MODULE 3
— Under Section 9 of the Rule on
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.]
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR.,
in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Hector B. Almeyda for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO
OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEDURE. — Section 1,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject
to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which
plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses
which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all
cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the
cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This
interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute
should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of
the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF
BP NO. 129. — Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak
of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious
reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such
courts: Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years
and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does
not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO
VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES. — As it is
clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that
among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or
city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE
1
CASE IS ACTUALLY FILED IN COURT.
Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326.
— This interpretation is in consonance with Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2
thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish.
As a matter of fact, it does.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION
IN CRIMINAL CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The Court feels that if
there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1
of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as
the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because
this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section
5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY
OR NOT THE INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. — The
Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the
meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here
sought to be corrected.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the
prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a
mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the
Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. LibLex
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-
complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the
crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal
to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained
by the responded judge. 4
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner
first argues that the charge against her is governed by the
following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the procedure in
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; prLL
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged does not exceed six months
imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or
both, irrespective of other impossible penalties, accessory or
otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal
cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced
only by information; Provided, further, That when the offense
cannot be prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint
shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended
party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act
to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal
ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
2
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining
and penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis
supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-
month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the
offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground
of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was
suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor
General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, providing as follows: LexLib
SECTION 1. How Instituted. — For offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall
be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by
filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of
conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the
said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan
Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the
office of the fiscal.
In all cases, such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the
filing of the complaint with the Officer of the Provincial Prosecutor comes
under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies
to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the
following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for
Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and
should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action
on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint
or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the
case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive
the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account
of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of
the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to
file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on
May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the
Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other
hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated
therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was
added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does
not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last
paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the
canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to
and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover
the true legislative intent. cdphil
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure
that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal
or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses
falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to
Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does
not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.
3
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed
commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running
of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed
in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326
which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings
referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does
not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that
the decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the
offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised
Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the
instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the penalty
cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's
office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary
judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not
justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as
reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a
distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent
the problem here sought to be corrected. LexLib
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the
petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and
ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section
1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a
judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the
period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated
October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
prescription. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C .J ., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,

Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.

||| (Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, [July 3, 1992], 286
PHIL 375-383)

4
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 167571. November 25, 2008.]
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI,
respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review 1 of the resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA
G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s
(petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent
motion for reconsideration. 2
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of
money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8
January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C.
Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three
(3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three
(3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson.
Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the
checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or
by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal
demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23
May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
3 no dealings with petitioner. 15
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili
and Tongson 4 for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P.
Blg. 22) 5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During
the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and
filed his counter-affidavit. 6 Tongson claimed that he had
been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since
petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal
capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums
to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was offered to
be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was
not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed
several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks
and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had
been falsified. IDAaCc
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several
documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. 7
He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim
wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business
associate. 8
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, 9 City Prosecutor III
Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and
5
dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal
before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili
was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,
10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced
checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings
submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). AHCcET
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion
was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the
matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her
resolution, 11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, 12 which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the
four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on
20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not
administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more
than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been
filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him
had already prescribed. 13 Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of
the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be
sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
because the initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the
investigating prosecutor. 14 Finally, ACP Sampaga found that Tongson had
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary
Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. 16 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, 17 the DOJ, this time
through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor
and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan. 18 Thus, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate
informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 19 On 8 July 2003,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information 20 charging petitioner with
three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 21
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, 22 the DOJ, presumably
acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the
subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the
three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In
justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies
to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for
the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not
provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No.
3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs
the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. 23 The DOJ also cited the
case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., 24 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the
proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial
proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
THEDcS
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari 25 before the
Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the
DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in
view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals
also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ
attached to the petition is a mere photocopy. 26 Petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's
resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. 27 Still, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that
subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would
not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution.
Besides, the Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently
without merit and the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. 28
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of
Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on
technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was
patently without merit and the questions are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. TCaAHI
The DOJ, in its comment, 29 states that the Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with
the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a
special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive
period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with
Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that
the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg.
22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they
claim that the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the
State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases. 30
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his
petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies
with the rules, the verification being intended simply to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are
true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held
in a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can
be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither
jurisdictional nor always fatal. 31
6
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure
an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct — the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on
them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of
justice may be served, 32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find
that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification
requirement. cAEDTa
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition on the ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy
or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A
plain reading of the petition before the Court of Appeals shows that it seeks
the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004, 33 a certified
true copy of which was attached as Annex "A". 34 Obviously, the Court of
Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes, 35 a case involving
the violation of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive
period is tolled only upon filing of the information in court. According to
petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, 36
wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive
period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the
violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes. 37 He argues that
sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would
result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the present case were
clearly beyond his control. 38
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to
Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law
applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own
prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
SEC. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided
in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) . . .; (b)
after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) . . .
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. SACTIH
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under
Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that
only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the
prescriptive period. HAICTD
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on
4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment", 39 and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice
of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of
the offense is halted. 40
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326
is illuminating. 41 Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December
1926 at a time when the function of conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in
the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time,
as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada 42 and People v.
Joson, 43 is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once
a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation inasmuch as the filing of the
complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings
against the accused. 44 These cases were followed by our
declaration in People v. Parao and Parao 45 that the first step
taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes
the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the
prescription of the offense. 46 Subsequently, in People v.
Olarte, 47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In
addition, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case,
its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender, 48 and hence, the
prescriptive period should be interrupted. CAIaDT
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan 49 and Sanrio Company Limited v.
Lim, 50 which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual
Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws,
the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by
the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et
al., 51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, 52
another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus
effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case 53
is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings"
7
in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in
the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation
of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive
function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it
involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and
judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. 54
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. 55 A clear
example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit
on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He
likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the
dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the proper
channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner
filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August
1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate
period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond
petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution
of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of
the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies. SHCaDA
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's
filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover,
since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the
information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is
also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner. DCaEAS
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, [November
25, 2008], 592 PHIL 286-298)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138596. October 12, 2000.]
SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION
LAQUI, SR. HELEN OJARIO and SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ,
respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision
1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47089
promulgated on March 01, 1999 and the subsequent
Resolution 3 dated May 11, 1999 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court,
are as follows:
"On February 2, 1994, private respondents filed a joint
complaint-affidavit for libel against petitioner before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City alleging that the
latter circulated on December 21, 1993 a letter containing
malicious imputations against them.
An information for libel then was filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on May 18, 1994.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed
a Demurrer to Evidence. Without resolving the incident, the
Metropolitan Trial Court in its Order dated November 9, 1996
ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the same falls
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, and ordered that the case be forwarded to the
RTC for further proceedings.
On November 29, 1996, the case was forwarded to Branch
215 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City docketed as Criminal
Case No. 96-6870.
On January 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription of the
offense of Libel. The RTC dismissed the case in an Order dated
April 2, 1997 but, stating that the offense had not yet
prescribed, ordered the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to re-
file the Information for Libel with the RTC.
On April 27, 1997, the Information for Libel was re-filed with
respondent court docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70948.
On June 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the
ground of prescription. The motion was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated October 3,1997.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in
the other Assailed Order dated December 4, 1997." 4
8
Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the trial court, herein
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of "whether or
not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred
in holding that the offense of libel in the instant case has not yet
prescribed." 5 The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated March 01, 1999,
upheld the contention of the trial court that the offense of libel had not yet
prescribed and consequently, dismissed the said petition. The appellate
court likewise denied herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution dated May 11, 1999. 6
Petitioner is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals and contending that —
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL HAS
NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN
DENIED HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. 7
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of libel
prescribes in one (1) year, to wit:
"ART. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen
years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in 10 years; with
the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in
five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year."
(italics supplied)
The said prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code, as follows:
"Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
proceed to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago." ADCETI
In the case at bench, the offense of libel allegedly occurred on December
21, 1993 when petitioner circulated a letter containing allegedly malicious
imputations against private respondents Srs. Helen Ojario and Bernadine
Juarez. At this point, the period of prescription for the alleged crime had
already started to run.
The one-year period of prescription for the crime was
interrupted on February 2, 1994 when respondents filed a
joint complaint-affidavit 8 for libel against petitioner before
the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City. At this point,
the prescription period had already run for forty-two (42)
days.
A preliminary investigation by the Office of the City
Prosecutor was thus conducted. On April 27, 1994, Asst. City
Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos issued a Resolution
stating that probable cause exists against petitioner and
recommended the filing of an information for libel against
her. Consequently, an information 9 for libel was filed against
petitioner on May 18, 1994 before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 32. 10
Despite the fact that the Metropolitan Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the said court proceeded
to conduct trial on the merits. After the prosecution had
rested, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence dated
September 18, 1996. However, instead of acting on the said
demurrer, the Metropolitan Trial Court, on November 08,
1996, issued an Order 11 ruling that it had no jurisdiction over
the crime of libel as the same falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Instead of dismissing
the case outright, the MTC ordered the forwarding of the
records of the case to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings. The case was eventually raffled off to Branch
215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. 12
On the basis of a Motion to Dismiss 13 filed by petitioner,
Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case on
April 2, 1997 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the
information against petitioner should have been re-filed
anew. The court ruled, however, that the crime had not yet
prescribed and ordered the re-filing of the case. 14 On April
27, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor re-filed the case
with the Regional Trial Court and eventually the same was
raffled to Branch 218 of the said court. 15 Petitioner tried to
have this case dismissed on the ground of prescription but
her motion to quash 16 the information was denied by
Branch 218 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court in a
Resolution 17 dated October 3, 1997. The denial by the
Regional Trial Court of petitioner's motion to quash was
subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals.
It is the contention of petitioner that the prescription period
for the crime of libel charged against her commenced to run
again when the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the
filing of the information for libel. Petitioner further argues
that the prescriptive period could have been interrupted
again had the information been filed with the Regional Trial
Court, the court with the proper jurisdiction to try the case
for libel. Considering however that the case was filed before
the Metropolitan Trial Court, which under the law does not
have jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the period of
9
prescription continued to run its course. Consequently, petitioner concludes
that when the information for libel was finally filed with the Regional Trial
Court, the crime had already prescribed and the State can no longer pursue
the case against her.
In support of her arguments, petitioner questions the reliance made by the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in the landmark case of People
vs. Olarte. 18 Petitioner submits that the adherence to the Olarte case must
be examined considering that in the said case, the principal issue was
whether or not the filing of a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court for
purposes of preliminary investigation, interrupts the period of prescription
of a crime. Petitioner argues that the cited case is inapplicable as it is not
disputed in the case at bench that the period of prescription was
interrupted during the process of preliminary investigation.
We are not persuaded.
In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking through
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, finally resolved the then conflicting views as to whether
or not the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes
of preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period
for the crime. The Court restated the correct and prevailing doctrine, as
follows:
"In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for
the Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after
mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is,
and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of
the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the
period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on the merits.
Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information' without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second,
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive
the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his
part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted
prescription 'shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted,' thereby indicating that
the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have the
power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits
usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the
court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may
terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the
accused because no prima facie case had been shown."
Subsequently, this Court, in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 19 broadened
the scope of Olarte by holding that the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal's office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner insists that the ruling in Olarte with respect to the
interruption of the prescriptive period is not applicable. In the
case at bench, the fact that the period of prescription was
interrupted by the filing of private respondents' joint affidavit
with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office is not disputed. The
Olarte case, however, makes several other pronouncements
that are determinative of the issues raised by petitioner.
It is clear from the Olarte case that the filing of the complaint
or information for purposes of preliminary investigation
represents the initial step of the proceedings against the
offender. This is one of the reasons why such filing is deemed
as having interrupted the period of prescription for the
prosecution of a crime. This period of prescription
commences to run again when the proceedings terminate
without conviction or acquittal, "if the court (or prosecutor)
should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has
been shown." 20
It is thus evident that petitioner's first premise that the period
of prescription commenced to run again when the Quezon
City Prosecutor's Office recommended the filing of a criminal
complaint against her is incorrect. When the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of libel charges against petitioner,
the proceedings against her were not terminated, precisely
because a prima facie case for libel was found against her.
Instead of terminating the proceedings against petitioner, the
resolution of the city prosecutor actually directed the
continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner by the
filing of the appropriate information against her and by the
holding of trial on the merits. As such, when the information
for libel was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, the
period of prescription for the crime was still suspended.
Another important teaching in Olarte is that "it is unjust to
deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control." This is
because in criminal prosecutions, the only thing that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
In the case at bench, private respondents were not remiss in
their right to seek grievance against respondent as they filed
their complaint before the city prosecutor forty-two days
after the alleged crime of libel occurred. It was the Office of
the City Prosecutor that committed an error when it filed the
complaint with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper
venue for the crime of libel brought about by the passage of
R.A. 7691 21 which took effect on April 15, 1994. Under
Section 2 of the said Republic Act, the jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded to include all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years. However, libel, which is punishable by imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to four years 22 is not
covered as the said law excludes from its coverage cases
10
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. 23 Under
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the information for libel should be
filed with the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. The
confusion was cleared up when this Court issued Administrative Order No.
104-96 dated October 21, 1996 which categorically stated that "LIBEL CASES
SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION
OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." 24
Evidently, Branch 215 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City was
not spared the confusion brought about by R.A. 7691, as its dismissal of the
case then pending before it was made only on November 8, 1996 or more
than two years after it had taken cognizance of the case. Notably, the
dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court took place a mere eighteen (18)
days after the issuance of S.C. Administrative Order No. 104-96.
The mistake of the Office of the City Prosecutor in filing the complaint and
of the Metropolitan Trial Court in taking cognizance of the case was thus
understandable. The error was immediately rectified by the said court upon
realizing its mistake when it ruled it was the Regional Trial Court which had
the proper jurisdiction over the case. This mistake should not operate to
prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses and, more
importantly, the right of the offended party to obtain grievance.
Moreover, the doctrine in People vs. Olarte, as applied in later cases, was
not meant to apply solely to cases where the filing of the complaint with the
municipal trial court or the prosecutor's office operates to interrupt the
prescription period for the prosecution of a crime.
In People vs. Galano, 25 an information was filed with the Batangas Regional
Trial Court even though the evidence of both the prosecution and defense
shows that the crime was committed in Manila. This Court, applying People
vs. Olarte, held that it was only when the trial court dismissed the case due
to lack of jurisdiction that "the proceedings therein terminated without
conviction and acquittal and it was only then that the prescriptive period
(which was interrupted during the during the pendency of the case in the
Batangas Court) commenced to run again."
In People vs. Enrile, 26 informations were filed against civilians before
military tribunals which had no jurisdiction over the persons of these
civilians. These civilians questioned the re-filing of the cases against them
before the civil courts raising, among others, that the crimes for which they
are being charged have already prescribed. This Court, applying by analogy
the ruling in the Olarte case, threw out the defense of prescription and held
that "the filing of the first indictments suspended the running of the
prescriptive period, and the prosecutions under the informations to be filed
should be regarded as mere continuations of the previous proceedings." At
the very least, the Court ruled, "the filing of the first charges should be
considered as having interrupted the prescriptive period notwithstanding
the lack of jurisdiction of the military tribunal in which they were filed."
More recently, in the case of Reodica vs. Court of Appeals, 27 an
information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
slight physical injuries was filed with the Regional Trial Court even though
the offense was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
The Court, even as it dismissed the cases pending before the Regional Trial
Court for lack of jurisdiction, disregarded the defense of prescription raised
by the accused. The Court, citing Olarte and the subsequent
cases of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals 28 and People vs.
Cuaresma, 29 ruled that "the prescriptive period for the quasi
offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular
mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of the
case."

From these cases, it is clear that the Appellate Court

committed no reversible error in ruling that the offense of
libel charged against petitioner had not yet prescribed. The
period of prescription for the crime was interrupted when the
complaint was lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor
and remained tolled pending the termination of the case
against petitioner. Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, therefore, correctly assumed jurisdiction over
the case of petitioner as the offense of libel for which she was
being charged has not yet prescribed. aScIAC

Petitioner's other argument that she has been denied her

right to a speedy trial deserves scant consideration. Well-
established is the doctrine that the right to a speedy trial is
violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay without participation or fault of the accused,
or when unjustified postponements are sought which prolong
the trial for an unreasonable length of time. 30 In the case at
bench, besides the filing of the petitions before the Court of
Appeals and this Court, petitioner had likewise filed a Motion
to Quash and a Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218. As such, it is clear that
petitioner is not without fault in the delay in the prosecution
of the case against her.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of

the Court of Appeals dated May 1, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Arambulo v. Laqui, G.R. No. 138596, [October 12, 2000],

396 PHIL 914-928)

11
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152662. June 13, 2012.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MA. THERESA
PANGILINAN, respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for
review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for the
nullification and setting aside of the Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and Private
Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay
recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings
pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed
against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
and ordered the filing of informations for violation of BP Blg.
22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City
Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and
RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00, both
checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and
violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other
checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16
September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both
dated 18 November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.
Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of
the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon
City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31 on 7 June
2000. DaAISH
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to
Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant
of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged
that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay
recommended the suspension of the criminal proceedings
pending the outcome of the civil action respondent filed
against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City.
The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of
12
Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection
with her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of
P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of P4,475,000.00,
both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation
of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the
affidavit-complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan on 3
February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raffled to MeTC; Branch 31 on
7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in
an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The
criminal cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads: ECaHSI
. . . Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February
2000 with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07
June 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest
amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22,
had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a
quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings
having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997
yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the
hearing of Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153. 4
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for review 5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
was docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution 6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition
to the CA for appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring
respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27
July 2001 Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason
that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already
prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated
that:
. . . this Court reckons the commencement of the period of
prescription for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed
to [respondent] sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was
within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the
private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject
checks and, the five (5) days grace period granted by law had
elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to
Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or
until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or
information against the petitioner before the proper court.
CDESIA
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and
89152 (sic) against the petitioner having been filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03 February
2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx xxx xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription
shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes 7 the Supreme Court held
that the proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
as amended, are 'judicial proceedings', which means the filing
of the complaint or information with the proper court.
Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall
be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and
not on any date before that, which is in consonance with
Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal
ordinance, this Court, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326,
as amended, governs the computation of the prescriptive
period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes 8 likewise
applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 9
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for
review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No.
3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by
Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of
prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution
of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the
Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of
prescription of the offense charged. 10 It submits that the
filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant
Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of
13
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases. EHSITc
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on
the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 11
that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not
the "judicial proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of
prescription. In relying on Zaldivia, 12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the
subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, 13 the Supreme Court ruled
that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal's Office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore
concluded that the filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City
on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within
which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with
Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the
petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply
with the mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy
of the decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural
lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint
before the City Prosecutor's Office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a
special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are
anchored on erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by
petitioner involved felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and
are therefore covered by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) 14 and
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 15
Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation
of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by
Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be
made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as
in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997
interrupted the period of prescription of such offense. DaHcAS
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent's claim that the OSG failed to attach to
the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002
decision of the CA and the required proof of service is refuted by the record.
A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original copy of the
petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also observed that
annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the Docket
Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively
erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already
prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription
for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the
law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with
the following rules: (a) . . .; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years; (c) . . . .
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited
law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should
be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the
guilty person. Cdpr
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, 16 this Court
ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court
even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of
prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in
the case of Francisco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. 17 when
it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal's Office
also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense.
Respondent's contention that a different rule should be
applied to cases involving special laws is bereft of merit.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC
and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in
Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. 18 is not controlling in special laws. In
Llenes v. Dicdican, 19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 20
Brillante v. CA, 21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 22
cases involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al., 23 the Court even ruled that investigations
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for
violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription
period because it is equivalent to the preliminary
14
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 24 which is in
all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating
agencies. EHTSCD
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of
1995" is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein
respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of
the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on
16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension
of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was
raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the
petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so
ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with
the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent's own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting,
that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte, 25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right
to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the
offender is to file the requisite complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12
March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, [June 13, 2012], 687 PHIL 95-
106)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 169823-24. September 11, 2013.]
HERMINIO T. DISINI, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 174764-65. September 11, 2013.]
HERMINIO T. DISINI, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST
DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
criminal action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is
a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution
is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close
associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari
the resolutions promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002, both
entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005
(denying his motion to quash the informations) 1 and August
10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial
of his motion to quash), 2 alleging that the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated
June 30, 2004 charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with
corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in
relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal
Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4 (a) of
Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring
together and confederating with the then President of the
Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there,
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give
gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of
15
accused DISINI's ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion)
shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion
(4 billion) shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of
stock having then a book value of P100.00 per share of stock, and
subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned and
controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical
construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project ("Project")
of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in
consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do
the engineering and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the
Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in
consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be
awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design and to construct the Project,
respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
CADSHI
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Criminal Case No. 28002
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI,
conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the
Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and
golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband
of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and family physician of the Marcos family, taking
advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Project ("PROJECT") of the National
Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive from
Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S.
Dollars ($1,000,000.00), more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Corporation (WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
Dollars ($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then
having business, transaction, and application with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI
securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract
for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and
architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and
subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc.
owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company of
Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which
stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and
gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as
accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash, 5 alleging that the
criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the
informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution
opposed the motion to quash. 6

On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself
for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan's favorable
action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. 7 He
then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the
motion to quash. 8
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated
January 17, 2005, 9 but the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second
assailed resolution. 10
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for
certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE THE INFORMATIONS WERE
"FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1, 2, 14 AND 14-A".
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
ASSUMED JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THE
REQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THE
ACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER. DEHaAS
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED,
DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO PRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DETERMINING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE
PERIOD.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DETERMINING THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF THE
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLY
ABSENT ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED TO UPHOLD
THE 'SUFFICIENCY' OF THE INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASE
NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENT COURT
DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT
CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS
16
DESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESCRIBED FORM,
THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THE ACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM. 11
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.
Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in
G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan, 12 which
involved the civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution,
and damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. Herminio T. Disini, et
al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
against Disini and others. 13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013
alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in
acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through the misappropriation
of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, embezzlement,
and other acts of corruption, 14 as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant
Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of Defendant
Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship . . . defendant Herminio
Disini obtained staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange
for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine
government.
xxx xxx xxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or
in unlawful concert, active collaboration and willing participation of
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their association and influence with the latter defendant
spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets,
engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries,
Inc. as conduits through which defendants received, kept, and/or invested
improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions from foreign
corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation; CcSEIH
(d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to
Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the
country for a scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendant's
staggering commissions — defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the
contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant; 15
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991, 16 the PCGG transmitted the records
of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319-
92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby transmitting to
your Office for appropriate action the records of the attached
criminal case which we believe is similar to the said
Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or
elements are also parts of the causes of action in the civil
complaints[-] filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some
properties or assets of the respondents have been
sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party
defendants in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the
Supreme Court, we are constrained to refer to you for proper
action the herein-attached case in view of the suspicion that
the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases
similar to that of the Cojuangco case. . . .
Ostensibly, the PCGG's letter of transmittal was adverting to
the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.), 17 viz.:
. . . [T]he PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a pima facie
basis filed a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors
alleging substantially the same illegal or criminal acts subject
of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General
filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. . . . .
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and
freeze orders against petitioner's properties, it was on the
basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten
and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of
coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG
cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said
criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge," as it has prejudged the matter. . . . 18
xxx xxx xxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the
PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot
possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an
even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice
can be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from
conducting the preliminary investigation of the complaints
subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and
that the records of the same should be forwarded to the
Ombudsman, who as an independent constitutional officer
has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct
such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action. 19
(Bold emphasis supplied) SETAcC
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the
Ombudsman, following its conduct of the preliminary
17
investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG,
were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Desierto, 20 with the Court requiring the Office of the
Ombudsman to file the informations that became the subject of Disini's
motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses
charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002. He
contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were
being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature
contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the
informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor
involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not
charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he
should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c)
of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal
complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal
cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their
immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close
associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the
Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A.
No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall
be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. DaScCH
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed
the criminal complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office
of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini only
after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the
PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an
impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case
being established against Disini to sustain the institution of
Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013
and the informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 involved the same transaction, specifically the
contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini and
President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the
engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do
the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project
(PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still
expressly aver in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth was no longer necessary. 21 With Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with
Civil Case No. 0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute
the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the
offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting
the President in "[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during
his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,"
18
expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth
covered President Marcos' immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, without distinction as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini's argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4
of R.A. No. 8249 22 applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and
Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including: ITSacC
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or
higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
-controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified
as Grade 27 or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a
and Subsection 4b, signifying the plain legislative intent of
limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To
include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons
covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive
mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases
pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002 despite Disini's being a private individual, and despite
the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission
of the offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the
informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be
considered, namely: (1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time when the period of prescription
starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is
interrupted. 23
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini
had offered, promised and given gifts and presents to
Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration of
Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical
Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do
the engineering and architectural design of and to construct
the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to
be awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption
of public officials. 24
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal
Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised
Penal Code with the "same penalties imposed upon the
officer corrupted." 25 Under the second paragraph of Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery), 26 if the gift
was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution
of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer
executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor
in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less
than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, 27 the period of
prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials
charged against Disini is 15 years. CIAHDT
19
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of
Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed
under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the
prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador, 28 however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15 years
would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the
longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable
to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to
February 1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the
applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v.
Pacificador.
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof
provides that prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to
offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 n 29 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto 30 is also enlightening, viz.:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,"
does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this
rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act
No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon
discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of
action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in this accord that the
Court confronted the question on the running of the prescriptive period in
People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
(G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto
dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in
a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at
the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive
act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime
which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in
1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the
complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence,
prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly
discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the
1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and
conspiracy among involved public officials and the
beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in
the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held
that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared
to question the legality of these transactions. (Citations
omitted) 31
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the
prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when
the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns &
Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the
offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the
connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved
and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered
it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved
party, to have known of the commission of the crimes
charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986.
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known
nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in
relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG's
exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a
prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case
No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP
contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the
presumption of their execution having been regularly done in
the course of official functions. 32 Considering further that
during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
assail the legality of the transactions, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful
transactions was possible prior to 1986. ECISAD
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and
their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the conduct n the
preliminary investigation. 33 In accordance with Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code 34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v.
Department of Justice, 35 the filing of the criminal complaints
in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the
running of the period of prescription. According to
Panaguiton: 36
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,
which involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property
Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court
ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the
Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the
20
DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive,
thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of
Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law,
with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the
charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of
the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood
either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted
against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense
charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the
filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor
for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of
prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five
years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses charged,
up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman.
4.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss
or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no
offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining
whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the
essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. 37 Extrinsic matters
or evidence aliunde are not considered. 38 The test does not require
absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense;
otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to
proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials)
and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4 (a) of RA No. 3019) have
sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, viz.: EIaDHS
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall
be included in the complaint or information.

The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging
corruption of public officers specifically put forth that Disini,
in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in Manila,
Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President
Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered,
promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos,
who, by taking undue advantage of his position as President,
committed the offense in relation to his office, and in
consideration of the gifts and presents offered, promised and
given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do
the engineering and architectural design of and to construct
the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the
contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by
Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article
212 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or
presents to a public officer; and
family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any
person having some business, transaction, application, request, or contract
with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close
personal relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application,
request, or contract with the government. CTaSEI
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4 (a) of
R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of
the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia
Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and
at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal
relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public
official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal
relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and
$17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having business,
transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the
PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family
or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe
the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
construction of the PNPPP.

2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the
presents are given to a public officer under circumstances resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the
that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case
indirect bribery. No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

The allegations in the information for corruption of public SO ORDERED.

officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: Sereno, C.J., Villarama, Jr., Perez * and Reyes, JJ., concur.
(1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to
President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of ||| (Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 & 174764-65, [September
the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing 11, 2013], 717 PHIL 638-669)
the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act
in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that
would make him liable for direct bribery. 39 The second
element of corruption of public officers simply required the
public officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute
certainty, that would make him liable for direct or indirect
bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos
received or accepted Disini's offers, promises and gifts — an
essential element in direct bribery — the allegation that
President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns
& Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under
circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.

The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging

the violation of Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly
upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4 (a) of
R.A. No. 3019 are:

1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with

a public official;

2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such

21
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 240310. August 6, 2018.]
WILBERT TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EVA ROSE PUA, JUDGE MARIA LUISA LESLE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 90, QUEZON CITY,
respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a
Resolution dated August 6, 2018 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 240310 — Wilbert Tolentino v. People of the
Philippines, Eva Rose Pua, Judge Maria Luisa Lesle, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 90, Quezon City.
This Court has carefully reviewed the allegations, issues, and
arguments adduced in the instant Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
accordingly resolves to DISMISS the same for: (1) failure to
state the date of receipt of the assailed Order dated March
19, 2018 as required by Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court;
and (2) failure to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial
Court gravely abused its discretion in rendering the Orders
dated March 19, 2018 1 and June 18, 2018 2 in Criminal Case
No. R-QZN-17-14518-CR.
Petitioner claims that the assailed Orders violate Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for failing to state clearly
and distinctly the facts and law on which the assailed Orders
are based. In NICOS Industrial Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 3 we reiterated the time-honored principle that "the
constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory
orders" 4 such as the RTC's March 19, 2018 Order denying
petitioner's motion to quash "because the provision 'refers
only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial
court resolving incidental matters.'" 5
Anent petitioner's claim that the action has prescribed,
although Republic Act (RA) No. 10175, or the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, does not categorically state the
prescriptive period for such action, the new prescriptive
period for the crime of libel in relation to RA No. 10175 can
be derived from the penalty imposed on the said crime.
Section 6 of RA No. 10175 provides that the "penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for
by the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and special
laws, as the case may be." As such, the former penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods is
increased to prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period. The new penalty,
therefore, becomes afflictive, following Section 25 6 of the
RPC. Corollarily, following Article 90 7 of the RPC, the crime of
libel in relation to RA 10175 now prescribes in fifteen (15)
22
years. Thus, respondent Eva Rose Pua's filing of the complaint on August 8,
2017 against petitioner's Facebook post dated April 29, 2015 was well
within the prescriptive period for libel in relation to RA 10175.
Lastly, on the issue of jurisdiction, Section 21 of RA 10175 vests the RTC with
jurisdiction without any qualification as to the place where the same should
be filed. Section 21 states: cSaATC
Section 21. Jurisdiction. — The Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction
over any violation of the provisions of this Act including any violation
committed by a Filipino national regardless of the place of commission.
Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was committed within the
Philippines or committed with the use of any computer system wholly or
partly situated in the country, or when by such commission any damage is
caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was
committed, was in the Philippines.
There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially
trained judges to handle cybercrime cases.
Given that there is no qualification as to where a criminal action for libel in
relation to RA 10175 must be filed, the filing of the Information before the
RTC of Quezon City, where respondent Eva Rose Pua resides, is proper. This
is in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides
that "[a]ll other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs reside, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants reside, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to AFFIRM the Orders dated March 19,
2018 and June 18, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Quezon City
in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-17-14518-CR.
The Manifestation filed by petitioner is NOTED.
SO ORDERED." Leonardo-de Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of
the First Division per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018;
Gesmundo, J., designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special
Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA
Acting Division Clerk of Court
||| (Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 240310 (Notice), [August 6, 2018])