RULE 80 SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

Circumstances Warranting Appointment of Special Administrator

Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No, L-40502 29 November 1976

Facts:

Virginia G. Fule, an illegitimate child, filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration
alleging Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places. At the same time, she
moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratix over the estate, which was granted by the CFI
of Laguna.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
contending that Amado “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death certificate and
therefore, the venue was improperly laid. The CFI denied the motion for reconsideration.
The CA reversed the CFI and appointed Preciosa as the administratix.

Issue: Whether Virginia or Preciosa is entitled to be appointed as special administratix of the estate
Ruling:

Preciosa is entitled to be appointed as special administratrix.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate.

“Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
The last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of the court. Amado was in Quezon City,
and not at Calamba, Laguna based on his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
The conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia’s petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore, the CA was correct in
appointing Preciosa as special administratix.

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De Guzman v. Guadiz
G.R. No. L-48585 3 March 1980

Facts: When Catalina Bajacan died, Feliciano de Guzman filed a petition for the probate of her will where
he was named executor. Villegas, et al. opposed contending that all the real properties of Catalina are now
owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos. De Guzman filed a motion for the appointment
of special administrator which was denied since the properties are in the possession of the oppositors.

Issue: Whether a special administrator should be appointed

Ruling: Yes, a special administrator must be appointed

Under Section 1, Rule 80 the probate court may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance of disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator
lies in the discretion of the Court. The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad
enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special
administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.

The reason for appointing special administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person
fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs

The facts in this case justifying the appointment of a special administrator are: (a) Delay in the hearing of
the petition for the probate of the will; (b) The basis of Villegas, et al’s claim to the estate and opposition to
the probate of the will is a deed of donation allegedly executed by Catalina and her late sister Arcadia in
their favor; and (c) The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of Villegas, et al. is to
appoint a special administrator who will have the personality to file an action for annulment of the Deed of
Donation.

Judge Guadiz has failed to distinguish between the partisan possessions of litigants from that of the neutral
possession of the special administrator. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not as a
representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of
the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. The accountability which the court attaches to the office of a
special administrator to be appointed by the court is absent from the personal possession of Villegas, et al.

Relucio vs. San Jose

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May 26, 1952 G.R. No. L-4783

FACTS: Felipe Relucio Sr. named petitioner Julita Relucio as administratrix and executrix of his estate. In a
special proceeding, petitioner Julita was appointed as administratrix of the testate estate of Felipe Relucio
Sr. Upon petition filed by Rolando et.al, to which Julita filed an opposition, the CFI of Manila issued an
order appointing Rolando as administrator in substitution of the petitioner. This order is appealed by Julita.
Pending appeal, Rolando moved for immediate execution of the said order, but this was ignored by the
court. He then filed a motion to declare Julita in contempt for failing to deliver to him, all papers and
documents related to the estate.

The CFI denied the motion for contempt. Instead, it appointed Equitable Banking Corporation as special
administrator pending the appeal of Julita. The Court reasoned that the appeal suspended the appointment of
Rolando as administrator, and that if Julita has to remain administratrix during the pendency of her appeal,
“a removed administrator may easily nullify such removal by interposing an appeal”.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of a special administrator is proper.

HELD: No, it is not.

The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are specified in Section 1 of Rule 81 of the
Rules of Court which provides as follows: “When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other
cause, the court may appoint a special administrator...”. A special administrator may also be appointed in a
case covered by Section 8 of Rule 87 “if the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he
represents.”

The case at bar falls under either Rule 81 or Rule 87. In any view of the case, there is a regular
administrator. Pending her appeal, the petitioner had the right to act as administratrix. If the judge decrees
immediate execution of the order, Rolando would then be the administrator pending appeal. Therefore, the
appointment of special administrator is not warranted.

De Guzman vs. Angeles

June 20, 1988 G.R. No. 78590

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FACTS: Petitioner Pedro De Guzman was the father of the decedent Manolito De Guzman, while private
respondent Elaine De Guzman was the wife of Manolito. Elaine filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Manolito praying that she be granted letters of administration. She also filed a motion for
writ of possession over 5 vehicles alleged to be conjugal properties of the De Guzman’s, which are now
under the possession of petitioner Pedro. She then filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint her as special
administratrix of the estate. The ex-parte motion was set for hearing and the lower court ordered that all
parties in the case be notified. However, no notice was given to Pedro. After hearing, the ex-parte motion
was granted.

Trouble ensued when Elaine, together with respondent sheriffs, tried to enforce the order by taking the
vehicles in Pedro’s possession. Pedro then files this petition to annul the lower court’s orders. He argues that
respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition for
settlement of estate was not yet set for hearing, and that the appointment constitutes grave abuse of
discretion for having been made without giving petitioner and other parties an opportunity to oppose.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Elaine as administratrix was proper.

HELD: No, it was not.

The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all other known heirs and other interested parties as to
the date thereof is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the appointment of an administrator in order
that no person may be deprived of his right or property without due process of law. Moreover, a hearing is
necessary in order to fully determine the suitability of the applicant to the trust, by giving him the
opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors, if any, to contest the said application.
Where no notice as required in Section 3, Rule 79 has been given to persons believed to have an interest in
the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of estate is void and should be annulled.

In this case, no notice as mandated by Rule 79 was caused to be given by the probate court before it acted on
the motions of Elaine to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession and to grant her
motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito. Therefore, said orders are void and should be set
aside.

Heirs of Castillo vs. Gabriel

November 11, 2005 G.R. No. 162934

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FACTS: The decedent is Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel. In the course of probate proceedings, Roberto Gabriel,
purporting to be the adoptive son of Crisanta was appointed as special administrator of Crisanta’s estate.
Crisanta’s will purports to name Roberto as the sole heir. When Roberto died, his widow Dolores Gabriel,
filed a motion that she be admitted as substitute in place of her husband, and be appointed as administratrix
of the estate.

One Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo also claimed to be the only legitimate child of Crisanta and her
husband. Belinda died. She was substituted by petitioners herein, Bena Jean, Daniel, Michael and Danibel.
Petitioners opposed Dolores’s motion and filed their own, praying that Bena Jean be appointed as
administrator. In a Resolution, the lower court appointed Dolores as special administratrix, hence this
petition.

Petitioners argue that since Dolores has no right to inherit from Crisanta then she is not qualified to be
appointed as administratrix of the estate.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Dolores as special administratrix is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is.

The appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular
administrators. The appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court,
that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The basis for appointing a
special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration, as well as when from any cause, general administration,
cannot be granted.

The phrase “by any cause” includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that
there is delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be
prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of special administrator. Besides, Dolores, being the
sole heir of Roberto, has as much stake in Crisanta’s estate. Thus, the preference of Dolores is sound, that is,
not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.

QUALIFICATIONS

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Corona vs. CA
August 30, 1982 G.R. No. L-59821

FACTS

The deceased is Dolores Luchangco Vitug. She left two wills disinheriting her husband and bequeathing her
properties to her sisters Exaltacion, Vicenta, Gloria and to her nieces, Rowena and Jenniffer. Rowena
Corona, herein petitioner, was also named as her executrix. Rowena filed a petition for probate of the Wills
and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as administrator. The Probate Court appointed Nenita as special
administratrix.

The surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an opposition and prayed that he be appointed as Special
Administrator because Nenita is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected. The probate court
then set aside its previous order and appointed Romarico as special administrator. This order was affirmed
by the CA, hence this petition.

Petitioner now argues that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should not be followed where the
surviving spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the
estate which would disqualify him from the trust.

ISSUE

Who should be appointed as special administrator?

HELD

Nenita Alonte should be appointed as co-special administrator with Romarico.

Rowena’s choice of special administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
discretion given her by the testatrix, is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita’s
appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and
equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in
the management of the decedent’s estate.

En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests
to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration and its earliest
settlement.

MATIAS v GONZALES (G.R. No. L-1090, June 29, 1957)

Aurea Matias filed a petition for probate of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of her
aunt, Gabina Raquel. Pursuant to the said instrument, except the properties bequeathed to Gabina’s other
niece and nephews, Aurea is the heir to the entire estate. She was also appointed executrix without a bond.
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Basilia Salud (over 80 years of age and blind), a first cousin of the Gabina, opposed the probate of her
alleged will. The RTC denied the petition for probate.

Meanwhile, Basilia moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of
the deceased, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata (her Attorney). The judge found Rodriguez
guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as special administrator of
the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia as special administratrix, to "be assisted and advised by her
niece, Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said
order, likewise, provided that "Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby
appointed as co-administrator." Later on, Basilia resigned as special administratrix.

Aurea now claims that she should have preference in the choice of special administratrix of the estate, she
being the universal heiress to said estate and, the executrix appointed in the alleged will of the deceased, that
until its final disallowance — which has not, as yet, taken place, she has a special interest in said estate,
which must be protected by giving representation thereto in the management of said estate

ISSUE: W/N Aurea is qualified as a special administrator considering the will where she was appointed as
executrix was denied to probate

HELD: YES. Aurea has a beneficial interest in the estate of the deceased and therefore, qualified.

Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Gabina was denied by respondent Judge, the order
to this effect is not, as yet, final and executory. It is pending review on appeal taken by Aurea Matias. The
probate of said alleged will being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea Matias has — as the universal
heir and executrix designated in said instrument — a special interest to protect during the pendency of said
appeal. Thus, in the case of Roxas vs. Pecson this Court held that a widow, designated as executrix in the
alleged will and testament of her deceased husband, the probate of which had denied in an order pending
appeal, "has . . . the same beneficial interest after the decision of the court disapproving the will, which is
now pending appeal, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate court."

Note: The lower court was ordered to re-hear the matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguez and appointment
of special administrators (Aurea, Victorina and Ramon)

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Roxas v Pecson (G.R. No. L-221, December 20, 1948)

Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother of the deceased Pedro Roxas filed a petition for the administration
of the latter's estate. Maria was appointed special administratrix. Meanwhile, Natividad (the widow) filed a
petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of
his estate designated is said will. In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by Maria and Pedro,
Nativida was appointed special administratrix and qualified as such over the objection of the respondents
Maria and Pedro who sought the appointment of Maria. Later on, the probate of the will was denied on the
ground that the attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of the testator, from
which the petitioner has appealed, and the appeal is now pending

Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria as special administratrix or
special co-administratrix. The respondent judge appointed Natividad as special administratrix only of all the
conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties
belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.

ISSUE: W/N the widow (Natividad) is qualified to be a special administratix despite the disallowance of the
probate of the will.

HELD: YES.

As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee
must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which
must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in exercising his discretion and appointing the
Natividad as special administratrix, had taken into consideration the beneficial interest of Natividad in the
estate of the decedent and her being designated in the will as executrix thereof. But the respondent's
subsequent act of appointing her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or community property, and
Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or exclusive property of the decedent, does not seem to
be in conformity with logic or reason. The petitioner has or claims to have the same beneficial interest after
the decision of the court disapproving the will, which is now pending on appeal, as she had prior to it,
because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellate court.
Besides, even if the will is not probated, the widow in the present case would have, under the law, the right
of usufruct over one-half of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. The beneficial interest required as a qualification for appointment as administrator of the estate
of a decedent is the interest in the whole estate and not only in some part thereof. The petitioner being
entitled to one-half in usufruct of all the exclusive properties of the decedent, she would have as much if not
more interest in administering the entire estate correctly, in order to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy,
economical administration of the state, and not suffer the consequences of the waste, improvidence or
mismanagement thereof. The good or bad administration of the property may affect rather the fruits than the
naked ownership of a property.
Note: SSC ruled that the lower court has no power to appoint two special administratices of the estate of a
deceased husband or wife, one of the community property and another of the exclusive property of the
decedent. Under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and
distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, then it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be
appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary
administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator.

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POWER AND DUTIES OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR

De Gala v Gonzales (G.R. No. L-30289, March 26, 1929)

Serapia de Gala (niece of the deceased Severina Gonzales) was appointed special administratrix of the estate
. She returned an inventory of the estate and made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving
husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in
possession. The lower court ordered Sinforoso to deliver to Serapia all the property left by the deceased.
Instead of delivering the property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de
Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he be appointed in her stead. The motion was granted
principally on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would
simplify the proceedings.

ISSUE: W/N the removal of Serapia as administrator was proper

HELD: YES.

The burden of the argument of Serapia’s counsel is that a special administrator cannot be removed except
for one or more of the causes stated in section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section can only
apply to executors and regular administrators, and the office of a special administrator is quite different from
that of regular administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion
of the court; the function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the
deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special administrator indicates that
both his appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below
abused its discretion in the present case. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor
of the property pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the court probably prevented
useless litigation.

Liwanag v Reyes (G.R. No. L-19159, September 29, 1964)

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Liwanag executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the Rotegaan Financing, Inc. It was stipulated that the
total amount of mortgage debt be fully paid a year thereafter. Before the one year period expired, the
mortgagor (Liwanag) died intestate. Rotegaan filed a complaint for foreclosure against the Estate of Pio D.
Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the estate. Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss on the
theory that she may not be sued as special administratrix.

ISSUE: W/N the action for foreclosure may be filed against the special administratrix

HELD: YES.

Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the
deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon
his security and prosecute his claim in the testate or intestate proceeding and share in the general distribution
of the assets of the estate;

(2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may
prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and

(3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations,
and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not be admitted as creditor of the estate, and shall
not share in the distribution of the assets.

Obviously, Rotegaan has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action for foreclosure against the
administratrix of the property.

The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against
the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against
them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are now to deny the
present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed,
the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.

ANDERSON vs. PERKINS

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Facts:

Special proceedings were commenced by Dora Perkins Anderson (petitioner) for the probate of the
will of Eugene Arthur Perkins. Alfonso Ponce Enrile was appointed as special administrator. the special
administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or
educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books,
gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order
to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value might be obtained in their disposition. Idonah
Slade Perkins (oppositor) filed an opposition to the proposed sale. Reasons, for the opposition were that (1)
most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and
(2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made. The lower
court still approved the sale. Idonah Perkins moved for reconsideration on the following grounds (1) that
said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased,
contrary to Rule 81, section 2. Rules of Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the
goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that
the personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) that there
is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the
inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is also
evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.

Issue: Whether the special administrator has the power to sell the perishable properties?

Ruling:

Yes. It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property
of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed. But it is not alone the specific property of the
estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special
administrator of perishable. It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not
only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to
sell "other property as the court ordered sold;" .

CO vs. Rosario

Facts:

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 RTC of Makati City appointed petitioner (Luis Co) and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special
administrators of the estate of the petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun. However, on motion of the other heirs,
the trial court set aside petitioner’s appointment as special co-administrator. Petitioner consequently,
nominated his son, Alvin Milton Co (Alvin, for brevity), for appointment as co-administrator of the estate
which was approved by the RTC. However four years later, other heirs filed a motion for the revocation of
the appointment of Alvin Co as special administrator for the reason that Alvin had become unsuitable to
discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or competence to
perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases against
him, which, even if there was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to
handle the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence. The RTC revoked the appointment of
Alvin Co.

Issue: Whether the revocation of the appointment of special administrator is proper?

Ruling:

Yes.  Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by
the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. 10 Courts may appoint or remove
special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As
long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. 

In ruling to revoke the appointment of Alvin Milton Co, the lower court took into consideration the
fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator which demands a high degree of trust and confidence
in the person to be appointed. The court a quo observed that, burdened with the criminal charges of
falsification of commercial documents leveled against him (sic), and the corresponding profound duty to
defend himself in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co’s ability and qualification to act as special co-
administrator of the estate of the decedent are beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is only proper
under the attendant circumstances. Such reasoning by the court a quo finds basis in actual logic and
probability. Without condemning the accused man (sic) as guilty before he is found such by the appropriate
tribunal, the court merely declared that it is more consistent with the demands of justice and orderly
processes that the petitioner’s son, who is already bidden to defend himself against criminal charges for
falsification in other fora be relieved of his duties and functions as special administrator, to avoid conflicts
and possible abuse.

ALCASID VS. SAMSON

Facts:

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 Respondents Amado Samson et. al, filed an application for the issuance of the letter of
administration in favor in one them, Jesus Samson, which was appointed by the court as special
administrator for the estate of Jose Samson. This was opposed by the wife of Jose, Josefina N. Samson and
her children. They asked for the granting of letters of administration in favor of Josefina N. Samson, in the
place of Jesus V. Samson. After hearing that dragged for almost two years, Judge Alcasid, issued an order
appointing Antonio Conda, Municipal Treasurer of Libon, Albay, as regular administrator. In that order the
special administrator Jesus V. Samson was instructed at the same time, to turn over all the properties and
funds of the estate in his possession to the regular administrator as soon as the latter qualified. Antonio
Conda put up the bond fixed by the court and, letters of administration were issued in his favor. Upon
motion of the widow, the court issued an order requiring the special administrator to deliver the properties
and funds of the estate now in his possession to the regular administrator within three (3) days from receipt
of the order of the court. On appeal, the CA ruled that Conda should not have been allowed to qualify in the
meantime, unless execution pending appeal should be ordered for special reasons pursuant to Rule 39,
section 2 of the Rules of Court; and that "should the special administrator be found, after due process of law,
unfit to continue", he "could be dismissed and another appointed to look after the interests of the estate until
the appeal filed against Conda's appointment is finally disposed of". The CA set aside the appointment of
Conda and annulled his bond.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct in set aside the appointment of Conda as regular administrator?

Ruling:

No. The Court has repeatedly decided that the appointment and removal of a special administrator
are interlocutory proceedings incidental to the main case, and lie in the sound discretion of the court.  In this
case, the special administrator was not actually removed by the court, but that he was superseded by the
regular administrator by operation of law. Rule 81, section 3, of the Rules of Court specifically provides that
—

When letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate of the deceased, the power of
the special administrator shall cease, and shall forthwith deliver to the executor or administrator the
goods, chattels, money and estate of the deceased in his hands.

No question of abuse of discretion can therefore arise on account of the order of April 8, 1956, requiring
Jesus V. Samson to turn over the administration to the regular administrator, such result being ordained by
law. Upon the other hand, the conditions of the estate justified the appointment and qualification of a regular
administrator, because the special administration had lasted nearly two years, and the prompt settlement of
the estate had been unduly delayed. 

JUNQUERA vs. BORROMEO

Facts:

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 Vito Borromeo made Jose Junquera as executor in his will. When Vito Borromeo died, Junquera
filed at CFI CEBU a petition for probate and during the pendency of the case he became the special
administrator upon filling of bond. Cris Borromeo and Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the petition
for the probate of the will and asked the Court to remove Junquera as special administrator on the ground
that he failed to submit an inventory of the estate as required by law as well as to deposit either in bank or
with the clerk of court all the income of the estate and by his conduct he may be considered as having
neglected his duties as such administrator. Junquera reasoned out that his failure to file inventory and report
is because the papers and documents related to the estate are in the possession of one Tomas Borromeo, who
residing in Manila and who owns one-half of the conjugal properties of the deceased. Finally on February
20, 1953, he submitted an inventory of the estate and reports of the income. After hearing the Court,
removed Junquera as special administrator.
Issue: Whether the removal of Junquera is proper?
Ruling:
It appears that a special administrator before entering upon his duties shall give a bond conditioned
“that he will make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased which come to his possession or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as are received
by him when, required by the court.”  He assumed office since then and yet until the motion for his removal
which was filed on January 2, 1953, or a period of approximately seven months, he appears not to have
taken any step to determine the property, real or personal, belonging to the estate and much less has filed an
inventory thereof with the court as required by law. While the above-quoted rule (section 4, Rule 82-Bond
of special administrator) does not fix any period within which he is required to submit an inventory of the
estate, it cannot be denied that such duty has to be performed within a reasonable period, if not as soon as
practicable, in order to preserve the estate and protect the heirs of the deceased. Such is inferred from section
2 of Rule 81 wherein it is provided that a special administrator “shall collect and take charge of the goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards (to be) appointed” for only in that manner can we satisfy the real purpose for which the office of
a special administrator is provided for. If such were not the case we would be opening the door to the
commission of irregularities or other mischiefs which may redound to the detriment of the estate and of the
heirs entitled to its distribution. It is for this reason that the law provides for his removal in case he fails to
perform “a duty expressly provided by these rules” or “becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust (section 2, Rule 83). (Italics supplied.) And if, as found by the trial judge,
Junquera “have not even attempted, much less done any substantial performance of any of (his)
commitments”, it is evident that he has proved to be unworthy of his trust.

RULE 81 BONDS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

COSME DE MENDOZA vs. PACHECO, G.R. No. 43351, February 26, 1937
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Facts:

Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme. To assure faithful performance
of his duties as an administrator, he filed a bond for P5,000, with Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero
as sureties. Soriano's account, upon approval, showed him indebted to the estate in the sum of P23,603.21.
Unable to turn this amount over to the estate upon demand of Rosario Cosme, the new administratrix, the
lower court ordered the execution of his bond after notice duly served upon the sureties. Pacheco and
Cordero are now questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to order the
execution of an administrator’s bond.

Issue: Does a probate court have the power to order the execution of an administrator’s bond?

Ruling:

Yes. To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to select an administrator of the estate of a deceased
person. Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters
testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom they are issued is required to give a bond in
such reasonable sum as the court directs, with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful
performance of his trust. The administrator is accountable on his bond along with the sureties for the
performance of certain legal obligations.

A Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the
administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the
administrator's duty. Court of First Instance in a probate proceeding cannot be devoid of legal authority to
execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed.

WARNER BARNES AND CO., LTD., vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., G.R. No. L-6637, September
30, 1954

Facts:

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Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., filed a complaint against Luzon Surety Co., Inc., of the recovery of the sum of
P6,000. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as
administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga in a special proceedings of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, the condition being that said bond would be void if the administratrix
"faithfully prepares and presents to the Court, within three months from the date of his appointment, a
correct inventory of all the property of the deceased which may have come into his possession or into the
possession of any other person representing him according to law, if he administers all the property of the
deceased which at any time comes into his possession or into the possession of any other person
representing him; faithfully pays all debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever
dividends which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just and true account of his
administrations to the Court within a year or at any other date that he may required so to do, and faithfully
executes all orders and decrees of said court." The administratrix allegedly violated the conditions of her
bond by failing to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the estate that had come into her hands, by
failing to pay or discharge the approved claim of the plaintiff, and by failing to render a true and just account
of her administration in general.

Luzon Surety insists that the bond in question was executed in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and
that the proper procedure is to enforce it in the administration proceedings were it was filed, not in a separate
civil action.

Issue: May the enforcement of an administrator’s bond be litigated in an ordinary civil action?

Ruling:

Yes. Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, the bond is expressly for the benefit of
the heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of the deceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why
a creditor may not directly in his name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.

LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. vs. PASTOR T. QUEBRAR and FRANCISCO KILAYKO,
G.R. No. L-40517, January 31, 1984

Facts:

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Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of Pastor T.
Quebrar, as administrator in two special proceedings for the administration of two separate estates. In
consideration of the suretyship wherein Luzon Surety Company, Inc. was bound jointly and severally with
Pastor T. Quebrar, the latter, together with Francisco Kilayko, executed two indemnity agreements, where
among other things, they agreed jointly and severally to pay the Luzon Surety "the sum of Three Hundred
Pesos (P300.00) in advance as premium thereof for every 12 months”.

For the first year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955, the Quebrar abd Kilayko paid the premiums under
each indemnity agreement. However, they failed to pay the premiums for the succeeding years.

In October 1962, the Quebrar and Kilayko filed a motion for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's
bonds on the ground that "the heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares".
The Court of First Instance ordered the cancellation of the bonds.

Luzon Surety is now demanding the unpaid premiums for the two bonds from August 1955 to their
cancellation in October 1962.

Issue: Were the administrator's bonds in force and effect from and after the year that they were filed and
approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled?

Ruling:

Yes. Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the administrator's
bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of
the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is
called upon to perform in the course of administration, it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to
respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship.

The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the term
covered by the bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been closed
and terminated in the manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the
estate, the bond contemplates a continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the
Quebrar and Kilayko.

RULE 82 REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, RESIGNATION, AND REMOVAL

OF EXECUTORS OR ADMINISTRATORS

BORROMEO vs. BORROMEO, G.R. No. L-6363, September 15, 1955

Facts: Dr. Maximo Borromeo, a resident of Cebu City, died without ascendants or descendants, but leaving his widow
Johanna Hofer Borromeo, and a will wherein he designated the Borromeo Bros. Estate Inc., a corporationentirely
17 | P a g e
owned by his brothers and sisters. The court of first instance of that province probated the will and granted letters
testamentary to Canuto O. Borromeo, Maximo’s borther and named executor in the will. Thereafter, the widow
submitted a motion to the court, praying for the removal of the executor on the grounds of negligence in the
performance of his duties and unfitness to continue discharging the powers of the office. When the court postponed
the hearing on the said motion, the executor withdrew cash from the deceased’s bank account, without authority of the
court, and deposited the money in the joint account of the executor and Exequiel, another brother of the deceased.

In time the petition was heard, the Judge, for several reasons, one of them the above withdrawal of funds,
decreed the removal of the executor. On motion for reconsideration the executor's attorney prayed that the
order be revoked or that at least, the executor be permitted to resign. His Honor then modified his order in
the sense that said executor was "relieved of (instead of removed from) his commitments as such executor".
Notwithstanding such modification, the executor appealed, contending that the modified order should be
revoked.

Issue: Should the executor be removed?

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that there were sufficient grounds for the removal of the executor, considering
the withdrawals made by the executor from the deceased’s bank account without the authority of the court.
Also, the executor omitted to include, as income of the estate, the sum of P6,000 which he had received
from Hacienda Plaridel of the decedent. Third, the executor claimed as his own certain shares of the
Interisland Gas Service, in the name of Maximo Borromeo, asserting that Maximo is his dummy. Conflict
between the interest of the executor and the interest of the deceased is ground for removal or resignation of
the former, who was thereby become insuitable to discharge the trust.

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

GR 187879, July 5, 2010

Facts: Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate, left several properties to their children, namely,
Leonardo, Renato, and Erlinda. However when Leonardo died, Leonardo’s heirs (Dalisay and children)
alleged that Renato and Erlinda took possession of their inherited properties in their exclusion.

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Renato and Erlinda prayed before RTC to be appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of
Vicenete and Maxima, being the next of kin, be exempt from posting Administrator’s bond. Leoanrdo’s
heirs (Dalisay) opposed and claimed that such appointment would further cause injustice to them.

RTC: appoint Renato and Erlinda, as the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima

Leoanardo’s heirs (Dalisay) at first did not contest RTC’s decision of appointment; but later on, they
contended that Renato and Erlina had been resorting to the mode of special administration merely to delay
and prolong their deprivation of what was due them. Thus, Dalisay filed motion to terminate such
appointment.

RTC: granted Dalisay’s motion, for the failure of Renato to post a bond
CA: ruled that RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking Renato and Erlinda’s appointment as joint
special administrators

Issue: WON RTC, as the probate court, gravely abused its discretion in revoking such appointment.

Held:
The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion as the removal of appointment was grounded on reason, equity,
justice, and legal principle.

It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove
special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion, such that
the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the application of the order of
preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not
obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice,
and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removal of special
administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

While the RTC considered that Renato and Erlinda were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their
appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment.

RULE 83: Inventory and Appraisal, Provision for support of Family

Period

Benjamina Sebial (Benjamina) vs. Roberta Sebial (Roberta)

GR No.L-23419. June 27, 1975.

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Facts: Gelacio Sebial died. he had 3 children with this 1st wife Leoncia (Roberta's mother) and 6 other
children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother).

Bejamina filed for the settlement of her father's estate and her appointment as administratrix. This petition
was opposed by Roberta on the ground that said estate had already been apportioned and that she should be
the one appointed as administratrix, not Benjamina. The Court appointed Benjamina and found that alleged
partition was invalid and ineffective.

So the letters of administration and a notice to the creditors were issued on the same date. Roberta moved
motion for reconsideration but it was denied. For the possibility of an amicable settlement, the court ordered
both sides to give a complete list of the properties of the decedent with segregation for each marriage.

Six months from the appointment, lower court approved the administratrix’s second inventory. Roberta
opposed, alleging as ground that the court has no jurisdiction to approve the inventory as it was files beyond
the 3-month period.

CA: certified the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the court lose jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months after the
appointment

Held: NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-month period is not
mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper court and the
publication of the notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and
retains such until the probate proceedings is closed.

Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after the three-month period, this delay will not deprive the
probate court of its jurisdiction to approve it. However, under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court,
such unexplained delay can be a ground for an administrator's removal.

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Provisional Inclusion in Inventory

Teresa Garcia (Teresa) vs. Luisa Garcia (Luisa)

GR No. 45430. April 15, 1939

Facts: Luisa was appointed special administratrix of the properties left by the deceased Paulina Garcia. Luisa
filed with the competent court an inventory. However, the heir Teresa objected to said inventory and ask to
be the appointed special administratix of the instestate for the sole purpose of bringing any actions which
she may believe necessary to recover for the benefit of the intestate the properties and credits set out in her
motion, as well as other properties which might be discovered from time to time belonging to the said
intestate.

CFI-Manila: Denied Teresa’s motion

Issue: WON a court has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon the exceptions which an heir takes to an inventory
of the properties

Held:Yes. A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to
determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the
deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right
of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the
right or credit.

In the case at bar, the lower court had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of the heir Teresa Garcia to the
inventory filed by the special administratrix Luisa Garcia, as well as the observations made by the former as
to certain properties and credits, and to determine for purposes of the-inventory alone if they should be
included therein or excluded therefrom

Additional Explanation
Morever, The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of
the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said
power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator. In compliance with this
duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased
should be included in or excluded from the inventory.

Francisco Cuizon et al. (Francisco) vs. Hon. Jose R. Ramolete

21 | P a g e
GR No. L-51291. May 29, 1984.

Facts:
Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land. Later on, he distributed his property
involving the salt beds between his two daughters, Rufina and Irene. Meanwhile, Irene executed a registered
Deed of Sale involving the said salt beds in favor of Franciso, her nephew/ Rufina’s son.

A decree of registration and the corresponding O.C.T. was issued in the name of Marciano. In that same
year, T.C.T covering the property in question was issued to Irene. The latter died.

Domingo Antigua, the appointed administrator of Irene’s estate, included the salt bed in the inventory and
asked the court to order Francisco to deliver the salt to him.

CFI-Cebu: granted the same.

The thrust of Francisco’s argument is that the respondent court, as a court handling only the intestate
proceedings to divest them of their possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the
same to the administrator. However, Domingo contended that failure to Francisco to apply relief in court
was a fatal defect. In addition, the administrator stated that the deed of sale of lost its efficacy upon the
rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree in favor of Irene.

Issue: WON a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued in favor
owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said parcels of have been included in the
inventory

Held:No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All said court could do is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is
dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was sold seven years
before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the
proceedings.

In Bolisay vs. Alcid, the Court held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action.”

Here, the property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name of third parties, the respondent
court should have denied the motion of Domingo and excluded the property in question from the inventory
of the property of the estate.

Guinguing v Abuton and Abuton

GR No. 23035, October 13, 1925
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Facts: Testator Ignacio Abuton had children with his first wife-Dionisia Olarte. He married a second time after the
death of the first wife. When he died, he left behind his second wife- Teodora Guinguing and their four children. His
will was probated and the administrator submitted to the court an inventory of the properties belonging to the deceased
at the time of his death. In this inventory, he included only the lands which the testator had devised to the children of
the second marriage, omitting other lands possessed by him at the time of his death and which were claimed by the
children of the first marriage as having been derived from their mother. Teodora filed a motion to ask the
administrator to include in the inventory the conjugal properties of Ignacio’s first marriage. To this, two Abuton
children opposed.

The trial court found that upon the death of his first wife, Ignacio liquidated the conjugal estate and divided among the
first set of children the property pertaining to this first wife in the conjugal division, with the exception of the house
and lot where he lived until his death. The share pertaining to the testator in said division was, the court found,
retained in his own hands; and this property constituted the proper subject matter of the present administration
proceedings. No property was acquired by testator during his second marriage. Accordingly, the court ordered the
administrator to include in the inventory of the estate of Ignacio all of the property the testator possessed at the time of
his death. The Abuton children appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the court was correct in ordering the inclusion of all the properties possessed by testator at the
time of death

Held: Yes. The Court explained that the improper inclusion of property or improper omission of property in the
inventory is not absolutely decisive of the rights of persons in interest.

It was not error for the trial court to look to the will to determine prima facie whether a certain piece of property
should or should not be included in the inventory, without prejudice of course to any person who may have an adverse
title to dispute the point of ownership.

The property in question, the house and lot in possession of Ignacio, was in the name of his first wife. This is the
reason why her heirs content that it belonged exclusively to her and not to the conjugal property of the first marriage.
This conclusion is erroneous. There is nothing to show that the land covered by a title in the name of the first
wife was not acquired by the spouses during their marriage, and the circumstance that the title was taken in
the name of the wife does not defeat its presumed character as conjugal property. Therefore, in liquidating
the conjugal property of the first marriage it was within the power of the surviving husband "to assign other
property to the first set of children as their participation in the estate of their mother and to retain in his own
hands the property for which a composition title had been issued in the name of the wife.

It should be pointed out as well that the inclusion of a property in the inventory does not deprive the occupant of
possession; and if it is finally determined that the property has been properly included in the estate, the occupant heir
is liable for the fruits and interest only from the date when the succession was opened. The provisions of the Civil
Code with reference to collation clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with respect to the obligation to
collate may be determined in the course of the administration proceedings, without necessity of the institution of a
separate action.

RULE 84 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS

Powers

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Wilson v Rear
GR No. 31860, Oct. 16, 1930

Facts: In November 1925, Wilson qualified as special administrator of Charles Rear’s estate – a whole plantation
consisting of public land. The commissioners filed an inventory and report and appraised the property of the estate at
P20,800 (Real property at P15,000 and personal property at P5,800). Actual debts of the deceased at the time of death
was only at P1,655.54.

Wilson never filed any report or account as special administrator until in 1927. In January 1927, the commissioners
filed their claims against the estate. Because the administrator did not have funds to pay the claims, the court orders
Wilson to sell properties of the estate. In October 1927, the court approved the sale of all the real properties of the
estate, which was sold at P7,600. Personal property (livestock) were also sold at P1,919.25. Total proceeds from the
sale of properties was therefore P9,519. When Wilson filed his final account in June 1928, he reported total
disbursements of P11,328, thus leaving a deficit of P1,809. The court approved this final account, but the heirs of
Rear opposed, claiming that Wilson as administrator has been imprudent and has committed waste in his
administration.

Issue: Whether Wilson has been prudent in his administration of the estate

Held: No. The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in the administration of an
estate, but it does impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. In the
instant case, there were no complications of any kind and in the usual and ordinary course of business, the
administrator should have wound up and settled the estate within eight months from the date of his
appointment.

If he had done so, total claims against the estate (debts, taxes, court expenses) were only around P3,422. He
could have sold the personal property valued at P5,800, get a positive balance of P2,378, which he could
give to the heirs, along with the entire value of the real property of P15,000.

Instead of doing that, and without any order, process or authority of the court, the administrator, as appears
from his amended final account, continued the operation of the plantation and the employment of a manager
and a large number of men. This increased labor expenses, the net result of which was that all of the
property of the estate was consumed, lost or destroyed, leaving a deficit against the estate of P1,809.

Wilson does not appear to have committed fraud. But even so, he was appointed and qualified as
administrator, and the law imposed upon him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the
estate in a business-like manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate without any unreasonable or
unnecessary delay. He was not appointed to act for or on behalf of the creditors,
or to represent the interests of the, heirs only. He should have administered the affairs of the estate for the
use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent business man would handle his own personal
business. When appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator to administer, settle, and close the
administration in the ordinary course of business, without any unnecessary delay. Neither does an
administrator, in particular, without a specific showing or an order of the court, have any legal right to
continue the operation of the business in which the deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets
of the estate in the payment of operating expenses.

San Diego v Nombre

GR L-19265, May 29, 1964

Facts: Nombre was appointed administrator of an estate. During the period of administration and without leave of
court, he leased a fishpond, which was part of the estate, to a certain Escanlar for a period of three years. By court
24 | P a g e
order, however, Nombre was removed as administrator and was replaced by Campillanos. His removal from
administration was appealed by Nombre.

In the mean time, Campillanos sought court approval to lease the same fishpond to San Diego at better lease terms.
Nombre presented a written opposition to Campillanos’ motion, since the lease contract of Escanlar was still
subsisting and he has not been informed of the motion to lease the same fishpond to another person. The trial court
declared that the lease contract entered into by Nombre and Escanlar was null and void for want of judicial authority.

Issue: (1) Whether a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate without prior judicial
authority and approval

(2) Whether the provisions of the New Civil Code on Agency should apply to judicial administration

Held: (1) Yes. The Court sustained the ruling of the CA, which held that Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court
authorizes a judicial administrator, among other things, to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed
of by will. Under this provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate of
the deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of
administration without special authority of the Court. For instance, he may lease the property without
securing previously any permission from the court And where the lease has formally been entered into, the
court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it
had no jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul
the lease.

Lease has been considered an act of administration.

(2) No. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the representative of said Court,
but also the heirs and creditors of the estate. A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is
required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to
his principal. The protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent,
stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial
administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.

Conflict of Interest

Jaroda v Cusi, Jr.

GR L-28214, July 30, 1969

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Facts: On 26 April 1965, respondent Tan was appointed special administrator over the estate of Carlos Villa
Abrille, whose estate included co-ownership over Juna Subdivision. On 4 May 1965, Tan filed an ex parte
petition for the withdrawal of the sums of money from the Philippine National Bank, which sums were not
listed in his petition for administration as among the properties left by the deceased, alleging that these sums
were deposited in the name of the deceased but that they actually belong to, and were held in trust for, the
co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The alleged co-owners of the subdivision concurred in the petition, but
not the heirs of the deceased. The court granted the petition. On 7 May 1965, special administrator Tan
executed, together with the other co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, a power of attorney appointing himself
as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon terms and conditions as he deems wise" the lots in the
subdivision. This was also granted by the court.

Petitioner Jaroda filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. She alleged that Tan has sold and
continues to sell the subdivision lots on the strength of the respondent court's order, to her irreparable
prejudice and that of the other heirs.

Issue: Whether Tan had acted in the interest of the estate he administered

Held: No. The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore, belong prima facie to his
estate after his death. And until the contrary is shown by proper evidence at the proper stage, when money
claims may be filed in the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is without power to make the
waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other
persons on the ground that the -estate is not the owner thereof. If even to sell for valuable consideration
property of the estate requires prior written notice of the application to the heirs. legatees, or devisees under
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable for disposing gratuitously of
assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such notice was given, and without it, the court's
authority is invalid and improper.

It has been broadly stated that an administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any
transaction concerning trust property. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraud and
maladministration, and once the harm is done, it might be too late to correct it. A concrete example would
be for administrator Tan to authorize agent Tan to sell a lot for P50, with the condition that if he can sell it
for more he could keep the difference; agent Tan sells the lot for P150.00; he retains P100.00 and deposits in
the bank P50.00 "in the name of Antonio V. A. Tan, in trust for Juna Subdivision”; thus, administrator Tan's
accounting to the estate for the sale of the lot for P50 would
be in order, but the estate would have been actually cheated of the sum of P100, which went to agent Tan in
his, individual capacity.
---The court below also failed to notice that, as alleged in the administrator's petition after the death of
Carlos Villa Abrille, the administrator Tan, in his personal capacity, had replaced said deceased as manager
of the Juna Subdivision by authority of the other co-owners. By the court's questioned order of 3 September
1965 empowering him to represent the interest of the deceased in the management of the subdivision, the
administrator Tan came to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two different principals: the court and the heirs
of the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other, in managing
and disposing of the lots of the subdivision. This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable
of independent defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly
undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with property under his
administration, should have to look to the wishes of strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed
him. A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no
one else.

Mananquil v. Villegas
A.M. No. 2430 30 August 1990

Facts:

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Mauro Mananquil, the appointed administrator of the Estate of Felix Leong, filed a disbarment case against
Atty. Crisostomo Villegas for gross misconduct or malpractice while the latter was counsel of record for
Leong. Leong was the administrator for the testate estate of Felomina Zerna.
In 1963, Leong, as administrator of Zerna’s estate, entered into a lease contract with the partnership of Hijos
de Villegas over several lots included in Zerna’s estate. Atty. Villegas was both a counsel of Leong and a
partner in the partnership of Hijos de Villegas. The said lease contract was renewed several times
Mananquil alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms and conditions and that Atty.
Villegas should have first notified and secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the
contracts were renewed; Atty. Villegas being counsel of that estate’s administrator.

Issue:Whether Villegas should have first secured the probate court’s approval regarding the lease.

Ruling: No. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or
administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may,
therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the
estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts
involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval.

Thus, considering that administrator Leong was not required under the law and prevailing jurisprudence to
seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, Atty.
Villegas, as counsel of Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various
lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.

RULE 85 ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND

ADMINISTRATORS

Joson v. Joson
G.R. No. L-9686 30 May 1961

Facts:

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Tomas Joson died on 05 July 1945. He married three times and was survived by 9 heirs. Upon his death, his
will was presented to the CFI by his son, Felicisimo Joson, for probate. In August 1945, said will having
been duly probated, Felicisimo was appointed administrator of the estate. Felicisimo filed his accounts for
the years 1945-1946, 1946-1947 and 1947-1948 all of which were never approved by the court. Eduardo
Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the accounts filed by the administrator alleging that the
administrator diminished the shares of the heirs in the yearly produce of the properties and had padded his
expenses of administration. The same heir filed another motion praying the court to order Felicisimo to post
a bond because in his accounts from 1947 to 1953 there was a big difference which Felcisimo should
account for to the heirs. The administrator submitted an amended statement of accounts for the same years
which were objected by two more heirs on the ground that the administrator had reported for the years 1947-
1952 an income short of what was actually received and expenses much bigger than those actually incurred
by him.

In the meantime, the heirs were able to compromise their differences and entered into an extrajudicial
settlement and partition of the entire estate. But, as the court was never informed of this extrajudicial
settlement either by the administrator or by the heirs, it issued an order requiring the administrator to file an
accounting of his administration from 1949 to 1954, which the administrator complied with.

However, without said accounts having been heard or approved, the administrator filed a motion to declare
the proceeding closed and terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such. Eduardo filed an opposition to
said motion but, after hearing, the court issued on order declaring the proceedings terminated and relieving
the administrator not only of his duties as such but also of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs’ opposition
to said accounts.

Issues:

1. Whether the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his administration is a mere incident
which can be avoided once the estate has been settled?
2. Whether the proceedings are deemed terminated by the mere execution of an extrajudicial partition
of the estate without the necessity of having the accounts of the administrator heard and approved by
the court
3. Whether the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of proving his account from the moment
said partition has been executed

Ruling:

No, the duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding
which can be waived or disregarded when the same is terminated It is a duty that has to be performed and
duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and terminated. Here
Felicisicimo has submitted his accounts for several years not only motu proprio but upon requirement of the
court, to which accounts the heirs have seasonably submitted their opposition. And when Felicisimo moved
the court to close the proceedings and relieve him of his administration and of his accounts, the heirs who
objected thereto objected likewise to the closing of the proceedings invoking their right to be heard but the
court ignored their opposition and granted the motion setting forth as reasons therefore what we quoted in
the early part of this decision. Verily, the trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so it
disregarded the express provisions of our rules relative to the settlement of accounts of a judicial
administrator.

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No. The fact that all the heirs of the estate have entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition in order
to put an end to their differences cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of the objections of the heirs
to the accounts submitted by Felicisimo not only because to so hold would be a derogation of the pertinent
provisions of our rules but also because there is nothing provided in said partition that the aforesaid accounts
shall be deemed waived or condoned. While the attitude of the heirs in concluding said extrajudicial
settlement is plausible and has contributed to the early settlement of the estate, the same cannot however be
considered as a release of the obligation of Felicisimo to prove his accounts. This is more so when,
according to the oppositors, the administrator has committed in his accounts a shortage which certainly
cannot just be brushed aside by a mere technicality.

Tumang vs. Laguio

G.R. No. L-50277 14 February 1980

Facts:

In a special proceeding involving the estate of the late Dominador Tumang, his wife, Magdalena, who is also
the adminstratrix and executrix of the will, filed a petition to declare the testate proceedings definitely
terminated and closed with respect to her and her two children, Melba and Nestor. The petition was

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premised on the claim that the said heirs have already received the properties adjudicated to them and that to
be able to transfer the said properties in their names, there should be an order from the court declaring that
the testate proceedings closed with regard to the said heirs. The petition was opposed by Guia Laguio,
another child of Magdalena, on the ground that not all the properties adjudicated to them has been delivered
and that there could not be a partial termination of the proceedings. Magdalena withdrew the petition and
during the hearing of the motion, filed a pleading captioned "Compliance", alleging that the estate and
inheritance taxes had been fully paid; that no claim has been presented that has not already delivered all the
properties and dividends of the shares of stock adjudicated to her and her minor children since the approval
of the original and amendatory projects of partition; and that with such admission, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to entertain the motion under consideration.

Issue:

Whether the court should have required the administratrix to render an accounting of the cash and stock
dividends received after the approval of her final accounting.

Whether the acceptance of the cash dividends by an heir constituted a waiver to demand such accounting.

Ruling:

Yes. The executor/administrator should account for his receipts and disbursements subsequent to his last
accounting. Section 8, Rule 85 provides that the "executor or administrator shall render an account of his
administration within 1 year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration…, and he
shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."

In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view of the fact that the
dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the final accounts rendered by the executrix. It
appears that the interests of all the parties will be better served and the conflict between petitioners and
respondent will be resolved if such additional accounting is made. Further, "it has been held that an executor
or administrator who receives assets of the estate after he has filed on account should file a supplementary
account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect to matters occurring after the
settlement of final account that representatives will be compelled to file supplementary account."

No, the acceptance does not constitute a waiver. The duty of an executor or administrator to render an
account is not a mere incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It is a
duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered
closed and terminated, to the end that no part of the decedent's estate be left unaccounted for. The fact that
the final accounts had been approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to require supplemental
accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the Rules provide that "he shall render such further
accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled."

Charges and Expenses of the Administrator

Rodriguez and Laurente v. Silva

G.R. No. L-4090 31 January 1952

Facts:

Judge Rafael Amparo ordered the cancellation of the bond of Pablo M. Silva who had resigned as joint
administrator of the intestate estate of Honofre Leyson, and allowed the same P600.00 as compensation for

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his services. Victorio Rodriguez and Margarita Leyson Laurente are the remaining administrator and an heir
of the deceased, appealed the said order.

Issue:

Whether the court may fix an administrator's or executor's fee in excess of the fees prescribed by Section 7
of Rule 86.

Ruling:

Yes. It will be seen from Section 7, Rule 86 that a greater sum may be allowed "in any special case, where
the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree
of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator." And so it has been held that "the amount of an
executor's fee allowed by the CFI in any special case under the provisions of Section 680 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on
appeal, except for an abuse of discretion (Rosenstock v. Elser)."

The fact that the Silva, an attorney-at-law, has served the estate in good stead, ought not be lost sight of.
Although being a lawyer is by itself not a factor in the assessment of an administrator's fee, it should be
otherwise, as in this case the administrator was able to stop what appeared to be an improvident
disbursement of a substantial amount without having to employ outside legal help at an additional expense
to estate.

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