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Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners

28 SCRA 345

DOCTRINE: The Board cannot compel petitioner to take the witness stand as a witness for
the complainants. The principle against self-incrimination is equally applicable to a
proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice the medical
profession.

FACTS:
Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the CFI Manila an
action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners, now respondent-appellant alleging therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would
present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such
malpractice charge. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating
that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called
upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority. Petitioner-appellee alleged that the Board of Examiners, in ruling to compel
him to take the witness stand was guilty of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the
constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which
could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi- criminal in character. The lower court
commanded respondent Board to refrain from hearing further proceeding with the administrative
case. Respondent Board denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion. An intervention was
filed by the intervenors Salvador and Enriqueta Gatbonton sustaining the power of respondent
Board, which for them is limited to compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in
their opinion, from the power to compel a witness to incriminate himself. The lower court held that
respondent Board is prohibited from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for
the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner-appellee can invoke his right against self-incrimination
and refuse to take the witness stand in an administrative case.

HELD:
YES. In the case of Cabal v. Kapunan, an administrative charge for unexplained wealth
having been filed against petitioner under the Anti-Graft Act, the complainant requested the
investigating committee that petitioner be ordered to take the witness stand, which request was
granted. Upon petitioner’s refusal to be sworn as such witness, a charge for contempt was filed
against him in the sala of respondent Judge. He filed a motion to quash and upon its denial, he
initiated this proceeding. The Supreme Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-
settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory
questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." While the matter referred to an administrative
charge of unexplained wealth, there is clearly still an imposition of penalty. The proceeding for
forfeiture while administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. In the case at
bar, petitioner will also be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property
but the revocation of his license as medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption by respondent Board and
intervenors-appellants that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited
to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal liability
being subsequently incurred. It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the language of
another American decision, is the protection against "any disclosures which the witness may
reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other
evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it becomes diluted. The
constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had
occasion to declare: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be
used as a presumption of his guilt." Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking
through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that is the right of a defendant "to
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand—with undiluted,
unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force to surrender to his detriment." So also with the observation of the late
Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. That right
is the hallmark of our democracy." In the light of the above, the Court holds that in an
administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of
Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.