G.R. No.

109068 January 10, 1994

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B.
BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G. HERNANDO, respondents.

Juan Jacito for petitioner.

Alipio V. Flores for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana1 against private respondent, this case assumed

another dimension when it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties
being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted
towards a compromise.

Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a
compromise and that the same failed. However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando
apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor
attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the
pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent
Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters
hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5)
days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close
relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should
allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently,
respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.

On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming
that since brothers by affinity are not members of the same family, he was not required to
exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded
from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an
affirmative defense in his answer.

On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that
"[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for
failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case." He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would
be dismissed.

On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his
complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal however to be
without prejudice.

Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo. He
raises these legal issues: (a) whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same
family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as
under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a
compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and maintained; and, (b) whether
the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were
exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic
autonomous social institution.2 This is also embodied in Art. 149,3 and given flesh in Art.
151, of the Family Code, which provides:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.

Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement
is mandatory4 that the complaint or petition, which must be verified, should allege that
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed, so that "[i]f it
is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."

Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which
provides as a ground for motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the same
family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made."

The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains the
reason for the requirement that earnest efforts at compromise be first exerted before a
complaint is given due course —

This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more

tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It is
necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a
lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers . . . A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a lawsuit
between strangers . . . 5

But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon
v. Gayon6 that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family does
not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that
"sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil
Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially
the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find no reason to alter existing
jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner
Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert
earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
In his Comment, Hernando argues that ". . . although both wives of the parties were not
impleaded, it remains a truism that being spouses of the contending parties, and the litigation
involves ownership of real property, the spouses' interest and participation in the land in
question cannot be denied, making the suit still a suit between half-sisters . . ."7

Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his "wife has no
actual interest and participation in the land subject of the . . . suit, which the petitioner
bought, according to his complaint, before he married his wife."8 This factual controversy
however may be best left to the court a quo to resolve when it resumes hearing the case.

As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our ruling in

O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit,9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 10 that the attempt to
compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit
between members of the same family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint being
assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.

It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be deemed to
have waived the aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the
Answer. On the other hand, we cannot sustain the proposition of private respondent that the
case was, after all, also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court 11 for
failure of petitioner to comply with the court's order to amend his complaint.

A review of the assailed orders does not show any directive which Guerrero supposedly
defied. The Order of 7 December 1992 merely gave Guerrero five (5) days to file his motion
and amended complaint with a reminder that the complaint failed to allege that earnest efforts
were exerted towards a compromise. The Order of 22 December 1992, which denied
Guerrero's motion for reconsideration, simply stated that "Plaintiff if it (sic) so desire must
amend the complaint otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case (emphasis supplied) . .
." The Order of 29 January 1993 dismissing the case without prejudice only made reference
to an earlier order "admonishing" counsel for Guerrero to amend the complaint, and an
"admonition" is not synonymous with "order". Moreover, since the assailed orders do not find
support in our jurisprudence but, on the other hand, are based on an erroneous interpretation
and application of the law, petitioner could not be bound to comply with them. 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of

7 December 1992, 22 December 1992 and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now be
assigned, is directed to continue with Civil Case
No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165060             November 27, 2008

ALBINO JOSEF, petitioner,
vs.
OTELIO SANTOS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
November 17, 20031 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80315,
dismissing petitioner’s special civil action of certiorari for failure to file a prior motion for
reconsideration, and the May 7, 20042 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant in Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, which is a case for
collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos, who claimed that
petitioner failed to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent on
various dates in 1994.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, found petitioner liable to
respondent in the amount of P404,836.50 with interest at 12% per annum reckoned from
January 9, 1995 until full payment.3

Petitioner appealed4 to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision in
toto.5 Petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari, but it was dismissed
in a Resolution dated February 18, 2002.6 The Judgment became final and executory on May
21, 2002.

On February 17, 2003, respondent moved for issuance of a writ of execution,7 which was
opposed by petitioner.8 In an Order dated July 16, 2003,9 the trial court granted the motion,
the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for issuance of writ of execution is
hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued commanding the Sheriff of this
Court to execute the decision dated December 18, 1996.

SO ORDERED.10

A writ of execution was issued on August 20, 200311 and enforced on August 21, 2003. On
August 29, 2003, certain personal properties subject of the writ of execution were auctioned
off. Thereafter, a real property located at Marikina City and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. N-105280 was sold on October 28, 2003 by way of public auction to fully
satisfy the judgment credit. Respondent emerged as the winning bidder and a Certificate of
Sale12 dated November 6, 2003 was issued in his favor.

On November 5, 2003, petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the sheriff’s levy and sale of the abovementioned personal and real
properties. Petitioner claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his
children; and that the real property covered by TCT No. N-105280 was his family home thus
exempt from execution.

On November 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the
petition for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s July 16,
2003 Order granting the motion for execution and ordering the issuance of a writ therefor, as
well as for his failure to indicate in his petition the timeliness of its filing as required under
the Rules of Court. On May 7, 2004, the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Thus, the instant petition which raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE LEVY AND SALE OF THE PERSONAL

BELONGINGS OF THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS WELL AS THE
ATTACHMENT AND SALE ON PUBLIC AUCTION OF HIS FAMILY HOME TO
SATISFY THE JUDGMENT AWARD IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT IS LEGAL.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS JUSTIFIED
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Petitioner argues that the trial court sheriff erroneously attached, levied and sold on execution
the real property covered by TCT No. N-105280 because the same is his family home; that
the execution sale was irregular because it was conducted without complying with the notice
and posting of requirements; and that the personal and real properties were sold for
inadequate prices as to shock the conscience. The real property was allegedly worth P8
million but was sold for only P848,448.64.

Petitioner also argues that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the
petition based purely on technical grounds, i.e., his failure to file a motion for reconsideration
of the trial court’s order granting execution, and his failure to indicate in his petition for
certiorari the timeliness of filing the same with the Court of Appeals.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that petitioner’s alleged family home has not been
shown to have been judicially or extrajudicially constituted, obviously referring to the
provisions on family home of the Civil Code – not those of the Family Code which should
apply in this case; that petitioner has not shown to the court’s satisfaction that the personal
properties executed upon and sold belonged to his children. Respondent argues that he is
entitled to satisfaction of judgment considering the length of time it took for the parties to
litigate and the various remedies petitioner availed of which have delayed the case.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner, in his opposition to respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of execution,

claimed that he was insolvent; that he had no property to answer for the judgment credit; that
the house and lot in which he was residing at the time was his family home thus exempt from
execution; that the household furniture and appliances found therein are likewise exempt
from execution; and that these furniture and appliances belonged to his children Jasmin Josef
and Jean Josef Isidro. Thus, as early as during proceedings prior to the issuance of the writ of
execution, petitioner brought to the fore the issue of exemption from execution of his home,
which he claimed to be a family home in contemplation of the civil law.

However, instead of inquiring into the nature of petitioner’s allegations in his opposition, the
trial court ignored the same and granted respondent’s motion for execution. The full text of
the July 16, 2003 Order provides, as follows:

This resolves the "Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution" filed by plaintiff thru
counsel and the "Opposition" thereto filed by the defendant on her own behalf.

The records show that a decision was rendered by this Court in favor of the plaintiff
on December 18, 1995 which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June
26, 2001 and by the Supreme Court on February 18, 2002. On June 18, 2003, this
Court received the entire records of the case from the Court of Appeals.

Considering the foregoing, it is now the ministerial duty of the Court to issue a writ of
execution pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for issuance of writ of execution is

hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued commanding the Sheriff of this
Court to execute the decision dated December 18, 1996.

SO ORDERED.13

The above Order did not resolve nor take into account petitioner’s allegations in his
Opposition, which are material and relevant in the resolution of the motion for issuance of a
writ of execution. This is serious error on the part of the trial court. It should have made an
earnest determination of the truth to petitioner’s claim that the house and lot in which he and
his children resided was their duly constituted family home. Since it did not, its July 16, 2003
Order is thus null and void. Where a judgment or judicial order is void it may be said to be a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head.14

The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a
particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.15

Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioner’s
family home, the trial court should have observed the following procedure:

1. Determine if petitioner’s obligation to respondent falls under either of the

exceptions under Article 15516 of the Family Code;

2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner’s claim that the property was his
family home;17 conduct an ocular inspection of the premises; an examination of the
title; an interview of members of the community where the alleged family home is
located, in order to determine if petitioner actually resided within the premises of the
claimed family home; order a submission of photographs of the premises, depositions,
and/or affidavits of proper individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the
petitioner, his children and other witnesses. At the same time, the respondent is given
the opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence to the contrary;

3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioner’s family home, the court
should determine:

a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or after, the
effectivity of the Family Code;18

b) if petitioner’s spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other beneficiaries

of the family home;19

c) if the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of determining
which of them, if any, is his family home;20 and

d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of
Articles 15721 and 16022 of the Family Code.

The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family
love and repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime.23 It is the sanctuary
of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a
shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that
binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The
protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic
social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall
be recognized or given effect,24 the trial court’s failure to observe the proper procedures to
determine the veracity of petitioner’s allegations, is unjustified.

The same is true with respect to personal properties levied upon and sold at auction. Despite
petitioner’s allegations in his Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine
the nature of the same, whether the items were exempt from execution or not, or whether they
belonged to petitioner or to someone else.25

Respondent moved for issuance of a writ of execution on February 17, 2003 while petitioner
filed his opposition on June 23, 2003. The trial court granted the motion on July 16, 2003,
and the writ of execution was issued on August 20, 2003. Clearly, the trial court had enough
time to conduct the crucial inquiry that would have spared petitioner the trouble of having to
seek relief all the way to this Court. Indeed, the trial court’s inaction on petitioner’s plea
resulted in serious injustice to the latter, not to mention that its failure to conduct an inquiry
based on the latter’s claim bordered on gross ignorance of the law.

Being void, the July 16, 2003 Order could not have conferred any right to respondent. Any
writ of execution based on it is likewise void. Although we have held in several cases26 that a
claim for exemption from execution of the family home should be set up and proved before
the sale of the property at public auction, and failure to do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exemption since the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor which must be claimed by the judgment debtor himself at the time of the
levy or within a reasonable period thereafter, the circumstances of the instant case are
different. Petitioner claimed exemption from execution of his family home soon after
respondent filed the motion for issuance of a writ of execution, thus giving notice to the trial
court and respondent that a property exempt from execution may be in danger of being
subjected to levy and sale. Thereupon, the trial court is called to observe the procedure as
herein laid out; on the other hand, the respondent should observe the procedure prescribed in
Article 160 of the Family Code, that is, to obtain an order for the sale on execution of the
petitioner’s family home, if so, and apply the proceeds – less the maximum amount allowed
by law under Article 157 of the Code which should remain with the petitioner for the
rebuilding of his family home – to his judgment credit. Instead, both the trial court and
respondent completely ignored petitioner’s argument that the properties subject of the writ
are exempt from execution.

Indeed, petitioner’s resort to the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals was
belated and without benefit of the requisite motion for reconsideration, however, considering
the gravity of the issue, involving as it does matters that strike at the very heart of that basic
social institution which the State has a constitutional and moral duty to preserve and protect,
as well as petitioner’s constitutional right to abode, all procedural infirmities occasioned upon
this case must take a back seat to the substantive questions which deserve to be answered in
full.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17,

2003 and May 7, 2004 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80315
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 16, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City, Branch 272 in Civil Case No. 95-110-MK, as well as the writ or writs of
execution thus issued in said case, are hereby DECLARED VOID, and all acts proceeding
therefrom and any title obtained by virtue thereof are likewise DECLARED VOID.

The trial court is hereby DIRECTED (1) to conduct a solemn inquiry into the nature of the
real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-105280, with a view toward
determining whether the same is petitioner Albino Josef’s family home, and if so, apply the
pertinent provisions of the Family Code and Rule 39 of the Rules of Court; and (2) to conduct
an inquiry into the ownership of all other properties that were levied upon and sold, with the
aim of determining as well whether these properties are exempt from execution under
existing law.

Respondent Otelio Santos is hereby DIRECTED to hold the abovementioned real and

personal properties, or the proceeds thereof, in trust to await the outcome of the trial court’s
inquiry.

Finally, the trial court is DIRECTED to resolve, with utmost dispatch, Civil Case No. 95-
110-MK within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138961               March 7, 2002

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN
AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 453941 which reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao,
Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to
recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William
Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia,
filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for
compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao"
against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan
and Linda Christina Liyao.2 The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that
petitioner "was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said
William Liyao," petitioner having been "recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime."3

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more
than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with
the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise on December
2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her
subsisting marriage, namely:

Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon
City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate children, Tita
Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita
Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty
Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president,
respectively.

Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature
of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure
his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon
the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde
Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial
Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with
her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food
and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his
confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate.
He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank
and Trust Company4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.5 William Liyao would
bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken
together.6

During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others,
William Liyao and Corazon together with Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao’s
legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio.7 Corazon also presented pictures in
court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various
social gatherings and other important meetings.8 During the occasion of William Liyao’s last
birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly
acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends
and said, "Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son."9 Since birth, Billy
had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or
acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts. William Liyao
supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after
William Liyao’s death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of
his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings,
collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains
where he shared his last moments with Corazon.

Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia
and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and
William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon
Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with
Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other
celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couple’s residence and cook for the family. During
these occasions, she would usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon,
during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her
three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would
often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains
and knew that William Liyao, while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of
grocery supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older
children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyao’s birthday on November 22, 1975
held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present,
including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, "Look, this is my son, very guapo
and healthy."10 He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He
intended to make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian Church
ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since William Liyao passed away on December 2,
1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyao’s funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even
recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph13 as
well as another shirt of lime green14 as belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented
with the following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From William."15 Maurita remembered
having invited the couple during her mother’s birthday where the couple had their pictures
taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still
married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally
separated from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao
with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when
she usually visited Corazon.

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy
is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her
customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazon’s house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the
Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and
even more so when the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At
the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another
miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored.
Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes’ wife and
sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided
Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave
Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon
Yulo although Gloria never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house
where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.

Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the
time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years
old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the latter’s death on
December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enrique’s half brother, Billy.
He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the
office. Enrique’s testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified
that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed
and that the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-
Liyao, were legally married.16 Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo
Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated
legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal
separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and
came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips or for conferences with the
lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at home because of his personal
hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other people’s homes. Linda
described him as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of
success would compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very tough,
strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes
before the fatal attack which led to his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the
office sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in
the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could
not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose
Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred legal
matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was
not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke
during the latter part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3)
days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did not
put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was
not legally separated from her husband and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not
indicate that the couple obtained any annulment17 of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda
chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately
after the death of Linda’s father, Corazon went to Linda’s office for the return of the former’s
alleged investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel of land sold
by Ortigas and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the
company, was able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William
Liyao from the office. There was one instance when she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is
leaving and taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to
the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not
recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown three
(3) large suit cases full of men’s clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts and pajamas.

Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been
separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the
time of her father’s death on December 2, 1975.19 Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-
vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime between
April and May 1974, his speech and hands were affected and he had to stay home for two (2)
to three (3) months under strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were
prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control.20 Tita
Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty
Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any formal demand that
they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William
Liyao. After assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come
across any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as rentals for the
house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs
presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were
displayed at the latter’s office.

The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard
of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he usually reported for work at San
Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 o’clock in the morning. At past 7:00
o’clock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift
driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month
that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the
office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack.
Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter
among which was buying medicine for him like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975,
Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on
the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyao’s breast and decided later to carry and bring him to
the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda
Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.

Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the
Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon
Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at
the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for
sale, represented himself as car dealer.

Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely
relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in
1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latter’s law office. Being the
driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the
group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to
Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers’ wives. During his employment, as driver of
Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for
activities like shopping.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants as follows:

(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the
minor William Liyao, Jr.;

(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
deceased William Liyao;

(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose
L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao,
Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional
rights as such; and

(d) Costs of suit.21

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of
evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was
conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court
observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status
of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth
certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly
and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing
herein petitioner to his legitimate children.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law
favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of
legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between
husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to
Article 255 of the Civil Code." The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some
witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally
married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each other’s company during the
supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court
further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr.
which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the
absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of
said certificates and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of
Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With
regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court
observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for
either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyao’s signature and name do not appear
thereon.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of
issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish
his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have
consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own
legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed
to be legitimate.22 The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a
declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and
the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.23

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently,
may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil
Code24 provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

 1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10)
years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she cohabited with the late William
Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo
when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a
document entitled, "Contract of Separation,"25 executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating
a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in
the future.26

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at
the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for
the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil
Code.27 Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved.28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory.29

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad
litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner
William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is
settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.30 We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear
mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could
impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself
cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn
the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to
be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of
legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption.31

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with
Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of
the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are
allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that
Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time
of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner
himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It
is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.1âwphi1

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by both parties on the petitioner’s claim of alleged filiation with the late William
Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the
petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented by her
mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.

Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply and fill the earth.
Others did not heed the sequence of this command because they multiply first and then go.
Corollarily, it is now commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father
for recognition and support.

The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as follows:

Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty.
Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together. In less that a year's
time, she resigned from her work.

Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor,
met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they renewed acquaintances.
Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than
four years. Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage, they eloped
to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa Apartment, located behind the
Filipinas Telephone Company branch office, of which he is the president and general
manager. He came home to her three or four times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the Filipinas
Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the marketing and paid rentals, lights
and water bills.1 Unable to speak the local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio
with a maid by the name of Nena. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their
expenses at home.

In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by petitioner and they
transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October, 1962, she delivered a still-born female
child at the Manila Sanitarium. The death certificate was signed by petitioner.2 Thereafter,
while they were living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was
born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was recorded as
Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz
Ilano.3 Leoncia submitted receipts issued by the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was
confined there from December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs.
Leoncia Ilano.4

The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in the form of cash
personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (niece of Leoncia)5 or thru
Merceditas herself;6 and sometimes in the form of a check like Manila Banking Corporation
Check No. 81532,7 the signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that
of petitioner because he often gives her checks which he issues at home and saw him sign the
checks.8 Both petitioner and his daughter admitted that the check and the signature are those
of the former.9

During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed
concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods10 as her
parent. Those signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he signed
them in their residence in their presence and of Elynia.11 Since Merceditas started to have
discernment, he was already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy.12 He treated her as a
father would to his child. He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He
would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.13

When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia his
picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards, Temiong."14

In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner.
She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor pains in the morning of December
30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to
inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse
sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in the evening, the
nurse promised to return the following morning for his signature. However, he left an
instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the
following morning.

Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and sometimes with
petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, upon his
instructions to get money as support and sometimes he would send notes of explanation if he
cannot come which she in turn gave to her aunt.15 They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta.
Cruz, Manila in 1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner lived
with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home.

Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship with Leoncia and
Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and signatures opposite column 16 of the
death certificate of a female child surnamed Ilano, although in column 13 thereof opposite
father's name the typewritten name, Artemio G. Ilano, appears. He also denied the following:
all the notes alleged to have been received from him by Elynia for delivery to Leoncia; the
signatures appearing in Merceditas' Report Card; and being the source of a photo of himself
with a handwritten dedication. He admitted that Manila Banking Corporation Check No.
81532 including the signature is his. He was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized
on January 7, 1964.16 He does not understand why this case was filed against him.17

Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for Leoncia, leased it in
his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities therefor. He and Leoncia lived together
and shared the same bed. They later transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway
54, Makati. He stopped visiting her in March or April, 1963 because he planned to get
married with another which he eventually did in September, 1963.

Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes ordered by Melencio
which were received by Leoncia.

Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither has she been
brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite. On December 30, 1963, her father was at their
home because he got sick on December 25, 1963 and was advised to have a complete bed
rest. Her father was hospitalized on January 7, 1964. She denied that her father was at the
Manila Sanitarium on December 30, 1963; that he fetched a certain woman on January 2,
1964, at the Manila Sanitarium because he was at their home at that time; and that her father
lived with a certain woman in 1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time he was living with
them in Imus, Cavite. He was working and reporting to the office everyday and when he goes
to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or brother goes with him.

Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous testimonies about
petitioner's sickness on December 30, 1963 and hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It could
not be true that her husband, during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three (3) times a week with
a certain Leoncia de los Santos because her husband never slept out of their house and that in
his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of the Filipinas Telephone Company he
does not go to Guagua even once a year because they have a branch manager, Melencio
Reyes.

After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties, the trial court was
not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of Merceditas, on the basis of the following:

1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of Merceditas'
conception;

2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia was living, took
care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her;

3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;

4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of Merceditas; and

5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by petitioner to Merceditas.

Thus it rendered judgment on April 24, 1981 dismissing the complaint.18

Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not share the same view
as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and documentary evidenced adduced by private
respondent led respondent court to the firm conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling
her to support. The dispositive portion of its decision dated December 17, 1991 reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and judgment is

hereby rendered declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of defendant ARTEMIO G.
ILANO with all the right appurtenant to such status.

Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in arrears at the rate of

EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a month from the date of the filing of
the complaint on August 16, 1972 up to August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1975 to August 15, 1978; ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August
16, 1978 to August 15, 1981; and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time she reached the age
of majority on December 30, 1984.

Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as

attorney's fees plus the costs.

SO ORDERED.19

The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated February 26, 1992. 20

Hence, the present petition.

We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by respondent court:

1) in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition or of a judgment declaring

petitioner father of Merceditas with finality;

2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for recognition; and

3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established decisions of this Court.

Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed by the trial court,
therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to give support to Merceditas. It would
have been only from the date of the judgment of the trial court that support should have
commenced, if so granted. Under the law in force when the complaint was filed, an
adulterous child cannot maintain an action for compulsory recognition. In order that the birth
certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition, it must be signed by the father. Equivocal
act, such as signing under the caption "parent" in the report card, is not sufficient. Merceditas
has never been to the family home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family;
nor brought around town by him, treated as his child, introduced to other people as his child,
led people to believe that she was part of his family.

The petition utterly lacks merit.

Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who are
conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural,
whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the
time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other
(Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments.21 Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas
was conceived,22 she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil Code provides
that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Article 26923 and other than
natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are
granted in the Civil Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the
transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon
them. They were born with a social handicap and the law should help them to surmount the
disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents.24 However, before Article
287 can be availed of, there must first be a recognition of paternity25 either voluntarily or by
court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a
natural child has no rights from his parents or to their estate because his rights spring not
from the filiation or blood relationship but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In other
words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his
parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as such a
child.26 The relevant law on the matter is Article 283 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child:

(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;

(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;

(3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;

(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is
his father.

While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father to recognize the
child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present case, petitioner is obliged to
recognize Merceditas as his spurious child. This provision should be read in conjunction with
Article 289 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of (other illegitimate)

children . . . under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is likewise our
finding, that private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and the paternity of
petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and
fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak denials of petitioner:

Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's mother and defendant

carried an intimate relations. It nonetheless was not satisfied that defendant is
the father of the plaintiff because it is not convinced that her mother and
defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her conception, and took
into account the testimony of Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the
apartment where Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively testified
that he took care of all the bills and that he shared the same bed with plaintiffs
mother.

The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the apartment at Guagua was
rented by the defendant, and that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee
and godson of the defendant with a monthly salary of P560.00 was a mere
subaltern of the latter, and only frequented the place upon instruction of the
defendant to take care of the needs of the plaintiff.

As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed in an apartment at

the back of the Guagua Telephone System owned by and of which Artemio
was the General Manager (TSN, p. 46, 8/18/73) and Melencio was the Officer-
in-Charge in the absence of Artemio whose residence and main office was in
Cavite. There, for the first time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4,
1/25/74). The apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio. As
Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p. 50, 8/18/73), Artemio
gave Leoncia the instruction to call upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia
needs (TSN, pp. 11-12, 1/25/74). Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the
supplies and services needed in the apartment for which procurement
Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding receipts of payment for
liquidation of cash advances Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or
Leoncia herself, gives to Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32, 8/13/73;
TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).

At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia three of four times a
week and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47, 8/13/73). Artemio was giving Leoncia an
allowance of P700.00 a month (TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73).

Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to commute between

Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962, Artemio transferred Leoncia to Calle
San Juan, Pasay City (TSN, pp. 19-20, 7/18/73) where they were known as
husband and wife (id. p. 41). In leaving Guagua for San Juan, Pasay City,
Leoncia was fetched by Artemio in a car driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11,
Appellant's Brief)

Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to several places

heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued to be a trusted man Friday of
Artemio who would deliver notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-3") and money
from Artemio to Leoncia. For reference, among the notes identified by
Leoncia as having come from defendant were the following:

Exh. "F-1"

"Dear Ne,

Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako ng diferencia sa paa

at ngayon ay masakit pa.

Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka aalis diyan ay si

Miling na lamang ang utusan mo sa Makati kung may kailangan ka dian.

Sgn."

"Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa municipio ng Makati.

Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.

Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay pupunta ako.

Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.

Sgn."

Exh. "F-2"

"Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong ginagawa.

Sgn."

Exh. "F-3"

"Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay pupunta ako diyan

(11:30 am). Wala akong pera ngayon kaya bukas na, sigurado yon.

Sgn."

Exh. "F-4"

"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad gawa ng mataas ang

dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang ako makapunta sa oficena.

Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga, pipilitin kong makarating

dian sa Jueves.

Sgn."

The address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to Leoncia whose
nickname is "Nene" but which Artemio shortens to "Ne". Miling is the
nickname of Melencio. The "Gracing" mentioned in Exh. "F-1" refers to
 Gracia delos Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who was with Artemio when
Leoncia was removed from the hospital during the birth of Merceditas. (pp.
17-19, Appellant's Brief). These tiny bits of evidence when pieced together
ineluctably gives lie to defendants' diversionary defense that it was with
Melencio S. Reyes with whom the mother lived with during her period of
conception.

The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the lover of Leoncia
being in the apartment and sharing the same bedroom and the same bed hardly
inspires belief.

xxx xxx xxx

Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship

between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that of a man Friday although
appellant (sic) would not trust him to the hilt and unwittingly required him to
submit to Leoncia an accounting of his expenditures
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or
Guagua Telephone System which would not have been the case, if it were true
that there was an intimate relationship between him and plaintiff's mother.

Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and Godfather, Melencio

foisted on the court a quo the impression that he was the lover and paramour
of Leoncia but since there was really no such relationship, he could not state
the place in San Juan or Highway 54 where he took Leoncia, nor how long
they stayed there belying his pretense (sic) of an intimate relationship with
plaintiffs mother.27

Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio, respondent court then applied
paragraph (2) of Article 283:

The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as sufficient to

establish that plaintiff was in continuous possession of status of a child in view
of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and sufficient
evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother. The belated
denial of paternity after the action has been filed against the putative father is
not the denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which had already
been recognized by defendant by various positive acts clearly evidencing that
he is plaintiff's father. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It
cannot be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be incompatible with the
stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of which affects public
interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the
revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself (1 Tolentino, pp.
579-580, 1983 Ed.).

To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an

illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession
of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly
and not through other, spontaneously and without concealment though without
publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno,
Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia
vs. Coquia, CA 50, O.G. 3701) There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care. (Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991.)

It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at
the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent
prenatal examination by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they
went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself (id. p. 36).

Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection
on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment
she had always known and called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN, pp. 28-29,
10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes
sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do
for his child — bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can
bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives Merceditas (sic) (TSN,
pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of
Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh.
"E-7" where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a "frog test" to know
the status of Leoncia.

Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas
(sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by
Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" and "E-3",
and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and
sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check
No. 81532 (Exh. "G") and the signature appearing therein which was
identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her
checks and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the
check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check
and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).

During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife,
Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When
Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio
signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the fourth and fifth
grading period(s) (Exh. "H-1" and "H-2") as the parent of Merceditas (sic).
Those signatures of Artemio were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas
(sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and
"H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of
Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). . . .
 xxx xxx xxx

When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, Artemio

gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best
regards, Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp. 19-20, Appellant's Brief)

The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the
totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs
to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio
was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not
appellee's daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment.

It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had

long beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that
defendant, who claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the
father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's signatures and
handwriting.28

Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not sufficient proof of

continuos possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court applied next paragraph
(4) of Article 283:

. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is) too replete with

details that are coherent, logical and natural which cannot be categorized as
mere fabrications of an inventive and malicious mind of which Leoncia de los
Santos was not shown to possess.

The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as
circumstances of plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and
supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the testimonial and documentary
evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may
not be infirmed by his belated denials.

Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's evidence as lacking in

credibility but did not deem as convincing proof that defendant is the father
since the Certificate of Live Birth was not signed by appellee and since the
monthly report card is not sufficient to establish recognition, considering the
denial of the defendant of his signature appearing thereon.

While defendant's signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth,
the evidence indubitably disclose(s) that Leoncia gave birth on December 30,
1963 to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium. Artemio
arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25, 5/17/74). At about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came
(id. p. 26) who made inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The
inquiries were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who heard the
answers of Artemio which the nurse took down in a sheet of paper (id. p. 28).
The inquiries were about the name of the father, mother and child. After the
interview the nurse told them that the information has to be recorded in the
 formal form and has to be signed by Artemio (id. p. 30) but because there is no
office, as it was past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in the morning for
Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to give the
biodata to Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very early the following
morning as in fact Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p. 33).
Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26).
As pointed out in Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:

The ruling in Roces vs.  Local Civil Registrar of Manila (102

Phil. 1050 [1958] and Berciles v.  Government Service
Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984] that if the father did
not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, register, or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it was
Eustaquio himself who went to the municipal building and gave
all the data about his daughter's birth. . . .

. . . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more than sufficient to

establish beyond reasonable doubt that appellee is the father of the plaintiff
Merceditas (sic) Ilano.

As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she
has nevertheless established that status by another method.

What both the trial court and the respondent did not take into account is that
an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed affiliation by "any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the
Civil Code, . . . Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a
judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.29

The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the
other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is
the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When
the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last
paragraph.30 This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the
Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.31

As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child of
petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into
account the following:
 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not
be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. (Article 203,
Family Code of the Philippines.)

The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having
been born on December 30, 1963, was about nine (9) years old at the time and
was already of school age spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month for her
school expenses alone, while defendant was earning about P10,000.00 a
month. She attained the age of majority on December 30, 1984 (Article
234, Supra). She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of
twelve (12) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days, which is hereby
fixed at P800.00 a month for the first three (3) years; and considering the
declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a
graduated increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next three (3) years;
P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3) years; and P1,500.00 a month
for the last three (3) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days until she
attained the age of majority.

This being an action for legal support, the award of attorney's fees is
appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court
deems it just and equitable under the given facts and circumstances that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.32

We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it was arrived at
arbitrarily.

The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost ten years after the
decision of the trial court was rendered does not deserve any consideration because it appears
that it is being raised for the first time in this petition.33

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated February 26, 1992 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-69679 October 18, 1988

VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM, LIM BIAK CHIAO and CALASIAO BIJON

FACTORY, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CONSORCIA FRIANEZA GOLEA,
MARIA FRIANEZA VERGARA, BENEDICTA FRIANEZA MAYUGBA
BONIFACIA FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DOMINGO FRIANEZA namely, DECIDERIA
Q. VDA. DE FRIANEZA FRANCISCO, DONA, VILMA and DECIDERIA, all
surnamed FRIANEZA HEIRS OF DANIEL FRIANEZA namely, ADELA V. VDA. DE
FRIANEZA in her behalf and as Guardian ad litem of Minors, DARLENE, DANIEL
JR., DUSSEL and DAISY GLEN, all surnamed FRIANEZA respondents.

Ethelwoldo R. de Guzman for petitioners.

Tomas B. Tadeo, Sr. for private respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This case involves a contest over the estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat wherein the
protagonists are her sisters and the children of her deceased brothers on one hand, and the
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be her only child.

Petitioners Violeta Cabatbat Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao Bijon
Factory assail the decision dated October 25, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals (AC-G.R. No. CV 67055), which affirmed the trial court's decision finding
that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the off-spring, hence, not a legal heir of the late
Esperanza Cabatbat.

The private respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D-3841), praying for the partition
of the estate of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without issue on April 23, 1977. Part
of her estate was her interest in the business partnership known as Calasiao Bijon Factory,
now in the possession of Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of the spouses
Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.

Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her husband, Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters,
Consorcia Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all surnamed Frianeza and the children of her
deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged
that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza, but was only a ward (ampon) of the
spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood,
without benefit of formal adoption proceedings.

Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation of Violeta to Esperanza Cabatbat were: 1)

the absence of any record that Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital where Violeta
was born and that she gave birth to Violeta on the day the latter was born; 2) the absence of
the birth certificate of Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live births of the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was supposedly
born; 3) certification dated March 9, 1977, of the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal
of the Office of the Civil Registrar General, that his office has no birth record of Violeta
Cabatbat alleged to have been born on May 26, 1948 or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan; 4)
certification dated June 16, 1977 of Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta studied
in the Calasiao Pilot Central School, Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were listed as
her guardians only, not as her parents; 5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she was in the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May 21,1948 to watch a cousin who delivered a child
there and that she became acquianted with a patient named Benita Lastimosa who gave birth
on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew up to be known as Violeta Cabatbat.
Pitted against the evidence of the plaintiffs are the evidence of herein petitioners consisting
of. 1) Violeta Cabatbat's birth record which was filed on June 15,1948 showing that she was
born on May 26, 1948 at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that she is a legitimate child
of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza Cabatbat; 2) testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that
Violeta is his child with the deceased Esperanza Frianeza; 3) testimony of Benita Lastimosa
denying that she delivered a child in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital and that Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is that child; 4) the marriage contract of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao where
Esperanza appeared as the mother of the bride; 5) Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1960, wherein
the vendee Violeta Cabatbat, then a minor, was represented and assisted by her "mother,"
Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat; and 6) another Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 21, 1961,
wherein Violeta Cabatbat was assisted and represented by her "father," Proceso Cabatbat.

Upon the evidence, the trial court held on August 10, 1979 that Violeta Cabatbat is not a
child by nature of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that hence, she is not a
legal heir of the deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Finding that defendant VIOLETA CABATBAT LIM is not a child by

nature of the spouses, decedent Esperanza Frianeza and defendant Proceso
Cabatbat, and not a compulsory heir of the said decedent;

(2) Declaring that the heirs of the decedent are her surviving husband,
defendant Proceso Cabatbat and her sisters, plaintiffs Consorcia MARIA,
BENEDICTA alias JOVITA, and BONIFACIA alias ANASTACIA, all
surnamed FRIANEZA her brothers deceased DANIEL FRIANEZA
represented by his surviving spouse, Adela Vda. de Frianeza, and their
children, Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, all surnamed
FRIANEZA and deceased DOMINGO FRIANEZA represented by his
surviving spouse Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza and their children, Francisco,
Dona, Vilma and Decideria, all surnamed FRIANEZA

(3) Finding that the estate left by the decedent are the thirty properties
enumerated and described at pages 13 to 19 supra and an equity in the
Calasiao Bijon Factory in the sum of P37,961.69 of which P13,221.69 remains
after advances obtained by the deceased during her lifetime and lawful
deductions made after her death;

(4) That of the real properties adverted to above, three-fourth (3/4) pro-
indiviso is the share of defendant Proceso Cabatbat, as the surviving spouse,
one-half (½) as his share of the conjugal estate and one-half (½) of the
remaining one-half as share as heir from his wife (decedent's) estate, while the
remaining one-half (½) of the other half is the group share of the heirs of the
brothers and sisters of his wife and of the children of the latter if deceased,
whose names are already enumerated hereinbefore in the following
proportions: one-sixth (1/6) each pro-indiviso to Consorcia Maria, Benedicta
alias Jovita, and Bonifacia alias Anastacia; one-sixth (1/6) to Adela B. Vda. de
Fraineza Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy Glen, as a group in
representation of deceased brother DANIEL FRIANEZA and one. sixth (1/6)
 to Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and Decideria as a
group in representation of deceased brother DOMINGO FRIANEZA

(5) That of the balance of the equity of the deceased in the CALASIAO
BIJON FACTORY in the sum of P13,221.69, three-fourths (3/4) or P9,916.29
is the share of Proceso Cabatbat as surviving spouse and as heir of his
deceased wife, and the remaining one-fourth (1/4) to the plaintiffs under the
sharing already stated in the preceding paragraph; (a) but because defendant
Proceso Cabatbat has overdrawn his share he is ordered to return to the estate
the sum of P796.34 by depositing the same with the Clark of Court; and (b)
defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, not being an heir, is ordered to return to the
estate the sum of P2,931.13 half of what she and her codefendant Proceso
Cabatbat withdrew from the equity of the deceased under Exhibit 29, receipt
dated April 30, 1977;

(6) Ordering jointly defendant a Proceso Cabatbat and Violeta Cabatbat Lim
to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00, the sum of P4,000.00 from
defendant Proceso Cabatbat and Pl,000.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat
Lim, and litigation expenses in the sum of Pl,000.00 from defendant Proceso
Cabatbat and P200.00 from defendant Violeta Cabatbat Lim, to the plaintiffs,
and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 236-239, Record on Appeal.)

Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the
trial court on October 25, 1984.

A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied by the Intermediate
Appellate Court.

Petitioners have elevated the decision to Us for review on certiorari, alleging that the
Intermediate Appellate Court erred:

1. In finding that petitioner is not the child of Prospers and Esperanza

Cabatbat;

2. In ignoring the provisions of Section 22 of Rule 132, Rules of Court;

3. In not considering the provision of Article 263 of the New Civil Code;

4. In disregarding Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11 of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim

Petitioners' first and fourth assignments of error raise factual issues. The finding of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that Violeta Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is a
factual finding based on the evidence presented at the trial, hence, it is conclusive upon Us.
Well entrenched is the rule that "factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are entitled to great respect" (Vda. de Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC, 144
SCRA 705). Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that: "Where a
private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given" does not apply
to petitioners' Exhibit "5," the supposed birth registry record of defendant Violeta Cabatbat
showing that she was born on May 26,1948, at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital in
Dagupan City, and that her father and mother are Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Frianeza,
respectively. In rejecting that document, the trial court pointedly observed:

This is very strange and odd because the Registry Book of admission of the
hospital does not show that Esperanza Frianeza was ever a patient on May 26,
1948. Indeed, Esperanza Frianeza was never admitted in the hospital as an
obstetrics case before or after May 26, 1948, that is from December 1, 1947 to
June 15, 1948 (Stipulation of Facts, Pre-Trial Order of May 23, 1977, Record
on Appeal, p. 117).

On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged to have
been delivered by Esperanza Frianeza in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital,
the records of the hospital show that only one woman by the same of the
Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to
an illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita Lastimosa as Baby
Girl Lastimosa (Exhibit S. Plaintiffs' Folder of Exhibits, p. 39, Record on
Appeal, pp. 117-118). Furthermore, the record of birth certificates of
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the
birth certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and the only birth certificate in
the file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby
Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita Lastimosa. (pp. 3-4, CA
Decision, pp. 13-14, Record on Appeal.)

Furthermore, the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the Office
of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5.

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal
provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this
is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim
that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is
not the decedent's child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of
the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is affirmed, but
with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the
widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. de Frianeza, who are not legal
heirs of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving
sisters of the deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under
Article 1001 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 9255             February 24 2004

AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF

THEIR FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress

Assembled:

SECTION 1. Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code
of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child."

SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,

proclamations, rules and regulations, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 3. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.