sulfuric acid 

is often used as a drying agent in the production of explosives, dyes, detergents, and
various anhydrous (water-free) materials.

Explosive substances act: sec 2.

Definitions
(a) the expression “explosive substance” shall be deemed to include any materials for making
any explosive substance; also any apparatus, machine, implement or material used, or
intended to be used, or adapted for causing, or aiding in causing, any explosion in or with any
explosive substance; also any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement;

Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain ... vs State Of Maharashtra on 3

March, 1981
Equivalent citations: 1981 AIR 1062, 1981 SCR (3) 68

10. In order to bring home the offence under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act,
the prosecution has to prove; (i) that the substance in question is explosive substance; (ii)
that the accused makes or knowingly has in his possession or under his control any
explosive substance; and (iii) that he does so under such circumstances as to give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that he is not doing so for a lawful object.

The burden of proof of these ingredients is on the prosecution. The moment the
prosecution has discharged that burden, it shifts to the accused to show that he was
making or possessing the explosive substance for a lawful object, if he takes that plea.

2. On a consideration of the evidence of the Explosive

Inspector, and other evidence, the substances in question
which were recovered from the appellants were "explosive substances" within the definition
ofthat expression in section 2 of the Explosive Substances
Act.
3: 1. The factum of the recovery of the said articles from the possession of
appellant No. 1 and also the evidence that his three sons, appellants 2 to 4, who were
managing and running the shop of M. F. Maniyar and Sons from which the incriminating
substances were seized clearly show that all of them were guilty. [76 G-H, 77A]
3: 2. The several substances seized, not being minute or small in quantity, make it
clear that the appellants were in "conscious possession" of the substances seized within
the meaning of section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act.
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7. The decision reported in Rajani Kanta Mandal v. State of Bihar relied on by the learned
Counsel for the petitioners has no application to the facts of this case. It was held in that
case that to substantiate a charge under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, it is
not sufficient to prove merely that the accused was in conscious possession of an
explosive substance and that the prosecution has to prove further that incriminating
objects were recovered from the possession of the accused in the circumstances giving
rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had taken them in his possession not for a lawful
object. But, in the present case, as already pointed out, there is prima facie reasonable
suspicion that the first petitioner was in possession of the gun-powder for an unlawful
object. As such, the first petitioner is not entitled to bail.

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Rajani kanta mandal vs state of bihar

8. Learned counsel has next argued that at best the prosecution can be said to have proved
that the appellant was in conscious possession of the incriminating objects. It is urged that
mere conscious possession of these objects is not sufficient to bring the charge home to
the appellant. There is force in this contention. Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act
provides as follows :

"Any person who ....... knowingly has in his possession ..... any explosive substance,
under such circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he ...... does not
have it in his possession ... for a lawful object, shall, unless he can show that he. ...... had
it in his possession ...... for, a lawful object, be punishable ......".

It is pointed out that there is no evidence in this case to show that the incriminating
articles were recovered in this case under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion that the appellant did not have them in his possession for a lawful object. In R.
v. Hallam, (1957) 1 All ER 665, Section 4(1) of the corresponding English Act was
construed by Lord Goddard, C. J. The words of that section are similar to those of Section
5 of the Indian Act. The question directly at issue in that case was whether the word
"knowingly" meant that the accused must know not only that he had a parcel or a
substance in his possession but also that it was an explosive.

It was held that the clear meaning of the section was that the person not only knowingly
had in his possession the substance but must know that it was an explosive substance. It
was then observed that if evidence was given that the person had the substance in his
possession, and some evidence of circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that he had got it for a lawful purpose was given, the jury were then entitled to infer that
he knew it was an explosive substance. I may quote his Lordship's words :

"We think the proper direction to give to a jury in this case is that they must first of all be
satisfied that he had the substance in his possession. Secondly, they must be satisfied that
it was in his possession in circumstances such as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that he had it in his possession not for a lawful object .... .".

This second ingredient is completely lacking in this case. The prosecution has led no
evidence to show that there are any circumstances in this case to give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that the appellant had incriminating articles in his possession not for a lawful
object. The only thing alleged on behalf of the prosecution was that the appellant was an
outsider. The appellant is either a Bengali or an Oriya. It is somewhat difficult to treat the
presence of a member of either of these two communities in a town like Jamshedpur as a
suspicious circumstance. According to the evidence of the prosecution itself, the appellant
never tried to conceal the contents of his Jhola.

If he was in possession of the incriminating objects not for a lawful object he would not
have so readily disclosed the contents of his jhola or the nature of the objects as readily as
he is reported to have done. I am, therefore, of opinion that there being no proof that the
incriminating objects were recovered from the possession of the appellant in
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that he had them in his possession not
for a lawful object the charge under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act is not
sirstainable against him.

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