Araneta vs.

Concepcion
Facts:

Luis Araneta filed an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery against his wife Emma. After the issues were joined, Emma filed
an omnibus petition, supported by her Affidavit, to secure custody of their three minor children, a monthly support for herself and said
children, the return of her passport, to enjoin Luis from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her. Luis  opposed the petition,
denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging that Emma had abandoned the children. He prayed that the parties be required to
submit their respective evidence.

Judge Concepcion resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody of the children to Emma and a monthly allowance of P2,300 for
support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, Luis
filed a petition for certiorari against said order and for mandamus to compel the respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence
before deciding the omnibus petition. 

The main reason given by the judge, for refusing Luis’ request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition
contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

“ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.”  (now
Art 58, Family Code)

Issue:

Does the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition preclude
the court from acting on an omnibus petition for support and custody?

Held:

It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation
between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one
another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient,
necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of
the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code, now Art. 49, Family
Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the
courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused.

The rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them
if necessary.

“The practical inquiry in litigation is usually to determine what a particular provision, clause or word means. To answer it one must proceed
as he would with any other composition — construe it with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. A statute is
passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intend. Consequently, each part of section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to confine
interpretation to the one section to be construed.” (Southerland, Statutory Construction section 4703, pp. 336-337.)

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the
policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means
conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should  be allowed that the court may determine which
is best for their custody.

The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of
custody and support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion. The court’s order fixing the  alimony and requiring payment is reversed.
Without costs. (Araneta vs. Hon. Concepcion, G.R. No. L-9667, July 31, 1956)

AQUINO VS QUEZON CITY G.R. No. 137534 March 3, 2006

Tax Delinquency, Notice of Delinquency, Real Property Tax

OCTOBER 6, 2017

FACTS:  

This case involves two petitions for review on certiorari involving the decisions declaring valid the auction sales of two real properties by the
Quezon City Local Gov’t for failure to pay real property taxes.

The first case deals with a lot formerly owned by petitioners Aquino. Petitioners withheld payment of the real property taxes as a form of protest
for the gov’t of then President Marcos. As a result of the nonpayment, the property was sold by the Quezon City local government, through the
Treasurer’s Office, at public auction to private respondent Aida Linao, the highest bidder. Petitioners claimed that they learned of the sale about
2 years later. They fixed as action for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages against the respondents.

The seconds case deals with a property located In Cubao, Quezon City in the name of Solomon Torrado. According to petitioner heirs, Torrado
paid taxes on the improvements on Lot 8 but not on the lot itself because the Treasurer’s Office could not locate the index card for that
property. For failure to pay real property taxes from 1976 to 1982, the City Treasurer sent a Notice of Intent to Sell to Torrado to his address
indicated in the tax register, which simply states as ‘ButuanCity. The notice was returned by reason of ‘Insufficient Address. Next sent was a
Notice of Sale of Delinquent Property. This was sent to the same address and similarly returned unclaimed. Thereafter, a public auction was held
and the lot was sold to Veronica Baluyot, who mortgaged the property to Spouses Uy who then sold it to DNX Corp for failure to pay the
mortgaged debt. Also, a Notice of Sold Property was subsequently sent to Torrado which was returned unclaimed.

ISSUE: 

Was there a failure on the part of the Quezon City Local Gov’t to satisfy the notice requirements before selling the property for tax delinquency?
RULING:  

Definitely, there is no more logical way to construe the whole chapter on ‘Collection of Real Property Tax (Sections 56 to 85) than to stress that
while three methods are provided to enforce collection on real property taxes, a notice of delinquency is a requirement regardless of the
method or methods chosen.

It is incorrect for the respondents to claim that notice of delinquency has limited application only to distraint of personal property. They
mistakenly lumped Section 65 exclusively with Sections 68 to 72 and, in so doing, restricted its application from the other tax remedies. Section
65 is to be construed together with Sections 66 and 78 and all three operate in reference to tax methods in general.

Petitioners are correct in insisting that two notices must be sent to the taxpayer concerned. Nevertheless, respondents still prevail because the
Court is satisfied that the two-notice requirement has been complied with by the Treasurer’s Office.

6.02. Intent ascertained from statute as whole

Aboitiz Shipping of Corp v. Cebu G.R. No. L-14526. March 31, 1965
Facts: Ordinance No.207 was passed by Municipal Board of Cebu, which required ships whose vessels dock at the public wharves of
piers located in the said city, but owned by the national government. The petitioner paid the wharfage charges under protest. Aboitiz
questioned the validity of the ordinance contending that the said ordinance could not have been enacted because the right to collect
wharfage belongs to the national government. As a result of this ordinance, they will be paying twice. The petitioner attacked Sec.
17(w) of the ordinance which states that “charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or
landing places,” questioning the application of the word “public” whether it refers to the ownership of the national government,
provincial, or municipality, because the local legislators  did not make distinction between those owned by the national government
and those owned by the city of Cebu.

Issue: Whether or not the city of Cebu may provide an ordinance charging vessels dock at public wharves of piers located in the said
city but owned by the national government

Held: No.

Ratio: Because Sec 17(w) of the Charter of Cebu would refer only to those public wharves or landing places owned by the City of
Cebu and not those owned by the national government, under the exclusive supervision of Bureau of Customs, Sec. 1142 of Revised
Administrative Code.

StatCon maxim: Legislative intent should accordingly be ascertained from a consideration if the whole context of the statute and not
from an isolated part or particular provision.