I.

a. Yes. The marriage between Harry and Elizabeth is valid.

According to Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
Law.

In the case at bar, Wilma was already a foreign national having been
naturalized as a citizen of that small country in Europe when he got the divorce
decree. Harry then, is already capacitated to remarry when he married
Elizabeth hence, their marriage is valid.

b. I will advise Harry to dissolve and liquidate his property relation with
Wilma as soon as possible and petition the court to recognize the foreign
divorce decree obtained by Wilma in order that his capacity to remarry will no
longer be questioned.

II.

a. As a judge, I will apply the doctrine of processual presumption.

According to the rules, the doctrine of processual presumption refers to
the right of the court to presume that in the absence of the proof, the alleged
foreign laws shall be treated as the same as that of the laws in the Philippines.
In the case at bar, Chin alleged that under the laws of China, village
leader has authority to solemnize marriage however she failed to present
evidence supporting her allegations hence, the court will presume that the laws
of China with respect to solemnization of marriage is the same as that of
Philippine marriage laws which however provides that village leader is not
among those who are authorized to solemnize marriage hence, we apply Article
35 of the Family Code, which says that marriages solemnized by a person not
authorized to do so shall render the marriage void.

b. The marriage between Chin and Jon is valid.

According to the Article 35 of the Family Code, when one or both of the
contracting parties believe in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the
legal authority to do so where in fact the same has none, the marriage will still
be valid.
In the case at bar, Chin and Jon did not have an idea that the authority
of the Baptist minister who solemnized their marriage was already expired a
month before the celebration of their marriage. This will not be case of
ignorance of the law since Chin and Jon relied on the fact that the Baptist
minister has the authority to solemnize marriage which is provided under
Article 7 of the Family Code.
Hence, their marriage is valid.

III.

a. Gemma’s suit will not prosper.

According to the Supreme Court, it is not enough to prove the

commission of the acts or the existence of abnormal behavior. It must be
shown that those said acts or behavior was manifestation of a serious mental
disorder and that it is the root cause why he was not able to perform the
essential duties of married life. It must also be shown that such psychological
incapacity, as manifested in those acts or that behavior, was existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.

In the case at bar, there was no showing that Arnell was suffering from a
manifestation of that disorder, that his behavior was a manifestation of that
disorder, and that such disorder prevented him from complying with duties as
a married person.

Hence, the acts of Arnell complained about do not by themselves

constitute psychological incapacity.

b. Still no.

According to the Court, statement of expert witness conforming to the

alleged suffering of the spouse’s personality disorder may be given great weight
however, such statements alone will not render the marriage void on the
ground of psychological incapacity since there are other matters to consider. It
must be shown that those said acts or behavior was manifestation of a serious
mental disorder and that it is the root cause why he was not able to perform
the essential duties of married life. It must also be shown that such
psychological incapacity, as manifested in those acts or that behavior, was
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
 IV.

a. No. John is not correct.

According to Article 45 of the Family Code, impotence may be a ground

for annulment of marriage if either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable and under Article 47 of the same Code, the period to
file for such action shall be within 5 years from the celebration of the marriage
however failure to do so shall not render the marriage ratified since this ground
is not subject of ratification.

In the case at bar, Marsha filed an action to annul their marriage on the
ground of impotency at the end of the 2nd year of their marriage. The action was
filed within the five year prescriptive period. However, even if no action was
filed, the marriage cannot be ratified.

Thus, John’s contention is not correct.

b. No.

According to the Supreme Court, in case the potent spouse is aware of

the impotency of his or her spouse before the celebration of their marriage, it is
implied that he/she renounced copulation by consenting to the marriage,
hence, he may be estopped from filing the action.

V.

a. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, Salaries and wages, properties
acquired by both through work and industry and properties presumed to be
acquired jointly while living together, shall be divided equally while properties
acquired through exclusive funds shall remain exclusive to either parties.

b. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, Salaries and wages shall be
separately owned by parties, properties acquired through exclusive funds shall
remain exclusive, properties acquired by both through work and industry shall
be owned in common in proportion to respective contribution however, there
will be no presumption of joint acquisition as to the properties acquired while
living together.
 c. No. In so far as Art. 148 of the Family Code is concern, properties
acquired while living together shall not be presumed as joint acquisition and
such will not be offset by efforts of the other in the care and maintenance of the
family and household.

d. The properties shall be divided depending upon the ground for

termination of marriage. In case of death, Article 103 of the Family Code will
apply, in case of Legal Separation, Articles 63 and 64 will apply and in case of
Annulment or judicial declaration of nullity, Articles 50 and 52 will apply.

VI.
a. Ed is the father of Alvin because Alvin was conceived and born during the
marriage of his mother to Ed. Under the law, the child born during the
marriage of the mother to her husband is presumed to be the legitimate child
of the husband. While it is true that there was no written consent by the
husband to the artificial insemination, absence of such consent may only give
the husband a ground to impugn the legitimacy of the child but will not
prevent the child from acquiring the status of legitimate child of the husband
at the same time of its birth.

b. Under the Family Code, Children born out of a bigamous marriage shall
be considered illegitimate.

Hence, Alvin is an illegitimate child and Andy is his biological father.

VII.
Yes, Joey has such a cause of action against Tintin.
While the Family Code has repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on
proof of filiation, said repel did not impair vested rights. Under the Civil Code,
as an illegitimate child may file an action to compel his recognition even after
the death of the putative father when the father died during the minority of the
child. While the Family Code has repealed this provision, it will not operate to
prejudice those who has already acquired a vested right thereto.
In the case at bar, Joey was born an illegitimate child in 1981. As an
illegitimate child, he had acquired, at birth, the right to prove his filiation in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in force at that time.
 VIII.
a. Yes, the position of the government is tenable.
Foreigners are disqualified to adopt unless they fall in any of the
exceptions provided for in the law.
Eva and Paul are both foreigners. Eva, falls in one of the exceptions. She
is qualified to adopt because she is a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
adopt a relative by consanguinity. Unfortunately, Paul is not qualified to
adopt because he does not fall in any of the exceptions. Hence, they cannot
adopt jointly. When husband and wife are adopting jointly, both of them
must be qualified to adopt in their own right. Eva cannot, alone by herself,
adopt her niece because husband and wife must adopt jointly unless they
fall in any exceptions provided for in the law. They cannot adopt separately
because they do not fall in any of the exceptions.
Hence, whether separately or jointly, Eva and Paul cannot adopt Vicky in
the Philippines.

b. No, my answer would be different.

Eva is qualified to adopt her illegitimate daughter, because she falls in one
of her exceptions that allow foreigners to adopt. She is a former Filipino citizen
adopting her relative by consanguinity. Eva can adopt separately her
illegitimate child because her case is also an exception to the rule that
husband and wife should adopt jointly.

IX.
As a judge, I would rule that the first marriage settlement was valid
because it was in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the
celebration of the marriage. Second, the subsequent agreement of the parties
was void as a modification of their marriage settlement. To be valid, the
modification must be executed before the celebration of the marriage. The
subsequent agreement of the parties did not effect a dissolution of their
conjugal partnership and a separation of their properties because it was not
approved by the court. To be valid, an agreement by the parties to dissolve
their conjugal partnership and to separate properties during the marriage has
to be approved by the court.
Considering that the marriage settlement was binding between the
parties, conjugal partnership of gains was the regime of their property
relations. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, all properties
acquired by the spouses during the marriage, jointly or by either one of them,
through their work or industry are conjugal. Therefore, the residential house
and lot, and the condominium unit are conjugal having been jointly acquired
by the couple during the marriage. Inasmuch as the subsequent agreement on
dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of property was invalid,
conjugal partnership subsisted between the parties. Therefore, the mansion
and the agricultural land are also conjugal having been acquired by one of the
spouses during the marriage.

The marriage settlement cannot prejudice third parties, such as the

creditors, because it was not registered with the local civil registered with the
local civil registrar where the marriage was recorded. To bind third parties, the
Family Code requires registration of the marriage settlement not only with the
proper register of deeds but also with the local civil registrar where the
marriage was recorded. Hence, if the rules on conjugal partnership will
prejudice the creditors, the rules on absolute community will be applied
instead. However, insofar as debts contracted by one spouse without the
consent of the other are concerned, the rule is the same for both conjugal
partnership and absolute community. The partnership or community is liable
for debts contracted by one spouse but only to the extent that it benefited to
the family. Therefore, if the debts contracted by Mila redounded to the benefit
of the family, all the conjugal partnership properties are liable to pay them but
only to the extent the family was benefited. The separate properties of Mila may
be held answerable for Mila’s debts and obligations that did not redound to the
benefit of the family.

X.
Both parents of Sam and Cathy shall be held liable for damages.
According to Article 221 of the Family Code, parents and other
persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their personal authority subject
to the appropriate defenses provided by law.