US v.

Valdez

A neighbor notified Mrs. Lewis of the smoke coming out of their house. Mrs. Lewis sent her servant
Banal to look for said fire. Banal went to the Mezzanine and found Valdes cleaning and a rug soaked
with kerosine burning.

Valdes along side his co servant and friend, Labarro were arrested on the same day and were brought to
the police station where Valdes admitted before several policemen that it was he who set fire to the rag
and he also set several fires around the house as he was induced by Labarro with the promise to pay him
1 peso per fire started.

In his affidavit however, Valdes denied setting fire to the kerosine doused rag and blamed Banal for the
incident. While being arraigned he stated that what he set fire was a pile of leaves, both of which are
contrary to his statement in the police station.

Issue: Was the crime consummated?

Ruling: NO.

The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the
acts conducive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent
of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed
cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason
that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the
rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near the partition of the entresol, the partition might
have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

Valenzuela v People

Valenzuela and Calderon were caught by a security guard (Lago) stealing TIDE DETERGENT
along SM Department Store. Their modus was that Valenzuela, wearing a Receiving Dispatch
Unit ID, went inside the store and loaded cases of Tide in a push cart, and then brought the same
to the parking lot where Calderon was waiting. Subsequently, they hailed a Taxi Cab and loaded
their stolen detergent. Lago, seeing these acts from the beginning stopped the taxi and asked
Valenzuela and Calderon for receipts, as they were not able to produce the same, they were
detained in the SM Security office and was later transferred to PNP-QC Police station.

ANG ILANG GIKAWAT: 4 cases of Tide Ultramatic, 1 case of Ultra 25 grams, and 3
additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00

In his defense, Valenzuela argues that he should be only liable for frustrated theft since at the
time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles
stolen based on cases decided by the Court of Appeals (which were not affirmed by the SC).

RULING: Theft can only be either attempted or consummated but never frustrated. Court delved
deep into the history of theft, but ultimately ruled that it is the legislature, as representatives of
the people who determines what acts constitute a crime. Any judicial interpretation of a crime
should be aligned with the intent of the legislature.

In the case at bar, under the elements of theft as defined by the legislature under Article 308 of
the RPC, theft is committed when the following elements are present:  

(1) that there be taking of personal property;

(2) that said property belongs to another;

(3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;

 (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and

(5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things

A close perusal of said legislative definition, it is clear that the ability to dispose the thing stolen
is not an element of theft. Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to
its taking by one with intent to gain. Hence, the ability to dispose is immaterial in the case of
theft, because once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to
freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already
ensued from such acts of execution. 

If the court adopts the logic that the inability to freely dispose of the stolen property would
effectively result in frustrated theft, it would only serve as a loophole or a convenient defense
and would, in turn, result in the derogation of legislative intent.

Canceran v. People

Canceran, Vequizo, and Diaz, Jr. was charged with Frustrated Theft. The information alleged
that they stole 14 cartons of Pond’s White Beauty Cream valued at P28,627.20 but they were
discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center (Ororama) who prevented them from
further carrying away said 14 cartons.

Canceran denied having done the same and stated that as he was going out to buy medicine for his wife,
he was approached by an unnamed man and asked him to pay for the items in his cart, and that he did
so as he was guilt-ridden for not doing so. He also alleged that an earlier Information for theft was
already filed which was eventually dismissed. A second Information was filed for the same offense over
the same incident and became the subject of the present case.

RTC found Canceran guilty of consummated theft citing Valenzuela v. People that there is no crime of
Frustrated Theft.

In the CA, Canceran raised the issue of double jeopardy. The CA held that there could be no double
jeopardy because he never entered a valid plea and so the first jeopardy never attached.
In the SC, Canceran argues that there was already double jeopardy as the first criminal case for
theft was already dismissed and yet he was convicted in the second case. He also argues that
there was no taking of the Pond’s cream considering that “the information in Criminal Case
admits the act of the petitioner did not produce the crime of theft.” Thus, absent the element of
taking, the felony of theft was never proved.

ISSUE: Should Canceran be acquitted in the crime of consummated theft as it was not charged in the
information?

RULING: No. A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was
charged with “Frustrated Theft” only.

There is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge
Canceran of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was
never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was
being charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be
convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.

An accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the
complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of
any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or
necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed  as to the nature of the offense
with which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher
than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an
unauthorized denial of that right.

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its
attempted stage. In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the
crime of consummated Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of
the overwhelming evidence to convict him for consummated Theft, because the
Information did not charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the
same would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations
against him, as he so protests.

There being an uncertainty, the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the accused,
Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed that the charge against him was
consummated theft.

Edenetino v. People

Leyble, magno and Maldecir were on their way home when Edentino appeared and shot Leyble with a
12 inch shotgun.

 Sonza in her capacity as  the officer in-charge of the security of all the medical records of the
patientsbrought the medical records of Leyble to court.
Edentinos alibi was that he was in another house, 1 kilometer away from the scene of the crime
and that the criminal complaint was precipitated by a pending Comelec gun-ban case filed
17

against Leyble, wherein petitioner was the witness.

RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide. It ruled that
petitioner was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crime charged against him, especially so,
when the complainant, Leyble, was alive to tell what actually happened

The CA ruled that "the trial court did not err in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Evaluation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed
that Leyble succinctly but clearly narrated how he was shot and he also categorically identified
petitioner as his assailant."

The CA also rejected petitioner's claim that Leyble filed the case against him because he testified
against the latter in the Comelec gun-ban case. Moreover, considering that Leyble had positively
identified [petitioner], whom he [knew] from childhood, as his assailant, motive [was] no longer
essential or relevant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of frustrated homicide?

RULING: NO. Only serious physical injuries since intent to kill is lacking, but wounds
shown to have been inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not frustrated or attempted
homicide but physical injuries only.

the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide
depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a
case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or
attempted homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s
sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or
slight physical injury

Thus, in order to determine whether the crime committed is attempted or frustrated parricide, murder
or homicide, or only lesiones (physical injuries), the crucial points to consider are: a) whether the injury
sustained by the victim was fatal, and b) whether there was intent to kill on the part of the accused

No proof of the extent of injury sustained by the victim

we find that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would have died from
his wound without timely medical assistance, hence, such doubt should be resolverd in favor of the
accused.

The intent to kill was not sufficiently established

"The assailant's intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from
the crime of homicide. The crime can only be homicide if the intent to kill is proven. The intent to kill
must be proven "in a clear and evident manner [so as] to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal intent of the aggressor

It is to be noted, likewise, that petitioner only fired a single shot at close-range, but did not hit any vital
45 46

part of the victims body- the victim's wounds, based on his Medical Certificate, were located at the right
deltoid and the left shoulder - and he immediately fled the scene right after the shooting. These acts
47 48

certainly do not suggest that petitioner had intended to kill the victim; for if he did, he could have fired
multiple shots to ensure the latter's demise.

People v. Aca-ac

Decoroso Aca-ac y Cespon, 57 years old at the time of the alleged rape incidents, denied the
charges and claimed that Felipa Aca-ac had instigated complainant to file the charges because he
told Felipa's husband that Felipa was having an affair with another man. He said the charges
were trumped up by Felipa because she wanted to extort P30,000.00 from him. He also stated
that he had a quarrel with Felipa's husband, Roberto, because the latter had stolen his chicken. 

Significantly, prosecution witness Dr. Stella Maris J. Amora, testified that there was no
laceration in the hymen of complainant. She said, however, that it was possible that there could
be a penetration of a male organ up to the labia minora and the hymen would still be intact.

Furthermore, accused-appellant alleged that at 57, he was already old and that he could no longer
have an erection.

The trial court ruled that only frustrated rape was committed while the Court of Appeals held that
accused-appellant was guilty of consummated rape and accordingly sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the accused was only guilty of frustrated rape.

the trial court relied on the findings of Dr. Amora which showed that complainant did not have any
lacerations in her hymen which in fact was intact. The trial court pointed out that there was no evidence
of penetration into the vagina of complainant. This is error. As this Court explained in People v. Orita,
rape is either attempted or consummated.

 since the entry of the male organ into the labia of the female organ alone is sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. For that matter, the mere touching of the labia or pudendum by the
male organ is enough to consummate the crime of rape. 
the fact that there was no laceration of complainant's private parts or that her hymen was intact,
as testified to by Dr. Amora, does not preclude a finding of rape against accused-appellant. It
bears emphasis that a broken hymen or laceration of any part of the female genital is not a pre-
requisite for a conviction for rape.

Accused-appellant's claim that it was impossible for him, then 57 years old, to commit the crime
of rape because he could no longer have an erection is self-serving. Age is not the criterion in
determining sexual interest and potency.

People v. Comadre

Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were
3

having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Barangay Councilman
Jaime Agbanlog.

Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on,
Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace
The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the
house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio
were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.

Antonio Comadre claimed that on that night, he was with his wife and children watching
television in the house of his father, Patricio, and his brother, Rogelio.

Danilo Lozano similarly denied any complicity in the crime. He declared that he was at home
with his ten year-old son.
Main issue: Did the accused conspire in committing the felony?

RULING: NO. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of
throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on
without uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him.

the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to
establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of
an illegal act is required.

The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any
participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere
presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are
insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in
furtherance of the crime.

Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral
assistance to his criminal act.