I.

As the agent, petitioner was mandated to look after the interests of the Spouses
Briones. However, instead of going after the insurance proceeds, as expected of it as
the agent, petitioner opted to claim the full amount from the Spouses Briones,
disregard the established principal-agency relationship, and put its own interests
before those of its principal.

The facts show that the insurance policy was valid when the vehicle was lost, and
that the insurance claim was only denied because of the belated filing.1â wphi1

Having been negligent in its duties as the duly constituted agent, petitioner must be
held liable for the damages suffered by the Spouses Briones because of non-
performance65 of its obligation as the agent, and because it prioritized its interests
over that of its principal.66

Furthermore, petitioner's bad faith was evident when it advised the Spouses
Briones to continue paying three (3) monthly installments after the loss,
purportedly to show their good faith.67 A principal and an agent enjoy a fiduciary
relationship marked with trust and confidence, therefore, the agent has the duty "to
act in good faith [to advance] the interests of [its] principal."68

If petitioner was indeed acting in good faith, it could have timely informed the
Spouses Briones that it was terminating the agency and its right to file an insurance
claim, and could have advised them to facilitate the insurance proceeds themselves.
Petitioner's failure to do so only compounds its negligence and underscores its bad
faith. Thus, it will be inequitable now to compel the Spouses Briones to pay the full
amount of the lost property.

II.

III.

The suit will not prosper because Pablo

was not unlawfully deprived of the car
although he was unlawfully deprived of the
price. The perfection of the sale and the
delivery of the car was enough to allow
Alfonso to have a right of ownership over
the car, which can be lawfully transferred to
Gregorio. Art. 559 applies only to a person
who is in possession in good faith of the
property, and not to the owner thereof.
Alfonso, in the problem, was the owner, and,
hence, Gabriel acquired the title to the car. Nonpayment of the price in a contract of
sale does not render ineffective the obligation to
deliver. The obligation to deliver a thing is
different from the obligation to pay its price.

IV.

The marriage of Roderick and Faye is

not valid. Art. 4 of the FC provide that the
absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites renders the marriage void ab initio.
However, no license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least
5 years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. In Republic v. Dayot(G.R. No.
175581, March 28, 2008), reiterating the
doctrine in Niñ al v. Bayadog (G.R. No. 133778,
March 14, 2000), this five-year period is
characterized by exclusivity and continuity. In
the present case, the marriage of Roderick and
Faye cannot be considered as a marriage of
exceptional character, because there were two
legal impediments during their cohabitation:
minority on the part of Faye, during the first
two years of cohabitation; and, lack of legal
capacity, since Faye married Brad at the age of
18. The absence of a marriage license made the
marriage of Faye and Roderick void ab initio.

V.

The owner of a dominant estate may validly

obtain a compulsory right of way only after he
has established the existence of four requisites,
to wit:
1. The (dominant) estate is surrounded by
other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
2. After payment of the proper indemnity;
3. The isolation was not due to the
proprietor's own acts; and
4. The right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate, and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to
the public highway may be the shortest.

VI.

In guaranty, the guarantor is entitled to the

benefit of excussion; whereas, in
suretyship the surety is not entitled.

VII.

The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under

Article 1028 for being in consideration of her
adulterous relation with the testator. She is,
therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy of
100,000 pesos. The legacy of 50,000 pesos in
favor of Ernie is not inofficious not having
exceeded the free portion. Hence, he shall be
entitled to receive it.

the institution giving X the free

portion is not valid, because the
prohibitions under Art. 739 of the Civil
Codeondonationsalsoapplytotestamentar
ydispositions (Art. 1028), among
donationswhichare considered void are
those made between persons who were
guiltyofadulteryorconcubinageatthetime
ofthe donation

VIII

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death

obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit
of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared
presumptively dead has never been absent.

IX

If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the
donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing.1â wphi1 Otherwise, the
donation shall be void.

X
Furthermore, what is most significant in
determining the type of donation is the
absence of stipulation that the donor could
revoke the donation; on the contrary, the deeds
expressly declare them to be “irrevocable,” a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea
of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is the essence of the act, to the
extent that a testator cannot lawfully waive or
restrict his right of revocation. The provisions
of the deed of donation which state that the
same will only take effect upon the death of the
donor and that there is a prohibition to
alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same
should be harmonized with its express
irrevocability

XI

The action filed by the lessee, for both

rescission of the offending sale and specific
performance of the right of first refusal which
was violated, should prosper. The ruling in
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair
Theater, Inc, (264 SCRA 482), a case with
similar facts, sustains both rights of action
because the buyer in the subsequent sale
knew the existence of right of first refusal,
hence in bad faith.

XII.

may not
engage in any other business unless their
partnership expressly permits him to do so
because as an industrial partner he has to
devote his full time to the business of the
partnership.

XIII.

Absence of marriage license did not make

the marriage void ab initio. Since the
marriage was solemnized in articulo mortis,
it was exempt from the license requirement
under Art. 31 of the Family Code.

XIV.

The chattel mortgage is only

given as security and not as payment for the
debt in case of failure to pay.

Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the

things sold, also in case of default of two or
more installments, with no further action
against the purchaser.

XV

Arnel has the right to use the surname of G,

her mother, and is entitled to support as
well as the legitime consisting of ½ of that
of each of X, Y and E

XVI

XVII

XVIII

A builder in good
faith is someone who occupies the
property in the concept of an owner. The
provisions on builder-planter-sower under
the Civil Code cover cases in which the
builder, planter and sower believe
themselves to be owners of the land, or at
least, to have a claim of title thereto

If Pedro is a builder in good faith and Juan

is an owner in good faith, Juan has the
right to appropriate as his own the house
after payment of indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code,
which are the necessary and useful
expenses. As to useful expenses, Juan has
the option to either refund the amount of
the expenses, or pay the increase in value
which the land may have acquired by
reason thereof. Alternatively, under Article
448 of the Civil Code, Juan has the right to
oblige Pedro to pay the price of the land.
However, Pedro cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the house. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rend, if Juan does not
choose to appropriate the house after
proper indemnity. It is the owner of the
land who is authorized to exercise the
options under Article 448 because his right
is older and by principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.

XIX

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the
health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of
any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use
of property.

It can easily be gleaned that the Torre de Manila is not a nuisance per se. The Torre
de Manila project cannot be considered as a "direct menace to I public health or
safety." Not only is a condominium project commonplace in the City of Manila,
DMCI-PDI has, according to the proper government agencies, complied with health
and safety standards set by law.

XX

In this case, there was no vendor-vendee relationship between

respondent and petitioner. A judicious perusal of the records would reveal
that respondent never bought the subject vehicle from petitioner but from a
third party, and merely sought financing from petitioner for its full purchase
price. In order to document the loan transaction between petitioner and
respondent, a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage29 dated August 18,
2005 was executed wherein, inter alia, respondent acknowledged her
indebtedness to petitioner in the amount of Pl, 196, 100.00 and placed the
subject vehicle as a security for the loan.30 Indubitably, a loan contract with
the accessory chattel mortgage contract - and not a contract of sale of
personal property in installments - was entered into by the parties with
respondent standing as the debtor-mortgagor and petitioner as the
creditormortgagee. Therefore, the conclusion of the CA that Article 1484 finds
application in this case is misplaced, and thus, must be set aside.

XXI

a person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the

death of a putative parent must do so via a record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation.

The following provision is therefore also available to the private

respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation:
Article. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
( 1) The open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.

Under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 173 and

Art. 175 of the FC, the filiation of
illegitimate children may be established in
the same way and by the same evidence
as legitimate children. Art. 172 provides
that the filiation of legitimate children
isestablishedbyanyofthefollowing: (1)the
record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final Judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signedby theparent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws.

A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the putative

parent, is tenuous proof of filiation.
Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia's delayed registration
of birth the same evidentiary weight as regular birth certificates.

Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment, filiation may still be established after the death of a putative
parent through an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument, signed by the parent concemed.64 However,
petitioners did not present in evidence any admissions of filiation.