JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 LIST OF CASES:
A. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES
1. DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA
SECTION 27, ARTICLE 18, 1987 CONSTITUTION
(G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987)
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner
Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the
other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de
Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986
but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra
on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G.
Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by
authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a
Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating
respondents Remigio M. Tigas, et al., as members of the
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, Esguerra no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.
However, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III
of the Provisional Constitution, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials
and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive
order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of the respondents to
replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on February 25, 1987.
HELD:
NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still
within the one year deadline under the Provisional
Constitution, the same must be deemed to have been
overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading:
“This Constitution shall take effect immediately
upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all
previous Constitutions.”
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite
on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.
Having become inoperative, Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the
respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum dated
February 8, 1987 by
the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any
legal force and effect.
The act of ratification is the act of voting by the
people. The canvass of the votes thereafter is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date
of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of the President is
merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which
was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the
Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite.
2. ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, G.R.
No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
DECISION
(En Banc)
LAUREL, J.:
I.      THE FACTS
Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner
and took his oath of office as member of the National
Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December
3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution
confirming the election of those who have not been subject
of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said
resolution. 
On December 8, 1935, however, private
respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the
petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National
Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing
that it will not consider any election protest that was not
submitted on or before December 9, 1935. 
Citing among others the earlier resolution of the
National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of
respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however
denied his motion.
II.    THE ISSUE
Did the Electoral Commission act without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest
filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
III.   THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition.]
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of
the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission acted within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner
Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National
Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
election protests against members of the National Assembly,
nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial
of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.
[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried
with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to
limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred.
In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating
to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
B. THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
1. BACANI V. NACOCO
[GRN L-9657 NOVEMBER 29, 1956]
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS:
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW

The plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in 2. PVTA VS.CIR

Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the
[GRN L-32052 JULY 25, 1975]
pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled
Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant
FACTS:
Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for defendant,
Private respondents filed with the CIR a petition,
requested said stenographers for copies, of the transcript of
allegingtheir employment relationship, the overtime services
the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing.
in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them,
Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer
thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their
was for the differential between the amount actually paid to
fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of
them and the amount allegedly due them. Petitioner
P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denied the
for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
allegations. The then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the
respondent Court sustained the claims of private
Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and
respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963
sought the recovery of the amounts paid. The respondents
up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970,
argue that National Coconut Corporation may be considered
and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had
as included in the term "Government of the Republic of the
already paid. Petitioner claims that the matter is beyond the
Philippines" for the purposes of the exemption of the legal
jurisdiction of the CIR as it is exercising governmental
fees provided for in Rule 1-30 of the Rules of Court.
functions and that it is exempt from the operation of C.A.
444, invoking the doctrine announced in the leading
ISSUE: Whether or not NACOCO is a part of the
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
Government of the Philippines by virtue of its performance of
decision, and the distinction between constituent and
government functions.
ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v.
National Coconut Corporation.
HELD:
No, NACOCO does not acquire that status for the
ISSUE: Whether or not the traditional classification of
simple reason that it does not come under the classification
function of government as ministrant and constituent
of municipal or public corporation. To resolve the issue in
applicable in the case at bar.
this case requires a little digression on the nature and
functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.
HELD:
To begin with, we state that the term "Government" may be
No. The irrelevance of such a distinction
defined as "that institution or aggregate of institutions by
considering the needs of the times was clearly pointed out
which an independent society makes and carries out those
by the present Chief Justice. Under this traditional
rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by
a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming
the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
that society by those who possess the power or authority of
promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people -
prescribing them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This
these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which
institution, when referring to the national government, has
is optional on the part of the government."
reference to what our Constitution has established
Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively:
composed of three great departments, the legislative,
"The growing complexities of modern society, however, have
executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of
functions of government are exercised. These functions are
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas
twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those
which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and
which constitute the very bonds of society and are
which the government was called upon to enter optionally,
compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are
and only 'because it was better equipped to administer for
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of
the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
society, and are merely optional.
individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
To this latter class belongs the organization of
and to be absorbed within activities that the government
those corporations owned or controlled by the government to
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the
promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people
increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a
we call government-owned or controlled corporations which
greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this
may take on the form of a private enterprise or one
development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national
organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private
policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle
corporation under the Corporation Law.
concerning the promotion of social justice."
But while NACOCO was organized for the
Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v.
ministrant function of promoting the coconut industry,
National Coconut Corporation, based on the Wilsonian
however, it was given a corporate power separate and
classification of the tasks incumbent on government into
distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the
constituent and ministrant in accordance with the laissez
provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
faire principle.
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21,
(sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518).
1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court, denying a
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines"
motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed.
used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers
only to that government. entity through which the functions of
the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty,
and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial,
municipal or other form of local government. These are what
we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality.
separate and distinct from the government and 'which are
governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and
liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of
their corporate charters.
As this Court has aptly said, "The mere fact that 3. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS V.
the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does MONTE DE PIEDAD
not make it a public corporation" (National Coal Co. vs. (G.R. NO. L-9959, DECEMBER 13, 1916)
Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-597). "By TRENT, J.:
becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the
Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far FACTS:
as respects the transactions of the corporation. Unlike the About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into
Government, the corporation may be sued without its the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of
consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the
Company remains an agency or instrumentality of earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on
government." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto a central relief board was
Springer, 50 Phil., 288.) appointed to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily
contributed and allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers
named in its resolution. By order of the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together
with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in
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the Official Gazette of Manila. These were later distributed
up to the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of
$365,403.85.
Upon the petition of the governing body of the
Monte de Piedad, the Philippine Government, by order,
directed its treasurer to turn over to the former the sum of
$80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each
and were received on the following dates: February 15,
March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the
possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various
petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the
above-mentioned allotments were made, the Philippine
Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover,
"through the Attorney-General and in representation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together
with interest. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of
the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and made the following
contentions:
that the $80,000, given to the Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so given as a
donation, and that said donation had been
cleared;
that the Government of the Philippine
Islands has not subrogated the Spanish
Government in its rights, as regards an important
sum of money abovementioned;
that the only persons who could claim to
be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it
was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que
trustent, thus, the plaintiff is not the proper party to
bring the action;
that the court erred in holding in its
decision that there is no title for the prescription of
this suit brought by the Insular Government
against the defendant appellant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the $80,000 received by Monte de Piedad
was in form of donation.
2. Whether or not the obligation on the part of the Monte de
Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even
considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of
sovereignty.
3. Whether or not the Government is a proper party to the
case under the doctrine of parens patriae.
4. Whether or not the Philippine Government is bound by the
statute of limitations.
HELD:
1.No.Documentary evidence shows that Monte de
Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-
General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for
more working capital, asked that out of the sum of
$100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, there
be transferred to it the sum of $80,000. The Monte de
Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not
be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would
be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given
to it as a donation.
The Department of Finance, acting under the
orders of the Governor-General, understood that the
$80,000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew
that it received this sum as a loan interest." Furthermore, the
Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as
March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable
loan, and without interest." Thus, there cannot be the
slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received
the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a
donation.
2.No. Court ruled that if legal provisions are in
conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions
of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their
force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United
States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal
law which regulates private and domestic rights," they
continued in force and are still in force unless they have
been repealed by the present Government.
From the nature and class of the subject matter, it
is clear that it falls within the latter class. They are laws
which are not political in any sense of the word. They
conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty
to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities
and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in
exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of
which are in the nature of charitable institutions, from
taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment
in securities are concerned, under the general supervision of
the Insular Treasurer.
3.Yes.The ground upon which the right of the
Government to maintain the action rests on the fact that the
money, being given to a charity became a public property,
only applicable to the specific purposes to which it was
intended to be devoted. It is but within those limits
consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public
resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the
Philippine Government. To deny the
Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary
to sound public policy.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Sohier
vs. Mass. General Hospital, ruled that: “insane persons and
person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries
of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their
rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign
authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this
beneficient functions has not ceased to exist under the
change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but
that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be
called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of
justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised
in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.”
Chancelor Kent says: In this country, the legislature or
government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to
enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no
other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, note.)
4.No. In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by
numerous authorities, is stated as follows:
In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary,
statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the
sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the
rule is otherwise where the mischief to be remedied are of
such a nature that the state must necessarily be included,
where the state goes into business in concert or in
competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to
enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or
government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.
In the instant case the Philippine Government is
not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and
prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions
or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon
it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United
States.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed
from is affirmed.
4. CO KIM CHAN V. VALDEZ TAN KEH
75 PHIL 113, SEPTEMBER 17, 1945
FERIA, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying
that the respondent judge be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case no.
3012 which was initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military
occupation of the islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance
of and continue the proceedings on the following grounds:
(1) the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen.
Mac Arthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all
judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and
the Republic established during the Japanese occupation;(2)
the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of
the defunct Republic in the absence of enabling law granting
such authority; (3) the government established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a de
facto government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the government established during the
Japanese occupation was a de facto government.
2. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts existing in the Philippines under the Phil. Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good
and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the US and Filipino forces.
3. Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. Mac
Arthur declaring “all laws, regulations and processes of any
other government in the Philippines than that of the
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control” has invalidated al judgments and judicial acts and
proceedings of the said courts.
4. Whether the courts of Commonwealth, which were
the same courts existing prior to and continue during the
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Japanese military occupation of the Philippines may
continue those proceedings in
said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and
liberated by the US and Filipino forces and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished.
HELD:
1. YES. The government established under the
names of Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of
the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was a civil
government and a de facto government of the second kind:
that which is established and maintained by military forces
who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the
course of war. The distinguishing characteristics of this kind
of de facto government are; (1) that its existence is
maintained by active military power within the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful
government; and (2) that while it exists it must necessarily
be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not
become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though
not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
2. YES. Being a de facto government, it necessarily
follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of
justice of those governments, which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well
known principle of postliminy in international law, remained
good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
3. NO. The phrase “processes of any other
government” is broad and may refer not only to judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as
constitutional processes of the
Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies
established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation.
Taking into consideration the fact that, according to the well-
known principles of international law, all judgments and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion,
of the de facto government during the Japanese occupation
were good and valid before and remained so after the
occupied territory had come again into the power of the
titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and
could not have been, the intention of the Gen. Mac Arthur, in
using the phrase “processes of any government” to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of
international law. The only reasonable construction of the
said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other
than judicial processes, or court proceedings, for according
to a well-known statutory construction, statute ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains.
4. YES. Although in theory, the authority of the local
civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in
practice, the invader does not usually take the administration
of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country to
which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented. If the
proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands
prior to the Japanese military occupation had been
continued during the Japanese military administration, the
Philippine Executive Commission and the so-called Republic
of the Philippines, it stands to reason the same courts, which
become reestablished and conceived of as having been in
continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of
the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may
continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said
courts, without necessity of enacting laws conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.
5. PEOPLE V. GOZO
53 SCRA 476, OCTOBER 26, 1973
FERNANDO, J:
FACTS:
Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot located inside
the US Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of
Olangapo City. She demolished the house and built another
one in its place without securing a building permit from the
City Mayor of Olangapo City. The City Court of Olangapo
found her guilty of violating a municipal ordinance that
requires permit from the municipal mayor for construction of
building as well as any modification, repairs or demolition
thereof.
On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Gozo put in
issue the validity of such ordinance by invoking due process.
She likewise questioned the applicability of the ordinance to
her in view of the location of her dwelling within the
naval base leased to the American Armed Forces; she
contended that the municipal government cannot exercise
therein administrative jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether municipal ordinance is valid?
2. Whether the municipal corporation retains its
administrative jurisdiction over the area where Gozo’s house
was located?
HELD:
1. YES, the municipal ordinance is valid. The
authority to require building permits is predicated upon the
general welfare clause. Its scope is wide, well-nigh all
embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public
morals, public safety, and the well being and good order of
the community.
2. YES, the municipal corporation retains its
administrative jurisdiction over the said area. By the
agreement, the Philippine Government merely consents that
the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This
consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy or
expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated
its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty,
the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine jurisdiction
retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also
such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for
reasons of their own decline to make use of.
Moreover, the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation,is the property of a state-force due to which it has
the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-
restriction. x x x A state is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional
right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed with an
alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They
are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
dimished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases
under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot
be foreign territory
6. LAUREL V. MISA
77 PHIL 856, JANUARY 30, 1947
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1945, Anastacio Laurel, herein petitioner,
a Filipino citizen, was arrested by the US Army and was
interned, under a commitment order “for his active
collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese
occupation”. He was charged with treason as defined and
penalized by Art. 114 of the Penal Code. But in September
1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth government
and since then he has been under the custody of the
Director of Prisons.
Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus
mainly asserting that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently,
the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty
over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens were suspended
during the Japanese occupation.
2. Whether the petitioner can be prosecuted for the
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crime of treason by giving aid and support to the enemy
during the Japanese occupation.
HELD:
1. NO. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy’s occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier and if its is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty
vested in the titular government must be distinguished from
the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it
cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or
divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called
period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant; x x x and that as a corollary of
the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended
and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of
the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign
subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance.
2. YES. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was
applicable to treason committed against the national security
of the legitimate government because the inhabitants of the
occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the
latter during the enemy’s occupation.
Just as a citizen or subject of a government or
sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason
committed in a foreign country, in the same way a inhabitant
of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
may commit treason against his own legitimate or sovereign
if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid
and comfort.
7. RUFFY VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
75 PHIL 875, AUGUST 20, 1946
TUASON, J:
FACTS:
During the Japanese occupation, herein petitioner,
Ramon Ruffy, a Provincial Commander of the Philippine
Constabulary, retreated in the mountains instead of
surrendering to the enemy. He organized and led a guerrilla
outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area. The said
Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th Military District, which
has been recognized and placed under the operational
control of the US Army in the South Pacific.
Sometime later, Col. Jurado effected a change of
command in the Bolo Area. Major Ruffy who was then acting
as Commanding Officer for the Bolo Area was relieved of his
position. Later on or on October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col Jurado
was slain allegedly by the petitioners. It was this murder
which gave rise to petitioner’s trial.
The trial court convicted petitioner and he now
filed this instant petition with the contention that he was not
subject to military law at the time the offense for which he
had been placed on trial was committed. Petitioners
contended that by the enemy occupation of the Philippines,
the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations
creating and governing the existence of the Philippine Army
including the Articles of War, were suspended and in
abeyance during such belligerent occupation. He also
assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War which
provides that “any person subject to military law who
commits murder in the time of war should suffer death or
imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct.”
Petitioner argued that the said law was in violation of Article
VII, section 2 of the Constitution since 93d of Article of War
fails to allow a review by the Supreme Court of judgments of
courts martial imposing death or life imprisonment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner was subject to military law at
the time the alleged offense was committed.
2. Whether 93d of Articles of War was constitutional.
HELD:
1. YES, petitioner was subject to military law at the
time the alleged offense was committed. The rule that laws
of political nature or affecting political relations are
considered superseded or in abeyance during the military
occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and
does not bind the enemies in arms.
By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the
officers and men of the Philippine army did not cease to be
fully in the service, though, in a measure, only in measure,
they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if they were
not in active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers
on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could
not be held guilty of breach of the discipline of the command
or of a neglect of duty x x x; but for an act unbecoming of a
gentleman or an act which constitutes an offense of the
class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in
general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and
trial.
Moreover, petitioners, by their acceptance of
appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General
Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became
members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of
War. x x x As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military
District, the petitioners operated under the orders of a duly
established and duly appointed commanders of the United
States Army and thus covered by Article 2 of the Articles of
War which provides for persons subject to military law.
2. YES, 93(d) of the Articles of War was
constitutional. It does not violate Article VII, section 2 of the
Constitution which provides that “the National Assembly may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over
all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment”. Court Martial are agencies of executive
character, and one of the authorities “for ordering of courts
martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional
functions of the President as Commander in Chief,
independently of legislation”. Unlike courts of law, they are
not a portion of the judiciary. x x x court martial are in fact
simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander in
Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy
and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders
or those of his authorized military representatives.
I. PEOPLE
1. Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Comm. On
Immigration
FACTS:
This is a case filed to enjoin the Commissioner of
Immigration from causing the arrest and deportation of the
petitioner herein - Lau Yuen Yueng.
Petitioner herein applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. She is a Chinese residing in
Kowloon, Hong Kong and that she desired to take a pleasure
trip to the Philippines and to visit her great grand uncle for a
period of one month.
When she arrived in the Philippines, Asher Y Cheng filed a
bond in the amount of PHP1, 000 to undertake among
others that Lau Yuen Yueng would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, petitioner was allowed to stay
until Feb. 13, 1962. But on January 25, 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino Citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest deportation, after
the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action
for injunction with preliminary injunction.
During the hearing, it was admitted that Lao Yuen Yueng
could not write either English or Tagalog. Except a few
words she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not even name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino
name except one, Rosa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not marriage by Lao Yuen Yueng made her ipso
facto a citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473,
upon which petitioners rely, reads.
Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalised shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW

Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the
phrase, "who might herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to a
class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that
compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization
laws was not required.
Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of
certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.

Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be

lawfully naturalised," what should be required is not only that
Issues:
she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but she must
Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine
also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2,
Baseline Law is unconstitutional.
such as those of age, residence, good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine
Discussions:
Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment
or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write
The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly
English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages,
affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the
education of children in certain schools, etc.
outermost points of our archipelago with straight baselines
and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal
In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is
waters. RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the
required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully
Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
naturalized, that she is not one of the disqualified persons
UNCLOS III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in
enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to establish
congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
her citizenship status as a fact.
Rulings:
Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act
473), an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a
naturalised, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is
Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones
not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate
Section 4 of the same law. likewise, an alien woman married
Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding the
to an alien who i subsequently naturalised here follows the
country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-
Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine’s
his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
maritime zones and continental shelf.
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of
Seciton 4 reads:
internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III,
any associations or group of persons who uphold and teach
an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to
doctrines opposing all organised governments.
the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines,
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessityof propriety of
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is
violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success
further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes
and predominance of their ideas.
passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
and subsoil and the resources therein.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases.
The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
family of states and it is in no way affecting or producing any
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines
are at war, during the period of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United III. GOVERNMENT
States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
1. Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
II. TERRITORY 2. LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER
1. RA 3046 PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO
2. RA 5446 VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET
3. PD 1599 AL.
G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986
4. RA 9522 – New Phils.
Baseline Law
FACTS: 

5. MAGALONA VS ERMITA On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino

G.R. No. 187167 16Aug2011
Facts:
In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the
Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the
Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the
validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the
law decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some
of their particular arguments are as follows:
RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power,
in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying
the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties.
RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of
the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and
damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions.
RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of
islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime area
but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986,
proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the
"new government was installed through a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines." 
ISSUE:  
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino
is legitimate. 
HELD: 
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is
not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. The Court further held
that the people have accepted the Aquino government which
is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a
de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government.  The community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the new government.
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW
3. VILLAVICENCIO VS. LUKBAN
(39 PHIL 778)
FACTS:
Respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vise,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which
had been permitted for a number of years in the City of
Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their
houses in the district by the police. At about midnight of
October 25, the police, acting pursuant to the orders from
the chief of the police and Justo Lukban, descended upon
the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers “Corregidor” and
“Negros”. They had no knowledge that they were destined
for a life in
Mindanao. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers
sailed for Davao during the night of October 25, 1918.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the Mayor of the City of
Manila is constitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court condemned the mayor’s act.
Respondent’s intention to suppress the social evil was
commutable. But his methods were unlawful.
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the
Philippines in conformity with an act of Congress. The
Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable
aliens after a hearing from the Islands. One can search in
vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the
right of the Mayor of the City of Manila or the Chief of Police
of that City to force citizens of the Philippine Islands, and
these women despite their being in a sense, lepers of
society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guarantees as other
citizens.
Law defines power. The law is the only supreme
power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
the limitations which gives itself and imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives.
The fundamental rights of life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions,
are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are
the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race
in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the
reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language
of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the government of the
commonwealth may be “government of laws and not of
men”.
IV. SOVEREIGNTY
1. WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR
OF PRISONS
75 Phil 285 | November 12, 1945
Ponente: Feria, J.
FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and
was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and
penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the
Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is
based on the contention that the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7
was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan
and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the
constitutional rights of the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is
constitutional.
HELD:
Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the
validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law
martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a
governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is
good and valid since it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act
No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts
during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which
convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion
must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
2. RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET
AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-533         August 20, 1946
Nature of the Action: Petition for prohibition, praying that
respondents be commanded to desist from further
proceedings in the trial of petitioners before the military court
Facts: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines,
military men were assigned at designated camps or military
bases all over the country. When the Japanese forces
reached Mindoro, Ruffy and his band were forced to retreat
to the mountains. A guerilla outfit was then organized, called
as the “Bolo Area”. However, a certain Capt. Esteban
Beloncio relieved petitioners of their positions and duties in
the “Bolo Area”, after Lieut. Col. Enrique Jurado effected a
change of command. The latter, however, was slain
allegedly by petitioners, and it was this murder which gave
rise to petitioners’ trial, the legality of which is now being
contested.
Issue: Were the petitioners subject to the military law at the
time of war and Japanese occupation?
Ruling: Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no
merit and that it should be dismissed with costs.
Ratio Decidendi: Yes, the petitioners were subject to
military law. By their acceptance of appointments as officers
in the Bolo Area, they became members of the Philippine
Army—the Bolo Area being a contingent of the 6th military
district which is recognized by the United States army. Thus,
petitioners are covered by the National Defense Act, Articles
of War, and other pertinent laws during an occupation.
3. William C. Reagan, Petitioner vs.
Commission of Internal Revenue
Facts:
                The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and
an employee of Bendix Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation
Corporation, which provided technical assistance to the
United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark Air Base
Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his
tour duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960
Cadillac car which valued at $6443.83. More than two
months after the car was imported, petitioner requested the
Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The
request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to
a member of the United States Armed Forces or an
employee of the U.S. Military Bases.
                On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie
Johnson for $6600, a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby
Point, Cavite as shown by a bill of sale executed at Clark Air
Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold the car to
Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale
executed in Manila.
                The respondent after deducting the landed cost of
the car and the personal exemption which the petitioner was
entitled, fixed as his net income arising from such
transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him liable for
income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought
refund from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He
filed a case within the Court of Tax Appeals seeking
recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally
collected by respondent from petitioner.
Ruling:
                The Philippine is an independent and sovereign
country or state. Its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. Its laws govern therein and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude
from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional rights over certain portions of its territory. Such
areas sustain their status as native soil and still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished but it does not
disappear.
 
The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease
to the American  armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW

Agreement which states that a “national of the US serving or Whether there is a violation of the people’s right to
employed in the Philippines in connection with the information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution,
construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all
bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason such its transactions involving public interest (1987
unemployment is not to be taxed on his income unless Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation
derived in the bases which one clearly derived the Phil. under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT
                Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the CODE OF 1991?
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendering the petitioner
liable of the income tax arising from the sale of his HELD: YES. The right of the people to information on
automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
within our territory to tax. official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
4. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO VS. limitations as may be provided by law.
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court
GRP PEACE PANEL has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect
GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008
public records, a right which was eventually accorded
constitutional status. The right of access to public
FACTS:
documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-
assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was
executory constitutional right.
suspended and the government sought a resumption of the
In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge
peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF
Dimaano,the Court ruled that access to public records is
member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when
predicated on the right of the people to acquire information
President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through
on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a
Prime
democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of
Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to
social and political significance. The incorporation of this
return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central
right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental
Committee to seriously
role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There
discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the
can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s
GRP.
problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24,
they are denied access to information of general interest.
2001, with the talk being facilitated by the Malaysian
Information is needed to enable the members of society to
government, the parties signing on the same date the
cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly
Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of
observed: “Maintaining the flow of such information depends
Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF
on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
thereafter suspended all its military actions.
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
Formal peace talks between the parties were held
ceases.”
in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of
In the same way that free discussion enables
which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time,
Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing
access to information of general interest aids the people in
the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of
democratic decision-making by giving them a better
the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation, so that
Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral
they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of
Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply
the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective
agreed “that the same be discussed further by the Parties in
manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited
their next meeting.”
exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a
A second round of peace talks was held in
government remains responsive to the changes desired by
Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with
the people.
the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire
status between the parties. This was followed by the
That the subject of the information sought in
Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation
the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no
and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001,
serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the
which was signed on
MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases,
May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there
the Court found that the regularity of real estate
were many incidence of violence between government
transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need
forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then
for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the
MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13,
civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper
2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then
management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant
the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad’s position as
loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses’
chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.
alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of party-
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held
list nominees, among others, are matters of public
between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to
concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the
the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as
present cases is of public concern, involving as it does
mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. Before
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious
which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
“consensus” ever embodied in an instrument – the MOA-AD
which is assailed
Matters of public concern covered by the right
principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers
to information include steps and negotiations leading to
183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962. Commonly
the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as
impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on
to the executory nature or commercial character of
Ancestral Domain and the
agreements, the Court has categorically ruled that the right
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP)
to information “contemplates inclusion of negotiations
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of
leading to the consummation of the transaction.” Certainly, a
North Cotabato [and Vice-Governor
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise
Emmanuel Pinol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never
183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the
exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose
Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on
its defects.
matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
Requiring a consummated contract will keep
official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and
the public in the dark until the contract, which may be
to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the
grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of
illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State
a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners
policy of full transparency on matters of public concern,
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. This
a situation which the framers of the Constitution could
initial petition was followed by several other petitions by
not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the
other parties. The Court ordered the consolidation of the
citizenry from participating in the public discussion of
petitions.
any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic
right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither
ISSUE:
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW
an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the
State of its avowed “policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.”
Intended as a “splendid symmetry” to the right to
information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public
disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution.
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-
quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to
information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of
Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes
the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands.
The policy of public disclosure establishes a
concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people’s right to know
as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These provisions are
vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and
essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to
the people. Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the
records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
so disclose.
C. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
Basis: Constitutional and
Jurisprudence
1. REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
54 SCRA 84 (1973)
FACTS:
A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding
against the Republic of the Philippines thereby confirming
the arbitration award of P1,712,396.40 in favor of respondent
corporation. After he decision became final and executory,
respondent judge issued an order directing the sheriff to
execute the said decision, and the corresponding alias writ
of execution was thus issued.
Hence the sheriff served notices of garnishment
with several banks especially the monies due to the AFP in
the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount
mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank
received such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller,
these funds of the AFP with the said banks are public funds
for the pensions, pay, and allowances of its military and
civilian personnel.
The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition
proceedings, challenges the validity of the Order issued by
Judge Villasor declaring the decision final and executory and
subsequently issuing an alias writ of execution directed
against the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.
ISSUE: May the writs of execution and notices of
garnishment be sued against public funds?
HELD:
NO. Although the State may give its consent to be
sued by private parties, there is corollary that public funds
cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the
consent to be sued has been previously granted and the
state’s liability has been adjudged.
Thus in the case of Commission of Public
Highways vs. San Diego, such a well-settled doctrine was
restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee. The universal
rule that where the state gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the
courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the
government funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment, is
based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriations as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot
be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific object is
appropriated by law.
2. Lasco v. UN Revolving Fund, 241 S 681
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and damages after being dismissed from their employment
with the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) which was involved in a
joint project of the Philippine Government and the United
Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.
The UNRFNRE filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that
respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its
personality since the UNRFNRE enjoyed diplomatic
immunity pursuant to the 1946 Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations. The respondent
attached a letter from the Department of Foreign Affairs
acknowledging its immunity from suit, prompting the Labor
Arbiter to issue an order dismissing the complaints.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied.
ISSUE: Did the private respondent waive its diplomatic
immunity when it engaged in exploration work and entered
into a contract of employment with the petitioners?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition,
stating that the presence of the private respondent in the
Philippines was not because of a commercial venture but
because of a joint project entered into by the Philippine
Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration
in Dinagat Island. The mission of the UNRFNRE was not to
exploit our natural resources and gain monetarily but to help
improve the quality of life of the people which included that
of the petitioners.
3. SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES
DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE
DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR
LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD,
ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES
(FINANCE OFFICER), petitioners, 
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and JUVENAL
LAZAGA, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set
aside the decision of the NLRC sustaining the labor arbiter,
in holding herein petitioners liable to pay private
respondent the amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon
computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is
made, as separation pay and other post-employment
benefits.
On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal
Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate an a
probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was
appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983
with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly
allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the
position of Professional III and designated as Head of
External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits.
SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international
organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center, organized through an agreement
entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967
by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as
the sponsoring country
On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his
capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of
termination to private respondent informing him that due
to the financial constraints being experienced by the
department, his services shall be terminated at the close of
office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to
separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic
salary for every year of service plus other benefits.
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
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COLLEGE OF LAW
Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD’s failure to pay
private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on
March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-
payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and
attorney’s fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim
alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case
inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international
organization and that private respondent must first secure
clearances from the proper departments for property or
money accountability before any claim for separation pay will
be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by
the private respondent.
LABOR ARBITER: ordered petitioner to pay the benefits
claimed
NLRC: affirmed the LA.  The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and,
PETITIONER CONTENDS that: SEAFDEC-AQD is immune
from suit owing to its international character and the
complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot
be maintained without its consent.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner is within the scope of application
of Philippine labor laws (WON SEAFDEC is immuned from
suit)
HELD:
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public
respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC
including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in
whose territory its office is located.
In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the
control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical
personality independent of the municipal law of the State
where they are situated. As such, according to one leading
authority “they must be deemed to possess a species of
international personality of their own.” (Salonga and Yap,
Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.])
One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e.,that it is
immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious
reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization
to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient
medium thru which the host government may interfere in
there operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to
local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to
discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its
member-states.
WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or
local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned
decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and
January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
4. ERNESTO CALLADO vs. INTERNATIONAL RICE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)
G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:
Facts:  In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may
Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the
IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip
to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager. In view of the findings,
he was charged with:  1. BEGOSO v. PVA 32 SCRA 466
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty
under the influence of liquor;  Facts:
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to
supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a
problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.  participation in the battle of Bataan" as well as
Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges
against him. However,  IRRI issued a Notice of Termination
to petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity
pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute
enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having
waived the same. 
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor
Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute
to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI
waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving
the case. 
finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed. 
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the
IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the
case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of
its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of
dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this
dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship?
Held: No. 
P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall
enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been
expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or
his authorized representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law.
There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the
Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys
immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question
conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a
political department of Government. 
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to
look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or
other officer acting under his direction. 
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and
an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by
which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.
TESTS TO DETERMINE IF SUIT IS AGAINST
THE STATE
Gaudencio Begosa, plaintiff-appellee, was an
"enlisted men of the Phil. Commonwealth Army,
inducted in the service of the USAFFE" having taken "active
the "liberation drive against the enemy" thereafter became
"permanently incapacitated from work due to
injuries he sustained in line of duty xxx."
Pltff. filed his claim for disability pension as far back as
3/4/55; but it was erroneously disapproved on 6/21/55,
because his dishonorable discharge from the Army was not
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW

a good or proper ground for the said disapproval, and that on

reconsideration asked for by him on 11/1/57, w/c he “the action of del Mar was premature because of his failure
continued to follow up, the Board of Administrators, Phil.
Veterans Administration finally approved his claim on 9/2/64, to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial
at the rate of P30/mo. Judge Soriano noted that: "had it not
been for the said error, it appears that there was no good intervention”
ground to deny the said claim, so the latter was valid and
meritorious even as of the date of its filing on 3/4/55, hence (3) The case is a suit against the state.
to make the same effective only as of the date of its approval
on 9/2/64-- according to defendant's stand-- would be greatly
unfair and prejudicial to plaintiff
The appeal assigns as one error what it considers “the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as
to be the failing of the LC in not holding that the complaint in
this case is in effect a suit against the State w/c has not del Mar demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA
given its consent thereto.
— a mere agency of the Philippine Government — and, in
HELD:
It does not admit of doubt that if the suit were in effect, of a suit against the Government which is not suitable
fact against the State, the LC should have dismissed the
complaint. Nor is it to be doubted that while ostensibly an without its consent.”
action may be against a public official, the defendant may in
reality be the government. As a result, it is equally well- (4) It was discretionary on the part of PVA to discontinue
settled that where a litigation may have adverse
consequences on the public treasury, whether in the pension.
disbursement of funds or loss of prop., the public official
proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity,
then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be
invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit Held:
against such a functionary had to be instituted because of
his failure to comply w/ the duty imposed by statute (1) When a case is a suit against the state:
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or
petitioner. Such is the present case.

xxx However, where the judgement in such a case would “As a general proposition, the rule — well-settled in this
result not only in the recovery of possession of the prop. in
favor of said citizen but also in a charge against or financial jurisdiction — on the immunity of the Government from suit
liability of the Government then the suit should be regarded
as one against the government itself, and consequently, it without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in
cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except
w/ the consent of said Government. “adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in

the disbursements of funds or loss of property.”

(2) Suits against the state must be dismissed

2.Del Mar vs Philippine Veterans Administration
[G.R. L-27299] June 27, 1973

Facts: (3) When a case is not a suit against the state:

Del Mar, the petitioner, was relieved with honorable

discharge with permanent total physical disability. Philippine “where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary

Veterans administration granted him pension but was soon who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the

discontinued because he received the same pension under amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated

the United States Veterans Administration. by statute for the benefit of the said claimant.”

(4) The case is not premature. Administrative liability is not

Issue: required.

The PVA decided that:

“Suffice it to state that where a case as in the present

(1) Petitioner is barred from receiving any pension from the controversy — involves a question solely of a legal nature,

Philippine Veterans Administration. there arises no need for the litigant to resort to all

administrative remedies available to him before seeking

judicial relief.”
“The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar’s receipt of a
(5) The act committed by the PVA, in suspending a provision
similar pension from the United States Government
of law, is against the constitution.
effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the

Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted him

as well as the monthly allowances he claimed for his five “… the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in

living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of whom all executive power resides, to take care that the laws

age.” be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative executive

(2) The filing of the case is premature. office or agency then can, contrary to the express language

of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive

prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the

JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW

license, even without a certificate of membership from

constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with PADPAO

the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed. The Issue:

statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its                 whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its
provisions. No deviation is allowable.” consent

Held:
3. Veterans Manpower and Protective
                Yes. The State may not be sued without its
Services, Inc. v. CA consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution).
G.R. No. 91359, September 25, 1992
Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that,
Grino-Aquino, J.
being instrumentalities of the national government exercising
a primarily governmental function of regulating the
Facts:
organization and operation of private detective, watchmen,
or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and
                The constitutionality of the following provisions of
agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the
R.A. 5487(otherwise known as the “Private Security Agency
Government’s consent, especially in this case because
Law”), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint:
VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public
respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because
SEC.
VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum
4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. -
of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount,
Any Filipino citizen or a corporation, partnership, or
and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public
association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos,
respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its
one hundred per cent of which is owned and controlled by
monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did
Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman
not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that
agency: Provided, That no person shall organize or have
purpose.
aninterest in, more than one such agency except those
which are alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree:
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to
x x x.” (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and 100.)
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge
Constabulary. -The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in
of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
consultation with thePhilippine Association of Detective and
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative
Protective Agency Operators,Inc. and subject to the
act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them,
rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of
the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although
this Act.”
it has not been formally impleaded.
VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A.
A public official may sometimes be held liable in
No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or
against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however,
restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the
since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC¬-SUSIA are
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
being called to account in this case, were performed by them
Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it
as part of their official duties, without malice, gross
has an interest in more than one security agency.
negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against
them in their private capacities.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity
of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying
The correct test for the application of state
Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and
immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but
Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the
the legal nature of the act.
Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen.
Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
that “all private security agencies/company security forces
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
organized within the Region where their main offices are
economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to
located...”. As such membership requirement in PADPAO is
have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair
when it enters into a business contract. It does not apply
competition and combinations in restraint of trade.
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement
was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
In the instant case, the Memorandum of
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours
Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was
of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila
intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize
and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
the salaries of security guards as well as the current rates of
security services, clearly, a governmental function. The
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin)
execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose
filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
of R.A.5487, as amended, which is to regulate the
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security
organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or
services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and
security guard agencies.
Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower
than the standard minimum rates provided in the
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat

competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline
recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and
the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency
(Annex D, Petition).

The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise

recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license.

As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a

clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it
requested one.

VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988,

requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of
PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
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COLLEGE OF LAW

the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private

SUIT AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES corporations.

1. PNB vs. CIR

G.R. No. L-32667    81 SCRA 214     January 31, 1978 2. Social Security System v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41299, 21
Facts:
February 1983
A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel
of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and
Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is En Banc
challenged on two grounds: [MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.]
FACTS: Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz
 That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the SSS
Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto.
execution was contrary to law and Rosario, Pateros, Rizal. Claiming that the conditions of

 That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be mortgage have been broken, SSS filed an application for

public in character.” In thus denying the motion to
quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part
of respondent Court a failure to abide by authoritative
doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the
notice of garnishment is denied for the lack of merit. PNB is
therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with
the ‘notice of Garnishment’ dated May 6, 1970.”
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C.
Cruz, instituted before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an
action for damages and attorney’s fees against the Social
Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
alleging, among other things, that they had fully and
religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not
defaulted in any payment.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was

denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
ISSUE: Can the SSS, exercising governmental functions, be
Issues: held liable for damages?
Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of
garnishment can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of
discretion. HELD: YES.
There should be no question on this score considering that
Discussions:
the SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It
According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits
against Government Agencies: has corporate powers separate and distinct from the
Government. SSS’ own organic act specifically provides that
“An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests
it with a separate judicial personality. If the agency is it can sue and be sued in Court. These words “sue and be
incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.”
sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So
From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice
that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys
Marshall. As was pointed out by him: “It is, we think, a sound
principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental
trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited
takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have
the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends
to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not
the character which belongs to its associates, and to the
business which is to be transacted. thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to
the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and
Rulings:
protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required
No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave
abuse of discretion. The premise that the funds could be to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right
spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs
sense that the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation
was a government-owned entity It does not follow though governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes
that they were exempt from garnishment.
unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen
  may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in
As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from
Court of Industrial Relations”, a government owned and
controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct contract and even for tort.
and separate from that of the Government. It may sue and
be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like
any other corporation.

Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the

government enters into commercial business, it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation. By engaging in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests
itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW

3. Rayo, et al. v. Court of First Upon the Solicitor General's motion, the trial court dismissed
Instance, G.R. No. L-55273-83, 19 December 1981 the complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction because the
PNR, being a government instrumentality, the action was a
Second Division
suit against the State (Sec. 16, Art. XV of the Constitution).

[ABAD SANTOS, J.]
The Malong spouses appealed to this Court pursuant to
Republic Act No. 5440
FACTS: During the height of that infamous typhoon
“KADING” the respondent corporation, acting through its
R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of
plant superintendent, Benjamin Chavez, opened or caused
first instance (now Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme
to be opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the
Court in cases involving only questions of law, or the
Angat Dam. And as a direct and immediate result of the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, etc.
sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said
or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, etc., or
floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated.
the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from ordinary appeal —
Hardest-hit was Norzagaray. About a hundred of its
i.e., by notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond,
residents died or were reported to have died and properties
under Rule 41— to appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45
worth million of pesos destroyed or washed away. Cases
were filed against the respondent.Respondent argued that
Issue/s:
“in the operation of the Angat Dam,” it is “performing a purely
governmental function”, hence it “can not be sued without
WON PNR is immune from suit.
the express consent of the State.”

WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or in a

ISSUE: Were the functions of National Power Corporation in
corporate capacity when it organized the PNR for the
the management of dam non-governmental and that it can
purpose of engaging in transportation
be sued for tort?

WON the State acted differently when it organized the PNR

HELD: YES.
as successor of the Manila Railroad Company
It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on
whether or not the NPC performs a governmental function
Held: No, PNR is NOT immune. The State divested itself of
with respect to the management and operation of the Angat
its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is no
Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has
different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company.
organized a private corporation, put money in it and has
The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not
allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter.
remove itself from the operation of articles 1732 to 1766 of
(R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and
the Civil Code on common carriers
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the Government. (See National
Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August
31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781.) Moreover, the charter provision that
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is reversed and set
the NPC can “sue and be sued in any court” is without
aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can
proceedings. Costs against the Philippine National Railways.
include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the
petitioners.
Ratio:

4. Malong vs. PNR

The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether
corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity
Facts:
from suit is determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs.
The Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on
Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs,
October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a paying
Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104
passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it
Phil. 593.)
was between Tarlac and Capas. The tragedy occurred
because Jaime had to sit near the door of a coach. The train
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which
was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the
they have assumed to act in a private or non-governmental
proximity of All Saints Day.
capacity are not suits against the State

The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay

them damages totaling P136,370.
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW
Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the
obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise. It
is not performing any governmental function
The point is that when the government enters into a
commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and
is to be treated like any other private corporation (Bank of
the U.S. vs. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L. ed. 244, cited
in Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel
Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388).
There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the
subject, but when the sovereign engages in business and
the conduct of business enterprises, and contracts with
individuals, whenever the contract in any form comes before
the courts, the rights and obligation of the contracting parties
must be adjusted upon the same principles as if both
contracting parties were private persons. Both stand upon
equality before the law, and the sovereign is merged in the
dealer, contractor and suitor (People vs. Stephens, 71 N.Y.
549).
Justice Abad Santos (Separate Opinion): All corporations
organized by the government are its instrumentality by the
very reason of their creation. But that fact alone does not
invest them with immunity from suit.
5. DISINI V. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO.
180564; JUNE 22, 2010)
FACTS: On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the
Philippines and Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement
under which Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and
provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and
documents they needed in its case against Westinghouse
Electric Corporation before the United States District Court
of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse
International Projects Company and others filed against the
Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce
Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin,
Herminio, as an executive in the latter's companies from
1971 to 1984.
The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for
the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant,
brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been
attended by anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the
Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse
cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other
domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic
against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but 18
years later, upon the Republic's application, the
Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini,
commanding him to testify and produce documents before
that court in an action that the Republic filed against
Herminio.
Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity
Agreement.
The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new
subpoena directing him to testify before it. Subsequently, the
PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar
as it prohibited the Republic from requiring Disini to testify
against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied
Disinis motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought
the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained
that the PCGGs power to grant immunity under Section 5 of
Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or
criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity from
providing evidence in court.
The Republic argued that Disini's immunity from testifying
against Herminio contravened the state's policy to recover ill-
gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President
Marcos. The Republic further argued that under the last
sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which
reads: Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini's obligation
to provide truthful information or testimony, Disini, despite
the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in
other cases, was to provide truthful information or testimony
in such other cases.
For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the
PCGG, was estopped from revoking the questioned
immunity as it had made him believe that it had the authority
to provide such guarantee. The Republic countered by
invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that (t)he right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from
them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
ISSUE: Did the PCGG act within its authority when it
revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement?
HELD: No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as
Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair.
The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords
latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of the criminal
immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate
levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the
witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-
gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to
conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce
cooperation. Trusting in the Government's honesty and
fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain.
Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due
process, should hold the Republic on to its promise.
A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be
withdrawn except by their mutual consent. This applies with
more reason in this case where Disini already complied with
JEAN JAMAILAH TOMUGDAN 17-1680-73
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW

the terms of the Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic
to revoke the Immunity Agreement at a late stage would run
afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for
a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits. The Court
should not allow the Republic, to put it bluntly, to double
cross Disini. The Immunity Agreement was the result of a
long drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying
to get the best concessions out of it.
The Republic did not have to enter into that agreement; it
was free not to. But when it did, it needed to fulfill its
obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the
government should be fair.
It has been a settled rule that by seeking affirmative relief,
voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan constitute waiver on the objection regarding
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of
jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant
files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other
than the dismissal of the case.
PCGG's revocation of the questioned immunity and
Sandiganbayan's denial of Disini's motion to quash the
subpoena were both annulled.
6. DEPT OF AGRICULTURE VS
NLRC
G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993
agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the
motor vehicles of the DA.
The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The
petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a
money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the
State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the
petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issues: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the
State applies in the case.
Discussions: Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of
the State to be “sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied. However,
the money claim should first be brought to the Commission
on Audit. Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the
State’s immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation
expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no execution shall issue
upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the
Government of the (Philippines), and that the conditions
provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims
against the Government must be strictly observed.
Rulings:

Facts
No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued
under any circumstances. The State may at times be sued.
The case is regarding money claim against Department of
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit
Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National Labor
is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government
Relations Commission (NLRC).
“consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied,
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security
which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
Agency entered into a contract for security services to be
parties.”
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a
Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA.
capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it
Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for
entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have,
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay,
in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay,
claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA
money claims.
and the security agency

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly

and severally liable with the security agency for the payment
of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA
and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus,
the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter
issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the
judgment against the property of the DA and the security