EN BANC

[G.R. No. 202202. March 19, 2013.]

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO , petitioner, vs . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ ,
respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the March 22, 2012 Decision 1 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) which declared the validity of private respondent
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez's substitution as the Liberal Party's replacement candidate for
the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.
The Facts
On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) led his certi cate of candidacy 2
(CoC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional o ce as
Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal
Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura
Juntilla (Juntilla), led a Veri ed Petition, 3 alleging that Richard, who was actually a
resident of Colgate Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in
his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla
asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section
6, Article VI 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be
declared disquali ed/ineligible to run for the said o ce. In addition, Juntilla prayed that
Richard's CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled. 5
On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution 6 granting
Juntilla's petition without any qualification. The dispositive portion of which reads: aHESCT

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RES OLVED, as it

hereby RES OLVES , to G R ANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of
Quali cation led by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I.
GOMEZ . Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ i s D IS QUAL IFIED as a candidate
for the O ce of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency
requirement.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
CO ME LE C En Banc through a Resolution dated May 4, 2010. 7 Thereafter, in a
Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with nality "in order to
enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution." 8
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) led her CoC 9
together with a Certi cate of Nomination and Acceptance 1 0 from the Liberal Party
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 endorsing her as the party's o cial substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the
same congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the
COMELEC's Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of
its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 8890 1 1 on May 8, 2010, approving,
among others, the recommendation of the said department to allow the substitution of
private respondent. The recommendation reads:
STUDY AND OBSERVATION
On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr.
Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru his counsel, opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy
Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for Mr. Richard I. Gomez.
The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no
substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for.

It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this

Commission, in SPA No. 09-059 speaks for disquali cation of candidate Richard
I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy:

'Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it

hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack
of Quali cation led . . . against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly,
RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the O ce of
Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.'

The said resolution was a rmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04,
2010.

The disquali cation of a candidate does not automatically cancel one's

certi cate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political party. In
effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose
candidacy was declared disquali ed. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege
given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.

Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the

qualification of a candidate to run in the public office.

The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12

in relation to Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated October 6, 2009.

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the
following:

xxx xxx xxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ

AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ ;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla led an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration 1 2 (May 9, 2010 Motion) of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc
resolution.
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 Pending resolution of Juntilla's May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections
were conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richard, whose name
remained on the ballots, garnered 101,250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino
Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes,
respectively. 1 3 In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard's votes were credited
in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected
Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
On May 11, 2010, Juntilla led an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending
May 9, 2010 Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890. 1 4 The said motion, however,
remained unacted. AIDTSE

On May 24, 2010, petitioner led a Petition 1 5 for quo warranto before the HRET in
order to oust private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed
to comply with the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution considering that the transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael,
Bulacan 1 6 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did
not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3) private respondent's
CoC was void due to her non-compliance with the prescribed notarial requirements i.e., she
failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the notarizing officer. 1 7
In her Veri ed Answer, 1 8 private respondent denied petitioner's allegations and
claimed that she validly substituted her husband in the electoral process. She also averred
that she was personally known to the notary public who notarized her CoC, one Atty.
Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not required to have presented any competent proof
of identity during the notarization of the said document. Lastly, she asserted that despite
her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in Metro Manila, she continued to
maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place where she was born and raised.
During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference
Order dated September 2, 2010, the parties agreed on the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;

2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;

3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for
failure to file the necessary petition for disqualification with the COMELEC;
4. Whether or not respondent's COC was duly subscribed; and
5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the
Fourth District of Leyte for lack of residency requirement. 1 9

Ruling of the HRET

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision 2 0
which dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a
quali ed candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District). It
observed that the resolution denying Richard's candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First Division's
February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of disquali cation and not of CoC cancellation.
Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent in lieu of Richard was legal and
valid. 2 1 Also, it upheld the validity of private respondent's CoC due to petitioner's failure to
controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who notarized her
CoC. 2 2 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been admitted that private respondent
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 resides in Colgate Street, San Juan City and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the fact was she
continued to retain her domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only
temporary.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues Before the Court
The crux of the present controversy is whether or not the HRET gravely abused its
discretion in nding that Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as
candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the former's
failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI
of the Constitution.
It is petitioner's submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it
upheld the validity of private respondent's substitution despite contrary jurisprudence
holding that substitution is impermissible where the substituted candidate's CoC was
denied due course to and/or cancelled, as in the case of Richard. On the other hand,
respondents maintain that Richard's CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled
by the COMELEC as he was only "disquali ed" and therefore, was properly substituted by
private respondent.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
A. Distinction between a petition
for disqualification and a petition to
deny due course to/cancel a
certificate of candidacy
The Omnibus Election Code 2 3 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a
candidate's bid for public o ce. Among these which obtain particular signi cance to this
case are: (1) a petition for disquali cation under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due
course to and/or cancel a certi cate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions
between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disquali cation case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a)
a candidate's possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; 2 4 or (b) his
or her commission of certain acts of disquali cation. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts
under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other
penal laws. 2 5 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2)
committing acts of terrorism to enhance one's candidacy; (3) spending in one's election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or
making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and
(5) violating Sections 80, 2 6 83, 2 7 85, 2 8 86 2 9 and 261, paragraphs d, 3 0 e, 3 1 k, 3 2 v, 3 3 and
cc, sub-paragraph 6 3 4 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states
that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by
nal decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have committed
any of the foregoing acts shall be disquali ed from continuing as a candidate for public
office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected. 3 5
It must be stressed that one who is disquali ed under Section 68 is still technically
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 considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because
of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In
other words, while the candidate's compliance with the eligibility requirements as
prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is,
however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought
about by the commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding
under Section 78 of the OEC 3 6 is premised on a person's misrepresentation of any of the
material quali cations required for the elective o ce aspired for. It is not enough that a
person lacks the relevant quali cation; he or she must have also made a false
representation of the same in the CoC. 3 7 The nature of a Section 78 petition was
discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC, 3 8 where the Court illumined: AcSIDE

Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the

CoC is not based on the lack of quali cations but on a nding that the
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the
quali cations required of the public o ce he/she is running for. It is noted that
the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the o ce he/she
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on quali cations or eligibility
for public o ce. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the
law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certi cate .
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo
warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the
eligibility or quali cation of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact
that a "Section 78" petition is led before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is led after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis
supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation,

much less one's intent to defraud, is of bare signi cance in a Section 78 petition as it is
enough that the person's declaration of a material quali cation in the CoC be false. In this
relation, jurisprudence holds that an express nding that the person committed any
deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one's
CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. 3 9 What remains material is that the petition
essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one's
ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification. 4 0
Pertinently, while a disquali ed candidate under Section 68 is still considered to
have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC
had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not
been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab
initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. 4 1 In
Talaga v. COMELEC 4 2 (Talaga), the Court ruled that:
. . . While a person who is disquali ed under Section 68 is merely prohibited to
continue as a candidate, a person whose certi cate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never
filed a CoC.

The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its
implications on candidate substitution.
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 B. Valid CoC as a condition sine
qua non for candidate substitution
Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an o cial candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disquali ed for any cause, a person
belonging to and certi ed by the same political party may le a CoC to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states that:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disquali cation or withdrawal of another.
— If after the last day for the ling of certi cates of candidacy, an official
ca n dida te of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disquali ed for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certi ed by, the
same political party may le a certi cate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "o cial candidate" before candidate
substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or
disquali cation of a candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an o cial
candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. 4 3
As de ned under Section 79 (a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public o ce who has led a certi cate of
candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition
of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly led a CoC in order to be
considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater importance
if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a person's public
declaration to run for o ce but evidences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be
elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula, 4 4 the Court has illumined:
A certi cate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the
whole world of the candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is a
statement of a person seeking to run for a public o ce certifying that
he announces his candidacy for the o ce mentioned and that he is
eligible for the o ce, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if
he belongs to any, and his post-o ce address for all election purposes being as
well stated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the
status of a candidate. In other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate
under legal contemplation. As held in Talaga: 4 5
. . . a person's declaration of his intention to run for public o ce and his
a rmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume,
followed by the timely ling of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that
render the person making the declaration a valid or o cial candidate.
(Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for

substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not
considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a person's CoC had been
denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the
electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a
disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. 4 6
C. Divergent effects of
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 disqualification and denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of COC
cases vis-à-vis candidate substitution
Proceeding from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut
distinction between a disquali cation case under Section 68 and denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of COC case under Section 78 vis-à-vis their respective effects on
candidate substitution under Section 77.
As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya 4 7 (Miranda), a candidate who is
disquali ed under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he
remains a candidate until disquali ed; but a person whose CoC has been denied due
course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate. 4 8 Stated differently, since there would be no candidate to speak
of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be
no candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain, however, in a disquali cation
case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her
candidacy is discontinued.
On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the
instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an o cial candidate of a
registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is disquali ed for any
cause . " Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section
and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.
D. Application to the case at bar
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disquali ed to run in the May 10, 2010
elections due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. 4 9 The
confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disquali ed" in the February 17,
2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En
Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by
the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a nding that Richard was merely
disquali ed — and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled — would
mean that he could have been validly substituted by private respondent, thereby
legitimizing her candidacy.
Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution did not
explicitly decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard's CoC should
not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private
respondent's substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for
Richard's "disquali cation" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to
and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, not for disquali cation. 5 0 As
earlier mentioned, the material misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78
petition refers to statements affecting one's quali cations for elective o ce such as age,
residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. 5 1 There is
therefore no legal basis to support a nding of disquali cation within the ambit
of election laws . Accordingly, given Richard's non-compliance with the one year
residency requirement, it cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Division's unquali ed
grant of Juntilla's "Veri ed Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Quali cation" 5 2 —
which prayed that the COMELEC declare Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from
seeking the o ce of Member of the House of Representatives" and ". . . that [his]
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 Certi cate of Candidacy . . . be DENIED DUE COURSE and/or CANCELLED" 5 3 —
carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard's CoC pursuant to
Section 78.
Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of CoC and the same is granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the
cancellation of the candidate's CoC is in order. This is precisely the crux of the Miranda
ruling wherein the Court, in upholding the COMELEC En Banc's nulli cation of the
substitution in that case, decreed that the COMELEC Division's unquali ed grant of the
petition necessarily included the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of the
candidate's CoC, notwithstanding the use of the term "disquali ed" in the COMELEC
Division's resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for in the said petition:
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe"
Miranda being disquali ed by the COMELEC in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his
certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondent's petition in SPA No. 98-019 speci cally prayed for the
following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certi cate of
Candidacy led by respondent for the position of Mayor for the
City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled .
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for. CacTSI

In resolving the petition led by private respondent specifying a very

particular relief, the COMELEC ruled favorably in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST
DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition . Respondent JOSE "Pempe"
MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position
of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections.
SO ORDERED.
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution
of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is su ciently clear that the prayer
speci cally and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there
being no quali cation on the matter whatsoever . The disquali cation was
simply ruled over and above the granting of the speci c prayer for denial of due
course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no dispute that the complaint or petition led by private
respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel
the certi cate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda . There is likewise
no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any
quali cation whatsoever . It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the
COMELEC granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the
candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that
the certi cate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due
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 course and cancelled . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz.:
3. Granting without any qualification
of petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC)
manifested COMELEC's intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to
cancel his CoC

xxx xxx xxx

In Miranda v. Abaya, the speci c relief that the petition prayed for was that
the CoC "be not given due course and/or cancelled" . The COMELEC
categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced — in apparent
contradiction — that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disquali ed." The Court held that
the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any quali cation,
disquali ed Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose
Pempe Miranda's CoC.
xxx xxx xxx

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually
granted the particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the
CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any
qualification . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the
COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law
Department's nding that Richard was only "disquali ed" and that his CoC was not denied
due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondent's
substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division's ruling encompassed
the cancellation of Richard's CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of
private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC
En Banc to have approved private respondent's substitution.
Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc's error as above-discussed,
the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion, warranting the grant of the instant
petition.
Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 5 4 While it is
well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole
judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of the members of
the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
latter. 5 5 In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled precedents
on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional
candidate for the Fourth District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year
residency requirement; (2) Juntilla's petition prayed for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of his CoC; and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing petition
without any quali cation. By these undisputed and essential facts alone, the HRET should
not have adopted the COMELEC En Banc's erroneous nding that the COMELEC First
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 Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution "speaks [only] of "disquali cation and not of
cancellation of [Richard's] CoC" 5 6 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private
respondent.
Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC
pronouncements relative to the quali cations of the Members of the House. Being the sole
judge 5 7 of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of its respective
members, the HRET cannot be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional
mandate 5 8 be circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive on this point is the Court's
disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET, 5 9 to wit:
Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal
basis to claim that the HRET, when reference to the quali cation/s of Members of
the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the COMELEC, such
that the HRET cannot disregard any ruling of COMELEC respecting the matter of
eligibility and quali cation of a member of the House of Representatives. The
truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to
the HRET when the dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility
and/or quali cation of a Member of the House of Representatives . A
petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole
judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another body may
have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the
issue of the Member's quali cation while the Member was still a
candidate . There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve the same
parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are distinct and
dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and quali cations" should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. More
particularly, the term "quali cations" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or
the inadequacy of his certi cate of candidacy. 6 0 As used in Section 74 of the OEC, the
word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public o ce, that is, having all the
quali cations and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public o ce. 6 1 In this relation,
private respondent's own quali cation to run for public o ce — which was inextricably
linked to her husband's own quali cations due to her substitution — was the proper
subject of quo warranto proceedings falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET
and independent from any previous proceedings before the COMELEC, lest the
jurisdictional divide between the two be blurred. cDAISC

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET's independence is not without
limitation. As earlier mentioned, the Court retains certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if
only to check whether or not it has gravely abused its discretion. In this regard, the Court
does not endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRET's independence; rather, it merely
ful lls its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws are upheld through the exercise
of its power of judicial review.
In ne, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by
deliberately adopting the COMELEC En Banc's awed ndings regarding private
respondent's eligibility to run for public o ce which essentially stemmed from her
substitution. In this light, it cannot be gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.
Owing to the lack of proper substitution in this case, private respondent was
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 therefore not a bona de candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth
District of Leyte when she ran for o ce, which means that she could not have been
elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on
the other issues respecting private respondent's own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision
rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031
(QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to participation in HRET.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Brion, J., took no part due to previous participation in HRET.
Peralta, J., took no part, incumbent member, HRET.
Bersamin, J., took no part due to prior participation in the HRET.
Del Castillo, J., I join the dissent of J. Abad.
Abad, J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., I join Justice Abad in his dissenting opinion.

Separate Opinions
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO , J., dissenting :

I vote to deny the petition of Silverio R. Tagolino on the ground that after the lapse of
the reglementary period of ten (10) days from the date of proclamation of respondent
Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative
District of Leyte, the said proclamation can no longer be assailed by an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto. Moreover, the substitution by said respondent of her husband
Richard Gomez cannot be questioned, there being no factual basis to assail the decision of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) not to cancel the certi cate of candidacy of
respondent's husband.
The Petition for Quo Warranto was filed out of time.
Respondent Gomez was proclaimed as the winning candidate for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives on May 12, 2010 whereas the Petition for Quo
Warranto was led by petitioner Tagolino on May 24, 2010, or twelve days after the
proclamation of respondent Gomez.
The pertinent provisions of the Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) provide as follows:
RULE 16. Election Protest. — A veri ed petition contesting the election or
returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be led by any
candidate who has duly led a certi cate of candidacy and has been voted for
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 the same o ce, within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The
party ling the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse
party shall be known as the protestee.

No joint election protest shall be admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and
su cient reasons, may consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them
jointly.

The protest is veri ed by an a davit that the a ant has read it and that
the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief. A
veri cation based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information
and belief," is not a sufficient verification.

An unveri ed election protest shall not suspend the running of the

reglementary period to file the protest.
RULE 17. Quo Warranto. — A veri ed petition for quo warranto contesting
the election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be led by any
voter within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party ling
the petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall be
known as the respondent.
The rule on veri cation provided in Section 16 hereof shall apply to
petitions for quo warranto.

As correctly asserted by respondent Gomez in her Veri ed Answer led before the
HRET, the Petition for Quo Warranto should have been dismissed outright pursuant to Rule
21 of the Rules of the HRET, quoted below:
RULE 21. Summary Dismissal of Election Contest. — An election protest or
petition for quo warranto may be summarily dismissed by the Tribunal without
the necessity of requiring the protestee or respondent to answer if, inter alia: . . .

(2) The petition is led beyond the period provided in Rules 16 and 17 of
these Rules[.]

This Court has emphasized the importance of compliance with the HRET Rules
prescribing reglementary periods to be observed by the parties in an election contest to
expedite the disposition of election controversies so as not to frustrate the will of the
electorate. In Hofer v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 1 the Court sustained
the dismissal by the HRET of the election protest for failure to comply strictly with the
period prescribed by the HRET Rules. IDTSaC

Similarly, Perez v. Commission on Elections 2 held that remedies are unavailing once
the prescriptive period to bring the appropriate petition has set in. The pertinent ruling of
the Court in Perez is quoted as follows:
Petitioner's remedies should have been (1) to reiterate her prayer in the
petition for disquali cation, and move for the issuance of an order by the
COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private respondent pending the
hearing of the said petition and, in the event the motion was denied before the
proclamation of private respondent, le a petition for certiorari in this Court with a
prayer for a restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent; or
(2) to le a petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamation of private respondent as
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 Representative-elect on May 16, 1998. Obviously, neither of these remedies can be
availed of now. 3

The HRET and this Court cannot set aside at will the HRET Rules mandating the
timely ling of election contests. Otherwise, a dangerous precedent will be set that will
cause uncertainty in the application of the HRET Rules and instability in the holding of an
elective post by a proclaimed winning candidate that may aversely affect public service.
In view of the foregoing, I submit that the HRET is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain
the Petition for Quo Warranto led by Tagolino, after the lapse of the reglementary period
prescribed by its own Rules. The proclamation of respondent Gomez has become
incontrovertible or unassailable after the expiration of ten (10) days from its date.
No factual basis to cancel the certificate of candidacy.
The lack of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET to entertain the untimely Petition for
Quo Warranto assailing the proclamation of private respondent Gomez would su ce to
dismiss outright the instant petition. Moreover, the substantive issue extensively
discussed in the ponencia of the Honorable Associate Justice Estela Perlas Bernabe,
particularly as to the "divergent effects of disquali cation and denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of COC (Certi cate of Candidacy) cases vis-à-vis candidate
substitution" is inappropriate.
Firstly, the certi cate of candidacy of Richard Gomez, the husband of respondent
Gomez, was not cancelled by the COMELEC.
Secondly, the decision by the COMELEC not to cancel said certi cate of candidacy
was proper as the COMELEC did not reach any nding that Richard Gomez deliberately
committed a misrepresentation, which is a requisite for the cancellation of a certi cate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In Mitra v. Commission on
Elections, 4 the Court ruled:
Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The
combined application of these sections requires that the candidate's stated facts
in the COC be true, under pain of the COC's denial or cancellation if any false
representation of a material fact is made. . . .
The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily
pertain to a material fact. The critical material facts are those that refer to a
candidate's quali cations for elective o ce, such as his or her citizenship and
residence. The candidate's status as a registered voter in the political unit where
he or she is a candidate similarly falls under this classi cation as it is a
requirement that, by law (the Local Government Code), must be re ected in the
COC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for
and represent the political unit where he or she ran as a candidate.

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate

attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with
the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate's
quali cations for public o ce. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78
addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in
a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception
on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation
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 necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material
falsity: a candidate who falsi es a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the
election laws.
Based on these standards, we nd that Mitra did not commit any
deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude
that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan, Palawan. The COMELEC, too, failed to
critically consider whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible for the
position of Governor of Palawan. (Emphases supplied and citations omitted.)

The ponencia of Justice Bernabe indulged in the legal ction that the certi cate of
candidacy of Richard Gomez was cancelled when it in fact was not. Neither can the Court
now on its own decree such cancellation in the absence of any factual basis or evidentiary
support for a nding that Richard Gomez committed a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render [him] ineligible."
Substitution was valid.
Since the COMELEC did not cancel the certi cate of candidacy of Richard Gomez
but only disquali ed him from running in the elections, the substitution by respondent
Gomez of Richard Gomez squarely falls within the ambit of Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), which uses the broad language "disquali cation for any cause," as
follows:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of
another. — If after the last day for the ling of certi cates of candidacy, an
o cial candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disquali ed for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certi ed by, the
same political party may le a certi cate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disquali ed. The substitute candidate nominated by
the political party concerned may le his certi cate of candidacy for the o ce
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the
day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disquali cation should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certi cate
may be led with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Petition for Quo Warranto lacked factual basis.

Regarding the issue of whether a Petition for Quo Warranto is a proper legal remedy
to assail the validity of the substitution of a candidate under Section 77 of the OEC, it
su ces here to state that, under Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, the grounds for a Petition for
Quo Warranto are ineligibility to run for a public o ce or disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Pertinently, Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides for the
qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives, states as follows: TCcSDE

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty- ve years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
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 party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereat for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.

The above-quoted provision refers to the personal attributes of a candidate. The

ponencia did not nd any of the above quali cations absent in the case of respondent
Gomez. However, the ponencia attributed the ineligibility of respondent Gomez to its
erroneous assumption that the certi cate of candidacy of Richard Gomez, whom she
substituted, should have been cancelled. As explained above, the COMELEC correctly did
not so cancel said certi cate, it having found no factual basis to do so. This being the case
and the fact that the Petition for Quo Warranto was led out of time, there is no need to
dwell on the issue of whether the Petition for Quo Warranto may validly question the
validity of the substitution of a candidate and to discuss the constitutional boundaries of
the respective jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the HRET.
In view of the foregoing, I reiterate my vote to dismiss the Petition for Certiorari filed
by Tagolino.

ABAD , J., dissenting :

On November 30, 2009 Richard Gomez (Richard) led his certi cate of candidacy
(CoC) for Congressman of Leyte's 4th District under the Liberal Party (LP) in the May 10,
2010 elections. He gave his residence as 910 Carlota Hills, Barangay Can-Adieng, Ormoc
City. After a week, Buenaventura O. Juntilla, a registered voter of the district, led a Verified
Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Quali cation 1 before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in SPA 09-059 (DC) on the ground that Richard was not an Ormoc
City resident. Juntilla asked the COMELEC two things: a) disqualify Richard and b) deny
due course to or cancel his CoC for material misrepresentation regarding his residence
since he in fact resided in Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
On February 17, 2010 the COMELEC First Division issued a resolution disqualifying
Richard for failing to present "su cient proof that would establish his ties to Ormoc." The
resolution failed, however, to order the denial of due course or cancellation of his CoC. The
dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of
Quali cation led by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ.
Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the
O ce of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency
requirement. 2 (Emphasis supplied.)

On February 20, 2010 Richard moved for reconsideration of the above resolution.
Juntilla, on the other hand, did not le a similar motion even when the COMELEC failed to
grant his other prayer for denial of due course or cancellation of Richard's CoC.
On May 4, 2010 the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 3 dismissing Richard's
motion for reconsideration. On the same day, Richard led with the COMELEC a
Manifestation 4 informing it of his acceptance of its decision in his case to enable a
substitute to take his place. Acting on the Manifestation, the COMELEC En Banc issued an
Order on May 5 declaring its May 4 Resolution final and executory.
On May 5, 2010 the LP Secretary-General wrote the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Leyte, nominating respondent Lucy Gomez as a substitute candidate for her husband,
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 Richard. Lucy Gomez promptly led her CoC with COMELEC as substitute candidate. On
the same date, Juntilla led with the COMELEC a Counter-Manifestation, 5 followed by a
letter to the COMELEC Law Department, opposing Lucy Gomez's substitution of her
husband, claiming that the substitution was invalid since she had no one to substitute in
view of the COMELEC's disqualification of Richard by final order.
On May 8, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution 8890 6 approving and
adopting, among other things, its Law Department's study and recommendation that Lucy
Gomez be allowed to substitute for Richard, given that the 1st Divisions ruling which did
not cancel Richard's CoC but merely "disquali ed" him, had already become nal and
executory. The pertinent portion of the study and recommendation that the En Banc
adopted states:
The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there
should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute
for.

It must be stressed that the reso l u ti o n of the First Division, this

Commission, in SPA No. 09-059 speaks of disquali cation of candidate
Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy:

"Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of
Quali cation led against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ
is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the O ce of Congressman, Fourth District
of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement."
The said resolution was a rmed by the Commission En Banc on May 4,
2010.

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the
following:

xxx xxx xxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A
SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ; (Emphasis supplied)

On the same day the COMELEC En Banc issued its May 8, 2010 resolution allowing
the substitution, Juntilla led an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration 7 of the
same but the motion remained unacted upon, obviously owing to the supervening May 10
elections. Juntilla never elevated or questioned the matter before the Supreme Court.
On May 12, 2010 the Leyte Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Lucy Gomez
as Congresswoman-elect to represent the 4th District of Leyte, having obtained 101,250
votes. Petitioner Silvestre R. Tagolino and another candidate, Eufrocino C. Codilla, Jr.,
garnered 493 votes and 76,549 votes, respectively.
In due time, Tagolino brought a quo warranto action 8 against Lucy Gomez with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) pursuant to its Rule 17 which allows
the ling of a petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a member of the House
of Representatives "on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic." Juntilla did
not join Tagolino in this action. cSIHCA

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 Tagolino alleged in his petition (1) that Lucy Gomez was not a resident of Ormoc
City at least one year immediately preceding the election; (2) that she was not a registered
voter in the 4th District of Leyte; and (3) that her CoC was void for failing to comply with
the requirements of Section 2 of the 2004 Notarial Law. 9 Tagolino did not raise in his
petition the question of the validity of Lucy Gomez's substitution of her husband Richard.
In her Answer, 1 0 Lucy Gomez averred: (a) that the petition was led beyond 10 days
from proclamation; (b) that the petition assails the validity of her CoC, which is outside the
jurisdiction of the HRET and should have been assailed before the COMELEC through a
petition to deny due course to or cancel her CoC; (c) that the COMELEC had already
resolved her substitution of Richard with nality in its Resolution 8890; (d) that she did not
have to present proof of her identity when her CoC was notarized the notary public
personally knew her; and (e) she never abandoned her domicile in Ormoc City despite her
change of residence and transfer of voting registration to San Rafael, Bulacan, arising from
her marriage to Richard.
On March 22, 2010 the HRET rendered a Decision 1 1 dismissing the quo warranto
petition and declaring Lucy Gomez a quali ed candidate during the May 2010 election for
the subject position, her substitution of her disquali ed husband being valid and legal.
HRET ruled that Lucy Gomez's domicile continued to be Ormoc City despite her marriage
to Richard. Tagolino moved for reconsideration but HRET denied the same on May 28,
2012, hence, this petition.
Question Presented
As the ponencia would have it, the issue boils down to the question of whether or
not Lucy Gomez validly substituted Richard whom the COMELEC declared disquali ed for
lack of residency.
But the above is not an accurate statement of the real issue in this case. The real
issue in this case is whether or not the HRET can review and reverse a COMELEC Decision
involving a member of the House of Representatives that had become final and executory.
Discussion
The election of Lucy Gomez as Congresswoman of the 4th District of Leyte was
preceded by two separate incidents before the COMELEC:
The first incident involved Richard. It consists in Juntilla's self-titled Veri ed Petition
to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Quali cation. Juntilla asked for Richard's
disquali cation, consistent with the substance of his petition, but added in his prayer that
the candidate's CoC be also cancelled or denied due course. The COMELEC First Division
granted the petition and disquali ed Richard but did not cancel or deny due course to his
CoC.
T h e second incident involved Lucy Gomez. Juntilla opposed her substitution of
Richard on the ground that the substitution was invalid since she had no one to substitute
in view of the COMELEC First Division's disquali cation of Richard by nal order. But the
COMELEC En Banc denied the opposition and allowed the substitution, given that the First
Division's resolution, which merely disquali ed Richard, had already become nal and
executory.
The key issue in this case is actually whether or not the HRET was correct in ruling
that the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution that disquali ed Richard
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 but did not cancel his CoC or deny it due course had already become nal and executory.
For, if it had indeed become nal and executory, that resolution would, as the COMELEC En
Banc held in its May 8, 2010 Resolution, provide legal basis for Lucy Gomez's substitution
of Richard.
It is clear from the facts that the COMELEC First Division's February 17, 2010
Resolution, which merely disquali ed Richard but did not cancel or deny due course to his
CoC, became nal and executory. That resolution may be in error, as the ponencia would
have it, but it certainly became final and executory for the following reasons:
F i r s t . Juntilla never led a motion for reconsideration of that resolution.
Consequently, he could not help its becoming final and executory as to him.
Se c o nd . Only Richard led a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First
Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution, which merely disquali ed him. When the
COMELEC En Banc dismissed that motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2010, Richard
led a manifestation on the same day, accepting its validity. On May 5 the COMELEC En
B a nc declared its May 4, 2010 Resolution nal and executory. Consequently, what
remained the last window of opportunity to review and possibly reverse the COMELEC
First Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution closed down.
T h i r d . Juntilla attempted to revive the issue concerning the COMELEC First
Division's February 17, 2010 Resolution when he opposed Lucy Gomez's substitution of
Richard. He claimed that the First Division's resolution resulted in the COMELEC denying
due course to Richard's CoC with the effect that, without a valid one, he could not be
substituted. But Juntilla is clearly in error since the COMELEC En Banc already declared on
May 5 that the First Division's February 17 Resolution merely ordered Richard's
disqualification and such resolution had irreversibly become final and executory.
Juntilla of course led on May 8, 2010 a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC En Banc's Resolution of the same date that allowed Lucy Gomez's substitution
of Richard, but the motion remained unacted upon, obviously owing to the supervening
May 10, 2010 elections. At any rate, Juntilla may be deemed to have abandoned that
motion for reconsideration for he never insisted that it be resolved. And he never raised
before this Court the issue of the validity of that COMELEC En Banc's May 8 Resolution
that allowed the substitution. Unchallenged, that resolution became nal and executory as
well.
The Court has of course ruled In Guerrero v. Commission on Elections 1 2 that, since
the Constitution makes the HRET "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and quali cations" of its members, it has the jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
of substitution involving such members. Said the Court:
Whether respondent [Rodolfo] Fariñas validly substituted Chevylle V.
Fariñas and whether respondent became a legitimate candidate, in our view,
must likewise be addressed to the sound judgment of the Electoral
Tribunal. Only thus can we demonstrate fealty to the Constitutional provision
that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress shall be the " sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and quali cations of their respective
members." 1 3 (Emphasis supplied)

But the above ruling should be understood in the context of the facts of the Fariñas
case. Guillermo Ruiz, a registered voter, led a petition with the COMELEC's Second
Division seeking the perpetual disquali cation of Rodolfo Fariñas as candidate for
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 Congressman for the May 11, 1998 elections on the ground that he had been campaigning
for that position despite his failure to le a CoC. Eventually, Fariñas led his CoC on May 8,
1998 in substitution of Chevylle Fariñas who withdrew earlier on April 3. Because of this
supervening event, on May 10 the Second Division dismissed Ruiz's petition for lack of
merit.
Fariñas won the elections and was promptly proclaimed. On May 16, 1998, however,
Ruiz led a motion for reconsideration of the Second Division's May 10 Resolution,
contending that Fariñas could not validly substitute for Chevylle, since the latter was not
the o cial candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino but was an independent
candidate. Meantime, on June 3, 1998 Fariñas took his oath as member of the House of
Representatives. caADSE

On June 10, 1998 petitioner Arnold Guerrero, a rival candidate, led a petition-in-
intervention with the COMELEC, assailing Fariñas' substitution of Chevylle. On January 6,
1999, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Ruiz's motion for reconsideration and Guerrero's
petition-in-intervention for lack of jurisdiction since Fariñas had in the meantime assumed
office.
Upon Guerrero's petition, this Court held that while the COMELEC has the power to
declare a CoC valid or invalid, its refusal to exercise that power, following Fariñas'
proclamation and assumption of o ce, simply recognized the jurisdictional boundaries
between the COMELEC and the HRET. The Court said that whether Fariñas validly
substituted Chevylle must now be addressed to the sound judgment of the HRET. The
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
Tagolino cannot invoke the Fariñas ruling for three reasons:
First, the Court's thesis in Fariñas is that the HRET can take over a pending matter
before the COMELEC since the latter may be considered ousted of its jurisdiction over the
same upon the winner's assumption of o ce. The HRET takes over the authority to resolve
such pending matter.
Here, however, the key issue of whether or not the COMELEC First Division's
February 17, 2010 Resolution, which merely disqualified Richard but did not cancel his CoC,
is no longer a pending matter. It became nal and executory since, as pointed out above,
Juntilla did not le a motion for its reconsideration and the COMELEC En Banc had found it
to be the case.
Second, Guerrero had the right to raise the issue of Fariñas' disquali cation before
the HRET since he intervened and joined cause with Guillermo in his action before the
COMELEC. This gave Guerrero a stake in the resolution of Guillermo's motion for
reconsideration after the COMELEC declined to further act on the same.
Here, Tagolino never intervened in Juntilla's actions before the COMELEC. He stayed
out of it. Consequently, he has no right to ask the HRET to resolve Juntilla's May 8, 2010
motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC En Banc's order of the same date. The right to
press for the resolution of that May 8 motion for reconsideration belonged to Juntilla who
alone led it. But, as it happened, he abandoned his motion when he did not come up either
to the Supreme Court or to the HRET to cause it to be resolved.
A n d third, Tagolino is barred from claiming that, in disqualifying Richard, the
COMELEC's First Division in effect caused the cancellation of his CoC. Tagolino made a
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 binding admission during the Preliminary Conference before the HRET that the COMELEC
did not in fact order such cancellation of Richard's CoC. 1 4 Thus, Tagolino admitted that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. By Resolution of February 17, 2010, the Comelec disquali ed Richard I.
Gomez as candidate for Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte for lack of
residency;

4. Gomez led a motion for reconsideration, which the Comelec En Banc

dismissed for lack of merit by Resolution of May 4, 2010;
5. Said May 4, 2010 Resolution of the Comelec did not order the
cancellation of Gomez' certificate of candidacy; (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Tagolino's admission in paragraph 5 above — that the COMELEC did not order the
cancellation of Richard Gomez's certi cate of candidacy — is binding on him, especially
since he makes no allegation that he made such admission through palpable mistake. 1 5
True, the parties raised before the HRET the issue of "whether the substitution of
respondent is valid." But this merely accords with Lucy Gomez's defense in her answer that
the COMELEC had already resolved her substitution of Richard with finality in its Resolution
8890. It did not mean that the parties were submitting to the HRET for resolution the issue
of the nal and executory nature of the COMELEC First Division's resolution that enabled
her to substitute for Richard.
So the Court comes to the real issue in this case: whether or not the HRET can
review and reverse a COMELEC decision, involving a member of the House of
Representatives, that had already become final and executory.
The HRET has no authority to review nal and executory resolutions or decisions of
the COMELEC that it rendered pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, no matter if
such resolutions or decisions are erroneous. The parties cannot by agreement confer such
authority on HRET. Neither the HRET nor the Court can set aside the COMELEC's nal and
executory resolutions that paved the way for Lucy Gomez to substitute her husband.
As for Lucy Gomez's residency quali cation, the evidence presented in the case
amply supports HRET's conclusion that she met such qualification.
For all of the above reasons, I vote to deny the petition.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 48-65. Signed by Supreme Court Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
Diosdado M. Peralta, and Lucas P. Bersamin, Representatives Franklin P. Bautista,
Joselito Andrew R. Mendoza; Justin Marc SB. Chipeco, Rufus B. Rodriguez (dissented),
and Ma. Theresa B. Bonoan-David (abstained).
2. Id. at 257.

3. Id. at 246-253.
4. Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty- ve years
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 of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter
in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Emphasis
supplied)

5. Rollo, pp. 252-253.

6. I d . at 259-265. Signed by Presiding Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, Commissioners

Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal (no part).

7. Id. at 266-277. Penned by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph, with Commissioners Rene V.

Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, and Armando C. Velasco, concurring,
Commissioners Jose A.R. Melo and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, no part.
8. Id. at 278-280.

9. Id. at 297.

10. Id. at 298.

11. Id. at 132-139.

12. Id. at 311-326.

13. Id. at 98.

14. See Torres-Gomez v. Codilla, G.R. No. 195191, March 20, 2012, 668 SCRA 600.

15. Rollo, pp. 85-93.

16. Registered in Precinct No. 0004A of San Rafael, Bulacan.

17. Rollo, pp. 87-92.

18. Id. at 102-119.

19. Id. at 54-55.

20. Id. at 48-65.

21. Id. at 56.

22. Id. at 58-59.

23. BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG No. 881, AS AMENDED.

24. The exception to this is when the said status is waived. Sec. 68 of the OEC partly provides:

Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — . . . Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to

a foreign country shall not be quali ed to run for any elective o ce under this Code,
unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.

25. Aratea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012.

26. Refers to election campaign or political activity outside the campaign period.
27. Refers to the removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda.

28. Refers to certain forms of election propaganda.

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 29. Refers to violation of rules and regulations on election propaganda through mass media.
30. Refers to coercion of subordinates.

31. Refers to threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion.
32. Refers to unlawful electioneering.
33. Refers to the release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds.

34. Refers to the solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election.
35. See BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG NO. 881, AS AMENDED, Section 68.
36. Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certi cate of candidacy. — A veri ed
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certi cate of candidacy may be led
by any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be led at any time
not later than twenty- ve days from the time of the ling of the certi cate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fteen days before the
election.
37. Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 196804 and 197015, October 9, 2012, citing Fermin v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.
38. Fermin v. COMELEC, id.

39. See Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642.

40. Id.
41. Supra note 25, citing Bautista v. COMELEC, 359 Phil. 1, 16 (1998).

42. Supra note 37.

43. Id.
44. 373 Phil. 896, 908, citing Ruperto G. Marting, The Revised Election Code with Annotations
41 (First Edition).
45. Supra note 37.

46. Supra notes 25 and 37.

47. Supra note 39.
48. Id.

49. Rollo, p. 264.

50. Fermin v. COMELEC, supra note 37.
51. Gonzalez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 775-776.

52. Rollo, p. 246.

53. Id. at 252-253; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
54. See Fernandez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 171821, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 116.
55. See Bengson III v. HRET, 409 Phil. 633 (2001); citations omitted.
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 56. Rollo, p. 133.

57. In the case of Lazatin v. HRET, 250 Phil. 390, 399-400 (1988), the Court stated that under
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive, viz.:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
co n f erred . The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired
as if it had originally remained in the legislature." Earlier this grant of power to
the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete;
Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unquali edly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously
granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be said with
regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
58. Art. 6, Sec. 17 of the Constitution states:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. (Emphasis supplied)
59. G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733, 747-748.
60. See Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172131, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 166.

61. Supra note 25, citing the Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press 2010).
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
1. G.R. No. 158833, May 12, 2004, 428 SCRA 383, 386-387.
2. 375 Phil. 1106 (1999).

3. Id. at 1116.
4. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744, 768-770.
ABAD, J., dissenting:

1. Rollo, pp. 246-253.

2. Id. at 259-265.
3. Id. at 266-277.

4. Id. at 278-279.
5. Id. at 281-286.
6. Id. at 303-310.
7. Id. at 311-324.

8. Id. at 85-92.
9. SEC. 2. A rmation or Oath. — The term "A rmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
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 (b) is personally known to the notary public or identi ed by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; . . .

10. Rollo, pp. 23-39.

11. Annex "A," Petition, id. at 48-64.
12. 391 Phil. 344 (2000).

13. Id. at 354.

14. HRET Records, Vol. 1, p. 504.
15. Section 4, Rule 139, Rules of Evidence. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)

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