Aquino III and Robredo v COMELEC

April 7, 2010 | Perez, J.

Topic: Political Org. and Govt. Structure – Legislature – Creation of a Legis. District

KEY FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province. The said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.

To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order
to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.

Petitioners, as public officers, taxpayers, and citizens, claim that the reapportionment
introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional standards that require a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district as allegedly provided for in Sec. 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution.
Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or
only 176,383.

The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, concede the existence of a

250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the
creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population
is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

PERTINENT ISSUES:
WON R.A. 9176 is unconstitutional, more specifically WON the 250, 000 population
requirement is indispensible in the creation of a legislative district in a province

RULING OF THE COURT:

NO, such is not an indispensible requirement, and thus R.A. 9176 is a valid law.
- Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality.
Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the
Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld.1
- The second sentence of Sec. 5(3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.”
- There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on
one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is
entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population.
Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled. The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
"each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or
each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.
- Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation
of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative
district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as

certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is
merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

DISPOSITIVE:
Petition DISMISSED, R.A. 9716 is a VALID LAW.

1 Professor Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer, p. 178, on this
presumption: “Every law carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by
this court… This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute
or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. People v. Judge Nitafan, G.R.
Nos. 107964-66, February 1,1999.”
 Chavez v JBC, Escudero, and Tupas, Jr.
April 16, 2013 | Mendoza, J.
Topic: Political Org. and Govt. Structure - Judiciary – The Judicial and Bar Council

KEY FACTS:
In 1994, an eighth member was added to the Judicial and Bar Council when two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC—one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate—each having one-half of a vote. Later on, the
JBC en banc decided that the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives were allowed one full vote each. Respondents Senator Francis Escudero
and Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. both sat in the JBC as representatives of the legislature.

Petitioner argues that the first paragraph of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution
should mean one representative for the entirety of Congress. Respondents claim that
the phrase “a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should
have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature, as both houses
have their respective powers in performance of their duties.

PERTINENT ISSUES:
WON the first paragraph of Art. VIII, Sec. 8 provides that only one representative shall
come from Congress, representing both houses.

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES, only one representative, representing both houses, is allowed by the Constitution.
- A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed
adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism.
- One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the
presidential election shall be broken “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting separately.”
- Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-
President to be confirmed “by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.”
- Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the
Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members.”
- In all these provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly,
the corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and
voted upon by its two Houses. Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust
Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral
form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot just lean on plain
oversight to justify a conclusion favourable to them. It is very clear that the Framers
were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC
because it was not in the exercise of its primary function―to legislate. JBC was created
to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was
merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.2
- No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the
Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members [one rep.
from the IBP, one professor of law, one retired member of the SC, and one rep. from the
private sector], three (3) representatives from the major branches of government―the
Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary
of Justice (representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the
Congress(representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In
so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was
in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of
government.
- The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of
Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of
Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally
empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional
authority, but it is not an absurdity.3

DISPOSITIVE:
MR is DENIED.

2
Professor Gorospe, Political Law (2016 ed.), p. 624, on the history of the JBC, citing this case: “Prompted
by clamor to rid the process of appointment to the Judiciary from political pressure and partisan
activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent
and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC).”
3
Gorospe, supra, p. 625, on the congressional rep, citing this case.: “With regard to the representative
coming from Congress, notwithstanding such body has two chambers, the Court held that pursuant to
the language of the Fundamental Law itself, there should only be one representative from Congress,
subject to both chambers working out the appropriate arrangement as to how to determine who will sit as
member at any given time.”
 Daplas v Dept. of Finance
April 12, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Topic: Law on Public Officers – Ill-Gotten Wealth and State Recovery – filing of SALNs

KEY FACTS:
Petitioner joined the government service as a casual clerk for the Municipal Treasurer of
Kawit, Cavite sometime in 1968, and had held various posts until she was appointed as
the Pasay City Treasurer on May 19, 1989, with a gross monthly salary of ₱28,722.00. At
the time material to the complaints, petitioner was concurrently holding the position of
Officer-in- Charge, Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance
(BLGF) in Cebu City.

Two (2) separate complaints were filed against petitioner by the Department of Finance-
Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS) and the Field Investigation Office
(FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman; respondents) for averred
violations, constituting Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service, arising out of her failure to disclose the true and detailed
statement of her assets, liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and financial
connections, and those of her spouse in her SALNs (a 1993 Mitsubishi Galant [250k],
stock subscription at KEI Realty and Devt. Corp [1.5M], several real properties in
Cavite, and multiple travels abroad without travel authority).

Petitioner insisted that she acquired her properties through lawful means, and
maintained that she was not totally dependent on her salary to finance the said
acquisitions.

In a Joint Decision dated May 8, 2007, the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, and imposed
the penalty of Dismissal. CA affirmed, hence this petition.

PERTINENT ISSUES:
WON the CA was correct in affirming the decision of the Ombudsman

RULING OF THE COURT:

Petition is partly meritorious.
- In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner failed to declare some properties in
her SALNs for the years 1997 to 2003 despite the legal obligation to do so.
 - The filing of SALNs is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution in order
to promote transparency in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against
government officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful means.
- By mandate of law, i.e., RA 6713, it behooves every government official or
employee to accomplish and submit a sworn statement completely disclosing his
or her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including
those of his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age
living in their households, in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of
wealth because the latter usually results from nondisclosure of such matters.4
- Both the Ombudsman and the CA held that such omission provides substantial basis
to hold petitioner liable for the administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct. The Court disagrees.
- Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the
administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are lacking to warrant
petitioner's dismissal from service. Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial
evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and conceal the
other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to disclose
in her 1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in
the absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false
statements. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some
motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes
- Likewise, the charge of Grave Misconduct against petitioner must fail. Verily, the
omission to include the subject properties in petitioner's SALNs, by itself, does not
amount to Grave Misconduct, in the absence of showing that such omission had, in
some way, hindered the rendition of sound public service for there is no direct relation
or connection between the two.

DISPOSITIVE:
The petition is PARTLYGRANTED. Petition found liable for SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE.

4 Professor De Leon and De Leon, Jr., The Law on Public Officers and Election Law (8th Edition), on the basis
for monitoring income and lifestyle of govt. officials and employees: “The law requires that the Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) must be accomplished as truthfully as detailed and as
accurately as possible. Every asset acquired by a civil servant (e.g., through a chattel mortgage) must be
declared. The SSAL serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and
lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in compliance with the constitutional policy to
promote transparency in government to eradicate corruption and ensure that they lead just and modest
lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made accessible to the public subject to
reasonable administrative regulations.”
 Republic v Provincial Govt. of Palawan
Dec. 04, 2018 | Tijam, J.
Topic: Mun. Corp. – Fiscal Autonomy and Self-Reliance- Share in the Natl. Wealth

KEY FACTS:
On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic or National
Government), through the Department of Energy (DoE), entered into Service Contract
No. 38 with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, Incorporated
(collectively SPEX/OXY), as Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of petroleum
operations in the area known as "Camago-Malampaya" located offshore northwest of
Palawan. Exploration of the area led to the drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural
gas reservoir about 80 kilometers from the main island of Palawan and 30 km from the
platform.

The Provincial Government of Palawan asserted its claim over forty percent (40%) of
the National Government's share in the proceeds of the project. It argued that since the
reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said share under
Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The National Government disputed the
claim, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately 80 km from Palawan's
coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the province and is within the
national territory of the Philippines.

The RTC ruled for respondents, holding that it was "unthinkable" to limit Palawan's
territorial jurisdiction to its landmass and municipal waters considering that the Local
Government Code empowered them to protect the environment, and R.A. No. 7611
adopted a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan
compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered
environment of the province. Hence, this petition.

PERTINENT ISSUES:
WON Palawan is entitled to the 40% share in the proceeds of the Project

RULING OF THE COURT:

NO, Palawan is not entitled to such proceeds.
- None of the parties in the instant cases dispute the LGU's entitlement to an equitable
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of national wealth within their
respective areas.
- Under Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, "(t)he State shall ensure the
autonomy of local governments." In furtherance of this State policy, the 1987
Constitution conferred on LGUs the power to create its own sources of revenue
 and the right to share not only in the national taxes, but also in the proceeds of
the utilization of national wealth in their respective areas.
- Section 7, Article X of the Constitution provides: “Local governments shall be
entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development
of the national wealth within their respective areas, in the manner provided by
law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits.”
- The Local Govt. Code gave flesh to Sec. 7 (Sec. 18, Secs. 289-91)
- The issue, therefore, hinges on what comprises the province's "area" which the Local
Government Code has equated as its "territorial jurisdiction." The intention of the LGC
is to consider an LGU's territorial jurisdiction as pertaining to a physical location or area
as identified by its boundaries.
- “As defined in its organic law, the province of Palawan comprises merely of islands.
The continental shelf, where the Camago-Malamapaya reservoir is located, was clearly
not included in its territory.”
- The Court also held that Presidential Decree No. 1596, which constituted
Kalayaan as a separate municipality of the Province of Palawan, cannot be the
basis for holding that the Camago-Malampaya reservoir forms part of Palawan’s
territory. It declared that the delineation of territory in PD 1596 refers to
Kalayaan alone and that the inclusion of the seabed, subsoil, and continental
margin in Kalayaan’s territory cannot by simple analogy be applied to Palawan. 5
- Likewise, it held that the definition of “Palawan” under Republic Act No. 7611
should not be taken as a statement of territorial limits for purposes of Section 7,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, but in the context of RA 7611 which is aimed
at environmental monitoring, research, and education.6
- The Court also did not subscribe to Palawan’s argument that the national
wealth, the proceeds from which the State is mandated to share with the LGUs,
shall be wherever the local government exercises any degree of jurisdiction. “An
LGU’s territorial jurisdiction is not necessarily co-extensive with its exercise or
assertion of powers. To hold otherwise may result in condoning acts that are
clearly ultra vires…”7

DISPOSITIVE:
Petition GRANTED. Decision of the RTC SET ASIDE.

5 Cited from “SC Holds Palawan as Not Entitled to Share in the Proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya Project,” an
article located on the SC official website. Posted January 23, 2019, at http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/541/.
6
Id.
7
Id., on the matter: “It may lead to, the words of the Republic, LGUs ‘rush(ing) to exercise its powers and
functions in areas rich in natural resources even if outside its boundaries) with the intention of seeking a
share in the proceeds of its exploration’ – a situation that ‘would sow conflict not only among the local
government units and the national government but worse, between and among local government units.”
 Goh v Bayron
November 25, 2014 | Carpio, J.
Topic: Mun. Corp. – Term Limits and Recall – COMELEC Authority on Recall Elections

KEY FACTS:
Alroben Goh filed before the COMELEC a recall petition against Mayor Bayron of
Puerto Princesa City due to loss of trust and confidence. COMELEC found the recall
petition sufficient in form and substance but suspended the funding of any and all
recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue.

COMELEC contended that while there is a law authorizing the Chairman to augment a
deficient appropriation, there was no existing line item in the Commission’s budget for
the actual conduct of recall elections. The Commission also posited that granting
arguendo that the line item for the “conduct and supervision of elections, referenda,
recall votes and plebiscites” under the Program category of the Commission’s 2014
budget is also a line item for the conduct of recall elections, still augmentation cannot be
made within the bounds of the law. Under Sec. 69 of the General Provisions of the 2014
GAA, there are priorities in the use of savings, and the conduct of recall elections is not
one of them.

Goh submits in this petition that, notwithstanding its finding that the recall petition was
sufficient in form and substance, COMELEC’s decision to nevertheless suspend the
holding of a recall election supposedly through lack of funding constituted grave
abdication and wanton betrayal of the Constitutional mandate and a grievous violation
of the sovereign power of the people.

PERTINENT ISSUES:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion by suspending the funding
of recall elections

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES, COMELEC committed grave abuse.
- The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to “[e]nforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.”8 The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the

8
Gorospe, supra, citing Pangadaman v COMELEC, 319 SCRA 283 (1999), on this granted power: “The
constitutional provisions relating to the COMELEC have been read liberally in favor of allowing such
body to do its job in the best of lights it sees – ‘to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers
for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.’”
COMELEC’s fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to
augment items in its appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such
authorization to the COMELEC Chairman.
- COMELEC is mandated to shoulder all expenses relative to recall elections.
- Despite COMELEC’s statement about the alleged failure of the 2014 GAA to provide
for a line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections, we hold that the 2014
GAA actually expressly provides for a line item appropriation for the conduct and
supervision of recall elections. This is found in the Programs category of its 2014
budget, which the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a “line item for the
‘Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.’”
- In addition, one of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is to conduct
recall elections. When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its
“Current Operating Expenditures,” such appropriation includes expenditures to carry
out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections.
- In the 2014 GAA, there is a specific line item appropriation for the “Conduct and
supervision of x x x recall votes x x x.” More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its
Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has “a line item for the ‘Conduct and
supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.’” This admission of the
COMELEC is a correct interpretation of this specific budgetary appropriation.
- To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific
purpose. However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into
different related subcategories of the same nature. For example, the purpose can
be to “conduct elections,” which even if not expressly spelled out covers regular,
special, or recall elections. The purpose of the appropriation is still specific — to
fund elections, which naturally and logically include, even if not expressly
stated, not only regular but also special or recall elections.
- Contrary to the COMELEC’s assertion, the appropriations for personnel
services and maintenance and other operating expenses falling under “Conduct
and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites” constitute a
line item which can be augmented from the COMELEC’s savings to fund the
conduct of recall elections in 2014. The conduct of recall elections requires only
operating expenses, not capital outlays.

DISPOSITIVE:
Petition is GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution PARTIALLY REVERESED and SET
ASIDE.