I.

a. Under Article 523 of the Civil Code, possession is defined as the holding
of a thing or the enjoyment of a right while occupation is a mode of acquiring
ownership under Article 712 of the Civil Code and it is effected through: (1)
Hunting and fishing; (2) Finding hidden treasures; (3) Finding of abandoned
movables and (4) Finding movables which never had an owner.

b. Easement may be constituted only on an immovable by nature while

usufruct may be constituted on either movable or immovable property; Easement
may not be extinguished by the death of the dominant owner while usufruct may be
extinguished by the death of usufructuary; Easement is non-possessory right over
an immovable whereas usufruct involves a right of possession over an immovable;
and Easement is limited to particular of specific use of servient estate whereas
usufruct includes all the uses and the fruits of the property.

c. Under Article 453 (1) of the Civil Code, if both parties are in bad faith,
they shall be treated as if they are both in good faith. The builder in bad faith has
the limited right of removal, this right can only be resorted if no injury is inflicted
on the work constructed and right to reimbursement for the value of materials.

II.

Marciano is correct.

According to Article 456 of the Civil Code, it is provided that, to the owners
of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

In the case at bar, considering that accretion was deposited on Marciano’s

land by the natural occurrence in the waters of the river and the latter did not
erect nor construct any structure for purposes of increasing the deposition of soil
and silt, Marciano automatically owns the accretion. Moreover, the occupancy of
Ulpiano and his children to the three (3) hectare unregistered land owned by
Marciano are undoubtedly possession not in the concept of an owner but that of a
concept of a holder taking into the consideration the fact that the same are
tenants of the said land based on the foregoing facts. Hence, their possession for
more than 30 years is of no moment since the law requires possession thereof in
the concept of an owner. Payment of taxes and tax declaration are not sufficient
to make their possession one in the concept of owner.

III.

Cathy can validly demand for the demolition of Bobby's house.

According to the Civil Code, it is provided that none of the co-owners shall,
without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common,
even though benefits for all would results therefrom.

In the case at bar, considering the fact that the construction of the house by
Bobby was done without the consent of his siblings, the alteration effected is
illegal. Because of this, Bobby is considered to be in bad faith and as a sanction for
his conduct, he can be compelled by Cathy to demolish or remove the said house at
his own expense. In the same view, Bobby cannot legally insist on purchasing the
land since he is in bad faith, he will not be given the option to pay for the price of
the lot as mentioned in Article 450 of Civil Code.

IV.

No. Anthony did not yet acquire ownership of the property.

According to Article 526 (1) of the Civil Code, it is provided that, he is

deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. In the same view, it is also
provided under Article 1134 of the said law that ownership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession
of ten years. The possession hereof shall be that of an owner and strictly should
be in good faith.

In the case at bar, Anthony is a possessor in good faith since he was not
aware of the defect in Bert's title and because of that Anthony may acquire
ownership and other real rights over the said property through open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of 10 years. However, Anthony still needs seven
more years of possession to add to his three years of possession in good faith in
order to acquire ownership of the property by acquisitive possession.

Hence, Anthony did not yet acquire the subject property since his
possession thereof is only for three years and it was not shown that he sought the
recording of such sale to the Registry of Property.

V.

a. Only Jenny can claim ownership over the additional one meter of land
deposited along her property.

According to Article 457 of the Civil Code, it is provided that, to the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the water.

In the case at bar, it was shown that Jessica constructed a concrete barrier
about 2 meters from here property line for purposes of extending the same,
however, Jenny did not do the same thing.

Hence, Jessica cannot legally claim ownership of the additional 2 meters of land
along her property because she constructed a concrete barrier about 2 meters
from her property causing deposits of soil and other materials when the water
recedes. The increase in her property was not caused by nature but was man-made.
b. If the properties of Jessica and Jenny are registered properties, the
benefit of such registration does not extend to the increased area of their
properties. It is well-established by the Court that accretion does not
automatically become registered land as there must be a separate application for
the same due to the technicalities in the description of the lot.

VI.

a. Don did not acquire an easement of right of way.

 According to the Civil Code, easement cannot be claimed by prescription if the
said easement is a discontinuous one. An example of which is a legal easement of a
right of way. Only continuous and apparent easements can be acquired by
prescription of 10 years of uninterrupted use and enjoyment.

In the case at bar, the easement involved is a right of way which is

characterized by law as a discontinuous easement. Don’s passage thereto was by
mere acquiescence or tolerance of Ernie.

Concomitant to the said provision, Don cannot claim to have acquired the
easement of right of way by prescription, because this easement is discontinous
although apparent.

b. Considering that there is no right of way existing to the land owned by Don,
Don may validly blocked the pathway and refuse to let his buyers pass through the
his land.
However, the lot buyers may request Don to establish a right of way as
voluntary easement by entering into a contract with him, or file action to
constitute a legal easement by proving compliance with the four requisites for
creating a legal easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code.

VII.

Yes. A can abate extra-judicially the squatter’s hut on the ground that it is a
nuisance.
According to the Supreme Court, a squatter’s hut, being an illegal construction
constitutes a public nuisance per se, if it poses problems of health and sanitation
and if the squatter’s hut is built on a private land and hinders or impairs the
owner’s use of his or her own property, then it would constitute a private nuisance.

Moreover, according to Article 705 of the Civil Code, one of the remedies
against a private nuisance is abatement, without judicial proceedings and that in
Article 706 of the same Code, it tells that any person injured by a private nuisance
may abate it by removing, or if necessary by destroying the thing which
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing
unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extra-
judicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.

VIII.

a. As a lawyer of Jose, I will ask my client if he can settle the issues extra-
judicially considering the provisions under Article 448 of the Civil Code. If
nothing happen, i will request the barangay council which has jurisdiction over
Mike and Jose to conduct a barangay conciliation and mediation proceedings
over the issues involved in the case at bar. If no settlement was attained, in
the interest of my client, i will file an ejectment case against Mike before the
Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the properties located
within the Pasay City.

b. Yes. If I were the judge I would consider Mike as a builder in good faith.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that Mike deliberately built his house
with a knowledge that a portion thereof will encroached on Jose's lot. In addition,
he cannot determine the precise boundaries or location of his property by merely
examining his title since he is not a geodetic engineer or any professional to that
effect.

Hence, in the absence of contrary proof, the law may presume that the
encroachment done by Mike was in good faith.

c. As a judge, I will abide by what Article 448 of the Civil Code provides.

According to the said law, it is the owner of the land who has the option or
choice, not the builder. The owner may choose between appropriation of what was
built after payment of indemnity, or to compel the builder to pay for the land if
the value of the land is not considerably more than that of the building. Otherwise,
the builder shall pay rent for the portion of the land encroached.

Concomitant to the above-mentioned law, Jose’s preference should be followed.

He may appropriate the building as his own or oblige Mike to buy the land.
 IX.

Jose should prevail.

According to Article 459 of the Civil Code, it is provided that, whenever the
current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known
portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which
the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he
removes the same within two years.
In the case at bar, the disputed area belongs, by right of accretion, to Jose,
the riparian owner. When the very same area was transferred by floodwaters to
the opposite bank, it became an avulsion and ownership thereof is retained by Jose
who has two years to remove it. On the other hand, Vicente’s claim based on
prescription is not meritorious since his possession was by mere tolerance of Jose
and, therefore, did not adversely affect Jose’s possession and ownership pursuant
to Article 537 of the Civil Code. So long as Vicente’s possession is merely that of a
holder, he cannot validly acquire the disputed area by prescription.

X.

The complaint for cancellation of easement of right of way should be dismissed.

According to Article 617 of the Civil Code, easements are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong. As an exception to the rule,
Article 631 enumerated the ways on how to extinguish easements, to wit: (1) By
merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By non-use for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period
shall be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect
to continuous easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took
place; (3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the
easement cannot be used; but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the
estates or either of them should again permit its use, unless when the use become
possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in accordance with the
provisions of the preceding number; (4) By the expiration of the term or the
fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is temporary or conditional; (5) By the
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate; (6) By the redemption agreed
upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates.
In the case at bar, although there was a failure to annotate the easement upon
the title of the servient estate however, the same is not among the grounds for
extinguishing an easement. Once easements attaches, it can only be extinguished
under Article 631, and they will subsist despite the fact that they are not stated
or annotated as an encumbrance on the Torrens title of the servient estate.

XI.
Ernesto is correct.
Under Article 449 of the Civil Code, he who builds, plants or sows in bad
faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity. In other words, one who builds on the land of another loses what is built
without right to indemnity.
In the case at bar, Demetrio is a builder in bad faith because he already
knew that the land belonged to Ernesto. As a result thereof, Ernesto becomes the
owner of the nipa sheds by right of accession. Hence, Ernesto is well within its
right in refusing to allow the removal of the nipa sheds.

XII.
Yes. Rachelle’s suit for reconveyance will prosper.

According to the rules, the proper time to file action for reconveyance is within
one year from the entry of the decree, however, if the action is based on fraud,
rule on indefeasibility of title will not apply instead the proper time to file the said
action is four years from discovery of such mistake or fraud.

In the case at bar, Rachelle’s contention was that there was fraud in the
registration of land sought by Rommel. It may be added also that Rommel may not
be a buyer in good faith.
 In view of the foregoing, Rachelle’s action for reconveyance may prosper.

XIII.

I would advise Manuel to file an application for registration under Sec 14 of

Pres. Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree (PRD), specifically
Sec14 (1) which requires (a) that the land applied for forms part of the alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain, and (b) that the applicant has been in
open, continuous and notorious possession and occupation thereof under bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. In this case, regardless if the
land subject to registration was not an alienable and disposable land when it
occupied so long as at the time of the filing, the same is alienable and disposable
land.

Manuel may also invoke Sec 14 (2) of the same Decree, which allows him to
register the subject land through ordinary acquisitive prescription for thirty
years, provided, however, that the land is patrimonial in character.

Manuel may also file an application for confirmation of imperfect or

incomplete title through judicial legalization under Sec. 48 (b) of CA no. 141, or the
Public Land Act (PLA).

Manuel may also invoke vested rights acquired under Rep. Act. No. 1942,
dated June 2, 1957, which amended Sec. 48 (b) of the PLA by providing for a
prescriptive period of thirty years for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It
must only be showed that possession and occupation commenced on January 24,
1947 and the 30-year period was completed prior to the effectivity of PD No. 1073
on January 25, 1977. PD No. 1073 now requires possession and occupation since
June 12, 1945.

Another alternative is for Manuel to secure title through administrative

proceedings under the homestead or free patent provisions of the PLA. The title
issued has the same efficacy and validity as a title issued through judicial
proceedings, but with the limitations that the land cannot be sold or disposed of
within five years from the issuance of patent.

To show the classification of the land as alienable and disposable, the

application must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification; and (2) a
certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
A presidential or legislative act may also be considered.