] T-6055A) covering
a parcel of land with an area of 171,309 square meters; (b) TCT No. T-4366 with a land
area of 254,085 square meters; (c) TCT No. T-4367 with a land area of 218,523 square
meters; and (d) TCT No. T-4368 with a land area of 155,345 square meters, despite the
lack of evidence of identity of the properties described in TCT Nos. T-4366, T-4367 and T-
4368 with the property covered by the Carpos' TCT No. 296463 or any portion of said
property claimed by petitioners. This was grievous and palpable error on the part of the
trial court considering that the property being claimed by the Carpos under their TCT No.
296463 had an area of only 171,309 square meters and the total area of the properties in
the titles invalidated by the trial court was 799,262 square meters.
It must be emphasized that in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, involving the same parties, the CA
ruled that:
On the other hand, defendant ALI, in its responsive pleading did not deny the existence of
a title in the name of the plaintiffs/private respondents. Instead, it alleged:
"14. The parcel of land described in TCT No. 296463, issued in the name of the plaintiffs,
completely overlaps the property covered by ALI's TCT No. T-5333. But TCT No. T-296463
traces itself to OCT No. 8575 which was issued on August 12, 1970, long after OCT No.
242 (the title from which ALI's TCT No. T-5333 was derived) was issued on May 9, 1950
(on the basis of Decree of Registration No. 2917, Record No. 43516). Hence, ALI's TCT No.
T-5333 is superior to TCT No. 296463. . . . ."
This is an admission that the private respondents have a title to the property in question,
and that the property described in private respondents' TCT No. 296463 completely
overlaps the title of petitioner ALI. This fact is further substantiated by an affidavit of Jose
Rizal Mercado, a Geodetic Engineer who, after attesting to his qualifications, competence
and experience, declared under oath:
"9. In connection with the subject case, Affiant was requested to find out, based on the
technical descriptions in their respective titles, if the lots described in the title of plaintiffs,
TCT No. 296463, overlaps the lots of ALI covered by TCT No. 41262 (formerly, TCT No. T-
5333 of LPVI, and, more previously, TCT No. T (125945) 6055-A, in the name of Ayala
Corporation), TCT No. 4366, TCT No. 4367 and TCT No. 4368, . . . . HETDAC
'9.1. To accomplish this task, Affiant resorted to the plotting of the technical descriptions
found in the plaintiffs' and ALI's respective titles. The standard operating procedure,
adopted by Affiant in this particular instance, in plotting properties is to study the
technical description in the titles and at the same time, to get all the available survey
plans described in the titles for reference.
'9.2. To evidence this plotting that Affiant conducted, Affiant prepared a Sketch Plan
reflecting Plaintiffs' title vis-a-vis ALI's title. Attached hereto as Annex "G" is an original
copy of the Sketch Plan prepared by the Affiant.
'9.3. The orange-shaded portion on the Sketch Plan indicates the area covered by the title
of the plaintiffs and it is clearly shown in this plan that plaintiffs' claimed property entirely
overlaps ALI's property delineated in TCT No. T-41262. Plaintiffs' claimed property (Lot 3,
PSU-56007) is in fact identical to ALI's lot (Lot 3, PSU-80886).
'9.4. The blue, pink and green lines on the Sketch Plan indicate the
boundaries of ALI's TCT Nos. 4366, 4367 and 4368, respectively, and it is
clearly shown that these do not overlap with plaintiffs' claimed property.'"
The Sketch Plan attached thereto clearly indicates the overlapping and
identical boundaries between the private respondents' TCT No. 296463 and
petitioner's TCT No. 125945, (formerly TCT No. T-5333). 23 In addition to
the affidavit of the Geodetic Engineer, the petitioner likewise attached to
its Motion for Summary Judgment copies of the following titles:
xxx xxx xxx
In contrast, the private respondents never controverted the petitioner's
allegation that their (private respondents') title, TCT No. 296463 traces its
origin to OCT No. 8575, issued on August 12, 1970, while that of the
petitioner has its origin in OCT No. 242, issued on May 9, 1950. Moreover,
the private respondents attached no supporting document to its
Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Thus, as matters stand, the requisites for the grant of summary judgment
appear to have been satisfied . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since the existence of two titles over the same property, as well as the fact
of overlapping of the technical descriptions of the two titles are admitted in
the pleadings, and substantiated by the supporting documents attached by
the defendant-movant (petitioner herein) to its Motion for Summary
Judgment, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. If at all, the
sole issue is a legal one, to wit: whose title (as to the conflicting ones) is
superior and must be upheld. This issue may be decided on the basis of the
affidavits and supporting documents submitted by the parties, as well as
the applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter. In other words, there
need not be a protracted trial thereon, since all that the trial court should
do is to apply the law to the issue, taking into consideration the documents
attached by the parties in their respective pleadings and/or submitted
together with the motion or the opposition thereto. The same is true with
the other defenses raised by the petitioner in its responsive pleading, to
wit: res judicata, prescription and laches — which may likewise be resolved
without going to trial. 24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) ETHSAI
The foregoing CA decision became final and executory after the separate
petitions for review filed with this Court by the parties were denied with
finality. The parties, and even the trial court, were bound by the CA's
factual finding therein that the only lots whose technical descriptions
overlap are those covered by the Carpos' TCT No. 296463 and ALI's TCT No.
T-5333 which later became TCT No. T-41262. There was simply no basis for
the trial court to invalidate all the ALI titles mentioned in the complaint.
The incorrectness of this sweeping invalidation of ALI titles in the Summary
Judgment is even more evident in the case of TCT No. T-4367 (Lot 2, plan
Psu-47035) and TCT No. T-4368 (Lot 3, plan Psu-47035). Petitioners' claims
with respect to these properties are already barred by res judicata. In
Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 25 petitioner
Morris Carpo already asserted his purported ownership of these two
properties based on a transfer certificate of title with the same survey plan
number (Psu-56007) as TCT No. 296463. However, in Realty, his claim was
discredited by the Court when it held that Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.
(Realty), ALI's predecessor in interest, 26 is the one with valid title to these
properties. The relevant portions of the Realty Decision are quoted here:
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m., situated in the vicinity
of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF Homes Parañaque are covered by
three (3) distinct sets of Torrens titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the name of Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc., which was derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21,
1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976,
GLRO Record Nos. N-29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in the name of Morris G.
Carpo, which was derived from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970
pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No. N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO
Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27, 1971 in the name of
Quezon City Development and Financing Corporation, derived from OCT
No. 8931 which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC Case No. P-206
GLRO Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina
Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree
No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.,
Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of Land Registration. . . . . TDCaSE
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga, father of Dominador Mayuga,
predecessor-in-interest of Realty, who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration
proceeding docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan
Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3 are the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, Realty and
QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases, LRC Case No. 976, GLRO
Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721
filed by Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved identical parcels of land, and
identical applicants/oppositors.
xxx xxx xxx
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the original registered owners, by
virtue of a deed executed before Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated
October 9, 1970. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of Florentino Baltazar, an
oppositor in the original application filed by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier,
the CFI-Rizal confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035
"desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As
such successors of Florentino, they could not pretend ignorance of the land registration
proceedings over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo Guico,
Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as the decisions rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of Dominador Mayuga, from whom
Realty derived its title, was issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of the title
in the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails . . . . In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof . . . ." 27
(Emphasis and underscoring ours; citations omitted.)
We now discuss each assignment of error raised in the petition.
First Assignment of Error
Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in declaring that the title of respondent is valid even
without the requisite survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
Petitioners clearly misunderstood or deliberately misread the CA's ruling on this point. It
is the CA's view that the trial court's pronouncement that OCT No. 242 was issued
without an approved survey plan was unwarranted in view of the presumption of
regularity that said title enjoys. SIcTAC
We cannot but agree with the CA on this point upon perusing the following portion of the
Summary Judgment:
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity
of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by
the plaintiffs in their complaint. A reading of the defendant's answer reveals that OCT No.
242 covers the property surveyed under SWO, but the pleadings on file fail to allege that
the same was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands, thereby justifying this
court to be skeptical of the validity of the issuance of OCT No. 242. In original land
registration cases, it is mandatory that the application should be accompanied by a survey
plan of the property applied for registration, duly approved by the Director of the Bureau
of Lands. A survey plan without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands has
the character of being of dubious origin and it is not therefore worthy of being accepted
as evidence. The property being claimed by the defendant ALI, allegedly registered under
OCT No. 242, is shown to have been surveyed under SWO and not bearing the approval of
the Director of the Bureau of Lands. Any title issued emanating from a survey plan
without the approval of the Director of the Bureau of Lands is tainted with irregularity
and therefore void, as ruled in Republic Cement Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
198 SCRA 734. In the said case, the Supreme Court held: "That unless a survey plan is duly
approved by the Director of Lands the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as
evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reported survey and its alleged results are not
entitled to credit and should be rejected."
The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless
the plan and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the
same are not of much value (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). In another case, it was
ruled that the Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve
original survey plans (Director of Lands, et al. vs. Honorable Salvador Reyes,
et al., 68 SCRA 177).
Evidently, the SWO survey of the property which defendant ALI claimed to
have been originated from OCT No. 242 had not been approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands, but was apparently prepared and
approved by the then Land Registration Commissioner and under the law,
the same is void. 28
To begin with, a perusal of the defendant's answer or amended answer
would show that, contrary to the trial court's allusions thereto, there is no
admission on the part of ALI that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey
plan that was duly approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. There
is likewise no evidence on record to support the trial court's finding that
the survey plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT No. 242 in the
1950 land registration proceedings was approved only by the Land
Registration Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT No. 242
was issued without a duly approved survey plan simply because the
notation "SWO" appeared in the technical description of the said title
which was attached to the answer and due to ALI's failure to allege in its
pleadings that the survey plan submitted in support of the issuance of OCT
No. 242 was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. 29 cDHAaT
It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey
plan mentioned in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the appropriate
authority all from the notation "SWO" which appeared beside the survey
plan number on the face of the title or from a failure to allege on the part
of ALI that a duly approved survey plan exists. We quote with approval the
discussion of the CA on this point:
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court a quo erred when, in ruling that the
validity of OCT No. 242 is dubious, it gave emphasis to defendant-
appellant's failure to allege that the survey plan of OCT No. 242 was duly
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. It is admitted that a
survey plan is one of the requirements for the issuance of decrees of
registration, but upon the issuance of such decree, it can most certainly be
assumed that said requirement was complied with by ALI's original
predecessor-in-interest at the time the latter sought original registration of
the subject property. Moreover, the land registration court must be
assumed to have carefully ascertained the propriety of issuing a decree in
favor of ALI's predecessor-in-interest, under the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions by public officers. The court upon
which the law has conferred jurisdiction, is deemed to have all the
necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction, and to have exercised it
effectively. This is as it should be, because once a decree of registration is
made under the Torrens system, and the time has passed within which that
decree may be questioned the title is perfect and cannot later on be
questioned. There would be no end to litigation if every litigant could, by
repeated actions, compel a court to review a decree previously issued by
another court forty-five (45) years ago. The very purpose of the Torrens
system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought
under a second action for registration, as what the court a quo did when it
faulted ALI's failure to allege that its predecessor-in-interest submitted a
survey plan approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands in the original
land registration case.
The Court need not emphasize that it is not for ALI to allege in its pleadings,
much less prove, that its predecessor-in-interest complied with the
requirements for the original registration of the subject property. A party
dealing with a registered land need not go beyond the Certificate of Title to
determine the true owner thereof so as to guard or protect his or her
interest. Hence, ALI was not required to go beyond what appeared in the
transfer certificate of title in the name of its immediate transferor. It may
rely solely, as it did, on the correctness of the certificate of title issued for
the subject property and the law will in no way oblige it to go behind the
certificate of title to determine the condition of the property. This is the
fundamental nature of the Torrens System of land registration, to give the
public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further. 30 (Underscoring ours;
citations omitted.)
It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the
registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land
registration proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, OCT No. 242 and its derivatives, including ALI's TCT No. T-41262,
enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need not allege or prove that
its title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a
presumption, it dispenses with proof. Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides: DCAHcT
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and
passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute
submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; . . . .
Thus, we held in Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna: 31
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No.
6763, showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on March 3, 1911, is presumed to have
been regularly issued by the accountable public officers who enjoy the legal presumption
of regularity in the performance of their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the
issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be
overturned without any countervailing proof to the contrary. In the words of Tichangco v.
Enriquez: 32
To overturn this legal presumption carelessly — more than 90 years since the termination
of the case — will not only endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying
principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so would reduce the vaunted legal
indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage. (Emphasis supplied.)
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No. 976
and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the requisites for the issuance of a
valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly approved
survey plan accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It
is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who would have the burden to
present adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not even
attempt to do.
We cannot accept petitioners' proposition that they did not have the burden of proof of
showing the irregularity of ALI's title since the burden of proof purportedly did not shift to
them since no full-blown trial was conducted by the RTC.
This specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
provides: ADTCaI
Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law.
With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all the bases of
their cause of action, particularly their allegation that ALI's title is null and void and that
such title should be cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that
petitioners never alleged the purported lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of
ALI's title. All that the complaint alleged is that ALI's titles should be declared void for not
being derivatives of the Carpos' title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners were
relying solely on the supposed priority of their own title over ALI's. It stands to reason
then that ALI did not have to allege in its Answer that its mother title, OCT No. 242, was
supported by a duly approved survey plan when petitioners did not raise the same as an
issue in their complaint or in any other pleading filed with the trial court.
Indubitably, in view of the CA's Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 44243, this controversy has
been reduced to the sole substantive issue of which between the two titles, purporting to
cover the same property, deserves priority. This is hardly a novel issue. As petitioners
themselves are aware, in Realty, it was held that:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in the case of two
certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails . . . . In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a
particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the
person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof . . . ." 33
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite, 34 we held that "[w]here two certificates of
title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to
trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived."
In all, we find that the CA committed no reversible error when it applied the principle
"Primus Tempore, Portior Jure" (First in Time, Stronger in Right) in this case and found
that ALI's title was the valid title having been derived from the earlier OCT.
Second Assignment of Error
Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their
cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. According to
them, since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a
duly approved survey plan, their cause of action did not prescribe.
However, as discussed above, the conclusion of the trial court that OCT No.
242 is void was not sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record. Verily,
the premise upon which petitioners build their theory of imprescriptibility
of their action did not exist.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CA's finding that:
As previously emphasized, OCT No. 242 of ALI's predecessor-in-interest was
issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before plaintiffs-appellees
filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Court's firmly
held view that plaintiffs-appellees' claim is barred not only by prescription,
but also by laches. CTSAaH
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after
the lapse of one (1) year from the time a decree of registration was issued,
any action for reconveyance that plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of
is also barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees' complaint was for quieting of
title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in said
complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of
OCT No. 242 in favor of ALI's predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled
that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal remedy granted to a
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in another's name, must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the
title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALI's title
is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period expired
in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere
lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion
or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances
inequitable or unfair to permit. In the instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as
well as their predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken
judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from which ALI's title was derived, for
forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now, and if successful, would
be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the validity of said
OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by the precise
provisions of P.D. 1529, thus:
"SECTION 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
value. — The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised . . .
subject, however, to the right of any person . . . to file in the proper Court
of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of entry of such
decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by
the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or
an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase
innocent purchaser for value or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree,
it shall be deemed to include and innocent lessee, mortgagee or other
encumbrances for value." 35
Third Assignment of Error
The next assigned error involves the question of whether the trial court, in
rendering the Summary Judgment, indeed relied heavily on the alleged
admission made by ALI on the validity of Carpos' title, as declared by the
CA. Specifically, the CA stated as follows:
In its assailed decision, the court a quo relied heavily on the alleged
admission by ALI in it[s] Answer of the existence and validity of plaintiffs-
appellees' title. We have read the pertinent pleading and We find ALI's
statement to be of no moment. aTHCSE
Nowhere in ALI's statement was there an admission of the validity of
plaintiffs-appellees' title. . . . .
The Court cannot comprehend where and how the court a quo could have
gotten the impression that ALI was admitting not only the existence, but
also the validity of plaintiffs-appellees' certificate of title. . . . . 36
An examination of the Summary Judgment of the trial court would readily
show that indeed the trial court relied on ALI's supposed admission of the
existence of Carpos' title in ruling which of the conflicting titles was valid.
Pertinently, the trial court merely declared:
The existence of plaintiffs' TCT No. 296463 has been admitted by defendant
Ayala in its answer to have been originated from OCT No. 8575 which was
issued on August 12, 1970. It is very significant that defendant ALI admitted it in its
answer that OCT No. 8575 and plaintiffs' TCT No. 296463 both originated from Decree No.
131141 issued on October 15, 1969 in the name of Apolonio Sabater as Annex "G" to
defendant ALI's answer. This admission made by the defendant in its answer is conclusive
upon it. It cannot therefore take position contrary to or inconsistent with its answer, and
the facts are to be taken as true (Westminister High School vs. Sto. Domingo, et al., G.R.
No. 12666 R-July 5, 1955; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248-255).
Upon the other hand, this Court is not inclined to concur with Ayala's claim of the validity
of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242 absent of any admission to that effect by
the plaintiffs in their complaint. . . . . 37
Although the Summary Judgment did not expressly state that ALI admitted the validity of
Carpos' title with its admission of the said title's existence, that is the unmistakable
import of the trial court's statements that ALI's admission of the existence of Carpo's title
"are conclusive upon it" and bars ALI from taking a "position contrary to or inconsistent
with its answer" followed by the statement that the trial court is "not inclined to concur
with Ayala's claim of validity of its TCT No. T-5333 and alleged OCT No. 242, absent of (sic)
any admission to that effect by the plaintiffs." This is yet another non sequitur argument
on the part of the trial court which the CA correctly pointed out in its own Decision.
Fourth Assignment of Error
As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the decision in the case of
Guico v. San Pedro 38 was binding on the Carpos as it proceeded to discuss, thus:
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting claims over a tract of
land situated in barrio Tindig na Manga, Parañaque, Rizal, which was subdivided into
eleven (11) lots. The subject land was sought to be registered by a certain Eduardo C.
Guico on the basis of an accompanying plan Psu-80886, which interestingly is also the
basis of ALI's TCT No. T-5333, now TCT No. 41262. Guico's application was opposed by,
among others, Florentino Baltazar, on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-
appellees' title was derived. HTCESI
It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is
the subject matter of the instant case), Lot 10 in favor of Baltazar on the basis of Psu
56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees' title was based, and the rest to the heirs of
Narciso Mayuga. While Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his Psu-56007, his claim was
rejected and the Lot was adjudicated to Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.
It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees have on the subject property
on the basis of Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their predecessor-in-interest, Florentino
Baltazar, the same had been clearly and finally denied by the Supreme Court in Guico vs.
San Pedro.
For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections with respect to
the fourth requisite, offering the lame excuse that it is not bound by such decision, there
being no identity of parties in Guico vs. San Pedro and the instant case. 39
We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of Guico and the
evidence on record that indeed the predecessors-in-interest of ALI and the Carpos with
respect to the subject property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially
since the parties' respective OCTs were not issued in these persons' names but rather a
certain Alberto Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be categorically said that
there was identity of parties between the Guico case and the instant case. Clearly, one of
the elements of res judicata, i.e., that there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, is lacking. In any event, the CA's questioned Decision had
sufficient basis in fact and law even without relying on the Guico case.
In conclusion, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in setting
aside the patently erroneous Summary Judgment of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December 22,
2003 and the Resolution dated December 16, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Spouses Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 166577, [February 3, 2010], 625 PHIL 277-
304)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 173120. July 26, 2017.]
SPOUSES YU HWA PING and MARY GAW, petitioners, vs. AYALA LAND, INC.,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 173141. July 26, 2017.]
HEIRS OF SPOUSES ANDRES DIAZ and JOSEFA MIA, petitioners, vs. AYALA
LAND, INC., respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
These petitions for review on certiorari seek to reverse and set aside the
June 19, 2006 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV Nos.
61593 and 70622, which reversed and set aside its February 8, 2005
Amended Decision 2 and reinstated its February 28, 2003 Decision, 3 in a
case for annulment of title and surveys, recovery of possession and judicial
confirmation of title.
The Antecedents
On March 17, 1921, petitioners Spouses Andres Diaz and Josefa Mia
(Spouses Diaz) submitted to the General Land Registration Office for
approval of the Director of Lands a survey plan designated as Psu-25909,
which covered a parcel of land located at Sitio of Kay Monica, Barrio Pugad
Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal, with an aggregate area of 460,626 square meters
covered by Lot 1. On May 26, 1921, the Director of Lands approved survey
plan Psu-25909.
On October 21, 1925, another survey plan was done covering Lot 3 of the
same parcel of land designated as Psu-47035 for a certain Dominador
Mayuga. The said survey, however, stated that the lot was situated at Sitio
May Kokek, Barrio Almanza, Las Piñas, Rizal. Then, on July 28, 1930,
another survey was undertaken designated as Psu-80886 for a certain
Eduardo C. Guico (Guico). Again, the survey indicated a different address
that the lots were situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Rizal.
Finally, on March 6, 1931, an additional survey plan was executed over the
similar parcel of land designated as Psu-80886/SWO-20609 for a certain
Alberto Yaptinchay (Yaptinchay). Psu-80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609
covered Lot 2, with 158,494 square meters, and Lot 3, with 171,309 square
meters, of the same land.
On May 9, 1950, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 242 was issued in
favor of Yaptinchay covering Lots 2 and 3 pursuant to Psu-80886/SWO-
20609. On May 11, 1950, OCT No. 244 was also issued to Yaptinchay. On
May 21, 1958, OCT No. 1609 covering Lot 3 pursuant to Psu-47035 was
issued in favor of Dominador Mayuga. On May 18, 1967, some of
properties were sold to CPJ Corporation resulting in the issuance of
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 190713 in its name.
On February 16, 1968, petitioner Andres Diaz filed a petition for original
registration before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pasay for Lot No. 1 of
Psu-25909. On October 19, 1969, judgment was rendered by the CFI of
Pasay for the original registration of Psu-25909 in favor of Andres Diaz. On
May 19, 1970, OCT No. 8510 was issued in the name of Spouses Diaz. On
May 21, 1970, the Spouses Diaz subdivided their 460,626 square meter
property covered by OCT No. 8510 into ten (10) lots, described as Lots No.
1-A to 1-J and conveyed to different third parties.
On May 17, 1971, CPJ Corporation, then owner of the land covered by TCT
No. 190713, which originated from OCT No. 242, filed Land Registration
Case No. N-24-M before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
166, against Spouses Diaz and other named respondents (Diaz Case). It
sought to review OCT No. 8510 in the names of Spouses Diaz on the ground
that the interested persons were not notified of the application.
On August 30, 1976 and December 4, 1976, Andres Diaz sold to Librado
Cabautan (Cabautan) the following parcels of land, which originated from
OCT No. 8510 under Psu-25909, to wit:
1. Lot 1-I, with an area of 190,000 square meters covered by the new TCT
No. 287416;
2. Lot 1-B, with an area of 135,000 square meters covered by the new TCT
No. 287411;
3. Lot 1-A with an area of 125,626 square meters covered by the new TCT
No. 287412; and
4. Lot 1-D, with an area of 10,000 square meters also covered by the new TCT No.
287412. 4
On March 12, 1993, petitioner Spouses Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw (Spouses Yu) acquired
ownership over 67,813 square meters representing the undivided half-portion of Lot 1-A
originating from OCT No. 8510 of Spouses Diaz. The said property was co-owned by
Spouses Diaz with Spouses Librado and Susana Cabautan resulting from a civil case
decided by the RTC of Makati on March 29, 1986.
On January 27, 1994, Spouses Yu acquired ownership over Lot 1-B originating from OCT
No. 8510 of Spouses Diaz with an area of 135,000 square meters. Pursuant to the
transfers of land to Spouses Yu, TCT Nos. 39408 and 64549 were issued in their names.
On the other hand, on May 4, 1980, CPJ Corporation transferred their interest in the
subject properties to third persons. Later, in 1988, Ayala Corporation obtained the subject
properties from Goldenrod, Inc. and PESALA. In 1992, pursuant to the merger of
respondent Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) and Las Piñas Ventures, Inc., ALI acquired all the subject
properties, as follows:
1. Lot 3 which originated from OCT No. 1609 under Psu-47035 and covered by a new TCT
No. 41325;
2. Lot 2 which originated from OCT No. 242 under Psu-80886/SWO-20609 and covered by
a new TCT No. 41263;
3. Lot 3 which originated from OCT No. 242 under Psu-80886/SWO-20609 and covered by
a new TCT No. 41262; and
4. Lot 6 which originated from OCT No. 242 under Psu-80886/SWO-20609 and covered by
a new TCT No. 41261. 5
First RTC Ruling
Returning to the Diaz case, on December 13, 1995, the RTC of Pasig City rendered a
Decision 6 against Spouses Diaz. It held that OCT No. 8510 and all the transfer certificates
issued thereunder must be cancelled. The RTC of Pasig City opined that Spouses Diaz
committed fraud when they filed their application for original registration of land without
informing the interested parties therein in violation of Sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496.
It also held that Spouses Diaz knew that CPJ Corporation had an appropriate interest over
the subject properties.
Aggrieved, Spouses Diaz elevated an appeal before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
61593.
Meanwhile, sometime in August 1995, Spouses Yu visited their lots. To their surprise,
they discovered that ALI had already clandestinely fenced the area and posted guards
thereat and they were prevented from entering and occupying the same. 7 They also
discovered that the transfer of certificates of titles covering parcels of land overlapping
their claim were in the name of ALI under TCT Nos. 41325, 41263, 41262, and 41261.
On December 4, 1996, Spouses Yu filed a complaint before the RTC of Las Piñas City,
Branch 255, against ALI for declaration of nullity of the TCTs issued in the name of the
latter (Yu case). They also sought the recovery of possession of the property covered by
ALI's title which overlapped their land alleging that Spouses Diaz, their predecessors had
open, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the same from 1921 until it was
transferred to Cabautan in 1976. Spouses Yu averred that Cabautan possessed the said
land until it was sold to them in 1994. 8 They likewise sought the judicial confirmation of
the validity of their titles.
Spouses Yu principally alleged that the titles of ALI originated from OCT Nos. 242, 244,
and 1609, which were covered by Psu-80886 and Psu-47035. The said surveys were
merely copied from Psu-25909, which was prepared at an earlier date, and the Director of
Lands had no authority to approve one or more surveys by different claimants over the
same parcel of land. 9 They asserted that OCT No. 8510 and its transfer certificates, which
covered the Psu-25909, must be declared valid against the titles of ALI.
The RTC of Las Piñas ordered the conduct of a verification survey to help in the just and
proper disposition of the case. Engr. Veronica Ardina-Remolar from the Bureau of Lands,
the court-appointed commissioner, supervised the verification survey, and the parties
sent their respective surveyors. After the verification survey was completed and the
parties presented all their pieces of evidence, the case was submitted for resolution.
Second RTC Ruling
In its May 7, 2001 Decision, 10 the RTC of Las Piñas ruled in favor of Spouses Yu. It held
that based on the verification survey and the testimonies of the parties' witnesses, OCT
Nos. 242, 244, and 1609 overlapped OCT No. 8510. The RTC of Las Piñas also pointed out,
and extensively discussed, that Psu-80886 and Psu-47035, which were the bases of OCT
Nos. 242, 244, and 1609, were marred with numerous and blatant errors. It opined that
ALI did not offer any satisfactory explanation regarding the glaring discrepancies of Psu-
80886 and Psu-47035. On the other hand, it observed that Psu-25909, the basis of OCT
No. 8510, had no irregularity in its preparation. Thus, the RTC of Las Piñas concluded that
the titles of ALI were void ab initio because their original titles were secured through
fraudulent surveys. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in that the
three transfer certificates issued in the name of Ayala Land, Inc. by the
Register of Deeds in the City of Las Piñas, namely, Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 41325, 41263 and 41262 all covering Lots Nos. 1, 2 and 6 of
survey plans PSU-47035, PSU-80886, Psu-80886/SWO-20609, the original
survey under PSU-47035 and decree of registration no. N-63394, and
Original Certificate of Title No. 1609 issue in favor of Dominador Mayuga,
including all other titles, survey and decrees pertaining thereto and from or
upon which the aforesaid titles emanate, are hereby declared spurious and
void ab initio. In the same vein, the Court upholds the validity of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. TCT Nos. T-64549 covering Lot 1-A in the name of
Mary Gaw, spouse of Yu Hwa Ping, and T-39408 covering Lot 1-B in the
name of Yu Hwa Ping (both originating from Original Certificate of Title No.
8510) pursuant to plan PSU-25909 undertaken on March 17, 1921. The
defendant is also ordered to pay the plaintiffs temperate damages in the
amount of One Million Pesos (PHP1,000,000.00) exemplary damages in the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP500,000.00), and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
Unconvinced, ALI appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 70622. Eventually, said appeal was consolidated with the
earlier appeal of Spouses Diaz in CA-G.R. CV No. 61593.
The CA Rulings
In its decision, dated June 19, 2003, the CA ruled in favor of ALI. It held that
in the Diaz case, the RTC of Pasig properly cancelled OCT No. 8510 because
Spouses Diaz committed fraud. It opined that Spouses Diaz knew of CPJ
Corporation's interest over the subject land but failed to inform it of their
application.
With respect to the Yu case, the CA ruled that Spouses Yu could no longer
assert that the titles of ALI were invalid because the one-year period to
contest the title had prescribed. Hence, ALI's titles were incontestable. The
CA underscored that the errors cited by the RTC of Las Piñas in Psu-80886
and Psu-47035, upon which the titles of ALI were based, were innocuous or
already explained. It also stressed that OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609, from
which the titles of ALI originated, were issued in 1950 and 1958; while the
OCT No. 8510, from which the titles of Spouses Yu originated, was only
issued in 1970. As the original titles of ALI predated that of Spouses Yu, the
CA concluded that the former titles were superior.
Undaunted, Spouses Yu and Spouses Diaz filed their motions for
reconsideration.
In its decision, dated February 8, 2005, the CA granted Spouses Yu and
Spouses Diaz' motions for reconsideration. It opined that the numerous
errors in Psu-80886 and Psu-47035 were serious and these affected the
validity of the original titles upon which the surveys were based. In
contrast, the CA noted that Psu-25909, upon which the original titles of
Spouses Yu and Spouses Diaz were based, bore all the hallmarks of verity.
The CA also emphasized that in Guico v. San Pedro, 12 the Court already
recognized the defects surrounding Psu-80886. In that case, the Court
noted that the applicant-predecessor of Psu-80886 was not able to submit
the corresponding measurements of the land and he failed to prove that he
had occupied and cultivated the land continuously since the filing of their
application. The CA likewise cited (1) the certification from the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources-Land Management Bureau (DENR-
LMB) that Psu-80886 was included in the list of restricted plans because of
the doubtful signature of the surveyor, and (2) the memorandum, dated
August 3, 2000, from the Assistant Regional Director for Operations of the
DENR directing all personnel of the Land Survey Division not to issue copies
or technical descriptions of Psu-80886 and Psu-47035.
The CA further wrote that the slavish adherence to the issue of prescription
and laches by ALI should not be countenanced. It declared that the
doctrine that registration done fraudulently is no registration at all prevails
over the rules on equity. With respect to the Diaz case, the CA held that
Spouses Diaz had no obligation to inform CPJ Corporation and its
successors about their registration because the original titles of the latter,
from which their transferred titles were derived, were based on fraudulent
surveys.
Undeterred, ALI filed a second motion for reconsideration.
In its assailed June 19, 2006 decision, the CA granted the second motion for
reconsideration in favor of ALI. It reversed and set aside its February 8,
2005 decision and reinstated its February 28, 2003 decision. The CA held
that Guico v. San Pedro did not categorically declare that Psu-80886 was invalid and it
even awarded some of the lots to the applicant; and that the certification of DENR-LMB
and the memorandum of the Assistant Director of the DENR could not be considered by
the courts because these were not properly presented in evidence.
The CA reiterated its ruling that Spouses Yu could no longer question the validity of the
registrations of OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609 because the one-year reglementary period
from the time of registration had already expired and these titles were entitled to the
presumption of regularity. Thus, once a decree of registration was made under the
Torrens system, and the reglementary period had lapsed, the title was perfected and
could not be collaterally attacked. The CA also stressed that the noted discrepancies in
Psu-80886 and Psu-47035 were immaterial to assail the validity of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and
1609, which were registered earlier than OCT No. 8510.
Hence, these petitions, anchored on the following:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER THE COMPLAINT OF SPOUSES YU IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION
II
WHETHER THE VALIDITY OF THE SURVEYS OF OCT NOS. 242, 244 AND 1609 AS AGAINST
OCT NO. 8510 CAN BE ASSAILED IN THE PRESENT CASE
III
WHETHER THE CASE OF GUICO V. SAN PEDRO IS APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE
IV
WHETHER THE ALLEGED ERRORS IN PSU-80886 AND PSU-47035 ARE OF SUCH DEGREE SO
AS TO INVALIDATE OCT NOS. 242, 244 AND 1609 AND ITS TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF
TITLES
In their Memorandum, 13 the petitioners chiefly argue that the complaint filed by
Spouses Yu is not barred by the one-year prescriptive period under Act No. 496 because
an action to annul the fraudulent registration of land is imprescriptible; that there are
several and conspicuous irregularities in Psu-80886 and Psu-47035 which cast doubt on
the validity of OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609; that Guico v. San Pedro did not categorically
award Lots No. 2 and 3 covered by Psu-80886 to the applicant therein because he was
still required to submit an amended plan duly approved by the Director of Lands; that the
applicant in Guico v. San Pedro never submitted any amended plan, hence, no lot was
awarded under Psu-80886 and its irregularity was affirmed by the Supreme Court; that
the registration of OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609 on a date earlier than OCT No. 8510 did
not render them as the superior titles; that in case of two conflicting titles, the court must
look into the source of the titles; that the sources of the titles, Psu-80886 and Psu-47035,
had numerous errors that could not be satisfactorily explained by ALI; and that Psu-25909
had the hallmark of regularity and it was approved by the Director of Lands at an earlier
date.
In its Memorandum, 14 ALI essentially countered that in the June 19, 2006 decision, the
CA properly disregarded the certification of DENR-LMB and the memorandum of the
Assistant Director of the DENR because these were not presented in evidence; that Guico
v. San Pedro recognized the registrability of Lots No. 2 and 3 under Psu-80886; that the
RTC of Las Piñas did not have jurisdiction to look beyond the details of the decrees of
registration; that the registration of a land under the Torrens system carries with it a
presumption of regularity; that in case of conflict between two certificates of title, the
senior and superior title must be given full effect and validity; and that the alleged errors
in the Psu-80886 and Psu-47035 were sufficiently explained.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the petitions meritorious.
The present case essentially involves the issue: between the registered titles of the
petitioners and ALI, which is more superior? Before the said issue can be discussed
thoroughly, the Court must first settle whether the actions instituted by the petitioners
were filed within the reglementary periods.
The actions were filed
within their respective
prescriptive periods
The Diaz case was a petition for review before the RTC of Pasig. It assailed OCT No. 8510
in the names of Spouses Diaz on the ground that the said title was issued through fraud
because the interested persons were not informed of their application for registration.
Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, "any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud [may] file in the competent Court of
First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest." 15
Here, OCT No. 8510 was issued in the name of Spouses Diaz on May 21,
1970. On the other hand, the petition for review of CPJ Corporation was
filed on May 17, 1971. Thus, the said petition was timely filed and the RTC
of Pasig could tackle the issues raised therein. When the RTC of Pasig ruled
in favor of CPJ Corporation, Spouses Diaz appealed to the CA. In the same
manner, when they received an unfavorable judgment from the CA,
Spouses Diaz filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court.
Accordingly, the appeal of Spouses Diaz is proper and it can be adjudicated
on the merits.
On the other hand, the Yu case began when they filed a complaint before
the RTC of Las Piñas against ALI for declaration of nullity of the TCTs issued
in the name of the latter because of the spurious, manipulated and void
surveys of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609. They also sought the recovery of
possession of the property covered by ALI's title that overlapped their land
alleging that their predecessors, Spouses Diaz, had open, uninterrupted
and adverse possession of the same from 1921 until it was transferred to
Cabautan in 1976. Spouses Yu also alleged that Cabautan possessed the
said land until it was sold to them in 1994. 16 It was only in August 1995
that they discovered that ALI clandestinely fenced their property and
prevented them from occupying the same. They also sought the judicial
confirmation of the validity of their titles.
ALI argues that the complaint of Yu is barred by prescription because it was
filed beyond the one-year period under Section 38 of Act No. 496. On the
other hand, Spouses Yu assert that their action was imprescriptible because
they sought to set aside the titles that were obtained through void surveys
and they assert that the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does
not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title.
The Court finds that the complaint of Spouses Yu is not barred by
prescription. While Section 38 of Act No. 496 states that the petition for
review to question a decree of registration must be filed within one (1)
year after entry of the decree, such provision is not the only remedy of an
aggrieved party who was deprived of land by fraudulent means. The
remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date
of the decree, not to set aside the decree, as was done in this case, but,
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance
or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, for damages. 17
Uy v. Court of Appeals 18 remarkably explained the prescriptive periods of
an action for reconveyance depending on the ground relied upon, to wit:
The law creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and
its title in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of
PD No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144 (2) of the
Civil Code, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title. This ten-year prescriptive period begins
to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust, which
repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. An
exception to this rule is when the party seeking reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust is in actual, continuous and peaceful
possession of the property involved. Prescription does not commence to
run against him because the action would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
The foregoing cases on the prescriptibility of actions for reconveyance
apply when the action is based on fraud, or when the contract used as basis
for the action is voidable. Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, a contract is
voidable when the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. When the
consent is totally absent and not merely vitiated, the contract is void. An
action for reconveyance may also be based on a void contract. When the
action for reconveyance is based on a void contract, as when there was no
consent on the part of the alleged vendor, the action is imprescriptible. The
property may be reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding the TCTs
already issued in another's name. The issuance of a certificate of title in the
latter's favor could not vest upon him or her ownership of the property;
neither could it validate the purchase thereof which is null and void.
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our
land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he
actually has. Being null and void, the sale produces no legal effects
whatsoever.
Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore
determined by the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a
claim of the existence of an implied or constructive trust, or one based on
the existence of a void or inexistent contract. x x x 19
As discussed-above, when the action for reconveyance is based on an implied or
constructive trust, the prescriptive period is ten (10) years, or it is imprescriptible if the
movant is in the actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved. On
the other hand, when the action for reconveyance is based on a void deed or contract the
action is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the New Civil Code. 20 As long as the land
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system is still in the name of the person who
caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to compel him to reconvey the
property to the real owner. 21
In Hortizuela v. Tagufa, 22 the complainant therein filed an action for reconveyance and
recovery of possession with damages for a parcel of land which was wrongfully granted a
patent or decree issued in a registration proceedings in the name of a third person. The
CA and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court initially dismissed the complaint because it
allegedly questioned the validity of the Torrens title in a collateral proceeding and it had
prescribed. When the case reached the Court, it ruled that the instituted complaint had
not prescribed because "in a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What is being sought is the
transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name to its
rightful owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration of the land is
fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee,
and the real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property." 23 It
was eventually ruled therein that the action for reconveyance was proper and the
possession was recovered.
In this case, Spouses Yu sought to reconvey to them once and for all the titles over the
subject properties. To prove that they had a superior right, they questioned the validity of
the surveys which were the bases of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609, the origin of ALI's TCTs.
Moreover, they also sought to recover the possession that was clandestinely taken away
from them. Thus, as the subject matter of this case is the ownership and possession of the
subject properties, Spouses Yu's complaint is an action for reconveyance, which is not
prohibited by Section 38 of Act No. 496.
Moreover, a reading of Spouses Yu's complaint reveals that they are seeking to declare
void ab initio the titles of ALI and their predecessors-in-interest as these were based on
spurious, manipulated and void surveys. 24 If successful, the original titles of ALI's
predecessors-in-interest shall be declared void and, hence, they had no valid object to
convey. It would result to a void contract or deed because the subject properties did not
belong to the said predecessors-in-interest. Accordingly, the Yu case involves an action
for reconveyance based on a void deed or contract which is imprescriptible under Article
1410 of the New Civil Code.
Further, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA in its February 8, 2005 Amended
Decision, to wit:
9. In light of the circumstances, we feel that a slavish adherence to the doctrine being
invoked by ALI with respect to alleged prescription and laches, should not be
countenanced. The said axioms do not possess talismanic powers, the mere invocation of
which will successfully defeat any and all attempts by those who claim to be the real
owners of property, to set aright what had been done through fraud and imposition.
Consistent with the doctrine that registration done fraudulently is no registration at all,
then this court must not allow itself to be swayed by appeals to a strict interpretation of
what are, after all, principles based on equity. To rule otherwise would be to reward
deception and duplicity and place a premium on procedural niceties at the expense of
substantial justice. 25
Neither can ALI be considered an innocent purchaser for value of the subject properties.
As discussed by the RTC of Las Piñas, when ALI purchased the subject lots from their
predecessors-in-interest in 1988, the titles bore notices of the pending cases and adverse
claims sufficient to place it on guard. In the TCTs of ALI, the notices of lis pendens
indicated therein were sufficient notice that the ownership of the properties were being
disputed. The trial court added that even the certified true copy of Psu-80886 had
markings that it had been used in some other cases as early as March 7, 1959. 26
Accordingly, ALI is covered by the present action for reconveyance. As both the Diaz and
Yu cases were properly filed and are not barred by prescription, these can be adjudicated
by the Court on the merits.
The Rule — that between
two (2) conflicting titles,
the title registered earlier
prevails — is Not Absolute
The June 19, 2006 and February 28, 2003 decisions of the CA essentially ruled that ALI's
titles were superior to those of the petitioners because OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609 were
registered earlier than OCT No. 8510. The CA emphasized that the general rule was that
in case of two certificates of title purporting to include the same land, the earlier date
prevails. This general rule was first discussed in Legarda v. Saleeby, 27 as follows:
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons,
has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the
"torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory
provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of
the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of
two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be
wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. x x x In
successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under
the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose
claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder
of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof x x x. 28
The said general rule has been repeated by the Court in its subsequent
decisions in Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 29 MWSS v. Court of Appeals, 30
Spouses Carpo v. Ayala Land, Inc., 31 and recently in Jose Yulo Agricultural
Corp. v. Spouses Davis. 32 Nevertheless, the rule on superiority is not
absolute. The same case of Legarda v. Saleeby explains the exception to the
rule, viz.:
Hogg adds however that, "if it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary
rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of
the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may
be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive." 33 [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, if the inclusion of the land in the earlier registered title was a
result of a mistake, then the latter registered title will prevail. The ratio
decidendi of this exception is to prevent a title that was earlier registered,
which erroneously contained a parcel of land that should not have been
included, from defeating a title that was later registered but is legitimately
entitled to the said land. It reinforced the doctrine that "[r]egistering a
piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title
because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of
title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein." 34
In his book, Land Registration and Related Proceedings, 35 Atty. Amado D.
Aquino further explained that the principle of according superiority to a
certificate of title earlier in date cannot, however, apply if it was procured
through fraud or was otherwise jurisdictionally flawed. Thus, if there is a
compelling and genuine reason to set aside the rule on the superiority of
earlier registered title, the Court may look into the validity of the title
bearing the latter date of registration, taking into consideration the
evidence presented by the parties.
In Golloy v. Court of Appeals, 36 there were two conflicting titles with
overlapping boundaries. The first title was registered on March 1, 1918,
while the second title was registered on August 15, 1919. Despite having
been registered at a prior date, the Court did not allow the earlier
registered title of the respondents to prevail because of the continuing
possession of the petitioners therein and the laches committed by the
respondents. Hence, the holder of an earlier registered title does not, in all
instances, absolutely triumph over a holder of a latter registered title.
In this case, the petitioners assail the numerous and serious defects in the
surveys of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609, which cast doubt on the inclusion
of the subject lands in ALI's titles. Accordingly, the Court must delve into
the merits of their contentions to determine whether the subject
properties are truly and genuinely included in ALI's title. Merely relying on
the date of registration of the original titles is insufficient because it is the
surveys therein that are being assailed. It is only through a judicious
scrutiny of the evidence presented may the Court determine whether to
apply the general rule or the exception in the superiority of titles with an
earlier registration date.
The survey of the registered
land may be scrutinized by
the courts when compelling
reasons exist
In its June 19, 2006 decision, the CA emphasized that OCT Nos. 242, 244,
and 1609 carry with it the presumption of regularity and that the surveys
therein were presumably undertaken by qualified surveyors before the
issuance of the titles. In effect, the appellate court declares that the
surveys of these titles should no longer be inspected.
The Court does not agree.
Although a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein, 37 it is not a conclusive proof of ownership. It is a well-
settled rule that ownership is different from a certificate of title. The fact
that a person was able to secure a title in his name does not operate to
vest ownership upon him of the subject land. Registration of a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or
title over the particular property described therein. It cannot be used to protect a usurper
from the true owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither
does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in favor of a
particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-
owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for
another person by the registered owner. 38
Hence, the Court may inquire into the validity of the ownership of a property by
scrutinizing the movant's evidence of title and the basis of such title. When there is
compelling proof that there is doubt on the validity of the sources or basis of such title,
then an examination is proper. Thus, the surveys of the certificates of title are not
immune from judicial scrutiny, in light of the genuine and legitimate reasons for its
analysis.
In Dizon v. Rodriguez 39 and Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 40 the Court confronted the validity
of the surveys conducted on the lands to determine whether the title was properly
subdivided. It was ruled therein that subdivision plan Psd-27941 was erroneous because it
was "prepared not in accordance with the technical descriptions in TCT No. T-722 but in
disregard of it, support the conclusion reached by both the lower court and the Court of
Appeals that Lots 49 and 1 are actually part of the territorial waters and belong to the
State." 41 Accordingly, the sole method for the Court to determine the validity of the title
was to dissect the survey upon which it was sourced. As a result, it was discovered that
the registered titles therein contained areas which belong to the sea and foreshore lands.
Here, only a direct review of the surveys of OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609, as well as OCT
No. 8510 can resolve the issue on the validity of these titles. The findings of the RTC of Las
Piñas and the CA differ with respect to the cited errors in the surveys. The Court is
convinced that through a rigorous study of the affected surveys, the valid owners of the
subject properties are can be finally adjudicated.
Finally, after resolving the various preliminary issues, the Court can now tackle the crux of
these petitions — the validity of Psu-25909, Psu-47035, Psu-80886, and Psu-80886/SWO-
20609. The resolution of this issue will decisively determine the true and rightful owner of
the subject properties.
Psu-47035, Psu-80886 and
Psu-80886/SWO-20609 contain
numerous and serious irregularities
which cast doubt on the validity of
OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609
At the onset, the present case poses an issue on the validity of registered and overlapping
titles based on their surveys. The Court must commend the RTC of Las Piñas for taking the
correct procedure in resolving such issue.
In Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp. v. Eridanus Development, Inc., 42 it was ruled
that a case of overlapping of boundaries or encroachment depends on a reliable, if not
accurate, verification survey; barring one, no overlapping or encroachment may be
proved successfully, for obvious reasons. The first step in the resolution of such cases is
for the court to direct the proper government agency concerned to conduct a verification
or relocation survey and submit a report to the court, or constitute a panel of
commissioners for the purpose. In that case, the Court lamented that the trial court
therein did not order the conduct of a verification survey and the appointment of
geodetic engineers as commissioners, to wit:
This is precisely the reason why the trial court should have officially appointed a
commissioner or panel of commissioners and not leave the initiative to secure one to the
parties: so that a thorough investigation, study and analysis of the parties' titles could be
made in order to provide, in a comprehensive report, the necessary information that will
guide it in resolving the case completely, and not merely leave the determination of the
case to a consideration of the parties' more often than not self-serving evidence. 43
Similarly, in Chua v. B.E. San Diego, Inc., 44 the Court ruled that in overlapping boundary
disputes, the verification survey must be actually conducted on the very land itself. In that
case, the verification survey conducted it was merely based on the technical description
of the defective titles. The opinion of the surveyor lacked authoritativeness because his
verification survey was not made on the land itself.
In this case, the RTC of Las Piñas issued an Order, 45 dated December 5, 1997, which
directed the parties to conduct a verification survey pursuant to the prescribed rules.
Engr. Veronica Ardina-Remolar (Remolar) from the Bureau of Lands of the DENR was the
court-appointed commissioner who supervised and coordinated the verification survey.
Engrs. Rolando Nathaniel Pada (Pada) and Alexander Ocampo (Ocampo) were the
geodetic engineers for Spouses Yu; while Engr. Lucal Francisco (Francisco) was the
geodetic engineer for ALI. They conducted actual verification survey on April 5, 6, 7 and
16, 1998 and June 8, 1998. Afterwards, Engr. Remolar submitted her Report, 46 dated
November 4, 1998, to the trial court which stated that there were overlapping areas in
the contested surveys. Likewise, Engrs. Pada and Francisco submitted their Verification
Reports and Survey Plans, 47 which were approved by the DENR. Then, the parties
presented their respective witnesses.
The RTC of Las Piñas had a technical and accurate understanding and appreciation of the
overlapping surveys of Psu-25909, Psu-47035, Psu-80886, and Psu-
80886/SWO-20609. In its decision, dated May 7, 2001, it ruled in favor of
Spouses Yu and it discussed extensively its observations and findings
regarding the overlapping areas, to wit:
From the evidence on record, it appears that the following plans were
made on the dates and by the surveyor specified herein:
Survey No. PSU-25909
March 17, 1921
A.N. Feliciano
Survey No. PSU-47035
October 21, 1925
A.N. Feliciano
Survey No. PSU-80886
July 28, 1930
A.N. Feliciano
Survey No. SWO-20609
March 6, 1931
A.N. Feliciano
Plan PSU-25909 (Exhibit "F") invoked by the plaintiffs and authenticity of
which is certified by appropriate government custodians including Engineer
Remolar, the court-designated commissioner, appears to have been
prepared on March 17, 1921 for one Andres Diaz and recites the following
entries:
"THE ORIGINAL FIELD NOTES, COMPUTATIONS AND PLAN OF THIS SURVEY
EXECUTED BY A.M. FELICIANO HAVE BEEN CHECKED AND VERIFIED IN THIS
OFFICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 1858 TO 1865, ACT 2711 AND ARE
HEREBY APPROVED MAY 26, 1921."
-and-
"This is to certify that this is a true and correct plan of Psu-25909 as traced
from the mounted paper of plan Psu-25909 which is on file at T.R.S. Lands
Management Sector, N.C.R.
"This true copy of the plan is requested by the Chief, Technical Records
Section as contained in a letter dated February 15, 1989.
TEODORICO C. CALISTERIO
Chief, Topographic 7 Special Maps Section
Traced by:
F. SUMAGUE
Checked by:
A.O. VENZON (Sgd.) 4/28/89
Thus, the Court holds that plan PSU-25909 (Exhibit "F") is a true copy of an
official document on file with the Bureau of Lands and is, therefore,
entitled to great weight and appreciation, there being no irregularity
demonstrated in the preparation thereof.
On the other hand, an examination of Plan PSU-47035 (Exhibit "G") invites
suspicion thereto. As observed by Engineer Pada in his verification survey
report, the photocopy of plan PSU-47035 submitted by the defendant
shows that the plan appears to have done for one Estanislao Mayuga, while
in the certified true copy of the pertinent decree (Exhibit "HH"/Exhibit 20),
it appears that the same was done for a certain Dominador Mayuga.
Viewing this discrepancy in the light of the fact that the plan for PSU-47035
was undertaken on October 21, 1925 or more than four years after the
survey for plan PSU-25909 was done, the same discrepancy leads the Court
to conclude that PSU-47035 is spurious and void.
The third plan enumerated above, plan PSU-80886 (Exhibit "II"/Exhibit 29), prepared on
July 28, 1930 or more than five years since plan PSU-25909 was done for Andres Diaz, also
invites suspicion. An examination of the same reveals that the lower right hand corner of
the plan, which bears the serial number PSU-80886, is manifestly different from the main
document in terms of the intensity of its contrast, and that the change in the intensity of
the shading is abrupt as one examines the document starting from the lower right hand
corner to anywhere else in the same document. Also, it is worth observing that the main
document, minus the lower right hand corner mentioned, does not indicate anything to
even suggest that it pertains to plan PSU-80886. For these reasons, the contention of the
plaintiffs that this lower right hand corner of the plan appears to be a spurious
attachment to the main document to make the main document it look like it is actually
plan PSU-80886, has merit.
Another discrepancy invites further suspicion under the circumstances. The main
document bears what appears to be the actual signature of the surveyor, Mr. A.N.
Feliciano while the lower right hand corner of the plan mentions only the name "Serafin
P. Hidalgo — Director of Lands" with the prefix "Sgd." But without any actual signature.
An interesting query arises: Why would the document bear an actual signature of the
surveyor without bearing the signature of the Director of Lands which in essence is the
more important signature for authentication purposes?
Still another discrepancy is with respect to a monument appearing in PSU-80886 (Exhibit
"II"). At the upper off-right portion thereof are entries referring to a monument more
specifically described as B.L.L.M. No. 4. According to Engineer Pada, citing a certified
document taken from the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, this monument was established only on November 27, 1937 (TSN,
March 24, 2000, pp. 18-20) which is more than seven years after PSU-80886 was
undertaken. How a monument which was established only in November 1937 can actually
exist in a plan made on July 28, 1930 is absolutely incredible.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds good reason to consider PSU-80886 (Exhibit "II"
and 29), relied upon by the defendant, spurious and void as well.
The fourth and last plan mentioned is SWO-20609, done on March 6, 1931.
It is admitted by the geodetic engineer of the defendant that a specific work order (SWO)
co-exists with a survey plan, and that in particular, SWO-20609 was undertaken in view of
alleged errors in plan PSU-80886 (TSN, February 16, 2001, pp. 31-32). Therefore, SWO-
20609 must be evaluated in relation to plan PSU-80886. From this perspective, the Court
also notes that SWO-20609 is attended with discrepancies thus rendering it devoid of any
credence.
For the record, in PSU-80886 (Exhibit "II"/Exhibits 29 and 30), the land concerned appears
to have been surveyed for one Eduardo C. Guico while in PSU-80886/SWO-20609 (Exhibit
"H"/Exhibit 35), the same land appears to have been surveyed for one Alberto
Yaptinchay. In addition, it is evident in PSU-80886 (Exhibits 29 and 30) that vital entries
regarding the total area of the property covered by the document bear many erasures,
particularly two erasures as to the total area in terms of number and one erasure as to
that total area in terms of unit of measurement.
The Court likewise notes with suspicion the fact that all four survey plans were
purportedly undertaken by one and the same surveyor, a Mr. A.N. Feliciano. It seems
extremely unusual why the same A.N. Feliciano, who surveyed the same property for
Andres Diaz in 1921, would do so again in 1925 with different results, and again in 1930
once more with different results, and still one more time in 1931 with still different
results. The only reasonable and logical conclusion under these telling circumstances is
that the second, third and last surveys corresponding to PSU-47035, PSU-80886 and PSU-
80886/SWO-20609 are all spurious and void, too.
The Court went through the record of the case and no satisfactory explanation has been
offered by the defendant regarding these discrepancies. Even the documentary evidence
presented by the defendant offers no plausible reason for the Court to reject the
contentions of the plaintiffs. This all the more strengthens the view of the Court to effect
that PSU-47035, PSU-80886 and PSU-80886/SWO-20609 are spurious and void ab initio.
This view is also strengthened by the credentials of Engineer Pada whom the Court
considers as a very credible witness.
All in all, the Court is convinced that the title of the plaintiffs to the properties in dispute
is superior over those invoked by the defendant. 48 [Emphases supplied]
The findings of the RTC of Las Piñas were affirmed by the CA in its February 8, 2005
decision. It agreed that there are indeed glaring errors in the surveys relied upon by ALI.
These errors could not be merely disregarded as they affect the authenticity and validity
of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609.
Conclusion
After a judicious study of the case, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC of Las
Piñas and the CA in its February 8, 2005 decision.
First, Psu-25909 was conducted by a certain A.N. Feliciano in favor of Andres Diaz and
was approved on May 26, 1921. Curiously, the subsequent surveys of Psu-
47035 for a certain Dominador Mayuga, Psu-80886 for a certain Guico and
Psu-80886/SWO-20609 for a certain Yaptinchay were also conducted by
A.N. Feliciano. It is dubious how the same surveyor or agrimensor
conducted Psu-47035, Psu-80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609 even though
an earlier survey on Psu-25909, which the surveyor should obviously be
aware, was already conducted on the same parcel of land. Engr. Pada,
witness of Spouses Yu, also observed this irregularity and stated that this
practice is not the standard norm in conducting surveys.
Second, even though a single entity conducted the surveys, the lands
therein were described to be located in different places. Psu-25909, the
earliest dated survey, indicated its location at Sitio of Kay Monica, Barrio
Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal, while Psu-47035 and Psu-80886 stated their
locations at Sitio May Kokek, Barrio Almanza, Las Piñas, Rizal, and Barrio
Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Rizal, respectively. Again, Engr. Pada observed
this peculiarity and pointed out that the subject properties should have had
the same address. ALI did not provide an explanation to the discrepancies
in the stated addresses. Thus, it led the CA to believe that the same
surveyor indicated different locations to prevent the discovery of the
questionable surveys over the same parcel of land.
Third, there is a discrepancy as to who requested the survey of Psu-47035.
The photocopy of Psu-47035 as submitted by ALI shows that it was done
for a certain Estanislao Mayuga. On the other hand, the certified true copy
of Psu-47035 depicts that it was made for Dominador Mayuga. Once more,
Engr. Pada noticed this discrepancy on the said survey. ALI, however, did
not give any justification on the diverging detail, which raises question as to
the authenticity and genuineness of Psu-47035.
Fourth, Psu-80886 does not contain the signature of then Director of Lands,
Serafin P. Hidalgo; rather, the prefix "Sgd." was simply indicated therein. As
properly observed by the CA in its February 8, 2005 decision, any person
can place the said prefix and it does not show that the Director of Lands
actually signed and gave his imprimatur to Psu-80886. The absence of the
approval of the Director of Lands on Psu-80886 added doubt to its
legitimacy. The excuse proffered by ALI — that Psu-80886 is regular and
valid simply because land registration proceedings were undertaken — is
insufficient to cure the crucial defect in the survey.
In University of the Philippines v. Rosario, 49 it was held that "[n]o plan or
survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by
the Director of Lands. The submission of the plan is a statutory
requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan and its technical
description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are of no
value." Hence, the lack of approval by the Director of Lands of Psu-80886
casts doubt on its legality. It also affects the jurisdictional facts before the
land registration courts which relied on Psu-80886 for registration.
Fifth, Psu-80886 was issued on July 28, 1930 but it referred to a specific
monument described as B.L.L.M No. 4. According to the LMB-DENR, the
said monument was only established on November 27, 1937, more than
seven years after Psu-80886 was issued. 50 This discrepancy was duly
noted in the findings of the verification report and it was affirmed by the
testimony of Engr. Pada. Thus, both the RTC of Las Piñas and the CA in its
February 8, 2005 decision properly observed that it was highly irregular for
Psu-80886 to refer to B.L.L.M No. 4 because the said monument existed
seven years later.
Sixth, ALI attempted to explain this anomaly by stating that Psu-80886 was
amended by Psu-80886/SWO-20609, a Special Work Order, in view of the
discrepancies of the former. While Psu-80886/SWO-20609 is dated March
6, 1931, ALI insists that it was actually conducted in 1937 and approved in
1940. However, in its February 8, 2005 decision, the CA noted that said
testimony crumbled under cross-examination as ALI's witness, Engr. Felino
Cortez (Cortez), could not reaffirm the said justification for Psu-80886's
manifest error of including a latter dated monument. Also, the Court
observed that ALI's other witness, Engr. Percival Bacani, testified that he
does not know why B.L.L.M No. 4 was used in preparing Psu-80886 even
though the said monument appears on all the titles. 51 Moreover, the
alleged explanation provided by ALI to justify the existence of B.L.L.M No. 4
in Psu-80886 was not indicated at all in the verification report and survey
plan they submitted before the RTC of Las Piñas. Accordingly, ALI did not
resolve the uncertainty surrounding the reference to B.L.L.M No. 4 by Psu-
80886 and it seriously damages the validity of the said survey.
Seventh, ALI explained that Psu-80886/SWO-20609 was undertaken to
correct a discrepancy in Psu-80886. Its witness, Engr. Cortez, confirmed
that Psu-80886/SWO-20609 was commenced to resolve the mistake in the
timeline. He added that the timeline published in the notice of initial
hearing in the Official Gazette for Psu-80886 was different from the
approved plan in Psu-80886/SWO-20609. He also noted some difference in
the area of Psu-80886 compared to Psu-80886/SWO-20609. 52 These
admissions show that Psu-80886 was flawed from the very beginning. Yaptinchay merely
requested the conduct of Psu-80886/SWO-20609 in order to resurrect or salvage the
erroneous Psu-80886 and to wrongfully acquire OCT No. 242. It does not, however, erase
the fact that Psu-80886, from which ALI's titles originated, is marred with irregularities.
This is a badge of fraud that further runs counter to the legitimacy of the surveys that ALI
relied upon.
Eight, the RTC of Las Piñas continuously observed the irregularities in Psu-80886. It stated
that "the total area of the property covered by the document bear many erasures,
particularly two erasures as to the total area in terms of number and one erasure as to
that total area in terms of unit of measurement." 53 Manifestly, no explanation was
provided why it was necessary to make erasures of the crucial data in the survey
regarding the total area.
Ninth, the RTC of Las Piñas continued its observations regarding Psu-80886's anomalies. It
added that "[a]n examination of the same reveals that the lower right hand corner of the
plan, which bears the serial number PSU-80886, is manifestly different from the main
document in terms of the intensity of its contrast, and that the change in the intensity of
the shading is abrupt as one examines the document starting from the lower right hand
corner to anywhere else in the same document. Also, it is worth observing that the main
document, minus the lower right hand corner mentioned, does not indicate anything to
even suggest that it pertains to plan PSU-80886. For these reasons, the contention of the
plaintiffs that this lower right hand corner of the plan appears to be a spurious
attachment to the main document to make the main document it look like it is actually
plan PSU-80886, has merit." 54 These observations were based on the first-hand
examination of the surveys, verification reports, and witnesses by the RTC of Las Piñas.
Tenth, as correctly emphasized by the CA in its February 8, 2005 decision, the Supreme
Court had previously noted the defects surrounding Psu-80886 in the case of Guico v. San
Pedro. The said case involved the application of registration of Guico of a tract of land
covered by Psu-80886, subdivided into eleven (11) lots, filed on November 4, 1930 before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI). The said land originated from Pedro Lopez de
Leon, covered by Psu-16400. It was transferred to his son, Mariano Lopez de Leon, and
then one-third portion thereof was conveyed to Guico. Several oppositors appeared
therein to assail Guico's application. On August 19, 1935, the CFI ruled that only Lot Nos.
1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 10 may be registered in the name of Guico.
On appeal, the CA disposed the case in this wise:
Adjudicamos a Eduardo C. Guico los lotes 2 y 3 de su plano y las porciones que quedan de
las adjudicadas a el por el Juzgado inferior y que no estan comprendidos en los terrenos
reclamados por Valeriano Miranda, Nicasio San Pedro, Jose Dollenton, Gregorio Arciaga,
Donato Navarro, Leon Navarro, Dionisio Dollenton, Basilio Navarro, Bernardo Mellama y
Lorenzo Dollenton, debiendo al efecto presentar un plano enmendado debidamente
aprobado por el Director de Terrenos, confirmado asi la decision apelada en lo que
estuvira conforme, y revocandola en lo que no estuviera. 55
When translated, the text reads:
We adjudicate to Eduardo C. Guico Lots 2 and 3 of his plant and the portions that remain
adjudicated to him by the lower court and that are not included in the lands claimed by
Valeriano Miranda, Nicasio San Pedro, Jose Dollenton, Gregorio Arciaga, Donato Navarro,
Leon Navarro, Dionisio Dollenton, Basilio Navarro, Bernardo Mellama, and Lorenzo
Dollenton, under the obligation to present an amended properly approved plan to the
Director of Lands, confirming therefore the appealed decision what is consistent with this
and revoking it on what is not. 56 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Undeterred, Guico filed an appeal before the Supreme Court alleging that the CA erred in
declaring that there was no imperfect title in favor of Pedro Lopez de Leon, his
predecessor-in-interest.
In its decision, dated June 20, 1941, the Court dismissed the appeal of Guico and affirmed
the CA ruling. It was held that "la solicitud de Pedro Lopez de Leon composicion con el
Estado no fue aprobada porque no pudo hacerse la medicion correspondiente." Its
translation stated that the application of Pedro Lopez de Leon regarding the composition
of the estate was not approved because he was not able to submit the corresponding
measurements, referring to Psu-16400, from which Psu-80886 was derived.
In addition, the Supreme Court noted that "while abundant proof is offered concerning
the filing of the application for composition title by the original possessor, the records
nowhere exhibits compliance with the operative requirement of said section 45 (a) of Act
No. 2874, that such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated
said lands continuously since the filing of their applications." 57
Consequently, the Court observed two major irregularities in the application of Guico
under Psu-80886, (1) his predecessor-in-interest did not submit any valid measurement of
the estate from which Psu-80886 was derived; and (2) that the applicant or his grantees
failed to occupy or cultivate the subject land continuously. These findings are substantial
and significant as these affect the validity of Psu-80886.
ALI insisted that Guico v. San Pedro should actually be construed in their favor because
the Court affirmed the ruling of the CA which awarded Lot Nos. 2 and 3 to Guico, hence,
Psu-80886 was valid.

The Court is not persuaded.
A reading of the dispositive portion of the CA decision in Guico v. San Pedro
does not categorically state that Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were absolutely and
completely awarded to Guico. The award of the said lots was subject to the
vital and primordial condition or obligation to present to the court an
amended, properly approved, plan to the Director of Lands. Evidently, the
Court was not satisfied with Psu-80886 because it lacked the requisites for
a valid survey. Thus, it required Guico to secure an amended and correctly
approved plan, signed by the Director of Lands. The purpose of this new
plan was to confirm that the appealed decision was consistent with the
facts established therein. The records, however, did not show that Guico
indeed secured an amended and properly approved plan. Psu-80886/SWO-
20609 obviously was not the required amended order because a special
work order is different from an amended survey. 58 Moreover, the said
special work order was initiated by Yaptinchay, and not Guico. The
insufficiency of Psu-80886 is evident in this decision.
Thus, as Guico did not subject Psu-80886 to a valid amended approved
plan, he was not awarded Lot Nos. 2 and 3 for registration. It can be seen
from the OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609; that Guico never secured their
registration because the Court discovered the anomalous Psu-80886. The
Court's pronouncement in Guico v. San Pedro, although promulgated more
than half a century ago, must be respected in accordance with the rule on
judicial adherence.
Lastly, the Court also agrees with the finding of the CA in its February 8,
2005 decision that Psu-25909 bears all the hallmarks of verity. It was
established that Andres Diaz was the very first claimant of the subject
property and was the proponent of Psu-25909. The said survey clearly
contained the signature of the surveyor and the Director of Lands, as can
be seen on its face. In stark contrast with Psu-80886, which contained
alterations and erasures, Psu-25909 has none. The original of Psu-25909
was likewise on file with the Bureau of Lands and a microfilm reproduction
was readily obtained from the file of the said office, unlike in Psu-80886
and Psu-47909.
The RTC of Las Piñas shared this examination. It ruled that Psu-25909 was a
true copy of an official document on file with the Bureau of Lands. It also
gave great weight and appreciation to the said survey because no
irregularity was demonstrated in the preparation thereof. The trial court
added that Engr. Remolar, as the appropriate government custodian and
court-appointed commissioner, certified the authenticity of Psu-25909.
In fine, the Court finds that there are numerous defects in Psu-47909, Psu-
80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609, which are all hallmarks of fraud, viz.:
1. That A.N. Feliciano conducted all the surveys even though he should
have known that the earlier dated survey Psu-25909, already covered the
same parcel of land;
2. That Psu-47909, Psu-80886 and Psu-25909 covered the same parcel of
land and were conducted by the same surveyor but each survey stated a
different location;
3. That the photocopy of Psu-47035, as submitted by ALI, shows that it was
done for a certain Estanislao Mayuga but the certified true copy of Psu-
47035 depicted that it was made for Dominador Mayuga;
4. That Psu-80886 did not contain the signature of then Director of Lands,
Serafin P. Hidalgo, and it is well-settled rule that no plan or survey may be
admitted in land registration proceedings until approved by the Director of
Lands;
5. That Psu-80886 was issued on July 28, 1930 but it referred to a specific
monument described as B.L.L.M No. 4, which was only established on
November 27, 1937;
6. That ALI attempted to explain this anomaly by stating that Psu-80886
was amended by Psu-80886/SWO-20609, which was done in 1937. On
cross-examination, however, the witness of ALI was unable to reaffirm that
the special work order was rightly performed in 1937 and the said
explanation was not reflected in the verification report and survey plan of
ALI;
7. That Psu-80886/SWO-20609 was undertaken to correct a discrepancy in
Psu-80886, which was an admission that the latter survey, from which the
titles of ALI originated, was defective;
8. That the total area of the property covered by Psu-80886 contained
many erasures, which were not satisfactorily explained;
9. That there was a difference in the intensity of the lower right portion of Psu-80886
which showed that it may simply have been an attachment to the main document; and
10. That in Guico v. San Pedro, the Court found that irregularities surround Psu-80886
because its predecessor-in-interest did not submit the corresponding measurement of his
survey and the applicant or his grantees failed to occupy and cultivate the subject land
continuously. Further, Lot Nos. 2 and 3 of Psu-80886 were not awarded to Guico because
the records do not show that he submitted the required amended properly approved plan
by the Director of Lands.
In contrast, Psu-25909 bore all the hallmarks of verity because it contains the signatures
of the surveyor and the Director of Lands, and it did not contain any erasure or alterations
thereon. Likewise, a duly authenticated copy of Psu-25909 is readily available in the
Bureau of Lands.
The foregoing anomalies surrounding Psu-47909, Psu-80886, and Psu-80886/SWO-20609
were similarly observed by the RTC of Las Piñas. The trial court was able to establish its
findings based on the verification survey it ordered, under the supervision of the court-
appointed commissioner. Hence, the trial court had the direct access to the evidence
presented by the parties as well as the verification reports and survey plans submitted by
the parties. It is a fundamental rule that the conclusion and findings of fact by the trial
court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for
strong and cogent reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case. 59
Even without considering (1) the certification from the DENR-LMB that Psu-80886 is
included in the list of restricted plans because of the doubtful signature of the surveyor,
and (2) the memorandum, dated August 3, 2000, from the Assistant Regional Director of
the DENR directing all personnel of the Land Survey Division not to issue copies or
technical descriptions of Psu-80886 and Psu-47035, there were numerous defects on the
surveys that affected their validity. The exclusion of these documents did not alter the
finding of the Court that the surveys were spurious and must be set aside.
Further, the Court cannot subscribe to the finding of the CA in its June 19, 2006 decision
that the numerous defects in Psu-47909, Psu-80886 and Psu-80886/SWO-20609 are "not
enough to deprive the assailed decree of registration of its conclusive effect, neither are
they sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the survey was definitely, certainly,
conclusively spurious." 60 The Court cannot close its eyes to the blatant defects on the
surveys upon which the original titles of ALI were derived simply because its titles were
registered. To allow these certificates of title in the registration books, even though these
were sourced from invalid surveys, would tarnish and damage the Torrens system of
registration, rather than uphold its integrity.
It is an enshrined principle in this jurisdiction that registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and
vested. The indefeasibility of a Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate
fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration
because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not
furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a
constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the
registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered
holds it as a mere trustee. 61
When a land registration decree is marred by severe irregularity that discredits the
integrity of the Torrens system, the Court will not think twice in striking down such illegal
title in order to protect the public against unscrupulous and illicit land ownership. Thus,
due to the numerous, blatant and unjustifiable errors in Psu-47909, Psu-80886, and Psu-
80886/SWO-20609, these must be declared void. Likewise, OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609,
their transfer certificates, and instruments of conveyances that relied on the anomalous
surveys, must be absolutely declared void ab initio.
With respect to the Diaz case, the Court agrees with the CA in its February 8, 2005
decision that Spouses Diaz did not commit fraud. As Psu-47909, Psu-80886 and Psu-
80886/SWO-20609 are void, then OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609 are also void ab initio. The
transfer certificates in the hands of third parties, including CPJ Corporation and ALI, are
likewise void. Accordingly, Spouses Diaz had no obligation to inform CPJ Corporation of
their application for registration and they could not be held guilty of fraud.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The June 19, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 61593 & 70622 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
February 8, 2005 Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.
||| (Spouses Yu Hwa Ping v. Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. Nos. 173120 & 173141, [July 26, 2017],
814 PHIL 468-507)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO
ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and
MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Apollo T . Tria for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
A petition for original registration of title over a parcel of land under
Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration Decree, was dismissed
by the land registration court for want of jurisdiction for failure to comply
with the provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation. The notice was only published in the
Official Gazette. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the case
and ordered the registration of the title in the name of the private
respondent. It ruled that although the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in
mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with
equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court; that the other requirements of
publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing and posting at
the site and other conspicuous places were all complied with.
The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 23 of PD 1529 clearly provides that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court. However, absent any publication of the notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration
court cannot validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
This is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due
process rationale behind the publication requirement. A land registration
proceeding is a proceeding in rem and is validated essentially through
publication. The rationale behind the newspaper publication is due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated
as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation. There was
failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. The
Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The
application for land registration was dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly
complied with.
Judgment reversed, without prejudice.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; P.D. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE); LAND
REGISTRATION; PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING IN OFFICIAL
GAZETTE AND IN NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION, MANDATORY. —
The law (Section 23 of P.D. 1529) used the term "shall" in prescribing the
work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the
latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The
said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory
character of a statute. While concededly such literal mandate is not an
absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends
upon its context in the entire provision, weq hold that in the present case
the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In
Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide. Jr.
held that Section 23 of PD 1599 requires notice of the initial hearing by
means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be
complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section
would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to
all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree,
include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed,
if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law
included such requirement in its detailed provision.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LAND REGISTRATION, A PROCEEDING IN REM;
VALIDATED ESSENTIALLY THROUGH PUBLICATION. — It should be noted
further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons,
including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so,
the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may
be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred
from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has
been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land
registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not
only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as
one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all
persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or interests; in the
subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why
the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that
before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name
of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
3. CIVIL LAW; P.D. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE); LAND REGISTRATION;
RATIONALE BEHIND PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION. — It may
be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as
well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at
hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely
read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that
the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact
not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LAND REGISTRATION DISMISSAL OF ACTION WARRANTED
FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT IN NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION. — Admittedly. there was failure to comply with the explicit
publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even
if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.
Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The
law is unambiguous and its rationale clear Time and again, this Court has declared that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no
alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must
be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration
case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause
such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application.
But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision 1
promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on November
19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive
portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby
set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant,
Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary
Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos,
residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered
under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby
dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this
land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned
to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6 However,
during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs — Margarita,
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by their
aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as
applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for
want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject
land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7
". . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish
the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. E') in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines. Exhibit E' was only published in the Official Gazette
(Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view
that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for
want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of
the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,
which in its pertinent portion provides: 8
"It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of
PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the
provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official
Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the
opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the
Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is
procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first,
publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because
without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a
particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice
of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably
necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally
infirm."
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals
which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged
CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated
this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored
his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on
Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals.
Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not
for certiorari under Rule 65. 9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave
abuse of discretion" 10 in holding —
". . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No.
86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not
dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication."
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial
hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper
of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official
Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . .
in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice
requirement of due process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply
with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official
Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals
ruled: 13
". . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot
be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in
the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court."
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the
opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it
justified its disposition in this wise: 14
". . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required
procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements
of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and
posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and
these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any
objection of the application for registration."
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of
the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
"Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the
date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by
means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published
once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners
so far as known, and 'to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx"
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in
the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court.
However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of
private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of
Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory
character of a statute. 15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in
statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by
means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with
"If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail
the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per
Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the
land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in
a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such
requirement in its detailed provision. LexLib
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem,
such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including
the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be
complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no
knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in
the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only
his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one
who institutes an action for recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all
persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or interests in the
subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why
the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that
before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name
of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as
well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at
hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely
read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that
the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all.
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact
not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse;
even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself
allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with
such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale
clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation,
vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. 19 There is
no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Chairman, Davide, Jr ., Melo, and Francisco, JJ ., concur.

||| (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102858, [July 28, 1997],
342 PHIL 239-249)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171631. November 15, 2010.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AVELINO R. DELA PAZ,
ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ,
represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the
Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC
Case No. N-11514, granting respondents' application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela
Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of
land 3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land
with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig,
Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion
Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration,
respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of
attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the
application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234,
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the
annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development,
Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-
000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-
01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10,
1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land
patent or any public land application; and (9) Certification by the Office of
the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the
real property for the year 2003 has been paid. EAIaHD
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob 4 dated June 18,
1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz
(Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their
deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay 5 dated March
10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners
of the subject parcel of land and they have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the
concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further
averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse, continuous,
and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner
even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years
since the filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They
maintained that the subject property is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date,
respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the
following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of
not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the
tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to
or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the
parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic,
there was no other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default 6 against
the whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents
presented their evidence in support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for
registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby
rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal
address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described
and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234,
Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all
taxes and other charges due on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of
registration shall be accordingly undertaken. aAHSEC
SO ORDERED. 7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The CA, in its Decision
dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The
CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from
their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public
and adverse possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA,
likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to establish that
the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN
IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT
IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN
RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO
PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN. 9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse
possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12,
1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession
and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also failed
to establish that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain. The subject property remained to be owned by the State under the
Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of
specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession
and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous
and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax
declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in
the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax
clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to
date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations
appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is
within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents
assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should
not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45. TAacHE
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court
is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings
complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts. 10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower
court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion. 11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the
subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier. 12 These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive
and convincing evidence. 13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State,
remain part of the inalienable public domain. 14 The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable
or disposable. 15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084
16 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D,
Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C.
Torres with the following annotation: SIaHTD
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on
Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court ruled that the notation of the
surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and
disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January
3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute
incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land
remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation, 18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan
stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable.
However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act
or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the
case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by
the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only
to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property
surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are
indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, 19 the Court
held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land.
In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of
land classification status issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land
as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof
required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable
zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to
establish that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is
already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still
inalienable public domain. 20
Anent respondents' possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the
records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. CDAcIT
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over
the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado),
the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents'
predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12,
1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939, 21 testified that since he attained
the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to them. 22
Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since
1950, 23 and on about the same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the
subject land. 24
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific
details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the
land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned
by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent
Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of
ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945,
the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that are
mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot
suffice. 25 An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of
law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances
evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land. 26
Respondents' earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name
of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only
prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 27 Respondents failed to explain
why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject
properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that
their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well
settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The
fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the
names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 28
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as
part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of the subject property
under PD 1529 should be denied. STaCcA
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela
Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose
R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred
twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108998. August 24, 1994.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES
MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND ACT; CONFIRMATION
OF IMPERFECT TITLE; REQUIREMENTS; POSSESSION IS TACKED TO THAT OF
APPLICANTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST; CASE AT BAR. — It must be noted
that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by
themselves," "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest." Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period
and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with
by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession.
In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land
not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not
deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in
possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore
short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of
land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-
interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof
since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their
predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect
title. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents
were able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest
had paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon
(Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by
Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove
that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo
from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia
(Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in
evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to
prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable
zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA G.R.
No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
2. ID.;ID.;ID.;DOCTRINE THAT BEFORE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE,
THE OCCUPANT IS NOT IN THE JURIDICAL SENSE THE TRUE OWNER OF THE
LAND, ALREADY ABANDONED. — At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in
Republic v.Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration.
There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the
occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State. Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic
v.Villanueva (supra),has already been abandoned in the 1986 case of
Director of Lands v.Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and
reiterated in Director of Lands v.Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991])
where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Narvasa, declared that: "(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive
and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon
completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. ..."Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability
of considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant
from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) '...shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title ....' No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than
a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claims is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cariño, '... (There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.'" (Emphasis supplied)
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION FOR AT
LEAST 30 YEARS OF ALIENABLE PUBLIC LAND IPSO JURE CONVERTS THE
SAME TO PRIVATE PROPERTY. — Subsequent cases have hewed to the
above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts
the same to private property (Director of Lands v.IAC, 214 SCRA 604
[1992];Pineda v.CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]).This means that occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land (National Power Corporation v.CA, 218 SCRA 41
[1993]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. — The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must
prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept
above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]).When the conditions set
by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right
to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued
(National Power Corporation v.CA, supra).As such, the land ceases to be a part of the
public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
5. ID.;ID.;TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; NOT A MEANS FOR ACQUISITION OF
TITLE TO PRIVATE LAND. — In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a
means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v.CA, 149 SCRA
32 [1987]).It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
6. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; BUYCO RULING (216 SCRA 78 [1992]) NOT APPLICABLE TO
CASE AT BAR. — In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director
of Lands v.Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis. We disagree. In Buyco,the
applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens
at the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity
ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions
of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public
Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed
by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on
review and we reversed. Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration of title
not merely because they were American citizens at the time of their application therefor.
Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time
immemorial or possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated from
public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have
acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land. In the case at bar, private respondents
were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the
properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process,
the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their
predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have
constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by
respondent Lapiña's mother.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY;
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN WHO HAS LOST HIS CITIZENSHIP MAY BE A TRANSFEREE
OF PRIVATE LANDS. — But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the
fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested
parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the
following pertinent provisions, to wit: "Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." "Sec. 8.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law." (Emphasis supplied) Section 8, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973
Constitution which reads: "Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may
provide." Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant
provision of which provides: "Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract
under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one
thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural
land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the
total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed. "In the case the
transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be
entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes
which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas
herein authorized." From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no
other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the
disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his
Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens
at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal
impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution
ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof
under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1)
hectare in case or rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). It is undisputed
that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land,
it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time
they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is
important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must
perforce be approved.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 6 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 185
PRIMARILY DIRECTED TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS THAN TO APPLICANT. —
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185,
must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to
Section 6, which requires the submission of the relevant sworn statement
by the applicant. The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of
BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are
primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance
therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much
less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the
land registration court prior to the approval of an application for
registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land
registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate
of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land
registration court approving the application for registration has become
final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the
requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be
complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that
is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the
certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the
decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the
approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of
registration is yet to be issued.
FELICIANO, J.,concurring:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY; NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN WHO HAS LOST HIS CITIZENSHIP
MAY BE TRANSFEREE OF PRIVATE LAND; TRANSFER MUST BE MADE AFTER
LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT BAR. — This separate statement is
concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before the dispositive
portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P.
Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March 1982, does not purport to cover the
set of facts before the Court in this case: i.e.,the respondent spouses
became transferees (on 17 June 1978) of the land here involved while they
were natural-born Philippine citizens who happened sometime later to
have been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P. Blg. 185, as far as
I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who were
already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees of private
land in the Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine
citizens. It is difficult, therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become
applicable to the present situation even at the subsequent time when the
respondent spouses would come before the Register of Deeds. B.P. Blg.
185, especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including a
specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square
meters) which may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which
must not be exceeded both by the land of which such foreign national
becomes transferee and by such land taken together with other land
previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph, Section 2,
B.P. Blg. 185) B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases
of land by the respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
naturalized as Canadian nationals.
CRUZ, J.,dissenting:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN
WHO HAS LOST HIS CITIZENSHIP MAY BE TRANSFEREE OF PRIVATE LAND;
LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 185; ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR OF COMPLIANCE THEREWITH. — With all due
respect, I have to dissent. There is no question that the property is private
land and thus subject to registration by qualified persons. It was really
needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly inapplicable here. We can
agree that the ruling case is Director of Lands v.Intermediate Appellate
Court, which is not challenged in this petition. But I think the ponencia
misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were natural-
born Filipinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the
question posed. The important point is that the respondent spouses are no
longer citizens of the Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not
follow that because they were citizens of the Philippines when they
acquired the land, they can register it in their names now even if they are
no longer Filipinos. Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant
because it is not disputed that the respondent spouses were qualified to
acquire the land in question when it was transferred to them. Section 8 of
the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of
private land to a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a
foreigner. Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that
the private respondents have observed "the limitations provided by law." The ponencia
finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private respondents'
name have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing that B.P. 185
has also been enforced. The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to
the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the
requirements in B.P. 185 have been read into the Act and should also be applied. Strict
compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos who
have become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our citizens, I see
no reason why we should be less so with those who have renounced our country.
DECISION
BIDIN,J p:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision
of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the court a quo in granting
application of respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question. llcd
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their
residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City, from one Cristela
Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41).At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses were then
natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two
(2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This
time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian
citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their
respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming private respondents'
title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this court hereby approves the said application
and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-
003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino
citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini
Street, San Pablo City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
"Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be annotated an easement of 6.25
meters road right-of-way."
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the
following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when
they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For this reason, the
prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In justice and
equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had
paid for it quite a large sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is
merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been
the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a
mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to confirm and register the title
which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
31189, March 31, 1987).With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court
has ruled that title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of
the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. The fact
that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them
for they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng
Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11, 1987)." (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this
present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time
had it not been for the constitutional issue presented therein. prcd
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary
rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even
privately owned unregistered lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle
that land of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus,
before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the
true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner further argued that it
is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for
confirmation of title would the land become privately owned land, for in
the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on
the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
"The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves
and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two
adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide
claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is
conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation
of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be
registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance
of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree." (Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
"The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the
alienable and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest
Development (Exhibit `P').The investigation conducted by the Bureau of
Lands, Natural Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had
been occupied by the applicants `whose house of strong materials stands
thereon';that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of
applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a
public instrument entitled 'Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan' duly executed by
the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits 'I' and 'J');and
that applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of
land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for
registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the
circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in
1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their
application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had
already passed to them." (Rollo, p.27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession
and argues:
"17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since 1979.However, tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence
of ownership. (citing cases)
"18. Then again, the appellate court found that applicants (respondents)
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration.'
This is not, however, the same as saying that respondents have been in
possession 'since June 12, 1945.' (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA
No. 141; see also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents'
possession. They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945
or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years
possession prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they
would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979
when, according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation
purposes in their name." (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner,
any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive
possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what
the law provides. cdll
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
"Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title thereof under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this charter." (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
"Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June
12, 1945."
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves",the
applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest".Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as
the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by
his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar,
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early
as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception,
were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1987 and therefore short of
the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by
private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in
open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the
shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights
necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title. cdphil
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982])
deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate
of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still
pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra),has already been
abandoned in 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA
509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo,200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where
the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
"(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. ...
"Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
". . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation
and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-
interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by
free patent. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
'As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of
law,a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the
authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent.'
"Nothing can be more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by the statute
as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself
(Section 48[b]) that the possessor(s) '...shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title ....' No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested.The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law
from the moment the required period of possession became complete.As was so well put
in Cariño, '... (There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect
of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." (Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous
and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts
the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC,214 SCRA 604 [1992];Pineda v.
CA,183 SCRA 602 [1990]).This means that occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in- interest, vest
title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land (National Power Corporation v. CA,218 SCRA 41 [1993]). Cdpr
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land
is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated,
must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco,216 SCRA 78 [1992]).When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation
v. CA,supra).As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and
goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA,149 SCRA
32 [1987]).It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be
gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to
establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest.
Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid
taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits
"F" to "F9").A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo
and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject
parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father
Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit
"G").Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in
evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to
prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and disposable
zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR
No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the
ruling in the Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco,the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of
the property. But this is where the similarity ends. the applicants in Buyco
sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public
Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and
was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands
brought the matter before us on review and we reversed. LibLex
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr.,stated:
"As we could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private
respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant
or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration
Act; the private respondents did not present any proof that they or their
predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a)
the 'titulo real' or royal grant (b) the 'concession especial' or special grant;
(c) the 'composicion con el estado' title or adjustment title; (d) the 'titulo
de compra' or title by purchase; and (e) the 'informacion posesoria' or
possessory information title, which would become a 'titulo gratuito' or a
gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]).The
primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and the
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
"If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be
upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890
[1946]):
'...All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been
part of the public domain or that if had been a private property even
before the Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935
[1909];212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed.,594) The applicant does not come under
the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor
in interest began in 1880.'
'. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or
completion of said period ipso jure.' (Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra)
"It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either
since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribed in
the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals
(178 SCRA 37 [1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then
Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . . , that an applicant for registration under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that
the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are
alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
"In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the
property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable land. On the contrary,
the entire property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the then 1973
Constitution).
"...(P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the
property in question. Their allegation of possession since time immemorial, ...,is patently
baseless. ...When referring to possession, specifically 'immemorial possession,' it means
possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he
has learned form his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra).Such possession was never present in
the case of private respondents. ...
"...,there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for more than eighty
(80) years. ...
xxx xxx xxx
"To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-
interest) had possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and
made the subject of both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his
estate among his heirs - in such manner as to remove the same from the public domain
under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31
May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his
heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private
respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
alternative ground relied upon in their application. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it
goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect
title, over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship." (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they
were American citizens at the time of their application therefor. Respondents therein
failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or
possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated from public domain;
such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired no
vested rights over the parcel of land. llcd
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at
the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights
thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the
prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land
Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the
Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in
their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following
pertinent provisions, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain."
"Sec. 8 Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article
XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land,
for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide."
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of
which provides:
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a
contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a
maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land,
or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence.
In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege
herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area
acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
"In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential
purposes, he shall be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or
rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized."
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law
has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185. LLpr
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be
no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of
what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered
no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in
character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under
claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides
that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
1,000 sq. m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by
him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land,
were natural born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer
and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant
whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important
is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must
perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185,
must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to
Section 6, which provides:
"Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the
registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this
Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing
the date and place of birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his
spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of
acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to
reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine
citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such
other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act."
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not
apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to
the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be
submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court
prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An
application for registration of title before a land registration court should
not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of
deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court
approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of
registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6,
BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the
applicants. The decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the
office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor
of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the
register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for
registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued. LibLex
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ.,concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J ., dissenting:
With all due respect, I have to dissent.
The ponencia begins by posing the issue thus:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
There is no question that the property is private land and thus subject to registration by
qualified persons. It was really needless to elaborate on Buyco, which is clearly
inapplicable here. We can agree that the ruling case is Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, which is not challenged in this petition.
But I think the ponencia misses the point. The finding that the respondent spouses were
natural-born Filipinos at the time they acquired the land does not settle the question
posed. prLL
The important point is that the respondent spouses were no longer citizens of the
Philippines but naturalized Canadians. It does not follow that because they were citizens
of the Philippines when they acquired the land, they can register it in their names now
even if they are no longer Filipinos.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution is irrelevant because it is not disputed that the
respondent spouses were qualified to acquire the land in question when it was
transferred to them.
Section 8 of the same article is not applicable either because it speaks of a transfer of
private land to a former natural-born citizen of the Philippines after he became a
foreigner.
Thus it states:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Even if it be assumed that the provision is applicable, it does not appear that the private
respondents have observed "the limitations provided by law."
The ponencia finds that all the requisites for the registration of the land in the private
respondents' name have been complied with. I do not believe so for there is no showing
that B.P. 185 has also been enforced.
The view has been expressed that we should confine ourselves to the requirements for
registration under the Public Land Act. I respectfully submit that the requirements in B.P.
185 have been read into the Act and should also be applied.
Strict compliance is necessary because of the special privilege granted to former Filipinos
who have become foreigners by their own choice. If we can be so strict with our citizens, I
see no reason why we should less so with those who have renounced our country. LexLib
Padilla and Davide, Jr.,JJ.,concur.
FELICIANO, J .,concurring:
I agree with the great bulk of the majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Bidin and the
result reached therein.
This separate statement is concerned only with the last two (2) paragraphs, just before
the dispositive portion, of the majority opinion. In my view, it should be stressed that B.P.
Blg. 185 which took effect on 16 March, 1982, does not purport to cover the set of facts
before the Court in this case: i.e.,the respondent spouses became transferees (on 17 June
1978) of the land here involved while they were natural-born Philippine citizens who
happened sometime later to have been naturalized as citizens of another country. B.P.
Blg. 185, as far as I can determine, addresses itself only to a situation of persons who
were already foreign nationals at the time they became transferees of private land in the
Philippines, but who were previously natural-born Philippine citizens. It is difficult,
therefore, to see how B.P. Blg. 185 can become applicable to the present situation even
at the subsequent time when the respondent spouses would come before the Register of
Deeds. B.P. Blg. 185, especially Section 6 thereof, imposes certain requirements, including
a specific limitation on the quantity of land (not more than 1,000 square meters) which
may be acquired thereunder, an amount limitation which must not be exceeded both by
the land of which such foreign national becomes transferee and by such land taken
together with other land previously acquired by such foreign national. (2nd paragraph,
Section 2, B.P. Blg. 185) LLjur
B.P. Blg. 185 would, of course, apply to subsequent purchases of land by
the respondent spouses, that is, purchases made after they were
naturalized as Canadian nationals.

||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, [August 24, 1994])
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171514. July 18, 2012.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DOMINGO ESPINOSA,
respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision 1 dated
November 11, 2004 and Resolution 2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456. ITHADC
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) filed with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an application 3 for land
registration covering a parcel of land with an area of 5,525 square meters
and situated in Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his
application, which was docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged
that: (a) the property, which is more particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of
Cad. 545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the
property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970 and the
latter's other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and (c) he and his
predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property in the
concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan 07-000893 4 to
prove the identity of the land. As proof that the property is alienable and
disposable, he marked as evidence the annotation on the advance survey
plan made by Cynthia L. Ibañez, Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating
that "CONFORMED PER L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No.
28 certified on June 25, 1963, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable
Area". 5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for the years
1965 and 1974 in Isabel's name — Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and 06137
— to prove that she had been in possession of the property since 1965. To
support his claim that he had been religiously paying the taxes due on the
property, Espinosa presented a Certification 6 dated December 1, 1998
issued by the Office of the Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax
declarations for the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 — Tax Declaration Nos.
14010, 17681 and 01071. 7 . 8
Petitioner opposed Espinosa's application, claiming that: (a) Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the "Public Land Act"
(PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosa's predecessor-in-interest
possessed the property only after June 12, 1945; and (b) the tax
declarations do not prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-
in-interest are in the character and for the length of time required by law.
CDHAcI
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment 9 granting Espinosa's
petition for registration, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering for the registration and the confirmation of title of [Espinosa] over
Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at [B]arangay Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an area of 5,525 square meters
and that upon the finality of this decision, let a corresponding decree of
registration be issued in favor of the herein applicant in accordance with
Section 39, P.D. 1529.
SO ORDERED. 10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the property is
alienable and disposable and that he complied with the requirements of
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the above-
entitled case, the Court is convinced, and so holds, that [Espinosa] was able
to establish his ownership and possession over the subject lot which is
within the area considered by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of
[predecessor]-in-interest have been in open, actual, public, continuous,
adverse and under claim of title thereto within the time prescribed by law
(Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in accordance with the Land
Registration Act. 11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosa's failure to prove that
his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest were for the period
required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration No. 013516, Isabel's
possession commenced only in 1965 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier as
required by Section 48 (b) of the PLA. On the other hand, Espinosa came into possession
of the property only in 1970 following the sale that transpired between him and his
mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the year 1978. According to
petitioner, that Espinosa and his predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession
for more than thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such possession
began on June 12, 1945 or earlier. 12
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosa's failure to present the original tracing cloth of the
survey plan or a sepia copy thereof is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v.
Republic of the Philippines 13 and Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes, 14 petitioner argued
that the submission of the original tracing cloth is mandatory in establishing the identity
of the land subject of the application. 15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance survey plan is not the
evidence admissible to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable. 16
By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the
MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA ruled that possession for at least thirty (30)
years, despite the fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the
property to private. Thus:
The contention of [petitioner] is not meritorious on the following grounds:
a) The record of the case will show that [Espinosa] has successfully established valid title
over the subject land and that he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in
continuous, adverse, public and undisturbed possession of said land in the concept of an
owner for more than 30 years before the filing of the application. Established
jurisprudence has consistently pronounced that "open, continuous and exclusive
possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same into
private property (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 604). This
means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by applicant and his
predecessor-in-interest vests title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and
b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12, 1945 is the latest
amendment of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict
implementation of the law would in certain cases result in inequity and unfairness to
[Espinosa]. As wisely stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for
registration of title over a parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or
his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession thereof
for thirty (30) years or more." 17
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other documentary evidence, not
necessarily the original tracing cloth plan, as the identity and location of the property can
be established by other competent evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without merit. While the best
evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes may be the original tracing
cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission, the court may sufficiently order the
issuance of a decree of registration on the basis of the blue print copies and other
evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70594,
October 10, 1986). The said case provides further: ETDaIC
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the applicant sufficient to justify the
registration and confirmation of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the
original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission for purposes of
comparison, should not militate against the rights of the applicant. Such is especially true
in this case where no clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has been
shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans which were found both
by the lower court and the Court of Appeals as conclusive proofs of the description and
identities of the parcels of land contained therein."
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic, supra, the Supreme Court
pronounced that the submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is
a mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply with such requirement is fatal to
one's application for registration. However, such pronouncement need not be taken as an
iron clad rule nor to be applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale
behind the submission of the tracing cloth plan. . . .:
xxx xxx xxx
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be established by other competent
evidence like a duly approved blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and
technical description of Lot 8499, containing and identifying the boundaries, actual area
and location of the lot, the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be excused.
18
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the property is alienable and
disposable:

[Espinosa] has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and disposable. In the
duly approved Advance Survey Plan As-07-0000893 (sic) duly approved by
the Land Management Services, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City, it is
certified/verified that the subject lot is inside the alienable and disposable
area of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain. 19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in its
Resolution 20 dated February 13, 2006.
Petitioner's Case
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CA's assailed
decision and attributes the following errors: (a) Espinosa failed to prove by
competent evidence that the subject property is alienable and disposable;
(b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey plan identifies the property in
preparation for a judicial proceeding but does not convert the property
into alienable, much less, private; (c) under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to determine the
exact metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a blueprint copy of the
survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the
property only if it bears the approval of the Director of Lands.
Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa has acquired
an imperfect title over the subject property that is worthy of confirmation
and registration is hinged on the determination of the following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan substantially
complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529; and AICHaS
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made by the
geodetic engineer who conducted the survey sufficed to prove that the
land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosa's application is
anchored on Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48 (b) of
the PLA and the grant thereof is warranted in view of evidence supposedly
showing his compliance with the requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.
Based on Espinosa's allegations and his supporting documents, it is patent
that his claim of an imperfect title over the property in question is based on
Section 14 (2) and not Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section
48 (b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not allege that his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as
prescribed under the two (2) latter provisions. On the contrary, Espinosa
repeatedly alleged that he acquired title thru his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty (30) years,
or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that should have been applied
is Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529, which states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts' disposition of this
case stemmed from their failure to apprise themselves of the changes that
Section 48 (b) of the PLA underwent over the years. Section 48 (b) of the
PLA originally states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government, since
July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Thus, the required possession and occupation for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
was since July 26, 1894 or earlier.
On June 22, 1957, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942 amended Section 48 (b) of the PLA by
providing a thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Thus:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least
thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled
to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. cCSDaI
On January 25, 1977, P.D. No. 1073 was issued, changing the requirement for possession
and occupation for a period of thirty (30) years to possession and occupation since June
12, 1945 or earlier. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073 states:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945.
On June 11, 1978, P.D. No. 1529 was enacted. Notably, the requirement for possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier was adopted under Section 14 (1) thereof.
P.D. No. 1073, in effect, repealed R.A. No. 1942 such that applications under Section 48
(b) of the PLA filed after the promulgation of P.D. No. 1073 should allege and prove
possession and occupation that dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. However, vested
rights may have been acquired under Section 48 (b) prior to its amendment by P.D. No.
1073. That is, should petitions for registration filed by those who had already been in
possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for thirty (30) years at
the time P.D. No. 1073 was promulgated be denied because their possession commenced
after June 12, 1945? In Abejaron v. Nabasa, 21 this Court resolved this legal predicament
as follows:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required
by the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the
effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and
possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the
Susi doctrine holds that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation
of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have
already gained title over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., that the law cannot impair
vested rights such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by
themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947" may
apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of
the Public Land Act. 22 (Citations omitted)
Consequently, for one to invoke Section 48 (b) and claim an imperfect title over an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain on the basis of a thirty (30)-year
possession and occupation, it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation
commenced on January 24, 1947 and the thirty (30)-year period was completed prior to
the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073.
There is nothing in Section 48 (b) that would suggest that it provides for two (2) modes of
acquisition. It is not the case that there is an option between possession and occupation
for thirty (30) years and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is
neither contemplated under Section 48 (b) that if possession and occupation of an
alienable and disposable public land started after June 12, 1945, it is still possible to
acquire an imperfect title if such possession and occupation spanned for thirty (30) years
at the time of the filing of the application. cDSaEH
In this case, the lower courts concluded that Espinosa complied with the requirements of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 based on supposed
evidence that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of the property
for at least thirty (30) years prior to the time he filed his application. However, there is
nothing on record showing that as of January 25, 1977 or prior to the effectivity of P.D.
No. 1073, he or Isabel had already acquired title by means of possession and occupation
of the property for thirty (30) years. On the contrary, the earliest tax declaration in
Isabel's name was for the year 1965 indicating that as of January 25, 1977, only twelve
(12) years had lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into possession.

The CA's reliance on Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court 23 is
misplaced considering that the application therein was filed on October 20,
1975 or before the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073. The same can be said with
respect to National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals. 24 The petition
for registration therein was filed on August 21, 1968 and at that time, the
prevailing rule was that provided under Section 48 (b) as amended by R.A.
No. 1942.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 25 the applicants therein entered into
possession of the property on June 17, 1978 and filed their application on
February 5, 1987. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the individuals from
whom the applicant purchased the property, or their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in possession since 1937. Thus, during the effectivity of
Section 48 (b) as amended by R.A. No. 1942, or while the prevailing rule
was possession and occupation for thirty (30) years, or prior to the issuance
of P.D. No. 1073, the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period was already
completed.
Thus, assuming that it is Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14
(1) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply in this case, as the lower courts held,
it was incumbent upon Espinosa to prove, among other things, that Isabel's
possession of the property dated back at least to June 12, 1945. That in
view of the established fact that Isabel's alleged possession and occupation
started much later, the lower courts should have dismissed Espinosa's
application outright.
In sum, the CA, as well as the MTC, erred in not applying the present text of
Section 48 (b) of the PLA. That there were instances wherein applications
were granted on the basis of possession and occupation for thirty (30)
years was for the sole reason discussed above. Regrettably, such reason
does not obtain in this case.
Being clear that it is Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 that should apply, it
follows that the subject property being supposedly alienable and
disposable will not suffice. As Section 14 (2) categorically provides, only
private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles
420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
public use, public service or intended for the development of national
wealth, are considered private. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 26
this Court held that there must be an official declaration to that effect
before the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription:
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision
that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420(2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property.
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth." (Emphasis supplied) EcHAaS
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of
the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable
lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. 27
Thus, granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the
property for an aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this does not operate
to divest the State of its ownership. The property, albeit allegedly alienable
and disposable, is not patrimonial. As the property is not held by the State
in its private capacity, acquisition of title thereto necessitates observance
of the provisions of Section 48 (b) of the PLA in relation to Section 14 (1) of
P.D. No. 1529 or possession and occupation since June 12, 1945. For
prescription to run against the State, there must be proof that there was an
official declaration that the subject property is no longer earmarked for
public service or the development of national wealth. Moreover, such
official declaration should have been issued at least ten (10) or thirty (30)
years, as the case may be, prior to the filing of the application for
registration. The period of possession and occupation prior to the
conversion of the property to private or patrimonial shall not be considered
in determining completion of the prescriptive period. Indeed, while a piece of land is still
reserved for public service or the development of national wealth, even if the same is
alienable and disposable, possession and occupation no matter how lengthy will not ripen
to ownership or give rise to any title that would defeat that of the State's if such did not
commence on June 12, 1945 or earlier.
At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the presumption that the
property belongs to the inalienable public domain.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private
person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable. 28
In Republic v. Sarmiento, 29 this Court reiterated the earlier ruling in Menguito v.
Republic 30 that the notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property
surveyed is alienable and disposable is not the positive government act that would
remove the property from the inalienable domain. Neither it is the evidence accepted as
sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property is inalienable:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-
geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No.
27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the
lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to
overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain. TaISDA
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is
inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. . . ."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains
inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer's notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does
not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently
proven that the land in question has been declared alienable." 31 (Citations omitted and
underscoring supplied)
Therefore, even if Espinosa's application may not be dismissed due to his failure to
present the original tracing cloth of the survey plan, there are numerous grounds for its
denial. The blueprint copy of the advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of
the identity and location of the subject property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed
geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management Services (LMS)
of the DENR; and (c) it is accompanied by a technical description of the property which is
certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of
the DENR. As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana, 32 the identity of the land, its
boundaries and location can be established by other competent evidence apart from the
original tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and technical
description:
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original tracing cloth
plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to afford certainty as to the
exact identity of the property applied for registration and to ensure that the same does
not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a
registration application must be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth
plan, especially where it is accompanied by pieces of evidence — such as a duly executed
blueprint of the survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the property —
which may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the
limits and extent of the property sought to be registered. 33

However, while such blueprint copy of the survey plan may be offered as
evidence of the identity, location and the boundaries of the property
applied for, the notation therein may not be admitted as evidence of
alienability and disposability. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, 34 this
Court enumerated the documents that are deemed relevant and sufficient
to prove that the property is already outside the inalienable public domain
as follows:

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., we ruled that it is not enough for the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO to
certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR
Secretary's declaration or the President's proclamation must be certified as
a true copy by the legal custodian of such official record. These facts must
be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. 35
(Citation omitted) EScAHT

Based on the foregoing, it appears that Espinosa cannot avail the benefits
of either Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48 (b) of the
PLA or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. Applying Section 14 (1) of P.D. No.
1529 and Section 48 (b) of the PLA, albeit improper, Espinosa failed to
prove that: (a) Isabel's possession of the property dated back to June 12,
1945 or earlier; and (b) the property is alienable and disposable. On the
other hand, applying Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529, Espinosa failed to
prove that the property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to
prove that his possession and occupation and that of Isabel were of the
character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered
unnecessary by the foregoing considerations.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and

GRANTED. The Decision dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution dated
February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Domingo Espinosa's application for
registration of title over Lot No. 8499 of Cad. 545-D (New) located at
Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Brion, Perez and Sereno, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 171514, [July 18, 2012], 691 PHIL 314-
335)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159595. January 23, 2007.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS,
respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether
prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land
registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would
unsettle precedent. We deny certiorari and instead affirm the assailed
rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes
Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on
17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental
rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as
El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros. 1 In the
decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots,
together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors
who had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous
possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue
the corresponding decree of registration. 2 Among these lots was Lot No.
771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion
(married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of
Sibulan, Negros Oriental. 3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra,
eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her
undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the
parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated
to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through
various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the
years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate
Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra. 4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of
Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the
fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous possession
of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has
ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI
Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the
issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The
records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the
Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941
Decision was rendered a few months before the commencement of the
Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941. ESCacI
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and
simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear
whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings. 5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and
received her documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently
presented by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 6
finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the
revival of the 1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of
confirmation and registration based on the 1941 Decision.
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in
main that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed.
The OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have
established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before
the Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied
by the appellate court in its Decision 7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision,
the Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of
judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special"
proceedings such as land registration cases. The Court of Appeals also
noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to first
request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had
been established that the original records in the 1941 case had already
been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court
of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to land registration cases.
The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon
judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. 8
Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from
the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by
statute of limitations. 9 It bears noting that the Republic does not challenge the
authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original
awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the property is inalienable or otherwise
still belonged to the State.
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals 10 and
Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro. 11 Shipside was cited since in that case, the Court dismissed
the action instituted by the Government seeking the revival of judgment that declared a
title null and void because the judgment sought to be revived had become final more
than 25 years before the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on
Article 1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of Lopez involved
the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the subsequent action by one set
of applicants for the issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years
after the judgment had become final. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding
that laches had set in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly
seven (7) years. cEDIAa
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but
definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the rulings of the lower courts.
The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land
registration case." 12
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 13 decided
in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a decision rendered in a land
registration case wherein the decree of registration remained unissued after 26 years was
already "final and enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of
error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration
case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years,
except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this
theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced
within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6,
Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and
his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. . . .
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or
issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and
does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the
issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no
motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the
land is ordered to be registered. 14
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a
land registration case was reiterated five (5) years after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal
Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al. 15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a
prayer for the issuance of a decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938
decision was, among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument,
the Court was content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana.
A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodil v. Benedicto. 16
These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras 17 and
Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente, 18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a
subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never
prescribes. 19
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on
prescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Apart
from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Ana doctrine was reiterated in
another three (3) more cases later, namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano, 20 Cacho v. Court
of Appeals, 21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals. 22 The doctrine of stare
decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any
compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy
employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feign that the
doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all.
Instead, it is insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-
year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to land
registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. 23 The Republic further observes
that Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of
final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that
the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the
current arguments of the Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions,
not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the
Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality
such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is
to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the
purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a
status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating
such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a
ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to
order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529)
does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the
application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory
fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not
specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily
understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for
the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the
title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to
land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. — After the
judgment directing the registration of title to land has become final, the
court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order
directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within
fifteen days from entry of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and
of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a
certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered,
nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall
cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as the original and
duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The
decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner, entered and
filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the original
certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be
sent, together with the owner's duplicate certificate, to the Register of
Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his
registration book. EHTADa
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the
rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No
obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant
or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The
obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to
issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn
the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to
transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and
the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the
decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds).
All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their
performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or
review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in
the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party
from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow
up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration
system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real
property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional
burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law
from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and
does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to
be executed by motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been
no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of
judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and
proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The
primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to
issue the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body
that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration court that
remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the
decree of registration. However, the Court sees the practical value of necessitating
judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the
land court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription
should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial
evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or
order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than prescription or
laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration. IcESaA
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even
though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in those cases, it should
be observed that neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did
they make any express declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed
by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation that marked both
Sta. Ana and the present case.
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an original
action for land registration, but from a successful motion by the Republic seeking the
cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might argue
that such motion still arose in a land registration case, we note that the pronouncement
therein that prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made in the
course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to that case.
Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of prescription merely restated the
provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to prescription,
followed by an observation that the judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25
years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good
reason, as the significantly more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the
revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer held interest in the subject
property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior
to the filing of the action for revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the
applicability of the rules of prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another
point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the proper execution of the certification
of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized
by the Court to employ the rules on prescription and laches on final decisions in land
registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in 2001,
the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle
of 2005 in the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more
unconventional than that in Shipside. The property involved therein was the subject of
two separate applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the
other by a different party in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a decree
of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968. 24 On the other hand, the petitioners
were able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the
property had already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus obstructing
the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches
arose because the petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and
the cancellation of the competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year
prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize
the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the execution of the
judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score. IHSTDE
Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must
prevail . . . ," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a
certificate of title pursuant to the 1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have
stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the
petitioners with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect
their interests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose the other
application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five
(5)-year reglementary period.
Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates its
application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract from Sta. Ana as a general rule
for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs
of Lopez would have entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had
already been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by a
Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial
duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate the judgment in favor of the
petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right of
ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was indubitable,
considering the earlier decree of registration over the same property
accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general
presumption that the final judgment, with which the corresponding decree
of registration is homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed by
another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption
obtains in this case as well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is
no impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent. 25

We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability

of Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability of the rules of
prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those
cases do not operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta.
Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the
enforcement of a final judgment in a land registration case, especially when
the said judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether deliberately
or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so
much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an
exercise in stating the obvious.

Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the
1941 Decision constituted res judicata that barred subsequent attacks to
the adjudicates' title over the subject property. The Republic submits that
said decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of
registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a
final decision's status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very own
execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as
a factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty
terminology aside, the Republic's arguments on this point do not dissuade
from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to
effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the
delay incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its
effectuation and the reasons for such delay, following the prostracted
failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of
registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had
duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates — her predecessors-in-
interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in the
names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in
interest. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were satisfied that
such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer any compelling
argument to dispute such proof. cCESaH

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Nillas, G.R. No. 159595, [January 23, 2007], 541 PHIL 277-
293)
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 168913. March 14, 2007.]
ROLANDO TING, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A.
LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA
L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-
983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and
Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu
Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29,
1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982
directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding
decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses
Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same
lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N. 1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia
L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio
and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file
an opposition to petitioner's application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC,
filed their Answer 2 calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in
LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on January 29, 1977
and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner's application on the
ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu
RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's application on the
ground of res judicata. 3
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole
issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in
LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become
final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been
issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA); 4 it was only on July 26,
2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents'
motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N; 5 and as no action for revival of the said
decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-year
prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment passé[d]
into extinction." 6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of
res judicata. 7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree.
— The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final
upon the expiration of thirty days 8 to be counted from the date of receipt
of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of
the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the
court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this
Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration
and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged
entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied) SaHTCE
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land,
with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title
of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
whole world. 9 It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary
period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. 10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's
approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's
application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole
world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had
become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of
registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land
Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is
erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by
the Land Management Services of the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey
may be used in court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said
requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special work order. 11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer Belleza
and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate action or
reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of
the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with
the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they
are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is
their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the
court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are
specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings." 12 (Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment
or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents
and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive
period, the same does not lie. ISHaTA
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 13 enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not
apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS
LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS
NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment,
except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case
has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by
another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years
by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,
such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913, [March 14, 2007], 547 PHIL 237-244)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 231116. February 7, 2018.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CLARO YAP, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
Nature of the Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the March 16, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491. The CA affirmed the October 20,
2011 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 6,
granting respondent's petition for registration of a parcel of land located in
Carcar, Cebu. cEaSHC
The Facts
On July 28, 2010, respondent Claro Yap (Yap) filed a petition 3 for
cancellation and re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 of
the Carcar Cadastre, and for the issuance of the corresponding Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) pursuant to the re-issued decree. His petition
alleged the following:
1. Lot No. 922 with an area of thirty four (34) square meters is covered by
Decree No. 99500 issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres
Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez;
2. Ownership over Lot No. 922 was vested upon Yap by virtue of
inheritance and donation and that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said
lot since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and/or by acquisitive prescription being
possessors in good faith in the concept of an owner for more than thirty
(30) years;
3. While a valid decree was issued for Lot No. 922, based on the
certification from the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, there is no
showing or proof that an OCT was ever issued covering the said lot;
4. Lot No. 922 was registered for taxation purposes in the name of Heirs of
Porfirio Yap; and
5. There is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting Lot No. 922,
or any other person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, in
possession, reversion or expectancy, other than Yap. 4
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an
Order 5 dated August 3, 2010 setting the case for hearing on August 3,
2011 and ordering the requisite publication thereof. Since no oppositors
appeared before the court during the said scheduled hearing, the RTC
issued another Order 6 setting the case for hearing on petitioner's
presentation of evidence.
During the ex parte hearing held on August 8, 2011, Yap presented the
following documents, among others, as proof of his claim:
1. Certified true copy of Decree No. 99500 issued by the authorized officer
of the Land Registration Authority (LRA); 7
2. Index of decree showing that Decree No. 99500 was issued for Lot No.
922; 8
3. Certification from the Register of Deeds of Cebu that no certificate of
title covering Lot No. 922, Cad. 30 has been issued; 9
4. Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Late Porfirio C. Yap with
Deed of Donation; 10
5. Certification from the Office of the City Assessor of Carcar indicating that
the heirs of Porfirio Yap had been issued Tax Declarations for Lot No. 922
since 1948;
6. Tax Declarations covering Lot No. 922 from 1948 up to 2002; 11
7. Blueprint of the approved consolidation and subdivision plan; and
8. Certification from Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO), Cebu City stating that there is no existing public land application
for Lot No. 922. 12
In its September 20, 2011 Order, 13 the RTC admitted petitioner's evidence and deemed
the case submitted for decision.
RTC Ruling
The RTC found that Yap had sufficiently established his claims and was able to prove his
ownership and possession over Lot No. 922. As such, it granted the petition and ordered
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to cancel Decree No. 99500, re-issue a new
copy thereof, and on the basis of such new copy, issue an Original Certificate of Title in
the name of Andres Abellana, as administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. The
dispositive portion of the October 20, 2011 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the court grants the petition in favor of the petitioner Claro Yap. The Land
Registration Authority thru the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu is hereby
directed to cancel Decree No. 99500 issued on November 29, 1920 and to re-issue a new
copy thereof in the name of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan
Rodriguez, and on the bases of the new copy of Decree No. 99500, to issue an Original
Certificate of Title covering Lot No. [922] in the name of Andres Abellana, as
administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. CTIEac
Further, the Register of Deeds is directed to furnish the petitioner, Claro Yap, with the re-
issued copy of Decree No. 99500 and the copy of its title upon payment of any
appropriate fees.
SO ORDERED. 14
Since the order of the RTC was for the re-issuance of the decree under the name of its
original adjudicate, Yap filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 15 stating that the new
decree and OCT should be issued under his name instead of Andres Abellana.
On the other hand, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its
Comment 16 mainly arguing that Yap's petition and motion should be denied since the
Republic was not furnished with copies thereof.
In its Joint Order 17 dated August 26, 2014, the RTC denied Yap's motion ruling that the
law provides that the decree, which would be the basis for the issuance of the OCT,
should be issued under the name of the original adjudicate. Likewise, the RTC also denied
the OSG's motion finding that the records of the case show that it was furnished with
copies of the Petition as well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration. 18
The OSG then interposed an appeal before the CA arguing that Yap's petition should have
been denied due to insufficiency of evidence and failure to implead indispensable parties
such as the heirs of Juan Rodriguez and/or Andres Abellana.
CA Ruling
In its March 16, 2017 Decision, the CA upheld the RTC's ruling finding that the pieces of
evidence submitted by Yap were sufficient to support the petition. It ruled that since it
has been established that no certification of title or patent had been issued over Lot No.
922, the RTC did not err in ordering the re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 in the name of
Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. 19
As regards the OSG's argument on non-joinder of indispensable parties, the CA
highlighted that it is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Nevertheless, it ruled that the
heirs of either Andres Abellana or Juan Rodriguez were not deprived of the opportunity to
be heard as the proceeding before the RTC was an in rem proceeding. Thus, when the
petition was published, all persons including the said heirs were deemed notified. 20
Lastly, while the CA delved into the issues ventilated by the OSG on appeal, it also noted
that it was too late to raise the same due to the latter's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the RTC's decision or submit a comment on the merits of Yap's Partial
Motion for Reconsideration. 21 The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 20, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 06, Cebu City, in LRC REC. NO. Lot No. 922, Cad. 30, Carcar
City, Cebu, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. 22
Thus, the OSG filed the instant petition raising essentially the same arguments but this
time also advancing the theory that Yap's action had already prescribed.
The Issue
The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the RTC correctly ordered the
cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof, and the issuance of the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title covering Lot No. 922.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition.
At the threshold, settled is the rule that prescription cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; 23 the general rule being that the appellate court is not authorized
to consider and resolve any question not properly raised in the courts
below. 24
In any event, prescription does not lie in the instant case.
There is nothing in the law that
limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree
The OSG now postulates that the petition should be denied due to Yap and
his predecessors' failure to file the proper motion to execute Decree No.
99500 as prescribed under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 25 It
also subscribes that the petition is now barred by the statute of limitations
26 since nine (9) decades had already passed after the issuance of the said
decree in November 1920 without any action brought upon by Yap or his
predecessors-in-interest. 27 SaCIDT
Further, the OSG asseverates that there is no proof that Decree No. 99500
has attained finality and the decision granting the issuance thereof was not
appealed or modified.
The foregoing arguments are specious.
Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 had been issued on November 29,
1920 by the Court of First Instance, Province of Cebu pursuant to the
court's decision in Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 58. 28
The issuance of the said decree creates a strong presumption that the
decision in Cadastral Case No. 1 had become final and executory. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the OSG to prove otherwise. However, no evidence was
presented to support its claims that the decision in Cadastral Case No. 1
and the issuance of Decree No. 99500 had not attained finality.
The fact that the ownership over Lot No. 922 had been confirmed by
judicial declaration several decades ago does not, however, give room for
the application of the statute of limitations or laches, nor bars an
application for the re-issuance of the corresponding decree.
In the landmark case of Sta. Ana v. Menla, 29 the Court elucidated the
raison d'etre why the statute of limitations and Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court do not apply in land registration proceedings, viz.:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
above assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a
decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be
enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another
proceeding to enforce the judgment, which may be enforced within 5 years
by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6,
Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the
same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose
is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings,
the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established.
After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration,
no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when
the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the
winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to
Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action,
except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ
of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse
or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action,
upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
The third assignment of error is as follows:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE
OF REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES BASED
ON A DECISION WHICH HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT YET BECOME FINAL, AND IN
ANY CASE ON A DECISION THAT HAS BEEN BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
We also find no merit in the above contention. There is nothing in the law
that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree.
The reason is what is stated in the consideration of the second assignment
error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not
need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore,
the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue
the decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been filed cannot prejudice the
owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing pronouncements were echoed in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar
30 and reiterated by the Court in the more recent Ting v. Heirs of Diego Lirio 31 wherein
We ruled that a final judgment confirming land title and ordering its registration
constitutes res judicata against the whole world and the adjudicate need not file a motion
to execute the same, thus:
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or
without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or
oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when
final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when no appeal within the
reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval in
LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration of the
lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx
The December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents
and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive
period, the same does not lie.
For the past decades, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on
prescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. Clearly,
the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law 32 from the time
decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need to
be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by
motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. 33 cHECAS
The propriety of cancellation and re-
issuance of Decree No. 99500, to
serve as basis for the issuance of an
OCT covering Lot No. 922, had been
sufficiently proven in the instant case
The OSG maintains that even assuming that Yap's petition is not barred by the statute of
limitations, the re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 is still improper due to the total lack of
evidence presented before the court. 34
We disagree.
At the outset, the Court need not belabor itself by enumerating and discussing in detail,
yet again, the pieces of evidence proffered in the instant case. This matter had already
been passed upon and settled by the courts a quo and it is not our function to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again. Yet, even if We take a second look at the facts of the case,
the Court is still inclined to deny the petition.
Records show that Yap sufficiently established that Decree No. 99500 was issued on
November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of
Juan Rodriguez. Further, it was also proven during the proceedings before the court that
no OCT was ever issued covering the said lot. In this regard, Section 39 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 35 or the "Property Registration Decree" provides that the original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. There is, therefore, a
need to cancel the old decree and a new one issued in order for the decree and the OCT
to be exact replicas of each other.
In Republic v. Heirs of Sanchez, 36 the Court enunciated the necessity of the petition for
cancellation of the old decree and its re-issuance, if no OCT had been issued pursuant to
the old decree:
1. Under the premises, the correct proceeding is a petition for cancellation of the old
decree, re-issuance of decree and for issuance of OCT pursuant to that re-issued decree.
In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 123361,
March 3, 1997, our Supreme Court had affirmed the efficacy of filing a petition for
cancellation of the old decree; the reissuance of such decree and the issuance of OCT
corresponding to that reissued decree.
"Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit amended
petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to his Court (docketed as
Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara, G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to
remand the case to the lower court, ordering the latter to accept the amended petition
and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decree under the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961) and Heirs of Cristobal
Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 [1968], and the lower court findings that the decrees
had in fact been issued, the omnibus motion should have been heard as a motion to re-
issue the decrees in order to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the
respondents being heard in their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept
the amended petition subject to the private respondent's being given the
opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already
on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing
evidence shall be given the parties."

Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case, a question may
be asked: Why should a decree be canceled and re-issued when the same is
valid and intact? Within the context of this discussion, there is no dispute
that a decree has been validly issued. And in fact, in some instances, a copy
of such decree is intact. What is not known is whether or not an OCT is
issued pursuant to that decree. If such decree is valid, why is there a need
to have it cancelled and re-issued?

Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of Section 39 of PD

1529 which states that: "The original certificate of title shall be a true copy
of the decree of registration." This provision is significant because it
contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the decree. If the old
decree will not be canceled and no new decree issued, the corresponding
OCT issued today will bear the signature of the present Administrator while
the decree upon which it was based shall bear the signature of the past
Administrator. This is not consistent with the clear intention of the law
which states that the OCT shall be true copy of the decree of registration.
Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of the old decree and the issuance
of a new one is necessary.

xxx xxx xxx

4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition in

representation of the decedent and the re-issued decree shall still be under
the name of the original adjudicate.

It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death of the
decedent. The heirs shall then succeed into the shoes of the decedent. The
heirs shall have the legal interest in the property, thus, they cannot be
prohibited from filing the necessary petition.

As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree means that the
new decree shall be issued which shall, in all respects, be the same as that
of the original decree. Nothing in the said decree shall be amended nor
modified; hence, it must be under the name of the original adjudicate.
(Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Based from the foregoing, the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of
Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof, and the issuance of the
corresponding OCT covering Lot No. 922 in the name of its original
adjudicate, Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan
Rodriguez.

Verily, this Court sees no reason to overturn the factual findings and the
ruling of the CA. Petitioner failed to show that the CA's decision was
arbitrarily made or that evidence on record was disregarded.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

March 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491 is hereby
AFFIRMED. AHDacC

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, Leonen and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Martires, * J., is on leave.

||| (Republic v. Yap, G.R. No. 231116, [February 7, 2018])

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123346. December 14, 2007.]
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
[G.R. No. 134385. December 14, 2007.]
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE
B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING
SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA
TIRADO, ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN,
LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTER OF
DEES OF MALABON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J p:
The stability of the country's Torrens system is menaced by the infestation
of fake land titles and deeds. Any decision of this Court that breathes life
into spurious or inexistent titles all but contributes to the blight. On the
contrary, the judicial devotion is towards purging the system of illicit titles,
concomitant to our base task as the ultimate citadel of justice and
legitimacy.
These two petitions 1 involve properties covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the
Maysilo Estate. 2 The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities,
comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the
Vatican. 3 Despite their prime location within Metropolitan Manila, the
properties included in OCT No. 994 have been beset by controversy and
sullied by apparent fraud, cloudy titles and shady transfers. It may as well
be renamed the "Land of Caveat Emptor."
The controversy attending the lands of OCT No. 994 has not eluded this
Court. Since 1992, our findings and ruling in MWSS v. Court of Appeals 4
have stood as the Rosetta Stone in deciphering claims emanating from OCT
No. 994, as was done in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 5 and in the Court's
Decision dated 29 November 2005 (2005 Decision) in these cases. 6 Yet in
the course of resolving these motions for reconsideration came the
revelation that OCT No. 994 was lost in translation following MWSS. Certain
immutable truths reflected on the face of OCT No. 994 must emerge and
gain vitality, even if we ruffle feathers in the process.
I.
A recapitulation of the facts, which have already been extensively narrated
in the 2005 Decision, is in order. For clarity, we narrate separately the
antecedent facts in G.R. Nos. 123346 and 134385.
A. G.R. No. 123346, Manotok Realty, Inc.
and Manotok Estate Corporation, vs.
CLT Realty Development Corporation
On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to
recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation
(Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129. 7
CLT's claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
177013 issued in its name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds, which
title in turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed
of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988. Hipolito's title
emanated from Jose Dimson's (Dimson) TCT No. R-15169, a title issued
pursuant to an order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City,
Branch 33. Dimson's title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.
8 cases.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by
CLT, claiming that Dimson's title, the proximate source of CLT's title, was
irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing
therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over
Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or
vendees of the National Housing Authority. 9 The Manotok title likewise
traced as its primary source OCT No. 994 which, on 9 September 1918, was
transferred to Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously
acquired the property on 21 August 1918 by virtue of an "Escritura de
Venta" executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Llopis. 10 On 3
March 1920, Ruiz and Leuterio sold the property to Francisco Gonzalez who
held title thereto until 22 August 1938 when the property was transferred
to Jose Leon Gonzalez, Consuelo Susana Gonzalez, Juana Francisca
Gonzalez, Maria Clara Gonzalez, Francisco Felipe Gonzalez and Concepcion Maria
Gonzalez under TCT No. 35486. The lot was then, per annotation dated 21 November
1946, subdivided into seven (7) parcels each in the name of each of the Gonzalezes. 11
The trial court, ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings and conclusions arrived at by
the majority commissioners appointed to resolve the conflict of titles. It was established
that the entire Maysilo Estate was registered under Act No. 496 by virtue of which OCT
No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal; 12 that Lot 26 was transferred to
CLT by Hipolito whose title was derived from the Dimson title and that on the basis of the
technical descriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok titles, the latter's
property indeed encroached on the property described in CLT's title. 13
The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial
court. 14 Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, 15 they filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court, ascribing error to the appellate court in upholding the
trial court's decision which decided the case on the basis of the majority commissioners'
report and overlooked relevant facts in the minority commissioner's report. 16
B. G.R. No. 134385, Araneta Institute
of Agriculture, Inc. v. Heirs of
Jose B. Dimson, et. al.
On 18 December 1979, Dimson filed with the then CFI of Rizal, Branch 33, Caloocan City a
complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Araneta Institute of
Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta). Dimson alleged that he was the absolute owner of part of the
Maysilo Estate in Malabon covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City. Alleging that Araneta had been illegally occupying the land and that the
latter refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands, he prayed that Araneta be
ordered to vacate the same and remove all improvements thereon and to return full
possession thereof to him. Araneta for its part admitted occupancy of the disputed land
by constructing some buildings thereon and subdividing portions thereof in the exercise
of its right as absolute owner. He alleged that Dimson's title to the subject land was void
and hence he had no cause of action. 17
The trial court ruled for Dimson in its Decision dated 28 May 1993 with these findings:
first, there were inherent technical infirmities or defects in the titles that formed each link
in the chain of ownership that culminated in the Manotok title, i.e., that the technical
descriptions in the titles were written in Spanish whereas those in the alleged mother
title, OCT No. 994, were in English, which, an abnormal state that deviated from the usual
practice in the issuance of titles; and second, it was established procedure to indicate in
the certificate of title, whether original or transfer certificate, the date of the original
survey of the mother title together with the succeeding date of subdivision or
consolidation. Thus, the absence of the original survey dates of OCT No. 994 on
Manotok's chain of titles, the trial court added, should mean that OCT No. 994 was not
the mother title not only because the original survey dates were different but also
because the original survey date must always be earlier than the issue date of the original
title. OCT No. 994 was issued on May 3, 1917 which was much ahead of the survey date
indicated in the succeeding titles, which is December 22, 1917. 18
Undaunted, Araneta interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, on 30 May
1997, affirmed the lower court's decision. 19 In so holding, the appellate court declared
that the title of Araneta to the disputed land is a nullity. It noted that Dimson's TCT No. R-
15169 was derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917" and that the same
was obtained by Dimson simultaneously with other titles, viz: TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, and
15168 by virtue of the Decision dated October 13, 1977 and Order dated October 18,
1977, in Special Proceedings No. C-732. It was also pointed out that Araneta's TCT No.
13574 and 21343 were both derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917"
which was previously "declared null and void by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals." 20
Araneta then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court attributing error to the
Court of Appeals in failing to recognize that it had a better right of possession over the
property than did Dimson. 21
As both petitions involved interrelated challenges against the validity of the parties'
separate titles to portions of the greater Maysilo Estate, they, along with G.R. No.
148767, 22 were consolidated per Resolutions dated 21 April 1999 and 6 March 2002.
Also in 2002, the Republic of the Philippines sought and was allowed intervention in these
On 29 November 2005, the Third Division of the Court rendered the 2005 Decision, 23 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. 24
The Court acknowledged that the paramount question raised in the petitions is whether
the titles issued in the name of Dimson and of CLT are valid. Noting that this question is
one purely of fact, the Court held that the same was beyond its power to determine and
so, the factual findings of the trial courts in these cases as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals must be accorded the highest degree of respect and not disturbed at all.

Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to discuss the absence of merit of the
petitions. First, particularly with respect to G.R. No. 123346, the Court
upheld the validity of the trial court's adoption of the commissioners'
majority report as part of the decision inasmuch as the same is allowed by
Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and that a case of overlapping
titles absolutely necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of
geodetic engineering who, on account of their experience and expertise,
are in a better position to determine which of the contending titles is valid.
For this reason, the Court emphasized, the trial court may well rely on their
findings and conclusions. Second, the Court pointed out that the titles of
respondents in all three cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered on 19 April 1917. However,
because the validity of said mother title was upheld by the Court itself in
MWSS and reiterated in Heirs of Gonzaga, the Court chose not to delve
anymore into the correctness of the said decisions which had already
attained finality and immutability.
The Manotoks and Araneta duly filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. On 5 June 2006, the cases were elevated to the Court en
banc, which heard oral arguments on 1 August 2006. The Court formulated
the issues for oral argument, thus:
From the above petitions, the following principal issues are gathered:
I.
Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties are valid:
A. Petitioner's titles:
1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272,
21107, 21485, 26405, 26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 63268,
55896, T-1214528, 163902 and 165119 in the name of Manotok Realty,
Inc., and TCT No. T-232568 in the name of Manotok Estate Corporation;
2. TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 in the name of Araneta Institute of Agriculture;
and
3. TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374 in the name of Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan
Association, Inc.
All these titles were derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
registered on May 3, 1917 in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City
covering Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, same city.
B. Respondents' Title:
1. TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation;
2. TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson; and
3. TCT No. T-1770 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation.
All these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered earlier, or on
April 19, 1917, covering the same Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate.
II.
Can this Court still overturn at this point its Decision in Metropolitan Water
Works and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
103558, November 17, 1992) and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 96259, September 3, 1996) sustaining the validity of OCT
No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 and nullify the same OCT No. 994
registered later, or on May 3, 1917?
III.
How will the Reports of the Department of Justice and the Senate Fact-
Finding Committee, not presented in evidence before the trial courts
concluding that the valid title is OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917,
affect the disposition of these cases?
Will it be necessary to remand these cases to the trial courts to determine
which of the Certificates of Title are valid? If so, which trial court? 25
A crucial fact emerged during the oral arguments. The Republic, through
the Solicitor General, 26 strenuously argued that contrary to the
supposition reflected in the Advisory, there was, in fact, only one OCT No.
994.
. . . In this particular case, it appears that on December 3, 1912, the Court
of Land Registration, the Judge Norberto Romualdez presiding, acting on
Land Registration Case No. 4429 rendered judgment ordering the GLRO to issue a decree.
Pursuant to this order, the GLRO prepared Decree No. 36455 and issued the same on
April 19, 1917 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, at Manila, Philippines. It may be observed
that at the face of the OCT 994 which was then on file at the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan and now kept in the LRA, the following entry can be seen. Received for
transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal this 3rd day of
May 1917 at 7:30 a.m. Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date
of transcription of the decree into the Original Certificate of Title. It appears that the
transcription of the decree was done on the date it was received by the Register of Deeds
of Rizal on May 3, 1917. There is no other date to speak of. In the records of the Land
Registration Authority, there is only one OCT 994, on its face appears the date of
transcript, May 3, 1917. The validity then of all subsequent titles tracing their origin from
OCT 994 should be tested in the light of these set of facts. . . . 27
On the other hand, the counsel for CLT stated during the same oral argument that he had
seen a photocopy of an OCT No. 994 that was dated 19 April 1917, 28 and manifested
that he could attach the same to CLT's memorandum. 29 At the same time, on even date,
the Court directed the Solicitor General and counsel for CLT to submit to the Court
"certified true copies of the Original Certificate of Title No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and
April 19, 1917, respectively, on or before Friday, August 4, 2006." 30
In response to this directive, both the Solicitor General and the counsel for CLT submitted
their separate "Compliance" to this Court, with their respective copies of OCT No. 994
attached thereto. Both copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the Solicitor General and CLT
indicate on their face that the decree of registration issued on 19 April 1917 was received
for transcription at the office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal on 3 May
1917. Indeed, there is no evident variance between the copies of OCT No. 994 submitted
by the OSG and CLT, and CLT admits just as much in its Memorandum dated 3 September
2006. 31
The claim of the Solicitor General that there is only one OCT No. 994 was duly confirmed
though belatedly by CLT itself. Even the ponente of the 2005 Decision has recognized this
fact, as indicated in her present Dissenting Opinion. The emergence of such fact, contrary
as it is to the crucial predicate underlying the issues presented in the Court's Advisory, has
changed the essence and complexion of the controversy. The key to grant or deny the
motions for reconsideration is the answer to the question: which is the true date of OCT
No. 994, 17 April 1917 or 3 May 1917?
II.
We turn to the date of OCT No. 994 as reflected in the quoted portion of the certified true
copy thereof submitted by the Republic of the Philippines: 32
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of said . . .
'Witness: the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate Judge of said Court, the 3rd day
of December, A.D. nineteen hundred and twelve.
'Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19th day of April A.D. 1917 at 9:00 A.M.
ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office of Justice
Received for transcription at the office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of P.I.
this third day of May, nineteen hundred and seventeen at 7:30 A.M. (emphasis supplied)
As evident on the face of OCT No. 994, the decree of registration was issued on 19 April
1917, and actually "received for transcription" by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917.
Interestingly, even as CLT admits that there is only one OCT No. 994, that which the
Solicitor General had presented to the Court, 33 it maintains that the OCT should be
deemed registered as of the date of issuance of the decree of registration, 19 April 1917,
instead of the date it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May
1917. The argument is based on the theory that it is "the decree of registration [that]
produces legal effects," though it "is entered before the transmittal of the same for
transcription at the Register of Deeds." 34
This argument marks a radical departure from CLT's earlier theory that there were two
OCTs No. 994, one dated 19 April 1917 and the other 3 May 2007, a theory which was
likewise reflected in the Court's earlier Advisory on the issues prior to the oral argument.
35 Yet the argument smacks of plain sophistry.
The process involved is what this Court called "the method of giving a paper title." 36 It is
spelled out in detail in Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act:
SEC. 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a
certified copy thereof, under the seal of the court, to the register of deeds for the
province, or provinces, or city in which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall
transcribe the decree in a book to be- called the 'registration book,' in which a leaf, or
leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by
the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and
shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. All certificates
of title shall be numbered consecutively, beginning with number one. The
register of deeds shall in each case make an exact duplicate of the original
certificate, including the seal, but putting on it the words 'Owner's
duplicate certificate,' and deliver the same to the owner or to his attorney
duly authorized. In case of a variance between the owner's duplicate
certificate and the original certificate the original shall prevail. The certified
copy of the decree of registration shall be filed and numbered by the
register of deeds with a reference noted on it to the place of record of the
original certificate of title: Provided, however, That when an application
includes land lying in more than one province, or one province and the city
of Manila, the court shall cause the part lying in each province or in the city
of Manila to be described separately by metes and bounds in the decree of
registration, and the clerk shall send to the register of deeds for each
province, or the city of Manila, as the case may be, a copy of the decree
containing a description of the land within that province or city, and the
register of deeds shall register the same and issue an owner's duplicate
therefor, and thereafter for all matters pertaining to registration under this
Act the portion in each province or city shall be treated as a separate parcel
of land.
SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of
registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the
registration book 'Original certificate of title, entered pursuant to decree of
the Court of Land Registration, dated at' (stating time and place of entry of
decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take effect upon the
date of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating to
the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled 'Transfer from
number' (the number of the next previous certificate relating to the same
land), and also the words 'Originally registered' (date, volume, and page of
registration.")
With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court in two vintage
and sound rulings made it plain that the original certificate of title is issued
on the date the decree of registration is transcribed. In the first ruling, it
was held that there is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree
and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by
the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of
title is made by the register of deeds. 37 Such difference is highlighted by
Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides that the certificate of title is issued in
pursuance of the decree of registration. In the second, it was stressed that
what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of
registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry. 38
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the
certificate of title itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the
recipient from the land registration office of the decree for transcription to
the certificate as well as the transcriber no less. Since what is now
acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994 indicates that it was received
for transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is that
date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able to
transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the book
being the original certificate of title. 39 Moreover, it is only after the
transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of
title is to take effect.
The textbook writers and authorities on Land Registration are unanimous
on the matter. The late Commissioner Antonio Noblejas, widely
acknowledged as the leading authority on the subject during his time,
wrote, thus:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of registration, the
Registrar of Land Titles transcribes the same in the registry book called the
"Registration Book" and issues an owner's duplicate certificate of title to
the applicant upon payment by him of the necessary registration fees. The
entry made by the Registrar of Land Titles in his registry book is actually the
original copy of the original certificate of title and shall be signed by him
and sealed with the seal of the Court and of his office. Pursuant to Rep. Act
No. 113, the Registrar of Land Titles may now use only the seal of his office,
dispensing with the court seal. 40
Professor Florencio Ponce, who was also once Register of Deeds of Quezon
City and Deputy Register of Deeds of Manila, was of the same conviction:
A decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the
Commissioner of Land Registration (formerly Chief, G.L.R.O.) in the name of
the Judge to the fact that the land described therein is registered in the
name of the applicant or oppositor or claimant as the case maybe. When
this is transcribed or spread in toto in the registration book and signed by
the register of deeds, the page on which the transcription is made become
the "original certificate of title," more commonly called the Torrens title.
xxx xxx xxx
The land becomes a registered land only upon the transcription of the decree in the
original registration book by the register of deeds, the date and time of such transcription
being set forth in the process and certified to at the foot of each entry or certificate of
title.
xxx xxx xxx
The issuance of the original and owner's duplicate certificates are basic for the valid
existence of the title. Issuance of additional copies are permissive and their non-existence
does not affect the status of title. A certificate of title is deemed as regularly issued with
the issuance of the original copy and owner's duplicate. 41
So was Professor Francisco Ventura:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of registration, the Commissioner
of Land Registration sends a certified copy thereof, under seal of the said office, to the
Register of Deeds of the province where the land lies, and the register of Deeds
transcribes the decree in a book, called the Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves,
in consecutive order should be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the
Register of Deeds in said book constitutes the original certificate of title and is signed by
him and sealed with the seal of his office. 42
The same view came from Professor Narciso Peña, also a former Assistant Commissioner
of the Land Registration Commission and Acting Register of Deeds of Manila, as he wrote,
thus:
Thus, Section 42 of Act No. 496 provides that the certificate first registered in pursuance
of the decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the
registration book "Original Certificate of Title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of
Land Registration, dated at (stating time and place of entry of decree and the number of
the case). This certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the
decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be
entitled. "Transfer from number (the number of the next previous certificate relating to
the same land)," and also the words "Originally registered (date, volume, and page of
registration). 43
The dissent has likewise suggested that the variance between these two dates is
ultimately inconsequential. It cannot be so for otherwise, the recent decision of the Court
in Alfonso v. Office of the President 44 would simply be wrong. In Alfonso, the Court
precisely penalized Alfonso, the former register of deeds of Caloocan because she
acquiesced to the change of the date of registration of OCT No. 994, as reflected in
several subsequent titles purportedly derived from that mother title, from 3 May 1917 to
19 April 1917. If indeed the difference in dates were "inconsequential," then it should not
have really mattered that Mrs. Alfonso, as found by the Court, had invariably issued
certificates of title, reflecting either the 19 April or 3 May date, a circumstance which, the
Court concluded, was irregular. But if the Court were to accede to the dissent and agree
that it did not really matter whether the date of registration of OCT No. 994 was 3 May or
19 April, then poor Mrs. Alfonso should be spared of the penalty of dismissal from the
service which the Court had already affirmed.
III.
Even the dissent does not insist, as the 2005 Decision did, that there is an OCT No. 994
registered or dated 19 April 1917. This new stance squarely contravenes or deviates from
the following unequivocal pronouncement in the 2005 Decision:
We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the issue in all these three (3) cases
involves the validity of the parties' overlapping titles. The titles of the respondents in
these cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City
registered on April 19, 1917. The validity of such mother title has already been upheld by
this Court in G.R. No. 103558, MWSS v. Court of Appeals, et al. dated November 17, 1992
earlier cited in the assailed Decisions. Significantly, the ruling in MWSS was reiterated in
G.R. No. 96259, Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals dated September 3, 1996.
We cannot delve anymore into the correctness of the Decision of this Court in MWSS. The
said Decision, confirming the validity of OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917 from which
the titles of the respondents in the cases at bar were derived, has long become final and
executory. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it
becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. 45
This new conclusion likewise differs from what the Court had to say regarding OCT No.
994 "dated April 19, 1917" in the adverted MWSS v. Court of Appeals 46 decision:
It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from TCT No. 36957
which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the other hand,
private respondents' title was derived from the same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19,
1917. Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails . . . In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to
hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of priority of
issuance, private respondents' title prevails over that of petitioner MWSS.
47
Four years later, the Court promulgated the Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals 48
decision, which essentially reaffirmed foregoing factual pronouncements
made in MWSS.
Notwithstanding the emerging error in fact that informed the MWSS and
Gonzaga decisions, the dissent now claims that said decisions confirmed
"the validity of the OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917." But if we
examine MWSS closely, it appears to be beset with semantic confusion. We
make the following relevant references from that decision, presented
sequentially:
(1) "Jose B. Dimson was the registered owner of a parcel land situated in
Balintawak, Kalookan City with an area of 213,012 square meters, more or
less, and covered by TCT No. C-15167 which was registered on June 8,
1978. Said parcel of land was originally Lot 28 of the Maysilo Estate (OCT)
No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No.
36455 issued in Land Registration Case No. 4429." 49
(2) Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that
petitioner's title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599 square
meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City, Cadastral Case
No. 34, while private respondents' title was derived from OCT No. 994
issued on April 19, 1917; 50
(3) "It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer
from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917. Upon the other hand, private respondent's title was derived
from the same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917;" 51
(4) "Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that
the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the
same is in existence. 5 Since the land in question has already been
registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent
registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void;" 52
In one (1) out of the four (4) times that reference was made to the mother
title of Dimson in MWSS, it was "OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917"
which is the language preferred by the dissent since it hews to the date of
issuance of the decree of registration in the authentic OCT No. 994.
However, the same decision inconsistently refers to it also as OCT No. 994
"registered on April 19, 1917", "dated April 19, 1917," and "registered
under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917." Notably, the context of MWSS in
making the final citation, "registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19,
1917," was to point out that as a result "the subsequent registration of the
same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void;" hence, no other conclusion can
be reached than that the Court deemed Dimson's mother title as having
been registered on a date earlier than 3 May 1917.
Since the dissent and even CLT now acknowledge that there is only one
OCT No. 994 which was registered by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on 3
May 1917, the earlier factual finding in MWSS is indefensible. MWSS
recognized an OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917, a title that never
existed and, even assuming that it did exist, is now acknowledged as
spurious.
Gonzaga primarily relied on the ruling of the Court in MWSS upon a finding
that the case involved "facts that are exactly the same as those that we
have passed and ruled upon in the [MWSS case]." The title which was
affirmed by the Court in Gonzaga, TCT No. C-26806 in the name of Lilia
Sevilla, was "a transfer from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994
which was registered on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455." 53
It was further observed by the Court that "on the one hand, [therein]
petitioners' titles indicate original registration to have been made on May
3, 1917, but on the other hand, private respondents' title indicates original
registration to have been made on April 19, 1917." 54
It was the title originally registered on 19 April 1917 which was made to
prevail in Gonzaga, following MWSS. Since there is no OCT No. 994
originally registered on 19 April 1917, as now acknowledged, it follows that
Gonzaga, like MWSS, is no longer reliable as well.
The argument has been raised by the ponente of the 2005 Decision that
the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 must be distinguished from "OCT No. 994
dated May 3, 1917 involved in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases" because the
former title was "based on the Cadastral Survey of Kalookan City under
Cadastral Case No. 34, also covering the Maysilo Estate." It is elemental to
note that assuming said 3 May OCT was somehow flawed because it was based on
Cadastral Case No. 34, it does not mean that the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No. 994 is
valid or had existed in the first place. Since even the dissent now discounts the existence
of the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No. 994, it should necessarily follow that any title that
is sourced from the 17 April 1917 OCT is void. Such conclusion is inescapable whatever
questions there may be about the veracity of the 3 May 1917 OCT based on Cadastral
Case No. 34.
It would be especially incoherent for the Court to reiterate MWSS and Gonzaga when
they effectuated the OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 and acknowledge at the
same time that the same OCT never existed, the genuine OCT No. 994 being that which
was registered on 3 May 1917. We need not go as far as to revive the MWSS or Gonzaga
decisions, but certainly we can decline to infuse further validity to their erroneous basic
premise that there was an OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. The dissent proposes
that we perpetuate the erroneous premise even as the error is plainly acknowledged, a
stance that will not serve the Court well should it prevail.
Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions now before us.
Undisputedly, the two cases involved different parcels of land. The present petitioners
could not be bound by the decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto
and their properties were not involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is basic
that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers
to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. 55
We can take instruction from the tack previously taken by this Court in dealing with
municipalities created by executive orders. Beginning with Pelaez v. Auditor General, 56
the Court declared as a general principle that the President had no power to create
municipalities through executive orders. However, instead of nullifying the creation of all
municipalities created in the same manner, the Court only annulled those municipalities
whose creation was specifically attacked in the petition filed by then-Vice President
Pelaez. 57 With respect to the other municipalities which were not annulled in Pelaez, the
Court would, in the next few decades, annul only the municipalities which were
specifically challenged in petitions raised before the Court. 58 However, after the
adoption of the Local Government Code of 1991 that gave statutory recognition to the de
facto municipalities which had not yet been annulled, the Court started to affirm the legal
existence of such municipalities. 59
As in Pelaez, the operative effect of the "doctrines" pronounced in MWSS and Gonzaga
can extend only to the parties and properties involved in said cases, even if it can be
argued that the rights involving other parties and properties are afflicted with
inconsistency as regards the legal rulings therein, similar to the municipalities created
which though created by void executive orders were not however annulled. Yet with the
emergence of a new fact — the enactment of the Local Government Code vis-à-vis
Pelaez, or the present acknowledgment that only the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 exists vis-
à-vis MWSS and Gonzaga — subsequent rulings would be informed primarily by the new
developments, rather than by the previous precedents that were not able to take into
account the true or new factual premises.
IV.
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be
affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If
these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such
titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic
factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs
from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become
virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no
longer be relied upon as precedents.
This approach immensely differs from that preferred by the 2005 Decision and the
dissenting view, which dwells in the main on the alleged flaws in the titles held by the
Manotoks and Araneta, without making a similar inquiry into the titles held by CLT and
the Heirs of Dimson. Since the decision in favor of CLT and the Heirs of Dimson was
ultimately grounded on a factual predicate now acknowledged as erroneous, it follows
that the primary focus should have been whether the titles held by CLT and the Dimsons
are valid and with force and effect. To that end, we need only examine the titles relied
upon by CLT and the Dimsons.
In the Manotok petition, CLT had originally filed a complaint for annulment of the titles in
the name of the Manotoks, alleging that it was the registered owner of Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. T-177013 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Reproduced below is what appears on the face of TCT No. T-177013: 60
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April,
in the year, nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume 36455, page ____, as Original Certificate of Title No.
994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ____ Record No. _____ in the name of
___________.
This certificate is a transfer from Trans. Certificate of Title No. R-17994/T-89, which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at City of
Kalookan
Philippines, on the 15th
day of March In the year
nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine at 19:48 a.m.
CLT further alleged that it derived TCT No. T-177013 on 10 December 1988
from Estelita Hipolito whose title, TCT No. R-17994, is depicted, thus: 61
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the
19th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume
NA, page NA, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No.
36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429, Record No. ________.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-15166/T-
75, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land
is concerned.
Entered at the City of Caloocan
Philippines, on the 12th
day of December in the
year nineteen hundred
and seventy-eight at 3:30
p.m.
Dimson's original complaint for recovery of possession against Araneta was
founded on the claim that he was the absolute owner of a parcel of land
located at Malabon, comprising fifty (50) hectares of the Maysilo Estate
covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Said
TCT No. R-15169 is reproduced below: 62
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the
19th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen, in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume
NA, page ___, Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No.
36455, issued in LRC Case No. 4429, Record No. __
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. [illegible]
which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is
concerned.
Entered at Caloocan City
Philippines, on the 8th
day of June in the year
nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight at 10:34
a.m.
It is evident from all three titles — CLT's, Hipolito's and Dimson's — that
the properties they purport to cover were "originally registered on the 19th
day April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration
Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal." Note, as earlier
established, there is no such OCT No. 994 originally registered on 19 April
1917.
The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of these three titles
can be accorded recognition simply because the original title commonly
referred to therein never existed. To conclude otherwise would constitute
deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could be affirmed only if it
can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually
existed. CLT and the Dimsons were given the opportunity to submit such
proof before this Court, but they did not. In fact, CLT has specifically
manifested that the OCT No. 994 they concede as true is also the one
which the Office of Solicitor General submitted as true, and that is OCT No.
994 issued on 3 May 1917.
Given this essential clarification, there is no sense in affirming the 2005
Decision which sustained the complaints for annulment of title and/or
recovery of possession filed by CLT and the Dimson when their causes of
action are both founded on an inexistent mother title. How can such
actions prosper at all even to the extent of dispossessing the present
possessors with title?
The dissent is hard-pressed in defending the so-called 19 April 1917 OCT
from which the Dimson and CLT titles are sourced. As earlier mentioned,
the focus is instead placed on the purported flaws of the titles held by the
Manotoks and Araneta notwithstanding that said parties swere the
defendants before the lower court and, therefore, the burden of proof did
not lie on them. The established legal principle in actions for annulment or
reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely
by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that
the land sought to be reconveyed is his. 63 In an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not
on the weakness of the defendant's claim. 64
V.
The dissenting view perceives a material difference between the present
acknowledgment of the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 and the titles involved
in the Gonzaga and MWSS cases. It dwells on the fact that the titles debunked in the
MWSS and Gonzaga cases, which find origination from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917,
seem to have been derived from Cadastral Case No. 34 also covering the Maysilo Estate.
It is in fact the theory of the dissent that there are, in effect, two competing sources of
title — the OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 arising from the issuance of Decree No. 36455
in Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 based on the
Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City in Cadastral Case No. 34. It is further opined that the
registration of lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No. 34, even if the date of such
registration is 3 May 1917, is void since such registration could not supplant the earlier
decision of the land registration court.
The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles in land cases. Had it
been adopted by the Court, the effect would have been to precipitate the utter
astonishment of legal scholars, professionals and students alike.
The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in
ordinary land registration cases was acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San
Agustin. 65 Such jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in
the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial
rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a
registered owner of his title." 66 It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz 67 that the
limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such lands even extends to the
determination of "which one of the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as
such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the
land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered to
be within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings." 68
The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar 69 concerned the validity of an order of a cadastral
court directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Sideco and his
children, at Sideco's own prayer, over land previously registered in the name of Crispulo
Sideco. This Court ruled that such order was valid and did not amount to a readjudication
of the title. After the cadastral proceedings therein had been initiated, the chief surveyor
had reported to the cadastral court that the land was covered by a decree in a land
registration proceeding and registered in the name of Sideco; the surveyor recommended
that the title be cancelled and a new one issued in the names of such persons as the court
may determine. In ruling that the new titles were valid, the Court stated that "[t]he
proceedings did not in any way purport to reexamine the title already issued, or to
readjudicate the title of the land. They were precisely predicated on the finality of the
title already issued, because it was the registered owner who was asked to express his
desire with respect thereto, and the court's order precisely followed the petition of the
registered owner." 70
The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former Register of Deeds,
explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to order the issuance of new titles in place
of the title issued under voluntary registration proceedings:
"Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral number, it is necessary that a
new title be issued, giving the lot its cadastral number in accordance with the cadastral
survey. This does not mean that the court has the power to alter the decree entered in
the previous registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify the said decree.
It does not adjudicate the title anew. It simply deals with the certificate of title. This is for
the convenience of the landowner because it is easier for him to identify his property
inasmuch as all the lands brought under the cadastral survey are designated by cadastral
numbers." 71
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land, already issued in
the name of a person, in the name of another, divesting the registered owner of the title
already issued in his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his
substantial rights. 72 Yet such prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court will not
have jurisdiction over the action involving the previously registered land, as explained in
Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the cadastral court may not issue a new title at all even if
it would not impair the rights of the previously registered owner, as emphasized in
Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplistic conclusion that because there was a
cadastral case covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles emanated, such titles
could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be such titles issued, and they would
be valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of the original registrant to whom OCT
No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 was issued.
VI.
From these premises, the Court is able to make the following binding conclusions. First,
there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received
for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date
which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be
acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the
decree of registration on 17 April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the
date of the title or the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917
is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT
titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts
doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT.
This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT
claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on
the dates appearing on their respective titles.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga
v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to
their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we
now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or
Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any
other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that
at bar.
With these conclusions, what then is the proper course of action to take
with respect to the pending motions for reconsideration? Considering that
CLT and the Dimsons clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in
them as plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and recovery of
possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their
original complaints before the trial court. However, such solution may not
satisfactorily put to rest the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate.
More pertinently, after the instant petitions were filed with this Court, the
Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, had sought to intervene. The
Republic did not participate as a party when these cases were still before
the trial courts and the Court of Appeals. While the Republic had originally
prayed for the grant of the petitions filed by all the petitioners in these
consolidated cases, instead it presently seeks of the Court the
promulgation of a new ruling upholding the validity of OCT No. 994 issued
73 or registered 74 on May 3, 1917. Rather than suggest whether the
petitions be granted or denied, the OSG argues that after a declaration
from this Court that it is the 3 May 1917 mother title that is valid, "a
remand of this case to the Court of Appeals, to settle which among the
private parties derived their titles from the existing OCT 994, is proper" 75
Notably, both the Manotoks and Araneta are amenable to the remand of
the petition, albeit under differing qualifications. The Manotoks submit that
there should be a remand to the court of origin, consolidating all the
present petitions, and that a full trial be conducted by the trial court. 76 On
the other hand, Araneta proposes four (4) options for the Court to
consider: (1) the dismissal of the original complaint filed by Dimson; (2) a
ruling granting Araneta's appeal and dismissing Dimson's complaint, but at
the same time remanding the case to a new division of the Court of
Appeals for factual determination pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court; (3) the suspension of the resolution of the present motion
for reconsideration while the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
factual determination; or (4) the remand of the proceedings to the Court of
Appeals for the reception of further evidence, particularly the Senate and
DOJ Reports, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, and the
consequent resolution by the appellate court of the instant petitions.
The OSG observes that during the oral arguments on the motion for
reconsideration, then Chief Justice Panganiban suggested that a remand
may be required to determine the status of the original title. 77
Considering that the genuine OCT No. 994 is that issued on/registered
on/dated 3 May 1917, a remand would be appropriate to determine which
of the parties, if any, derived valid title from the said genuine OCT No. 994.
On the one hand, the appreciation of facts is beyond the province of this
Court, since it is not a trier of fact 78 as well as not capacitated to
appreciate evidence at the first instance. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals has the competence to engage in that undertaking.
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for
certiorari, 79 the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues,
delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its
members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. 80 The delegate
need not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact.
81 Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect
by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of
experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary
evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter
pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
82 this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more particularly
to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate
Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces'
and/or ‘areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of
such postulates and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." 83 The Court
of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's
Report" shortly thereafter. 84 Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant
procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to
the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of
the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when
a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any
stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. 85 The order of reference
can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may
likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. 86 The commissioner is likewise
mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him
by the order of reference. 87 In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of
the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can obtain herein.
VII.
The OSG likewise adverts to the findings reached in the respective investigations and
reports by the Department of Justice and the Philippine Senate, components of the two
other co-equal branches of the government. Both the DOJ Report dated 28 August 1997
and the Senate Report dated 25 May 1998 conclude that there is only one (1) OCT No.
994 issued or registered on 3 May 1997. The OSG argues that the contents of both of
these reports may be considered as evidence. It also points out, with basis, that these
reports may be taken judicial notice of by this Court, following Section 1, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court. Indeed, it cannot be disputed that these reports fall within the ambit of
"the official acts of the legislative [and] executive. . . departments." 88
It bears noting that the DOJ and Senate Reports were rendered on 28 August 1997 and 25
May 1998 respectively. They were issued some years after the trial courts had
promulgated their respective decisions in the Manotok and Araneta cases, and even after
the Court of Appeals handed down its decision against the Manotoks which is assailed in
its present petition. 89 In Araneta's case, the Court of Appeals had first ruled against
Araneta in its Decision dated 30 May 1997, or just shortly before the rendition of the DOJ
and Senate Reports.
Since this Court is not a trier of fact, we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by
the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence,
though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of
the parties. The Court, in the 2005 Decision, refused to take into account the reports on
the regrettable premise that they could somehow "override" the judicial decisions earlier
arrived at. 90 The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions,
but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the
other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by
the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without
inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial
scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject
them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be
threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. The Manotoks and Araneta advert to
certain factual allegations relating to their titles and backstories to advance their
respective positions. Still, if it indeed emerges from the determination of the Court of
Appeals on remand that notwithstanding the clear flaws of the title of respondents the
titles of petitioners are cut from the same counterfeit cloth, then the Republic of the
Philippines, an intervenor in these cases, is armed anyway with any and all appropriate
remedies to safeguard the legitimate owners of the properties in question.
VIII.
The definitive conclusions reached by the Court thus far in these cases are spelled out in
Part VI of this Resolution. Said conclusions serve to guide the Court of Appeals in hearing
these cases on remand.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear these
cases on remand. The Special Division shall be composed of three Associate Justices of
the Court of Appeals, namely; Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice
Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior
Member.
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and
submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three
(3) months from finality of this Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is
directed to make the following determinations based on the evidence already on record
and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT No.
994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as
recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they
are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks
and Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muñoz-
Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they
are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in
favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the
Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of
expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994
on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles
acquired by the Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace
its title to the title acquired by the Government through expropriation.
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the
conflicting claims of title should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special
Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with
Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and
Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., took no part due to relationship to one of the counsels.
Ynares-Santiago, J., took no part.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see my dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J., took no part and is on leave.
Corona, J., see my concurring and dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr. and Reyes, J., We join the dissent of J. A.S. Gutierrez.
Nachura, J., took no part. As a Solicitor General appeared in the oral
argument.
G.R. No. 123346 — MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION, petitioners, versus CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 134385 — ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC.,
petitioners, versus HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, represented by his
Compulsory Heirs: His surviving spouse, ROQUETA R. DIMSON and their
children, NORMA and CELSO TIRADO, ALSON and VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA
and CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA and RENE POLICAR and ESPERANZA R.
DIMSON; REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, respondent.
G.R. No. 148767 — STO. NIÑO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC.,
petitioners, versus CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
Dissenting Opinion
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
"Justice delayed is justice denied." Let this Court be the shining example of
speedy justice for the lower courts to emulate.
At the outset, I must stress that the final resolution of these cases has been
delayed unnecessarily and has dragged on far too long, thereby causing
prejudice to the parties. The oldest 1 of these three consolidated cases was
instituted in the trial court way back on December 18, 1979. It is now
nearly thirty (30) long years since then and the Court En Banc has just
resolved petitioners' motions for reconsideration 2 of the Decision dated
November 29, 2005 rendered by the Third Division.
Petitioners utterly failed to show any reversible error committed by the
Court of Appeals in its assailed Decisions affirming the trial courts'
judgments. Therefore, why should these cases be remanded to the same
court?
I dread the day when the aggrieved parties herein would bewail the delay
of the resolution of their cases and lay the blame on this Court as the
perpetrator of the awful dictum that "justice delayed is justice denied." Let
us give sense to the constitutional mandate that "all persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
bodies." 3 This constitutional guarantee is intended to stem the tide of "disenchantment
among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial
tribunals." 4 In Matias v. Plan, 5 this Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice)
Reynato S. Puno, expressed grave concern if such constitutional guarantee is ignored,
thus:
The Constitution guarantees the right of persons against unreasonable delay in the
disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Judges play
an active role in ensuring that cases are resolved with speed and dispatch so as not to
defeat the cause of the litigants.
xxx xxx xxx
The need for speedy administration of justice cannot be ignored. Excessive delay in the
disposition of cases renders the rights of people guaranteed by various legislations inutile.
. . . . (Underscoring supplied)
In the same vein, Justice Isagani A. Cruz (retired) stated that the constitutional provision
on speedy disposition of cases "deserves support" and its "implementation depends
ultimately upon the Supreme Court, which unfortunately is no paragon of speedy justice
either, . . . ." 6
Indeed, the aphorism "justice delayed is justice denied" is by no means a trivial or
meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the
dispensation of justice, 7 including this Court of last resort. The adjudication of cases must
not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with our established rules of
procedure, but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. The
essence of the judicial function is that "justice shall be impartially administered without
unnecessary delay." 8
This Court has incessantly admonished and dealt with severely members of the bench for
undue delay in the disposition of cases, for such amounts to a denial of justice which, in
turn, brings the courts into disrepute and erodes the faith and confidence of the public in
the Judiciary and the justice system. 9 The integrity and honor of the Judiciary is
measured not only by the impartiality, fairness, and correctness of the decisions
rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are speedily resolved. 10
Let this Court be the shining example of speedy justice for the lower courts to emulate.
It is on the basis of the above doctrine that I strongly DISSENT to the Resolution of the
Majority remanding the entire record of these cases to the Court of Appeals for the
purpose of determining:
"(i) Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT. No.
994 dated 3 May 1917?
(ii) Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in
the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws
sufficient to defeat the claims of titles of the Manotoks and Araneta?
(iii) Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of Judge Munoz-Palma and the
1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish
a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to
the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
(iv) Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation
proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what
are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government and whether any
of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government through
expropriation.
(v) Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting
claims of title should prevail."
At the outset, I must stress that the cases at bar have been heard and decided by the
three (3) RTC Branches of Caloocan City. Their Decisions have been reviewed closely and
AFFIRMED by the three (3) Divisions of the Court of Appeals, not to mention by this
Court's Third Division in its Decision dated November 29, 2005. Indeed, all the factual and
legal issues have been fully determined. Furthermore, during the oral arguments, then
Solicitor General, now Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura, presented before the Court En
Banc the original copy of OCT 994. Every Justice came to know that this OCT No. 994
bears two (2) dates: April 19, 1917 — the issuance of Decree No. 36455 and May 3, 1917
— the date the Decree was forwarded to the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City for
transcription. Thus, it became clear to all the Justices that there is only one OCT 994 from
which the titles of the Dimson's heirs and CLT originated. So why should we remand these
cases to the Court of Appeals to determine again whether there are two (2) OCT No. 994?
I repeat, the evidence to prove there is only one (1) OCT 994 had been presented before
all the Justices of this Court. Why should we close our eyes and disregard completely the
truth that there is only one OCT NO. 994? By remanding these cases to the appellate
court to determine the issue of whether there are indeed two (2) OCT No. 994, we are all
deceiving ourselves. We are all scared to face the truth! But why?

A brief restatement of the facts is imperative.
These three (3) consolidated cases involve Lots 25-A-2 and 26 of the
Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
(later transferred to the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan).
I — G.R. No. 123346
G.R. No. 123346 stemmed from a complaint 11 for recovery of ownership
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 129, Caloocan City,
presided by Judge Bayani Rivera, by CLT Realty Development Corporation
(CLT Realty) against the Manotok Corporations. CLT Realty alleged that its
title is being overlapped by those of the Manotok Corporations. This was
specifically denied by the latter.
During the proceedings, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties,
appointed three Commissioners, namely: Engr. Avelino L. San
Buenaventura (nominated by CLT Realty), Engr. Teodoro I. Victorino
(nominated by the Manotok Corporations), and Engr. Ernesto S. Erive, Chief
of the Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Quezon City (nominated by the two
Commissioners and the parties).
Commissioners Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura submitted a
Majority Report finding that CLT Realty's title is valid, while those of the
Manotok Corporations are spurious.
The trial court, on the basis of the Majority Report, decided in favor of CLT
Realty. Its Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision
penned by Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by then Presiding
Justice Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. (both retired) and Justice Cancio C. Garcia,
a member of this Court who retired recently.
The Manotok Corporations filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. The Third Division, in its Decision dated November 29, 2005,
affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals. I was the ponente of the
Decision, concurred in by Justice Artemio Panganiban (who later became
Chief Justice), Justice Renato Corona, now a Dissenter, and Justice Conchita
Carpio-Morales. Justice Cancio Garcia inhibited himself, having participated
in and signed the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals.
II — G.R. No. 134385
The second case is G.R. No. 134385. The Heirs of Jose B. Dimson filed with
the RTC, Branch 33, Caloocan City, presided by Judge B.A. Adefuin-De La
Cruz, a complaint 12 for annulment of titles of the Araneta Institute.
The trial court's findings are similar to those of the Majority Report of the
Commissioners stated earlier. It rendered a Decision in favor of the Heirs of
Jose Dimson which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision
penned by Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro, concurred in by Justice Pedro
A. Ramirez (both retired) and Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion (deceased).
The Third Division of this Court, in its same Decision, upheld the Court of
Appeals judgment.
III — G.R. No. 148767
The third case, G.R. No. 148767, originated from a complaint 13 for
annulment of title and recovery of ownership filed with the RTC, Branch
121, Caloocan City, presided by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles. The complaint
was filed by CLT Realty against Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.
(Sto. Niño Association). The trial court decided in favor of CLT Realty. Its
Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision penned by
Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Justice Fermin A.
Martin, Jr. (retired) and Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (also retired).
Again, the Third Division sustained the Court of Appeals Decision.
Notably, the instant petitions for review on certiorari filed by herein
petitioners were denied by the Third Division basically on the ground that
they raised questions of fact, over which this Court has no power to
determine as it is not a trier of facts. 14 Besides, considering that the trial
courts' findings of fact have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and
there is no showing that their Decisions are contrary to the evidence and
the law, such factual findings are binding and conclusive on this Court. 15
The Manotok Corporations and Araneta Institute filed their respective
motions for reconsideration. Petitioner Sto. Niño Association did not file a
motion for reconsideration, hence, the Decision of the Third Division has become final
and executory as against it.
These consolidated cases were later elevated to the Court En Banc. The parties (except
for Sto. Niño Association who no longer participated) were then heard in oral arguments.
I wrote a draft Resolution denying the Motions for Reconsideration. Justice Dante Tinga
dissented.
Now, Justice Tinga, in his ponencia, concluded that: first, there is only one (1) OCT No.
994 dated May 3, 1917, it appearing on the record that OCT No. 994 was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on May 3, 1917, the date which should be
reckoned as the date of registration of the title; second, any title that traces its source to
OCT No. 994 dated April 17, 1917 is void for such title is inexistent; and third, the
Decisions of this Court in MWSS vs. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals
cannot apply to the cases at bar, "especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No.
994 dated April 17, 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent."
I cannot give my concurrence to such conclusions due to the following grounds:
A
There is only ONE existing OCT No. 994, with Decree (of registration) No. 36455, "issued"
on April 19, 1917 by the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal acting as Court of Land
Registration, then presided by Judge Norberto Romualdez, and was "received for
transcription" by the Registry of Deeds, same province, on May 3, 1917.
During the oral arguments, then Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now a
member of this Court) representing herein intervenor Republic of the Philippines,
maintained that there is only one OCT No. 994 existing in the books of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA). The Decree was issued on April 19, 1917 and received for
transcription on May 3, 1917. 16 He then presented to the Court the original copy of OCT
No. 994. On its first page, the following entries appear:
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
NO. 994
OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL
Entered pursuant to the following Decree:
Decree No. 36455
United States of America
Philippine Islands
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION
Case No. 4429, having been duly and regularly heard, in accordance with the provisions of
law, it is hereby decreed that in the undivided interests hereinafter stated, . . . .
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of . . . .
Witness: The Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate Judge of said Court, the 3rd day
of December, A.D. nineteen hundred and twelve.
Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19th day of April, A.D. 1917 at 9:00 A.M.
ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office
Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal,
this third day of May, nineteen hundred and seventeen at 7:30 A.M. (Underscoring
supplied)
When asked by Associate Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna on the above-quoted entries, the
Solicitor General admitted that the original OCT No. 994 refers also to Decree No. 36455,
"issued" on April 19, 1917, and was "received for transcription" by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, thus:
JUSTICE AZCUNA:
Mr. Solicitor General, I have here the original OCT 994, but it says here that it refers to
the Decree also. And it says that it was issued at Manila, i.e. the nineteenth day of April
1917. So the date April 19, 1917 is also reflected in this title?
SOLICITOR GENERAL NACHURA:
Yes, Your Honor. It's the date of the Decree.
JUSTICE AZCUNA:
In reference to the date the Decree was issued.
SOLICITOR GENERAL NACHURA:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE AZCUNA:
In fact, the date of the decision is also here, December 3, 1912?
SOLICITOR GENERAL NACHURA:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE AZCUNA:
And then it says at the bottom, received for transcription [on] May 3, 1917.
SOLICITOR GENERAL NACHURA:
Yes, Your Honor. 17 (Underscoring supplied)
In light of the Solicitor General's declaration, the Court, upon termination
of the oral arguments, required respondent CLT Realty to submit its own
copy of OCT No. 994. The parties were also directed to submit their
respective memoranda in support of their motions for reconsideration,
which they did.
Respondent CLT Realty later submitted a certified copy of the same OCT
No. 994 and manifested that it forms part of the records in the Sto. Niño
Association case (G.R. No. 148767) offered in evidence as Exhibit "D"
before the trial court in Civil Case No. C-15491.
Significantly, a perusal of the copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the
Solicitor General and respondent CLT Realty shows that they are identical.
There is no dispute that they are one and the same.
It is now clear that there is only one OCT No. 994 at the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal. This mother title, as shown on its face, was
issued by virtue of the Decision dated December 3, 1912 of the Court of
First Instance, acting as Land Registration Court, then presided by Judge
Norberto Romualdez, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 4429. The
Decision ordered the registration of the land described therein in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Thus, pursuant
to the said Decision, Decree (of registration) No. 36455 was issued on April
19, 1917 and on May 3, 1917, was "received for transcription" by the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
Now, why does Justice Tinga maintain there are two OCT No. 994 and that
the one dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent and void?
The crucial issue is — which of the
Certificates of Titles Certificates of
Title of the contending parties validly
emanated from the sole OCT No. 994
of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal?
Now, considering that there is only one OCT No. 994 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued on April 19,
1917 and received for transcription at the said Office on May 3, 1917, the
confusion or disagreement over the date of its issuance (whether April 19,
1917 or May 3, 1917) becomes inconsequential in the resolution of the
merits of the instant cases since both dates appear on the mother title
itself. The real crucial issue here is:
Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties validly
emanated from the sole OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal?
Let me trace the titles of the contending parties in these two (2) cases,
subject of the motions for reconsideration.
I — G.R. No. 123346
(Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation, petitioners, v. CLT
Realty Development Corporation, respondents)
Here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the titles of Jose
B. Dimson and CLT Realty have been validly derived from OCT No. 994
issued pursuant to Decree (of registration) No. 36455 on April 19, 1917 in
Land Registration Case No. 4429.
The evidence shows that the titles of CLT Realty and Dimson were
derivatives of OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, which was
originally issued to Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, married to Pioquinto Rivera. This
mother title was issued pursuant to the Decision dated December 3, 1912 of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, acting as Court of Land Registration, presided by Judge
Norberto Romualdez (who later became a member of the Supreme Court) in Land
Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to the said Decision, the Decree (of registration) No.
36455 was issued on April 19, 1917 by the CFI of Rizal. On May 3, 1917, the Decree was
"received for transcription" by the Registry of Deeds, same province.
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal and Pioquinto Rivera had four children, but three died,
leaving Bartolome Rivera as the surviving sibling.
Bartolome and his co-heirs (his nephews and nieces) filed with the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal an action for partition and accounting, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
424.
On December 29, 1965, the CFI rendered a Decision ordering the partition of the
properties left by Maria de la Concepcion Vidal among Bartolome and his co-heirs.
Bartolome and his co-heirs filed with the CFI of Rizal, presided by then Judge Cecilia
Muñoz Palma (who later became a member of the Supreme Court), a petition for
substitution of their names in lieu of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, docketed as Civil Case
No. 4557. Judge Palma issued an Order granting the petition.
Lots 25 and 26, among others, covered by OCT No. 994, were allotted to Bartolome.
Bartolome then executed a Deed of Transfer and Conveyance in favor of Jose B. Dimson,
herein respondent in G.R. No. 134385 represented by his heirs. Among the lots conveyed
were Lots 25-A-2 and 26. This Deed of Transfer and Conveyance was approved by Judge
Palma in an Order dated June 13, 1966.
Consequently, Jose Dimson filed with the CFI of Rizal, Branch 33, Caloocan City, a petition
entitled "In the matter of the Petition for Confirmation of the Order, Jose B. Dimson,
represented by Roqueta Rodriguez Dimson, petitioner," docketed as Special Proceedings
No. C-732. On October 18, 1977, Judge Marcelino N. Sayo issued an Order directing the
Register of Deeds for Caloocan City to segregate and issue separate certificates of title
over Lots 25-A-2 and 26, among others, in favor of Jose Dimson. Thus, TCT No. R-15166
and TCT No. R-15169 were issued in his name.
Estelita I. Hipolito purchased Lot 26 from Dimson. Hence, TCT No. 15166 was cancelled
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. R-17994 was issued in her name.
CLT Realty, on the other hand, acquired Lot 26 from Estelita on December 10, 1988 by
virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage. Consequently, TCT No. R-17994 in her
name was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 177013 was issued in CLT Realty's name.
CLT Realty's TCT No. 177013 is what is involved in both G.R. Nos. 123346 and 148767,
while Jose Dimson's TCT No. R-15169 is the subject in G.R. No. 134385.
The trial courts found that the titles
of the Manotok Corporations were
not derived from OCT No. 994,
hence, spurious.
As culled from the Commissioners' Majority Report and the findings of the trial courts,
the titles of the Manotok Corporations were not derived from OCT No. 994 and are
therefore spurious:
This is the chronology of transfer of the Manotok Corporation's title. Lot 26 was
subdivided leading to the issuance of TCTs Nos. 4210 and 4211 registered on September
9, 1918 in the names of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio, respectively. The titles of
the Manotok Corporations were derived from TCT No. 4211.
TCT No. 4211 was later cancelled by TCT No. 5261 in the name of Francisco Gonzales,
which was later cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the names of his six children.
The land covered by TCT No. 35486 in the names of Francisco's six children was
subdivided under Plan Psu 21154. But this plan could not be traced at the depository
plans — the Bureau of Lands. The alleged Subdivision Plan had seven resultant lots
covered by individual titles — TCTs Nos. 1368 to 1374 — six of which are in the individual
names of Francisco's children.
These seven lots were expropriated by the government thru the Homesite and Housing
Corporation, after which they were subdivided into 77 lots acquired by the tenants. The
Manotok Corporations purchased 20 lots from the tenants covered by 20 separate TCTs.
The issuance of the Manotok
Corporations' titles suffer fatal
irregularities.
The Commissioners' Majority Report and the trial court found numerous irregularities —
fatal in character — in the issuance of the Manotok Corporations' titles, namely:
1. The technical descriptions on the titles, TCTs Nos. 4210 and 4211 in the names of Ruiz
and Leuterio; and TCTs Nos. 5261 and 35480 in the names of Francisco
Gonzales and his 7 children, from where the titles of the Manotok
Corporations originated, were inscribed in Spanish. However, their alleged
mother title, OCT No. 994, is in English.
2. The date of survey appearing on the said titles (TCTs Nos. 4210, 4211,
5261 and 35486) was December 12, 1917, instead of "September 8-27,
October 4-21, November 12-18, 1911" as appearing on OCT no. 994.
3. The lots covered by the same titles are not identified by lot numbers.
There is no mention therein of Lot 26, Maysilo Estate.
4. There is no Subdivision Survey Plan No. indicated on TCTs Nos. 4210,
4211, 5261 and 35486 covering the purported subdivision of Lot 26.
5. No survey plan could be found in the Bureau of Lands or LRA.
6. Subdivision Plan No. Psd – 21154, the alleged subdivision plan of TCT No.
35486 in the names of Francisco Gonzalez's 6 children, could not be found
in the Bureau of Lands.
7. The tie lines stated in the technical descriptions of TCTs Nos. 1368-1374
embracing the lots expropriated, deviated from the mother lot's tie point
(the Bureau of Lands Location Monument No. 1, Caloocan City). This
resulted in the shifting of the position of the 7 lots which do not fall inside
the boundary of the mother lot.
Based on these concrete facts, the commissioners' Majority Report
concluded that petitioners Manotok Corporations' titles overlap that of
respondent CLT Realty. The overlapping is caused by the inherent technical
defects on TCT No. 4211 (from which the Manotok Corporations derived
their titles) and the questionable circumstances of its issuance, thus:
8. In the light of the foregoing facts, the undersigned Commissioners have
come to the following conclusions:
a. There are inherent technical infirmities or defects on the face of TCT Nos.
4211 (also on TCT No. 4210), 5261 and 35486. The fact that the technical
descriptions in TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 are written in Spanish while
those on the alleged mother title, OCT-994, were already in English, is
abnormal and contrary to the usual practice in the issuance of titles. If OCT-
994 is the mother title of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, then said titles
should also be written in English because OCT-994 is already in English. It is
possible that an ascendant title be written in Spanish and the descendant
title in English, the language now officially used, but the reverse is highly
improbable and irregular.
b. Also, the fact that the original survey dates of OCT-994 (September 8-27,
October 4-21 and November 17-18, 1911) are not indicated on the
technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, but an entirely
different date, December 22, 1917, is instead indicated, likewise leads to
the conclusion that TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486 could not have been
derived from OCT-994. It is the established procedure to always indicate in
the certificate of title, whether original or transfer certificates, the date of
the original survey of the mother title together with the succeeding date of
subdivision or consolidation. Thus, in the absence of the original survey
dates of OCT-994 on TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, then OCT-994 is not
the mother title of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, not only because the
original survey dates are different but because the date of original survey is
always earlier than the date of the issuance of the original title. OCT-994
was issued on May 3, 1917 and this is much ahead of the date of survey
indicated on TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which is December 22, 1917;
c. Granting that the date December 22, 1917 is the date of a subdivision
survey leading to the issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, there are,
however, no indications on the face of the titles themselves which show
that a verified and approved subdivision of Lot 26 took place. In subdividing
a lot, the resulting parcels are always designated by the lot number of the
subdivided lot followed by letters of the alphabet starting from the letter
"A" to designate the first resultant lot, etc., for example, if Lot 26 is
subdivided into three (3) lots, these lots will be referred to as Lot 26-A, Lot
26-N and Lot 26-C followed by a survey number such as "Psd-_____" or
"(LRC) Psd-_____." However, the lots on TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 do not
contain such descriptions. In fact, the parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
4210 and 4211 are not even described by lot number, and this is again
technically irregular and defective because the designation of lots by Lot
Number was already a practice at that time as exemplified by the technical
descriptions of some sub-lots covered by OCT-994, i.e., 23-A, 25-A, 25-D,
etc.;
d. That TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 which allegedly was the result of a
subdivision of Lot 26 should not have been issued without a subdivision
plan approved by the Director of Lands or the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office. Republic Act No. 496 which took effect on November 6, 1902,
particularly Section 58 thereof, provided that the Registry of Deeds shall not enter the
transfer certificate to the grantee until a plan of such land showing all the portions or lots
into which it has been subdivided, and the technical description of each portion or lot,
have been verified and approved by the Director of Lands. . .' and as corroborated by
Section 44, Paragraph 2, and that the plan has been approved by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office, or by the Director of Lands as provided in Section fifty-eight of
this Act, the Registry of Deeds may issue new certificates of title for any lot in accordance
with said subdivision plan;'
e. The absence of a lot number and survey plan number in the technical description
inscribed on TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, and the absence of a subdivision survey plan for Lot
26 at the records of the Bureau of Lands or the Land Registration Authority lead to the
conclusion that there was no verified and approved subdivision survey plan of Lot 26,
which is a compulsory requirement needed in the issuance of said titles;
f. Similarly, the absence of plan Psd-21154 from the files of the Bureau of Lands, the
official depository of survey plans, is another indication that the titles covered by TCT
Nos. 1368 thru 1374 which were derived from TCT No. 4211 are again doubtful and
questionable;
g. Moreover, the changing of the tie points in the technical descriptions on TCT Nos. 1368
thru 1374 from that of the mother lot's tie point which is BLLM No. 1, Caloocan City to
different location monuments of adjoining Piedad Estate which resulted in the shifting of
the position of the seven (7) lots in relation to the mother lot defeats the very purpose of
tie points and tie lines since the accepted practice is to adopt the mother lot's tie point in
order to fix the location of the parcels of land being surveyed on the earth's surface.
h. Based on the foregoing, it is the conclusion of the undersigned Commissioners that
defendants' (Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation) titles overlap
portions of plaintiff's (CLT Realty Development Corporation's) title, which overlapping is
due to the irregular and questionable issuance of TCT Nos. 4211 (also of TCT No. 4210),
5261, 35486, 1368 to 1374. The inherent technical defects on TCT No. 4211 (from where
defendants derived their titles) and TCT No. 4210 which were exhaustively elucidated
above, point to the fact that there was no approved subdivision of Lot 26 which served as
legal basis for the regular issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. Thus, as between
plaintiff's title, which was derived from regularly issued titles, and defendants' titles,
which were derived from irregularly issued titles, plaintiff's title which pertains to the
entire Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate should prevail over defendants' titles. 18
(Underscoring supplied)
Significantly, the above findings and conclusions in the Commissioners' Majority Report
are similar to the findings of the trial court 19 in Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.
v. CLT Realty Development Corporation (G.R. No. 148767) wherein the titles of CLT Realty,
and those of the Manotok Corporations (G.R. No. 123346) and Sto. Niño Association are
involved. These findings and conclusions are discussed lengthily by the trial court in its
February 12, 1996 Amended Decision, later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated May 23, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52549, 20 thus:
The conflict stems from the fact that the plaintiff's (CLT Realty Development
Corporation's) and defendant's (Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.'s) titles overlap
each other, hence, a determination of the respective origins of such titles is of utmost
importance.
TCT No. T-177013 in the name of the plaintiff was derived from R-17994 T-89 in the name
of Estelita Hipolito, which title can trace its origin from OCT 994. The boundaries of OCT
994 known as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate are the same as that of the plaintiff's titles.
On the other hand, TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374, both in the name of the
defendants, are the latest in a series of titles which descend from TCT No. 4211. A trace of
the history of TCT No. 4211 reveals that it was succeeded by TCT No. 5261 which was in
turn succeeded by TCT No. 35486. TCT No. 35486 was allegedly subdivided into seven lots
covered by TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374. One or two of these subdivided lots were the
predecessors of the defendants' titles.
It behooves this court to address the issue of whether or not TCT No. 4211 from which
the defendants' titles were originally derived can validly trace its origin from OCT 994.
There is pervasive evidence that TCT No. 4211 could not have been a true derivative of
OCT No. 994.
Firstly, the survey dates indicated in OCT No. 994 are September 8-27, October 8-21 and
November 17-18, all in the year 1911. On the other hand, these dates of original survey
are conspicuously missing in TCT No. 4211 contrary to established procedure that the
original survey dates of the mother title should be indicated in succeeding titles. Instead,
an examination of TCT No. 4211 reveals a different date on its face. This date, December
22, 1917, could not be an original survey date because it differs from those indicated in
the mother title. Of equal importance is the fact that the date of original survey always
comes earlier than the date of the issuance of the mother title. Since OCT No. 994 was
issued on April 19, 1917, it is highly irregular that the original survey was made several
months later or only on December 22, 1917.
Neither is the Court inclined to consider this date as the date a subdivision survey was
made. The regular procedure is to identify the subdivided lots by their
respective survey or lot numbers; on the contrary, no such lot number is
found in TCT No. 4211, pointing to the inevitable conclusion that OCT No.
994 was never validly subdivided into smaller lots, of which one of them is
covered by TCT No. 4211.
Secondly, the assertion that TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 which preceded the
defendants' titles were issued pursuant to subdivision plan PSD 21154 is
not supported by the evidence. The Land Management Bureau which
handles survey plans has no records of the said PSD 21154. The Registry of
Deeds of Rizal has a copy of the plan but the court finds such possession
questionable since the Land Registration Authority which supervises the
Registry of Deeds does not have a copy of the same. The court therefore
believes that the issuance of TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 is attended by a serious
irregularity which cannot be ignored as it affects the very validity of the
alleged subdivisions of the land covered by TCT No. 35486.
Thirdly, the language of the technical descriptions of the land covered by
OCT No. 994 is already in English, while its alleged derivative titles TCT Nos.
4211, 5261 and 35486 are still in Spanish. This is in direct violation of the
practice that the language used in the mother title is adopted by all its
derivative titles. The reversion to Spanish in the derivative titles is highly
intriguing and casts a cloud of doubt to the genuineness of such titles.
Fourthly, the tie points used in the mother lot were not adopted by the
alleged derivative titles particularly TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374, the immediate
predecessors of the defendants' titles. The pivotal role of tie points cannot
be brushed aside as a change thereof could result to the shifting of
positions of the derivative lots in relation to the mother lot. Consequently,
overlapping could take place as in fact it did when the defendants' titles
overlapped that of CLT at the northwestern portion of the latter's property.
Fifthly, the results of laboratory analysis conducted by a Forensic Chemist
of the NBI revealed that TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 were estimated to be fifty
(50) years old as of March 1993 when the examination was conducted.
Hence, the documents could have been prepared only in 1940 and not in
1918 as appearing on the face of TCT No. 4211.
Based on the foregoing patent irregularities, the court finds the attendance
of fraud in the issuance of TCT No. 4211 and all its derivative titles which
preceded the defendants' titles. Evidently, TCT No. 4211 cannot be validly
traced from OCT No. 994. Being void ab initio, it did not give rise to any
transmissible rights with respect to the land purportedly invalid, and
resultantly, the defendants, being the holders of the latest derivatives,
cannot assert any right of ownership over the lands in question. 'The void
ab initio land titles issued cannot ripen into private ownership.' (Republic
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
xxx xxx xxx
The court's findings are consistent with a ruling of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR No. 45255 entitled 'CLT Realty Development Corp. vs. Manotok
Realty, Inc., et al.' promulgated on September 28, 1995, affirming the
decision of the other branch of this court ordering the cancellation of TCT
Nos. 4210 and 4211 which encroached on a specific area of Lot No. 26 of
the Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City. This court is also aware that on January
8, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
defendants in the aforementioned case for lack of merit. 21 (Underscoring
supplied)
It is clear from the foregoing findings of the trial court and the appellate
court that petitioners Manotok Corporations' titles were derived from
questionable and irregularly issued titles whose origin cannot be validly
traced to OCT No. 994.
2. G.R. No. 134385
(Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc., petitioner, v. Heirs of Jose B. Dimson,
Represented by His Compulsory Heirs: His Surviving Spouse, Roqueta R.
Dimson and Their Children, Norma and Celso Tirado, Alson and Virginia
Dimson, Linda and Carlos Lagman, Lerma and Rene Policar, and Esperanza
R. Dimson; and the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, Respondents)
In this case, the trial court likewise found that the titles of the Araneta
Institute are not derived from OCT No. 994 and are spurious. In upholding
the title of the Heirs of Dimson, it ruled:
. . ., [T]racing back the title of the plaintiffs' (Heirs of Jose B. Dimson's) TCT
No. R-15169, the record will show that:
1) On May 25, 1962, then Judge Cecilia Munoz-Palma of the Court of First
Instance, 7th Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, issued an Order in Case No. 4557
(In re: petition for substitution of names of Bartolome P. Rivera, Eleuteria
Rivera, Pelagia R. Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles, Venancia R. Aquino and Rosauro R.
Aquino, as petitioners) judicially declaring said petitioners Bartolome Rivera, et al. as the
surviving heirs of Maria dela Concepcion Vidal and directing the cancellation of the name
of said Maria dela Concepcion Vidal, 9 years of age, among the registered owners, and to
substitute in lieu thereof the aforesaid petitioners Bartolome Rivera et al., (Exhibit 3-
David & Santos).
This Order of May 25, 1962 (Exhibit B-David Santos) was duly annotated on the Original
Certificate of Title No. 994 (Exhibit J) on June 3, 1962 and under Entry No. 48542 File T-
104230, which reads:
Entry No. 43542 File T-104230 — ORDER In compliance with an Order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Case No. 4557, the name Maria dela Concepcion Vidal, 9 years old is
hereby cancelled and in lieu thereof the following is substituted: 1. Bartolome Rivera,
widower 1/3 of 1/189/1000 percent; 2. Eleuteria Rivera, married to Hermogenes
Bonifacio 1/6 of 1-89/1000 percent . . . Fidela R. Angeles — 1/3 of 1-1897/1000
Date of Instrument — May 25, 1962
Date of Inscription — June 1962
2) On June 13, 1966, said Judge Cecilia Munoz-Palma of the Court of First Instance, 7th
Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal issued an Orderin the same case No. 4557 wherein the deed
of transfer and conveyance executed by Bartolome Rivera in favor of Jose B. Dimson of
whatever property said Bartolome Rivera is entitled to as one of the heirs of Maria dela
Concepcion Vidal to be taken from lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT No. 994 of Rizal
was approved (Exhibit 1-David Santos).
3) Plaintiff applied for the segregation of the 25% agreed upon on September 30, 1960 to
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City docketed as Special
Proceedings No. C-732, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Confirmation of the
Order, Jose B. Dimson, represented by Roqueta Rodriguez Dimson, petitioner (Exhibit A)
for which a favorable Decision dated October 13, 1977 was rendered by Judge Marcelino
N. Sayo (Exhibit 2-David and Santos).
4) On October 11, 1977, an Order was issued by Judge Marcelino N. Sayo in Special
Proceedings No. C-732 ordering the Register of Deeds for Caloocan City the segregation
and issuance of separate certificates of titles, which Order reads:
WHEREFORE, it having been duly established that Bartolome Rivera was the owner of the
lots mentioned in Exhibit E, which are Lots Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29; that Jose B.
Dimson, per Exhibit B, is entitled to 25% of the total area of the said lots contained in
Exhibit B; that the areas to which Jose B. Dimson is entitled and sought to be segregated
either in whole or in part are portions of the lots mentioned in Exhibit "B"; that per
Exhibit "D", the segregation of the said lots necessitates approval by the Court, upon
certification by the Land Registration Commission that the subdivision Plan of the lot on
lots sought to be segregated are correct: that the plans, LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4419 —
SWO — 5268 (Exhibit "F") covering Lots 15, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 and plan are certified
correct and approved by the Land Registration Commission on March 20, 1964; that plans
of portion of Lot 25-A which is Lot 25-a-1 (Exhibit "H"), plan of portion of Lot 25-A which is
Lot 25-A-2 (Exhibit "I"), and plan of portion of Lot 28 (Exhibit "J") are based from the
technical descriptions appearing on the approved LRC SWO-5268 on file with the Land
Registration Commission as correct; that Bartolome Rivera can legally dispose the lands
covered by and mentioned in Exhibit "E", the segregation and issuance of separate
certificates of title over Lots 25-A-1, 25-A-2, 26 and portion of Lot 29 is hereby
APPROVED. The Register of Deeds for Caloocan City is hereby directed to issue in the
name of herein movant JOSE B. DIMSON, of legal age, Filipino, married to Roqueta
Rodriguez Dimson, with residence and postal address at No. 10 Magalang Street, East
Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, after payment of the necessary fees, separate transfer
certificates of titles for the lot covered by plan (LRC) SWO-5268 (Exhibit "G") AND for the
lots covered by the PLANS Exhibits "H", "I" and "J".
SO ORDERED. 22 (Underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the chronology of the transfer of the title of the Heirs of Dimson is consistent
with that of CLT Realty in G.R. No. 123346, the same title which the trial court and Court
of Appeals found to be valid.
On the other hand, it appears from the documentary evidence that TCTs Nos. 7784 and
13574 in the name of the Araneta Institute were derived from TCTs Nos. 26538 and
26539, respectively, both in the name of Jose Rato. Rato's titles, however, were issued
pursuant to Decree No. 4429, which is entirely different from Decree No. 36455 upon
which OCT No. 994 was issued. Moreover, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the CFI of
Isabela, but with Record No. 4429 in Laguna. This means that the properties of Araneta
Institute are either in Isabela or Laguna, not in Maysilo Estate, Caloocan City.
The issuance of the Araneta
Institute's titles suffer fatal
irregularities.
Similarly, the trial court also found the following fatal irregularities in the issuance of
theAraneta Institute's titles, to wit:
a. Rato's titles from where the Araneta Institute's titles originated were not
annotated on OCT No. 994.
b. When TCT No. 13574 was issued in the name of the Araneta Institute,
what was cancelled was TCT No. 6169, not TCT No. 26539 in the name of
Jose Rato.
c. When the other TCT No. 7784 was issued in the name of the Araneta
Institute, the corresponding document (Deed of Sale and Mortgage) was
not annotated thereon, and the previous title supposed to be cancelled
was not received by the Register of Deeds.
In affirming the trial court's nullification of Araneta Institute's titles for
being spurious, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated May 30, 1997,
held:
"Upon the other hand, defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of
Agriculture's TCT No. 13574 was derived from TCT No. 26539, while TCT
No. 7784 (now TCT No. 21343) was derived from TCT No. 26538. TCT No.
26538 and TCT No. 26539 were both issued in the name of Jose Rato. TCT
No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both show Decree No. 4429 and Record No.
4429.
Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance of Isabela. On
the other hand, Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary Land Registration
Case on March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhs. 8, 8-A Rivera). The
trial court ruled defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of Agriculture's TCT
No. 13574 spurious because this title refers to a property in the Province of
Isabela (RTC Decision, p. 19).
Another point, Araneta's TCT Nos. 13574 (Exh. 6) and 21343 are both
derived from OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 which was declared
null and void by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System vs. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 783 (1992). The Supreme
Court ruled: 'Where two certificates of title purport to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails . . . . Since the land in question has already
been registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent
registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void.'
In sum, the foregoing discussions unmistakably show two independent
reasons why the title of defendant-appellant Araneta Institute of
Agriculture is a nullity, to wit: the factual finding that the property is in
Isabela, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the MWSS case. 23
(Underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's findings that
there exist questionable circumstances "which create serious doubts in the
mind of the Court as to the genuineness and validity of the titles of
defendant Araneta (TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574) over the land in question,"
to wit:
Thus, as correctly found by the trial court:
The records will show that defendant Araneta's claim of ownership over
the 500,000 square meters of land covered by TCT R-15169 (Exhibit D also
marked Exhs. 5, 5-A, 5-B and 20, 20-A, and 20-B David & Santos) in the
name of plaintiff Jose B. Dimson, is based on TCT 13574 (Exh. 6-defendant)
and TCT 7784 (now TCT 12343) (Exhibit M). And these said TCT 13574 and
TCT 7784 (now TCT 21343) which were found to be overlapping TCT R-
15169 (Exh. D) were based on two (2) deeds of conveyances:
1) Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 def.) with TCT
26539 with a land area of 581,872 square meters as the subject matter
thereof. Said deed was the basis of issuance of TCT 13574 (Exh. 6 def.)
entered in the name of defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture on May
20, 1949 with the same area of 581,872 square meters. TCT 26539 was
consequently cancelled. The Court observes that the said Deed of Sale and
Mortgage was between Jose Ma. Rato and Victoneta Incorporated as
vendee, and Don Salvador Araneta as guarantor, but TCT 13574 was issued
in the name of defendant Araneta Institute of Agriculture.
2) Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated November 13,
1947 (Exh. M) covering 390,282 square meters, was made the basis for the
issuance on March 4, 1948 of TCT 7784 (now TCT 21343) issued February
19, 1951 with an area of 333,377 square meters. As to why defendant
Araneta did not present in evidence TCT 21343 was never explained. The
Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale and Mortgage did not indicate therein
the title of the land subject matter of the said document, but the Court
noted in TCT 7784 that it cancelled TCT 26538 (Exhibit 8-A defendant)
which consists of 593,606.90 square meters. No explanation was made as
to the differences in the area in the Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale and
Mortgage (390,282 sq.m.) in the TCT 7784 (333,377 sq.m.) and in TCT
26538 (593,606.90 sq.m.).
According to witnesses Zacarias Quinto, real estate officer of defendant Araneta, the land
where Araneta Institute of Agriculture is located is within the area of 97.2 hectares. If the
area of TCT 13574 (390,282 sq.m.) will be added, the same will give a total area of
972,154 sq.m. or 97.2 hectares.
Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato from
where defendant was said to have acquired TCT 13574 and TCT 7784 (now TCT 21343) in
the name of Araneta and the other documents related thereto:
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record No. are both 4429. In the
same vein, TCT 26539 also shows that it has Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela
(Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429, issued for Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on
March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A Bartolome Rivera et al.).
How then could TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both have Decree No. 4429 and Record No.
4429, which were issued in the Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela and issued in
Laguna, respectively.
2) TCT 26538 and 26539 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato are not annotated in the original
Certificate of Title 994 where they were said to have originated.
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit I)
executed on April 8, 1925 was only registered and was stamped received by the Office of
the Securities and Exchange Commission only April 29, 1953 when the Deed of Sale &
Mortgage was executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and the Novation of
Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947 (Exh. M). So that
when the Philippine Land Improvement was allegedly given a special power of attorney
by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the said two (2) documents, the
said Philippine Land Improvement Company has not yet been duly registered.
4) TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato both cancel TCT 21857
which was never presented in Court if only to have a clear tracing back of the titles of
defendant Araneta.
5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5 defendant) is TCT
26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of defendant Araneta cancels TCT 6196 instead of TCT
26539. That was never explained. TCT 6196 was not even presented in Court.
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 593,606.90 was cancelled by
TCT 7784 with an area of only 390,282 sq.m.
7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in its name, when the
registration of the document entitled Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage
(Exhibit M) was suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no title was received by the Register of
Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on March 4,
1948 (Exhibit N and N-1).
Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec. 53 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, no new certificate of title shall be entered no memorandum shall be made
upon any certificate of title by the register of deeds, in pursuance of any deed or other
voluntary instrument, unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented for such
endorsement.
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is not reflected on the
Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT 26538 (Exhibit 7-defendant) meaning that TCT
26538 still exists and intact except for the encumbrances annotated in the Memorandum
of Encumbrances affecting the said title (Exhibit 16-A and 16-N David & Santos).
9) In the encumbrance annotated at the back of TCT 26539 (Exhibit 4-defendant) there
appears under entry NO. 450 T 6196 Victoneta, Incorporated covering parcel of land
canceling said title (TCT 26539) and TCT 6196 was issued (Doc. No. 208, page 96, Book 17
of Notary Public of Manila Rodolfo A. Scheerer, Date of Instrument: 8-23-47 Date of
Inscription: 10-18-47 (Exh. 4-A defendant) which could have referred to the Deed of Sale
and Mortgage of 8-23-47 (Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before Entry 5170 T-8692
Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company, with date of Instrument: 1-10-29, and
Date of Inscription: 9-21-29.
In TCT 26838 (sic — 26538), this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land
Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the document, Novation of Contract,
Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does not appear.
Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the value of
P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the Philippine Land Improvement Company. Said
entry was also entered on TCT 26539.
The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the documents presented by
defendant Araneta are not in possession of said defendant, for according to witness
Zacarias Quintan, the real estate officer of the said defendant Araneta since 1970, his
knowledge of the land now in possession of defendant Araneta was acquired by him from
all its documents marked in evidence which were obtained only lately when they were
needed for presentation before this Court (t.s.n. 6-24-47, p. 34)
All the foregoing are matters which create serious doubts in the mind of
the Court as to the genuineness and validity of the titles of defendant
Araneta over the land in question. 24 (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the findings and conclusions of the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals that petitioners' titles are spurious are based on hard facts fully
supported by the records and thoroughly discussed in their respective
Decisions. They cannot simply be brushed aside without running afoul to
settled principles of law.
It is appalling to note that, as observed by the Court of Appeals, the
Araneta Institute "never raised a single argument or assignment of error
disputing these factual findings of the trial court." Its failure to refute not
only indicates the frailty or emptiness of its cause, but also validates the
correctness of the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
The recent ruling in G.R. No.
150091, Yolanda O. Alfonso,
petitioner, vs. Office of the President
is inconsequential to the present
cases.
Justice Tinga capitalizes on the Alfonso Decision upholding the dismissal
from the service of Yolanda O. Alfonso, former register of deeds of
Caloocan City, for grave misconduct and dishonesty after having been
found administratively liable for changing the date of the registration of
OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917. This only reinforces the
fact that there is only one OCT No. 994 and that it was Alfonso who made it
appear that there are two OCT No. 994. In fact, Justice Tinga concurred in
this Decision.
Notably, the Alfonso Decision categorically held that "in deciding this
administrative case, this Court deems it fit, though, to steer clear from
discussing or passing judgment on the validity of the derivative titles of OCT
No. 994, . . . ." It stated that: "Reference to OCT No. 994 is made only to
determine the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of petitioner." It
cannot therefore provide support to Justice Tinga's position.
B November 12, 1997. This is incredible." 30
This Court should no longer review the trial courts' findings of fact which
have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as there is no showing that
such findings are not supported by evidence. Such findings are binding and
conclusive on this Court.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, strictly
forbids this Court from resolving questions of fact as it is not a trier of facts.
Thus, it is not our function to review factual issues and evaluate or weigh
the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties already
considered in the proceedings below. 25 Since there is no specific showing
that the trial courts and the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error, we cannot disregard the elementary and well-established rule that
where the findings of fact of the trial courts are affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, as in these cases, the same are accorded the highest degree of
respect and, generally, will not be disturbed on appeal. Such findings are
binding and conclusive on this Court. 26
In the ponencia, Justice Tinga also ruled that should there be a remand, the
validity of Dimson's and CLT's claims should further be explored since the
ultimate question would pertain to the validity of the Orders rendered in
Dimson's favor by then-Judge Muñoz Palma of the Rizal CFI and Judge Sayo
of the Caloocan CFI. Allegedly, the Order of Judge Sayo was recalled. I
wonder why Justice Tinga, at this late stage, still assail the validity of those
Orders. Does he understand that to do so violates basic procedural law?
Also, where in the records of the trial courts is the alleged "Recall Order" by
Judge Sayo? This "Recall Order" was not presented as evidence before the
trial courts. Hence, there can be no other conclusion than that the same is
INEXISTENT.
In his ponencia, Justice Tinga made reference to the DOJ Committee Report
dated August 28, 1997 and the Senate Committee Report dated May 25,
1998. I submit that these Reports have no probative value as they are not
recognized as evidence under our Rules of Court; and that such Reports
cannot override or supplant the consistent findings and conclusions of the
trial courts because judicial proceedings had already been terminated
before these courts where the parties were accorded due process and
evidence were presented in accordance with the rigid observance of the
Rules of Court. Significantly, those findings were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the Third Division of this Court.
The Senate Committee, it must be stressed, has a different role from that of the Judiciary.
The courts of law have the constitutional duty to adjudicate legal disputes properly
brought before them. A congressional investigation, however, is conducted in aid of
legislation. As aptly held by this Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S.
Puno, in Agan, Jr., et al. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., et al.: 27
Finally, the respondent Congressmen assert that at least two (2) committee reports by
the House of Representatives found the PIATCO contracts valid and contend that this
Court, by taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an action of a co-equal body.
They insist that the Court must respect the findings of the said committees of the House
of Representatives. With due respect, we cannot subscribe to their submission. There is a
fundamental difference between a case in court and an investigation of a congressional
committee. The purpose of a judicial proceeding is to settle the dispute in controversy by
adjudicating the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the case. On the other hand,
a congressional investigation is conducted in aid of legislation (Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R.
No. L-3820, July 18, 1950). Its aim is to assist and recommend to the legislature a possible
action that the body may take with regard to a particular issue, specifically as to whether
or not to enact a new law or amend an existing one. Consequently, this Court cannot
treat the findings in a congressional committee report as binding because the facts
elicited in congressional hearings are not subject to the rigors of the Rules of Court on
admissibility of evidence. The Court in assuming jurisdiction over the petitions at bar
simply performed its constitutional duty as the arbiter of legal disputes properly brought
before it, especially in this instance when public interest requires nothing less.
(Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, the vehement objections of the CLT Realty and the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson
against any reliance on the said Reports are reasonable. They contended that:
1. The Committee Reports "were treacherously secured ex-parte by petitioners Manotok
Corporations and Araneta Institute and their allies after they lost before the trial courts."
28
2. The said Reports are unreliable because they "emanate from ex-parte self-serving
proceedings." They (CLT Realty and the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson) were never notified of
the hearings conducted in the Senate and DOJ, and that the same were prepared without
their knowledge, consent or participation — hence, "a violation of their constitutional
right to due process." 29
3. The Senate Committee Report is "long in recommendation, but short in duration of
hearing, for it took only one day for the Senate to conduct the aforesaid hearing on
4. The Reports "were practically solicited for the purpose of subverting the judicial
process. This attempt continues today under the guise of persuading the Court to
remand." 31
5. This Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot be unduly burdened with the task of
reexamining, reviewing, reevaluating, and re-weighing each and every piece of evidence
already adduced presented, evaluated and considered below. Indeed, the Manotok
Corporations and Araneta Institute, after being faced with consistent and unanimous
unfavorable rulings by the trial courts, cannot now induce this Court to take a first look
and a fresh crack at alleged new factual issues in the alleged DOJ and Senate Committee
Reports which were never raised before the trial courts. 32
6. The Committee Reports cannot be considered because the factual findings and
conclusions reached therein were apparently based on inadmissible hearsay evidence and
documents that were never authenticated in the manner provided under the Rules of
Court on evidence. 33
7. The "scheming introduction of the Committee Reports is an attempt to influence
judicial proceedings and the judiciary itself, by interjecting the findings of the different
branches of the government, in the hope that said findings will influence the Honorable
Court, in petitioners' favor, after they lost in the trial courts. This is a crude attempt to
sabotage the orderly administration of justice . . ., obviously to obtain a reversal of the
trial courts' decisions. This violates the time-honored principle of separation of powers
and thereby undermines the independence of the judiciary. 34
8. The Reports cannot overturn the factual findings made by courts of justice after
judiciously weighing and evaluating the evidence presented by the parties. Worse, these
alleged reports are now being utilized to review the rulings of the Honorable Court in the
MWSS and Gonzaga.
9. The Committee Reports are in the nature of a collateral attack against the titles of CLT
Realty and Jose B. Dimson, which is proscribed under Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529. 35
10. Considering the well-settled rule that a court is not authorized to take judicial notice
in the adjudication of cases pending before it of the contents of the records of other
cases, and even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, 36
with more reason that this Court should not take judicial notice of findings in non-judicial
proceedings in the adjudication of cases. At best, what may be taken judicial notice is only
the existence of these Reports, but not the findings and conclusions therein which cannot
supplant pervasive evidence, as found by the trial courts and the Court of Appeals,
independently establishing that petitioners' titles are spurious. 37 Hence,
these Reports may not even be conveniently utilized as basis for a re-trial.
Moreover, a court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in
controversy. 38
Thus, to reiterate, there is absolutely no basis to remand these cases to the
Court of Appeals. To repeat, the trial courts had already received,
evaluated, and appreciated the respective evidence of the contending
parties in support of their contrasting claims on the validity of their
respective titles. The Court of Appeals has affirmed the uniform findings of
the trial courts. Significantly, all the courts below have consistent findings
that the titles of the Manotok Corporations and the Araneta Institute are
spurious, and that those of the CLT Realty and Jose B. Dimson are valid,
having originated from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, based
on the Decree No. 36455 issued on April 19, 1917 in Land Registration Case
No. 4429.
C (from which their titles emanated) be upheld.
Petitioners are bound by the Court's Decisions in
MWSS and Gonzaga.
Petitioners Manotok Corporations' contend that they are not bound by this
Court's pronouncement in MWSS and Gonzaga, they being "strangers" in
those cases. Petitioners have ignored the unique nature of land registration
proceedings under the Torrens system, upon which OCT No. 994 was
issued pursuant to Decree (of registration) No. 36455 in Land Registration
Case No. 4429. Section 2 of Act No. 496 (otherwise known as "The Land
Registration Act"), as amended, provides that the land registration
proceedings under the said Act "shall be proceedings in rem." 39 Section
38, same Act, also provides that "(e)very decree of registration shall bind
the land, and quiet title thereto," and "shall be conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or
included in the general description ‘To whom it may concern.'" Section 38
further declares that upon the expiration of one year from entry of the
decree of registration within which the said decree may be questioned,
"every decree or certificate of title issued . . . shall be incontrovertible,"
meaning, it can no longer be changed, altered or modified. 40
This has to be the rule so as not to defeat the objective of the Torrens
system, which is to guarantee the indefeasibility of the title to the
property. 41 Thus, we have invariably ruled that since the proceedings for
the registration of land titles under the Torrens system is an action in rem,
not in personam, personal notice to all claimants of the res is not necessary
to give the land registration court jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of
the res; and neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or invalidate
the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding. This rule is founded
on the principle that the State, as sovereign over the land situated within it,
may provide for the adjudication of title in a proceeding in rem, which shall
be binding upon all persons, known or unknown, 42 herein petitioners
included.
The MWSS and Gonzaga Decisions,
confirming the validity of OCT
No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917
from which the titles of respondents
herein emanated, had long become
final and executory.
The correctness of the MWSS and Gonzaga Decisions of this Court are now
beyond question. These Decisions confirming the validity of OCT No. 994
issued on April 19, 1917 from which the titles of the respondents in the
cases at bar originated had long become final and executory. Final
judgments — like those of MWSS and Gonzaga, adjudicated by this Court
15 and 11 years ago, respectively — deserve respect and should no longer
be disturbed. At any rate, there is no question that this date appears on the
face of OCT 994 as the date of the issuance of Decree No. 36455.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decision and disturb not
what is settled. 43 This established doctrine simply means that a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different, as in
these cases. It comes from the basic principle of justice that like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same question relating to the
same event is brought by parties similarly situated as in a previous case
already litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis
is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. 44
D up before this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. However, they did not do
Petitioners were fully afforded due process.
Petitioners Manotok Corporations allege they were denied due process and that the
commissioners' Majority Report are flawed.
Even if these matters can be raised for the first time before this Court, petitioners'
allegations are utterly baseless.
The proceedings before the
commissioners and the trial court
were properly conducted.
Records show that petitioners have been fully accorded due process during the
proceedings before the commissioners and before the trial court. It is unfortunate that
petitioners ignored the fact that the trial court, before it rendered its Decision, set the
hearing of the commissioners' Majority and Minority Reports on December 9, 1993.
However, during that hearing, petitioners did not ask that they be allowed to present
witnesses or additional evidence, if any. Instead, they submitted their comment on the
Majority Report praying that the said report be rejected and that TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211
Then, after respondent CLT Realty submitted its own comment on the Minority Report,
the trial court, on February 8, 1994, issued an Order directing the parties to file their
respective memoranda. Again, petitioners did not object to this Order. Instead, they
complied by filing their memorandum praying that the trial court approve the Minority
Report of a lone commissioner and render judgment in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court
approves the [Minority] Report dated October 23, 1993 of Commissioner Reodoro I.
Victorino. Defendants [Manotok Corporations] further pray that their ownership of the
land in question be upheld and the validity and effectiveness of their certificates of title
thereto be similarly sustained.
Also, when the trial court issued its Order dated April 22, 1994 resolving respondent CLT
Realty's Motion for Clarification and stating that the case was considered submitted for
decision, 45 still petitioners did not question or seek a reconsideration of this Order.
Certainly, this is not the actuation of a litigant who feels aggrieved by such actions of the
trial court. Simply put, had petitioners believed that the trial court acted with grave abuse
of discretion in considering the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
commissioners' Reports, the parties' respective comments thereon, and their
memoranda, they could have, right then and there, asked the trial court for
reconsideration and, if the same was denied, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. That they did not do so only shows that their belated allegation
of denial of due process is a mere afterthought, obviously because the trial court's
Decision was adverse to them.
It bears stressing that it is well within the power of the trial court to adopt the
commissioners' Majority Report as the basis of its judgment. The very reason why the
commissioners were appointed by the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, was to
determine whether there is overlapping of the parties' titles. By appointing them based
on their background, expertise and experience in the field of geodetic engineering, the
contending parties and the trial court concede that their chosen commissioners are in a
better position to determine which of the titles were regularly issued. Consequently, the
trial court may rely on their findings and conclusions. Under Section 11, Rule 32 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the trial court is clearly authorized to "render
judgment by adopting, modifying, or rejecting the report (by the commissioners) in whole
or in part or it may receive further evidence or may recommit it with instructions."
Furthermore, the trial court did not conduct further reception of evidence before
deciding the case since not one of the parties asked for it. The parties themselves opted
to submit the case for decision on the bases, among others, of their respective comments
on the commissioners' Reports. By doing so, they unmistakably impressed upon the trial
court that their respective evidence they submitted to the commissioners were complete
and ripe for adjudication. In fact, petitioners themselves specifically prayed that the trial
court adopt in its Decision the Minority Report of a single Commissioner, which is
favorable to them. Certainly, under the doctrine of estoppel, petitioners are barred from
assailing the trial court's judgment for being premature since they themselves had asked
the said court that it should already decide the case. They cannot now espouse a posture
inconsistent with their conduct below as this is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice.
As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated September 28, 1995 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 45255:
Had defendants-appellants (herein petitioners Manotok Corporations) seriously believed
that the trial court acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in considering
the case submitted for resolution and in deciding the same solely on the basis of the
Commissioners' Report and the memoranda submitted by the parties without conducting
hearings for the reception of evidence, they could have immediately brought this matter
so.
Instead, it was only after the trial court had rendered an adverse decision against them
that defendants-appellants raised for the first time in their Brief, the
alleged procedural error committed by the trial court in rendering its
Decision based on the Majority Report. 46 (Underscoring supplied)
The Commissioners' Majority Report
is duly supported by evidence.
Contrary to their claim, the findings of fact and conclusions contained in
the commissioners' Majority Report (as well as the Minority Report) are
based on the documentary evidence of the parties. In fact, petitioners
admitted that the commissioners verified the certificates of title and
related documents with the proper government agencies and "examined
the title records." 47 It bears stressing that these certificates are the core
documents upon which the commissioners based their findings because
they contain the necessary facts showing the data of the land in question,
namely: the registered owner/s and the person/s to whom the titles were
issued or transferred; the technical description and the metes and bounds
of the land; the approved survey plans; the date of the original survey of
the mother title; voluntary transaction affecting the whole land or part
thereof or interest therein; the number of the previous certificate/s of title
covering the same land and the fact that it was originally registered; the
record number; the number of the original certificate of title; the volume
page of the registration book in which the latter is found; and annotation of
encumbrances in the certificates. 48
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the findings in the commissioners' Majority
Report are based substantially on the very documents submitted by
petitioners themselves in the course of the proceedings. Clearly, their
allegations that they were denied due process and that the Majority Report
is defective because it does not cite any "specific evidence" are without
merit.
The commissioners who rendered the
Majority Report did not exceed their
authority.
The commissioners acted within the scope of their authority. In their
Comment on the Majority Report, petitioners did not complain that the
commissioners exceeded their mandate. Likewise, petitioners did not raise
such objection in their Memorandum. Instead, they asked the trial court to
approve the Minority Report and render judgment in their favor. And since
petitioners did not present before the trial court the alleged error of the
commissioners, the same is deemed waived. 49
In De la Rama Steamship Co. v. National Development Co., 50 this Court
held that where, as here, a party fails to file opportunely his objections to
the Report of the commissioner or referee, questions relating to the Report
cannot be reviewed and he cannot dispute the findings therein or escape
the legal consequences flowing therefrom. In the same vein, we ruled in
Santos v. De Guzman and Martinez 51 that:
By way of emphasis, we now desire to add that if a party desires to
challenge the findings of a referee, he must do so by timely and specific
exceptions to the referee's report. If he fails to make such exceptions and
the report is confirmed by the trial judge, he is bound by the findings and
cannot be heard to dispute their truthfulness or escape the legal
consequences flowing therefrom. Questions relating to the report of a
referee can be reviewed only where the record discloses the exceptions
taken thereto. (Underscoring supplied)
We reiterate that the commissioners who submitted the Majority Report
did not exceed their authority. They verified and examined the numerous
documents and certificates of title of the parties and their predecessors, as
well as the corresponding transfer documents and surveys. Upon
examination, these commissioners found "inherent technical defects on
TCT No. 4211 (from which petitioners Manotok Corporations derived their
titles) and TCT No. 4210." The said defects, they explained, "point to the
fact that there was no approved subdivision of Lot 26 which served as legal
basis for the regular issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211." They further
found that petitioners' titles overlapwith portions of respondent CLT
Realty's title, explaining that the overlapping "is due to the irregular and
questionable issuance of TCT Nos. 4211 (also of TCT No. 4210), 5261,
35486, 1368 to 1374." They thus concluded that respondent's title
(pertaining to the entire Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate), which was derived
from regularly issued titles, should prevail over petitioners' titles, which
were derived from those irregularly issued.
The Commissioners explained their findings and stated their conclusions in
their Majority Report pursuant to their mandate to resolve the issue of
whether petitioners Manotok Corporations' titles overlap that of CLT
Realty. Intrinsically intertwined with such mandate is the commissioners'
duty to state the basis of their findings and conclusions. This is obviously
necessary to enable the trial court, as well as the appellate court in case of
appeal, to fully understand the commissioners' findings and to make proper judgment.
Petitioners very well know that the commissioners' Reports are still subject to approval by
the trial court which has the final say on the matter. Clearly, the commissioners acted
within their authority.
Considering that petitioners Manotok Corporations were fully accorded due process, their
plea that this case be remanded to the trial court for hearing and reception of evidence is
unwarranted.
E
The magnitude of the land area involved in these
cases, as alleged by petitioners, is exaggerated.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Manotok Corporations alleged that the Maysilo
Estate consists of 1,660 hectares of land located in Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon
City, 1,342 hectares of which are covered by OCT No. 994; and that considering the
magnitude of the land area involved, our Decision will prejudice many landowners.
Likewise, Araneta Institute claimed in its motion for reconsideration that the Decision
involves 1,660 hectares of land in Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon City; and that this
case has utmost significance, affecting national interest. Hence, our Decision should be
reconsidered.
The allegations of the Manotok Corporations and Araneta Institute that our ruling
involves 1,660 hectares of land in Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon City are
exaggerated, to say the least. The controversy between the Manotok Corporations and
CLT Realty involves only 201,288 square meters, or more than 20 hectares only.
In Araneta Institute v. Heirs of Jose B. Dimson, the area involved is only 50 hectares, not
1,660 hectares.
The case between Sto. Niño Association and CLT Realty only covers 30,152 square meters,
or more than three hectares only.
CONCLUSION
Finally, I cannot fathom why the majority of my colleagues gave full credence to the
allegations of Justice Tinga which have no bearing whatsoever to respondents' claim.
Worse, they have not been raised and passed upon by the trial courts and the three (3)
Divisions of the Court of Appeals. To be sure, they have not been proved by evidence.
Justice Tinga's posture grossly violates the settled rule that no new issues shall be raised
for the first time on appeal. The remand of these cases to the appellate court is an
attempt on his part to prolong the litigation and disturb the findings of the said courts
sustained by overwhelming evidence. I reiterate that the titles of Dimson and his heirs
and that of the CLT are valid. On the other hand, the titles of the Manotok Corporations
and Araneta Institute are spurious. These are the findings of the three trial courts and
affirmed by the three Divisions of the Court of Appeals. To litigate these findings once
again will entirely change the settled jurisprudence of this Court. The doctrine that there
should be an end to litigation has been seriously disturbed. This is a sad day for the Court.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated
November 29, 2005.
G.R. No. 123346 — MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION versus
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.
G.R. No. 134385 — ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC. versus HEIRS OF JOSE B.
DIMSON, represented by his compulsory heirs: his surviving spouse, ROQUETA R. DIMSON
and their children, NORMA and CELSO TIRADO, ALSON and VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA and
CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA and RENE POLICAR and ESPERANZA DIMSON; and the
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF MALABON.
G.R. No. 148767 — STO. NIÑO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC. versus CLT REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
CORONA, J p:
The integrity of the Torrens system of land registration should be zealously guarded at all
costs. Otherwise, the value of certificates of titles will be seriously impaired. This is the
fundamental principle that should guide this Court in resolving the motions for
reconsideration in these consolidated petitions. And the reason why I respectfully submit
that the decision dated November 29, 2005 should be reconsidered.
THERE IS ONLY ONE OCT NO. 994:
THAT REGISTERED ON MAY 3, 1917
The issue involving OCT No. 994 is not whether the true date of its registration was April
19, 1917 or May 3, 1917 but which of these dates exists in the books of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA).
While it appears at first glance that there were two different dates of
registration of OCT No. 994 — April 19, 1917 and May 3, 1917 — only one
OCT No. 994 appears in the books of the LRA. This was OCT No. 994
registered on May 3, 1917. There was only one OCT No. 994. And it was
registered on May 3, 1917, not on April 19, 1917.
The voluminous records of these cases show the following material
antecedent facts relative to the issuance of OCT No. 994:
1. on December 3, 1912, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal presided
by Judge Norberto Romualdez, rendered judgment in Land Registration
Case No. 4429 ordering the issuance of a decree of registration;
2. pursuant thereto, the General Land Registration Office prepared decree
no. 36455 and issued the same on April 19, 1917 at 9:00 in the morning in
Manila, Philippine Islands and
3. on May 3, 1917, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal received
decree no. 36455 and had it transcribed. Thus, the following entries
appeared on the first page of OCT No. 994:
Witness: the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate, Judge of said
Court, the 3rd day of December, A.D. nineteen hundred and twelve.
Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19th day of April, A.D. 1917 at 9:00 A.M.
ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office
Received for transcription at the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, this third day of May nineteen hundred and seventeen at
7:30 A.M.
Clearly then, May 3, 1917, the date of transcription of the decree of
registration, was the date OCT No. 994 was registered and became
effective. This was in accordance with Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496
(The Land Registration Act), the applicable law at the time OCT No. 994 was
issued:
Section 41. Immediately after final decision by the court directing the
registration of any property, the clerk shall send a certified true copy of
such decision to the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, who shall
prepare the decree in accordance with Section forty of Act Numbered Four
Hundred and Ninety Six, and he shall forward a certified copy of said
decree to the register of deeds of the province or city in which the property
is situated. The register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book to be
called the "Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive
order shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the
register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the original certificate of
title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. All
certificates of title shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the
court. All certificates of title shall be numbered consecutively, beginning
with number one. The register of deeds shall in each case make an exact
duplicate of the original certificate, including the seal, but putting on it the
words "owner's duplicate certificate," and deliver the same to the owner,
or to his attorney duly authorized. In case of a variance between the
owner's duplicate certificate and the original certificate, the original shall
prevail. The certified copy of the decree of registration shall be filed and
numbered by the register of deeds with reference noted on it to the place
of record of the original certificate of title: Provided, however, That when
an application includes land lying in more than one province, or one
province and the city of Manila, the court shall cause the part lying in each
province or in the city of manila to be described separately by metes and
bounds in the decree of registration, and the clerk shall send to the register
of deeds for each province, or the city of Manila, as the case may be, a
copy of the decree containing the description of the land within that
province or city, and the register of deeds shall register the same and issue
an owner's duplicate thereof, and thereafter for all matters pertaining to
registration under this Act the portion in each province or city shall be
treated as a separate parcel of land.
Section 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of
registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the
registration book, "Original certificate of title, entered pursuant to decree
of the Court of Land Registration, dated at" (stating the time and place of
entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take effect
upon the date of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates
relating to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled
"Transfer from number" (the number of the next previous certificate
relating to the same land), and also the words "Originally registered" (date,
volume, and page of registration). (emphasis supplied)
April 19, 1917 was the date of issuance or forwarding of the decree of registration
(decree no. 36455) to the registrar of deeds. It was not the date of transcription of said
decree. The transcription in the registry book by the registrar of deeds was made on May
3, 1917, the day it was received by the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. There
could thus be no other date of registration but May 3, 1917.
Registration means "recording; inserting in an official register; enrollment, as registration
of voters; the act of making a list, catalogue, schedule, or register, particularly of an
official character, or of making entries therein." 1 In general, it means any entry made in
the books of registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict senses, and
cancellation, annotation and even the marginal notes. 2 In its strict sense, it is the entry
made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and
other real rights. 3 In its juridical aspect, it is the entry made in a book or public registry of
deeds. 4 Therefore, the transcription or entry of the decree of registration in the
registration book was what constituted registration, in this case, on May 3, 1917.
SINCE THE "TWO OCT NO. 994
THEORY" IS FALSE, THE RULING
THAT UPHELD THE RESPECTIVE
TITLES OF RESPONDENTS HAS NO
BASIS
The "two OCT No. 994 theory" (that is, there were two OCT No. 994s, one registered on
April 19, 1917 which was superior to the other OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917)
was the foundation of the November 29, 2005 decision. On that theory rested the ruling
that the respective titles of respondents CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) and
the heirs of Jose B. Dimson (heirs of Dimson) as derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on
April 17, 1917 5 should be upheld over that of petitioners. The theory has been proven
false as no OCT No. 994 registered on April 17, 1917 ever existed.
The difference between the "two OCT No. 994 theory" and the fact that only one OCT No.
994 existed is critical and crucial. In judicial decision-making, theory must give way to
reality because a decision should always be based on facts to which the relevant law shall
be applied.
Moreover, in these cases, the difference between theory and reality and the dates April
19, 1917 and May 3, 1917 are significant as well as decisive. On them hang the conflicting
claims and rights of the contending parties. Indeed, the Court formulated the Advisory on
the issues for oral arguments of these cases on the premise that there were two OCT No.
994s:
I.
Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties are valid?
A. Petitioners' titles:
1. Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485,
26405, 26406, 26407, 33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 53268, 55896, T-1214528, 163902
and 165119 in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc., and TCT No. T-232568 in the name of
Manotok Estate Corporation;
2. TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 in the name of Araneta Institute of Agriculture; and
3. TCT Nos. T-158373 and 13574 in the name of Sto. Niño Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.
All these titles were derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917 in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City covering Lot 26 of the Maysilo
Estate, same city.
B. Respondents' titles:
1. TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation; and
2. TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson.
All these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered earlier, or on April 19, 1917,
covering the same Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate. (emphasis supplied)
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
(TCT) NOS. T-177013 AND R-151669
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN VALIDLY
DERIVED FROM OCT NO. 994
REGISTERED ON MAY 3, 1917
I submit that the respective certificates of title of respondents (TCT No. T-177013 of CLT
and TCT No. R-15166 of the heirs of Dimson) could not have been valid derivative titles of
OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917.
First, CLT and the heirs of Dimson have consistently claimed that the mother title of their
respective certificates of title was OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. However,
OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 never existed. It was a fruit of
fraud and falsification. 6 Thus, the certificates of title of CLT and the heirs
of Dimson had no valid source.
Neither CLT nor the heirs of Dimson presented a certified copy (or even any
copy) of the mother title of TCT Nos. T-177013 and TCT No. R-15166. CLT
submitted OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 and admitted that there
was only one OCT No. 994. It, however, argued that OCT No. 994's
registration date should be April 19, 1917, the date of issuance of the
decree of registration. This is a complete turnaround from its original
contention that there were two OCT No. 994s, one registered on April 19,
1917 and another registered on May 3, 1917. The Court should not allow
this.
In the trial courts, CLT and the heirs of Dimson traced their titles to the
spurious OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917. They even underscored
this point to show that their mother title was issued earlier than, and
prevailed over, OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917. They are therefore
estopped from claiming otherwise. 7
Respondents cannot change horses in midstream. A party cannot adopt a
new theory or argument, specially one that is inconsistent with its previous
contention. The Court should not countenance CLT's act of adopting
inconsistent postures as this would be a mockery of justice. 8 This rule
applies more strictly in case of appeal. As this Court declared in Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue: 9
The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be
considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal, much more in a motion for reconsideration as in this case,
because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.
Second, in upholding the validity of the titles of CLT, heavy reliance is made
on the observations of the trial court and the Court of Appeals focusing on
the alleged technical defects of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 (from where
petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc.'s titles originated). To my mind, however,
there are compelling reasons to annul respondent CLT's title.
True, this Court is not a trier of facts, specially if the factual findings of the
trial court are affirmed by the appellate court. But it is not without
exceptions. 10 The Court may review the findings of fact of the trial and
appellate courts when such findings are manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible. 11 Moreover, to lay the matter to rest and in the interest of
justice, this Court can set aside the procedural barrier to a re-examination
of the facts to resolve the legal issues. 12
In these cases, the trial and appellate courts found (and this Court adopted
the finding in its November 29, 2005 decision) that there are two OCT No.
994s, registered on April 19, 1917 and May 3, 1917, respectively. However,
such finding has been shown to be manifestly erroneous.
TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an area of
891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT No. R-17994 issued in the
name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a
transfer from TCT No. R-15166 in the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in
turn, was supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on April
19, 1917.
Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title revealed that Hipolito acquired
ownership by virtue of a court order dated October 18, 1977 approving the
compromise agreement which admitted the sale made by Dimson in her
favor on September 2, 1976. Dimson supposedly acquired ownership by
virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in Civil
Case No. 4557 awarding him, as his attorney's fees, 25% of whatever
remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 that were undisposed of in the
intestate estate of the decedent Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the
registered owners of the properties covered by OCT No. 994. This order
was confirmed by the CFI of Caloocan in a decision dated October 13, 1977
and order dated October 18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732.
However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No. 994, particularly
the following entries, showed:
AP-6665/0-994 — Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certificado en
cuanto a una extencion superficial de 3,052.93 metros cuadrados y
16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor
de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias
Quinones el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de
Titulo No; 4210, pagina 163 Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento — Agosto 29, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion — September 9, 1918
10.50 AM
AP-6665/0-994 — Venta: — Queda cancelado el presente Certficado el cuanto a una
extencion superficial de 871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida
a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias
Quinones el segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No 4211,
pagina 164, Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento — Agosto 25, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion – September 9, 1918
10:50- AM
Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an area of 891,547.43 sq. m.
which corresponds to the total area sold in 1918 pursuant to the above-cited entries.
Inasmuch as, at the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was made on June 13, 1966, no
portion of Lot No. 26 remained undisposed of, there was nothing for the heirs of Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal to convey to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had nothing to convey to
Hipolito who, by logic, could not transmit anything to CLT.
Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate
described in Hipolito's certificate of title was not approved by the chief of the Registered
Land Division as it appeared to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079, Psd-5080 and Psd-
15345 of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. How Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was
therefore perplexing, to say the least.
All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the trial and appellate
courts. The circumstances called for the need to preserve and protect the integrity of the
Torrens system. However, the trial and appellate courts simply disregarded them.
CLT'S AND THE HEIRS OF DIMSON'S
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD
NOTHING TO TRANSFER
As early as 1918, the entire Lot No. 26 had already been disposed of and title thereto was
transferred to the predecessors-in-interest of Manotok Realty, Inc. as evidenced by the
issuance of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. This fact was reflected in the following annotations
on OCT No. 994:
a. Ap 6665/0-994 stating that TCT 4210 was issued on September 9, 1918 in favor of
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio canceling OCT No. 994 insofar as portions of Lot
No. 26 with areas of 3,052.93 sq. m. and 16,512.50 sq. m., respectively, by virtue of a
deed of sale dated August 29, 1918 and
b. Ap 6665/0-994 stating that TCT No. 4211 was issued on September 9, 1918 in favor of
Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio totally canceling OCT No. 994 with regard to Lot
26 by virtue of a sale dated August 25, 1918 covering the remaining 871,982 sq. m. of the
said lot.
Clearly, Dimson's TCT No. R-15166 had no basis because the property it was supposed to
cover was already covered by TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. Moreover, Dimson anchored his
right to Lot No. 26 by virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1.
He presented the said order dated June 13, 1966 to the CFI of Caloocan City for
confirmation only after the lapse of 11 years from its issuance. 13
The order dated June 13, 1966 was recalled by the CFI of Rizal on August 16, 1966. Thus,
his petition for confirmation was invalid on two grounds: (1) his right to file it had already
prescribed and (2) with the recall of the order dated June 13, 1966, there was no longer
anything to confirm. These fatal defects likewise tainted the heirs of Dimson's TCT No. R-
15169 because it was issued on the basis of the same decision dated October 13, 1977
and order dated October 18, 1977 of the CFI of Caloocan (the same bases for the issuance
of TCT No. R-15166).
The river cannot rise higher than its source. To reiterate, Dimson's TCT Nos. R-15166 and
R-15169 had no basis. Since Dimson's title was the source of Hipolito's title and,
subsequently, of CLT's TCT No. 177013, then CLT's certificate of title also had no basis.
Dimson did not acquire any portion of Lot Nos. 26 or 25-A (covered by the titles of
Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. [Araneta]). As such, he could not transfer any portion
thereof to Hipolito. In the same vein, having acquired nothing from Dimson, Hipolito
transmitted nothing to CLT.
Moreover, the rule is that where two certificates of title are issued to different persons
covering the same parcel of land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as
between the original parties and, in case of successive registration where more than one
certificate is issued over the land, the person holding title under the prior certificate is
entitled to the property as against the person who relies on the second certificate. 14 In
other words, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder
of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from, the person who
was the holder of the earliest certificate. 15
TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211 preceded Dimson's TCT No. R-15166 by almost 50
years while TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 of Araneta were issued 30 years earlier
than Dimson's TCT No. R-15169. As between the source of Manotok Realty,
Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation's titles and that of CLT's, therefore,
that of the latter prevails. In the same vein, Araneta's titles prevail over
that of the heirs of Dimson.
THE ALLEGED DEFECTS IN CONNECTION
WITH THE ISSUANCE OF TCT NO. 4211
WERE INSUFFICIENT TO NULLIFY THE
TITLE
The trial and appellate courts ruled that fraud attended the issuance of TCT
No. 4211 from which petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc. derived its titles.
According to the trial and appellate courts: (1) the dates of original survey
appearing on TCT No. 4211 were different from those indicated in OCT No.
994; (2) the Bureau of Lands had no copy of Psd-2115 which was the basis
for the issuance of TCTs Nos. 1368 to 1374 which preceded petitioner
Manotok Realty, Inc.'s titles and (3) the technical description of the land
appearing on OCT No. 994 was in English while the derivative titles were
still in Spanish and the tie points in the mother lot were not adopted in the
derivative titles.
However, the alleged irregularities are not sufficient to nullify TCT No.
4211. They were mere technical defects which may have been committed
in the preparation thereof. The more important consideration should be
whether or not there was a deviation or change in the area of Lot No. 26 as
described in OCT No. 994 and those described in the derivative TCTs. In the
case of TCT No. 4211, there was no such deviation or change.
Moreover, since the titles of respondents CLT and the heirs of Dimson are
invalid for having a non-existent source, the respective titles of petitioners
enjoy the presumption of valid and regular issuance. A review of the
purported defects of these titles should await a proper action, that is, one
that directly attacks their validity.
THE COMMITTEE REPORTS OF THE
SENATE AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE HAVE PROBATIVE VALUE
This Court already recognized the evidentiary value of the report of the
Senate in Alfonso v. Office of the President 16 when it included relevant
portions of the report in its factual findings. While Alfonso involved a
disciplinary issue distinct from the issues in these cases, the facts there
were intimately and extensively related to the facts here as Alfonso
showed how OCT No. 994 allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 came
about as a product of fraud and falsification.
Moreover, the reports of the Senate and the Department of Justice are
official acts of co-equal branches of the government. Under Section 9, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court, it is mandatory for courts to take judicial notice
of these reports.
THERE IS NO NEED TO
REMAND THESE CASES
The discussion on the venue of these cases (should these cases be
remanded to the CA) and the reasons why such venue is the proper one
ought to be commended for its comprehensiveness. However, I submit it is
actually academic and unnecessary. There is no need to remand these
cases.
The discussion is unequivocal:
[The existence of the so-called 17 April OCT having been discounted], it
should necessarily follow that any title that is sourced from the 17 April
1917 OCT is void. Such conclusion is inescapable whatever questions there
may be about the veracity of the 3 May 1917 OCT. . . .
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court
should be affirmed or set aside [is] whether or not the titles invoked by the
respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No.
994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not
be recognized by this Court.
As emphasis, the following point is made:
The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of these three titles
can be accorded recognition simply because the original title commonly
referred to therein never existed. To conclude otherwise would constitute
deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven
that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT and the [Dimsons]
were given the opportunity to submit such proof before this Court, but they did not. In
fact, CLT has specifically manifested that the OCT No. 994 they concede as true is also the
one which the Office of the Solicitor General submitted as true and that is OCT No. 994
issued on 3 May 1917.
The certificates of title of CLT and the heirs of Dimson have no valid source. They are the
bastard offsprings of the "mother of all land titling scams." 17 This Court has the duty to
snuff them out, not to perpetuate them. They should be ordered expunged from the
registry books of the Office of the Registrar of Deeds. Furthermore, the respective
complaints filed by CLT and the heirs of Dimson in the trial courts should be dismissed.
To reiterate, the logical consequence of declaring the respective certificates of title of CLT
and the heirs of Dimson void and unworthy of legal recognition is to order the dismissal of
Civil Case Nos. C-15539 and C-15491 instituted by CLT and Civil Case No. C-8050 filed by
the heirs of Dimson.
With the dismissal of the complaints, no controversy remains to be decided and no case
need be remanded. Nonetheless, the ponencia is still not satisfied but asks further:
. . . what then is the proper course of action to take with respect to these pending
motions for reconsideration?
The esteemed ponente further argues that:
Considering that CLT and [the heirs of Dimson] clearly had failed to meet the burden of
proof reposed in them as the plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and recovery of
possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their original
complaints before the trial court.
Yet, more is desired:
However, such solution may not satisfactorily put to rest the controversy surrounding the
Maysilo Estate.
The ponencia's allusion to "the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate" is misleading
and without factual and legal basis. After the respective complaints of CLT and the heirs
of Dimson are dismissed, the controversy surrounding the portions of the Maysilo Estate
involved in these cases will be resolved and terminated. Thus, there will be no more
controversy to speak of.
Judicial power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 18 Courts resolve only
cases that involve actual controversies. They are mandated to settle disputes between
real conflicting parties through the application of the law. 19 Until it can be shown that an
actual controversy exists, courts have no jurisdiction to render a binding decision. 20
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. 21
There will be no more justiciable controversy in these cases after the Court declares that
the respective certificates of title of CLT and the heirs of Dimson are void and unworthy of
legal recognition. Thus, there will be nothing more to remand.
NO DIRECT CHALLENGE TO
PETITIONERS' TITLES REMAINS
In support of the action to remand these cases, the following opinion is rendered:
More pertinently, after the present petitions were filed with this Court, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, had sought to intervene. The
Republic did not participate as a party when these cases were still before the trial courts
and the Court of Appeals. While the Republic originally prayed for the grant of the
petitions filed by all the petitioners in these consolidated cases, instead it presently seeks
of the Court the promulgation of a new ruling upholding the validity of OCT No. 994
issued or registered on [3 May 1917]. Rather than suggest whether the petitions be
granted or denied, the OSG argues that after a declaration from this Court that it is the 3
May 1917 OCT mother title which is valid, "a remand of this case to the Court of Appeals,
to settle which among the private parties derived their titles from the existing OCT 994, is
proper."
Notably, both the Manotok group and Araneta are amenable to the remand of the
petition[s], albeit under differing qualifications.
And the ponencia concludes:
Considering the reality that the genuine OCT No. 994 is that issued/registered/dated 3
May 1917, remand would be appropriate to determine which of the parties, if any,
derived valid title from the genuine OCT No. 994.
There is no factual and legal basis therefor. The annulment of the respective certificates
of title of respondents CLT and the heirs of Dimson terminated the controversies subject
of these cases. It removed the direct challenge raised by respondents to the respective
titles of petitioners.

Notably, nowhere did the Republic assail the validity of the respective
certificates of titles of petitioners. It never prayed for the annulment of
their titles. 22 Otherwise, it would have gone against one of the
fundamental principles of the Torrens system of land registration: a
Torrens title is not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title cannot be changed, altered, modified enlarged or

diminished in a collateral proceeding. 23 As a rule, it is irrevocable and
indefeasible. A strong presumption exists that it was validly and regularly
issued. 24 The duty of courts is to see to it that this title is maintained and
respected unless assailed in a direct proceeding. 25 A Torrens title cannot
be attacked collaterally. 26 The efficacy and integrity of the Torrens system
must be protected at all costs.

With the annulment of the respective titles of respondents CLT and the
heirs of Dimson, no direct challenge to the respective titles of petitioners
subsists. The strong presumption of valid and regular issuance of
petitioners' titles remains. Unless and until directly attacked by a party that
has an actual and direct interest on the annulment of said titles, that
presumption will stand.

The Court does not have the panacea for any and all ills allegedly
surrounding the Maysilo Estate. It should be constantly reminded of its
own pronouncement in Vera v. Avelino: 27

Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a
remedy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are
undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct. . . .

Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the
repository of remedies for all political or social ills. . . . 28

The duty of this Court is to ensure and preserve the integrity of the Torrens
system. That duty must be performed with all due fidelity to the
fundamental principles governing that system.

Resolving all controversies, perceived or real, surrounding the Maysilo

Estate is a desirable objective. However, it is simply not within the Court's
powers to do in these cases. The Court is not enjoined, empowered or
equipped to clean the Augean stables, nor to accomplish the task in a single
day.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the

intervenor Republic of the Philippines.

||| (Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., G.R. Nos.
123346 & 134385 (Resolution), [December 14, 2007], 565 PHIL 59-164)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142549. March 9, 2010.]
FIDELA R. ANGELES, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-
Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this
Court En Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches over three cities,
comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the
Vatican." 1 What we have before us now is touted as "one of the biggest
and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history." 2
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with
this infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular petition
easy, on one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset,
applicable; but complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must
be determined with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just,
equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for
almost forty-five (45) years.
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents
Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order 3
dated January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan
City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de
Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a Certificate of Finality on
March 12, 1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them
claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and
alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the
parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan
and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for
partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo
Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with
the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No.
C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120. THIcCA
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this Court
to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals, 4
reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court held
that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid
title by virtue of the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya
granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case;
directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon
City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners,
including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area
of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters
(105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be
sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided
among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the
property.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the
Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners' Report dated October 21,
1997 and Supplemental Commissioners' Report dated December 30, 1997
that the following lots with transfer certificates of title to be issued by the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in the names of all co-owners be sold
and the proceeds thereof divided among themselves in proportion to their
respective interest in the property, is approved.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby
directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-
owners for the following lots, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this
Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City
refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA
Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA
Administrator to direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order.
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a letter-reply 7
dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1) the 1st Indorsement 8 dated September
22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-11 9 issued to
all Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part: SHDAEC
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the directive of
the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement dated 22 September 1997, copy
enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee
(created under DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No.
994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April
1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this
DOJ directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers of Deeds, copy
attached, stating the following:
xxx xxx xxx
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement dated 27
March 1998, . . . had recommended to the Office of the Solicitor General the filing of an
appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated 8 January 1998.
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate Committee on
Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its Senate Committee Report No. 1031
dated 25 May 1998 . . . . 10 (Emphasis ours.)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated
May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning
came up with the following findings:
i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or
registered on May 3, 1917[.]
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication perpetrated
by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the late
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed the physical and genetic
impossibility of such relationship[.]
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, acted
maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing "certifications" and/or written
statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered on April 19, 1917
when in truth and in fact it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted
maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of
Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No. 994. Malice was
evident because she had previously issued certificates of title in the names of other
individuals which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact
questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the registration of OCT No.
994. 11 (Underscoring in the original.)
The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA
"to prevent its alteration and tampering." We quote the last portion of said letter-reply:
HESAIT
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register of Deeds
and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April
1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in
the double, if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering the
subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land mentioned in the
subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority, as the protector of the integrity of the
Torrens title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real properties and put a stop to
further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens system of land registration.
With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance of transfer
certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers from certain deficiencies,
to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the issuance of various certificates
of title in the names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands
were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government agency
but merely sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with
the Order will result to duplication of certificates of title covering land previously
registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court
did not declare the nullity of the certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 994
issued on 3 May 1917. It merely invalidates the title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the
title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the various transfer
certificates of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must
be a separate action in court for the declaration of nullity of certificates of
title pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94
SCRA 874), "there are too many fake titles being peddled around and it
behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the
issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a mockery
of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty,
devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people
at large." 12
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement,
13 made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this Court in
MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has the power or
authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest
Court of the land." According to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed
to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April
19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court on
"what is the valid OCT No. 994." Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is well
settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer
amend, modify, much less set aside the same" and that respondent
Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which
rendered the Order of no effect. 14
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the
issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3,
1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated
without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and that this was
contemptuous and contumacious and calls for "condemnation and reproof
of the highest degree." 15
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely
ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424
cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has
no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
other than this action."
In his Comment, 16 respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for
denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that
the latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was
pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made by the committee
created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after
conducting an independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way
alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the
Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in existence at the time the 1st
Indorsement was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages.
17 IDaEHC
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of
Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being
compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he
had no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform
an act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did
not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was
therefore not a real party-in-interest in this case.
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ
Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due
to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in
February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the investigation
of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection
with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the
committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original
Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City
and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of Transfer
Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a finding
of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the
involvement of and to recommend the actions to be taken against
person(s) and/or officials and employees of this Department or its agencies
who may appear to have participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative
and/or judicial actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by this Department, the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, and other units and
attached agencies of this Department, with respect to such irregularly issued Transfer
Certificates of Title, taking into account the final decisions of the courts affecting the
Maysilo Estate." 18
Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation
of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely administrative to
formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the
LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with
regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to
the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committee's report dated August 27,
1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies, procedures,
and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not only with
respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo Estate but to all
other original or transfer certificates of title as well. He contends that the 1st
Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said
that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997
was issued long before the Order dated January 18, 1998, thus it could not be said that
petitioner was denied due process as her rights and interests were non-existent at that
time. Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due
process when the LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioner's counsel to
present petitioner's case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that such
opportunity to be heard satisfies the requirements of due process, as the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 19
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is a factual
issue which the petitioner must prove in the course of a trial where petitioner's claim for
damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Such
being the case, it is inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a
claim for damages the amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such claim
should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no showing that petitioner paid
the required docket fees for her claims for damages. On this score alone, such a claim
should be outrightly dismissed. 20
In her Reply, 21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has to be named
as private respondent because he was the cause of public respondents' failure to comply
with their ministerial duty. A private respondent is "the person interested in sustaining
the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondent to
appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public respondents
affected by the proceedings . . . ." He is not charged with any improper act, but he is a
necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for by petitioner shall require private
respondent's active participation. 22
Anent private respondent's argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in any way alter or
modify any judgment of this Honorable Court, petitioner counters that the 1st
Indorsement and "pertinent acts of private respondent . . . resulted in the altering or
supplanting of a judgment of this Court." The complaints praying that an investigation be
conducted on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the
private respondent by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917,
after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs
of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent's claim, she is entitled to file a
petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been
suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful
act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules of Court in
support of her argument:
RULE 65
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A certified copy of the
judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon
the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned
in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as
contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with
Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding
upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse
party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that
did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had caused the
issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that
had already become final and executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the
doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of government to
be left alone to discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit. 23
DAEaTS
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed their
Comment 24 on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property
subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint
that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No.
994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership, and
possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the
complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to deceive. This is
because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding
Committee created by the DOJ, which are the result of the joint
undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General,
and the LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are
not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their
names. 25
Public respondents claim the following as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25,
1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are
not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par.
3, p. 33, Senate Report). . . . .
As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been
partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y
Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason,
Pedro Baños, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino
Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose
Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason
y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto
Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y de
la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito
Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patiño, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia
O'Farrell y Patiño, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y
Gonzales, Domingo Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente
Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon
in proportion to their respective shares, as evidenced by the document
entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO
(PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO) consisting of fifty-two (52) pages
which is attached as Annex "D", and its faithful translation into English
consisting of forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex "E", and both made
integral parts hereof.
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same
subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-
enumerated true owners.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the
undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration of
the questioned Order of the lower court.
The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending
before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the resolution
by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate. 26
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully
neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned
transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case
No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and
enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a
writ of mandamus against said public respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to
this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not unlawful
for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the
act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus
does not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus
will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial
doubt exists. 27 It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in
matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in
the exercise of either. 28
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with
the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if substantial
doubt exists to justify public respondents' refusal to comply with said Order. Did public
respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioner's request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority 29
instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a
sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is
reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same
parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. AcDaEH
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right
to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and
complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is
indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the
case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But
where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case,
mandamus cannot issue. 30 (Emphasis ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree
of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would
result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in
this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds
cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were
existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was
reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither
could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register of
Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA
Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent
Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for
his refusal to grant petitioner's request. 31 There was, therefore, sufficient basis for
public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained
in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and
her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist.
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En
Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation 32
(the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution 33 in the same case dated
March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate
and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to rest.
All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound
by the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions. HIcTDE
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court 34
which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one
from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was
dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioner's claim no longer has a
leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be
affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If
these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such
titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic
factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs
from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become
virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no
longer be relied upon as precedents. 35
||| (Angeles v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 142549, [March 9, 2010], 628 PHIL 381-401)
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly
issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following
conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:

First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that
mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3
May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the
date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on
the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as
the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April
1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson
and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April
1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an
inexistent OCT. . . . .

Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga
v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to
their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we
now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or
Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any
other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that
at bar. 36 (Emphases supplied.)

To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports
regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a
Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand,
declaring as follows:

Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the
findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these
are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by
the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. . . . The reports
cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if
admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level
as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they
were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade
the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments
presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis,
and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.

There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could
only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. . . . . aHcACT

xxx xxx xxx

The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Resolution. 37

Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence
engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the latter's conclusions as
to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case
affirmed the earlier finding that "there is only one OCT No. 994, the
registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May
1917 and not 19 April 1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994
which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and
void."

In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No.
C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several attempts of
different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be
attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of
money, should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears,
however, that the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo
Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper
because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the very basis of their
claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.

The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus
not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for
lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.