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International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, (Vol. 4, pp. 203-210). Valencia, Spain.

ENACTIVISM AS A METHODOLOGY
David A. Reid

Abstract As research is learning, theories for learning and research methodologies

in mathematics education overlap. For the Enactivist Research Group, enactivism is
both the theoretical framework and the methodology for our research. Key ideas such
as autopoesis, structure determinism, structural coupling, and coemergence are used
to make sense of the learning of all participants in research, researchers included.
This paper describes these key ideas and enactivist research methodology in
mathematics education.

Introduction
In his plenary paper at PME-18 John Mason (1994) reminded us of the
interconnection between the theories for learning we employ as psychologists of
mathematics education, and the methodologies we employ as researchers. It is
obvious that this must be the case when we consider that our research is a particular
instance of human learning, and ought to be understood in the same conceptual frame
as that which we use to understand human learning of mathematics. In the following
I describe how the theories of Maturana, Varela, Lakoff, and Johnson (among others)
have informed and defined the research methodology of the Enactivist Research
Group, as a model for enactivist research in mathematics education.

Enactivism, and Experientialism and Embodied Cognition.

While there have been some recent expositions on enactivist theory at PME (Edwards
& Núñez, 1995) and in journals (Davis, 1995) a brief review is in order. Such a
review of an entire theoretical perspective is in many ways a futile endeavor, but I
hope here to touch on those points which are important to the following discussion of
methodology, and to make some connections and contrasts with radical and social
constructivisms.

Many of the ideas of enactivism can be found in the works of Merleau-Ponty

(1962), Wittgenstein (1958), and Bateson (1987), but the first presentation of these
ideas as a general theory for cognition comes in the works of Maturana and
Varela (Maturana, 1987; Maturana & Varela, 1992; Varela, Thompson & Rosch,
1991). They describe and name the key concepts of autopoesis, structure
determinism, structural coupling, and coemergence. These ideas complement the

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experientialism of Lakoff and Johnson to produce a theory for cognition as "the
enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that
a being in the world performs" (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991, p. 9).
The idea of autopoesis will seem familiar to constructivists, especially of the more
radical variety. Autopoesis refers to that property of complex dynamic systems of
spontaneous self-organization. The components of autopoetic systems "must be
dynamically related in a network of ongoing interactions" (Maturana & Varela, 1992,
pp. 43-44). That is, the components interact in ways which are continually changing,
but which at the same time allow for the continuation of interactions so that the
system continues to exist. In addition, the interactions of the components of an
autopoetic system are responsible for the production of the components themselves.
Autopoetic entities come into existence as a result of their own properties, and also
maintain their existence by modifying their own properties.

The problem is how to handle the problem of structural change and to show how
an organism, which exists in a medium and which operates adequately to its
need, can undergo a continuous structural change such that it goes on acting
adequately in its medium, even though the medium is changing. Many names
could be given to this; it could be called learning. (Maturana, 1987, pp. 74-75)

Learning then, for enactivists, is precisely this continual change which allows the
learner to continue to function as an individual in a medium. Some social
constructivists will be pleased to know that any sufficiently complex dynamic system
can be described as autopoetic, and an enactivist description of an individual's
learning could be applied just a well to a community as a whole.
Another idea which will be familiar to constructivists is that of structure
determinism. What an autopoetic entity does is determined by its own structure, not
by an external stimulus, which might trigger some action the structure was
determined to do. There is an important distinction to be made, however, with some
constructivist perspectives. It is not a matter of an individual having a cognitive
structure, which determines how the individual can think, or of there being
conceptual structures which determine what new concepts can develop. The organism
as a whole is its continually changing structure which determines its own actions on
itself and its world. This holistic vision of the cognitive entity is central to the idea of
embodied cognition, described by Lakoff (1987), Johnson (1987), and Edwards &
Núñez (1995).
It is possible, in fact probable according to empirical observation and complexity
theory (Kauffman, 1993, 1995), that autopoetic entities organize themselves into
networks of inter-action. When entities are in such a state, we say they are
structurally coupled.

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 If I have a living system ... then this living system is in a medium with which it
interacts. Its dynamics of state result in interactions with the medium, and the
dynamics of state within the medium result in interactions with the living system.
What happens in interaction? Since this is a structure determined system ... the
medium triggers a change of state in the system, and the system triggers a change
of state in the medium. What change of state? One of those which is permitted
by the structure of the system. (Maturana, 1978, p. 75)

Each acts according to its structures, but those structures are such that actions become
coordinated. From an evolutionary point of view this can be explained by claiming
that organisms which structurally couple are more likely to survive, so such
structures become the most common. Complexity theorists would argue that such
structures are inevitable at certain levels of complexity. In any case, structural
coupling is a integral part of learning, that is the self-modification of autopoetic
entities.
Structural coupling tends to be self-reinforcing, either because of the structures on
the entities involved, or because they form part of an autopoetic entity whose
autopoesis requires maintaining structural coupling among its parts. A favorite
example is the herd of antelope, which leaves a single member behind when it moves
from hilltop to hilltop, to act as a sentry for the herd as a whole. This particular
interaction between that antelope and the herd threatens that individual, but for the
herd as a whole it is a form of structural coupling which allows the continuing
existence of the herd as an autopoetic entity.

Enactivist Methodology
Enactivism, as a methodology, a theory for learning about learning, addresses several
levels of the activity of research. The level most familiar to most of us will be the
interrelationship between researcher and data, in which we find ourselves learning
new things within a context which is partially of our own creation. Enactivism can
also be used to talk about the interrelationships in the research community, in which
we as autopoetic researchers engage with other researchers in ways which preserve
the structural coupling between us. A third level is that of coemergent autopoetic
ideas which live in the medium of our minds, and of which we are emergent
phenomena (as the herd is of the antelope).
A stereotypical image of research is the "experiment" in which we create a
controlled situation, set events in motion, and impartially observe the results.
This stereotype has already been extensively critiqued in the philosophy of science,
so I will restrict myself to describing the enactivist alternative. In all
research we establish a relationship, a structural coupling, with the milieu which
is to be our topic of study. We interact with the people, objects, chemicals, and

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ideas we find there. By so doing we modify the milieu for each of its inhabitants, and
the autopoetic entities in the milieu adapt in ways determined by their structures but
triggered by our presence. At the same time we engage in the process we are there
for, adapting in response to the triggers offered by the milieu. Note that an important
part of our structures are our theories, beliefs, and biases. The changes which can be
triggered in us, that is, what we can learn about the research context, are determined
by our theories, beliefs and biases. What we learn is determined by what we know.
When I refer to the people, objects, chemicals, and ideas in a research situation, I
refer to what is usually considered to be the source of "data" which is then
interpreted. And there is "data" in enactivist research. The data generated in my
research include field notes, video tapes, audio tapes, participants' writings,
transcripts, notes based on viewing video tapes, mathematical activity traces which
summarize the actions in a video taped session, research reports, conference
presentations, and notes from discussions with other researchers. These artifacts can
be lumped together as "data", but at the same time all of them record acts of
interpretation, or a researcher learning in coemergence with a research situation. It
can be said that there is no data, only interpretations and interpretations of
interpretations. This is an important point to keep in mind, although I will be using
"data" and "interpretation" interchangeably in the following, mostly to improve
readability.
As a community, researchers in a field form the context in which their research
occurs. I have to learn in ways which allow me to remain in interrelation with the
participants and other aspects of my own research, and simultaneously in ways which
allow me to remain a member of this research community. This establishes
constraints. There are constraints offered by research data and constraints offered by
the research community. I cannot know that the students I have worked with learn
mathematics by a undertaking a series of gymnastic maneuvers and remain in
interrelation with those students, or my video tapes of them. The "data" forbids some
hypotheses. At the same time I cannot attribute their learning to messages beamed
into their minds from outer space, even thought the data offers nothing to disprove
this possibility, because such a hypothesis would sever my structural coupling with
my research community.
The analysis of data in enactivist research can also be seen as a process of co-
evolution of ideas. Theory and data coemerge in the medium of the researcher. The
necessity of theory to account for data results in a dialogue between theory and data,
with each one affecting the other. As enactivist researchers we attempt to make use
of this interaction to transform the analysis of data into a continual process of change
and encourage this process as the mechanism of our own continuing learning.

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An Example of Enactivist Research
Over the past three years the Enactivist Research Group has been engaged in
exploring enactivism both as a theory for learning and as a research methodology
(Kieren, Gordon Calvert, Reid & Simmt, 1995; Gordon Calvert, Kieren, Reid &
Simmt, 1995; Reid 1995). In doing so we have explored two key features of
enactivist research, the importance of working from and with multiple perspectives,
and the creation of models and theories which are good-enough for, not definitively
of.
Multiple perspectives can refer to many aspects of enactivist research. The most
obvious is the participation of a number of researchers, each with her or his own
agenda, theories, and background. Enactivist research differs from collaborative
research in that there is no common goal or question in which we are all interested
(beyond the general nature of cognition). Particular research interests of the group
include deductive reasoning, conversation, recursive models of understanding, and
mathematical beliefs. At the same time we work with a common collection of data,
about which we each reach conclusions related to our own interests and theories.
These conclusions need not be parts of a single consistent whole. In fact, particular
interpretations might be quite different. While some interpretations are not accepted
by every member of the group, all interpretations must be explicable. That is it must
be possible to explain the conceptual structure in which the interpretation holds, even
to others who may not see the world thorough that conceptual structure. I use the
phrase "multiple consensual contradictory perspectives," where "consensus" is used
to mean the explanation of interpretations in way which make sense to others, to
capture the important features of perspectives in enactivist research.
There are other ways in which multiple perspectives emerge. One is through
multiple revisitations of data which brings a researcher to a situation with new
theories and aims which represent the current structure of an ever changing being.
Another is through the examination of a wide range of data. The aim here is not to
come to some sort of "average" interpretation that somehow captures the common
essence of disparate situations, but rather to see the sense in the range of occurrences,
and the sphere of possibilities involved. A third source of perspectives is the act of
communicating our research to others. By so doing we invite audiences and readers
to engage with us in enactivist research producing their own interpretations of our
ideas and data.
The selection of this wide range of data is not always a matter of planning.
Part of working with the Enactivist Research Group is continually encountering
new situations which occasion reflection and interpretation. For each of us the
data we see is in some ways "found" and made sense of. This aspect of enactivist
research has been called "bricological" (Reid, 1995). Bricological research
combines the flexibility and creativity of bricolage, with an underlying logic of

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inquiry. Bricolage, as it is used in conceptualizing bricological research, favors the
production of complex structures, theories, models, etc. appropriate to research on
complex systems such as human learners and societies. It can be contrasted with a
technological attitude that favors production of lots of results through
straightforward, "clean" techniques. The logic of the bricological methodology
comes from the questions chosen for research, and the theories and models with
which the research begins. These questions, models, and theories reflect expectations
of what might be seen. These expectations correspond to the plastic structure that
determines the actions of an individual in a context. Just as an individual's structure
changes in changing the context, so our expectations change even as we observe,
interview, and analyze according to our expectations.
It is important to note that the theories and models of enactivist research are not
models of. That is to say they do not purport to be representations of an existing
reality. Rather they are theories for; they have a purpose, clarifying our
understanding of the learning of mathematics for example, and it is their usefulness in
terms of that purpose which determines their value. The recursive dynamical models
for understanding, developed by Kieren and Pirie (Kieren, Pirie & Reid, 1994) and
the language for discussing reasoning developed by Reid (1995) are two examples of
theories for.

Conclusion
As researchers we search for understanding of the learning of mathematics, making
use of psychological perspectives, theories for learning, to make sense of what we
see. I have given an example here of how one such perspective acts also to make
sense of what we do. Enactivism, based on an equation of knowing, being and doing,
provides a context in which it is easy to see research about learning as a form of
learning. It is not special in this regard, but I hope that by presenting enactivism as a
methodology I have presented it as a theory for learning better than I might have, and
that by describing that methodology through a theory for learning I have been able to
communicate the spirit of the research that is done by the Enactivist Research Group.

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