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Afghan Peace Process

Afghan led Afghan owned peace process.

US Policy towards Afghanistan "war is peace freedom is slavery ignorance is strength"

Graveyard of Empires

The Americans may have finally learned their history lesson: all empires, from the Persian and the Mongol to the British and
Soviet, have suffered defeat in Afghanistan. It is the graveyard of empires, stupid

Except at harvest-time, when self-preservation enjoins a temporary truce, the Pathan tribes are always engaged in private
or public war. Every man is a warrior, a politician and a theologian. Every large house is a real feudal fortress. Every village
has its defence. Every family cultivates its vendetta; every clan, its feud. The numerous tribes and combinations of tribes all
have their accounts to settle with one another.
Source: Winston S. Churchill, 'Chapter XI —The Mahmund Valley', My Early Life, London, Thornton Butterworth, 1930, p. 121

The U.S.-Taliban Agreement: Four Goals

The U.S.-Taliban Agreement

The U.S.-Taliban "Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan" was signed by U.S. Special Representative
for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban's Political Deputy and Head of the Political
Office Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar on February 29, 2020, in Doha, Qatar.
The agreement follows more than eighteen months—and nine rounds—of peace talks, involving Khalilzad,
representatives from the Taliban, delegations from the Afghan government, and numerous other special
representatives or envoys from neighboring or regional countries and international organizations. The
signing of the deal was preceded by a seven-day reduction in violence agreement that was seen as a test
of the Taliban's ability to control its forces
1) Armed groups will be prevented (by the Taliban and Afghan security forces) from using
Afghanistan as a base for acts against the United States and its allies
The Taliban agreed that it will not threaten the United States or its allies, and that it will prevent
armed groups and others in Afghanistan from doing the same. The Taliban also committed to
sending "a clear message" that it will not cooperate with those intent on such activities
2) Foreign forces will withdraw from Afghanistan, including U.S. troops and contractors and
coalition forces
The United States committed to withdrawing all of its military forces—as well as those of allies,
partners, and civilian security personnel—within fourteen months of signing the agreement,
pending the Taliban's demonstration of commitment to the agreement. Presumably as a show of
good faith, the United States also committed to drawing down its troops to 8,600, and withdrawing
from 5 military bases within the first 135 days.
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3) Intra-Afghan negotiations were notionally scheduled to begin on March 10, 2020
The start of negotiations has been dependent on the ability of the Taliban and the Afghan
government to release one thousand prisoners and five thousand prisoners respectively, with the
ultimate goal of releasing all political prisoners three months after talks begin. Once negotiations
have started, the United States has committed to reviewing its sanctions against the Taliban, and
working with the UN Security Council and Afghan government to remove their Taliban-related
sanctions as well.
4) The agenda for intra-Afghan negotiations will include'' discussion of how to implement a
permanent and comprehensive cease-fire, and a political roadmap for the future of Afghanistan
The United States and the Taliban agreed that they seek a "post-settlement Afghan Islamic
government." Pending successful negotiations and an agreed-upon settlement, the United States
has agreed to seek economic cooperation from allies and UN member states for Afghan
reconstruction efforts, and has pledged no further domestic interference in Afghanistan

U.S.-Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Declaration

The same day that U.S. and Taliban negotiators signed the U.S.-Taliban agreement in Doha, Secretary of
Defense Esper, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary Jens Stoltenberg, and Afghan
President Ashraf Ghani signed a joint declaration in Kabul, Afghanistan. Similar to the U.S.-Taliban
agreement, the joint declaration identifies four goals for achieving peace in Afghanistan and regional
stability, with the last two goals dependent on the status of the first two:
1) Prevent terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against the United States
and its allies
Unlike the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the joint declaration specifically references terrorist groups al-
Qaeda and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Khorasan, rather than "armed groups." The United
States and NATO committed to continue training Afghan security forces (per existing security
agreements) and conducting counterterrorism operations, while the Afghan government
committed to preventing these terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a base and continuing
to conduct counterterrorism and counter-narcotic operations.
2) Establish a timeline for withdrawing all foreign troops from Afghanistan.
Similar to the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the United States agreed to reduce its forces to 8,600 within
the first 135 days of signing the agreement, and to withdraw all of its troops within 14 months,
pending the Taliban's fulfillment of its agreement with the United States. The United States also
agreed to continue seeking funds for the training, equipping, and advising of Afghan security forces
3) Agree on a political settlement for future of Afghanistan, following intra-Afghan negotiations.
The Afghan government agreed to join intra-Afghan negotiations, provided the Taliban meets the
conditions outlined in the U.S.-Taliban agreement, and committed to discussions about prisoner
releases. With the United States, the Afghan government also agreed to begin reviewing its
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sanctions against the Taliban after intra-Afghan negotiations begin. The United States, for its part,
confirmed its commitment to seeking UN Security Council approval for future agreements, working

with the Afghan government on reconstruction efforts, and refraining from interference in
Afghanistan's domestic affairs.
4) Establish a permanent and cornprehensive cease-fire.
Both the U.S.-Taliban agreement and joint declaration resolve to establish a permanent cease-fire
in Afghanistan as a precondition for achieving a political settlement. • In addition to these goals,
the United States, NATO, and the Afghan government have agreed that they will work together to
ensure that. Afghan institutions continue to promote social and economic advances, protect the
rights of Afghan citizens, and support democratic norms

The Intra-Afghan Negotiations

Issue of Initial Prisoner Swap

Under the U.S.-Taliban agreement, talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban were supposed
to begin on March 10, 2020, following an initial prisoner swap. However, the Afghan government had not
been consulted on or agreed to the exchange, in which the Afghan government would commit to releasing
five thousand Taliban prisoners and the Taliban would release one thousand Afghan security forces
prisoners. As a result, the prisoner exchange immediately became a contentious issue and talks were
delayed
Formation of Twenty-One-Member Negotiation' Team
Despite initial disagreements over the prisoner exchange as well as ongoing Taliban attacks on Afghan
government forces, however, the Taliban and Afghan government began to discuss a timeline and location
for intra-Afghan talks. In March 2020, the Afghan government named a twenty-one-member negotiation
team for the talks, comprised of "politicians, former officials and representatives of civil society," including
five women. The Afghan government also eventually agreed to an initial release of 1,500 prisoners and to
negotiate on the release of additional prisoners as part of an ongoing process.
Power-Sharing Agreement Reached Between Ashraf Ghani And Abdullah Abdullah
Under the power-sharing agreement reached between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah in May 2020,
Abdullah was named chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, a group that will have final
say on whether or not to sign any agreement negotiated with the Taliban
First Round of Talks
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In June 2020, the Taliban and Afghan government confirmed that they will meet in Doha for the first round
of talks; the Afghan government, however, was careful in its framing of the prospective meeting,
emphasizing that no agreement or consensus had been reached on a location for direct negotiations.
EID Ceasefire
In late July, the Afghan government and Taliban observed a three-day cease-fire in observance of Eid al-
Adha and,
September 12, 2020
finally, in September 2020, representatives of the Afghan government and Taliban held a ceremony to
mark the official start to peace talks in Doha

Implementing the U.S.-Taliban and U.S.-Afghan Government Agreements

• Uncertain US behavior
• Taliban-Terrorist linkage
• Taliban's strategy: talk-talk, fight-fight
• Division among Taliban and Afghani government own ranks

Uncertain US behavior
First, it is uncertain how the United States and allies will be able to assess that necessary conditions have
been met for a full drawdown of military forces, and whether the United States will be able to renegotiate,
and ultimately remove, sanctions on the Taliban. The first 135 days of the agreement have passed and the
United States has reduced troop levels to 8,600 and removed troops from 5 bases, as stipulated by the
U.S.-Taliban agreement and the joint declaration with the Afghan government. However, Taliban attacks
increased across the country following the signing of the agreement and it remains to be seen whether
and how the United States will respond. The United Nations' Afghanistan sanctions monitoring team has
also raised concerns about the ability of the United States and UN Security Council to remove sanctions
on the Taliban given its connections with al-Qaeda and whether it will be possible to address the Taliban's
reliance on narcotics trafficking for profit
Taliban-Terrorist linkage
Second, in order to prevent "armed groups" or "terrorist groups" from using Afghanistan as a base, both
the U.S.- Taliban agreement and joint declaration acknowledge that the Taliban and Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) will need to conduct counterterrorism operations. However, neither
agreement acknowledges or grapples with whether the Taliban and ANDSF—and coalition forces, as
appropriate—will coordinate these operations, how they will validate that attacks have not been carried
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out or supported by subgroups within the Taliban, nor how the Taliban will prove that it has suppressed
Islamic State in Khorasan operations. Moreover, the Taliban's connections to al-Qaeda, largely through
the Haqqani network, could prove difficult to sever. Despite agreeing to sever ties with terrorist groups

under the agreement signed with the United States, a UN report published in May 2020 found that the
Taliban remains in close contact with al-Qaeda.
Taliban's strategy: talk-talk, fight-fight
Finally, despite observing short cease-fires since the agreement was signed, the Taliban seems to have
escalated its military campaign against Afghan security forces. In June 2020, the Afghan government
reported that attacks by the Taliban were up nearly 40 percent over the previous three months when
compared to the same time last year. In July, President Ghani warned that ongoing high levels of violence
pose a serious challenge to the beginning of negotiations, and the Afghan government said that more than
3,500 security forces personnel have been killnd since February.
Division among Taliban and Afghan government own ranks
The internal cohesion and perceived weaknesses of both the Afghan government and the Taliban will also
play a role in the ability for all parties, including the United States, to implement these agreements.

Challenges and Concerns

Challenges to the Intra-Afghan Negotiations

• Concerns around the prisoner swap
• The composition of a future Afghan state and government
• Taliban and Afghan government face internal challenges that threaten their cohesion and
credibility
• Taliban's euphoria of victory: peace could be compromised

Concerns around the prisoner swap

First, concerns around the prisoner swap had to be resolved before prospects for intra-Afghan talks
became a reality. The Afghan government had initially balked at releasing prisoners on the Taliban's list,
insisting many of them were too dangerous. In August 2020, however, the Afghan government convened
a loya jirga—a grand assembly of elders—to discuss and eventually approve the release of the
approximately four hundred remaining Taliban prisoners who had been accused of major crimes.
Following a decree from President Ghani, as of September 2020, the Afghan government had released all
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five thousand of the prisoners from the list requested in exchange for nearly eight hundred and fifty
Afghan security forces. The final six Taliban prisoners, accused of playing a role in the deaths of American,
Australian, and French nationals, and whose proposed release had prompted international protest, were
also released and flown to Qatar to be placed under house arrest, clearing the way for negotiations to
formally begin.

The composition of a future Afghan state and government

Second, questions over the composition of a future Afghan state will need to be resolved for negotiations
to be considered a success. The Afghan government and Taliban will need to address fundamental
concerns about ideology, as well as broad-ranging and practical concerns about power-sharing,
transitional justice, and disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the Taliban into the Afghan security
forces. The Taliban's stated goal for Afghanistan has been to re-create the Islamic Emirate that was
overthrown in 2001. If the Taliban is serious about participating meaningfully in these negotiations and
coming to a power-sharing agreement with the Afghan government, it will have to be flexible and willing
to compromise on this goal, as well as others
Taliban and Afghan government face internal challenges that threaten their cohesion and credibility
Third, the Taliban and Afghan government face internal challenges that threaten their cohesion and
credibility. The Afghan government is fragile. It has faced internal divisions over Ghani's acceptance of the
U.S.-Taliban agreement (which the Afghan government did not participate in) and has been caught up in
negotiations over the disputed outcome of the September 2019 Afghan presidential elections. Those
elections resulted in a months-long dispute over the outcome, which resulted in both Ghani and Abdullah
taking the presidential oath of office in March 2020. While the power-sharing agreement reached by
Ghani and Abdullah in May 2020 allows Abdullah to lead the High Council for National Reconciliation, as
well as name half of the members of the Afghan government's cabinet, tensions between Ghani and
Abdullah, as well as their respective political camps, remain high. Further fractures in their relationship
would threaten the ability of the Afghan government to present a unified front in negotiations with the
Taliban. Beyond the top-level political tensions, the Afghan government is also plagued by high-levels of
corruption and a strained ability to exert control outside of Kabul and a few other major cities. Powerful
officials, warlords, and politicians representing Afghanistan's larger minority ethnic groups may challenge
any agreement the government tries to reach with the Taliban
Taliban's euphoria of victory: peace could be compromised
Finally, after perceiving a signed deal with the United States as a victory, the Taliban could prolong
negotiations to appease the United States—biding its time while the U.S. military completes its withdrawal
and enabling the group to then ramp up its military campaign and attempt to overthrow the Afghan
government. The Taliban's recent escalation of violence not only raises questions about its ability to
control members of the organization, but also about the Taliban's commitment to the agreements it signs.
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If the Taliban simply uses participation in negotiations to appease outside actors or pursue alternate
objectives, peace could be compromised

DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

• Women's Rights
• The Role of Civil Society
• Governance and the Rule of Law
• Development and stability
• Disarmament, Demobilization and reintegration.
• Counter-terrorism

Women's Rights
The extent to which Afghan peace negotiations are able to incorporate women's rights, including
fundamental human rights, will affect the possibilities for peace in Afghanistan. Women face barriers at
all levels of Afghan society, and the quota of women serving in official positions is still low.
The Role of Civil Society
The U.S.-Taliban agreement and U.S.-Afghan government joint declaration do not contain provisions
carving out a space for civil society organizations to participate meaningfully in discussions about the
country's future. This could affect the inclusiveness of the intra-Afghan negotiations and the ability of the
negotiations to reflect concerns of the wider population.
Governance and the Rule of Law
Important questions concerning a future Afghan government revolve around its composition, the judiciary
(including transitional justice) system, and the rule of law.
Counterterrorism
While Afghanistan faces domestic challenges related to counterterrorism within its own borders, the
transnational nature of terrorism means that several terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda and the
Islamic State in Khorasan, are still active in Afghanistan and across the broader Middle East and South
Asia. Preventing terrorism from spreading within Afghanistan has been a core objective of the United
States, and how to address terrorism has been a large point of discussion in negotiations
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The future of peace in Afghanistan will depend on how major regional powers, including Russia, China,
India, Pakistan, and the European Union, act in ways that could undermine the peace process—or propel
it forward. Tensions among the major powers—the United States, China, the European Union, India, and
Russia—and others are increasing, which could affect the outcome of the Afghan peace process as each
power attempts to secure its own interests in the region. Moreover, deteriorating bilateral relationships
between two or more regional powers (for example, between the United States and Iran) could also
undermine efforts to cooperate, or otherwise sway the outcomes of intra-Afghan negotiations.

Role and stakes of regional and great powers in Afghanistan

• Pakistan
• India
• China
• Russia
• Iran
• Us
• EU and NATo
Role and stakes of Pakistan in Afghan Peace process
Role
• Muree peace process, 2015 onwards (last meeting June 2019)
• Decree from Pakistani Ulemas: April 2018 •
• Eid Ceasefire between Afghan Taliban and Afghan govt June 2018
• Release of Taliban Leaders from Pakistan's jail, Oct 2019
• China -Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (3'd round) July, 2020
• Recent visit of Abdullah Abdullah to Pakistan (Sep 27,2020) Pakistan also participated in all
multilateral forums (Moscow front, Geneva conference) to bring Peace in Afghanistan
Pakistan stakes
• Security
• Stability
• Development
• Refugees Issues
• Narcotics and smuggling
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India’s Afghanistan Dilemma?
• Risk of terrorism
• Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan
• persistently fractured government in Kabul.
• US withdrawal from Afghanistan
Options for India
• India can play the role of spoiler
• Carrots-for-Taliban plan
• Talking to Pakistan to arrive at a modus vivendi
• Coordinating India’s Afghanistan policy with Iran
• Use its relationship with Gulf countries to establish leverage on Taliban
Role of other Powers
• China
• Russia
• Iran
• US
• EU and NATO
Prospects for peace in Afghanistan
• Back to future scenario
• Probability of Civil war

It is said, the wise learn from the mistakes of others, the smart learn from their own mistakes, and the
foolish learn from neither
Options

• Minimum presence of US
• Regional Consensus
• Counterterrorism
• Pragmatic role of Taliban
• Development, democracy and Human rights.

May Afghans, especially the Taliban prove as resilient in the pursuit of peace as they have been in
waging war
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