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‘lee good. Bu dots a many epee 2 THE COMING OF THE GREAT PURGE seize total power by terrorist action. This was the gist the sere eter irculate by Stali’s feo pty commits in uly 1936" na way the charge was tus. Thte mara conspiracy, I id inception n 1932, andtok fal shape in 1934, twas caetllyorgniced, a sought otal power trough tees setion aginst mich ofthe pat nes leadership. Beyond that pin, fact eaves of and fton begins. Those accused being ringleaders ofthe conpraey—Zinoviev, Kameaev. Trask, an ‘others—were among is intended ics and the one namin the eter asthe ce intended vein Staln—was the archconspiratot The est leer was projective. Through a sls darkly it evealed what happened ‘rom the ume when Stain eame ose himself ete target of plo by 4 ‘multode of masked enemies, he began conspiring agains them. Their conspiracy was Rhona his was ea FE LATE 1932 Soviet Rusia was the scene of conspiracy 10 Ea STALIN IN POWER ‘Conspiracy from Above Alterthe Seventeenth Congress Stalin became more inaeesile han ‘ver inhis establishment on Staraya Square He redoedthe daly contacts ‘ith ficial othe minimum and pent hours alone in his Study, ping back and forth and smoking his pipe. “On sch days it was said in his immediate secretariat tht Stalin was thinking, tht he was working ou new in. And when Sain was thinking, absolute silence was incumBet ‘pon everybody.” "Old Bolshevik infeed that Stalin was nov ying ‘bce wheter fllow Kiros plicy lino that avoredby Kaganovich land Yeshov, Actually, Stalin had akeady chosen his course of ston rd ‘only needed to work ot the inca of implementation ‘A conspiracy fom above has the special resources ofthe citadel of poweraliajs great advantage and sil greater inthe cenlized pole eal onder ofa modem pary-sate. The Seventeenth Congress enkanced ‘he Soviet itadet's valu Sali. tyelded a ew st of pat ules more in keeping wit his neds, a purty hierarchy more in accordance With BS desires, nd. new Party Conta Commision tht he securely controle, approved a reorganization of the Censal Commitce apparatus oa the bass of plan resented by Kaganovieh, The various deparents were ow specialized according branches of the econo}, andeach was made ‘esponsble forall ary activities ints sphere. The nubof power realted the Secret Department, now ealled Special Sector.” Poskeebysev te ‘mained Read of it Each public and regional pry committe: had its own special sector, directly subordinate to and ineammunication withthe msi ‘te. Via Poskeyshey ad his staf, Stalin thus presided over a personal power structure ramified throughout the country. It possessed extensive ‘eronnel les, served asthe main conduc of conde information at ‘ictves, and handled Hason withthe scaity police, No beter ise nen fora conspiracy rom above col have been devised, ‘Whether Sun ook anyone wholly into his coidenc isnt known and may be doubted this was one's conspiracy. Yet, the executor of Is plans had tobe aprized of them by sages, and thee was need for cxzanizatonal assistance outside the party apparatus. Even under ted ‘ection af the specially appointed purge commision, the 1933 purge had ‘beena limite aa. The party coud not be the orga of is own nea a transformation, noe could it handle the ae, nterogatios, ial, ee ‘ition, and repression that would accompany atenoistic purge. Inv ‘ably, Sain ume at this jnetre othe secuty police. “Te police leaders were themselves mostly Olé Bolsheviks and des tind for destruction. But by vine of thet profession, their ined rea ‘Tue Cone oF vie Gast Pune a sso follow odes, and Stalin's ld on Yap, the pie etbiishment ‘eas maipalabl for his conspiatral purposes. Inealy 1984 he invited { gzoupof leading OGPU offeils toa mesting iis ofc. Among those present were Yagods and the Cea! Comite person then in charg of Tsion withthe OGPU, Feldman, Stalin wanted information onthe pice chit’ life-style. How well were they hosed?” Wha Kins of cars were at thei disposal? Did they enjoy the we of good dachas? Bezobracie? [An ‘outagc,”he exclaimed on hearing her answers. The “best sons ofthe Soviet Union must live nz manner biting the importance oftheir work, (One ofthe seps then taken wis the ting of «complex of comfortable dachas apd» spacious clubhouse forthe police oficial exclusive we at the village of Novogorsk near Moscow Sain was seeking wo cement is ties with men on worn he knew he would soon have to rely frextraord ray services. “The longsiling Menchinsky died in May 1938. On 11 July the ress publsheda governmental decree setting upan ll-nion People’s Commis aca of Tteral Affairs (NKVD). Vagos was appoied head of and [aS Agranov and GE. Prokoicy Became his deputies. The OGPU was incorporated int the new commissriat a the Chie! Administration of Intemat Security. Other divisions were GULAG. the malita or regular police fore, the horde gard, internal recrity eres, re department, nd civil registry. The OGPU judicial colleium. which had power of Psing summary death sentences, was abolished. The decree spied that sate security cases would hencefoh be feed tothe cours afer police investigation. Cases of esponage andthe like were to be ied by & tltarycolegim of the Sopeme Count ial, the NKVD woul have ‘Special Board (Oroboe soveshchanle) with ight of administrative, that 's,nonjdica sentencing totems of up ive years of exile, deporaion, ‘orconfinement in bores "The police reorganization was peste tothe pubic asa reform measure made possible by enbanced stability of the regime and the full ompetece of the court stem to decide slate security cases. In fact ‘vast move in Stalin's conspimcy. The provision for teason cases 0 be {deed by a Supreme Cour muta collepium presage the staging of « eres of ean tals before tht colegio under te chairmanship of ‘V.V, Uirkh, deserted a a “army military just" Further, a sate romulgatd in June 1934 introduced the concept of high treason into Soviet legislation asa new rubric covering such previously recognized times av espionage, the divulging of militar or sate secrets, and Hecing ‘Shroa, The sate made these crimes punishable y death ad contained the svagely punitive provision tha family member of service personnel "uly of fleeing abroad were subject oie ton jar sentences i they a STALIN IN POWER should abe he erie a know ofthe intention to commit without rport- ing this the autor, and wo sentences of wp o fv years f inno of such Knowledge.” Stalin was pating high teson on the county's ‘agcnda, apd anticipating cgeumstanes under which Soviet persone would {eel presse o fle abroad, oF not ote hore whem ordered 0 “Another potent washe Special Board, The dere of July dicted the mew commissariat o prepare astute on this organ. Under the tate, issued's November 1934, the Speci! Board was to consis ofthe pple’ commissar schairman, his two depuis, the head of he militia admins tuatlon, the USSR procrator or his depay, and onc of twats. Iwas ‘empowered fo pss adminisuatie seatence on “persons deemed socially dangerous.” No deintion of “scaly dangerous" was given. The sate ‘as not printed in the ate November issue ofthe pennicaly published register of ne aws, along with ter lesa ca ts date, bt in March 193 along with laws passed in early 1985." The delay in publication, undoubtedly detiberate. was probaly modvate by th deste not pa lcize the mission ofthe newly nsttted policy orgum—which tecame instrument of the wholsrale reprise that bepan ater Kiov's death in Decemner 1934 “The Special Board hada tsi ancestor. An insitation ofthe sane same and character existed inthe Rusian Ministy of Internal Affais tnder he last two ars. The statute on "Meases wo Maintain tate Sec rity and Public Trang.” pase in 181 afer the assassination of Tsar ‘Aleander creat an Ose soveshchanie with power of adits tivesenencingo personsto exile fortes of one to ve years, reo ‘ofthe vie-mini of internals a chaiman wo tepresenies of his ministry, and two representatives of the Ministry of Fort, Is det Sioa equ confirmation bythe minister of incr far” The mai mission ofthe aris Special Bord ad bee o send revolonaic n> cle. Stalin's Special Board son aequited similar function, sn some aes ffetng te same people ‘Bur befae the new machinery of repression cou be pu fo work, a {sitieation was needed fo the unleashing of eor- Although Lenin ws Incautous enough to ase the phase “troristic purge.” nothing of that ‘Kind had yet occured inthe party Stalinist preston the Lf, ost bythe claim that “Trotkytam” was alien to olsbevsn, fll short of ‘ight teor.Futrme, te iat fair had dramatized the stength ‘oF the opposion at Politburo level to Blosdshed as 4 means of selling Scores Betcen Bolsheviks. tin needed a pomerfl,poltcally persue ‘Sveexeuse far overcoming this oppesition. ‘German events proved instructive to hima this time. The Reichstag fre ofthe previous year a oon played up inthe Soviet press for what t ‘may have been Nazi-stagd crime followed by leiltion to authorize ‘Tue Comin oF ve Gna Pomc ns summary justice and ensuing terror against Communist and oterlef-wing ‘kmens: On 30 June 1984 Hillr ated agin this time t const is ‘itazoral power by supressing sags, potently unl clement inthe [Nazi movement self, namely the Storm Troops led by Captain Emest Rohm In swift conspiracy fom above that ha the sippon and bsp of the German military leaders, he brought about the weeken masse of ‘Roum and oes on the pretext that they were planing a coup. Then be legalized governnctl terror with 3 one-pargraph la that ea: The measures taken on June 30 and July I and 20 snke down the treasonous tacks are jutiable acs of sel defense by the sate.” Ts tested that ‘the Rotim purge really interes Stalin an that he atentvely rd ll repons oa from Soviet secret agents in Germany." Also that atthe fist Polituro meting after 30 June, he sai “Have you end wha appenet in Gennany? Some fellow maine!) that Hr: Kaos howto a is polite opponents” Although Stali’s interest is understandable, the Rohm purge was as much a model of what be could mot doa twas a source of tsrction To ‘oop down amis party enemies nan openly eros “night of th long knives," as Hier described his weekend operation in Gemany, was out ‘ofthe question fr Stain. Not only did Bolshevik pol clare mile against any sich ston it ws not Stalin's may to act 30. Besides, his {enemies were fr to numerous wo be pt ut ofthe way ina sage limited ‘operation. What he needed was ater, a Soviet equivalent ofthe Rech {ag fire abeinus crime and politically shocking event in which numbers of prominent Ol Bolsheviks could be implicated. One tht pespating ‘event were brought off an emergency leilatve act ini o Hitler's fne-sentence law could clear the way for a widening ae of repression agains party members. The ba te ausins the party 3 then const- {uted would he broken, twas natural fr Saino think of an assassination the precipitating event Not only ha! heated asasinaton his owa, by the ies of Riutin—been on his mind for seme time. Soviet history comaned Suggestive episode that was burned int the memory of Stalin’ poitcal generation: the events of 30 August 1918, when SRe mutdred ths be of ‘the Pevogtad Chea, M.S. Urishy, and ried oil Lenin in Moscow. A sharp itensifcation of the RedTerror ensued then. There was thas precedent for inating a eet of oficial error in respons othe ssa ‘ation ofa ealingBolsevik in Leningrad) and the ates seni tion ofthe supreme leader in Moscow. This patern reappears inthe sre rela eter of July 1986, which accused the inaginary comterrvol tionary onganization of murdering Kirov in Leningrad an planing the murder af Lenin's uccessor in Moseo ‘The eoic of Kirov a the vc was a inevitable asthe decision to 76 STALIN IN POWER, se an ssssinaton the precipitating event. Stain became envious Ios oward his one-time tien, od serious ferences with him oner poi, an eared him as val for party leadership. Forter, no other Teading Communists death by violence woul have so reatasbock effect nd serve so wll 0 jus the leasing of tron. Noe would i have ‘eaped Sais mind tha the Zinovew-Kamenev group, whose past c= ‘ord of opposition and disgrace made it the best possible Old Bolshevik ‘cle wo implicate inthe cme, had foeme adherens in Ziaovev's od Strongeld, Lesingrad “Ivan Vasiivich” and the Bolshevik Grandes Benin procuring the mirderof coma asthe pretext for tro: in purge, i would have been out of character for Stain to ecogeze his ‘riminaity. He had to se himeelf as wie and just leader. In Being an ‘cian, he had to playa erie part Once again, Russian history was ‘ofhlp. I Peter serve him asa role mode! i he pair, the "tere tsa" Ivan Groany, dso inthe Great Purge ‘Wiat were the sources of his postive image of Ivan? One of them vasa book by R. I. Wipper, a professor at Moxcow University. Wipper,| {monarchist then, published a biography of Ivan in 1922 in Moscow. Ie ‘haraeerized Ivan a6 “one ofthe retest diplomats ofl mes" apd said ‘twas forthe good of Russa that he thew off the oligarchy and promoted service nobles of obscure origin thigh places while foriby transplanting tiled mageates to new repions. Thee realy was "prea! plot” hatched hy the Moscow hoyars and Novgorod clergy agains he life of Ian, who therefore “annot be accused of beng oersspicious." As forthe bloody Novgorod evens, cbjecive dacumentay testimony was lacking and be sides the ts was then posing through a very dificult period fie, Suffering from the consciousness of his soation, desert, bis ence. ‘ment by enemies and traitors, and lack of fitful and reliable supporters." ‘The oprichnina was 3 "weapon against Wea0n,”& "progressive inst tion and a "great miliary: admiisrative reform” called forth by the

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