TRANSPO 31 -NAPOCOR VS. CA, Supra.

Service Commission as required by section 16, paragraph h, of the Public

TRANSPO 32
G.R. No. L-5868        December 29, 1953
SANCHO MONTOYA, in his own behalf and as guardian ad litem of the
minors ISMAEL, FELICITAS, DIVINA and NAPOLEON, all surnamed
MONTOYA, petitioners,  interest of the public. In fact, the law requires that, before the approval is
vs.
MARCELINO IGNACIO, respondent.
BAUTISTA, J.:
In the afternoon of January 5, 1949, Tomasita Arca boarded the jeepney
driven by Leonardo de Guzman at Tanza, Cavite in order to go to Cavite City.
She paid the usual fare for the trip. While the jeepney was on its way to its
destination, and at a point between Tanza and Cavite City, somewhere in
barrio Ligton, municipality of Rosario, it collided with a bus of the Luzon Bus
Line causing as a result the death of Tomasita. Tomasita was then a school
teacher of Tanza Elementary School with an annual compensation of P1,320.
Her death left a widower and four minor children. Because of the jeepney's
failure to transport Tomasita safely to her destination and her resultant death,
her widower and children instituted the present action praying that the
defendants, owners of the jeepney, be ordered to pay them an indemnity in the
amount of P31,000.
Defendants, set up as a special defense that the collision between the jeepney
and the bus was investigated by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite
and the result of the investigation was that the one at fault was the driver of
the bus and, as a consequence, said driver was charged with triple homicide
thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Criminal
Case No. 10771). Defendants claim that inasmuch as the present case involves
the same issues as those in the case filed against the driver of the bus, the
same should be held in abeyance until after the final termination of the
criminal case. Defendant Cayetano Tahimik further claims that he is not and
has never been the owner of the jeepney and cannot therefore be held
responsible for the damages cause by it.
Service Law.1awphil.net
There is merit in this contention. The law really requires the approval of the
Public Service Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege
pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate
issued to the grantee. The reason is obvious. Since a franchise is personal in
nature any transfer or lease thereof should be notified to the Public Service
Commission so that the latter may take proper safeguards to protect the
granted, there should be a public hearing, with notice to all interested parties,
in order that the Commission may determine if there are good and reasonable
grounds justifying the transfer or lease of the property covered by the
franchise, or if the sale or lease is detrimental to public interest. Such being
the reason and philosophy behind this requirement, it follows that if the
property covered by the franchise is transferred, or leased to another without
obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding against the Public
Service Commission and in contemplation of law the grantee continues to be
responsible under the franchise in relation to the Commission and to the
public. Since the lease of the jeepney in question was made without such
approval, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that Marcelino Ignacio still
continues to be its operator in contemplation of law, and as such is responsible
for the consequences incident to its operation, one of them being the collision
under consideration.
It may be argued that section 16, paragraph (h) provides in its last part that
"nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the sale, alienation, or
lease by any public utility of any of its property in the ordinary course of
business", which gives the impression that the approval of the Public Service
Commission is but a mere formality which does not affect the effectivity of
the transfer or lease of the property belonging to a public utility. But such
provision only means that even if the approval has not been obtained the
transfer or lease is valid and binding between parties although not effective
against the public and the Public Service Commission. The approval is only
necessary to protect public interest.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. Judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendant Marcelino Ignacio to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of P31,000 as damages, with costs.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the lower court rendered
decision dismissing the case holding that defendants are not liable because it
was not proven that the collision which resulted in the death of Tomasita Arca
was due to the negligence of the driver of the jeepney whose ownership is
attributed to defendants. From this decision plaintiffs have appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision appealed from, but in so doing
predicated its affirmance not on plaintiffs' failure to prove that the collision
was due to the negligence of the driver but on the fact that Marcelino Ignacio
was not the one operating the jeepney but one Leoncio Tahimik who had
leased the jeepney by virtue of a document duly executed by the parties. And
not agreeable to this findings, plaintiffs filed the present petition for review.

In their first assignment of errors, petitioners claim that the lower court erred
in ruling that to maintain an action for damages caused by the breach of a
carrier's obligation to carry a passenger safely to his destination it is necessary
to prove that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of said
carrier in order that liability may attach which, they claim, is contrary to the
ruling of this court in the case of  Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., 46 Off. Gaz.,
pp. 2028-2029. But we notice that while such is the ruling entertained by the
lower court it was not concurred in by the Court of Appeals so much so that it
made an express manifestation that it fully agreed with the theory of
petitioners. The ruling of the court below having been overruled, we see no
reason why the same issue should now be reiterated in this instance.

The second error refers to the person who was actually operating the jeepney
at the time of collision. It is claimed that while Marcelino Ignacio, owner of
the jeepney, has leased the same to one Leoncio Tahimik on June 8, 1948, and
that at the time of collision it was the latter who was actually operating it, the
contract of lease was null and void because it was not approved by the Public

1
TRANSPO 33
G.R. No. 88195-96 January 27, 1994
"Y" TRANSIT CO, INC., petitioner,  claimant cannot be faulted for its failure to have the certificates of
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND
YUJUICO TRANSIT EMPLOYEES UNION (ASSOCIATED LABOR
UNION), MANUEL VILLARTA, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by "Y" Transit Co., Inc. for the
annulment of the decision of the National labor Relations Commission, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order should be as it is hereby REVERSED
reinstating the levy made by the Sheriff on July 13 and 16, 1982.
Accordingly, the sale of the levied properties may proceed pursuant to
existing laws.
SO ORDERED.1
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
In March 1960 and sometime thereafter, Yujuico Transit Co., Inc., mortgaged
ten (10) of its buses to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to
secure a loan in the amount of P2,795,129.36. Thereafter, the Board of
Directors of Yujuico Transit Co., Inc. passed a resolution authorizing its
President, Jesus Yujuico to enter into a dacion en pago arrangement with the
DBP, whereby Jesus Yujuico would transfer to the DBP the Saint Martin
Technical Institute in consideration of the full settlement of the obligations of
three companies, one of which was Yujuico Transit Co, Inc. Accordingly, on
or about October 24, 1978, the transfer of the property was made and DBP
released the mortgages constituted on the buses of Yujuico Transit Co., Inc.
Consequently, the company transferred the ownership of its mortgaged
properties, including the buses, to Jesus Yujuico.
Meanwhile, sometime in June and July 1979, the Yujuico Transit Employees
Union (Associated labor Union) filed two (2) consolidated complaints against
Yujuico Transit Co., Inc. for Unfair Labor Practice and violations of
Presidential Decrees Nos. 525, 1123, 1614 and 851 (non-payment of living
allowances).
On May 21, 1980, Jesus Yujuico sold the subject buses to herein petitioner
"Y" Transit Co., Inc. for P3,485,400.00.
On July 23, 1981, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint for unfair labor practice but holding Yujuico Transit Co., Inc. liable
under the aforementioned Presidential Decrees in the amount of P142,790.49.
On February 9, 1982, a writ of execution for the said amount was issued by
the Labor Arbiter. On June 14, 1982, an alias writ of execution was issued and
levy was made upon the ten (10) buses. Thereafter, "Y" Transit Co., Inc. filed
Affidavits of Third Party Claim.
Private respondents herein opposed the Third party claim on the ground that
the transactions leading to the transfer of the buses to "Y" Transit Co., Inc.
were void because they lacked the approval of the BOT as required by the
Public Service Act. They also argued that the buses were still registered in the
name of Yujuico Transit Co. which was, therefore, still the lawful owner
thereof.
The Labor Arbiter found that "Y" Transit Co., Inc. had valid title to the buses
and that the BOT, by its subsequent acts had approved the transfer. The
decision stated further, thus:
The fact that the registration certificates of most of the vehicles in
question are still in the name of Yujuico Transit Co., Inc. at the time of
the levy on execution does not militate against the claimant. Registration
of a motor vehicle is not the operative act that transfers ownership, unlike
in land registration cases. Furthermore, the evidence shows that the
registration transferred in its own name. Prior to the levy, claimant had
already paid for the transfer fee, the fee for the cancellation of mortgage
and other fees required by the BLT. Moreover, the registration fees of the
vehicles whose last digit of their plate numbers made the vehicles due for
registration were already paid for by the claimant (Exhibits "N" to "N-7").
Therefore, there was already a constructive registration made by the
claimant (Mariano B. Arroyo vs. Maria Corazon Yu de Sane, et al., 54
Phil. 511, 518), sufficient notice to affect the rights of third-parties. It is
now ministerial on the part of the BLT to issue the Registration
Certificates in the name of the claimant, but the same was held in
abeyance pending the computerization of the records of BOT on public
utility vehicles. On all fours is the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Mariano B.  Arroyo vs. Ma. Corazon Yu de Sane, 54 Phil. 511, which
upheld the right of PNB as mortgagee over motorized water vessels as
superior over the rights of a judgment creditor who had already secured a
writ of attachment and execution over the vessels, it appearing that the
delay was caused by the Collector of Custom's uncertainty as to the
necessity of the registration of the vessels. 2
Accordingly, the Third-Party Claim was granted and the release of all the
buses levied for execution was ordered.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter's decision on the ground that
the transfer of the buses lacked the BOT approval. It ordered the reinstatement
of the levy and the auction of properties.
"Y" Transit Co., Inc. thereafter filed this special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying for the issuance of
a Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and for the
annulment of the NLRC decision as it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In this petition, "Y" Transit Co., Inc. raised the following issue, to writ:
I The public respondent NLRC committed palpable legal error and grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it held that
there was no valid transfer of ownership in favor of the petitioner,
completely disregarding the preponderance of evidence and existing
jurisprudence which support the validity of the transfer of ownership to
the petitioner.3
On July 6, 1989, petitioner filed a motion to cite Labor Arbiter Benigno C.
Villarente, Jr. for contempt of court and for the issuance of an order for the
immediate release of the property. Petitioner argues that the Labor Arbiter
refused to release the vehicles levied on June 5, 1989 despite notice that a
TRO has been issued by the Supreme Court; that there was no reason to hold
on to the levy as petitioner had already posted a bond to answer for the
damages and award in the above-entitled case; that the labor arbiter wrongly
required the payment of storage charges and sheriff's fees before releasing the
levied buses.
Did public respondent commit grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the levy
on the buses which have been allegedly transferred to a third party, herein
petitioner "Y" Transit Co., Inc.?
We rule in the negative.
2
The following facts have been established before the NLRC: that the transfer
of ownership from Yujuico Transit Co., Inc. to Jesus Yujuico, and from Jesus
Yujuico to "Y" Transit Co., Inc. lacked the prior approval of the BOT as
required by Section 20 of the Public Service Act;4 that the buses were
transferred to "Y" Transit Co., Inc. during the pendency of the action; and that
until the time of the execution, the buses were still registered in the name of
Yujuico Transit Co., Inc.
In Montoya v. Ignacio,5 we held:
. . . The law really requires the approval of the Public Service
Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto,
may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate issued to the
grantee. The reason is obvious. Since a franchise is personal in nature any
transfer or lease thereof should be notified to the Public Service
Commission so that the latter may take proper safeguards to protect the
interest of the public. In fact, the law requires that, before approval is
granted, there should be a public hearing with notice to all interested
parties in order that the commission may determine if there are good and
reasonable grounds justifying the transfer or lease of the property covered
by the franchise, or if the sale or lease is detrimental to public interest.
Such being the reason and philosophy behind this requirement, it follows
that if the property covered by the franchise is transferred, or leased to
another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer is not
binding against Public Service Commission and in contemplation of law,
the grantee continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to
the Commission and to the public. . . .
auction of the subject properties on May 12, 1989. The sheriff levied on the
properties on June 5, 1989. The Supreme Court issued the Temporary
Restraining Order on June 19, 1989 and this was received by the Labor
Arbiter on June 22, 1989. On June 28, 1989, the Labor Arbiter directed the
sheriff to release the two buses already levied upon by him.
Likewise, we find no error in requiring petitioner to pay the storage fees prior
to the release of the properties. Storage costs are imposed in accordance with
the provisions of Rule IX of the NLRC Manuel of Instructions for Sheriffs, to
wit:
Sec. 3. Storing of Levied Property. — To avoid pilferage of or damage to
levied property, the same shall be inventoried and stored in a bonded
warehouse, wherever available, or in a secured place as may be
determined by the sheriff with notice to and conformity of the losing
party or third party claimant. In case of disagreement, the same shall be
referred to the Labor Arbiter or proper officer who issued the writ of
execution for proper disposition. For this purpose, sheriffs should inform
the Labor Arbiter or proper officer issuing the writ of corresponding
storage fees, furnishing him as well as the parties with a copy of the
inventory. The storage fees shall be shouldered by the losing party.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Motion to Cite Labor Arbiter Benigno Villarente, Jr. is DENIED and
petitioner is ordered to PAY storage costs and sheriff's fees.

It may be argued that Section 16, paragraph (h) provides in its last part This decision is immediately executory.
that "nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the sale,
alienation, or lease by any public utility of any of its property in the
SO ORDERED.
ordinary course of business," which gives the impression that the
approval of Public Service Commission is but a mere formality which
does not affect the effectivity of the transfer or lease of the property
belonging to a public utility. But such provision only means that even if
the approval has not been obtained the transfer or lease is valid and
binding between the parties although not effective against the public and
the Public Service Commission. The approval is only necessary to protect
public interest. (Emphasis ours)

There being no prior BOT approval in the transfer of property from Yujuico
Transit Co., Inc. to Jesus Yujuico, it only follows that as far as the BOT and
third parties are concerned, Yujuico Transit Co., Inc. still owned the
properties. and Yujuico, and later, "Y" Transit Co., Inc. only held the same as
agents of the former. In Tamayo v. Aquino,6 the Supreme Court stated, thus:

. . . In operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved

by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of
the registered owner and should be responsible to him 
(the registered owner) for any damages that he may cause the latter by his
negligence.

Conversely, where the registered owner is liable for obligations to third parties
and vehicles registered under his name are levied upon to satisfy his
obligations, the transferee of such vehicles cannot prevent the levy by
asserting his ownership because as far as the law is concerned, the one in
whose name the vehicle is registered remains to be the owner and the
transferee merely holds the vehicles for the registered owner. Thus, "Y"
Transit Co., Inc. cannot now argue that the buses could not be levied upon to
satisfy the money judgment in favor of herein respondents. However, this
does not deprive the transferee of the right to recover from the registered
owner any damages which may have been incurred by the former since the . . .
transfer or lease is valid and binding between the parties. . . . 7 Thus, had there
been any real contract between "Y" Transit Co., Inc. and Yujuico Transit Co.,
Inc. of "Y" Transit Co., Inc. and Jesus Yujuico regarding the sale or transfer
of the buses, the former may avail of its remedies to recover damages.

Regarding the Motion for Contempt filed by petitioner, we are constrained to

deny the same since the Order to levy upon petitioner's alleged properties was
issued even before the issuance by the Court of a temporary restraining order.
From the records, it appeared that Labor Arbiter Villarente ordered the public

3
TRANSPO 34 – PLDT VS. NTC, Supra.
TRANSPO 35
G.R. No. 141667             July 17, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL
ELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC),petitioner, 
vs.
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
(ICC), respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic, through the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC),
seeks the annulment and setting aside of the Amended Decision1 dated
September 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA), setting aside the orders
dated June 4, 1996 and June 25, 1997 of the NTC insofar as said orders
required respondent International Communications Corporation (ICC) to pay
the amount of P1,190,750.50 by way of permit fee as a condition for the grant
of a provisional authority to operate an international telecommunications
leased circuit service, and the Resolution2 dated January 24, 2000, denying
NTC's motion for reconsideration.
There is no dispute as to the facts:
On April 4, 1995, respondent ICC, holder of a legislative franchise under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7633 to operate domestic telecommunications, filed
with the NTC an application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity to install, operate, and maintain an international
telecommunications leased circuit service between the Philippines and other
countries, and to charge rates therefor, with provisional authority for the
purpose.
In an Order3 dated June 4, 1996, the NTC approved the application for a
provisional authority subject, among others, to the condition:
2. That applicant [ICC] shall pay a permit fee in the amount of
P1,190,750.00, in accordance with section 40(g) of the Public Service
Act,4 as amended;
Respondent ICC filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the Order insofar
as the same required the payment of a permit fee. In a subsequent Order dated
June 25, 1997, the NTC denied the motion.
Therefrom, ICC went to the CA on a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, questioning
the NTC's imposition against it of a permit fee of P1,190,750.50 as a
condition for the grant of the provisional authority applied for.
In its original decision5 dated January 29, 1999, the CA ruled in favor of the
NTC whose challenged orders were sustained, and accordingly denied ICC's
certiorari petition, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. In view thereof,
the assailed orders dated 4 June 1996 and 25 June 1997, requiring the
payment of permit fees in the amount of One Million One Hundred
Ninety Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos (P1,190,750.50)
as a condition for the grant of a Provisional Authority to operate an
International Circuit service, are hereby AFFIRMED. ACCORDINGLY,
the International Communications Corporation is hereby ordered to pay
the amount of One Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty and 50/100 Pesos (P1,190,750.50) to the National
Telecommunications Commission.
SO ORDERED.
In time, ICC moved for a reconsideration. This time, the CA, in its Amended
Decision dated September 30, 1999, reversed itself, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 29 January 1999 including
the imposition by the public respondent of permit fees with respect to
[ICC’s] international leased circuit service is hereby REVERSED.
Judgment is hereby rendered, setting aside the questioned orders dated 04
June 1996 and 25 June 1997, insofar as they impose upon petitioner ICC
the payment of the amount of One Million One Hundred Ninety
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty and Fifty Centavos (P1,190,750.50) by
way of permit fees as a condition for the grant of a provisional authority
to operate an International Leased Circuit Service. No costs.
SO ORDERED. (Word in bracket added).
Petitioner NTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was denied
by the CA in its equally challenged Resolution dated January 24, 2000.
Hence, NTC's present recourse claiming that the CA erred in ruling that:
1. NTC has arrogated upon itself the power to tax an entity;
2. Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act has been amended by Section
5(g) of R.A. 7925;6
3. The imposition of permit fees is no longer authorized by R.A. 7925;
and
4. The imposed permit fee in the amount of P1,190,750.50 for
respondent's provisional authority is exorbitant.
Before addressing the issues raised, we shall first dwell on the procedural
matter raised by respondent ICC, namely, that the present petition should be
dismissed outright for having been filed out of time. It is respondent's posture
that petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed with the CA vis-a-vis the
latter's Amended Decision is a pro forma  motion and, therefore, did not toll
the running of the reglementary period to come to this Court via this petition
for review.
Under Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a recourse to this Court by
way of a petition for review must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of
the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration  filed in due time after
notice of the judgment. While a motion for reconsideration ordinarily tolls the
period for appeal, one that fails to point out the findings or conclusions which
were supposedly contrary to law or the evidence does not have such an effect
on the reglementary period as it is merely a pro forma motion.7
In arguing for the outright dismissal of this petition, respondent ICC claims
that the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner NTC in connection with
the CA’s Amended Decision failed to point out specifically the findings or
conclusions of the CA which were supposedly contrary to law. Respondent
contends that the issues raised by the petitioner in its motion for
reconsideration were mere reiterations of the same issues which had already
been considered and passed upon by the CA when it promulgated its
Amended Decision. On this premise, respondent maintains that petitioner’s
aforementioned motion for reconsideration is a mere pro forma motion that
did not toll the period for filing the present petition.
Under established jurisprudence, the mere fact that a motion for
reconsideration reiterates issues already passed upon by the court does not, by
4
itself, make it a pro forma motion.8 Among the ends to which a motion for
reconsideration is addressed is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is
erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or evidence; and in so doing, the
movant has to dwell of necessity on issues already passed upon. If a motion
for reconsideration may not discuss those issues, the consequence would be
that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing
only motions for reopening and new trial.9
Where there is no apparent intent to employ dilatory tactics, courts should be
slow in declaring outright a motion for reconsideration as pro forma. The
doctrine relating to pro forma motions has a direct bearing upon the movant's
valuable right to appeal. Hence, if petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
indeed pro forma, it would still be in the interest of justice to review the
Amended Decision a quo on the merits, rather than to abort the appeal due to
a technicality, especially where, as here, the industry involved
(telecommunications) is vested with public interest. All the more so given that
the instant petition raises some arguments that are well-worth resolving for
future reference.
This brings us to the substantive merits of the petition.
In its Amended Decision, the CA ruled that petitioner NTC had arrogated
upon itself the power to tax an entity, which it is not authorized to do.
Petitioner disagreed, contending the fee in question is not in the nature of a
tax, but is merely a regulatory measure.
Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act provides:
Sec. 40. The Commission is authorized and ordered to charge and collect
from any public service or applicant, as the case may be, the following
fees as reimbursement of its expenses in the authorization, supervision
and/or regulation of the public services:
xxx       xxx       xxx
g) For each permit, authorizing the increase in equipment, the installation
of new units or authorizing the increase of capacity, or the extension of
means or general extensions in the services, twenty centavos for each one
hundred pesos or fraction of the additional capital necessary to carry out
the permit. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act is not a tax measure but a
simple regulatory provision for the collection of fees imposed pursuant to the
exercise of the State’s police power. A tax is imposed under the taxing power
of government principally for the purpose of raising revenues. The law in
question, however, merely authorizes and requires the collection of fees for
the reimbursement of the Commission's expenses in the authorization,
supervision and/or regulation of public services. There can be no doubt then
that petitioner NTC is authorized to collect such fees. However, the amount
thereof must be reasonably related to the cost of such supervision and/or
regulation.10
Petitioner NTC also assails the CA's ruling that Section 40(g) of the Public
Service Act had been amended by Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7925, which
reads:
Sec. 5. Responsibilities of the National Telecommunications
Commission. - The National Telecommunications Commission
(Commission) shall be the principal administrator of this Act and as such
shall take the necessary measures to implement the policies and
objectives set forth in this Act. Accordingly, in addition to its existing
functions, the Commission shall be responsible for the following:
xxx       xxx       xxx
g) In the exercise of its regulatory powers, continue to impose such fees
and charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable costs and
expenses for the regulation and supervision of the operations of
telecommunications entities. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA ratiocinated that while Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act (CA
146, as amended), supra, allowed NTC to impose fees as reimbursement of its
expenses related to, among other things, the "authorization" of public services,
Section 5(g), above, of R.A. No. 7921 no longer speaks of "authorization" but
only of "regulation" and "supervision." To the CA, the omission by Section
5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 of the word "authorization" found in Section 40(g) of
the Public Service Act, as amended, meant that the fees which NTC may
impose are only for reimbursement of its expenses for regulation and
supervision but no longer for authorization purposes.
We find, however, that NTC is correct in saying that there is no showing of
legislative intent to repeal, even impliedly, Section 40(g), supra, of the Public
Service Act, as amended. An implied repeal is predicated on a substantial
conflict between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and
old laws.11 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible such that they
cannot be made to stand together.12
Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes or
provisions, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of declaring
outright the validity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be
avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to harmonize such statutes or
provisions if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the
handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same
time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the government.
It is this policy the Court will apply in arriving at the interpretation of the laws
and the conclusions that should follow therefrom.13
It is a rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored.
An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent with each other that they cannot co-exist. This is based
on the rationale that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the
judicial function of construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the
place of Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize,
as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor
of their validity and co-existence.14
Here, there does not even appear to be a conflict between Section 40(g) of the
Public Service Act, as amended, and Section 5(g) of R.A. 7925. In fact, the
latter provision directs petitioner NTC to "continue to impose such fees and
charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses for the
regulation and supervision of telecommunications entities." The absence alone
of the word "authorization" in Section 5(g) of R.A. No. 7921 cannot be
construed to mean that petitioner NTC had thus been deprived of the power to
collect such fees. As pointed out by the petitioner, the words "authorization,
supervision and/or regulation" used in Section 40(g) of the Public Service Act
are not distinct and completely separable concepts which may be taken singly
or piecemeal. Taken in their entirety, they are the quintessence of the
Commission's regulatory functions, and must go hand-in-hand with one
another. In petitioner's own words, "[t]he Commission authorizes, supervises
and regulates telecommunications entities and these functions... cannot be
considered singly without destroying the whole concept of the Commission's
regulatory functions."15 Hence, petitioner NTC is correct in asserting that the
passage of R.A. 7925 did not bring with it the abolition of permit fees.
5
However, while petitioner had made some valid points of argument, its
position must, of necessity, crumble on the fourth issue raised in its petition.
Petitioner itself admits that the fees imposed are precisely regulatory and
supervision fees, and not  taxes. This necessarily implies, however, that such
fees must be commensurate to the costs and expenses involved in discharging
its supervisory and regulatory functions. In the words of Section 40(g) of the
Public Service Act itself, the fees and charges which petitioner NTC is
authorized to collect from any public service or applicant are limited to the
"reimbursement of its expenses in the authorization, supervision and/or
regulation of public services." It is difficult to comprehend how the cost of
licensing, regulating, and surveillance could amount to P1,190,750.50. The
CA was correct in finding the amount imposed as permit fee exorbitant and in
complete disregard of the basic limitation that the fee should be at least
approximately commensurate to the expense. Petitioner itself admits that it
had imposed the maximum amount possible under the Public Service Act, as
amended. That is hardly taking into consideration the actual costs of fulfilling
its regulatory and supervisory functions.

Independent of the above, there is one basic consideration for the dismissal of
this petition, about which petitioner NTC did not bother to comment at all. We
refer to the fact that, as respondent ICC aptly observed, the principal ground
given by the CA in striking down the imposition of the P1,190,750.50 fee is
that respondent ICC is entitled to the benefits of the so-called "parity clause"
embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, to wit:

Section 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. -

Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under
existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become
part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such
franchises x x x.

In this connection, it is significant to note that the subsequent congressional

franchise granted to the Domestic Satellite Corporation under Presidential
Decree No. 947, states:

Section 6. In consideration of the franchise and rights hereby granted, the

grantee shall pay to the Republic of the Philippines during the life of this
franchise a tax of one-half percent of gross earnings derived by the
grantee from its operation under this franchise and which originate from
the Philippines. Such tax shall be due and payable annually within ten
days after the audit and approval of the accounts by the Commission on
Audit as prescribed in Section 11 hereof and shall be in lieu of all taxes,
assessments, charges, fees, or levies of any kind, nature, or
description levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial,
or national authority x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The CA was correct in ruling that the above-quoted provision is, by law,
considered as ipso facto part of ICC's franchise due to the "parity clause"
embodied in Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925. Accordingly, respondent ICC
cannot be made subject to the payment of the subject fees because its payment
of the franchise tax is "in lieu" of all other taxes and fees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Amended

Decision and Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

6
TRANSPO 36 – PLDT VS. NTC, Supra. 2. As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered
TRANSPO 37 – BF HOMES VS. MERALCO, Supra. withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered
and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of
Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for
TRANSPO 38
operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of
taxi, to wit: 
G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982
1980 — Model 1974 
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO
CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION
1981 — Model 1975, etc. 
CORPORATION, petitioners, 
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered
BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents. withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each
particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to
the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Transportation Commission. 

This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary

For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators
herein shall immediately be effective in Metro-Manila. Its
of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to
implementation outside Metro- Manila shall be carried out only after the
declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10,
project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the date has
1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52,
been determined by the Board. 1
dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation. 

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of
August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and
Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any
other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement
other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace
said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be
Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of
allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. To quote said
TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public
Circular: 
convenience. 

Pursuant to BOT Memo-Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year models
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public utilities in
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: 
Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered as
automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require any
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of further dropping order from the BOT. 

Old and Dilapidated Taxis  Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having year
models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The following
schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and concerned: 
comfortable units are used as public conveyances; 

WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time Year Automatic Phase-Out Year
and again, complained against, and condemned, the continued operation Model
of old and dilapidated taxis; 
  1980 
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of
comfort, convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and
dilapidated taxis should be adopted;  1974 1981 

WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of 1975 1982 
Transportation, the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi
operator has not only covered the cost of his taxis, but has made 1976 1983
reasonable profit for his investments; 

1977  
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares
that no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in
implementation of the same hereby promulgates the following rules and etc. etc.
regulations: 

Strict compliance here is desired. 2

1. As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are
ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be
registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration
taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and
allowed for operation;  those of model 1974, in 1981. 

7
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the
Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation of this Decree. 
implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models
The Board may also can conferences, require the submission of position
which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other
roadworthy and fit for operation. 
persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or
employ any other suitable means of inquiry. 
On February 16, 1981, petitioners filed before the BOT a "Manifestation and
Urgent Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was
In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process,
heard on February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and
petitioners contend that they were not caged upon to submit their position
documentary evidence, offered the same, and manifested that they would
papers, nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the
submit additional documentary proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March
issuance of the questioned BOT Circular. 
27, 1981 attached to petitioners' pleading entitled, "Manifestation,
Presentation of Additional Evidence and Submission of the Case for
Resolution." 3 It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded
the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information
or data in the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory
On November 28, 1981, petitioners filed before the same Board a
that it should first call a conference or require the submission of position
"Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition"
papers or other documents from operators or persons who may be affected,
praying that the case be resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981
this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is given wide
to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have
discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that
under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs
they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with
are phased-out on January 1, 1982. 
certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry
prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. operators of public conveyances are
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired
case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.  by the BOT. 

On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is
following queries were posed for consideration by this Court:  neither violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon.
Cloribel and Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972): 
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars
in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, Pevious notice and hearing as elements of due process, are
thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property
process?  rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in
consequence of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally
dependent upon a past act or event which has to be established or
B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
ascertained. It is not essential to the validity of general rules or
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or
implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. (Emphasis supplied) 
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to. 

Petitioners further take the position that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is
(1) Equal protection of the law; 
arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon
their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
(2) Substantive due process; and  therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at
the time of registration. As public contend, however, it is impractical to
subject every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible
standard?  collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be
adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:  of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience
shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and
a fair return on investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and
Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power  no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially
considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours
4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process
and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.  has been met. 

Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to
follow in the exercise of its powers: 
Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the
preceding section, the Board shag proceed promptly along the method of
legislative inquiry.  pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion,
may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of
Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway
Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government
office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in
On Equal Protection of the Law: 
Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal
protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only
and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion: 
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules
herein shall immediately be effective in Metro Manila. Its implementation
outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined
by the Board. 4

8
In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the
Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process
of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities. 

The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that
taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to
heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.
Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can
hardly be successfully claimed. 

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the

overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from
the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of
its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all
things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate
property rights. 6 In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7

In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation

services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause
does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies
to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of
classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is
reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real
differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 8 What
is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal
means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be
accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities
imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. 

Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from
any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the
infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and
undeniable. 10

WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby
dismissed. No costs. 

SO ORDERED.

9
TRANSPO 39
G.R. No. 47065             June 26, 1940
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., petitioner, 
vs.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of
transporting passengers in the Province of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a
certain extent, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of
motor vehicles commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by
the former Public Utility Commission in cases Nos. 24948, 30973, 36830,
32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public
Service Commission an application for authorization to operate ten additional
new Brockway trucks (case No. 56641), on the ground that they were needed
to comply with the terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a
result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the decision of
September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's application for increase of
equipment, the Public Service Commission ordered:
Y de acuerdo con que se provee por el articulo 15 de la ley No. 146 del
Commonwealth, tal como ha sido enmendada por el articulo 1 de la Ley
No. 454, por la presente se enmienda las condiciones de los certificados
de convenciencia publica expedidos en los expedientes Nos. 24948,
30973, 36831, 32014 y la authorizacion el el expediente No. 53090, asi
que se consideran incorporadas en los mismos las dos siguientes
condiciones:
Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y authorizacion arriba
mencionados seran validos y subsistentes solamente durante de
veinticinco (25) anos, contados desde la fecha de la promulgacion de esta
decision.
Que la empresa de la solicitante porda ser adquirida por el
Commonwealth de Filipinas o por alguna dependencia del mismo en
cualquier tiempo que lo deseare previo pago del precio d costo de su
equipo util, menos una depreciacion razonable que se ha fijar por la
Comision al tiempo de su adquisicion.
Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing
certificates, the petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Public Service Commission on
November 14, 1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present petition
for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this court praying that an order be
issued directing the secretary of the Public Service Commission to certify
forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that
this court, after hearing, render a decision declaring section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this court
should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is
constitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are
not applicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939.
Stated in the language of the petitioner, it is contended:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission
by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or
rule except the unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission,
constitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its
functions in the premises, and for that reason, the Act, in so far as those
powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and void.
2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
454, is valid delegation of legislative powers, the Public Service
Commission has exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only
to future certificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued
prior to June 8, 1939, when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as
applied by the Commission, violates constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, invoked by the respondent Public Service
Commission in the decision complained of in the present proceedings, reads
as follows:
With the exception to those enumerated in the preceding section, no
public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid
and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as
"certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and
public necessity," as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of
said service and the authorization to do business will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner.
The Commission may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of the
certificate provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be
acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any
instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certificate
shall valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation of any
of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of the
certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the
Commission. 
In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the
equipment, its actual condition, the age of the model, or other
circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken into
consideration.
The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or
amendment of certificates actually force and to those which may
hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itineraries and time
schedules of public services and to authorization to renew and
increase equipment and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as
amended, no public service can operate without a certificate of public
convenience or certificate of convenience and public necessity to the effect
that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business will
"public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under the second
paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public Service Commission may
prescribed the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first paragraph is
that "the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or
by any instrumental thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a
restatement of the principle already embodied in the Constitution, section 6 of
Article XII, which provides that "the State may, in the interest of national
welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation,
transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the Government. "Another condition which the Commission may
prescribed, and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the certificate "shall
be valid only for a definite period of time." As there is a relation between the
first and second paragraphs of said section 15, the two provisions must be read
and interpreted together. That is to say, in issuing a certificate, the
Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation of the service
under said certificate during a definite period fixed therein "will promote the
public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under section 16 (a) of
Commonwealth Act. No. 146 which is a complement of section 15, the
Commission is empowered to issue certificates of public convenience
whenever it "finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner." Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission
under section 15 is inseparable from the certificate itself, said period cannot
be disregarded by the Commission in determining the question whether the
issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner. Conversely, in determining "a definite period of time," the
Commission will be guided by "public interests," the only limitation to its
10
power being that said period shall not exceed fifty years (sec. 16 (a),
Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) We have already
ruled that "public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard.
(People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated June 15,
1938; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, citing New York Central Securities
Corporation vs. U.S.A., 287 U.S. 12, 24, 25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146;
Schenchter Poultry Corporation vs. I.S., 295, 540, 79 Law. ed. 1570, 1585;
Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34 Phil., 697, 711-712.)
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things,
that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years," and
when it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission
may prescribed as a condition for the issuance of a certificate that it "shall be
valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no such
certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National
Assembly meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More
than this, it has thereby also declared its will that the period to be fixed by the
Public Service Commission shall not be longer than fifty years. All that has
been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function,
involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly
having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and
suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly may itself exercise the
function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission
does not make the provision in question constitutionally objectionable.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure
action and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily results
from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and
prevent deposition. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows
the range of governmental action and makes it subject to control by certain
devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative
authority, and from the earliest time American legal authorities have
proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the
legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into
the mass of judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of confusion. One
thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation
of powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest
delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De
Legius et Consuetedinious Angliae, edited by G. E. Woodbine, Yale
University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in
principle in the Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
(People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated
June 12, 1939.) Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the
approval of the practice by the court. (Dillon Catfish Drainage Dist, v. Bank
of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178; State vs. Knox County, 54 S. W.
2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing tendency, this
Court, since the decision in the case of Compañia General de Tabacos de
Filipinas vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioner (34 Phil., 136), relied upon
by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its seal of approval to the
"delegation of greater powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship
Co. vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56
Phil., 446; People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G. R. No. 45655, promulgated
June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal & Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and Hilscher vs. People, G. R. No.
45866, promulgated June 12, 1939.).
Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, the power of the Public Service
Commission to prescribed the conditions "that the service can be acquired by
the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon
payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable," and "that
the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time" is expressly
made applicable "to any extension or amendment of certificates actually in
force" and "to authorizations to renew and increase equipment and
properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the subject and
have found that these conditions were purposely made applicable to existing
certificates of public convenience. The history of Commonwealth Act No. 454
reveals that there was an attempt to suppress, by way of amendment, the
sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite
period of time," but the attempt failed:
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sr. CUENCO. Señor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma pagina,
lineas 23 y 24, pido que se supriman las palabras 'and likewise, that the
certificate shall be valid only for a definite period time.' Esta disposicion
del proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un plazo
de vigencia certificado de conveniencia publica. Todo el mundo sabe que
bo se puede determinar cuando los intereses del servicio publico requiren
la explotacion de un servicio publico y ha de saber la Comision de
Servisios, si en un tiempo determinado, la explotacion de algunos buses
en cierta ruta ya no tiene de ser, sobre todo, si tiene en cuenta; que la
explotacion de los servicios publicos depende de condiciones flutuantes,
asi como del volumen como trafico y de otras condiciones. Ademas, el
servicio publico se concede por la Comision de Servicios Publicos el
interes publico asi lo exige. El interes publico no tiene duracion fija, no es
permanente; es un proceso mas o menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempo.
Se ha acordado eso en el caucus de anoche.
EL PRESIDENTE PRO TEMPORE. ¿Que dice el Comite? 
Sr. ALANO. El Comite siente tener que rechazar esa enmienda, en vista
de que esto certificados de conveniencia publica es igual que la
franquicia: sepuede extender. Si los servicios presentados por la compañia
durante el tiempo de su certificado lo require, puede pedir la extension y
se le extendera; pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un
certificado de conveniencia publica de una manera que podria pasar de
cincuenta anos, porque seria anticonstitucional. 
xxx     xxx     xxx
By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeated. (Sesion de 17 de
mayo de 1939, Asamblea Nacional.)
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing
certificates had been granted before June 8, 1939, the date when
Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth
Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding
them in perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill provided that "no
franchise, privilege, or concession shall be granted to any corporation except
under the conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the Congress of the United States." The Jones Law, incorporating a similar
mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to
any individual, firm, or corporation except under the conditions that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United
States." Lastly, the Constitution of the Philippines provided, in section 8 of
Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual,
firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public
interest so requires." The National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution,
logically succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the power to
amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right granted prior to or after the
approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and
454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has
declared its will and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public
convenience. 
Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities,
being a proper exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only
to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to
those already established and in operation. 
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the
establishment of petitioner's operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not
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 subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes for the regulation (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been
of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As neither notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present
soon as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of established evidence. The Commission appears to have taken advantage of the petitioner
utilities, become at once subject to the police power thus called into to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of twenty-five
operation. Procedures' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 (25) years which might as well be twenty or fifteen or any number of years.
U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v. Railroad This is, to say the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are
Commission, 184 Cal. 737, 195 Pac. 423, 14 A. L. R. 249. The statute is cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation. The right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
'Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes,
statute passed in pursuance of the police power. The only distinction in Morgan v. U.S., (304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129), "the
recognized in the statute between those established before and those liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
established after the passage of the act is in the method of the creation of requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
their operative rights. A certificate of public convenience and necessity it present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
required for any new operation, but no such certificate is required of any he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
transportation company for the operation which was actually carried on in Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 :Law. ed. 1288.)
good faith on May 1, 1917, This distinction in the creation of their In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right
operative rights in no way affects the power of the Commission to to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
supervise and regulate them. Obviously the power of the Commission to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons
hear and dispose of complaints is as effective against companies securing to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without or
their operative rights prior to May 1, 1917, as against those subsequently consideration." While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
securing such right under a certificate of public convenience and decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
necessity. (Motor Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission of California that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
et al., 209 Pac. 586.) nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked.
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more
fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary
Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic
to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a
acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every
limitation upon power.
utility company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines.
(Streator Aqueduct Co. v. et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of a common
carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the
superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When private property is Public Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with law
"affected with a public interest it ceased to be  juris privati only." When, and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest,
he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discounting the use, but so
long as he maintains the use he must submit to control. Indeed, this right of
regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the
state to exercise legislative control over public utilities may be exercised
through boards of commissioners. (Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31
Phil., 1, citing Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg.
Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517; New York
etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol 151 U.S. 556, 571; Connecticut etc. R.
Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs. Kentucky, 161
U.S. 677, 695.) This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded
upon the police power, and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities
are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the protection of the public as well as of
the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional,
either impairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due
process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as
the question whether or not private property shall be devoted to a public and
the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide; and if
he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot complain that it
becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9-
10.) in the light of authorities which hold that a certificate of public
convenience constitutes neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property
right, and is mere license or privilege. (Burgess vs. Mayor & Alderman of
Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs. Commisioners of
Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E. 321;
Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83, 148 N. E. 581; Martz vs. Curtis [J. L.]
Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E. [d] 220; Manila Yellow
Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)

Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional, we are, however, of the opinion that the decision of the Public
Service Commission should be reversed and the case remanded thereto for
further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public Service
Commission has power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or
revoke at any time any certificate issued under the provisions of this Act,
whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate
was issued have been misrepresented or materially changed." (Section 16, par.
[m], Commonwealth Act No. 146.) The petitioner's application here was for
an increase of its equipment to enable it to comply with the conditions of its
certificates of public convenience. On the matter of limitation to twenty five
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TRANSPO 40 – KMU LABOR CENTER VS, GARCIA, Supra.

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